Grand Delusion

•
•

J
 _ran De usion
-... talin and the German Invasion o Russia

Gabriel Gorodetsky

Yale University Press

New Haven and London
 •

..

0754
.sss
G67
1999

Copyright © 1999 by Gabriel Gorodetsky

All rights reserved. T his book may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any
form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copy­
right Law and except by reviewers for the public press) without written permis­
sion from the publishers.

Set in Palatino by Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong

Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and Kings Lynn

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Gorodetsky, Gabriel, 1945-

Grand delusion: Stalin and the German invasion of Russia I Gabriel
Gorodetsky.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-300-07792-0 (cloth: alk. paper)
1. World War, 1939-1945 Soviet Union. 2. World War,
1939-1945 Diplomatic 11istory. 3. Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953.
I. Title. D754.S65G67 1999 99-12728
940.54'0947 dc21 CIP

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 Contents

List of Illustrations and Maps

• • •

Vlll

Preface IX
•

Introduction: The Premises of Stalin's Foreign Policy 1

1. 'Potential Enemies': London and Moscow

at Loggerheads 10
'The Truce of the Bear' 10
'He Who Sups with the Devil' 13
Cripps' s Mission to Moscow 19

2. The Scramble for the Balkans 23

Soviet-Italian Collusion 23
The Soviet Seizure of Bessarabia 29
British Schemes for the Balkans 35
The Vienna Award: The German Encroachment
in the Balkans 39
Clash over the Danube 44

3. On a Collision Course 48
Orang nach Osten: The Initial Plans 48
Soviet Intelligence and the German Threat 52
The Bulgarian Corridor to the Turkish Straits 57

v
Vl Contents
•

4. The Road to 'Barbarossa'

Molotov's Visit to Berlin
Hitler Opts for War
Postscript: Preventive War?
..

5. The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 89

The British Perspective: Co-operation or
Embroilment? 89
Bulgaria Tu1.. ns to the Axis 95
The Urge for the Straits 102

6. The Red Army on Alert 115

The Soviet Defence Plans 115
The Bankruptcy of the Military 124
The Gathering Clouds 130

7. At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat 137

8. Churchill's Warning to Stalin 155

British Intelligence and 'Barbarossa' 155
The 'Cryptic' Warning 159
Rumours of War and a Separate Peace 170
The Bogy of a Separate Peace 173
Aftermath 176

9. Japan: The Avenue to Germany 179

10. 'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 202

11. 'The Special Threatening Military Period' 227

On the Alert 227
En1ergency Deployment 237

12. The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 246

1.,he Conspiracy 246
The Mission 248
Contents Vll
• •

Fictitious Negotiations
'Running the Bolshevik Hare'
Hess as Perceived by the Kremlin

13. On the Eve of War 275

\'Mobilization Is War!' 275
A Middle East Diversion: The Flaw in
British Intelligence
The Tass Communique

14. Calamity 294

Self-Deception 294
London: 'This Avalanche Breathing Fire
and Death' 301
. 22 June 1941: The Long Weekend 306

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index 394
 Illustrations and Maps

Plates between pages 208 and 209

Stalin, Minister of Defence Voroshilov and politburo members at Stalin's dacha.

Foreign Mi11ister Molotov at his desk. (Russian Foreign Ministry)
Churchill and Maisky at a lunch party in the Winter Garden of the Soviet Embassy,
London. (Hulton Getty)
J

Ambassador Maisky with aides at the Embassy. (Russian Foreign Ministry)

Count von Schulenburg with Molotov at tl1e signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
The Yugoslav Ambassador Milan Gavrilovi<; and his daughter.
Defence Minister, Marshal Timoshenko, Cl1ief of Staff, General Meretskov, and General
Zhukov, summer 1940.
Warning to Stalin of Hitler's decision on 'Barbarossa' fro1n the Soviet military attache in
Berlin, 29 December 1940.
Molotov reviewing the guard of honour in Berlin railway station, November 1940.
Molotov entertained by Hitler i11 Berlin, November 1940.
The Luftwaffe's bombing of Belgrade, 6 April 1941. (Museum of Military History,
Belgrade)
King Boris of Bulgaria visiting Hitler at Berchtesgaden. (Ringier CR Zurich)
Tl1e Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, boarding the trans-Siberian train at
V ladivostock heading for Moscow.
Matsuoka watches over Molotov signing the pact of neutrality with Japan in April 1941.
(Russian Foreign Ministry)
General Zhukov at the front, May 1941.
The former British ambassador to Belgrade Sir Ronald Campbell (left) and Sir Stafford
Cripps, recalled for consultations by the Foreign Office, 12 June 1941. (Hulton Getty)

Photographs are from the author's collection unless specified otherwise.

