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IAF Equipmentand Force Structure Requirementst

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156 views30 pages

IAF Equipmentand Force Structure Requirementst

IAF Equipmentand Force Structure Requirementst IAF Equipmentand Force Structure Requirementst

Uploaded by

Afeef Ibn Albra
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements

to Meet External Threats, 2032

Vivek Kapur*

In keeping with the theme ‘IAF Deep Multidimensional Change 2032:


Imperatives and a Roadmap’, this article focuses on the responses to the
external threat challenges that are likely to be face by IAF in 2032. These
external challenges have been identified to be the individual Chinese
and Pakistani threats as well as a combined Sino-Pak threat. The article
confines itself to developing a possible force structure only in terms of
numbers of combat and support aircraft of various types for 2032. It
contains an examination of the currently planned IAF structure for the
year 2022 and beyond, against the war-gamed force requirement for
winning wars along our borders while retaining capability to project
force in areas of national interest beyond our borders. The article
underscores the fact that the current plan for the force structure requires
to be enhanced to meet the challenges successfully.

Introduction
This article follows ‘Challenges for the Indian Air Force: 2032’ (Vol. 7,
No. 1, January-March 2013), dealing with the main challenges Indian Air
Force (IAF) is likely to face in 2032, when it completes a century. Here,
I assess possible responses to the external challenges posed by the Peoples
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF). I do
so separately in a single-front war scenario against either one and follow it
up with a worst case scenario of a simultaneous war against both. I begin

* The author was a Research Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
New Delhi. The article is based upon open source material and reflects the views of the
author.

ISSN 0976-1004 print


© 2014 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, January–March 2014, pp. 65–94
66  Journal of Defence Studies

with explaining the method of working out force level requirements,


followed by the working out of required force levels for a one-front border
war. I follow this up with an expansion of this force level calculation to
cover a two/two-and-a-half front war situation. The article culminates in
a suggested force structure for the 2032 time period in order for the IAF
to meet all its expected commitments effectively.

Future Force-level Projection Methodology


The first possible method of calculating force-level requirements is
to work on units of force per unit of border length. While it may be
feasible for land forces, it is unsuitable for air forces due to the fact that
an aircraft or a squadron of fighter–bombers cannot be assigned to, say,
x km along the border as they are able to reach much larger distances
laterally as well as longitudinally. Moreover, the lack of persistence1 of
aircraft and multiple mission execution capability makes this method
even more infeasible. Lacking time, information and resources needed
for a full target selection, evaluation/analysis, followed by over-the-target
(OTR)2 calculations along both of the two land frontiers, I will utilize
a simplified form of war gaming-derived force-on-force attrition-based
method to calculate my assessed IAF’s force structure needs for 2032.
To avoid OTR calculation complexities and keeping in mind multirole
capabilities of aircraft planned for IAF service in the future, I will utilize
an air-to-air scenario for my calculations on the assumption that in an era
of transparency of the battlespace,3 all aerial missions4 will be challenged
by opposing air power and, hence, air-to-air engagement disparity can be
leveraged to advantage.
It is quite true that the most difficult place to destroy a fighter is in
aerial combat and air power purists will rise to object to this method due
to their legacy knowledge over the years. Despite this, I will look at the
air-to-air arena due to reasons of reduced complexity and the traditional
Indian reluctance to initiate offensive operations ab initio;5 the latter is
very important for seizing air superiority with enemy air power destruction
on the ground.6 I will then compare my results with the publicly available
IAF plans for 2032 to come to my recommendations for force structure
development.

Nature of Aerial Engagements


The IAF has trained to very high standards in within visual range (WVR)
combat and is arguably second to none in this field, as buttressed by
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 67

IAF experience in international exercises7 with advanced air forces that


operate state-of-the-art Western equipment. However, advent of new
generation, infra red (IR)-guided all-aspect air-to-air missiles (A4Ms),8
such as the R-73E, Python-4, Python-5, AIM-9X, ASRAAM9 and Iris-T,
has made the WVR arena exceptionally lethal, wherein likelihood of one
of the engaged aircraft being shot down is very high, with possibility of a
superior pilot being shot down by even a young pilot if the latter carries
a more capable weapon.10 This harsh fact coupled with the relentless
advance of technology has led to IAF progressively moving towards
beyond visual range (BVR) aerial combat. In the BVR arena, more
control can be exercised on the outcome of an engagement. Starting with
exercise Garuda-I in 2003,11 the IAF has, through exposure to advanced
air forces, such as the United States Air Force (USAF), Royal Air Force
(RAF) and the French Air Force, and through in-house effort, developed
an advanced understanding of BVR aerial combat and fully integrated
this into its training since the late twentieth century.12

Attrition in Aerial Warfare


First, it is important to understand that, more than the total number of
aircraft deployed, what matters more in war is the number of sorties13
that can be flown per unit time period. Total numbers matter but good
serviceability state and ability to sustain high sortie generation rates
matter more as these enable more to be done with less.14 Hence, the IAF
must prioritize increasing serviceability rates across all service equipments.
High attrition rates are not sustainable by any air force.15 While imposing
a very high attrition rate on the enemy is desirable, it may not be feasible
given resource constraints. An attrition rate of 4 per cent imposed on the
enemy, in my opinion, is adequate for our purposes if our own attrition
can be contained to below 1 per cent.
In order to simplify the discussion, I will now consider only air-to-air
engagements while assuming a common standard attrition figure of 0.25–
0.5 per cent to both sides from their opponent’s surface-based weapons
(AAA and SAMs).16 Thus, in this deliberately simplified discussion, only
the ability to apply a skewed air-to-air attrition on the enemy would
decide the outcome.
The history of aerial warfare brings out the importance of higher
numbers of aircraft in a specific engagement for success. Two forces
equal in numbers and reasonably close in equipment and skills have
tended to have equal losses in combat. On the other hand, whenever
68  Journal of Defence Studies

the numbers ratio has become favourable to one side, its losses as well as
loss percentages have fallen disproportionately, with the opposite effect
on the less numerical party.17 Thus, technology and skills irrespective,
numbers do matter18 in aerial combat.19 This remains true even today.
The slogan of ‘fighting outnumbered and winning’ has no place at the
operational level of war20 unless a very large technological asymmetry
exists.21 It should be remembered that in more recent times, while war
fighting has essentially remained the same, what has changed is just the
way of inflicting the desired damage. Hence, the IAF must train very
hard to increase its equipment serviceability rates as well as combat crew
proficiency. This could be achieved through intense training and realistic
exercises.

Single-front War Requirements


A single-front war may require to be fought against either Pakistan or
China. It would be prudent to prepare to fight the more powerful of the
two as this preparation would automatically ensure that the lesser foe can
also be dealt with.22 However, major differences between the two threats
force a separate evaluation of each. China wields a more technologically
advanced and numerically superior PLAAF, while PAF is a relatively small
force well trained to fight against a superior foe.

Single-front War: Western Front (Pakistan)


The Western air forces, with which PAF has exercised regularly since
the 1950s, speak very highly of the professionalism and competence of
PAF combat crew. Further, PAF has consistently trained to apply itself
innovatively against a numerically superior IAF. Comparing the available
open source information on third party, post-exercise assessments on the
PAF and its pilots’ participation with distinction in Arab–Israel Wars,23
I conclude that the PAF is about even with IAF on the intangibles of
tactical innovation, sortie generation rates and aircrew skill/competence.24
Thus, I place IAF and PAF combat personnel at par giving a comparative
ratio of 1:1. So, in sum, one aircrew–aircraft combination of PAF would
be equal to a similar combination of the IAF. In such a situation, the
larger and better-equipped force could be expected to prevail. The IAF, in
order to deal with the PAF, would require fielding a force roughly similar
in numbers to PAF, which, it was estimated in the previous article, to
comprise a force with 61425 fighters in 2032. It could be expected to
have eight to 12 AWACS/AEW&C aircraft and six Flight Refuelling
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 69

