Cruz v Secretary The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

RESOLUTION Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors
filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their
PER CURIAM: earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
Rules). of the Constitution:

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In 1 
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in "(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within
dismissed for lack of merit. ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and "(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that "(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the over the ancestral domains;
petition be granted in part.
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the ancestral lands;
the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples "(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
(Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition. resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter
into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an than 25 years; and
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like "(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed. develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.),
filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral
NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and "(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. 4

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

These provisions are: Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2,
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and series of 1998;
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority
to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands; "(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary "(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
terminates; development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of
indigenous peoples; the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion
sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II,
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples." 5 hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6 constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Petitioners pray for the following: Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and
57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the B. Valenton v. Murciano
petition is DISMISSED.
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. D. The Philippine Constitutions

SO ORDERED. II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

SEPARATE OPINION A. Indigenous Peoples

PUNO, J.: 1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

PRECIS 2. Their Concept of Land

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's
essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2 A. Legislative History

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual,
custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority,
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness
of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in
a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must 1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
come to terms with history."
2. The concept of native title
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it
introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with (a) Cariño v. Insular Government
settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural
resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without (b) Indian Title to land
considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to
interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the (c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting
the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to 3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
This Opinion discusses the following: domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
A. The Laws of the Indies
 C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine "We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in
order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in
ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
natural resources, control and supervision in their development and condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the
exploitation. natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they
now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free
and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of
ancestral domains and is ultra vires. We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b)
the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those
of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of
who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
the 1987 Consitution.
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be
disposed of at our will."4
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of
the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish
Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. 5 Private land titles could only be
Movement. acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant
from the Crown.6
DISCUSSION
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
SYSTEM. deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to
the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
A. The Laws of the Indies amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended
by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the the lands shall revert to the state.
feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal
concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the
Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
following manner:
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his
Murciano.9 name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. 13 For those lands
granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long- also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed,
time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. 14
subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased
the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the
plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the
administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse Crown's instructions:
possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code,
had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the "x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of
State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it. the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether
or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their
the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will
any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others." 15
was it recognized?"
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these
of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of
law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and
Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general
prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the doctrine, the Court stated:
Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754. 11
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
Indias, the court interpreted it as follows: that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his
deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."16
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands
belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force
kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by
not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king prescription, without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those
was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the
been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton
occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or
showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain
possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American
the authorities."12 Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. 30 The
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all
and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public doctrine.31
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; 19 and that the government's
title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization
Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government "Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
and the friar lands.22 minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. 23 After the passage of the 1935 lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations. 24 supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system
under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts
Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of "Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation. 27 not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
D. The Philippine Constitutions beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
conservation of the natural resources of the country. 28 There was an overwhelming
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other - the right to safe and clean air and water;
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the - the right to claim parts of reservations;
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under - the right to resolve conflict;32
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
- the right to ancestral lands which include
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may
be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the concerned;
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date
x x x." of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted
by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It
is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to
IPRA. self-governance and empowerment, 34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to
preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies. 36
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the
of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former
or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. 38
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is
which traces its origin to native title.
granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals by a petition for review.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
- the right to develop lands and natural resources; unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years
- the right to stay in the territories; and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages. 40

- the right in case of displacement; A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural 1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte
1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and the United Nations (UN) Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 42 Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as: 2. In Region III- Aetas.

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of 3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal,
people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of
who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon,
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to 4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan,
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur;
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent Sur.
from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization,
or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of 5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat
present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains
or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga
or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized
del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people
have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership
since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and 8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island;
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and
who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been of Agusan and Bukidnon.
displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains. 9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of
the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the
Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands.
del sur and South Cotabato.
They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,
Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder
early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C. persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders
promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. 55 The oldest known written body of
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are
the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. 56 Whether customary or
rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans,
reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption.
the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by
socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between
influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society. 45 subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed
of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters. 57
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property
cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our in land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The
ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life social order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the
where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. 58 This ancient
and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences. 47 Life was communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of
essentially subsistence but not harsh.48 resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without
sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They usufruct was what regulated the development of lands.59 Marine resources and
had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their
not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land
literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their
see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives. 50 They had their own religion and positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights,
religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the
rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of
and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early survival.61
Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider
the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over
man and the object of nature. 51 territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Subanon.62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao
Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. 52 The territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63
barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred
families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still
chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of
chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however,
executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war. 53 has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land. 64

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive
from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the
fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and
profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were
governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands.
separate communities.66 The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were
naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not
banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process,
collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community. 78 Their own political,
government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. 68 The economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less
fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual
material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the
by the same laws."69 non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally
and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and and vices of the Filipinos.79
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct
their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. 70 With President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7,
the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion,
to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of "In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt
the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North
and civilization.71 American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government
as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72 practices and introduce civilized customs."80

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of
concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in
Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the accord with humanity and with the national conscience." 81
owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives,
and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74 The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-
Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade
classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." 82
into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came
from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they
third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75 passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the
Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a
Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. "special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76 advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau
dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve
Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them. 83 their way of life.90

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as
raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos. the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy
certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land
rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal
permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, Filipinos.92
creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The
law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000
mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their
the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur,
colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take
relationship.85 approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in
Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. 93 Timber
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from
resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment. 94
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in
Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one
system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With of preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino
government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and
peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the
undertaken by the national government in the name of national development. 87 President.95

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision: The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies." 88 their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their
ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural culture distinctly their own.
minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were
referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" 2. Their Concept of Land
culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests"
were to be considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly
the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of
tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and
community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population. 97 The
original lifeways beside the larger community." 89 In short, while still adopting the kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to
their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system.
customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them.
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies
archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked
kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social
structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. 98 A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous
traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law
control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts
to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
generation but the future ones as well.99
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session
stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background
could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related
by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered
its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive
The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging
migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of
for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden
the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed
farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. 102 For the
of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the
Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule,
elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has
rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the
sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by
governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant
the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. 103 Under of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs." 109
Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged
except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
Senator Flavier further declared:
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should
first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no
case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105 "The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared
for the land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had
territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These
territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on
plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and
indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio- defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it;
and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples." 110 "This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications
that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a framework of national unity and development.
bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle
of parens patriae. Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and
ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be
Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters
laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations,
exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where: the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the
mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the
cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
"native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was
cases."111 enunciated in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had
vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes. 115
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705,
P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite
the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued: IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early
years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains
resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs." and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are
defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their
ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent "Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
others, are entitled to the protection of the State. immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112 individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation. 120 This
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto. 121
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators; The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in
Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and
of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." decide in accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, (CALT).124
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated. 125
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government
and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland (1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely Native title is defined as:
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, "Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117 back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." 126
embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that
Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs. way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be
recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall Court held:
recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.128 "It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same
title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is
over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on
lands and are private. one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129 and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide." 137

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice
Insular Government.130 Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives." 138 It was
146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that
had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot of the laws." The court declared:
custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no
document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title "The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the
to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American
government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious
prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one,
his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation 133 was proclaimed over his land and, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first
shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land. 134 exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369,
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is
the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to
appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme Court 135 affirmed the C.F.I. by own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. 136 On one Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard
asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any
never formed part of the public domain. person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only
that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their
regarded as their own."139 own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title,
but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief
The Court went further: the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of
it."
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely
case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
applicant the benefit of the doubt." 140 Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even
without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate.
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as Justice Holmes explained:
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this
title is presumed to "never have been public land." "It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
in the 1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the
discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.144
clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the
land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it
plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as upheld as "native title." It simply said:
owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even "The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his
into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil
Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that
537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and
prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been
overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he
theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his
nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
supplied).141 important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the
Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce." 145
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire x x x.
length of the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native
title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not
University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different
Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation
Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain
and development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
Supreme Court in said case. determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
(b) Indian Title upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons
exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" the different Indian tribes in the United States."153
as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the
American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An
during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use
in reference to native Americans. 149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress,
Provincial Board of Mindoro.150 by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and
prescription.155
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial
governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also
reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of
imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or
escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory
the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. 157 It is a right which exists apart from
upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances
successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession
their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries. 158
roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v.
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United M'Intosh.159
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted,
can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy. In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the
chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer.
United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old
the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new
Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States. 152 world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court,
they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to "It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the
subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.160 The power of acquiring that right."162
exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves
natives, the court further stated that: the universal recognition of this principle. 163

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S.
interpose between them. citizens.164

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was
as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
exclusive title to those who made it. treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the
Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as between the United States government and the Indians as:
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed
and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the "The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign
soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and
all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their protector.
occupancy."161 They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of
the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they
right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed
to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian
claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as
as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects to the laws of a master." 166
subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their
absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
domains. Thus:
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate
a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights,
and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these
acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, possession is not a property right. 173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title
States. rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. 175 It entails
that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and
x x x. customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen. 176 Such
title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal
of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by ownership.177
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily
was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general
on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public
distinct from others." x x x.167 domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set
apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. 180 Once set apart by proper
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees nation's power to dispose of, them. 181
themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land
vested in the government of the United States." 168 claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is
recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee, 169 this title was Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however,
to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians
discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights
land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the
asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically
conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of
could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native
they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves. 170 Americans' ownership of these lands, 186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles
has remained firmly entrenched. 187
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to
the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the
sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and
and the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete
ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the (c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the "Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities,
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of
citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than
domains and lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding cases to support the thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the
concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral
matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Registration Act 496.
Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. 189 The land ceases to be part For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
or completion of the prescribed statutory period. purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the
rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from
grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land the approval of this Act."196
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-
interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and
private property even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh Cho, however, was decided such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the
applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial 197 or for a period
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same
long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or
both for ordinary citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities 195 that Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned
converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
of title. domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
Land is Private.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually- Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain. 198 Its provisions apply to
owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been
the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or
to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit: appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows
registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains
and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and
Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or
has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
land for proper disposition.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or
nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the
October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA. right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time
he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.203
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on
National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public x x x.
domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and
(d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and "Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of
the ICCs/IPs.201 (a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
constitutional mandate. majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral title under the provisions of this Chapter.
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona
specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at
twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse,
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper
or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or
all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines involuntarily.215
ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the
Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the
under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the
of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs
of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the right to themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It
consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
destroy the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing
owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. 208 Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The
lands are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law. limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary
laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus: Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains," 216 the IPRA, by
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has
the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the long existed under customary law.217
material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally
holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil
belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that
likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights." custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. 219 In other
words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the
view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a
ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These communal law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration. 221
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil
Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper
held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a right over
ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
the very community itself.212
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over
property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a the territories identified and delineated."
maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single
instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of
the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs
time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through
perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant
man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. 222 settlers and organizations into their domains;

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall
Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters
and air space;
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved
lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains: and intended for common and public welfare and service;

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof
include: shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of
Justice whenever necessary."
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains; "Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and territories a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP
to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15)
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral years from the date of transfer."
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon
ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually
these rights;"
occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds,
and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of
informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x; displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and
clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote
and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws. the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property this provision, within thirty days from its execution." 223
rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with
the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal,
domains. petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by the State.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these
Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake
Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation. the same in four (4) modes:

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural 1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the 3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The Filipino citizens;
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such 4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by itself,
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production, 224 joint
grant.
venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period
of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
Filipino citizens. the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance
agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale 227 and small-scale
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general equipment."229
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a)
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It
ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these
expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as: provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of
ownership over these resources.
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;" specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general. 232 Nevertheless, to avoid any
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the the 1987 Constitution.
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in
the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other (b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is
natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b)
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as
belonging to the State. "Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied,
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine. uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose
Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional. of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads: participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private,
that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the
and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation
ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the and encroachment upon these rights;"
fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to
recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated enumerates the following rights:
consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, occupied;
waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land. 231 The
 c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of (c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is
the natural resources found therein; Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and
the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; "Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered
into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP
with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights. 233 may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the
ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights'
and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any
the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale
conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the extensive use that require technology other than manual labor. 236 The law recognizes the
purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development
measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period
development of natural resources. of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on
condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of members of the ICCs/IPs.
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in
the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve"
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority
must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws. 234 rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant
of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from chooses.
large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the
third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the
plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the
who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." 235 Section 7 (b) State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the
also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation
very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale. to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly
undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in
the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no
the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co- certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this
oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If consultation process."
the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of
under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
renewable for another 25 years. government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and
domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the
by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project
(2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with granted by any department or government agency.
them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any
allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs. concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by
the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement.
on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie
to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections
choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural
resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and
57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism
land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during
subsistence and survival. the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the
limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights. 238 The rise of
following provision: the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American
Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental fundamental rights and freedoms.
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the
prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine
ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation
Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly
was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the foreign in origin or derivation. 251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted
building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best- in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The
organized indigenous bodies in the world.240 histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture
and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of
This came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The
indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still
together with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation. 241 Indigenous continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly
rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task
become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda. 242 of continuing democratization, 253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, laws in our national legal system.
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for
example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the
Asian Development Bank.244 SEPARATE OPINION

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and KAPUNAN, J.:
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national
unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the
the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International race own the land because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much more man? Man
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247 is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live
human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a grace
Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs …
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and life.
many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. 249 ILO
Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration - Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen,
of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" "Tribal Filipinos" in Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis,
(ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it the World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to
removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in
aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. 1 The presumption is that the
and economic development."250 legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no
further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 2
CONCLUSION
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and construed in view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of
religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the these provisions should take into account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to
the constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples be recognized and (b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
protected.
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of
therefore, their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned livelihood, life-style, etc.);
"Indians" of the United States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand
and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous (d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the
peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main,
promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community realized the preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment
among the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and (e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
most comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
(f) Other relevant facts.6
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among
the rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the
resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of
or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without the free Filipinos who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest
and informed consent of the indigenous peoples. culture.7 Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples,
characterized them as "uncivilized," 8 "backward people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10 and
"a low order of intelligence."11
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now
The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In
employs the politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural
the sense the term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin
communities" as follows:
word indigenus, which means "native."3 "Indigenous" refers to that which originated or
has been produced naturally in a particular land, and has not been introduced from the
outside.4 In international law, the definition of what constitutes "indigenous peoples" Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term "indigenous peoples" has
been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a xxx
working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo: 5
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now prevailing in those territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sections of society and possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs,
are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political,
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures,
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization,
into the present, of one or more of the following factors: or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of
present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
plowing our soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. 18
were the original inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native
culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that
regime,12 these native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands, political power for the common good.
the lands of their forefathers.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our property and its increments.19
national culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial
rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible distinction between the Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities.13 The extant Philippine national applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural
culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, subject to
elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. 14 While the culture of the prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities
majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has retained to their ancestral lands.20
its essentially native character.
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall
twelve million Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. 21
cultural communities,15 accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated
seventy million Filipinos16 in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on
poorest sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among
policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which
them is significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples are also
shall come from such communities.22
among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of
law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any,
voice in national politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation. IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It
provides, among others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development, protect their
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less extent of the ancestral domains.23 Moreover, IPRA enumerates the civil and political
fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people rights of the indigenous peoples; 24 spells out their social and cultural
empowerment and social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors rights;25 acknowledges a general concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title
of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law thereto;26 and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the
several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous President.27
peoples, to wit:
Preliminary Issues
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development. 17
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing. 38 The
order to decide the case.28 proper party requirement is considered as merely procedural, 39 and the Court has ample
discretion with regard thereto. 40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs.
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. 29 The Governor General 41 held:
threshold issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of
judicial review in the present case. x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must
show some personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the
for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
or anticipatory,30 or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest,
problems.31 A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the presence of opposing that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. 42
views or contentions.32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain
unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at
precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi- large, may also be the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled
faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.33 The controversy must that a private citizen may enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined
also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. 34 therein that:

In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law … The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any
has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he
been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different
implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as
adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for distinguished from a private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the
judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would
constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to
domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into maintaining a petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be
motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient granted.43
authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional
process. In Tañada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be
informed of matters of public concern.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the
constitutional questions herein. In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or
consulted on matters of national concern.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced
he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 35 Evidently, and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law."47 Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
citizens, the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance". 36 Yet, in a G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about
the conduct of government and the allocation of power. 37 Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by
petitioners-the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.48 other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.55
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony
is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the
the guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without challenged provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR
distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing
to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They further ask that the
strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the
and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen’s suit. activities pertaining to natural resources.