Maps

Territorial changes - 1938-40

The western littoral of tl1e Black Sea - Autumn 1940
Russian and Ger1nan deployments on the eve of the war
 ( Preface

Few events of the twentieth century compare in significance with Oper­

ation 'Barbarossa' . Its impact on the Second World War and its after1nath
was enormous. Yet what springs to mind at the mention of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the German invasion of Russia is primarily
anecdotal: Viacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
for example, drinking to the success of the Wehrmacht after tl1e German
occupation of Poland in 1939; General Guderian and his Soviet counter­
part reviewing the joint parade of the Red Army and the Panzer units in
Brest-Litovsk held to mark the division of Poland; the passage, on the
night of 22 June 1941 and to the sound of German guns, into the German­
held territories of the last train loaded with Soviet industrial merchan­
dise.1 T'hese anecdotes highlight what is known as the 'stab in the back'
theory: tl1e pact is still perceived as the most ob,1ious and most immedi­
ate cause of the Second World War. It is perhaps one of the ironies of
history that, only two years later, Germany and Russia would be locked
in a war of unprecedented dimensions, the outcome of which sealed the
Allied victory over Nazi Germany.
What prompted me to tread this well-ploughed furrow was the publi­
cation in 1985 of a series of articles, later turned into books, by V. Rezun,
better known simply as 'Suvorov', a defector from Russian Military Intel­
ligence (GRU). Suvorov depicted Soviet Russia as the aggressor, rather
than the victim, in June 194 1 . He advanced the preposterous and unsub­
stantiated claim that, throughout 1939-41, Stalin had been meticulously
preparing a revolutionary war against Germany. Operation 'Groza'
(Thunder) was planned for 6 July 1941 but was pre-empted by Hitler's
own invasion of Russi.a. The implication is breathtaking: in executing
his foreign policy Stalin, like Hitler, was pursuing a master plan which

lX
•
x Preface

sought wbrld domi11ation by transforming the Second World War into a

revolutionary war. 2
I had been crossing swords with Suvorov since the first presentation
of his ideas.3 However, it vvas the acclaim with which Icebreaker
was received in Russia, and the reluctance of Russian military and
diplomatic historians to respond, which led me to publish, in Moscow
and in Russian, a comprehensive rebuttal under the title The Icebreaker
1\1yth [in translation].4 As a former master of disinformation in the GRU,
Suvorov exploited the fact that the period in question was rife with myth
and conspiracy, inost of it deliberately propagated. These inventions were
later adopted uncritically by historians, not merely because of the lack of
solid information but also because of the political polarization of the Cold
War. The popularity of Suvorov's flimsy and fraudulent work in Russia
and in many quarters in the West proves that the oldest, stalest con­
spiracies survive longest. His books engender myths and consistently
and deliberately obstruct the search for truth b)' simplifying a complex
situation.
The process of nation-building, particularly through revolutionary
means, thrives on myth. The Soviet Union's official cult of the Great
Patriotic War created, then promoted, a standard version of the history
of the war.5 For five decades the officially generated account served as
the primary cohesive force in the collective social memory of the Soviet
l

people. It concealed Stalin's crimes by glorifying his contribution to

victory, and was later exploited by Khrushchev and other communist
leaders to galvanize public support. The history of the war thus emerged
as a bizarre cocktail of facts, falsifications and, above all, omissions. For
obvious reasons what suffered most at the hands of Soviet historians was
the era of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the disastrous opening stages
of the war. So sacred was the shrine that it was the last to be demolished
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This, however, was achieved by
iconoclasts who, in their eagerness to debunk the myth, have produced
an equally distorted and politicized account of the war. The omissions
have been filled with historical inventions, of which Suvorov' s is the out­
standing example.
Suvorov's views would not have warranted serious academic comment
had they 11ot coincided with the ongoing Historikerstreit, the rancorous
debate on the nature and course of German history.6 Broadly speaking,
Suvorov's arguments have been adopted to support Nolte's arguments
on the rationality and legitimacy of the politics of Nazi Germany. If Stalin
had indeed been intent on 'liberating' Central Europe, then Hitler's deci­
siort to fight Russia could no longer be viewed as a fulfilment of the
ideological blueprirlt outlined in lv1ein Kampf, as a strategic folly or
crude aggressive act. In Germany Icebreaker enabled Professors Nolte,
Hoffman, Maser and Post to condone Hitler's move to the East as a pre-
Preface Xl
•

emptive strike. The war is vindicated by traditional German geopolitical

interests and the threat to Germany and the civilized Western world by
the abhorrent Stalinist regime.7 The Austrian historian Ernst Topitsch
went even further, arguing in his book S talin's War that the Second World
War 'was essentially a Soviet attack on the Western democracies, in which
Germany . . . served only as military surroga.te'.8 Comrnon to this new
historiography is a failure to offer any convincirtg evidence to sustain the
allegations. The discourse is essentially confined to a theoretical exami­
nation of Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the V\'ar, and reveals strong
ideological predilections.9
While engaged in writing a rebuttal to Suvorov's work I grew increas­
ingly uncomfortable with the vast literature on the Ribbentrop-Molotov
Pact and Operation 'Barbarossa' . It became obvious that, by diverting the
debate to the issue of the pre-emptive strike, Suvorov 11ad succeeded in
deflecting historians from the fundamental issue: a convincing explana­
tion of Hitler's decision to invade Russia. The issue is by no means the
focal point of this book, and I make no claim to provide a final judgment.
l-Iowever, by juxtaposing the newly available Soviet archival sources and
the German ones, it has been possible to produce a carefully documented
sequence of events, exposing the circumstances which led Hitler to issue
Directive 21 in December 1940.
The focal point of the present book, however, is the elucidation of
Stalin's policies on the eve of the war. After more than half a century of
research, Stalin's policies still remain, in the words of Churchill, 'a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma'. The 'totalitarian model', con­
structed during the Cold War to deflect hostility from the former enemy
on to the new one, makes no real contribtition. All it does is suggest an
affinity between Marxism and Nazism.10 The almost total absence of evi­
dence of Stalin's intentions on the eve of the war led historians either to
attribute to him a dubious plot or to agree with Churchill in dismissing
·Stalin and his generals as 'the most completely outwitted bunglers of the
Second World War so far as strategy, policy, foresight [and] competence'
are concerned.11 Such scanty evidence as did emerge came from the Soviet
army shortly after Stalin's death. After Khrushchev's rise to power the
marshals took advantage of their powerful position to dodge responsi­
bility for the disastrous events of 22 June by pinning all the blame on
Stalin. But even this abundance of military recollection, in book and
article form, examined the events strictly from the military point of view.12
The emphasis on theoretical foundations and the mental roots of the
conflict further deflected the debate from the actual events leading to the
war in the East. No serious attempt has been made to explore the intri­
cate political game which Stalin devised and which was linked to his mil­
itary strategy and political vision. The absence of clear evidence has led
historians decisively up a blind alley.13
Xll Preface
• •