Aircraft (FRA). The currently planned IAF force of 42 (756 aircraft) to


4526 (810 aircraft)27 squadrons would prove adequate to dominate PAF.
On the western front, given the IAF’s practice of generating at least three
to five sorties per aircraft per day, the IAF would be able to generate
considerably more sorties per unit time than PAF, thus gaining an edge
and maintaining it. As most IAF aircraft are planned to be multirole
capable, the same aircraft would undertake air-to-ground missions as
well; reducing attrition to ground-based air defences through extensive
use of stand of weapons. The IAF would have an advantage in this respect
over PAF through a superior surface-based anti-aircraft capability derived
from its medium-range surface-to-air missiles (MR-SAMs), long-range
surface-to-air missiles (LR-SAMs), Spyder, Akash, and other weapons.
The PAF is unlikely to be able to match all these weapons. Currently, its
most advanced SAM system is planned to be the Anglo-Italian SPADA
2000 and Chinese HQ-9, which are not as advanced as the IAF’s under-
development MR-SAM and LR-SAM. Even PAF’s purchase of Chinese
reverse engineered S-300 SAMs would not tilt this balance away from IAF.
Thus, in addition to higher attrition suffered in air-to-air engagements
through being able to field lesser numbers per engagement, PAF is also
likely to suffer higher attrition than IAF to surface-based weapons.
Hence, a 42–45 fighter squadron IAF in 2032 is likely to be more
than adequate to deal with the threat from PAF in a single-front situation
where the western front alone is considered. Through careful planning,
it may be possible to make do with even as few as 35 squadrons (630
fighters)28 on the western front, thus sparing seven to 10 squadrons for
manning other areas, without the final outcome on the western front
changing, save for it taking a few days more to achieve a favourable
resolution to the fighting in the West.

Single-front War: The North-East Front (China)


The most likely area for a possible conflict with People’s Republic of China
(PRC) is the North-East (NE) in a situation of PRC attempting forcible
occupation of Arunachal Pradesh (AP). This situation is also the most
challenging given the lack of good Indian infrastructure in the NE. With
the focus on the NE as the most likely area of border conflict, Lanzhou
Military Region (MR) has not been examined in detail.
China has a vast network of airfields in its MRs. However, the
airfields in the Chengdu MR, that faces India across the Himalayas, are
concentrated primarily in the Yunan province to the east of India, with
70  Journal of Defence Studies

Table 1  Distances between Chinese Airfields and Indian Areas of


Interest in the NE32
Yuanmou Airfield (taken
Lhasa Region Bangda Airfield
Distances between as representative of Yunan
Airfields (east Tibet)
province’s many airfields)
West AP–Tibet 170 km   560 km   940 km
border near
Bhutan (Tawang
area in this)
Middle of AP– 230 km   255 km   750 km
Tibet border
Eastern end of 370 km   290 km   485 km
AP–Tibet border
Tezpur 325 km   584 km   890 km
Chabua 455 km   395 km   781 km
Jorhat 430 km   501 km   920 km
Gawahati 355 km   725 km 1,009 km
Bagdogra 381 km   967 km 1,330 km
Kolkata 730 km 1,195 km 1,395 km
Kalaikunda (KKD) 810 km 1,347 km 1,556 km

very few airfields on the Tibetan Plateau.29 Of the several airfields in


Yunan province, Yuanmou airfield is taken as representative due its near-
central location in the airfield clusters.30 Bangda airfield lies towards the
eastern edge of the Tibetan Plateau towards Kalaikunda.31
The distances given in Table 1 indicate that most potential targets in
the Chengdu MR would lie within IAF’s radius of action (RoA), while
all of the NE would be within the PLAAF’s RoA.33 Both PLAAF and
IAF are expected to have adequate FRA in 2032. The RoA of all aircraft
is expected to be increased by approximately 60 per cent with in-flight
refuelling (IFR). Hence, RoA is not likely to be a limiting factor for IAF
and PLAAF to engage all targets in the theatre of operations. Tactical
routing, when desired, would also be possible given the two air forces’
fighters’ RoA.

IAF versus PLAAF Combat Evaluation


Combat Crew Capabilities
Assessments of PLAAF capabilities bring out several shortcomings such
as the PLAAF’s historical focus on air defence to the exclusion of other
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 71

missions.34 In the last few years, this has changed as the newer aircraft
inducted have viable air-to-surface capability, including ability to deliver
PGMs. The PLAAF training for air-to-surface missions has traditionally
been weak, a point highlighted in the most authoritative open source
Western works from the RAND Corporation.35 It must be expected
that having learned the lessons of the two Gulf Wars as well as Coalition
operations in Kosovo, the PLAAF will work towards remedying training
drawbacks. The PLAAF is also believed to suffer from inadequate realistic
combat training in air-to-air missions,36 a weakness difficult to overcome
in a short time period, though it is likely that given the traditional
determination shown by the Chinese in most endeavours, they will do
their utmost to overcome this drawback.37 The PLAAF has commenced
air exercises with PAF.38 This could lead to PLAAF learning advanced
tactics from PAF which has had continuous exposure to Western air
forces since the 1950s. Therefore, while most equipment in service with
PLAAF and IAF in the period under consideration is likely to be more
or less evenly matched, the inclination to rubbish PLAAF combat crew
capabilities must be avoided. The PLAAF is expected to train ever more
effectively for a multitude of combat roles.
The IAF, in contrast, despite its insular attitude from 1947 till the early
twenty-first century, has been able to train its combat crews effectively
and of late, has also been able to afford to buy/develop the sophisticated
weapon systems needed to be truly effective. The IAF performance in
international exercises with modern Western air forces has convincingly
and consistently demonstrated that its training standards in both air-
to-air as well as air-to-surface missions are second to none and that its
combat crew are able to adapt to dynamic air situations and implement
innovative and effective combat solutions to bring engagements to a
favourable conclusion.39
The IAF has been exploiting advanced BVR combat theory and tactics
for at least two decades as on date, while the PLAAF, as per open source
material, is not known to have fully implemented such tactical applications.
In the years ahead, PLAAF is likely to fully integrate BVR training into
its tactics. Given the initial lead enjoyed by IAF, it should be able to stay
ahead of PLAAF with respect to advanced combat tactics in both BVR
and WVR scenarios. In this context, it is assessed that, with respect to
PLAAF, IAF is likely to retain an aerial combat efficiency and effectiveness
advantage of, at worst, 1.5:1 and, at best, 1.9:1, with a mean figure of
1.7:1 advantage for IAF.40 The rationale for this advantage is buttressed by
72  Journal of Defence Studies

the fact that Chinese media, such as Global Times, Xinhua and Chinamil.
com.cn, prominently display articles on live weapon firing training and
bad weather/night missions by PLAAF aircrew as great achievements.41
Such things are routine in IAF and not mentioned as they are considered
par for the course from raw ‘flight cadet’ stage onwards. Converting these
figures to more usable ratios through inverting them 1.7:1 in IAF’s favour
can be used as 0.588 IAF equals 1.0 PLAAF or 1 PLAAF crew–aircraft
combination 42 0.588 IAF crew–aircraft combination (alternatively, this
can be stated as 59 IAF aircraft are able to match 100 PLAAF aircraft, of
the same generation).

