IAF Equipmentand Force Structure Requirementst
IAF Equipmentand Force Structure Requirementst
Vivek Kapur*
Introduction
This article follows ‘Challenges for the Indian Air Force: 2032’ (Vol. 7,
No. 1, January-March 2013), dealing with the main challenges Indian Air
Force (IAF) is likely to face in 2032, when it completes a century. Here,
I assess possible responses to the external challenges posed by the Peoples
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Pakistan Air Force (PAF). I do
so separately in a single-front war scenario against either one and follow it
up with a worst case scenario of a simultaneous war against both. I begin
* The author was a Research Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
New Delhi. The article is based upon open source material and reflects the views of the
author.
the numbers ratio has become favourable to one side, its losses as well as
loss percentages have fallen disproportionately, with the opposite effect
on the less numerical party.17 Thus, technology and skills irrespective,
numbers do matter18 in aerial combat.19 This remains true even today.
The slogan of ‘fighting outnumbered and winning’ has no place at the
operational level of war20 unless a very large technological asymmetry
exists.21 It should be remembered that in more recent times, while war
fighting has essentially remained the same, what has changed is just the
way of inflicting the desired damage. Hence, the IAF must train very
hard to increase its equipment serviceability rates as well as combat crew
proficiency. This could be achieved through intense training and realistic
exercises.
missions.34 In the last few years, this has changed as the newer aircraft
inducted have viable air-to-surface capability, including ability to deliver
PGMs. The PLAAF training for air-to-surface missions has traditionally
been weak, a point highlighted in the most authoritative open source
Western works from the RAND Corporation.35 It must be expected
that having learned the lessons of the two Gulf Wars as well as Coalition
operations in Kosovo, the PLAAF will work towards remedying training
drawbacks. The PLAAF is also believed to suffer from inadequate realistic
combat training in air-to-air missions,36 a weakness difficult to overcome
in a short time period, though it is likely that given the traditional
determination shown by the Chinese in most endeavours, they will do
their utmost to overcome this drawback.37 The PLAAF has commenced
air exercises with PAF.38 This could lead to PLAAF learning advanced
tactics from PAF which has had continuous exposure to Western air
forces since the 1950s. Therefore, while most equipment in service with
PLAAF and IAF in the period under consideration is likely to be more
or less evenly matched, the inclination to rubbish PLAAF combat crew
capabilities must be avoided. The PLAAF is expected to train ever more
effectively for a multitude of combat roles.
The IAF, in contrast, despite its insular attitude from 1947 till the early
twenty-first century, has been able to train its combat crews effectively
and of late, has also been able to afford to buy/develop the sophisticated
weapon systems needed to be truly effective. The IAF performance in
international exercises with modern Western air forces has convincingly
and consistently demonstrated that its training standards in both air-
to-air as well as air-to-surface missions are second to none and that its
combat crew are able to adapt to dynamic air situations and implement
innovative and effective combat solutions to bring engagements to a
favourable conclusion.39
The IAF has been exploiting advanced BVR combat theory and tactics
for at least two decades as on date, while the PLAAF, as per open source
material, is not known to have fully implemented such tactical applications.
In the years ahead, PLAAF is likely to fully integrate BVR training into
its tactics. Given the initial lead enjoyed by IAF, it should be able to stay
ahead of PLAAF with respect to advanced combat tactics in both BVR
and WVR scenarios. In this context, it is assessed that, with respect to
PLAAF, IAF is likely to retain an aerial combat efficiency and effectiveness
advantage of, at worst, 1.5:1 and, at best, 1.9:1, with a mean figure of
1.7:1 advantage for IAF.40 The rationale for this advantage is buttressed by
72 Journal of Defence Studies
the fact that Chinese media, such as Global Times, Xinhua and Chinamil.
com.cn, prominently display articles on live weapon firing training and
bad weather/night missions by PLAAF aircrew as great achievements.41
Such things are routine in IAF and not mentioned as they are considered
par for the course from raw ‘flight cadet’ stage onwards. Converting these
figures to more usable ratios through inverting them 1.7:1 in IAF’s favour
can be used as 0.588 IAF equals 1.0 PLAAF or 1 PLAAF crew–aircraft
combination 42 0.588 IAF crew–aircraft combination (alternatively, this
can be stated as 59 IAF aircraft are able to match 100 PLAAF aircraft, of
the same generation).
sorties per day.50 The PLAAF’s force multipliers in view of their greater
complexity could be expected to fly a single mission per day, providing
cover for their fighters almost round the clock in the battle area.
