TOGUAY, Paul Jeffrey U.

2019-80129
Block 4

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and
judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos
(P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the
horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and
lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.

The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to
be recoverable. So ordered.

Citation G.R. No. L-12219

Date March 15, 1918

Petitioner AMADO PICART

Respondent FRANK SMITH, JR.

PRINCIPLES/ 1. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
DOCTRINES be stated as follows:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

2. Thus, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to

3. Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before
them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was
the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
 Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

4. The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.

STREET, J.:

FACTS:
On December 12, 1912, Amado Picart was riding on his pony over a bridge. Before he had gotten
half way across, Frank approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about ten (10) or twelve (12) miles per hour. As the Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him
was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.

The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road
for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side.

Smith continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock
of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

The Court of First Instance of La Union absolved Smith from liability Picart appealed. Picart
sought to recover PhP 31,000 for damages.

ISSUE:
1 whether or not Smith in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence
such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

2. Whether or not Picart’s conduct or Smith’s is immediately and directly responsible.

RULING:
1. YES. Smith in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as
gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

In the case at bar, As the Smith started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the
horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the
bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away;
and from this moment it was not longer within the power of Picart to escape being run down by going
to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith; and it was
his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the
bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of
collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He
was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in
view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here
confronted him. When the Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.

Thus, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.

CONCLUSION:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take
care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the
duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can
be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence
in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

2. The negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the
accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable
with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.

This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the
defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate
himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as
a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment Picart had no
opportunity to avoid the accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other
words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on
his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the
condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery.

Why do we have to know there is negligence on the part of the injured? BECAUSE while contributory
negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received
in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other
party.