Sortie Generation Rates


The PLAAF has historically been known for poor aircraft utilization rates.
These have been reported to be consistently as low as two to three sorties
per aircraft per week.43 In the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War, PLAAF averaged
one sortie per aircraft (deployed for the war) every five days!44 The PLAAF
is also reported to suffer from poor logistics support for its aircraft and
other weapons systems.45 The bulk of the data supporting such claims
dates back to the mid-1990s. Subsequent to that time, PLAAF has
inducted more modern equipment. It is assessed that these new inductions
and efforts to enhance effectiveness of the PLAAF would lead to better
utilization rates. In early January 2013, the Chinese leadership explicitly
called on the PLA to prepare to fight and win wars.46 For PLAAF, in
the future period under consideration, a utilization rate of two sorties
per fighter aircraft per 24 hour period is likely to be the norm. While
equipment can be relatively easily obtained or built, training for higher
efficiencies of combat crew is a difficult and time-intensive task which
cannot be hurried along. Given the state of PLAAF in the mid-1990s,
the improvement assumed for it in 2032 is considered reasonable from
the author’s own experience in training establishments of various types
and theoretical study of human productivity.47 The PLAAF is expected
to have 633 fighter aircraft (including 120 fifth generation, 380 fourth+
generation and 153 fourth generation or earlier) deployed in the Chengdu
and Lanzhou MRs in 2032.48 However, given the peace along its other
borders and being the controller of the escalation ladder against Taiwan
and its other neighbours, PRC could induct more aircraft from other
regions when required. However, Chengdu MR, aligned against India’s
north-east, is unlikely to be able to sustain more than 1,000 fighters at any
given time.49 Thus, PLAAF could be expected to fly a maximum of 2,000
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 73

sorties per day.50 The PLAAF’s force multipliers in view of their greater
complexity could be expected to fly a single mission per day, providing
cover for their fighters almost round the clock in the battle area.
The IAF, traditionally, has catered for a rate of utilization of three
sorties per day for strike aircraft and five sorties per day for air defence
aircraft and has regularly trained for achieving these utilization rates during
exercises. New aircraft inductions with simpler maintenance schedules51
should lead to three sorties per aircraft per day being achievable by all IAF
fighter–bomber aircraft on a sustained basis.52
BVR combat is expected to be IAF’s choice in terms of engagements
with extensive ground-based and aerostat/AWACS/AEW&C cover
available to friendly fighters. For achieving a better than 2:0 exchange
ratio over PLAAF, IAF would need to fly more than 2,000, ideally 3,000–
4,000, sorties per day. At a rate of three sorties per aircraft per day, IAF
could achieve this with 1,000–1,300 fighters in the theatre. The IAF
would need, after applying the combat efficiency factor, between 1,000
× 0.588 = 58853 and 1,300 × 0.588 = 76454 fighter aircraft in order to be
able to achieve the objective of winning against the PLAAF in the NE
war. Given the similar technology levels of the two air forces, equipment
availability rates are assumed to be the same, say, 80–85 per cent.55 With
IAF’s norm of 16 + 2 aircraft per squadron, a total of (588/18) = 32.66
33 to (764/18) = 42.4 43 fighter squadrons would be required in the NE
against PLAAF in order to meet required sortie numbers in the expected
conflict with China and win. The IAF, while engaged in conflict with
China in the NE, cannot leave the northern borders with China as well as
the borders with Pakistan unguarded. Hence, IAF will require deploying
adequate force along these two borders to ensure that it is able to deal
with any unforeseen military situation there. The currently assessed force
levels for India, Pakistan and China are tabulated in Table 2. Minimum
precautionary requirements along the Indo-Pakistan border are likely to
be 15–20 squadrons of third-generation or fourth+ generation fighters
apart from other weapon systems. An additional five fighter squadrons
are likely to be required to be deployed along the central sector’s northern
borders and these squadrons could form part of the NE forces that are
being routinely rotated for rest and recuperation, hence not requiring any
further force levels to be built up.
While the estimated force levels for 2032 for PAF and PLAAF were
covered in the previous article of this project, the assessed IAF 2032 force
structure, as is known in open sources, is placed at Appendix ‘A’.
74  Journal of Defence Studies

Table 2  Comparison of Currently Known Equipment Plans for 2032


IAF PAF PLAAF
Fighter 810, including 154 614, including 20+ 2,464, including over
fifth generation fifth generation 300 fifth generation
Transport/ 322, including 20 Adequate, 8–12 336, including 11+
Special AWACS/AEW&C, AWACS, 4+ FRA, AWACS, 4+ Recce/
Mission 18 FRA, 172+ 54+ RPA Surv/Elint, 3+
Remote Piloted Airborne Command
Aircraft (RPA) Post (ACP)
Helicopter 522, including 8–10 70+ 538, including 250+
attack helicopter units attack helicopters
Source: Vivek Kapur, ‘Challenges for Indian Air Force: 2032’, Journal of Defence
Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 79–108.

Assessed IAF Future Force Structure Required


Fighters
Totalling up, the IAF would need a total of 33 to 43 (+20) = 53–63
fighter squadrons (1,044–1,224 fighters)56 of fifth, fourth+ and fourth
generation in 2032 in order to be able to win a single-front war with
China in the NE, while keeping adequate forces available for dealing with
any concurrent threat from Pakistan. The IAF is currently cleared by the
Government of India (GoI) to build up to 42–45 squadrons by the end of
the Thirteenth Plan period (2027).57 The IAF expects to be at 45 fighter
squadron strength by 2032. An additional two to three squadron worth
could be held by units such as Tactics and Air Combat Development
Establishment (TACDE), Aircraft Systems Testing Establishment
(ASTE) and Air Defence (AD) Flights, giving IAF an actual force of
47–48 squadron worth in 2032. Hence, in order to cover the gap while
striving for this planned 45 squadron strength, IAF must initiate the case
for further expansion to a force level of up to 5858 fighter squadrons.
This further increase could be done in two ways. The first is through
GoI sanction for an increase in strength to 58 squadrons. The second
method could be to get sanction to form a reserve force on the same lines
as the US Air National Guard. This latter method is likely to prove more
economical in manpower and equipment exploitation.

Aircraft versus Missiles


India’s ballistic missiles are operated by the Strategic Forces Command59
and these missiles, with their relatively low accuracy, cannot replace air
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 75

strikes.60 There is an argument for replacement of fighter aircraft with


cruise missiles for attack missions. This could form part of the solution
once India’s Nirbhay, a long-range cruise missile, is inducted alongside
Brahmos. However, cruise missiles have many limitations.61 Supersonic
cruise missiles such as Brahmos suffer from very short ranges.62 Cruise
missiles are less effective against targets with very small vertical dimensions
due to their flight profiles. Additionally, a single cruise missile addresses
just one target and many may be required to destroy a single target. Aircraft
are able to fly multiple missions taking on different targets in each of
these. Therefore, a one-to-one exchange of fighters with cruise missiles is
unlikely to be feasible. At most, cruise missiles could be deployed to make
up for shortage of a few aircraft or to supplement the fighter effort. The
currently under-development subsonic long-range cruise missile, Nirbhay,
could supplement the relatively shorter-range Brahmos in delivering a
long-range precision strike capability. If a ground-based surface-to-surface
missile unit of the IAF were to field, say, 60 Nirbhay and 48 Brahmos
missiles, it could be considered to be equivalent in combat potential to
a single flying squadron with a dedicated air-to-ground strike role. Such
units could be used as alternatives to strike squadrons.

Force Multipliers
The strength of currently planned High Value Airborne Assets (HVAAs),
20 AWACS and 12 FRA, would be adequate if these inductions proceed
as already planned.63

Training
Combat training requires to be ramped up even more than today to ensure
that a combat-efficiency edge is maintained and progressively increased
over the PLAAF.

Infrastructure
Infrastructure of the IAF in the west is very well developed but the east
has been ignored to a large extent. However, with the China threat
looming, it is essential that IAF rapidly refurbish its infrastructure in
the NE. This would entail upgradation of aircraft operating surfaces and
hardening of airfield facilities64 at existing airfields and development of
new airfields to full-fledged IAF operational base level. A good road and
railway network also needs to be laid in the area to enable efficient logistics
flow. In view of long gestation periods for infrastructure development
76  Journal of Defence Studies

projects, it is essential that IAF start on this infrastructure development


task immediately.

IAF Organization
The IAF is organized into two functional commands—Maintenance
Command (MC) and Training Command (TC)—and five operational
commands: Western Air Command (WAC); South Western Air Command
(SWAC); Central Air Command (CAC); Eastern Air Command (EAC);
and Southern Air Command (SAC).65 The IAF has traditionally treated
WAC and SWAC as the two proper operational commands. Given
the potent PLAAF threat, EAC and CAC would require to be treated
as the prioritized operational commands alongside WAC.66 The IAF
organizational issues will be discussed in-depth in a later article.

Manning Levels
The IAF must endeavour to ensure that its combat crew to equipment
ratio is raised to at least 2.5:1 in order to enable effective utilization of
the available war-fighting potential. This will require an extensive and
focused training programme. Support manpower would also require to be
adequate in numbers and training. This aspect will be looked at in detail
in a later article.