The particular contribution of the present book is a coherent analysis

of Stalin's policies which not only challenges the standard interpretations
but produces a completely new narrative. Apart from an introductory
note, the book does not dwell on the negotiations leading to the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact or on its immediate repercussions; the ruthless
implementation of the secret protocols has been fully surveyed elsewhere.
The focus here is the year precedin g the war. A serious flaw in most
military and diplomatic histories is the narrow angle from which the
period is examined. It is rarely remembered that, during that year alone,
Europe underwent probably the most extensive political transformation
of its history. Event after event, ranging from the German invasion of
Norway and Denmark in the north through that of the Low Countries
and France to the encroachment into the Balkans, had direct repercussions
on Soviet policy. The outbreak of war, and the enormity of its con­
sequences, provided a retrospective point of departure for historians,
overshadowing the political drama which preceded it.
A second flaw, which this book sets out to rectify, has been the tendency
to explore the episode exclusively on the basis of the German-Soviet col­
laboration of 1 939-41 . By examining the policies of Stalin in the context
of German-Soviet relations alone, historians have avoided the equally
complex and significant relationship with Britain, as well as those with
Turkey and the Balkan countries.14 This shortcoming was further �xacer­
bated by a failure to examine the various geographical and thematic
aspects sufficiently clearly. Few would deny that the activities of the
General Staff, the Comintern, the Central Committee and Narkomindel
(the Russian Foreign Ministry) finally converged in the Kremlin. Though
a measure of latitude was allowed, the final decision always rested
with Stalin, who, formally in charge after assuming the premiership in
mid-May 1941, adopted a comprehensive approach to both military
and diplomatic affairs. An illuminating example of the complexity of the
decisio11-making process is the evaluation of General Zhukov's proposal
for a counter-offensive to forestall the German build-up of May 1941.
This was considered by Stalin against the background of rumours of
an impending German-Soviet war, Rudolf Hess's mysterious flight to
England a few days earlier, the defeats inflicted upon Yugoslavia and the
British army in the Balkans and North Africa, and the recently signed Pact
of Neutrality with the Japanese, not to mention the puzzling overtures
made by Count Werner von Schulenburg (the German ambassador in
Moscow) in an attempt to avert the war. By widening the scope and exam­
ining the German onslaught on Russia in its broader geographical, mili­
tary, strategic and political framework, I have been able to detect further
clues to Stalin's attitudes on the eve of the war.
The unique feature of the present narrative is that it is substantiated
by a wide array of predominantly unpublished and newly published
Preface Xlll
• • •

material from a range of national archives. In the last decade, since Glas­
nost, an endless flow of information has emerged, shedding new light on
the approach to war.15 It seems almost inconceivable that, as late as 1990,
the very existence of the secret protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
was officially denied by President Gorbachev.16 So far the majority of
analyses of Operation 'Barbarossa' have been based exclusively on
German sources. A small number of the most recent works have been
based on documentary collections published in Moscow,17 but none
has utilized the growing range of archival resources. Nor have Russian
scholars made extensive use of them: new scholarly work tends to be
confined in its scope, focusing on selected themes.
Through painstaking efforts, I have succeeded in obtaining access to a
vast array of Russian archival sources from the Russian Foreign Ministry
and the General Staff, and an extensive selection of documents from both
the NKVD (the Internal Affairs Commissariat - later, Ministry - in charge
of domestic and foreign intelligence) and the GRU. The files of the Foreign
Ministry included those of V. Molotov, his deputy A. Vyshinsky, I. Maisky,
the Soviet ambassador in London, and V. G . Dekanozov, the Soviet ambas­
sador in Berlin. I have further consulted the files of the Balkan embassies,
the bulkiest in the Ministry for that period.
It is lamentable for the historian that Stalin's terror discouraged his
entourage not only from keeping diaries but from expressing themselves
in writing at all. Those who could not resist the temptation were fully
aware of their vulnerability. I t was undoubtedly humiliating for Maisky,
for instance, to submit his diary for Stalin's inspection before accompa­
nying Eden to Moscow in December 1941:

Tomorrow I am setting off to the USSR together with Eden. As

travelling by sea is a hazardous affair these days, I address this letter
to you.
In the enclosed portfolio you will find a diary which I kept, though
not very regularly, during the last seven years . . . . from a historical
point of view, this diary is undoubtedly of interest. In any case, over
the last seven years I have found myself in an ideal position to observe
world politics, and have had the opportunity of establishing relations
with the leading political figures in England and in other countries.
I am sending my diary to you. Do with it as you please.18

The human dimension, so vital in Russian political culture, is thus hard

to retrieve, compared for instance with the very personal and vivid picture
the reader can glean of political life in London. The few glimpses I have
been able to capture are drawn from Maisky' s detailed and illuminating
diary, used extensively in this book for the first time, and an assortment of
private papers (such as the encounter between Zhukov, Timoshenko and
Xl\' Preface
•

Stalin at the Politburo meeting in mid-June 1941). Similarly I have made

full use of the more interesting memoirs of military and diplomatic figures
which appear in the Bibliography; there is, however, little crtance that
further such material exists and will emerge. These sources were supple­
mented by an exhaustive examination of the wide spectrum of printed
documentary material. Ullfortunately various collections of documents
which I was able to consult shortly after 1991 11ave since been closed.
Research in Russian archives is still governed by a mixture of whim
and bureaucratic hazard vvhich u11dermines the process of research. As a
matter of principle I have refrained from paying for archival access, apart
from legitimate photocopying costs. I succeeded in gaining sight of impor­
tant materiai only after endless trips to Moscow, patient haggling and
pleading. A typical hurdle is the decision of Russian Military Intelligence
to withhold all cipher telegrams for the years 1941-50. Hence, for instance,
the recently published second volun1e of the Russian official publication
of docume11ts on Soviet foreign policy (Doki£menty vneshnei politiki,
1940-22 iiL11ia 1 94 1 ) is severely depleted. The ruling included material
relating to the six months preceding the war. Fortunately I had already
seen most of the key telegrams, and for the re1nainder I extrapolated from
records of meeti11gs within the files of the relevant embassies.
On the military side the material consulted included the entire range
of military intelligence placed before Stalin on the eve of the war: the
detailed bi-weekly cumulative reports beginning in autumn 1940, the
ensuing reports of the head of Military Intelligence and the reports of
the military attaches. I also consulted the stenographic minutes of the
extraordinary military council of the High Command in December 1940,
the proceedings of the war games of Janu_ary 1941 and the full set of
the directives of the General Staff. Similarly an extensive selection of
documents dealing with the Red Army's preparations for the war was
explored. I further succeeded in gaining access to some key material held
in the Presidential Archives, now regrettably closed to research. Most
enlightening were the records of the Comintem and particularly the diary
of its President, DimitrO\', V\7hich I was able to consult in its Bulgarian
version. Dimitrov V\7as closely associated with Stalin and left a candid
description of some Politburo meetings. I was further able to see many
records from the archives of the Russidn Security Services which provide
remarkabie insight into tr�e intelligence scene. Those ir.. clude, inter alia,
intercepts of telegrams from Moscow, copies of telegrams from Sir
Stafford Cripps (the British ambassador in Moscovv on the eve of the war)
obtained through members of the 'Cambridge Five' in London, dis­
patches from various rings in Berlin, as �iVell as the file on Hess, of which
J. Costello \vas able to use only a couple of documents in his Ten Days to
Desti11y: Tlze Sec1-et S tory of t}1e Hess Peace I1zitiative a11d British Efforts to S trike
a Deal zL1itJ1 Hitler (Ne'\v York, 1991).
Preface xv

The book also makes full use of Brjtish archives, both of the Foreign
Office, the Prime Minister' s Papers, the Chiefs of Staff, Military Intelli­
gence and various other branches, as well as a variety of collections of
private papers. But the jewel in the crovvn was undoubtedly the Bulgar­
ian and Yugoslav archjves, which have not previously been used by
Western scholars and which, juxtaposed with the German and the Soviet
documents, give a full picture of the scramble for the Balkans and shed
fresh light on Stalin's aims and ambitions. I have further consulted the
relevant files dealing with Russia at the Quai d'Orsay. The Swedish
ambassador to Moscow, V. Assarasson, was one of the few people in
whom the German and the Italian ambassadors confided, and his reports
and papers deposited in the Swedish State Archives are a goldmine for
the historian.