In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if
a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the
implementation of an unconstitutional statute, 49 and by necessity, he may assail the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the exploration,
validity of a statute appropriating public funds.50 The taxpayer has paid his taxes and development, utilization and conservation of the country’s natural resources.
contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for
proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the the relief sought.
purpose of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 51
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and assumes jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating therein.
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should
manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that "the initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the
amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first
current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a
"ONCC") and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC")," 52 which were procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice.
merged as organic offices of the NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayer’s
suit. This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy. Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction,56 such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, choice of court forum. The resort to this Court’s primary jurisdiction to issue said writs
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation. 57 We
are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with held in People v. Cuaresma58 that:
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
entity or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person be allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
over-crowding of the Court’s docket x x x.59 (Emphasis supplied.) and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
upon the lives not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos
cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of
Substantive Issues ownership60 over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title. 61 The
term "ancestral lands" under the statute refers to lands occupied by individuals,
Primary Issue families and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities, including
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves These lands are required to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or
around the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), through their ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the present". 62 On the
5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the other hand, "ancestral domains" is defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous
Constitution, which states: cultural communities, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and
agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no longer occupied
exclusively by indigenous cultural communities but to which they had traditional access,
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
particularly the home ranges of indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
natural resources therein.63 Again, the same are required to have been "held under a
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
present".64 Under Section 56, property rights within the ancestral domains already
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and respected."
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or ancestral lands, ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the fundamental question is, who, between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the
measure and limit of the grant. rightful owners of these properties?

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation,
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to of the fundamental law.65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is
Filipino citizens. assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations.
Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a
valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.66
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is
public domain and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been
Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following arguments: regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It
has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court. 67
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired
exclusive dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some
contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American
Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish
archipelago. Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land
must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere. 68
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the
the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private King has by virtue of his prerogatives. 70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the
titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property
is the source of any asserted right of ownership in land. or propriedad.71 These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the
sovereign.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists.
However, petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King,
public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them
argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. 72 By fiction of law, the
cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of
lands, and national parks. title, and from him all lands were held.73 The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing
more than a natural fruit of conquest. 74
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral
lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private
was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution. ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular
Government75 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision 76of the pre-war
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
Constitution to protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2, x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like
Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
mandate of Congress. before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x.77 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the
State, petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or
which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since
natural resources. time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception
to the theory of jura regalia.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of
an ancestral land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his
ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as far they could involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to
remember. He also proved that they had all been recognized as owners, the land having private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person.
been passed on by inheritance according to native custom. However, neither he nor his Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed
ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The government opposed never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General’s thesis that native
the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the United title under Cariño applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently,
States Supreme Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
title to their ancestral land. lands, and national parks under the Constitution 82 is irrelevant to the application of
the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of
Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction. 78 We applied the Cariño doctrine
in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,79 where we stated that "[a]ll lands that Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.
were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and
the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time occupation thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never entered into with Portugal,83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the considered as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples.84 The discovery
Spanish conquest."80 and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only members
of the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said continents were
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Cariño was premised deemed sufficient to create title under international law. 85
on the fact that the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription,
having established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did
the property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the not mean that it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws
ancestral land applied for by Cariño was transferred from the State, as original owner, to of Spain, the Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over the
Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands. 86
decreeing "by mere legislative fiat…that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to
[indigenous peoples] without judicial confirmation." 81 In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the
natives of their property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to King to do no harm to the natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the
alienable lands of the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines wrote:
the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging
There is no merit in these contentions. opportunity to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his
written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II
A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could
to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the have been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian,
public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King instructed
ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their
State. Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its persons or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in
possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time friendship and "to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved."
immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in- Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if attacked, the royal
interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of instructions admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might
title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as arouse native hostility.87
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but
land occupancy.88 Thus, the Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the
ownership of lands already held by the natives.89 The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did established social system. x x x
not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June
25, 1880, provided that all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural
their possession by means of adjustment proceedings, 90 and within the period specified. resources that have been found from generation to generation to be critical to the
The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law, survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State. 98
declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but
for which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Stated simply, the Solicitor General’s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles
Maura Law, it was held in the case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not be to land, had the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands,
construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of including ancestral lands and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that
registering such title.91 such a theory would necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested
rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
States, contrary to petitioners’ assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of
Spain, including the latter’s rights over lands of the public domain. 92 Under the Treaty of I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor
Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any
property existing at the time.93 During the American colonial regime, native title to land misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that property and the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for the potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
benefit of the Filipinos.94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley’s State."99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for
Instructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying social welfare and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain,
the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional
rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial government in the construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than
Philippines,95 was that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of
process of law."96 These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed
turn expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, then were extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the
property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural resources [which the State]
domains were firmly established in law. deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence." On the contrary, said
Section restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of existing rights by
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other natural
peoples to their ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions." The
sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935 Constitution." 97 He advances the following "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of
arguments: ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of
the law should be given their ordinary or usual meaning, 100 and the term "existing rights"
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.
restructure the consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the
mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has wrested control of Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely necessary for social welfare Constitution101to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
and existence. It has been held that the State may impair vested rights through a ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under
legitimate exercise of police power. IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the
Congress,102 since such recognition and protection amount to the alienation of lands of
the public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of
the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary such a customary law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the
sense, the term "right" refers to any legally enforceable claim. 103 It is a power, privilege, ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is
faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another. 104 When used in the ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and
relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just and relations arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may
legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it.105 Said provision in the Constitution cannot, by any have a different provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding suggestions
reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of also by way of an amendment.
ownership over such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have
exceeded its constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral lands. MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.

The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would
"provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in be ownership based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision, thinking expressed in the consultation is that this should be codified and should be
does Congress have the power to decide whether ancestral domains shall be private recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the
property or part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the power to determine concept. 106 (Emphasis supplied.)
whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found
therein?
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the
following exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution
did not intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations
property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private
in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in
property, and that customary laws shall merely determine whether such private
terms of the tribal ownership or community ownership or of private ownership within the
ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or
ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
clans within the community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and
Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, is instructive: MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as
ownership by private individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from
either Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State
"CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS will set aside the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the
GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and ancestral domain it could accept more specific ownership in terms of individuals within
extent of the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the the ancestral lands.
extent thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising therefrom. On the
other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis
or relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of supplied.)
the ancestral domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws
and our regular civil laws on property. It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never
expressly mentioned Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to concept of native title to land, or that they were unaware of native title as an exception to
Congress to make the necessary exception to the general law on property relations. the theory of jura regalia.108 The framers of the Constitution, as well as the people
adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the
subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines into MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner
consideration in construing the Constitution. 109 that Filipinos can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms
of the right of a particular person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as
private property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional mandate
and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality. MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110

Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the
development policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean framers of the Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person
"as subject to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
the State ownership of all lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural
resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of
ancestral domains are the property of the State. the indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to
Section 2 of the same Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the State. The
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper,
made in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and the whole Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision.
nationalization of lands of the public domain and natural resources, and is of paramount That construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument. 111
importance to our national economy and patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted the Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands
phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly to prevent the impairment of and other natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof
Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth
lands and ancestral domains, to wit: hereinbefore,112 include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of indigenous
lands. How does this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights? cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1,
say that in cases where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these Article XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural
two have to be respected. inequities and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural
of Baguio City are considered as ancestral lands? resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
one of the publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions;
as ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to and Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to
certain individuals or certain groups. advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.

MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is
ancestral land? the more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is
given prominence as the first objective of national economic development. 114 The framers
of the Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and national development policies and programs," intend to establish a hierarchy of Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the
constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and
Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and
to create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick
balancing of interests: which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or
recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples.
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide’s formulation of the first sentence, he says: Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
"The State, SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind,
tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural important to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the
well-being." There are at least two concepts here which receive different weights very ancestral domains will result during the delineation process. The mere fact that Section
often. They are the concepts of national development policies and programs, and the 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does
rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the
ask: When the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed
concept? I ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply
transgressed in the interest of national development policies and programs. Hence, I because it recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."
would like to know which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national development policies and programs. The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous
peoples’ concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more Civil Law, "ownership" is the "independent and general power of a person over a thing
paramount. The concept introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is for purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby." 122 The civil law
what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests taking into account the specific concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from
needs and the specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its
did so in the autonomous regions.115 (Emphasis supplied.) use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that
which is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over the possession the thing owned. 123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership
natural resources within the ancestral domains. emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal
character of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the destroyed"124 because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not
public domain and other natural resources,116 as well as the State’s full control and merely the individual member.125
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources.117 Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous
(a),118 5,119 and 7120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on
states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, wit:
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." 121 They would have
the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where
natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the we transferred the other provision but here itself -
abdication of State ownership over these resources.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement.
I am not convinced. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural
resources because we all agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the
rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be
exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to
protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be the 1935 Constitution."131 However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that,
done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title
has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim
lawyers or the secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when there are
damages within their ancestral lands. While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of
land by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the
already considered in subsequent sections which we are now looking for. Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The
unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you. underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural
resources from the Spanish regime up to the present. 132 Natural resources, especially
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous minerals, were considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its
people where they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior battles in wars against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over
consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you want minerals wherever these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized
to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that the separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may be found therein. 133
it is already there and I will make sure that they cross check.
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman. its nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s
cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American
citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate
mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land
version you do not have and if you agree we will adopt that. 127 (Emphasis supplied.)
pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from
exploiting minerals within his property.134 Although the United States made a distinction
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples between minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these
over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim minerals was in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution
ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous found it necessary to maintain the State’s ownership over natural resources to insure
peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements their conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the
made by them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which country through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines
enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found would become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal
within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural security and independence. 135
resources.
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in resources in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973 136 and 1987
relation to the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, 128 including the Constitutions.137
preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous
peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains
resources located therein are undertaken.
belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the
NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has the lands and not to the natural resources therein.
not been recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case
of Reavies v. Fianza129 in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has
Section 52[i] provides:
been upheld in this jurisdiction. 130 They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples,
- The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. IPRA necessarily gives them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural
The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and resources, to the prejudice of the State.143
Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of
Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the
government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full
notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed. control and supervision of the State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. This provision,
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and
administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the foregoing are prohibited. The
Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout. 144 No constitutional
Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions
of these areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as
of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned to effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law.145
over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government
agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
such certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer natural resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself
the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law,
as divesting the State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens.146 Further, Section 6,
the natural resources within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to
established doctrine that all natural resources are owned by the State. apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. 147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII
mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not use of marine and fishing resources.148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in
unconstitutional. view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with
the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve pronouncement,149 cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of
the natural resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the utilization of natural resources without the State’s direct participation.
profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources.138 The statute also grants Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration,
them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any development and utilization of the natural resources under existing laws, 150 the State
natural resources within the ancestral domains.139 Before the NCIP can issue a retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale basis 151 or otherwise.
certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the
perfection of any production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources
indigenous peoples concerned must be obtained. 140 In return, the indigenous peoples are under Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under
given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine
or portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation. 141 land be declared as a people’s small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous
peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and mining contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for
dominant role in the utilization of our country’s natural resources. Petitioners, on the mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community
other hand, allege that under the Constitution the exploration, development and concerned153 and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community
utilization of natural resources may only be undertaken by the State, either directly or give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be
indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. 142 To paid to them by the parties to the mining to the contract.154
petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit that by
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from
indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: undertaking activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
"to manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future agreements with private entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as between the State and the
natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous peoples.
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the indigenous peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which upon authority granted by the proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit
they may sustain as a result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the the ownership rights of the State over the natural resources.
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment of these
rights." To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the
utilization of natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7,
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of
7(b) pertains only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of
only to the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore."
purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit. 155 The
exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the entire Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of
process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources which under natural resources within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as
the Constitution belong to the State. well as the traditional activities of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for
the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before any search for or utilization
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the of the natural resources within their ancestral domains is undertaken.
utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does
not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of preference or first In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities,
consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with IPRA requires that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained.
due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area. The State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples in
accordance with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that national development
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character policies and programs should involve a systematic consultation to balance local needs as
in the grant of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by well as national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the
government entities. Several factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the
and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the environment and on the requirements of the region after thorough consultation. 156 To this end, IPRA grants to the
indigenous peoples’ way of life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position to and implementation of any project, government or private, and the right not to be
undertake the required utilization. removed therefrom without their free and prior informed consent. 157 As to non-members,
the prior informed consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State
blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino
natural resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and
existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy,158 the Environmental Impact
owns these resources. System,159 the Local Government Code160 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995161already
require increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous
peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous distinguish.163 What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or
peoples must be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, vested upon its effectivity.
renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any
production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a grant of the power to Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens
control the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but merely the titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes
imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land,
may be adversely affected by the operation of such entities or licensees. whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear
Corollary Issues to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. 164 With regard to ancestral
domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause. community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the
Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon
III of the Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or submission of the final report of the ADO.165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural
protection of the laws." requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and
inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon
submission of a report by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains
petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion
of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process
clause.162 Petitioners’ contention is erroneous. Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP167 and the application of customary law,168 violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads:
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of indigenous peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property rights within the ancestral
claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples, 170 including even disputes between a
domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized
member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in
and protected.
the delineation of ancestral domains.171 Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the
members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a
indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one
their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples who is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a
to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 172
same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such
interpretation is obviously incorrect.
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied
first in disputes involving property, succession and land, 173 and that such laws shall
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples. 174 They assert that "[w]hen the
whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is not],
the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of
and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non- due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what these
indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not customary laws are."175
Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in
the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are
be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the
possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation passed by
ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as Congress.
the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice. Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this
jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence, 179 and it is not contrary to law, public
quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable order or public policy.180 Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the
to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving
procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP. members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the
settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.181
domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII
of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon
of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership the President’s power of control over the Executive Department.
and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is
not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.176 The IPRA prescribes the The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section
application of such customary laws where these present a workable solution acceptable 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that:
to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This interpretation is
supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and
lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary
laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
xxx
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law
shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and
supplied.) implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the
rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the
Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
for purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be carried
domains,177 where all the parties involved are members of indigenous
out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all
peoples,178 specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one
those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of
of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the
the Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.
indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law
is not required.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the (1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5,
President over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of 6, 7, and 8) affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral
the President as "lateral but autonomous...for purposes of policy and program lands and domains by virtue of native title do not diminish the State’s ownership
coordination." of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are
considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain,
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing following the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs. Insular Government;195
Rules characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the
President, such characterization does not remove said body from the President’s control (2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands
and supervision. and other natural resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56,
57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency over the natural resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as
promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and the well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation
recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto. 182 It has been granted thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration, development and
administrative,183 quasi-legislative184 and quasi-judicial powers185 to carry out its mandate. utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the indigenous
The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it impossible to place said agency peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization
entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of
reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent 1991196and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. 197 Moreover, the rights granted to
agency" is defined as an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one indigenous peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral
not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a "subordinate domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them under the
agency" or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or aforesaid laws;
revision.186
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all their ancestral lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons,
instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the
Appeals,187 like those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the ancestral lands and domains;198
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although
independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the (4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions
President" and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power of control and (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others,
supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution 188 with respect to its establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of
performance of administrative functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the
the President’s approval in obtaining loans to finance its projects; 189 (2) it must obtain the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is
President’s approval for any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned
properties in whatever from and from whatever source;190 (3) the NCIP shall submit by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and
annual reports of its operations and achievements to the President, and advise the latter
on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples;191 and (4) it shall exercise such other (5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an
powers as may be directed by the President. 192 The President is also given the power to independent agency under the Office of the President does not infringe upon the
appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP193 as well as to remove them from office for President’s power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community. 194 since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP
under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and
To recapitulate: supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned,
 the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the [J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to
SEC. satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition. suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.