Transport Aircraft
The ground infrastructure in terms of roads in the NE has been neglected
over the years, but is now reportedly in process of being refurbished.67
Indian Army would mobilize and move forward to its border posts and
locations by road with induction from the rest of the country being by
rail or road. The Indian Army is expected to deploy eight mountain
divisions68 on the land borders in the NE.69 The enemy is expected to
interdict at least some of the roads required by our army for resupply of
men and material. In a case of land routes of resupply being interdicted,
there will be need for aerial resupply of petrol, oil and lubricants (POL),
ammunition and other essential stores to such army units. There may also,
at times, be need for induction of work reinforcement to some locations
as well as inter-area transfer of troops and equipment to meet emergent
situations. With eight divisions deployed in the area, it would be prudent
for IAF to cater for aerial resupply of at least two divisions engaged in
combat. ‘Inter-area transport of troops’ capability should exist for at least
two mountain brigades.
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 77

It is understood that all army units would have integral reserve supplies
for emergencies. A worst-case situation is considered here of reserve not
being available or being already expended. The IAF transport assets
cannot be built up in a hurry; hence, it is prudent to have assets in being
catering for the worst-case situation. One division has approximately
15,000 troops and includes three to four artillery brigades, each with 18
guns. Assuming that each gun fires 150 rounds per day, the replenishment
requirement in terms of ammunition for an artillery brigade would be 18
× 150 × 40 kg = 108,000 kg per day. Thus, for each division, 108 × 3 =
324.0 tons of artillery ammunition requires to be catered for in addition
to 15 tons of food at the rate of 1 kg of dry ration per day per man and
15,000 × 5 kg = 75 tons of small arms ammunition of various calibres per
day. In addition, POL to the tune of 14 tons would also be needed, giving
total airlift requirement of 428 tons per day per division. If IAF caters for
two divisions, this amounts to 856 tons per day.
An IL-76 can, in practice, carry 40 tonnes of load; a C-17 can carry
77 tonnes; and a C-130J can carry 20 tonnes. A Mi-17 helicopter can
carry 3 tonnes up to an altitude of close to 5–6 km above mean sea level
(AMSL); and a CH-47 Chinook can carry 4 tonnes to similar altitudes.70
Air supply of stores will require a mix of airdropping and air landing
due to limited availability of drop zones of required size. Air landing is
not likely to be possible by IL-76 aircraft, while C-17, C-130/Medium
Transport Aircraft (MTA) may be able to land at some forward airstrips
and Mi-17/Chinook helicopters may be able to land at most locations. Of
the total load to be delivered to a division, it is assumed that 60 per cent
can be airdropped and the remainder needs to be air landed, with 20 per
cent of the total air–land load able to be done by C-130 class of aircraft
and the last 20 per cent of the total requiring helicopter carriage due to
topography. Thus, with this calculation, 0.6 × 856 = 513.6 tonnes would
require to be airdropped daily by IL-76 /C-17 aircraft, which would
consume 12.86 or 13 IL-76 sorties or 6.67 = 7 C-17 sorties; alternatively,
this could be done in 26 C-130/MTA sorties (at the rate of 20 tonnes per
sortie).
For transport aircraft, in view of the much greater time needed for
loading and offloading, it is assumed that two sorties are possible per day.
Thus, the heavy-lift effort requires at least seven serviceable IL-76 or four
C-17 aircraft being available for operation in the theatre. Air landing of
171.2 tonnes would require nine C-130 sorties. If the entire airdrop effort
is carried out by Il-76/C-17 aircraft—with C-130s not being required to
78  Journal of Defence Studies

carry out any airdrops—then nine serviceable C-130s would be required


in the theatre.”Taking serviceability of 60 per cent for IL-76 and 80 per
cent for C-130 and C-17 aircraft, this translates to a requirement of 12
IL-76 aircraft, five C-17 aircraft and 12 C-130 aircraft in theatre, working
out to one C-17 squadron and 1.5 squadrons each of C-130 and IL-76
aircraft (at the IAF norm of eight to 10 aircraft per transport squadron),
with some spare effort available for emergencies and purely IAF tasks.
Airlifting of 171.2 tonnes by Mi-17 would require 57.06 or 58 sorties
from 29 serviceable aircraft in theatre, which would require a total of 39
aircraft in theatre at average serviceability rate of 75 per cent. By CH-47
Chinooks, this would require 43 sorties from 22 CH-47 helicopters. At
75 per cent serviceability, this works out to 29 aircraft. This translates to
four Mi-17/three Chinook squadrons in the theatre (at the IAF norm of
10 aircraft per helicopter squadron).71
The Mi-17/Chinook helicopters could also supplement the available
firepower in the area in the armed helicopter role. With Indian Army
expanding its aviation corps to include integral intra-theatre heli-
lift capability and attack helicopter capability, this rotary wing should
be adequate. The IAF’s planned two squadrons of AH-64 Apache
attack helicopters would be deployed in this area and by 2032, should
be expanded to six attack helicopter squadrons in the NE to give each
division dedicated helicopter fire support capability. Indian Army’s
own attack helicopters would cover the shortfall, if any. Eight advanced
light helicopter (ALH) squadrons would be required to provide light air
communication capability to the divisions deployed in the NE. Remnants
of the upgraded Mi-25 attack helicopters would remain on the western
front in view of their limited altitude capability, with light combat
helicopter (LCH) units deployed in the northern areas.
Other tasks for IL-76 and C-130 class of aircraft would remain, such
as air supply of troops in the north Jammu and Kashmir region, including
Siachen Glacier, and other operational tasks in WAC, SWAC, CAC, SAC
and MC. These tasks could, it is estimated, be met by one squadron each
of IL-76, C-17 and C-130/ MTA aircraft, while these commands outside
the eastern theatre of operations would require a total of eight Mi-17/
Chinook and 10 ALH helicopter squadrons for IAF roles and missions,
including aid to civil authorities. It should be borne in mind that IAF’s
helicopter force would be supplemented by Indian Army’s own expanded
aviation assets.
The total number of transport and helicopter squadrons comes to two-
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 79

and-a-half squadrons of IL-76 and C-130 aircraft each, two squadrons of


C-17 and 12 Mi-17, 11 Chinook and 18 ALH squadrons.

Structure for a Two-front War


Hence, for fighting a 1.5 or two-front war,72 the IAF would need
total of 33–43 (+20) = 53–63 fighter squadrons of fifth, fourth+ and
fourth-generation fighters in 2032. The total number of transport
and helicopter squadrons required comes to: two C-17; 2.5 IL-
76 and C-130/MTA squadrons; 12 Mi-17; 11 Chinook; 18 ALH
Dhruv; and eight attack helicopter squadrons. In addition, the IAF
would need ‘Enhanced Prithvi’-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems, adequate SAM and AAA assets for defence of its bases and
other vital areas (VAs) and vital points (VPs). The IAF, reportedly,
already has plans to cover its entire territory with ground-based radar
cover and aerostat radars supplemented by AWACS. The AWACS
and AEW&C requirements would be 20 aircraft in five squadrons of
four aircraft each, as planned already.73 The IAF would also require
reorganization to some extent to incorporate introduction of advanced
systems such as ABMs. Progressive induction of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) is expected to continue, keeping in mind that UAVs
will supplement and not replace manned aircraft in most tasks until
such time as their technology matures adequately for unmanned
combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to be effective weapon systems.
Deployment of two-thirds of this IAF is envisaged to be in EAC and
CAC, with the remaining one-third being based in WAC, SWAC
and SAC.