Acknowledgments

In Russia I was helped by many colleagues. Special gratitude and appre­

ciation is due to the late General Dimitry Volkogonov, who provided
unstinting support in my search for new irtformation and material. An
invaluable source of information, critical observation and assistance was
Dr Lev Bezymensky, the distinguished Russian historian, Zhukov's inter­
preter during the war and former editor of Novae vremiia. My special
thanks to the director, Mr P. Stegny, and staff of the archival department
of the Russian Foreign Ministry for their assistance. Major-General V. A.
Zolotariov, director of the Institute of Military History, kindly allowed me
to consult fragments of its rich collection. Likewise I am grateful to
General Yuri Kobaladze of the Russian Security Services for allowing me
access to their sources.
Professor John Erickson, an old friend and undisputed expert on the
Soviet military on the eve of the war, provided constant assistance:
I profited from companionship and eye-opening conversations. I am
grateful for the considerable assistance I received from Lieutenant­
Colonel David M . Glantz of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and I am par­
ticularly indebted to Professor Bruce Menning, also of Fort Leavenworth
and the foremost expert on Soviet military planning. General Dr Shimon
Naveh, an outstanding authority on the Soviet milita_ry doctrine, an
inspiring original thinker and close friend, guided me with great patience
and enthusiasm through the most sophisticated innovatio11s in this field
introduced by Generals Triandafilov and Tukhachevsky in the 1930s;
he also helped me to master various military issues which called for
professional expertise.
An early version of this book was written at St Antony's College,
Oxford. I owe special gratitude to my friends Timothy Garton Ash, Anne
XVI Preface
•

Deighton and Harry Shukman for their comments and support, and to
Iverach McDonald, the former political editor of The Times who shared
with me his lively and insightful observations of the period . I thank the
Warden and Fellows of the College for their interest in my work and for
the congenial atmosphere within which the book was substantially pre­
pared. The late F. H. Hinsl�y and Dr Zara Steiner, of Cambridge Univer­
sity, read an earlier version of the manuscript and suggested significant
improvements. Sir Maurice Shock, former Rector of Lincoln College,
Oxford, was kind enough to allow me access to the private papers and
diary of Sir Stafford Cripps and to share with me on many occasions his
wide knowledge of British politics.
Special warm personal appreciation is due to Dr Boris Morozov, my
colleague at the Cummings Center at Tel Aviv University, who went out
of his way to assist me in the arduous process of detecting indispensable
but often elusive archival material in Moscow. I am equally indebted to
Dr Petra Marquand-Bigman, who diligently assisted me in the research
of the German aspects of the story. Professor Michael Confino, who first
ignited my interest in Russian studies some thirty years ago, and was the
first to introduce me to the 'Eastern Question', was kind enough to help
me with the translation of various Bulgarian documents. Dr Raphael Yago
of the Cummings Center helped me with the translations of the Ruman­
ian sources, and especially the recently released volume of telegrams of
G. Gafencu, the Rumanian ambassador in Moscow. My gratitude is due
to Dr Ronald Zweig and Professor Dan Diner, my colleagues and friends
at Tel Aviv University, who carefully read the final version of the manu­
script and made astute observations. A fellowship from the Kennan
Institute at the Wilson Center enabled me to consult the rich archival
and manuscript resources in Washington. Robert Baldock, my editor at
Yale University Press, deserves special gratitude. His unstinted help went
well beyond the call of duty.
Finally I am indebted to my wife Sue, who edited the manuscript most
meticulously and made valuable comments which profoundly affected
the final version of the book.

Gabriel Gorodetsky
The Rubin Chair of Russian and East
European History and Civilization
Tel Aviv University
 Introduction: The Premises of
Stalin's Foreign Policy

There is little to warrant the suggestion that Stalin's foreign policy fol­
lowed a blueprint: that a direct line existed between Lenin's militant pro­
gramme of 'Imperialism as the Highest Form of Capitalism', devised in
Switzerland in 1915, and Stalin's supposedly revolutionary war of 1941,
which brought this policy to fruition. The first decade after the Russian
Revolution was characterized by a dynamic re-evaluation of foreign
policy. The Bolsheviks faced a formidable challenge in their attempt to
reconcile two contradictory factors, the axiomatic need to spread the rev­
olution beyond Russia's borders and the prosaic need to guarantee sur­
vival within them. From its inception, Soviet foreign policy was marked
by a gradual but consistent retreat from hostility to the capitalist regimes
towards peaceful coexistence based on mutual expediency. This was
justified at first as a tactical move, and thus temporary. However, what
started as the provisional New Economic Policy (NEP) turned out to be
only the first in a series of extended 'breathing spaces', clad in a variety
of ideological guises: 'Socialism in One Country', 'United Front', 'Popular
Front', 'Grand Alliance', 'Thaw', 'Detente' and, most recently, 'Glasnost'.
The prolongation of these 'transitional' periods brought a steady and con­
sistent erosion of the ideological dimension of Soviet foreign policy.
By 1926 officials at the British Foreign Office recognized the rise of the
'strong, stern, silent' Stalin as the unchallenged leader of the Communist
Party. 'It is not surprising' they commented, 'that the defeat of the fanatic
/

Bolshevik opposition indicates a foreign policy which utilises ''national

tools'' .'1 The distance between that view and Trotsky's own announce­
ment, on his appointment as the first People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, that his task would be to 'publish a few revolutionary proclama­
tions and then close shop'2 reflects the extent to which Soviet foreign