SEPARATE OPINION That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
MENDOZA, J.: corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the
opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not
complain of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual
right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches
the plea that the questions raised are of "transcendental importance." of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court,
as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to
rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and
assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary
controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the
to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of
to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
wrongs.1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a property right of
petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand compensation
for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in
what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a
we render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not
actual litigation will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities
legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as
expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question. 2 applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of
expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution
far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not
to determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
possible.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive
departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies.
No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not
keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all cases. . . ." only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or
hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather than experience.
Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has
questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into
been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the
the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated,
judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from
cannot take place in a vacuum.
invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases
even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners will be a "galling cop out"4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this
isolationism."5 To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or
Court, adopting the submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of
a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to hold
its jurisdiction in such cases:
that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace of For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie,
because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the
United States Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the
court’s jurisdiction is mainly appellate.
Footnotes
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial
review, and so that there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country 1
 Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII, §1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result
either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking
and legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the decisions 7 of this
2
 Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).
Court.
3
 42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy
is not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of
4
 Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.
government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law,
are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by 5
 Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.
Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of 6
 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota, presented."8 For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last  Occeña v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104
7

resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy SCRA 1 (1981); Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 59 (1981).
between individuals.9 Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the
constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every 8
 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
statute, must be accorded to it.
9
 Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education,
Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor 97 Phil. 806 (1955).
General,10 reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right
and the object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are 10
 16 Phil. 366 (1913).
regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of
11
 136 SCRA 27 (1985).
the laws." On the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to
bring these proceedings.12
12
 Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.

In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel

13
 Supra note 10.
the Governor General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do
so. The ruling was that he did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although
mandamus was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
bring the suit, because the public has a right to know and the failure of respondents to
publish all decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed
petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what
public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them
except in general and in common with other citizens.
 SEPARATE OPINION domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural
(Concurring and Dissenting) resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.

PANGANIBAN, J.: Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in
life, Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be
handling of the procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and
have shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two constitutional questions the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of
of transcendental importance,1 which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the
by the highest court of the land. 2 Further, I am satisfied that the various aspects of this nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades
controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by the parties. Moreover, the repository of the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the Philippines.
prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies 3 to address the problems raised by
petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral The Constitution Is a Compact
arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a
galling copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds. My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all
other laws must conform.5 It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework the principles upon which the State and the government are founded. 6 Having the status
of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just
With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’s resolution of the two main for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact
substantive issues, which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain
Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act manner.7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos
(IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as - to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is
exempt from its compass.
1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public
domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the
respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of
not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of development."8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions
the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people. that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority.
As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions
Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural wealth. contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's property regime.

2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be
"exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources," which the Alienated or Ceded
Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the
State." Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the
"conquest" of our country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain.
communities’ right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions The King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all
of this Constitution."4 I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous our lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources. By royal decrees, though,
peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public private ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed; or
(2) ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be
obtained by prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
meant the abandonment or waiver of ownership claims. than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United
States. The latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of
property rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the "free and corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
open x x x exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
are found."10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents. management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
crafted and ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources.11 Although respecting Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might be entitled to "SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads: mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen,
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license, may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for measure and limit of the grant.
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial "The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8
and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state: "The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or "The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State’s
development and use of local scientific and technical resources. implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned
have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution." In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in
private land, the State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not be used
impelled by the desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos by any private person, including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would
themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers decided impede the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled to just compensation for the
to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation loss sustained.
of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in
support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows: "[T]he natural resources, In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim
particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged holders and patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
not only to the generation then but also to the succeeding generation and consequently located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to
should be conserved for them."12 comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or
a waiver of the claim.
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all
forces of energy and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political
Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural resources. Their history cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted only to perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by
Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The present conceding the nation’s resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more
Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not
control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their
expressly states that only agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It
quote below the relevant provision:13 would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and,
consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of not grant ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for ancestral lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain." 16 I say,
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, however, that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x." provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it
declares that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all State"; and "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
ancestral domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these be alienated."
properties - including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are
private and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged to As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 17 the Court declared as belonging to the public
the indigenous people’s ancestors since time immemorial. domain all lands not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under
laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).
Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the
1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor
ICCs/IPs from that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They the solicitor general’s following statements:
maintain that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a
fair synthesis of these refers to ‘x x x the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control "3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of
x x x, a collective right to freely use the particular territory x x x [in] the concept of law involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is
trusteeship.'" to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions
do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that Constitution states that ‘with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
preserves the property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
of its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however, alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that
still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its ‘with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of alienated’."
private respondents’ claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and equality.
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and incapable of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the
lands to the pre-Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such defense of indefeasiblity of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not
lands and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such
agriculture-based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups’ land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land
ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within. being void ab initio."

In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains
ancestral domains, then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution
is IPRA’s Section 5719- without the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) - The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the
insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very
natural resources within ancestral domains. wordings of the law belies this statement.

The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally
must fail. Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs,
the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
create exceptions to them. immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x bodies of water, mineral and other natural
In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government20 has been modified or resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)
superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as
referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs
must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to encompass the natural resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition
the natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above. and protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.

Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that
down after our three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority ancestral domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all
member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c).22 The reason was that the generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law
declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources found therein, In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral
are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest domains, with no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory
ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means directly contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards
that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the
not indigenous can never own any part thereof. land.31

On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371
occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial x x x, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, x x x Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more
including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, than 12 hectares of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant.
swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the right of ownership More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership need not be by
virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial. RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In
fact, by their mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by
Constitution, more specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
domain, minerals and natural resources – none of which, except agricultural lands, can immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
be alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
purposes by a positive act of the government.26 Mere possession or utilization thereof, cultivators."
however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties. 27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration they have used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to back to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and
be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing use enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If
by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land,
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private
information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property.
property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and
compounded or consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what
title."28
their forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our country." 32 They trace
their right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that have become part of Mindanao.
are merely definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral lands. 33
of the law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word
group."29 It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined. 30 Thus, after
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various
defining a term as encompassing several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same
ICCs/IPs as ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral
term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated items in its
lands.34 Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral
definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law. In
domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the
other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources
30 million hectares of land in the country.35 This means that four fifths of its natural
found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it
resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million
means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.
Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the
overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining. These figures indicate a 2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants
violation of the constitutional principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth" among Filipinos. 3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies
and other forms of exaction
RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources 4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in
the settlements of disputes over their rights and claims
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and 5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of
supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses
enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. 37 Such agreements, 6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces
however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and against their will
conditions as may be provided by law.
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of or, at least, no longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the
ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found within their territories are concerned. two major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand,
Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those
natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the whose rights may have been injured by specific provisions of RA 8371.
utilization thereof.38 And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-
ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like
Epilogue
period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and
utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. "SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well
contravention of our most fundamental law. being.

I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
utilization of natural resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."
objection. These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution. Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of
ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 – policies and programs.
(1) ownership of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2)
the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and utilization of such resources – I Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society.
believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought This does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the
up: Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving
them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains.41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth
domains amounts to undue deprivation of private property to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by
our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of
the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively

mandating "reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so
at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced
generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil
to a conflagration of national proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to
coddle the few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society
be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can
the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of
opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from
exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice – empowering and
enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the
blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and

to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and
related provisions of RA 8371.
 United States Supreme Court and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as
owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his
father, in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had
CARINO v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894, and again in
ISLANDS(1909) 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in
force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that
No. 72 lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a
sanatorium, etc., had been designated,-a purpose that has been carried out
Argued: January 13, 1909Decided: February 23, 1909 by the Philippine government and the United States. In 1901 the plaintiff filed
a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were
[212 U.S. 449, 450]   Messrs.
Frederic R. Coudert, Howard Thayer Kingsbury, registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory title,
Charles C. Cohn, D. R. Williams, and Paul Fuller for plaintiff in error. it is said.

[212 U.S. 449, 453]   Solicitor General Hoyt and Paul Charlton for defendant in Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The
error. government has spent some energy in maintaining that this case should have
been brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We are of opinion,
[212 U.S. 449, 455]   however, that the mode adopted was right. The proceeding for registration is
likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle. It is a
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens act, such as was
discussed in Tyler v. Registration Ct. Judges, 175 Mass. 71, 51 L.R.A. 433,
This was an application to the Philippine court of land registration for the 55 N. E. 812. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an assertion of legal
registration of certain land. The application was granted by the court on title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of error
March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the court of first instance of the is the general method of bringing cases to this court, an appeal the exception,
province of Benguet, on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not applying the general
on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken possession rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U.S. 47, 65 , 33 S. L. ed. 805, 812, 10
of the property for public and military purposes. The court of first instance Sup. Ct. Rep. 478; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U.S. 478 , 40 L. ed. 1044, 16 Sup.
found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This Ct. Rep. 871; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia ( Metropolitan R. Co.
judgment was affirmed by the supreme court (7 Philippine, 132 ), and the v. Macfarland) 195 U.S. 322 , 49 L. ed. 219, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28. [212 U.S. 449,
case then was brought here by writ of error. 457]   Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is
suggested that, even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered,
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an because the Philippine Commission's act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the
Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty province of Benguet among others from its operation. But that act deals with
years before the treaty of [212 U.S. 449, 456]   Paris, April 11, 1899 [30 Stat. at the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the
L. 1754], as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that
held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine
maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom Commission's act No. 496, of 1902, which established a court for that
of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier purpose with jurisdiction 'throughout the Philippine archipelago,' 2, and
date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to
own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is entitled to trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to
registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained. that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an
important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below,- which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to
namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, enforce.
shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in
the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race
that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was
the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
became, if it was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny
the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the
government is bound to respect. internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the organic act of July 1, 1902, chap.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far 1369, 12, 32 Stat. at L. 691, all the property and rights acquired there by
correct that the Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date the [212 U.S. 449, 459]   United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of
of the treaty of Paris, to which the United States succeeded, it is not to be the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus
assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is true that assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its
Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution,
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no
accorded to those [212 U.S. 449, 458]   in the same zone of civilization with law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
themselves. It is true, also, that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein
that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain the equal protection of the laws.' 5. In the light of the declaration that we have
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the quoted from 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such declare in the next breath that 'any person' did not embrace the inhabitants of
power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, Benguet, or that it meant by 'property' only that which had become such by
and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom
recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide. and by long association,-one of the profoundest factors in human thought,-
regarded as their own.
The province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in
his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under It is true that, by 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact
the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but
not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that not all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives
province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the for not more than 16 hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native
Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be
Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be
that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such
circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the
owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that
every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond
all the wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the this recognition in their books.
provision that we have quoted as to the administration of the property and
rights acquired by the United States, such land and property as shall be Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited
designated by the President for military or other reser- [212 U.S. 449, in 3 Philippine, 546: 'Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
460]   vations, as this land since has been. But there still remains the question deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
what property and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired. valid title by prescription.' It may be that this means possession from before
1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no
than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the
be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for
a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority; but
give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those who
the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For
examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated,
law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into effect, the applicant's father
was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is said, the
the power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings
yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one 'for the benefit of the that it described, and in that way to require every one to get a document of
inhabitants thereof.' title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it does not
appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover been made 'for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not individuals.' (We follow the translation in the government's brief.) It does not
own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6 it
for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were is provided that 'interested parties not included within the two preceding [212
recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other U.S. 449, 462]   articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the years] may legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership
Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in
title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a the following manner.' This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those
contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine, 537, while it declared already to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case
commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are unlawfully
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the treasury 'will
justa prescripcion. It is true that it [212 U.S. 449, 461]   begins by the reassert the ownership of the state over the lands,' and will sell at auction
such part as it does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not unlawful, practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through
and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural construction of the decree is
confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts forward as a Judgment reversed.
reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition of almost all property
in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general rules, on the
principle that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession;
recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree;
and then suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may
legalize their possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain
price.