The IAF, traditionally, has catered for a rate of utilization of three
sorties per day for strike aircraft and five sorties per day for air defence
aircraft and has regularly trained for achieving these utilization rates during
exercises. New aircraft inductions with simpler maintenance schedules51
should lead to three sorties per aircraft per day being achievable by all IAF
fighter–bomber aircraft on a sustained basis.52
BVR combat is expected to be IAF’s choice in terms of engagements
with extensive ground-based and aerostat/AWACS/AEW&C cover
available to friendly fighters. For achieving a better than 2:0 exchange
ratio over PLAAF, IAF would need to fly more than 2,000, ideally 3,000–
4,000, sorties per day. At a rate of three sorties per aircraft per day, IAF
could achieve this with 1,000–1,300 fighters in the theatre. The IAF
would need, after applying the combat efficiency factor, between 1,000
× 0.588 = 58853 and 1,300 × 0.588 = 76454 fighter aircraft in order to be
able to achieve the objective of winning against the PLAAF in the NE
war. Given the similar technology levels of the two air forces, equipment
availability rates are assumed to be the same, say, 80–85 per cent.55 With
IAF’s norm of 16 + 2 aircraft per squadron, a total of (588/18) = 32.66
33 to (764/18) = 42.4 43 fighter squadrons would be required in the NE
against PLAAF in order to meet required sortie numbers in the expected
conflict with China and win. The IAF, while engaged in conflict with
China in the NE, cannot leave the northern borders with China as well as
the borders with Pakistan unguarded. Hence, IAF will require deploying
adequate force along these two borders to ensure that it is able to deal
with any unforeseen military situation there. The currently assessed force
levels for India, Pakistan and China are tabulated in Table 2. Minimum
precautionary requirements along the Indo-Pakistan border are likely to
be 15–20 squadrons of third-generation or fourth+ generation fighters
apart from other weapon systems. An additional five fighter squadrons
are likely to be required to be deployed along the central sector’s northern
borders and these squadrons could form part of the NE forces that are
being routinely rotated for rest and recuperation, hence not requiring any
further force levels to be built up.
While the estimated force levels for 2032 for PAF and PLAAF were
covered in the previous article of this project, the assessed IAF 2032 force
structure, as is known in open sources, is placed at Appendix ‘A’.
74 Journal of Defence Studies
Force Multipliers
The strength of currently planned High Value Airborne Assets (HVAAs),
20 AWACS and 12 FRA, would be adequate if these inductions proceed
as already planned.63
Training
Combat training requires to be ramped up even more than today to ensure
that a combat-efficiency edge is maintained and progressively increased
over the PLAAF.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure of the IAF in the west is very well developed but the east
has been ignored to a large extent. However, with the China threat
looming, it is essential that IAF rapidly refurbish its infrastructure in
the NE. This would entail upgradation of aircraft operating surfaces and
hardening of airfield facilities64 at existing airfields and development of
new airfields to full-fledged IAF operational base level. A good road and
railway network also needs to be laid in the area to enable efficient logistics
flow. In view of long gestation periods for infrastructure development
76 Journal of Defence Studies
IAF Organization
The IAF is organized into two functional commands—Maintenance
Command (MC) and Training Command (TC)—and five operational
commands: Western Air Command (WAC); South Western Air Command
(SWAC); Central Air Command (CAC); Eastern Air Command (EAC);
and Southern Air Command (SAC).65 The IAF has traditionally treated
WAC and SWAC as the two proper operational commands. Given
the potent PLAAF threat, EAC and CAC would require to be treated
as the prioritized operational commands alongside WAC.66 The IAF
organizational issues will be discussed in-depth in a later article.
Manning Levels
The IAF must endeavour to ensure that its combat crew to equipment
ratio is raised to at least 2.5:1 in order to enable effective utilization of
the available war-fighting potential. This will require an extensive and
focused training programme. Support manpower would also require to be
adequate in numbers and training. This aspect will be looked at in detail
in a later article.