Recommended Overall Force Structure of IAF, 2032


In order to be able to fight a two-front war and win in the NE, while
maintaining the status quo in the west, the IAF would require building a
force as listed below. This projection also takes into account the IAF’s role
in carrying out its wartime tasks effectively.
• Fighters: 53–63 squadrons of (fifth generation, 4.5 generation,
fourth++ generation and fourth+ generation) fighters. The 53
squadron force would be adequate in case the numbers tend to
be biased towards fifth-generation fighters; and if the majority
(over 50 per cent) of the fighters are 4.5 generation or below, 63
squadrons would be prudent to cater for a two-front war. After
80  Journal of Defence Studies

a careful study of the ground targets to be destroyed, IAF could


elect to field surface-to-surface cruise missile units in place of a few
squadrons. This argument is not being extended in this article as
a target study would be required to cull out those predetermined
targets that can be destroyed through cruise missile attack. This
study requires access to the lists of predetermined targets that are
believed to be prepared in peacetime by all military services the
world over. These lists are almost certainly classified and hence,
cannot be accessed. In addition, towards OOAC may need to be
maintained. Induction of long-range cruise missiles could reduce
fighter numbers marginally. The final mix of fighters and long-
range cruise missiles would require to be worked out by operations
staff aware of actual target sets and operational requirements.
Without live data, it is assessed, that a force of about 90–100
stealth-modified Nirbhay/other long-range cruise missiles could
be counted against one attack/strike squadron.74
• Transport Aircraft: For the border war and conventional tasks,
IAF would require two C-17, 2.5 IL-76 and 3.5 C-130/MTA
squadrons. For OOAC tasks, further squadrons would need to be
maintained.
• Force Multipliers: IAF would require 20 AWACS /AEW&C and 12
FRA aircraft. The OOAC task would require additional AWACS
or AEW&C.
• Helicopters: IAF would require a total of 12 Mi-17-1V/11 Chinook
class and 18 ALH, 10 attack helicopter class of helicopter units
for its peace and wartime tasks. This would be supplemented by
Indian Army’s aviation corps.
• Weapons: IAF would rely primarily on PGMs for ground attack due
to requirements of combat effectiveness. Costs should be reduced
through indigenous design and manufacture of PGMs.
• Organization: IAF would require building infrastructure, especially
in the NE, on a war footing. Air commands would be reorganized
to make EAC and CAC full-fledged operational commands at par
with or even ahead of WAC, with SWAC assuming a quasi-feeder
command role.

Recommendations
The examination of the required force structure to effectively meet the
external challenges lead to the following recommendations:
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 81

• IAF must pursue its re-equipment plan with vigour. The currently
planned 45 squadron force should be expanded to 53–63 fighter
squadrons. If the numbers of fifth-generation fighters are increased,
then 53 squadrons may suffice. However, if 4.5 and fourth+
generation aircraft numbers are enhanced, then a target of 63
squadrons should be aimed for. These figures are quite reasonable
considering that as far ago as the mid-1960s, the Tata Committee
had recommended a 64 squadron air force for India at a time when
the threat was far more benign.75 Additional forces should be raised
for OOAC requirements. Induction of stealthy long-range cruise
missiles could help moderate these squadron numbers somewhat.
• Till production can be ramped up, the retirement of older types
of aircraft should be delayed in order to maintain numbers. In the
worst case, aircraft types already retired could be reinstated to cover
shortfalls.
• In the period between this stopgap measure and induction of
the definitive aircraft, diplomacy must be used to ensure that no
military situation requires utilization of force.
• The transport fleet should be upgraded to include two squadrons
of C-17, 2.5 squadrons of IL-76 and 3.5 squadrons of C-130/
MTA.
• IAF’s helicopter fleet should comprise 12 Mi-17-1V/11 Chinook,
18 ALH class helicopters squadrons and 10 attack helicopter
squadrons, in addition to 12 VIP duty AW101 helicopters in one
squadron.
• Air commands be realigned to designate EAC, CAC and WAC
as the main operational commands with two-third of IAF assets
earmarked for EAC, WAC and CAC; SWAC be an operational
command of relatively lesser importance and a ‘feeder command’
for EAC, CAC and WAC.
• HVAA plans for 20 AWACS/AEW&C and 12 FRA be aggressively
pursued. A further six AWACS/ AEW&C be raised and maintained
for OOAC tasks.
• Currently known plans for upgradation of the radar and other
electronic systems be progressed as planned.
• SAMs be inducted in adequate numbers as per current plans
and the indigenous ballistic missile defence (BMD) system be
integrated into the IAF’s AD system.
• Infrastructure development, especially in the NE, including rail,
82  Journal of Defence Studies

road links to airfields as well as development of new military


airfields, while enhancing facilities at existing airfields, be taken up
on a war footing. Hardening of airfields should be a priority.
• Development of PGMs be prioritized to enable their widespread
use in all IAF air-to-ground missions. PGMs would be the most
common weapons used by IAF with indigenous design and
manufacture to reduce costs.
• Stealthy versions of Nirbhay, Brahmos and Brahmos-II be
developed on priority.
• Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to
be tasked to develop versions of Prithvi, Agni and other ballistic
missiles with terminal homing capability for higher accuracy.
• Training be prioritized in order to maintain an edge over the
potential adversaries.
• A separate OOAC force be especially raised, trained and maintained
under a designated joint expeditionary force command apart from
the regular air force structure.
• IAF must become a major and active stakeholder in the development
of new technology and tactics through increased interaction with
institutions of higher learning if required.

Appendix A: IAF Planned Force for 2032


The known slow progress of Indian R&D as well as procurement
programmes has been factored in in the assessments of the IAF’s Assessed
2032 ORBAT. The Chinese ability to progress on schedule has been
included in the PLAAF Assessed ORBAT 2032 in the first article.
Table AA1  Expected IAF ORBAT 203276
Fighter Aircraft
Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
1. Su-30MKI 112 272 Su-30MKI due by 2016–17;77 in line
to undergo super 30 upgrade.78
2. Super 30 160 Heavy UPG to 4.5 generation.79
3. Mirage-2000H/UPG 4080 Numbers post losses; due for replacement.
4. MiG-29B/UB UPG 50 ’’
5. Jaguar 100 After upgrades; possibly due for
81

replacement.
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 83

Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
6. Rafale 126 Rafale, possibly undergoing first mid-life
upgrade.
7. LCA Tejas Mk-2 108 Definitive variants with GE414+/Kaveri
engines. Possibly undergoing mid-life
upgrade. Possibly higher numbers may be
there.
8. FGFA82 14483 Possibly undergoing mid-life upgrade.
9. Advanced Medium 10 Entering service; definitive variant under
Combat Aircraft development.
(AMCA)84
Total 81085 Including 154 FGFA, 160 4.5 generation,
238 fourth++ generation, 110 fourth+
generation and 267 legacy fighters—810
in 45 squadrons.

Transport and Special Mission Aircraft


Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
1. IL-76MD 12 Being retired, 12 left in service of
earlier 17.
2. C-17 16 Heavy lift ruggedized performance.
3. An-32 90 Medium transport (4–6.7 tonne
practical load). Re-engined and
upgraded.
4. C-130J 12 Special mission (maximum load 20
tonne).
5. IL-78 6 FRA.
6. Airbus FRA 12 ’’
7. Phalcon 5 AWACS.
8. Airborne Early 15 Indigenous, on EMB-145 airframe.
Warning & Control
(AEW&C)
9. Embraer Legacy 4 VIP communication.
10. B-737 4 VIP configuration.
11. BBJ 3 ’’
12. Light Transport 40 48+ passengers or 6+ tonne load.
Aircraft HS-748 replacement.
84  Journal of Defence Studies

Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
13. Saras 25 19 passengers or 2.01 tonne load.
Replaced the D0-228s.
14. Rustom-1 40 Tactical recce version, airborne time
11–12 hours.
15. Rustom-2 or 80 Precision-guided munitions (PGM)
Rustom-C armed variant. Aloft time 24 hours.
16. HAROP 10 10–12 per squadron.
squardons
17. Harpy NK
18. Heron-I/II UAV 45/20
19. Autonomous 20 Entering service.
Unmanned Research
Aircraft (AURA)
Stealthy UCAV
Total 525 Includes 205 RPA, 20 AWACS and 18
FRA.

Trainer Aircraft
Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
1. Hawk 143 Initial order and follow-on order for 20 placed in
2010–12.
2. HJT-36 Sitara 202 Intermediate jet trainer (IJT).
3. Pilatus PC-7  75 Primary trainers.
Total 420 Procurements should be ongoing as IAF expands.
Not possible to predict timing/quantum of orders.