It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the
argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be
that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under
the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind
of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if
he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called
upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. [212 U.S. 449, 463]   The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February
13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the
decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be
construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter
of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the
court of land registration for another recognition of the common-law
prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law
present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legal
tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible
effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the
whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
G.R. No. 5246           September 16, 1910 motion, and which, according to his allegations, are included in the lands decreed to the
petitioners. He alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He
vs. further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee. inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the
same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration
Ramon Salinas, for appellants. Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee. exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon this
motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both
parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying the former
TRENT, J.:
decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla
de la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist,
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case and modifying its decree dated the
only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said decree was not obtained by means of
Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to fraud; and, second, that the court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described
Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her in the appellee's motion are not their property.
husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the following-
described property:
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of the land
described in the petition and were included in the decree of February 12, 1908, and that
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, the petitioners are the owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree.
Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses and one camarin of
light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares;
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including
bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of
the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document
Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo,
dated the 26th of November, 1864, duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde
Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on
mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; and on the west by
the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, Jose
Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo. Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant
for several parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly
inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is
assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the 18th of
December, 1906, was accompanied by a plan and technical description of the above- It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the
described parcel of land. appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that
the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said
two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a
tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their petition, as an occupant,
decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926,
while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the absolute
directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four
owner under the estate grant by inheritance.
petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of
Remedios Grey.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of
the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land
of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section
Registration asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground
that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land which are described in said
38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the estate and also the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if
should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864. known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. In the
form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the applicant is required to state
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to that and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights
time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when their and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or expectancy
mother died. So these children were minors when the father of the appellee obtained the of all persons, with their names in full, together with their place of residence and post
estate grant. office addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling
to be published twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners, who persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the
were then minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents to one adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may concern." In addition to the notice in the
Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a
as the representative of the petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person named in the
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental contract was duly executed application whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in
in writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the
and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose application, and in a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in
Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la which the land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of the
Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The
with Jose Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While certificate of the clerk that he has served the notice as directed by the court by
the appellee admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed
did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two small in the notices, if no person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion of
parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the rental contract between the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the
the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee the land is not described. In the description in the published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express
rental contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, provisions of law "all the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the
brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, according default an order." If the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in
to the description given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the his application, a decree or registration shall be entered.
said court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not
binding upon Anacleto R. de la Cruz, the appellee. Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the and against all persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches
petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
year. The same two parcels of land are included in the state grant issued in favor of included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such decree
Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained after the death of the shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the petitioners honestly person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing
believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time they judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year.
appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
required that they include in their application the names of their tenants. Under these
circumstances, did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to
after its decree had been entered in February of the same year? above.

The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest
applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express
description of the land. It shall contain the name in full and the address of the applicant,
provision of law the world are made parties defendant by the description in the notice "to actual — as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes
all whom it may concern." Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)

Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in
circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905,
defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens
must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the appellee, whether his System, supra.) The same meaning should be given to the word "fraud" used in section
(appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).

The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been the word as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not
opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree attempt to say what acts would constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be
was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly determined from the fact an circumstances in each particular case. The only question we
believed that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. are called upon to determine, and have determined, is whether or not, under the facts
One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor when the original plan and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12,
was made. 1908, by means of fraud.

Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due
reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as
anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which
there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud. shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has been The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given
frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts; the first is notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified;
the distinction between the meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all
conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to the whom it may concern." If this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to
protection of bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The second is the be due process of law.
distinction between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral"
fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to the Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and
conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was
express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in
Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.) its practicable form.

With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have
certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the
mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal fraud. In registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all
other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and every kind of occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are
fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such
deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word. This system was
held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No.
and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none 496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of
of these three classes of cases was there absent the element of intention to private individuals.
deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of
registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more and transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under
more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without security. governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute
(Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.) and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian
Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted
because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which the
person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself protected against any Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur. The
defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.) percentage of errors, as compared with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is
very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by average risk of error being only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In Queensland the risk of
Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use: error was only 1 ½ cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania
and in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the
First. It has substituted security for insecurity. whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been
adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some of the States of the
American Union, and practical experience has demonstrated that it has been successful
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and
as a public project.
the time occupied from months to days.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
been the subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs.
Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165;
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
R's" can transact his own conveyancing.
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud. copied substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.

Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has States.
barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp.
75, 76.)
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never
heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S.,
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was 516.)
made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in
1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registration takes the place of "title by
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary
deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is
requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be
effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The
instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within
certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes
the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any
indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same
provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court
sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from
over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this
intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . .
not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional
The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty,
rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the
and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer
plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9
Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50
Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular
person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to
bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to
be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right
to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held
conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this
jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree
allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the
proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.

The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest
its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has
absolute power to determine the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death,
but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings
had in the case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances, especially the absolute lack
on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right,
or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions
of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we
do not decide.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from
should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without
special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915 to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
D.R. Williams for appellee.
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or
decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by
reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot
JOHNSON, J.: on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore
registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that
From the record the following facts appear: the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying
that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having
of Ermita in the city of Manila. thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for
registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall,
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the
said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same,
registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that
of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the
the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
system. Said registration and certificate included the wall. once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey
petition of the defendant also included said wall. Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered
that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world)
to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.)
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to
under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where
not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law. hold the title" (p. 237).

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not
the name of two different persons. be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition
view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise
subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse
possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set
persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration. aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent
certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the
"torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one
of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that
the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express
documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be
be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are
of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered,
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the
vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a
proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the
the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of
his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against
became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of
day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser."
a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an
be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
the courts". purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said
quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the
purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the
certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall,
thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be
which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of
right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers,
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the purchaser," in said sections.
conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case,
the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever
not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of
the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to
oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons
became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of
had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate,
absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that sections 710, 710 [a]).
judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him. When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson,
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank,
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all
an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate
the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot
proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee
persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent
The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the
litigation. appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the
recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required
a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to
statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in
such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and
the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with
sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and
upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead who was innocent of any act of negligence.
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption.
The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the
allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record. land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the
ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that
are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title
purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to to the land.
such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the
facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of
what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and
there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising
in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders
difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the
land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee,
as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. 201070 DATE OF INSTRUMENT – Feb. 12, 1981

LUZ S. NICOLAS, Petitioner DATE OF INSCRIPTION – May 8, 1981

vs.
LEONORA C. MARIANO, Respondent and further subject to a proviso, proscribing any transfer or encumbrance of said parcel
of land, viz[.]:
DECISION
"EXCEPT BY HEREDITARY SUCCESSION, THE HEREIN LOT OR ANY PART
DEL CASTILLO, J.: THEREOF CANNOT BE x x x (illegible), TRANSFERRED, OR ENCUMBERED WITHIN
FIVE (5) YEARS FROM THE DATE OF RELEASE OF THE MORTGAGE INSCRIBED
When both parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault, none of them may expect positive AT THE BACK HEREOF WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT AND AUTHORITY
relief from the courts in the interpretation of their agreement; instead, they shall be left as FROM THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY."
they were at the time the case was filed. This Petition for Review on Certiorari  assails
1

the Court of Appeals' (CA) June 21, 2011 Decision  and March 1, 2012
2
Accordingly, the NHA withheld conveyance of the original TCT No. C-44249 to Leonora
Resolution  denying herein petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration  in CA-G.R. CV
3 4
Mariano, furnishing her instead a photocopy thereof as the issuance of the original TCT
No. 93532. in her name is conditioned upon her full payment of the mortgage loan. Leonora
Mariano’s last payment was in February 1999. The NHA’s Statement of Account
Factual Antecedents indicates that as of September 30, 2004, Leonora Mariano’s outstanding obligation
amounted to ₱37,679.70. Said obligation remained unpaid.
The CA's summation of the facts is hereby adopted, thus:
On January 28, 1998, Leonora Mariano obtained a ₱100,000.00 loan from defendant-
The subject of the instant controversy is the one-half portion of a 155-square meter appellant Luz Nicolas  with a payment term of ten (10) months at the monthly interest
6

parcel of land known as Lot 13-A, Block 40 located at 109 Kapayapaan Street, Bagong rate of 7%. To secure the loan, she executed a Mortgage Contract over the subject
Barrio, Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) No. C- property, comprising the one-half portion of the parcel of land.
44249. The parcel of land is part of the National Housing Authority’s (NHA) Bagong
Barrio Project and built thereon is plaintiff-appellee Leonora Mariano’s  five-unit
5 On February 22, 1999, Leonora Mariano, having defaulted in the payment of her
apartment which she leases out to tenants. obligation, executed in favor of Luz Nicolas a second mortgage deed denominated as
Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay, this time mortgaging the subject property and the
In 1972, Leonora Mariano filed with the NHA Application No. 99-02-0323 for a land grant improvements thereon for a consideration of P552,000.00 inclusive of the original loan of
under the Bagong Barrio Project. In 1978, the NHA approved the Application, thus, her P100,000.00. The Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay provides for a payment term of one (1)
institution as grantee of the foregoing parcel of land. The grant, however, is subject to a year and contains the following stipulations:
mortgage inscribed as Entry No. 98464/C-39393 on the dorsal side of TCT No. C-44249,
viz[.]: x x x           x x x          x x x

--- NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY – 1. Na kung sakali at mabayaran ng UNANG PANIG ang IKALAWANG PANIG o ang
kahalili nito ang nabanggit na pagkakautang na halagang Limang Daan Limamput
TO GUARANTEE A PRINCIPAL X X X (illegible) IN THE SUM OF ₱36,036.10 Dalawang Libong Piso (P552,000.00), salaping Pilipino, kasama ang interes o tubo, sa
PAYABLE WITHIN TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS WITH ANNUAL INTEREST OF loob ng taning na panahon, ay mawalan ng bisa at saysay ang SANGLAANG ito;
TWELVE (12%) PERCENT UNTIL FULLY PAID IN THREE HUNDRED (300) EQUAL
MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS.x x x 2. Na kapag hindi nabayaran ng UNANG PANIG sa IKALAWANG PANIG ang buong
halagang pagkakautang na nabanggit sa itaas, ay ituturing ng ma[g]kabilang panig
na ang lupa at bahay na nakasangla ay nabili at pagmamayari na ng IKALAWANG
PANIG at sumasang-ayon ang UNANG PANIG na magsagawa ng kaukulang that the parties have given their consent thereto. A careful scrutiny of the document will
Kasulatan ng Bilihan na wala nang karagdagang bayad o halagang ibinibigay sa readily show that at the time of the execution thereof there was no consideration for the
nagsangla. sale of the property. The alleged vendor, plaintiff herein, made it appear that she
received the sum of Php600,000.00 in full and in her complete satisfaction from the
x x x           x x x          x x x alleged vendee, herein defendant. The lack of consideration was likewise bolstered by
the defendant’s production of the handwritten memorandum or note of the various
On June 7, 2000, Leonora Mariano, similarly defaulting on the second obligation, amounts allegedly received by the aforesaid defendant from the plaintiff on different
executed a deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property, conveying to Luz Nicolas the occasions. It is important to stress, however, that even admitting arguendo that several
ownership of the subject property and the improvements thereon for a purchase price of amounts were received by the plaintiff from the defendant, there has not been any
₱600,000.00. A document denominated Pagtanggap ng Kabuang Halaga, executed indication that the same were intended as consideration for the sale of the property in
before Punong Barangay Crispin C. Peña, Sr. attested to the full payment of the question. x x x It has been observed also that the alleged payments occurred long after
₱600,000.00 to Leonora Mariano. It appears that from June 1999, the tenants of Leonora the execution of the Deed of Sale, or a span of four (4) months to be more exact. No less
Mariano’s five-unit apartment have been remitting monthly rentals to Luz Nicolas in the than the barangay captain had categorically declared that he did not see that the
amount of ₱2,000.00, or ₱10,000.00 in the aggregate. From said period until June 2004, defendant even handed over the amount of Php600,000.00 to the plaintiff. Moreover, a
Luz Nicolas’ rental collection amounted to ₱600,000.00.  (Emphasis in the original)
7 scrutiny of the aforesaid fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property will readily
show that it did not even specifically described [sic] the subject-matter of the alleged
sale.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
There are two sets of mortgage contracts executed by the parties herein. One in the
On July 8, 2004, Leonora C. Mariano (Mariano) sued Luz S. Nicolas (Nicolas) before the
amount of Php100,000.00 with an interest of 7% payable in ten (10) month period and
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). In her Amended Complaint  for "Specific
8