Transport Aircraft
The ground infrastructure in terms of roads in the NE has been neglected
over the years, but is now reportedly in process of being refurbished.67
Indian Army would mobilize and move forward to its border posts and
locations by road with induction from the rest of the country being by
rail or road. The Indian Army is expected to deploy eight mountain
divisions68 on the land borders in the NE.69 The enemy is expected to
interdict at least some of the roads required by our army for resupply of
men and material. In a case of land routes of resupply being interdicted,
there will be need for aerial resupply of petrol, oil and lubricants (POL),
ammunition and other essential stores to such army units. There may also,
at times, be need for induction of work reinforcement to some locations
as well as inter-area transfer of troops and equipment to meet emergent
situations. With eight divisions deployed in the area, it would be prudent
for IAF to cater for aerial resupply of at least two divisions engaged in
combat. ‘Inter-area transport of troops’ capability should exist for at least
two mountain brigades.
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 77
It is understood that all army units would have integral reserve supplies
for emergencies. A worst-case situation is considered here of reserve not
being available or being already expended. The IAF transport assets
cannot be built up in a hurry; hence, it is prudent to have assets in being
catering for the worst-case situation. One division has approximately
15,000 troops and includes three to four artillery brigades, each with 18
guns. Assuming that each gun fires 150 rounds per day, the replenishment
requirement in terms of ammunition for an artillery brigade would be 18
× 150 × 40 kg = 108,000 kg per day. Thus, for each division, 108 × 3 =
324.0 tons of artillery ammunition requires to be catered for in addition
to 15 tons of food at the rate of 1 kg of dry ration per day per man and
15,000 × 5 kg = 75 tons of small arms ammunition of various calibres per
day. In addition, POL to the tune of 14 tons would also be needed, giving
total airlift requirement of 428 tons per day per division. If IAF caters for
two divisions, this amounts to 856 tons per day.
An IL-76 can, in practice, carry 40 tonnes of load; a C-17 can carry
77 tonnes; and a C-130J can carry 20 tonnes. A Mi-17 helicopter can
carry 3 tonnes up to an altitude of close to 5–6 km above mean sea level
(AMSL); and a CH-47 Chinook can carry 4 tonnes to similar altitudes.70
Air supply of stores will require a mix of airdropping and air landing
due to limited availability of drop zones of required size. Air landing is
not likely to be possible by IL-76 aircraft, while C-17, C-130/Medium
Transport Aircraft (MTA) may be able to land at some forward airstrips
and Mi-17/Chinook helicopters may be able to land at most locations. Of
the total load to be delivered to a division, it is assumed that 60 per cent
can be airdropped and the remainder needs to be air landed, with 20 per
cent of the total air–land load able to be done by C-130 class of aircraft
and the last 20 per cent of the total requiring helicopter carriage due to
topography. Thus, with this calculation, 0.6 × 856 = 513.6 tonnes would
require to be airdropped daily by IL-76 /C-17 aircraft, which would
consume 12.86 or 13 IL-76 sorties or 6.67 = 7 C-17 sorties; alternatively,
this could be done in 26 C-130/MTA sorties (at the rate of 20 tonnes per
sortie).
For transport aircraft, in view of the much greater time needed for
loading and offloading, it is assumed that two sorties are possible per day.
Thus, the heavy-lift effort requires at least seven serviceable IL-76 or four
C-17 aircraft being available for operation in the theatre. Air landing of
171.2 tonnes would require nine C-130 sorties. If the entire airdrop effort
is carried out by Il-76/C-17 aircraft—with C-130s not being required to
78 Journal of Defence Studies
Recommendations
The examination of the required force structure to effectively meet the
external challenges lead to the following recommendations:
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 81
• IAF must pursue its re-equipment plan with vigour. The currently
planned 45 squadron force should be expanded to 53–63 fighter
squadrons. If the numbers of fifth-generation fighters are increased,
then 53 squadrons may suffice. However, if 4.5 and fourth+
generation aircraft numbers are enhanced, then a target of 63
squadrons should be aimed for. These figures are quite reasonable
considering that as far ago as the mid-1960s, the Tata Committee
had recommended a 64 squadron air force for India at a time when
the threat was far more benign.75 Additional forces should be raised
for OOAC requirements. Induction of stealthy long-range cruise
missiles could help moderate these squadron numbers somewhat.
• Till production can be ramped up, the retirement of older types
of aircraft should be delayed in order to maintain numbers. In the
worst case, aircraft types already retired could be reinstated to cover
shortfalls.