Helicopters
Sl. Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
1. Mi-25/35 23 May be retained with upgrades.
2. Apache Longbow-III 44 Follow-on orders likely, assumed to be 22
more.
3. Light Combat 60 Estimated, no orders yet.
Helicopter (LCH)
4. Mi-8 64 ’’
5. Mi-17 78
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 85

Sl. Aircraft No. Remarks


No.
6. Mi-17-1V 74 ’’
7. Mi-17-5V 139
8. Mi-26 8
9. CH-47 Chinook 20 ’’
10. Augusta AW101 VIP 12 VIP communication duties
version
11. Chetak 0 Replaced by ALH
12. Cheetah 0 ’’
13. ALH Dhruv 195
Total 522

The IAF, as brought out in Table AA1, is expected to field a total of


810 fighter aircraft in 2032. Two to three squadron strength more could
be held by specialist testing, training and development units, thus giving
an actual strength of about 47–48 squadrons with 846–64 aircraft.

Notes
1. Aircraft are limited by their fuel availability restrictions in staying over a
particular area for long periods of time as compared to surface forces.
2. The OTR calculations lie in the domain of air task planers in Air Command
Headquarters (HQs) who need to work out the number of weapons that
must fall on the target to achieve its desired degradation. Then, they apply
probability factors to determine the number of weapons that must be
carried by the number of aircraft to achieve the desired result. This is a very
complex, highly technical and time-consuming effort which also requires
detailed intelligence inputs. This lies outside the scope of the article.
3. Even today, with Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS),
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) and Aerostat radars widely
available, the aerial battlespace is transparent to large measure. Indications
are that this transparency will continue to increase in the period till 2032.
4. Whether airborne for air-to-air or air-to-ground weapon delivery.
5. It has been India’s experience and policy to respond to enemy attacks rather
than initiate hostilities, as seen in 1947–48, 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999.
This historical behaviour has been cited as proof of India’s moral ascendancy
and peaceful nature. In other words, India’s policy appears to be to react but
not to initiate hostilities through taking pre-emptive action.
6. In 1967, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian
86  Journal of Defence Studies

Air Forces, essentially on the ground, in a daring pre-emptive air strike.


Since then, such a feat has not been duplicated elsewhere. See ‘The Six Day
War’, available at http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/six_day_war_1967.
htm, accessed 31 December 2012.
7. ‘India–France Air Exercises: Garuda-2 News & Pics’, 4 July 2005, available
at http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread151541/pg1, accessed 25
December 2012; and Baldauf, Scott, ‘Indian Air Force, in War Games,
Gives US a Run: Foreign Fighter Jets Performed Well against F-16s in
Recent Exercises’, 28 November 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2005/1128/p01s04-wosc.html, accessed 2 January 2013.
8. Earlier, close combat air-to-air missiles were able to lock on to their targets
best from the rear quarters, homing on to the hot jet engine exhaust
signature. A4Ms are able to lock on to their targets from all aspects,
including from the frontal quarters as well through incorporating advanced
multi-wavelength, very sensitive IR sensors as well as advances in guidance,
fusing and warhead technology.
9. Refers to the cooperative West European effort to develop a modern
close combat missile called the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile
(ASRAAM).
10. Technology is today playing an ever-increasing role in the trade between
human skills and technological advantage. If, say, a mediocre pilot operates
a technologically more advanced weapon system against a better skilled
opponent, the degree of technological advantage would play major role
in determining the outcome; and if adequate technological asymmetry
exists, the inferior pilot could defeat his superior opponent relatively easily
(for example, a F-22 ‘Raptor’ flown by a rookie against an ace pilot in an
obsolete MiG-19). The reverse is more difficult but could, at times, be
achievable (say, a rookie in a MiG-29 or F-16A/B being beaten by a skilled
pilot in a MiG-21; or a good pilot in a F-15C beaten by a better pilot in a
MiG-21 or MiG-29).
11. ‘India–France Air Exercises: Garuda-2 News & Pics’, n. 7.
12. The IAF has had BVR-capable aircraft since the mid-1980s and has shown
its expertise in BVR combat in many international training exercises.
Regarding all BVR-capable aircraft ending up in WVR combat, since
the Gulf of Sidra incident (4 January 1989)—wherein a pair of US Navy
fighters shot down two Libyan MiG-23 aircraft with WVR weapons (AIM-
9 Sidewinder missiles) but at BVRs—through the 1991 and 2003 Gulf
Wars, air operations in Kosovo, etc., there as been no case of BVR combat
ending up in WVR combat. The premise of BVR ending up in WVR dates
back to the Vietnam air war in the mid-1960s till the mid-1970s when
missile technology was still rudimentary with the US AIM-7 ‘Sparrow’ in
its initial versions being the only BVR in use. Since then, missile technology
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 87

and reliability has improved manifold. In fact, most modern WVR missiles,
such as the Russian R-73E, Israeli Python-4 and Python-5 and the US
AIM-9X Sidewinder, boast BVR-like engagement ranges. The last WVR
aerial combats were fought in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the Falklands
War in 1982. Non-effectiveness of AWACS and AEW&C, if due to terrain,
would apply to both sides and hence not change the outcome appreciably.
Anyone who has entered WVR combat with two aircraft against say four or
five adversaries would appreciate the importance of numbers even in WVR
combat with close combat missiles. How many of the enemy can a pair of
eyes and one brain keep track of while also flying to the aircraft’s limits?
13. In aviation jargon, a sortie is one flight or mission of single aircraft from
moving off the ramp, taking off, carrying out its assigned task, returning,
landing and returning to the ramp, or designated parking point. The word
has been borrowed from its use earlier in armies, especially the cavalry where
troops often ‘sortied forth to meet the enemy’ or in other words, moved out
from besieged positions to meet the enemy in combat.
14. An air force that can generate five sorties per aircraft per day can generate
more sorties than another air force with higher absolute numbers of aircraft
but a lower sortie generation rate of say two or three. Say, air force ‘A’ has
100 fighters and a sortie generation rate of five per aircraft per day; and air
force ‘B’ has 200 aircraft but a sortie generation rate of two/aircraft/day. ‘A’
would be able to fly 500 sorties in a day, while ‘B’ would be able to fly just
400 sorties in the same period giving ‘A’ an advantage in number of targets
that can be addressed, etc. In 1971, PAF flew 2,914 combat sorties, while
the IAF flew 7,346 combat sorties. Overall, attrition in this war for IAF was
0.48 per cent and for PAF, it was 1.42 per cent. See Lal, P.C., My Years with
the IAF, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986.
15. In World War II, bombers of the US 8th Air Force suffered an attrition rate
of close to 12–16 per cent, in October 1943, forcing cessation of daylight
bomber missions into Germany. In October 1973, the Israeli Air Force lost
40 fighters in one afternoon (approximately 4 per cent attrition on sorties-
flown basis and 10 per cent attrition on total aircraft owned) over the Golan
Heights to Syrian forces forcing cessation of all Israeli air operations till a
solution could be found. Also, see Warden, The Air Campaign, pp. 10–60.
16. Both sides, the IAF and PAF/PLAAF, are likely to make extensive use
of advanced electronic countermeasures (ECMs) to degrade the other
side’s SAMs and hence, the manufacturers’-claimed high single-shot kill
probability (SSKP) of SAMs is likely to fall appreciably. Article length
limitations do not allow for an elaboration on this point from historical
experience. While modern SAMs and AAA are more potent than in 1971,
the anti-SAM/AAA tactics and technologies are also more effective. As
mentioned earlier, in 1971, overall IAF attrition was 0.48 per cent and of
88  Journal of Defence Studies