the other one in a jacked up price of Php552,000.00 payable within a period of one (1)
Performance with Damages and with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
year from its execution. The plaintiff’s contention that the unpaid obligation in the amount
Order and thereafter a Permanent Mandatory Injunction" before RTC Branch 121,
of Php100,000.00 has already been consolidated to the jacked up amount of
Mariano sought to be released from the second mortgage agreement and stop Nicolas
Php552,000.00 is tenable. Anent the claim of the defendant that the plaintiff never paid
from further collecting upon her credit through the rentals from her apartments, claiming
her, such alleged failure however could not be attributed to the fault of the plaintiff
that she has fully paid her debt. In addition, she prayed for other actual damages, moral
considering that the latter had been tendering her payments not only once but for several
damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.
times and it was the defendant who refused to accept the payments for various reasons.
It is crystal clear that the defendant’s refusal to accept the payments which were
In her Answer,  Nicolas denied that she collected rentals from Mariano’s apartments; that
9
tendered by the plaintiff was nothing but a malicious scheme devised by the defendant to
Mariano’s debt remained unpaid; that the subject property and the improvements thereon make the plaintiff’s obligation ballooned [sic] to Php552,000.00, which would make it
were later sold to her via a deed of absolute sale executed by Mariano which, however, more difficult for the plaintiff to pay the increased amount of Php552,000.00 in lump sum.
did not bear the written consent of the latter’s husband; and that as a result of the sale, The actuations displayed by the defendant is indeed a downright manifestation of bad
she obtained the right to collect the rentals from the apartment tenants. Nicolas thus faith on her part in her desire to own the property belonging to herein plaintiff, which is in
prayed that Mariano be ordered to surrender the title to the subject property to her, and brazen violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides among others that ‘Every
to pay her moral and exemplary damages and costs. person must in the exercise of his right and in the performance of his duties act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.’ Be that as it may,
After trial, the trial court issued its Decision  in Civil Case No. C-20937 dated August 26,
10
the plaintiff, despite her vigorous protestation to the jacked up amount of Php552,000.00
2009, decreeing as follows: had agreed to sign the second mortgage denominated as ‘Sanglaan Ng Bahay At Lupa’
payable within a period of one (1) year. Apparently, the defendant’s consuming
The Court is inclined to believe that what had been entered into by and between the aspiration to push the plaintiff against the wall, had even accentuated when she
parties was a mere contract of mortgage of real property and not a sale of real property. demanded payment of the aforestated sum from the herein plaintiff even before its
maturity.
The Court could not uphold the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
dated June 7, 2000 because it is tainted with flaws and defects. There is no evidence
It is important to stress however, that in plaintiff’s sincere desire to settle her obligation, Nicolas filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 93532. In its
upon request of the defendant, had even executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor assailed June 21, 2011 Decision, however, the CA ruled against Nicolas, stating thus:
of the latter, authorizing the aforesaid defendant to collect the rentals from the five-door
apartment belonging to the plaintiff, which commenced from June 1999 up to June 2004. Aggrieved, Luz Nicolas interposed this appeal, raising the following assignment of errors:
Although the defendant assured the plaintiff that the payments by way of rentals would
be applied to the indebtedness of the plaintiff, such verbal agreement was never reduced I
in writing in view of the trust and confidence reposed by the plaintiff upon the defendant.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEED OF SALE AS NULL AND
In sum, the defendant was able to collect the total amount of Php612,000.00 from the VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION;
tenants of the plaintiff, which evidently tremendously exceeded the amount of the alleged
indebtedness of the plaintiff to the defendant in the increased amount of Php552,000.00.
II
x x x           x x x          x x x
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELEASING THE APPELLEE FROM HER
OBLIGATION TO THE APPELLANT AND CANCELING THE TWO MORTGAGES; [and]
There is no doubt that the plaintiff has suffered mental anguish and injury due to the
wrongful act done by the defendant against the plaintiff. Hence, the latter is entitled to an
III
award of moral damages inasmuch as the sufferings and injuries suffered by the plaintiff
are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission (Art. 2217, Civil
Code of the Philippines). However, the amount of moral damages suffered by the plaintiff THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES AND
in the amount of Php400,000.00 is unconscionable which must have to be reduced by COST OF SUIT.
the court.
The pivotal issue in this appeal is whether x x x the RTC committed reversible error in (1)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring the Absolute Sale of Real Property invalid, (2) cancelling the Mortgage
and against the defendant by: Contract and Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay, and (3) awarding moral damages to Leonora
Mariano.
1. Ordering the cancellation of the two (2) mortgages denominated as Mortgage
Contract and the Sanglaan Ng Lupa At Bahay, thus releasing the plaintiff from xxxx
her obligation relative thereto;
Luz Nicolas maintains that the Absolute Sale of Real Property is valid on the grounds: (1)
2. Ordering the defendant, to stop collecting further monthly rentals on the five- that the same is Leonora Mariano’s free and voluntary act in settlement of her mortgage
door apartment belonging to the plaintiff from the tenants of the latter; and, liability of ₱552,000.00; (2) it pertains to the subject property for the valid consideration of
₱600,000.00, ₱552,000.00 of which Leonora Mariano had already received by way of the
mortgage debt; and (3) that the Pagtanggap ng Kabuuang Halaga is conclusive evidence
3. To pay moral damages in the amount of Php100,000.00, and,
of Leonora Mariano’s full receipt of the ₱600,000.00. She further avers that the RTC
erred in declaring Leonora Mariano’s release from liability on the basis of the purported
4. To pay the costs of suit. special power of attorney, contending that the special power was never formally offered
in evidence and that assuming arguendo it exists, the Absolute Sale of Real Property
SO ORDERED. 11
superseded the same, making her rental collection one in the concept of an owner. She
finally theorizes that the Absolute Sale of Real Property novated the mortgage contracts
  because it converted Leonora Mariano’s mortgage obligation of ₱552,000.00 into partial
consideration for the subject property and that it is Leonora Mariano who is instead liable
Ruling of the Court of Appeals for moral damages, having maliciously filed the fraudulent complaint against her who
entered into the foregoing contracts in good faith.
For her part, Leonora Mariano, reiterates the grounds raised in her Motion to Dismiss Otherwise stated, the mortgagor must be the owner of the property subject of the
Notice to Appeal by Expunging and further avers the appeal is procedurally infirm for mortgage; otherwise, the mortgage is void.
non-compliance with Sections 5 and 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. She maintains the
propriety of the RTC’s Decision, stressing that being the trial court’s factual conclusion, Thus, having declared the Absolute Sale of Real Property and the two mortgages, i.e.
the same must be accorded great respect the Mortgage Contract and the Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay, void, all rights and
obligations created thereunder are effectively obliterated and rendered ineffective. Luz
x x x. Nicolas’ supposed ownership of the subject property and her right to collect rentals on
Leonora Mariano’s five-unit apartment, on the one hand, and the latter’s mortgage debt
The appeal is partly meritorious. of ₱552,000.00, on the other hand, are necessarily void, hence, without force and effect.
A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not create,
xxxx modify, or extinguish a juridical relation. Parties to a void agreement cannot expect the
aid of the law. The courts leave them as they are, because they are deemed in pari
delicto or in equal fault. It follows, therefore, that the award of moral damages must also
As regards the merits of this appeal, we are one with the RTC in declaring the Absolute
be vacated. The rule is no damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract
Sale of Real Property invalid, but we cannot uphold that the invalidity thereof due to lack
since being inexistent, it produces no juridical tie between the parties involved.
of the essential requisites of consent, object, and consideration. Indeed, the Absolute
Sale of Real Property contains all the foregoing requisites and nothing in the records
proves, or at least suggests, that the same was executed through fraud or under duress. WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August
Hence, by no stretch of the imagination can we sustain the RTC’s declaration of invalidity 26, 2009 of the RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan City, in Civil Case No. C-20937 is
on said ground. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the award of moral damages of P100,000.00
to Leonora Mariano.
We declare the Absolute Sale of Real Property is invalid on the ground that Leonora
Mariano, the supposed vendor of the subject property, is not the owner thereof. For a SO ORDERED. 14

sale to be valid, it is imperative that the vendor is the owner of the property sold. The
records show that Leonora Mariano, to debunk Luz Nicolas’ claim of ownership of the Nicolas moved to reconsider, but in its assailed March 1, 2012 Resolution, the CA held
subject property, openly admitted that she has not fully paid the grant thereof to the NHA. its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Leonora Mariano, as mere grantee of the subject property who failed to fulfil the
conditions of the grant, never acquired ownership thereof, hence, was without any right On May 8, 2012, Mariano filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.  In a November
15

to dispose or alienate the same. "Nemo dat quod non habet." One cannot give what he 13, 2013 Resolution,  this Court resolved to give due course to the instant Petition.
16

does not own. Hence, not being the owner of the subject property, Leonora Mariano
could have not transferred the ownership thereof to Luz Nicolas. 12
On November 5, 2014, Mariano filed a Motion for Urgent Execution Pendente
Lite,   which the Court noted in a February 2, 2015 Resolution.
17 18

Furthermore, the Absolute Sale of Real Property is a clear violation of the express
proviso, prohibiting "any transfer or encumbrance of subject property within five (5)-years Issues
from the release of the mortgage." Said violation rendered the Absolute Sale void ab
initio, thus, the Republic’s retention of ownership over the subject property.  A buyer
13
Nicolas submits that –
acquires no better title to the property sold than the seller had. Necessarily, Luz Nicolas
cannot invoke the Absolute Sale as basis of her right to collect rentals.
I.
Leonora Mariano, being not the owner of the subject property, we declare that both the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
Mortgage Contract and the Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay she executed are void ab initio.
RULINGS IN HEIRS OF SALVADOR HERMOSILLA VS. REMOQUILLO (513 SCRA
For a person to validly constitute a mortgage on real estate, he must be the absolute
409-410) AND MAGOYAG VS. MARUHOM (626 SCRA 247, 257 [2010]) WHICH ARE
owner of the property mortgaged as required by Article 2085 of the New Civil Code.
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR SINCE RESPONDENT LEONORA C.
MARIANO ALIENATED THE SAID PROPERTY WHEN SHE WAS THE ABSOLUTE NHA’s prior written consent and authority, this condition is null and void as it unduly
OWNER OF THE PROPERTY. restricts Mariano’s rights as owner of the subject property; that Republic Act No. 6552
should instead apply in Mariano’s case, which involves an installment sale of real
a) THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED IN FAVOR OF property; and that consequently, the mortgages and deed of sale executed by and
RESPONDENT MARIANO IS AN EVIDENCE OF HER OWNERSHIP OVER between the parties should be upheld for being in accordance with law, supported by
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. adequate consideration, and in furtherance of the intentions of the parties thereto.

b) ARTICLE 1477 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BOLSTERS RESPONDENT’S Arguments of Mariano
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WHICH NECESSARILY
CAPACITATES HER TO ALIENATE THE SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF In her Comments and Opposition to the Petition for Review,  Mariano fully agrees with
20

PETITIONER. the pronouncements of the CA, except that she believes that she must be awarded moral
damages as prayed for and proved during trial. She admits that even if TCT No. C-44249
II. was issued in her name, she is not the owner of the subject property since she has not
fully paid the installments to the NHA; this being so, she concedes that she had no right
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT to mortgage and sell the same to Nicolas. She adds that TCT No. C-44249 constitutes
RESPONDENT WAS NOT THE ABSOLUTE OWNER AT THE TIME THE DEED OF mere evidence of title, and does not vest title itself, to the subject property. Thus, she
ABSOLUTE SALE WAS EXECUTED. prays for affirmance with modification, in that she be awarded the amounts of
₱960,000.00 as reimbursement for Nicolas’s excess rental collections; ₱500,000.00
additional actual damages; ₱1,000,000.00 moral damages; ₱400,000.00 attorney’s fees;
III.
and costs of suit.
THE PROVISO IN THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE THAT PROHIBITS
Our Ruling
APPELLEE LEONORA C. MARIANO TO TRANSFER OR ENCUMBER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS A STIPULATION CONTRARY TO LAW SINCE THE SAID PROVISO
YIELDS TO R.A. 6552 (AN ACT TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO BUYERS OF REAL The Petition must be denied.
ESTATE ON INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS [MACEDA LAW]).
While title to TCT No. C-44249 is in the name of Mariano, she has not completed her
IV. installment payments to NHA; this fact is not disputed, and as a matter of fact, Mariano
admits it. Indeed, Mariano even goes so far as to concede, in her Comments and
Opposition to the Petition, that she is not the owner of the subject property.  Thus, if she
21

THE DEED OF SALE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS
never became the owner of the subject property, then she could not validly mortgage and
VALID AND BINDING. 19

sell the same to Nicolas. The principle nemo dat quod non habet certainly applies.
Arguments of Nicolas
x x x By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and set aside, Nicolas argues in mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
her Petition that the CA seriously erred in affirming the cancellation of the mortgage disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best
contracts and invalidating the parties’ deed of sale, since, as the registered owner of the proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
subject property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-44249, Mariano had considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. x x x  (Emphasis supplied)
22

every right to mortgage and sell the same to her; that while the National Housing
Authority (NHA) withheld the original copy of TCT No. C-44249 and merely gave a
Indeed, the Torrens system of land registration "merely confirms ownership and does not
photocopy thereof to Mariano pending full payment of the installments, this does not
create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of
detract from the fact that Mariano is the owner of the subject property; that while there is
transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or
a proviso in TCT No. C-44249 to the effect that Mariano may not transfer or encumber
recognized by law." 23

the subject property within five years from the date of release of the mortgage without the
Nicolas is charged with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the subject
property. The original owner’s copy of TCT No. C-44249 is not in Mariano’s possession,
and the latter could only present a photocopy thereof to her. Before one could part with
his money as mortgagee or buyer of real property, it is only natural to demand to be
presented with the original owner’s copy of the certificate of title covering the same.
Secondly, Entry No. 98464/C-39393 on the dorsal side of TCT No. C-44249 constitutes
sufficient warning as to the subject property’s condition at the time. In other words, TCT
No. C-44249 was not a clean title, and if Nicolas exercised diligence, she would have
discovered that Mariano was delinquent in her installment payments to the NHA, which in
turn would have generated the necessary conclusion that the property belonged to the
said government agency.

For her part, Mariano cannot recover damages on account of her claimed losses arising
from her entering into contract with Nicolas.  Realizing that she is not the owner of the
1âwphi1

subject property and knowing that she has not fully paid the price therefor, she is as
guilty as Nicolas for knowingly mortgaging and thereafter selling what is not hers. As
correctly held by the CA, both parties herein are not in good faith; they are deemed in
pari delicto or in equal fault, and for this, "[n]either one may expect positive relief from
courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave them as they
were at the time the case was filed."  Besides, if Mariano’s prayer for damages were to
24

be considered at all, she should have directly assailed the CA’s pronouncement by filing
her own petition before this Court, which she failed to doWith the foregoing
pronouncement, the Court finds no need to tackle the other issues raised by the parties.
They have become irrelevant in light of the view taken of the case. Consequently,
Mariano’s Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and Motion for Urgent Execution
Pendente Lite require no further resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The June 21, 2011 Decision and March 1, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93532 are AFFIRMED.
 title when their request for a Height Clearance with the Department of Transportation and
Communications was referred to the defendant-appellant Mactan[-]Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of the latter’s ownership of the said lot
by way of purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.
G.R. No. 171535               June 5, 2009
At this point, it becomes imperative to trace the chain of ownership over Lot No. 4763-D.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, It is undisputed that the original owners of said property were the spouses Julian Cuison
vs. and Marcosa Cosef, who owned the entire Lot No. 4763, of which Lot No. 4763-D is a
SPOUSES EDITO and MERIAN TIROL and SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MIRANDA portion of (sic). Unfortunately for herein parties, this is where the similarity of facts end
NGO, Respondents. (sic), and the instant controversy begins.