1
2 Grand Delusion

policy had changed in its first decade. The initial supposition that foreign
relations would be superfluous in a world shattered by revolution was
replaced, first in 1921 and particularly after 1924, by a sober evaluation
of the need to reach a modus vivendi with the outside world. The Com­
intern (the Co1nmunist International Organization run from Moscow),
too, bent its ideological line to c9!1form to national interests. By early 1924
its Fiftl1 Congress reluctantly conceded the ascendancy of an 'era of sta­
bilization of capitalism' and advocated a reorientation of the communist
parties and the front organizations in defence of Russia.3 The experience
of th.e first decade of the revolution proved that duality could hardly be
maintained without compromising Russian national interests. Stalin's
wish to establish the supremacy of moderate diplomacy rather than
encourage ideological fervour was reflected by the replacement of G.
Chicherin as Commissar for Foreign Affairs by M . Litvinov, the repre­
sentative of the Western orientation in Narkomindel (the Soviet Foreign
�Ainistry). Despite differences in mentality, temperament and social back­
ground, both Litvinov and Stalin shared a prudent and pragm.atic
approach to foreign affairs.4
By the end of the first decade of the Soviet state, a sequence of diplo­
matic and ideological setbacks dictated an urgent reassessment of prior­
ities. The dream of u.nconditional support from the world proletariat
had been shattered beyond repair. On the face of it the Comintern now
resorted to a purely militant line, proclaiming the end of the stabilization
of capitalism and the revival of revolutionary opportunities in the West.
United-front tactics were abandoned and replaced by militant 'class
against class' slogans. However, after thoroughly sovietizing the shaky
communist movement in Europe, the Comintern of tl1e 1930s no longer
resembled that of the first decade. By 1941 it had lost its grip and was for
all practical purposes abandoned, as this book shows, although its for1nal
dissolution came only in 1943. .
However, the legacy of imperial rivalry, amplified by the communist
experience, intensified the mutual suspicion which marked the early
1920s. Mistrust remained a major factor in the gradual but steady decline
into the instability of the 1930s. Rapid industrialization and collectiviza­
tion V\rere aimed at extracting by brute force economic resources which
could not be obtained through normal trading procedures with the West.
Given the reality of capitalist encirclement and fears of renewed inter­
vention, defence against the external tl1reat was a prerequisite for the
achievement of 'Socialism in One Country' . The search for mutual assis­
tance pacts with Russia's immediate neighbours preceded Hitler's rise to
power and gained momentum after 193 1 .
Historical memory is short. Given the unexpected emergence of the
Soviet Union as a superpower after the Second World War, it is perhaps
difficult to recall that up to the outbreak of the war the fear of renewed
Introduction: The Premises of Stalin's Foreign Policy 3

capitalist intervention was widespread. The new Russian military doc­

trine, devised after 1928, was marked by a recognition of the various
threats facing the Soviet ·union rather than by an expansionist drive.
Rather than anticipating a war among the imperialist states, the fear was
of an armed crusade against the Russian Revolution. Up to 1927, due
mostly to the weakness of tl1e Red Army and the l1ope of reaching a modus
vivendi with the West, it was assumed that the support of the European
workers would be effective in deterring the Western governments from
embarking on war with the Soviet Union. By 1927, however, revolu­
tionary expectations had subsided and tlle Red Army was assigned the
role of averting the threat.5 The coherent policy of 'collective security',
pursued with on1y marginal tactical deflections, perceived danger
throughout the capitalist camp, whether from fascist Germany or the
Western derr1ocracies. Adopting balance-of-power policies, so a.lien to
Marxist theory, which rejected siding with one capitalist power against
another, Stalin directed his efforts towards safeguarding the revolt1tion
from within through collaboration with the West.
The conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of Neutrality on 23
August 1939 (Molotov had become Commissar for Foreign Affairs three
months before) marked a change in the grouping of forces but not in the
general aims of Stalin's foreign policy. The same holds for the secret
protocols, signed a month later� which established spheres of influence
between the Soviet Union and Germany. The motives for signing the pact
become clear once we establish the precise timing of Stalin's shift towards
Germany. T'he controversy over the pact's interpretation encompasses
two opposing poles and a wide spectrum of opinions betweerL them. At
one extre1ne is tl1e view that the Soviet Union had pursued an indis­
putably noble policy of erecting a European-wide shield of collective
security against Nazi aggression. The collapse of collective security is
ascribed not to the lack of Soviet efforts, but rather to 'appeasement', tl1e
failure of the Western democracies to combat Hitler's aggression. Accord­
ing to this view, the Russians did not seriously consider the German
option until late in August 1939 when they realized that the West was
clingi11g to appeasement, while Hitler was set on occ11py1ing Poland.
At the opposite extreme are the allegations that collective security
against aggression was never the Kremlin's real objective, but a front from
which to woo Hitler into an agg1·essive alliance. This interpretation under­
lines the ideological premises of Soviet foreign policy. Historians like
Robert Tucker and most recently 'Su vorov' contend that, as far back as
1927, Stalin was determined to drive a wedge between the capitalist states
and manoeuvre thern into a mutually destructive inter-imperialist war
from which the USSR would emerge unscathed and in a strong position
to expand territorially from all her borders. To provoke this war, Stalin
is purported to have facilitated Hitler's rise to power by meticulously
4 Grand Delusion