• In the period between this stopgap measure and induction of
the definitive aircraft, diplomacy must be used to ensure that no
military situation requires utilization of force.
• The transport fleet should be upgraded to include two squadrons
of C-17, 2.5 squadrons of IL-76 and 3.5 squadrons of C-130/
MTA.
• IAF’s helicopter fleet should comprise 12 Mi-17-1V/11 Chinook,
18 ALH class helicopters squadrons and 10 attack helicopter
squadrons, in addition to 12 VIP duty AW101 helicopters in one
squadron.
• Air commands be realigned to designate EAC, CAC and WAC
as the main operational commands with two-third of IAF assets
earmarked for EAC, WAC and CAC; SWAC be an operational
command of relatively lesser importance and a ‘feeder command’
for EAC, CAC and WAC.
• HVAA plans for 20 AWACS/AEW&C and 12 FRA be aggressively
pursued. A further six AWACS/ AEW&C be raised and maintained
for OOAC tasks.
• Currently known plans for upgradation of the radar and other
electronic systems be progressed as planned.
• SAMs be inducted in adequate numbers as per current plans
and the indigenous ballistic missile defence (BMD) system be
integrated into the IAF’s AD system.
• Infrastructure development, especially in the NE, including rail,
82 Journal of Defence Studies
replacement.
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 83
Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
6. Rafale 126 Rafale, possibly undergoing first mid-life
upgrade.
7. LCA Tejas Mk-2 108 Definitive variants with GE414+/Kaveri
engines. Possibly undergoing mid-life
upgrade. Possibly higher numbers may be
there.
8. FGFA82 14483 Possibly undergoing mid-life upgrade.
9. Advanced Medium 10 Entering service; definitive variant under
Combat Aircraft development.
(AMCA)84
Total 81085 Including 154 FGFA, 160 4.5 generation,
238 fourth++ generation, 110 fourth+
generation and 267 legacy fighters—810
in 45 squadrons.
Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
13. Saras 25 19 passengers or 2.01 tonne load.
Replaced the D0-228s.
14. Rustom-1 40 Tactical recce version, airborne time
11–12 hours.
15. Rustom-2 or 80 Precision-guided munitions (PGM)
Rustom-C armed variant. Aloft time 24 hours.
16. HAROP 10 10–12 per squadron.
squardons
17. Harpy NK
18. Heron-I/II UAV 45/20
19. Autonomous 20 Entering service.
Unmanned Research
Aircraft (AURA)
Stealthy UCAV
Total 525 Includes 205 RPA, 20 AWACS and 18
FRA.
Trainer Aircraft
Sl.
Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
1. Hawk 143 Initial order and follow-on order for 20 placed in
2010–12.
2. HJT-36 Sitara 202 Intermediate jet trainer (IJT).
3. Pilatus PC-7 75 Primary trainers.
Total 420 Procurements should be ongoing as IAF expands.
Not possible to predict timing/quantum of orders.
Helicopters
Sl. Aircraft No. Remarks
No.
1. Mi-25/35 23 May be retained with upgrades.
2. Apache Longbow-III 44 Follow-on orders likely, assumed to be 22
more.
3. Light Combat 60 Estimated, no orders yet.
Helicopter (LCH)
4. Mi-8 64 ’’
5. Mi-17 78
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 85
Notes
1. Aircraft are limited by their fuel availability restrictions in staying over a
particular area for long periods of time as compared to surface forces.
2. The OTR calculations lie in the domain of air task planers in Air Command
Headquarters (HQs) who need to work out the number of weapons that
must fall on the target to achieve its desired degradation. Then, they apply
probability factors to determine the number of weapons that must be
carried by the number of aircraft to achieve the desired result. This is a very
complex, highly technical and time-consuming effort which also requires
detailed intelligence inputs. This lies outside the scope of the article.
3. Even today, with Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS),
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) and Aerostat radars widely
available, the aerial battlespace is transparent to large measure. Indications
are that this transparency will continue to increase in the period till 2032.
4. Whether airborne for air-to-air or air-to-ground weapon delivery.
5. It has been India’s experience and policy to respond to enemy attacks rather
than initiate hostilities, as seen in 1947–48, 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999.
This historical behaviour has been cited as proof of India’s moral ascendancy
and peaceful nature. In other words, India’s policy appears to be to react but
not to initiate hostilities through taking pre-emptive action.