DECISION According to plaintiffs-appellees: Originally, the entire Lot No. 4763 was decreed in the
names of spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act on June 1, 1934. [In] January 1974, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
PUNO, C.J.:
Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to Spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug. The latter
spouses thereafter succeeded to secure the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of of Lot No. 4763, Opon Cadastre as evidenced by Court Order dated July 3, 1986. Said
Civil Procedure seeking to reverse, annul and set aside (i) the May 27, 2005 Decision 1 of Court Order subsequently became final and executory, thus a reconstituted title, OCT
the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 72867 entitled "Spouses Edito and Merian No. RO-2754, was issued in the name of the original owners-spouses Julian Cuison and
Tirol, et al. v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority," and (ii) its February 17, Marcosa Cosef. On September 12, 1986, the Deed of Absolute Sale between spouses
2006 Resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Julian Cuison/Marcosa Cosef and spouses Moises Cuizon/Beatriz Patalinghug was
registered and annotated on OCT No. RO-2754, which was cancelled to give way to the
The instant case finds its genesis in a complaint for quieting of title filed on August 8, issuance of TCT No. 16735 in the name of spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz
1996 by respondents, Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Patalinghug. Thereafter, the latter sold a portion, denominated as Lot No. 4763-D, to
Miranda Ngo, against petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Mrs. Elma Jenkins on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier discussed, sold the same lot
The facts were aptly summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows: to herein plaintiffs-appellees on September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that all
throughout the chain of ownership, the titles – albeit from a reconstituted one – of the
The instant appeal revolves around a certain parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, over which previous owners were absolutely devoid of any annotations of liens, encumbrances, lis
the parties to the above-entitled case assert ownership and possession. pendens, adverse claim, or anything that may cause a reasonable man of ordinary
prudence and diligence to suspect the contrary. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees have
xxx xxx xxx been in actual, uninterrupted and peaceful possession of the property since 1993, and if
the possession of their predecessors-in-interest be tacked, plaintiffs-appellees would be
Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners, Edito P. Tirol and Alejandro Y. Ngo, along in constructive, uninterrupted and peaceful possession for sixty-two (62) long years as of
with their respective spouses, claim to have purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel of the date of filing their Complaint for Quieting of Title in the court a quo.
land, Lot No. 4763-D, from a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a Filipino citizen married to a
certain Mr. Scott Edward Jenkins, an American citizen, per Deed of Absolute Sale dated According to the defendant-appellant: On March 23, 19863 , the original owners, spouses
September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees bought the said property on the strength of the Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to the government, through the
apparent clean title of vendor Jenkins as evidenced by the Tax Declaration and Transfer [then] Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA, for brevity). In a Certificate dated March 19,
Certificate of Title No. 18216, all under Mrs. Elma Jenkins’ name, which bear no 1959, vendor Julian Cuison confirmed that he was the possessor and actual owner of Lot
annotation of liens, encumbrances, lis pendens or any adverse claim whatsoever. After No. 4763 which was located within the "Mactan Alternate International Airport" and that
the sale wherein plaintiffs-appellees were purportedly purchasers for value and in good the duplicate copy of the certificate of title was lost or destroyed during the last war
faith, they succeeded in titling the said lot under their names per Transfer Certificate of without him or his predecessor(s)-in-interest having received a copy thereof. Since then,
Title No. 27044 on September 20, 1993, and further proceeded to pay realty taxes the government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA, has been in open, continuous,
thereon. It was only in January 1996 that plaintiffs-appellees discovered a cloud on their exclusive and adverse possession of the property in the concept of owner. Said lot
allegedly became part of the Clear Zone of Runway 22 for purposes of required The trial court held that there was a valid transfer of title from Spouses Julian Cuison and
clearance for take-off and landing. Moreover, defendant-appellant asserts that plaintiffs- Marcosa Cosef to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), and accordingly, the
appellees are nothing more than trustees of Lot No. 4763-D in favor of defendant- respondents did not buy Lot No. 4763-D from a person who could validly dispose of it. It
appellant MCIAA, being merely successors-in-interest of the original owners, spouses likewise ruled that the government (through the CAA, and now respondent MCIAA) has
Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who undertook in paragraph 4 of the Deed of been in possession of the disputed land since it bought the same in 1958, when a public
Absolute Sale, to assist in the reconstitution of title so that the land may be registered in deed of absolute sale was executed in its favor. Lastly, respondents were considered as
the name of vendee government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA. In paragraph 5 of having bought Lot No. 4763-D in bad faith since they ignored circumstances that should
the same Deed of Absolute Sale, the parties also agreed that the property be registered have made them curious enough to investigate beyond the four corners of the Transfer
under Act 3344 pending the reconstitution and issuance of title. Purportedly, in gross and Certificate of Title. In the trial court’s view, the facts that Lot No. 4763-D (i) is only about
evident bad faith and in open violation of their Deed of Absolute Sale, the spouses Julian 320 meters from the center of the runway and therefore part of the clear zone and (ii) has
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef again sold the same property to spouses Moises Cuizon and been vacant for several decades should have alerted the respondents to the possibility
Beatriz Patalinghug, who in turn sold the lot to Mrs. Elma Jenkins, who eventually sold that the lot could be part of the airport complex and therefore owned by petitioner.
the same to herein plaintiffs-appellees. Defendant-appellant MCIAA further imputes bad
faith to plaintiffs-appellees under the rationale that because their title came from a Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration 6 on January 23, 2001, and a
reconstituted one and that Lot No. 4763 was within the Clear Zone of Runway 22 of the Supplemental (sic) to Motion for Reconsideration7 on May 17, 2001. Petitioner duly filed
airport, plaintiffs-appellees should have exerted effort in researching the history of its Opposition8 to the said Motions on April 10, 2001 and June 13, 2001, respectively.
ownership and cannot possibly claim to be innocent of MCIAA’s ownership and
possession thereof.4 In an Order9 dated August 9, 2001, the trial court did a complete volte face and reversed
its Decision. Holding that Article 1544 10 of the New Civil Code – which set forth the rule
In its December 4, 2000 Decision,5 the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner MCIAA in this on double sales – finds application to the instant case, the trial court ratiocinated:
wise:
In the words of the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Cabana, this Court finds that in the case
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules in favor of defendant and thus of [a] double sale of real property[,] Article 1544 of the New Civil Code applies.
DISMISSES the complaint of plaintiffs for want of merit. Defendant was certainly the first buyer and the plaintiffs [were] the subsequent buyers, to
be exact fourth (sic).
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the defendant MCIAA, is adjudged as
(sic) the lawful owner of the entire Lot 4763, Opon Cadastre. But who among the parties herein has a better right to Lot No. 4763-D? To answer this
question, it is necessary to determine first the issue [of] whether or not the plaintiffs were
The Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot 4763-D in favor of plaintiffs is hereby declared buyers in good faith.lawphil

null and void.

xxx xxx xxx
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 for Lot 4763-D under the names of plaintiffs is
likewise deemed null and void. The Court is not convinced that indeed the plaintiffs were buyers in bad faith. xxx The
registration of the deed of absolute sale by the defendant at the Registry of Deeds under
The Register of Deeds is directed to issue to the defendant MCIAA a transfer certificate Act No. 3344 sometime in 1959 is not the registration being contemplated under the law.
of title covering the whole Lot 4763. "Registration under Act No. 3344 differs materially from registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law and under the Land Registration Act. In the Spanish Mortgage Law[,]
The counterclaim of defendant, however, is denied for lack of merit. there is [an] express provision (Article 17) to the effect that titles recorded thereunder
cannot be annulled or invalidated by prior unrecorded rights, while the Land Registration
No pronouncement as to costs. Act (No. 496) contains a special disposition that only transactions noted on the certificate
of title and entered in the registry books can bind the land. On the other hand,
transactions registered under Act No. 3344 cannot defeat a third person with a better
SO ORDERED.
right. Of course[,] the law does not define exactly what may be considered a better right,
leaving the matter of its construction to the courts. The main reason for the difference in Simply stated, the issue may be synthesized as follows: Between respondents Spouses
the operation of Act No. 3344 compared with the other systems of registration lies Tirol and Spouses Ngo, on the one hand, and petitioner MCIAA, on the other, who has
obviously in the fact that recordings under said Act No. 3344 are not preceded by any the superior right to the subject property?
investigation, judicial or administrative, as to the validity or efficacy of the title sought to
be recorded." It is undisputed that Lot No. 4763 was a registered land, only that at the We rule in favor of the respondents, but on grounds different than those relied upon by
time of registering defendant’s document of sale there was no copy of the certificate of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
title because the same was not available due to the after effect of the last global war.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. In Cheng v.
Hence, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs when they contended that "even at the time Genato, et al.,15 we enumerated the requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply,
when OCT No. RO-2754 was issued[,] there was no document allegedly proving its viz.:
(defendant) ownership being annotated on the certificate of title." At the time when
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16735, 18216 and 27044 were issued to the plaintiffs (a) The two (or more) sales transactions must constitute valid sales;
and their predecessors-in-interest, there were no annotations of the alleged claim of the
defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs have all the good reasons to rely on the validity of the
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject
titles. xxx
matter;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
xxx The fact that Lot No. 4763-D was within 320 meters from the center of the runway
and within airport premises, was part of the clear zone, and had long been vacant are not
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
enough warning to third persons dealing [with] such land. It was undisputed that the lot in
matter must each have bought from the very same seller.
controversy is outside the perimeter fence of the defendant. The fact that the said lot was
part of the clear zone is not sufficient justification to warn the plaintiffs in (sic) buying it.
Such fact was merely for the purpose of construction of buildings, not for realty Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were
ownership.11 (italics in the original) initiated not by just one vendor but by several successive vendors.16 In the instant case,
respondents and petitioner had acquired the subject property from different transferors.
Petitioner, through its predecessor-in-interest (CAA), acquired the entire Lot No. 4763
Aggrieved, petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a
from its original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, on March 23, 1958.
Decision12 on May 27, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
On the other hand, respondents acquired the subject parcel of land, a portion of Lot No.
4763, from Mrs. Elma Jenkins, another transferee, some thirty-five years later. The
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the immediate transferors of Elma Jenkins were the spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz
assailed Order dated August 9, 2001 is AFFIRMED. Patalinghug who, in turn, obtained the subject property from spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef. Therefore, the instant controversy cannot be governed by Article 1544
SO ORDERED. since petitioner and respondents do not have the same immediate seller.

On June 21, 2005, petitioner seasonably moved for its reconsideration but the Court of This notwithstanding, we find that respondents have a better right to Lot No. 4763-D.
Appeals denied the same in its February 17, 2006 Resolution. 13
Petitioner does not contest that Lot No. 4763, of which the property subject of this case is
Hence this appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, where petitioner a part, was registered under Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act) even before the
argues that: Second World War. Paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale17 between petitioner and
Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef stipulates, in relevant part:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AUGUST 9, 2001 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT EVEN IF THE That since the Original/Transfer Certificate of Title of the aforementioned property has
SAME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. 14 lavvphi1
been lost and/or destroyed, or since the said lot is covered by Cadastral Case No. 20
and a decree issued on July 29, 1930, xxx the VENDEE hereby binds itself to correctly registered is binding only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not
reconstitute said title at its own expense and that the VENDOR, his heirs, successors affect innocent third persons.23
and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that the said lot may
be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law. (italics supplied) Petitioner, however, is of the impression that registration under Act No. 3344 is
permissible because the duplicate copy of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 4763-D
Additionally, in his Certification18 dated March 19, 1959, Julian Cuison stated that "the had been lost or destroyed. This argument does not persuade. Our pronouncement in
duplicate copy of the certificate of title for [Lot No. 4763] was lost or destroyed during the Amodia Vda. de Melencion, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 24 is apropos:
last war without having been received by [him] or [his] predecessor-in-interest."
In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject property was under the
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration of instruments must be done in the operation of the Torrens System even before the respective conveyances to AZNAR and
proper registry in order to effect and bind the land.19 Prior to the Property Registration Go Kim Chuan were made. AZNAR knew of this, and admits this as fact. Yet, despite
Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act) governed the recording of this knowledge, AZNAR registered the sale in its favor under Act 3344 on the contention
transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a Torrens title. On the other hand, that at the time of sale, there was no title on file. We are not persuaded by such a lame
Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the system of recording of transactions excuse.
over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party with a better
right.20 Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is xxx xxx xxx
registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not
considered registered21 and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale
notice to the whole world.22 in favor of AZNAR was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, the
said document is deemed not registered. Rather, it was the sale in favor of Go Kim
Consequently, the fact that petitioner MCIAA was able to register its Deed of Absolute Chuan which was registered under Act No. 496.AZNAR insists that since there was no
Sale under Act No. 3344 is of no moment, as the property subject of the sale is Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and the Register of Deeds
indisputably registered land. Section 50 of Act No. 496 in fact categorically states that it are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at the time. The contention is
is the act of registration that shall operate to convey and affect the land; absent any such untenable. The fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not
registration, the instrument executed by the parties remains only as a contract between convert it into unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is merely an evidence of
them and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration, ownership or title over the particular property described therein. This Court agrees with
viz.: the petitioners that AZNAR should have availed itself of the legal remedy of
reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead of registration under Act 3344. We
SECTION 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or note that in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying, AZNAR, beset with the similar
otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms problem of a lost certificate of title over a registered land, sought the reconstitution
of deeds, mortgages, leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use and thereof. It is unfortunate that, in the instant case, despite the sale of the subject property
sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other way back in 1964 and the existence of the remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR
voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall opted to register the same under the improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract status to lie undisturbed.25 (italics supplied)
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the In the instant case, petitioner MCIAA did not bother to have the lost title covering Lot No.
land, and in all cases under this Act the registration shall be made in the office of register 4763-D reconstituted at any time, notwithstanding the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale
of deeds for the province or provinces or city where the land lies. (italics supplied) was executed in 1958, or more than fifty years ago. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt. Laws must come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy. 26 As a
Hence, respondents may not be characterized as buyers in bad faith for having bought matter of fact, this entire controversy may very well have been avoided had it not been
the property notwithstanding the registration of the first Deed of Absolute Sale under Act for petitioner’s negligence.
No. 3344. An improper registration is no registration at all. Likewise, a sale that is not
Furthermore, under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing with
registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title and the law
will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of the
property,27 except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry.28 Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we rule that respondents
exercised the required diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the
subject property as to be considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. We
quote with favor the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in this respect:

Defendant-appellant MCIAA also asseverates that the close proximity of the property to
the runway of the airport (320 meters from the center line of the runway) and the fact that
it has been vacant for a considerable period should have caused [plaintiffs-appellees] to
be dubious of the title of the previous owners thereof. This was, in Our opinion,
satisfactorily explained by plaintiffs-appellees when witness Mr. Edito Tirol testified in
open court that he never thought it strange that the land had always been vacant, and
that besides, there were private houses beside the vacant lot, suggesting that the
property must be of private ownership and not that of the airport. Furthermore, he
testified that he undertook great care in verifying the clean title of the said land, [e.g.,]
deputizing an employee to do the necessary research, personally copying pertinent
documents registered in the Registry of Property and even consulting legal advice on the
matter. These, for Us, are badges of good faith. Besides, being allegedly part of the
Clear Zone, ATO aviation rules proscribe merely the installation of buildings and other
physical structures, except landing facilities. Aviation rules (which, although repeatedly
invoked, interestingly were not presented before the court by defendant-appellant
MCIAA) do not prohibit realty ownership. 29