PAF, it was 1.42 per cent (see Lal, My Years with the IAF), so the figures
assumed here should be valid in the more modern scenario of 2032.
17. Japan’s attack on Midway in World War II, with 108 bombers and fighters
opposed by 26 US fighters, led to the latter suffering almost 100 per cent
losses. On 11 January 1944, 238 US bombers escorted by 49 fighters
met 207 German fighters in combat. In the resulting engagement, 34 US
bombers were lost. About a month later, 941 US bombers and 700 fighters
met 250 German fighters, resulting in the loss of just 21 bombers. In June
1982, 90 Israeli fighters met 60 Syrian fighters, resulting in nil Israeli losses,
whereas 23 Syrian aircraft were destroyed. See Warden, The Air Campaign,
pp. 59–60.
18. Numbers will matter always as there are limits to how much a fewer number
of aircraft and crew combinations can do. That is why the USAF plans to
induct several hundreds (1,763 to be exact) of the fifth-generation F-35
Lightning-II fighters, and the F-22 fifth-generation fighter numbers were
curtailed at 187 due to issues of cost and not projected need by USAF. The
US does not have a high-tech enemy since the demise of the Soviet Union,
but still sees the need for large numbers of very advanced fifth-generation
fighters. This brings in the fact that in combat, numbers will always matter
whether in WVR or in BVR environments. Even in the modern age, efforts
will be expended to destroy as much of the enemy’s assets as possible on
the ground, despite the enemy’s efforts to protect these. I have factored
in training and tactical skills to leverage these aspects in dealing with an
enemy with superior numbers. However, in individual engagements, ability
to use a larger number of aircraft will matter. At Red Flag exercises, the
lowly and humble Jaguar (an optimized air-to-ground attack aircraft with
minimal air-to-air capabilities) has, through utilization in larger numbers
in a trail/or train (one behind the other in a long line) formation, shot
down the mighty F-15 ‘Eagle’ when the F-15 pilots could not cope with
the situation of large numbers of Jaguars and got sandwiched in between
the Jaguar formation members. A German fighter pilot, Oswald Boelcke
(19 May 1891–28 October 1916), formulated rules for aerial fighting and
laid these down as the ‘Dicta Boelcke’. These rules emphasized utilization
of not individual aircraft but formations (or larger numbers) of aircraft, and
the dicta formulated in the early twentieth century remain as true today as
they were during World War I; technology, meanwhile, has changed a great
deal. Manfred von Richthofen (the Red Baron), Germany’s premier fighter
ace, was a student of Boelcke.
19. Ibid., pp. 60–65.
20. Ibid., pp. 63.
21. Wishful thinking apart, unfortunately, this does not exist between IAF
and PLAAF, or for that matter, between IAF and PAF. The technological
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 89

edge is unlikely to change in IAF’s favour by 2032 as compared to PLAAF,


given the development programmes already underway in the two countries:
IAF imports AWACS from Israel, while People’s Republic of China (PRC)
builds its own AWACS; and IAF buys Rafale, MiG-29K, FGFA, C-17,
etc., with grudging transfer of technology by the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM), whereas PRC designs and builds its own J-10, J-15,
J-16, J-20, J-31 and Y-20. The trend appears to be towards the technology
edge shifting more in PLAAF’s favour rather than the other way around as
per data currently available. Hence, numbers do matter a great deal to IAF.
22. The US prepared to fight the Soviet Union, ensuring that it could thus take
on any other nation without additional effort. The PRC currently plans to
be able to challenge the US, thus achieving force levels more than adequate
to fight any other country.
23. Qazi, Faddy, ‘RAF Eurofighter Typhoons Pilots “Beaten” by PAF F-16
Viper Pilots’, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/08/
eurofighter_beaten_by_f16/, accessed on 25 January 2013. Also, see
‘Thread: PAF vs IAF’, Iranian Defence, 15 May 2012, available at http://
www.iraniandefence.com/forums/world-military-forum/1525-paf-vs-iaf.
html, accessed on 21 January 2013. PAF participated in 2009 in Air Tactics
Leadership Course (ATLC) at Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates
(UAE), alongside RAF, French Air Force, USAF, Jordanian Air Force and
UAE Air Force. Moreover, during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in the
1980s, PAF shot down several Afghan/Soviet fighters along the Pakistan–
Afghanistan border.
24. It could be quite correctly argued that performance in exercises with
peacetime limitations does not translate to actual combat performance.
However, in absence of actual wars fought by the concerned nations, there
is no other way to judge capabilities except to extrapolate from exercises,
while the limitations of these are accepted and understood. Having real
live ammunition in the air around one can change things considerably.
Constraints of data availability restrict my addressing this point.
25. Including 20 fifth-generation, 534 fourth-generation/fourth-generation+
and 60 third-generation or earlier fighters.
26. Standing Committee on Defence (2011–2012) (Fifteenth Lok Sabha)
Ministry Of Defence Demands For Grants (2012-2013) Fifteenth Report
Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi, pp. 59.
27. At the rate of 18 aircraft per squadron.
28. At the rate of 18 aircraft per squadron.
29. There are four airfields in the vicinity of Lhasa and a few small airfields
close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC), just north of the AP border with
Tibet.
90  Journal of Defence Studies

30. Airfield location coordinates obtained from http://www. scramble.nl and


plotting done on Google Earth and distances measured on Google Earth
using scale tool, accessed 15 December 2012.
31. Airfield location and plotting on Google Earth and distances measured on
Google Earth using scale tool.
32. Ibid.
33. Allen, K.W., Krumel, G. and Pollack, J.D., ‘China’s Air Force Enters the
21st Century’, RAND Corporation Report from Project Air Force, 1995,
pp. 111–17; and ‘Modern Fighters Combat Radius’, available at http://
forum.keypublishing.com/archive/index.php?t-99342.html, accessed 2
January 2013.
34. Allen et al., ‘China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century’, pp. 33–103.
35. Ibid. and Cliff, Roger, Fei, J., Hagen, J., Hague, E., Heginbotham, E.,
Stillion, J., ‘Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth’, 2011, available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG915.html, accessed 1 January
2013.
36. Allen et al., ‘China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century’, n. 33, pp. 120–
133.
37. Ibid., pp. 33–109.
38. ‘Joint Exercise “Shaheen-1” between Pakistan and Chinese Air Forces
Launched, Islamabad’, 18 March 2011, available at http://www.paf.gov.
pk/18_Air_Exercise.html, accessed 27 December 2012.
39. ‘Indo–UK Air Exercise INDRADHANUSH-2007 Draws to a Close
at UK’, available at http://frontierindia.net/ex-indradhanush-2007-
kickstarts#axzz2lpbsg7fN, accessed on 26 January 2013; and David A.
Fulghum ‘3rd Wing Explains “Cope India” Exercise’, 10 April 2004,
available at http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-cope-india-article02.
html, accessed on 27 January 2013.
40. Author’s assessments based upon detailed examination of relevant RAND
reports and other open source documents relating to PLAAF and IAF from
primarily Western sources.
41. Regular perusal of websites http://www.globaltimes.cn, http://www.
chinamil.com.cn, http://www.chinaorg.cn and http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/, accessed daily since January 2007 and last accessed 30 January
2013.
42. Symbol ‘ ’ is used as ‘is equivalent to’ in this article.
43. Allen et al., ‘China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century’, n. 33, p. 65.
44. Ibid., pp. 93.
45. Ibid., pp. 55–105.
46. ‘China’s directive to the People’s Liberation Army: Get Ready for War’, January
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 91

2013, available at http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/01/18/19-