6. In 1967, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian
86 Journal of Defence Studies
and reliability has improved manifold. In fact, most modern WVR missiles,
such as the Russian R-73E, Israeli Python-4 and Python-5 and the US
AIM-9X Sidewinder, boast BVR-like engagement ranges. The last WVR
aerial combats were fought in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War and the Falklands
War in 1982. Non-effectiveness of AWACS and AEW&C, if due to terrain,
would apply to both sides and hence not change the outcome appreciably.
Anyone who has entered WVR combat with two aircraft against say four or
five adversaries would appreciate the importance of numbers even in WVR
combat with close combat missiles. How many of the enemy can a pair of
eyes and one brain keep track of while also flying to the aircraft’s limits?
13. In aviation jargon, a sortie is one flight or mission of single aircraft from
moving off the ramp, taking off, carrying out its assigned task, returning,
landing and returning to the ramp, or designated parking point. The word
has been borrowed from its use earlier in armies, especially the cavalry where
troops often ‘sortied forth to meet the enemy’ or in other words, moved out
from besieged positions to meet the enemy in combat.
14. An air force that can generate five sorties per aircraft per day can generate
more sorties than another air force with higher absolute numbers of aircraft
but a lower sortie generation rate of say two or three. Say, air force ‘A’ has
100 fighters and a sortie generation rate of five per aircraft per day; and air
force ‘B’ has 200 aircraft but a sortie generation rate of two/aircraft/day. ‘A’
would be able to fly 500 sorties in a day, while ‘B’ would be able to fly just
400 sorties in the same period giving ‘A’ an advantage in number of targets
that can be addressed, etc. In 1971, PAF flew 2,914 combat sorties, while
the IAF flew 7,346 combat sorties. Overall, attrition in this war for IAF was
0.48 per cent and for PAF, it was 1.42 per cent. See Lal, P.C., My Years with
the IAF, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986.
15. In World War II, bombers of the US 8th Air Force suffered an attrition rate
of close to 12–16 per cent, in October 1943, forcing cessation of daylight
bomber missions into Germany. In October 1973, the Israeli Air Force lost
40 fighters in one afternoon (approximately 4 per cent attrition on sorties-
flown basis and 10 per cent attrition on total aircraft owned) over the Golan
Heights to Syrian forces forcing cessation of all Israeli air operations till a
solution could be found. Also, see Warden, The Air Campaign, pp. 10–60.
16. Both sides, the IAF and PAF/PLAAF, are likely to make extensive use
of advanced electronic countermeasures (ECMs) to degrade the other
side’s SAMs and hence, the manufacturers’-claimed high single-shot kill
probability (SSKP) of SAMs is likely to fall appreciably. Article length
limitations do not allow for an elaboration on this point from historical
experience. While modern SAMs and AAA are more potent than in 1971,
the anti-SAM/AAA tactics and technologies are also more effective. As
mentioned earlier, in 1971, overall IAF attrition was 0.48 per cent and of
88 Journal of Defence Studies
PAF, it was 1.42 per cent (see Lal, My Years with the IAF), so the figures
assumed here should be valid in the more modern scenario of 2032.
17. Japan’s attack on Midway in World War II, with 108 bombers and fighters
opposed by 26 US fighters, led to the latter suffering almost 100 per cent
losses. On 11 January 1944, 238 US bombers escorted by 49 fighters
met 207 German fighters in combat. In the resulting engagement, 34 US
bombers were lost. About a month later, 941 US bombers and 700 fighters
met 250 German fighters, resulting in the loss of just 21 bombers. In June
1982, 90 Israeli fighters met 60 Syrian fighters, resulting in nil Israeli losses,
whereas 23 Syrian aircraft were destroyed. See Warden, The Air Campaign,
pp. 59–60.