choreographing the policy of the Comintern and the German Communist

Party on a suicidal course and undermining a possible alliance with the
Social Democrats. The Nazi-Soviet pact was, in this view, always implicit
in Stalin's plans, while 'collective security' only concealed his genuine
designs on tRe West. Suvorov is in fact at pains to ascribe to Stalin a con­
tinuous aggressive policy in collusion with Germany dating back to the
Rapallo Treaty of 1922.6
It is most tempting to attribute the Russians' shift to disillusionment
with the West after the Munich conference in September 1938. Their exclu­
sion from the conference and the free hand given to Germany in Czecho­
slovakia confirmed the deep-rooted Soviet suspicion that the British and
French Prime Ministers, Chamberlain and Daladier, were determined to
fend off the German danger by encouraging Hitler to expand eastwards.
However, such an interpretation overlooks the fact that, despite the severe
blow to collective security, Munich was not considered by Stalin to be
irreversible. Moreover, he had no alternative to pursue as long as Hitler
continued to gamble on further Western submission.
A favourite watershed for most historians is Stalin's survey of Soviet
foreign policy to the 1 8tl1 Party Congress on 10 March 1939. Stalin's
famous warning to the Western democracies that he did not intend to
'pull the chestnuts out of the fire' is often cited. In retrospect, historians
detect here Stalin's decision to collaborate with Nazi Germany. However,
even a cursory examination of the entire text of the speech should, suffice
to show that Stalin in fact dismissed Lenin's ideas of a revolutionary war
and warned that a world war posed a threat to Russia. Besides, within a
week Hitler abrogated the Munich Agreement and forced Chamberlain
to adopt a more bellicose attitude.
The unilateral British guarantees to Poland of 31 March 1939 represent
the crucial move towards the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the opening
salvoes of the Second World War.7 They altered the scene at a stroke. In
making his declaration Chamberlain barely consulted the Foreign Office
or his own advisers; the guarantees were his spontaneous emotional reac­
tion to the personal humiliation he had suffered when Hitler seized
Prague on 1 5 March 1939. Paradoxically, by guaranteeing Poland, Britain
in effect challenged Germany, thus effectively abandoning her position
as the arbiter of the European balance of power. The guarantees had two
possible consequences. The deterrent element was designed to bring
Hitler back to the negotiating table. However, were Hitler still to press his
territorial claims against Poland, the military axiom inspired by the
lesso11s of earlier wars, of avoiding a war on two fronts, would make
it imperative for Hitler to neutralize the Soviet Union. Consequently a
German option, hitherto unavailable, opened up for the Soviet Union.
Conversely, when it dawned on Chamberlain that the path to a 'second
Munich' was not smooth and that war remained a real possibility, he was
Introduction: The Premises of Stalin's Foreign Policy 5

reluctantly forced to secure at least a measure of Soviet military commit­

ment vital for the implementation of the guarantees. In this manner, and
without prior design, the Soviet Union became the pivot of the European
balance of power.8
The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is remembered as a 'shock' and a 'sur­
prise', confirming the perfidious Russian nature. Suvorov recruits this
powerful image to question Russian sincerity in the 1939 negotiations for
a tripartite agreement with England and France. He argues that 'Stalin
did not seek such alliances . . . Stalin could have remained neutral, but
chose instead to stab in the back those countries engaged in a struggle
with fascism' .9 This is presented as a corollary to the ideological blueprint
drawn up by Stalin in the 1 920s. Both myths, the 'stab in the back' and
the 'blueprint', were spawned during the Cold War and were sustained
by a simplistic reading of events leading up to the pact. In reality the
British were quick to recognize the likely impact of the guarantees on
Soviet foreign policy. Hardly had the guarantees been given than Sir
William Seeds, the British ambassador to Moscow, alerted Whitehall to
the consequences: 'Russia had had enough and would henceforth stand
aloof free of any commitments.' In mid-April he went on to warn that, if
the guarantees to Poland were to remain, Russia could 'quite properly be
tempted to stand aloof and in case of war confine its advertised support
of the victims of aggression to the profitable business of selling supplies
to the latter'. Once Hitler established a common border with Russia, Seeds
even expected an agreement on the future of the Baltic States, Poland
and Bessarabia. Likewise the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs admitted that 'now that HMG have given their guarantees, the
Soviet Government will sit back and wash their hands of the wl1ole
affair'.10 On the very day of the signature of the pact, Sir Nevile Hender­
son, the British ambassador to Berlin, admitted that the British 'policy vis­
a-vis Poland would always have made it inevitable in the end' .11
In the new circumstances Stalin could theoretically commit himself
to the Germans. But, with Czechoslovakia still fresh in his memory,
he seemed most concerned that Chamberlain might pursue a policy of
appeasement once Germany moved against Poland, and encourage
her to continue her progress eastwards. It should be remembered that
the lasting feature of Soviet foreign policy in the inter-war period was
an intense suspicion that Germany and Britain might close ranks and
mount a crusade against communist Russia. Events which had little
direct bearing on Russia, such as the Locarno Treaty of 1925, Germany's
entry into the League of Nations the following year and, of course, the
Munich conference, were seen in this vein. Soviet historians attributed
the failure of the negotiations in 1939 to sinister Western attempts to
revive German militarism by conspiring with German fascism and div­
erting the aggressors eastwards. While there is no hard evidence that
6 Grand Delusion