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 27, 2005 Decision and
the February 17, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 171531               January 30, 2009 February 1967, Cipriano executed a document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement
of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales," 15 wherein he declared himself as the only heir
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., Petitioner, of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the decedent during his lifetime, including the
vs. alleged sale of the disputed property to spouses Rodolfo.
HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL and VICTORIA V. MOLINO),
HEIRS OF SEVERINA P. TUGADE (ILUMINADA and LEONORA P. TUGADE, HEIRS Respondents likewise averred that on the following day 14 February 1967, TCT No. T-
OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA G. DELA CRUZ (by and through ALFONSO G. 824116 was issued in the name of Cipriano "without OCT No. 404 having been
DELA CRUZ), HILARIA G. COBERO and ALFREDO G. COBERO) and SIONY G. cancelled."17 However, TCT No. T-8241 was not signed by the Register of Deeds. On the
TEPOL (by and through ELENA T. RIVAS and ELESIO TEPOL, JR.), AS HEIRS OF same day, TCT No. T-8242 was issued in the name of the spouses Rodolfo and TCT No.
DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA, Respondents. T-8241 was thereby cancelled. 18 Subsequently, on 31 October 1969, the spouses
Rodolfo sold the disputed property to petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale with
DECISION Mortgage. Consequently, on 5 November 1969, TCT No. T-8242 was cancelled and TCT
No. T-1086319 was issued in the name of petitioner. 20
Tinga, J.:
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of Cipriano, filed on 24
This is a petition for review  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals’
1 January 1997 a petition before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, for the issuance of
Decision dated 22 March 20052 and Resolution dated 9 February 20063 in CA-G.R. CV a new owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 404, docketed as Other Case No. 04-0-97. 21 The
No. 67462. The Court of Appeals reversed the 12 November 1999 Order of the Regional RTC denied the petition.22 The trial court held that petitioner was already the owner of the
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 734 which granted the motion to dismiss filed land, noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent transfer of the property to it at the
by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. (petitioner). The appellate court denied petitioner’s motion back of OCT No. 404 did not affect its title to the property.
for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss23 the complaint on the grounds that the action is
The factual antecedents are as follows: barred by the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years having elapsed from the
issuance of TCT No. T-10863 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the complaint
states no cause of action as it is an innocent purchaser for value, it having relied on the
Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed a complaint
clean title of the spouses Rodolfo.
seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of 23.7229 hectares situated in
Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404
in the name of Pablo.5 In the alternative, the respondents prayed that damages be Impleaded as defendants, the heirs of Cipriano filed an answer to the complaint in which
awarded in their favor.6 they denied knowledge of the existence of the extrajudicial settlement allegedly executed
by Cipriano and averred that the latter, during his lifetime, did not execute any document
transferring ownership of the property.24
OCT No. 4047 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents’ complaint. It
contained several annotations in the memorandum of encumbrances which showed that
the property had already been sold by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez The Register of Deeds and the National Treasurer filed, through the Office of the Solicitor
and Restituto Morales. Respondents also attached copies of the following documents as General, an answer averring that the six (6)-year period fixed in Section 102 of
integral parts of their complaint: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-8241, 8 TCT No. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for the filing of an action against the Assurance
T-8242,9 TCT No. T-10863,10 the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation Fund had long prescribed since the transfer of ownership over the property was
of Sales11 executed by Cipriano Pascua, Sr. (Cipriano), and the Deed of Sale with registered through the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 in favor of petitioner as early as
Mortgage12 between spouses Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo (spouses Rodolfo) and 1969. They also claimed that respondents have no cause of action against the
petitioner. Assurance Fund since they were not actually deprived of ownership over the property, as
they could have recovered the property had it not been for their inaction for over 28
years.25
In their complaint,13 respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate sometime in June 1945
and was survived by his four children, one of whom was the deceased Cipriano. 14 On 13
The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss.26 Noting that respondents had never The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that petitioner is an innocent
claimed nor established that they have been in possession of the property and that they purchaser for value is contrary to the allegations in respondents’ complaint.
did not present any evidence to show that petitioner has not been in possession of the
property either, the RTC applied the doctrine that an action to quiet title prescribes where Hence, the present petition for review.
the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the RTC’s granting of
The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a case of implied or the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of the Court of Appeals’ reversal of
constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had inaccurately claimed to be the sole heir the RTC’s ruling.
of Pablo in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate which led to the issuance of TCT
No. T- 8241 in his favor. As the prescriptive period for reconveyance of a fraudulently The petition is meritorious.
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
title, the trial court held that the action for reconveyance had already prescribed with the
It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no
lapse of more than 28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969
cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the
as of the filing of the complaint on 21 November 1997.
complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute
a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
The RTC added that it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the
be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint.30 The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts
The RTC further held that petitioner had the right to rely on TCT No. T- 8242 in the name which are well pleaded in the complaint. 31
of spouses Rodolfo. Petitioner is not obliged to go beyond the title considering that there
were no circumstances surrounding the sale sufficient to put it into inquiry. The factual allegations in respondents’ complaint should be considered in tandem with
the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral
Concerning the Assurance Fund, the RTC held that the claim against it had long parts. In a number of cases, the Court held that in addition to the complaint, other
prescribed since Section 102 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for a six-year period within which pleadings submitted by the parties should be considered in deciding whether or not the
a plaintiff may file an action against the fund and in this case the period should be complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 32 Likewise, other facts not
counted from the time of the issuance of the challenged TCT No. T-10863 on 5 alleged in the complaint may be considered where the motion to dismiss was heard with
November 1969 and thus expired in 1975. the submission of evidence, or if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation discloses
facts sufficient to defeat the claim.33 For while the court must accept as true all well
Undaunted, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. 27 pleaded facts in the complaint, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court
will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts,
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order.28 In ordering the reinstatement of the nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
complaint, the appellate court ruled that the averments in respondents’ complaint before included in the pleadings to be unfounded.34
the RTC make out a case for quieting of title which has not prescribed. Respondents did
not have to prove possession over the property since petitioner as the movant in a In the case at bar, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the
motion to dismiss hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. hearing, the parties presented documentary evidence. Among the documents marked
The appellate court found that possession over the property was sufficiently alleged in and offered in evidence are the annexes of the complaint. 35
the complaint which stated that "neither petitioner nor the Rodolfo spouses ever had
possession of the disputed property" as "a number of the Pascua heirs either had been Based on the standards set by this Court in relation to the factual allegations and
(still are) in actual, continuous and adverse possession thereof or had been enjoying (still documentary annexes of the complaint as well as the exhibits offered at the hearing of
are enjoying) the use thereof." 29 By the same token, laches had not set in, the Court of the motion to dismiss, the inescapable conclusion is that respondents’ complaint does
Appeals added. not state a cause of action against petitioner.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242 in the name of the fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, there are instances when such a
spouses Rodolfo, who were petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest, or any circumstance fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. 39 And one such instance is
from which it could reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any actual knowledge of where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to
facts that would impel it to make further inquiry into the title of the spouses Rodolfo. 36 It is the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
basic that a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the
rely on, the title of his predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of registration is the certificate.40
operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned," it
follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in The Court cannot give credence to respondents’ claims that the Extrajudicial Settlement
the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales was not registered and that OCT No. 404 was
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for not cancelled by the Register of Deeds. The Register of Deeds of Zambales certified that
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the the extrajudicial settlement was recorded on 14 February 1967, per Entry No. 18590.
rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the This is in compliance with Section 56 of Act No. 496, 41 the applicable law at the time of
Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. The public shall registration, which provides that:
then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Torrens
system of registration. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in which he shall enter in the
and prejudiced immeasurably.37 order of their reception all deeds and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of writs
and other process filed with him relating to registered land. He shall note in such book
Contrary to the assertion of respondents, OCT No. 404 was expressly cancelled by TCT the year, month, day, hour, and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in
No. T-8241. The alleged non-signature by the Register of Deeds Soliman Achacoso, , which they are received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time so
does not affect the validity of TCT No. T-8241 since he signed TCT No. T- 8242 and noted, and the memorandum of each instrument when made on the certificate of title to
issued both titles on the same day. There is a presumption of regularity in the which it refers shall bear the same date. [Emphasis supplied]
performance of official duty. The presumption is further bolstered by the fact that TCT
No. T-8241 was certified to be on file with the Registry of Deeds and registered in the Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every conveyance,
name of Cipriano. It is enough that petitioner had examined the latest certificate of title mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
which in this case was issued in the name of the immediate transferor, the spouses registered land shall be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only by the certificate Deeds of the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
of title of the person from whom he had purchased the property. 38 notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. 42

Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales Thirdly, respondents cannot make out a case for quieting of title since OCT No. 404 had
executed by Cipriano alone despite the existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is not already been cancelled. Respondents have no title to anchor their complaint on. 43 Title to
binding on such other heirs, nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section 44 of the real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right
Property Registration Decree, which provides that: of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and,
as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property. 44
SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title. — Every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of Moreover, there is nothing in the complaint which specified that the respondents were in
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same possession of the property. They merely alleged that the occupants or possessors are
free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the "others not defendant Spouses Rodolfo"45 who could be anybody, and that the property is
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely: in actual possession of "a number of the Pascua heirs" 46 who could either be the
respondents or the heirs of Cipriano. The admission of the truth of material and relevant
xxxx facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or
conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a forgery, the Court still conclusions from
has to uphold the title of petitioner. The case law is that although generally a forged or
facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor

surplusage and irrelevant matters.47

The other heirs of Pablo should have filed an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust within ten (10) years from the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. 48 The legal relationship
between Cipriano and the other heirs of Pablo is governed by Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which provides that if a property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes.

From the above discussion, there is no question that petitioner is an innocent purchaser
for value; hence, no cause of action for cancellation of title will lie against it. 49 The RTC
was correct in granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

Lastly, respondents’ claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot prosper. Section 101
of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any
loss, damage or deprivation of any right or interest in land which may have been caused
by a breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive. Even
assuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim against the Assurance Fund, the
respondents’ claim has already prescribed since any action for compensation against the
Assurance Fund must be brought within a period of six (6) years from the time the right
to bring such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 67462 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 12 November 1999 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 in Civil Case No. 432-097
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, Petitioners, v. which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. Victoriano v.
AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of First Instance
HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, Respondents. of Rizal, supra)"

Eduardo S. Baranda, for Petitioners. 3. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; ALLOWS
CANCELLATION OF LIS PENDENS UPON PROOF THAT THE PURPOSE OF
Rico & Associates for Private Respondents. NOTICE IS TO MOLEST THE ADVERSE PARTY; FAILURE TO CANCEL NOTICE
PURSUANT THERETO, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Respondent Judge Tito
Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of
SYLLABUS Deeds’ stand that the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the
ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of
PURPOSE. — "Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph
party causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he thereof which provides: "Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final
could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court
notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party
keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of
results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v. Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration
Duran, Et Al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-485).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS IS MINISTERIAL. — Under
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE COURT TO CANCEL LIS Sections 10 and 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the function of a
PENDENS; DELAYING TACTICS OF PARTY IN CASE AT BAR IS A GROUND FOR Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrance,
CANCELLATION. — A notice of lis pendens of Civil Case No. 15871 was instruments and the like is ministerial in nature.
annotated on petitioner’s Certificate of Title No. 106098 covering Lot No.
4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. It appears, however, that private respondents 5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR AND
in filing said case were trying to delay the full implementation of the final UNEQUIVOCAL STATUTES MUST BE TAKEN TO MEAN EXACTLY WHAT IT
decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court DAYS; P.D. NO. 1529 IS CLEAR. — The elementary rule in statutory
ordered the immediate implementation of the writs of possession and construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving said lot. The foregoing unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed
facts necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court
Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Parañaque v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’
of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
158), to the effect that: "We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, 6. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF WORD "SHALL." — According to Webster’s Third
where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means
main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for "ought to, must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation,
used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." cralaw virtua1aw library resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

7. CRIMINAL LAW; AND REGISTRATION; P.D. NO. 1529; A REGISTER OF ". . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with
DEEDS HAS NO LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A MOTION FOR COMMISSIONER the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot
MUST BE SOUGHT IN CASE OF DOUBT. — The respondent Acting Register of No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of
the respondent Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens Title No. 6406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was
annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda. The Court
of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana
any deed . . . or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over
the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private respondents’
of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the
accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been
denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera
8. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION; DELAY IN THE filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On
IMPLEMENTATION OF COURT’S FINAL RESOLUTION; RESPONSIBILITY FALLS August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals deemed the petition. Perez and Gotera
ON THE RESPONDENT JUDGE. — In the ultimate analysis, however, the filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042
responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court’s already before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a
final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the resolution dated January 7, 1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles in another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial
of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant
dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. case — G.R. No. 64432 — contend that the writs of possession and
15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties demolition issued in the respondent court should now be implemented; that
claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title. Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only
to delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent
should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but futile
effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and
DECISION that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the
filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September
26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order to maintain the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo. Considering that — (1) there is merit in the instant petition for
indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R.
64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition
designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo moot and academic pending the Court’s consideration of the issues, the Court
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406. RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to
take cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of
the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our the writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered." (pp. 107-108,
Rollo — G.R. No. 64432) for." (p. 466, Rollo - G.R. No. 64432).

On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of
On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case
62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R.
the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which
in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the remained unresolved.
meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated
February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
subject matter as the Resolutions abovecited pursuant to our Resolution No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional
dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the
No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984. judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 "1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon.
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to
register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
"Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "2. To cancel No. T-25772. Likewise to cancel No. T-106098 and once
cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and
"(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated Alfonso Hitalia;
January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042; Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises." (p. 473, 64432
Rollo)
"(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29,
1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17, 1986 a Resolution in
64432; G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for.
Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we
"(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496, issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and Court Administrator for implementation by the judge below.
that of Honorable Supreme Court.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
"Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November
the same is hereby GRANTED. 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987 respectively, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared "O R D E R

null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared
valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda "This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants
and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre. through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of
"The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation
Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated
November 5, 1986. 25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in
the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by
"Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the
writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second "b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
Division per its Resolution dated September 17, 1986, the present motion is implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
hereby GRANTED. 25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?" (p. 536, Rollo — 64432).

"WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
library
chanrob1es virtual 1aw

prayed for.
x          x           x
x          x           x

"Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983
"O R D E R and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the
"This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply disciplinary sanctions upon
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986 in compliance with the whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of this
order of this Court dated November 25, 1986, a Motion for Extension of Time Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court."
to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on December (p. 615, Rollo - 64432)
4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to its Order dated
December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court’s orders dated
thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds Avito
same is hereby GRANTED. Saclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of
"WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title
date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 No. T-106098.
is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to
issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate." (pp. 286-287, out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners.
Rollo 64432) This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated
February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez,
private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R. No. 62042 and
a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February
1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates of titles.
"a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion "That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of
to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action. subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon
the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Branch 23 denied the petitioners’ motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987
order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this "Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February 12, Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere
1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the Pendens." (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
petitioners.
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the
of lis pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his
petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds’ motion for
motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. reconsideration.

In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case
motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the
pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T- notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were
111561 and T-111562. earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph title.