18. Numbers will matter always as there are limits to how much a fewer number
of aircraft and crew combinations can do. That is why the USAF plans to
induct several hundreds (1,763 to be exact) of the fifth-generation F-35
Lightning-II fighters, and the F-22 fifth-generation fighter numbers were
curtailed at 187 due to issues of cost and not projected need by USAF. The
US does not have a high-tech enemy since the demise of the Soviet Union,
but still sees the need for large numbers of very advanced fifth-generation
fighters. This brings in the fact that in combat, numbers will always matter
whether in WVR or in BVR environments. Even in the modern age, efforts
will be expended to destroy as much of the enemy’s assets as possible on
the ground, despite the enemy’s efforts to protect these. I have factored
in training and tactical skills to leverage these aspects in dealing with an
enemy with superior numbers. However, in individual engagements, ability
to use a larger number of aircraft will matter. At Red Flag exercises, the
lowly and humble Jaguar (an optimized air-to-ground attack aircraft with
minimal air-to-air capabilities) has, through utilization in larger numbers
in a trail/or train (one behind the other in a long line) formation, shot
down the mighty F-15 ‘Eagle’ when the F-15 pilots could not cope with
the situation of large numbers of Jaguars and got sandwiched in between
the Jaguar formation members. A German fighter pilot, Oswald Boelcke
(19 May 1891–28 October 1916), formulated rules for aerial fighting and
laid these down as the ‘Dicta Boelcke’. These rules emphasized utilization
of not individual aircraft but formations (or larger numbers) of aircraft, and
the dicta formulated in the early twentieth century remain as true today as
they were during World War I; technology, meanwhile, has changed a great
deal. Manfred von Richthofen (the Red Baron), Germany’s premier fighter
ace, was a student of Boelcke.
19. Ibid., pp. 60–65.
20. Ibid., pp. 63.
21. Wishful thinking apart, unfortunately, this does not exist between IAF
and PLAAF, or for that matter, between IAF and PAF. The technological
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 89
distance and the rest may fall anywhere outside the CEP circle. Moreover,
in aerial attack, an undershoot error is better that an overshoot error due to
debris dispersion geometry and target damage probability.
61. Nicholls, David J., ‘Cruise Missiles and Modern War Strategic and
Technological Implications’, May 2000, pp. 21–29, available at http://
www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=
0CCgQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2F2.zoppoz.workers.dev%3A443%2Fhttp%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetT
RDoc%3FAD%3DADA425467&ei=qa2VUt7GEoPBrAfwmICwDg&us
g=AFQjCNFOPgoneVYUJZPur7UDfcaprLjE4w&bvm=bv.57155469,d.
bmk, last accessed on 6 January 2013.
62. Nirbhay cruise missile is expected to have range of 750–1,000 km, while
Brahmos range is less than 300 km. See ‘India to Test Subsonic Cruise
Missile Nirbhay in February’, The Times of India, 25 January 2013, available
at http://m.timesofindia.com/india/India-to-test-subsonic-cruise-missile-
Nirbhay-in-February/articleshow/18187656.cms, accessed 28 January
2013.
63. ‘DRDO to Develop Indigenous AWACS’, available at http://www.
defencenow.com/news/1052/drdo-to-develop-indigenous-awacs.
html, accessed 31 December 2012; and Pandit, Rajat, ‘Europe Pips Russia
in Mega Mid-air Refuelling Aircraft Deal’, 4 January 2013, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Europe-pips-Russia-in-mega-
mid-air-refueling-aircraft-deal/articleshow/17879413.cms, accessed 4
January 2013.
64. These hardened facilities would include blast pens, Bulk Petroleum
Installations (BPIs) and ammunition dumps and crucial communications
facilities.
65. Controller General of Defence Accounts, ‘IFA (Air Force) Manual’, 2008,
available at http://cdajabalpur.nic.in/ifa/afmanual/PDF, accessed 1 January
2012.
66. Northern parts of WAC face the western parts of PRC’s Chengdu MR
and southern parts of Lanzhou MR. The CAC faces central Tibet, while
EAC faces Chengdu MR and covers AP also. The SWAC faces just the
less dangerous Pakistan threat, while SAC looks after south India and may
require to support/supplement Indian Navy’s operations in the Indian
Ocean.
67. Bhat, Anil, ‘BRO’s Fast-track Construction in Arunachal Pradesh Bearing
Fruit’, 16 June 2012, available at http://kanglaonline.com/2012/06/bros-
fasttrack-construction-in-arunachal-pradesh-bearing-fruit/, accessed 2
January 2013.
68. Of these, six exist today, and two new mountain divisions are being raised.
69. Shukla, Ajai, ‘In a First, Indian Tank Brigades to Defend China Border’,
IAF Equipment and Force Structure Requirements . . . 93