Jan-13-World-View-China-s-directive-to-the-People-s-Liberation-Army-
Get-Ready-for-War, accessed 24 January 2013.
47. Productivity increases were studied by this author in detail during a Master
of Business Administration (MBA) course at Faculty of Management
Studies (FMS), University of Delhi.
48. See Table 1.4, ‘PLAAF Assessed ORBAT 2032’, in Vivek Kapur, ‘Challenges
for the Indian Air Force: 2032’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1,
pp. 79–108.
49. Assessment based upon analysis of Google Earth images of PLAAF airfields
in Chengdu MR. Moreover, China can be expected to fight to win and as
per available information on PLAAF doctrine, it would try to impose its
will rapidly on the enemy. Chinese white papers on defence bring out the
emphasis on gaining ‘command’ of the air as a first step in local border wars.
50. At the rate of two sorties per aircraft per 24 hours.
51. See Table 1.4, ‘PLAAF Assessed ORBAT 2032’, in Vivek Kapur, ‘Challenges
for Indian Air Force: 2032’, n. 48.
52. Ibid.
53. After applying the combat efficiency factor discussed earlier.
54. Ibid.
55. Most modern aircraft, since the 1980s, have followed the line replaceable
unit (LRU) concept. In this, at the field level, an unserviceability requires
ground crew to remove a ‘black box’, replace it with another, while
backloading the unserviceable one for repair and return from the factory.
This makes keeping aircraft serviceability high an easier task.
56. Totalling up the requirements marked out above.
57. See ‘Indian Air Force’, http://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/indian-air-
force/, accessed 25 February 2013.
58. Average of 53–63 squadrons.
59. ‘Strategic Force Command of India Comes of Age’, available at http://www.
defenceinfo.com/strategic-force-command-india-comes-age, accessed 13
January 2013.
60. India’s Prithvi missiles are claimed to have a circular error probable (CEP)
of 25 metres (m), while Agni-5 is claimed to have a sub-200 m CEP. Agni-
1, Agni-2 and Agni-3 are claimed to have a CEP of 40 m. These CEPs are
impressive and very good for nuclear payloads. However, fighter aircraft
train to deliver CEPs consistently of under 10 m for achieving the desired
results of air strikes. Hence, India’s current ballistic missiles fall well short
of being considered possible replacements for fighter aircraft. It is good
to remember that a CEP figure means that half of the weapons launched
are likely to fall within a circle centred at the target with a radius of that
92  Journal of Defence Studies

distance and the rest may fall anywhere outside the CEP circle. Moreover,
in aerial attack, an undershoot error is better that an overshoot error due to
debris dispersion geometry and target damage probability.
61. Nicholls, David J., ‘Cruise Missiles and Modern War Strategic and
Technological Implications’, May 2000, pp. 21–29, available at http://
www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=
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62. Nirbhay cruise missile is expected to have range of 750–1,000 km, while
Brahmos range is less than 300 km. See ‘India to Test Subsonic Cruise
Missile Nirbhay in February’, The Times of India, 25 January 2013, available
at http://m.timesofindia.com/india/India-to-test-subsonic-cruise-missile-
Nirbhay-in-February/articleshow/18187656.cms, accessed 28 January
2013.
63. ‘DRDO to Develop Indigenous AWACS’, available at http://www.
defencenow.com/news/1052/drdo-to-develop-indigenous-awacs.
html,  accessed 31 December 2012; and Pandit, Rajat, ‘Europe Pips Russia
in Mega Mid-air Refuelling Aircraft Deal’, 4 January 2013, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Europe-pips-Russia-in-mega-
mid-air-refueling-aircraft-deal/articleshow/17879413.cms, accessed 4
January 2013.
64. These hardened facilities would include blast pens, Bulk Petroleum
Installations (BPIs) and ammunition dumps and crucial communications
facilities.
65. Controller General of Defence Accounts, ‘IFA (Air Force) Manual’, 2008,
available at http://cdajabalpur.nic.in/ifa/afmanual/PDF, accessed 1 January
2012.
66. Northern parts of WAC face the western parts of PRC’s Chengdu MR
and southern parts of Lanzhou MR. The CAC faces central Tibet, while
EAC faces Chengdu MR and covers AP also. The SWAC faces just the
less dangerous Pakistan threat, while SAC looks after south India and may
require to support/supplement Indian Navy’s operations in the Indian
Ocean.
67. Bhat, Anil, ‘BRO’s Fast-track Construction in Arunachal Pradesh Bearing
Fruit’, 16 June 2012, available at http://kanglaonline.com/2012/06/bros-
fasttrack-construction-in-arunachal-pradesh-bearing-fruit/, accessed 2
January 2013.
68. Of these, six exist today, and two new mountain divisions are being raised.
69. Shukla, Ajai, ‘In a First, Indian Tank Brigades to Defend China Border’,
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 93

Business Standard, 17 September 2012, available at http://www.business-


standard.com/india/news/infirst-indian-tank-brigades-to-defend-china-
border/486647/, accessed 1 January 2013.
70. ‘CH-47 Chinook’, available at www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/ch47d/
docs/CH-47F_overview.pdf+max+load+for+CH-47D&hl=en&gl=in&pid
=bl&srcid=ADGEESjO8pBcP-QLg_xD1eV4sPcbnu47BpbyS3qKOSEz8
mycJjsykz7qV4rATo_tsPJ-, N_ppROlCR75uzSX7tqOds30gvw6C
3xR1IsVRW0l3Iz0PlVfem3Rbx8ff7G9Y_irIzFaZpfGY&sig=AHIEtbT
GcQQhSNu1TrR-ePZwYEmX-HYiXQ, accessed 23 January 2013; and
discussions with experienced IAF helicopter pilots.
71. Controller General of Defence Accounts, ‘IFA (Air Force) Manual’, n. 65.
72. 1.5 front and two front: fighting in the NE while holding Pakistan at
bay and fighting simultaneously along both the NE and western borders
respectively.
73. Raghuvanshi, Vivek, ‘India Considers Purchasing More AWACS
Aircraft’, 19 December 2012, available at http://www.defensenews.com/
article/20121219/DEFREG03/312190005/India-Considers-Purchasing-
More-AWACS-Aircraft, accessed 30 December 2012.
74. On the premise that one fighter–bomber aircraft is equated to five cruise
missiles that feature stealth characteristics through application of low
observable technologies.
75. Singh, Jasjit, Defence from the Skies, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2007,
pp. 12.
76. This would comprise two waves by all the 500 aircraft. Each wave would be
a single mission by each aircraft.
77. Data in the table have been obtained from: Janes World Air Forces, No.
34, 2011, pp. 279–86; www.scramble.nl and www.fas.org (accessed 4
December 2012); articles in various aviation journals such as India Strategic,
Vayu and Aviation Week & Space Technology; ‘Indian Air Force’, available
at http://anand-indianairforce.blogspot.in/, accessed 22 January 2013; and
the news media, with special reference to interviews of senior IAF officers.
Data thus assembled were analyzed and educated estimates made to arrive
at the final table figures.
78. The super 30 upgrade is a very major upgrade of the Su-30MKI’s avionics
to include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with low
probability of intercept (LPI) capability amongst others improvements.
The airframe is to be extensively modified to reduce the radar cross-section
(RCS), thus making it stealthier than the Su-30MKI, moving towards fifth-
generation RCS figures. Several systems designed for the PAK-FA are to be
incorporated in the super 30 bringing it closer to a fifth-generation fighter.
79. Ahmedullah, Mohammed, ‘IAF’s Sukhoi Jets to be Upgraded to
94  Journal of Defence Studies

Fifth Generation Fighters’, available at http://rusembassy.in/index.


php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3039%3Aiafs-sukhoi-jets-to-
be-upgraded-to-fifth-generation-fighters&catid=16%3Apress-on-bilateral-
relations&lang=en, accessed 5 December 2012; and ‘Super Sukhoi on There
Way’, available at http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2011/10/
super-sukhoi-on-there-way.html, accessed 5 December 2012.
80. Janes World Air Forces, No. 34, 2011, pp. 284–85.
81. Ibid.
82. Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) is to be developed from the
Russian Sukhoi T-50 prototype. The T-50 is likely to lead to Russia’s PAK-
FA fifth-generation fighter with a variant being developed to meet IAF’s
specific requirements.
83. Sharma, Rajeev, ‘India Cuts Order of FGFA Fighter. F-35 on the Horizon?’,
25 October 2012, available at http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-
blog/2012/10/25/india-snubs-russia-on-fifth-generation-fighters/, accessed
2 January 2013.
84. AMCA is DRDO’s indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft project.
This was meant to be a follow-on to the LCA programme and aimed at
developing an Indian fifth-generation fighter capitalizing on the learning
gained in the LCA programme.
85. A further three squadron worth of aircraft could be held in flying units such
as TACDE, ASTE and AD Flights, in addition to two to three aircraft as
war wastage reserves (WWR) per squadron. The WWR would usually be
kept in storage till required to be activated.

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