"That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of
based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido,
"‘At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional
disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio,
in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a the Providos’ counsel, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on petitioners’
memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in the Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon Cadastre.
the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.’ Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an
order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
"That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098,
T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the
No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order
‘Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maxima Provido and Perfecto Provido, directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents.’ annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit. "Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party
causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should
clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the
who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, Rules of Court; Jamora v.
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the Duran, Et Al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3,
names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E," citing cases.)" (Nataño v. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486).
G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners
Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the
library

x          x           x cases of Victoriano v. Rovira (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Parañaque
v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil. 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10
SCRA 158), to the effect that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge

Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer "We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been
certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and
other co-owners." (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied) undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under
peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and
No. 62042 contrary to the trial court’s findings that they were not. where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are
unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo defendant. Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Parañaque v.
in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)"
Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being
fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but
and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting. unsuccessfully the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,
1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed. Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds’ stand that the notice of
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571,
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil
implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the
64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

"Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the
notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the room for construction. According to Webster’s Third International Dictionary
party who caused the registration thereof." cralaw virtua1aw library of the English Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, . . .
obligation - used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function
misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The
15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a
10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge’s Order directing him to
the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper
filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the step to be taken in pursuance of any deed . . . or other instrument presented
validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
G.R. No. 64432. Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the
Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
torrens certificate of title. implementation of this Court’s already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of
the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the
requests for registration . . . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right Certificate of Title.
to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree." cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the SO ORDERED.
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the
Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds . . ."
virtua1aw library
cralaw

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231;
Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132
SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to
 SECOND DIVISION her husband Paquito, signed, executed, and delivered to BPI Family several
documents required for the loan. These documents were the Real Estate
G.R. No. 208264, July 27, 2016 Mortgage, Loan Agreement, Promissory Note, and Disclosure Statement, as
well as the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 1035 in the name of Paquito.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. RICO C.
MANALASTAS, Respondent. On the same day, Reynold Cuasay, BPI Family's bank personnel, brought the
Real Estate Mortgage and the other documents to the Office of the Register of
DECISION Deeds of San Juan City for annotation and registration of the mortgage.

CARPIO, J.: Manalastas, as Examiner of said office, examined the documents and

assessed the corresponding fees. After Cuasay paid for the fees, Manalastas
entered the mortgage in the Registration Book under Entry No. 4435/T-1035
The Case
and affixed his initials on the Real Estate Mortgage. Thereafter, Manalastas
endorsed the same document to Paras, as Acting Deputy Register of Deeds.
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision dated 25
After examination, Paras affixed his initials on the Real Estate Mortgage then
September 20122 and Resolution dated 1 July 20133 of the Court of Appeals
endorsed it further to Dee, the Register of Deeds. Finding the documents to
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114797. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision
have passed through the natural course of registration, Dee also affixed her
dated 12 September 2006 of the Office of the Ombudsman, which found Rico
signature on the Real Estate Mortgage, the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT
C. Manalastas (Manalastas) guilty of gross negligence and imposed on him
No. 1035, and the Registry Copy of TCT No. 1035, which served as collateral
the penalty of one year suspension without pay.
for the loan.
The Facts
Thereafter, BPI Family released the net proceeds of the loan in the amount of
P19,765,093.27 by crediting the Spouses Tiu's Joint Current Account/Savings
This case originated from a complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Miriam
Account No. 6835-0036-96 which was opened at BPI Family's Commonwealth
Jane M. Jacinto (Jacinto), Assistant Vice President of BPI Family Savings
branch.
Bank, Inc. (BPI Family), against Atty. Lorna S. Dee (Dee), Manalastas, and
Gilberto M. Paras (Paras), in their capacities as Register of Deeds, Examiner,
On 1 February 2001, the real Paquito Tiu, accompanied by his lawyer, Atty.
and Acting Deputy Register of Deeds, respectively, of the Office of the
Deogracias C. Eufemio, went to BPI Family's main office located in Makati
Register of Deeds of San Juan City, Metro Manila.
City. Paquito informed BPI Family's officers that the signatures of one Paquito
Tiu appearing on the loan documents were not his since he was not the same
In the Complaint, Jacinto alleged that sometime in September 2000, Dy Chiu
Paquito Tiu who signed them. Paquito presented his Owner's Duplicate Copy
Ha Tiu or Marian Dy Tiu (Marian) applied for a loan in the amount of
of TCT No. 1035 and submitted a Sworn Statement stating that he never
P20,000,000 with BPI Family. Marian requested that her husband's property
signed the loan documents applied for by Marian and that his signatures
located at 19 Lincoln St., West Greenhills, San Juan City be appraised for
therein were forged.
collateral purposes. The property was registered in the name of Paquito Tiu
(Paquito), Marian's husband, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
BPI Family immediately made a verification with the Office of the Register of
(TCT) No. 1035. BPI Family assessed the property at P3 6,072,900.
Deeds of San Juan City. Upon thorough examination, the Owner's Duplicate
Thereafter, BPI Family approved the loan application of Marian secured by the
Copy of TCT No. 1035 submitted by Marian, although on its face appeared to
residential property.
be real and authentic since the title was in a Land Registration Authority
form, turned out to be fake and spurious.
On 25 January 2001, Marian and a certain person whom she introduced as
After such discovery, Dee, as Register of Deeds, filed with the Office of the is a party to such fraud. If the real Paquito Tiu did not appear to contest the
Prosecutor (Pasig City) a case against Marian for falsification of public loan and the mortgage then the forgery would not have been discovered,
documents. bolstering Manalastas's claim that he had acted in good faith in his dealings
with the documents presented before him for registration. Moreover, the CA
Subsequently, BPI Family filed an administrative complaint 4 for Grave declared that the proximate cause of BPI Family's loss was its failure to
Misconduct with the Office of the Ombudsman against Dee, Manalastas, and discover the forgeries in the documents as well as the real identity of the
Paras. BPI Family asserted that due to their negligence and dereliction of impostor husband. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
duties in failing to examine the genuineness and authenticity of TCT No. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1035, the bank was allegedly defrauded in the amount of P16,460,671.63, WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 12,
exclusive of interest and other charges. 2006 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03- 0386-J is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Rico C. Manalastas is EXONERATED.
In a Decision dated 12 September 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman found Thus, he should be paid his backwages corresponding to the period of his
Dee, Manalastas, and Paras guilty of gross negligence and imposed on them illegal suspension.
the penalty of one year suspension without pay. The Office of the
Ombudsman declared that the government officials were grossly negligent in SO ORDERED.10
the performance of their official functions when they failed to distinguish the
discrepancies between the owner's duplicate copy of title presented for
BPI Family filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in a
registration and the original copy of the title on file with their office. The
Resolution11 dated 1 July 2013.
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Hence, the instant petition filed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, herein public respondents Rico S. Manalastas, Gilberto M.
Paras, and Atty. Lorna Salangsang Dee, are hereby meted the penalty of ONE The Issue
(1) YEAR SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY in accordance with number (2), Section
25, Republic Act No. 67705 in relation to Section 10(b) of Administrative The issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in exonerating
Order 07, Rules of Procedure, Office of the Ombudsman. Manalastas for negligence in failing to determine the genuineness of the
owner's duplicate copy of the title attached to the real estate mortgage
xxxx sought to be annotated with the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Juan
City.
SO ORDERED.6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

Since Paras retired from government service in October 2003, his penalty of
suspension was rendered moot and academic. Dee and Manalastas filed their The petition lacks merit.
separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman in an undated Order.7 chanrobleslaw
Petitioner contends that Manalastas fell short of his duties and responsibilities
as Examiner of the Office of the Register of Deeds for failing to determine the
Manalastas then filed an appeal8 with the CA. In a Decision9 dated 25 genuineness of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 1035 when referred to
September 2012, the CA reversed the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman. him for examination in the annotation and registration of the real estate
The CA ruled that Manalastas enjoys in his favor the presumption of mortgage. Petitioner maintains that there is substantial evidence to hold
regularity in the performance of his official duty and BPI Family failed to Manalastas administratively liable for negligence since it is expected of
discharge the burden of proving otherwise. The CA added that no liability Manalastas to exercise utmost caution in the examination of documents
could attach to Manalastas in a registration procured through fraud unless he related to registration. Here, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 1035
sought to be annotated and registered is an "authenticated copy." Petitioner was to have the real estate mortgage registered and annotated and not to
insists that the loanable amount with BPI Family involved P20,000,000; thus, verify the authenticity of the owner's duplicate copy of title. Prior to such
Manalastas should have been more circumspect in examining the registration, BPI Family already approved the loan. The relevant portions of
genuineness of the said document. the Decision dated 25 September 2012 state:

Manalastas, on the other hand, contends that the owner's duplicate copy of
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It must be noted that the main purpose of BPI when it brought the Real
TCT No. 1035 attached to the real estate mortgage presented to him Estate Mortgage together with the purported owner's duplicate copy of title to
purported and appeared to be authentic and there was no patent defect or the Office of the Register of Deeds was to have the said
irregularity on its face. Manalastas asserts that the falsification of the title, mortgage inscribed in the records of said office and annotated at the back of
which was an almost exact replica of the original, must have been the certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument and not  to
professionally done that reasonable care would not have immediately verify the authenticity of the owner's duplicate copy of title. In fact, BPI
detected such misrepresentation. Manalastas maintains that registration was verified the authenticity of the forged title only after the real Paquito Tiu
effected because there was no defect or irregularity on the face of the showed up and informed its head office about the forgery. 13
document which would cause a person in his position to deny such
registration.
We agree with the CA.
In the present case, Manalastas was found guilty of gross negligence for
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 14 lays down the general functions
failing to discover the falsity of the owner's duplicate copy of title attached to
of the Register of Deeds:
the real estate mortgage submitted by BPI Family to the Office of the
Register of Deeds. The Office of the Ombudsman ruled that BPI Family had chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - The office of the

adequately established Manalastas's negligence by substantial evidence. The
Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments
relevant portions of the Ombudsman's Decision dated 12 September 2006
affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the
state:
province or city wherein such office is situated.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Considering that the Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title No. 1035 attached to the
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
Real Estate Mortgage being sought to be annotated, is in an authenticated
Instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property
form only, that fact should have put the respondents on guard and therefore,
which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that
each respondent should have been more vigilant by exerting effort in
said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that
comparing and verifying its authenticity by looking into its minute details vis-
the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
a-vis the original copy on file with them.
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to
xxx [I]t is noted that, the BANK has no means of knowing whether or not a
appeal by consulta  in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
title is genuine except upon verification from the Office of the Registry of
Deeds as custodian of the original copies of the transfer certificates of title.
Lamentably, it is in this wise that respondents were grossly negligent in the Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or
performance of their official functions when they failed to distinguish the instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the
discrepancies between the owner's duplicate copy of title being presented for Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering
registration and the original copy of the title on file with their office. 12 the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial act,
it must be performed in any case. The public officer having this ministerial
duty has no choice but to perform the specific action which is the particular
However, the CA, in reversing the decision of the Ombudsman, held that the
duty imposed by law. The purpose of registration is to give notice to all
primary reason why BPI Family went to the Office of the Register of Deeds
persons. It operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to
others, but neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the
a valid one between the parties.15 chanrobleslaw misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as
is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as
Since registration of documents is a ministerial act and merely creates a is required in a criminal case, but the evidence must be enough for a
constructive notice of its contents against all third persons, 16 the Register of reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
Deeds is not authorized to determine whether or not fraud was committed in
the document sought to be registered.17 chanrobleslaw In this case, the owner's duplicate copy of title attached to the real estate
mortgage was written in an official paper of the Land Registration Authority
Here, the falsification of the owner's duplicate copy of title was professionally and contained all the markings of a genuine title. The Office of the Register of
done, that even someone exercising reasonable prudence and care would not Deeds is not mandated to investigate further than necessary when
instantly detect. On its face, the title was not apparently discernible as fake documents presented before it appear authentic. We agree with the CA when
or spurious and could pass as a genuine and bona fide document. The title it declared:
was in authentic form issued by the Land Registration Authority and an exact
reproduction of the original copy with the same serial numbers, impressions,
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [T]here is no basis to hold petitioner liable for gross negligence simply

texts, and signatures. When a document is in "authentic form," this means because he failed to discover the forgery in the owner's duplicate copy of
that at the time the document was inspected and verified, there was nothing title. It would be a grave injustice to punish him, when, in reality, he himself
extraordinary that would have placed even a reasonable person to suspect of was a victim of the defraudation.
any wrongdoing.
xxxx
As a public officer, Manalastas enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions.18 Manalastas accepted the xxx [N]o liability could attach to petitioner in all registration procured through
requirements presented by BPI Family for annotation and registration of the fraud, as in this case, unless he is a party to such fraud. Indeed, were it not
real estate mortgage in the ordinary course of transaction. His examination of for the appearance of the real Paquito Tiu, the forgery would not have been
the owner's duplicate copy of title and his recommendation to his superiors discovered. This bolsters petitioner's claim that he had acted in good faith in
for the approval of the annotation and registration of the real estate his dealings with the documents presented before him for registration. 22
mortgage were made in good faith and not tainted with gross negligence.
Also, BPI Family has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight
regularity in the performance of official duty. BPI Family would want to pass
care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
the blame to Manalastas by imputing gross negligence on his part when it is
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 19 It is
BPI Family which is the proximate cause of the loss.
characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
As mentioned by the Office of the Ombudsman in its Decision dated 12
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
September 2006, BPI Family had been remiss in approving the loan without
persons may be affected.20
first making a thorough investigation of the true identity of its clients and the
chanrobleslaw

genuineness of the documents submitted to it. The relevant portions of the

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof needed to adjudge a
Decision state:
respondent guilty is substantial evidence. In Miro v. Mendoza,21 we held that
substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x [T]he BANK may have been negligent to protect its interests when it
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
approved the loan without first making the necessary investigation normally
conducted by banking and/or financial/lending institutions, that is, i) by
It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial
ascertaining that all the documents presented are authentic and that the
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on
persons who introduce themselves as owners are indeed the owner[s] of the
property, and borrowers, if not the registered owner, are equipped with the
legal document to transact business and ii) by conducting actual character
and background investigation on Marian Dy Tiu as applicant and of Paquito
Tiu being the registered owner of the property. 23

Thus, as aptly held by the CA:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It cannot be said that by reason of the failure of petitioner to discover the

forgery, BPI was defrauded in the amount of P4,850,000.00 considering that
prior to registration of the mortgage, BPI already approved the loan applied
for by Marian upon the latter's submission of the requisite documents with
the presence of an impostor husband. In other words, as between the failure
of BPI to discover the forgeries in the documents as well as the real identity
of the impostor husband on one hand, and the failure of petitioner to discover
the forged owner's duplicate [copy] of title on the other, the former should be
considered as the proximate cause of BPI's loss. 24

As Justice Tuason opined, in his concurring and dissenting opinions in the

case of him v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,25  Registers of Deeds are not
cralawred

guardians entrusted with watching over the private interests of contracting

parties who are fully capable of looking after their own affairs. Thus, BPI
Family has to bear the burden of loss.

In sum, in the absence of any substantial evidence that Manalastas did not
properly perform his duty as Examiner or that he intentionally performed an
illegal act, then the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
should prevail. We do not find Manalastas administratively liable for gross
negligence in carrying out his official functions which he had executed within
reasonable bounds of diligence and care.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 25

September 2012 and Resolution dated 1 July 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 114797.

SO ORDERED.