such a plan was ever contemplated by the British Cabinet, historians have
argued that Chamberlain's strategic policy remained deterrent in nature;
and actively encouraged efforts to defuse international tension by diplo­
matic mea�Chamberlain remained hostile to binding military agree­
ments, which could be provocative in nature, and to exerting pressure
on Poland to accept Soviet assistance.12 In view of the Germans' constant
infringement of treaties signed by them, Russia had no confidence in a
written agreement.
From 3 1 March onwards Stalin faced a severe dilemma which had little
to do with ideological predisposition. Essentially catttious and pragma­
tist in foreign relations, Stalin was haunted by the suspicion that, despite
the guarantees, Britain would abandon Poland as she had done Czecho­
slovakia, thereby fostering German aggression on the eastern front. These
apprehensions dictated an alignment with Germany. On the other hand,
in the event of a British failure to respond to Germany's invasion of
Poland, Germany was likely to violate such an agreement and continue
the push eastwards. This prognosis led to desperate Soviet efforts to
replace the unilateral guarantees with a contractual military alliance.13
However, from the outset such an alliance proved difficult owing to
Poland's refusal to permit transit of Soviet troops in the event of war, and
to Britain's reluctance to recognize the Soviet Union as her principal ally
in Eastern Europe. Collective security continued to be viewed as the more
viable and desirable alternative. 'fhese negotiations, though they dragged
on for a number of months, reached deadlock at the very beginning over
the issues which finally drove the Russians into German arms. Soviet and
Western historians have often failed to realize that England and the Soviet
Union were in fact seeking different agreements. The Russians had con­
sistently pressed, in conformity with their policy of collective security, for
a treaty of mutual assistance. The salient features were an unequivocal
definition of the military measures to be taken by each of the belligerents
once war, which they regarded as inevitable, broke out.14
By adhering to deterrent measures the British failed to satisfy Russia's
fundamental security needs. There was little room for manoeuvre, and
from the outset Britain's Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had slender
expectations. Rather than a commitment, he wished Russia to join one of
his endless attempts to discourage Hitler from pursuing his ambitions
while cherishing the hope that he might be forced back to the negotiat­
ing table. Halifax was therefore careful to advise the Russians to
limit their activity to a statement 'on their own initiative', fastidiously
restricted with qualifications tl1at 'in the e'rent of any act of aggression
against any European neighbour of the Soviet Union which was resisted by
the country concet· ned, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be
available, if desired, and woulti be afforded in such manner as would be
found most convenient' (autho1·' s italics). Halifax believed that what he
Introduction: The Premises of Stalin's Foreign Policy 7

termed a 'positive declaration' by the Soviet government 'would have a

steadying effect upon the international situation' . 1 5 The 'steadying effect'
was tantamount to deterrence. He hardly wavered from this position
throughout the arduous s11mmer months of 1939.
The rigid British position led Stalin, out of sheer calculation, to seek an
alternative through dialogue with the Gerrrians. But the final decision '"'as
practically forced on him on 19 August 1939, when he received remark­
able intelligence on Hitler's long- and short-term aims. The report con­
veyed the Fiihrer' s determination to solve the Polish problem at all costs,
regardless of the risk of having to fight on two fronts. Hitler furtl1er
counted on Moscow to 'conduct negotiations with us, as she had no inter­
est whatever in a conflict with Germany, nor was she anxious to be
defeated for the sake of England and France'. It is worthwhile noting, for
those who adhere to the 'community of fate' model, that although the
document advocated 'a new Rapallo stage . . . of rapprochement and eco­
nomic collaboration with Moscow', it underlined the ephemeral nature
....

of the 'Second Rapallo' which was to be pursued 'for a limited period' of

approximately two years.16
Clearly the dynamic force behind events since the Munich Agreement
was Germany. Like the British, Stalin, far from initiating the aggression,
had to comply with Germa11 demands, which amounted to an ultimatum.
Going through the proposal on 19 August, he carefully rnarked in thick
blue pencil Hitler's 'advice' to accept the draft agreement, as Poland's
behaviour towards Germany was sucl1 that 'a crisis may occur any day'.
Hitler fu1·ther commented that it would be wise for Staiin not 'to lose any
time'.17 The decision was further confirmed by the realization that the
Anglo-French military delegation, which reached �v1oscow in the second
week of August, lacked instructions or authority and had constantly to
consult London and Paris.18
These calculations underpinned the agreement. Soviet policy remained
essentially one of level- headed Realpolitik. 19 Stalin had wavered for a
long time, as was his practice in formulating foreign policy. Under
these conditions various opposing factions were able to develop. The
principal opporLents of Litvinov, and therefore of collective security, were
Molotov, chairman of the Soviet Council of Commissars, and Andrei
Zhdanov, Stalin's protege and first secretary of the Leningrad region.
Their isolationist view, however, was genuinely aimed at insulating tl1e
Soviet Union from imminent war in Europe, rather than at seeking a
....

revolutionary outlet.20 Stalin alvvays exploited opportunities as they

appeared at a given moment. Througl1ot1t most of the 1930s he adhered
to collective security, in an attempt to protect Russia from a disast1·ous
\l\rar, until he despaired of its success at the end of the decade. Given his
understand. able and ever present suspicion of reconciliation between
Britain and Germany, it is doubtful whether Stalin saw the pact as an
8 Grand Delitsion

ironclad guarantee of Russia's western borders. It did not lead to a fra­

ternity of 'blood and steel' with Germany, or to a revival of the long­
forgotten dream of relentless expansion.
Neutralify-was hardly construed as a prelude to world revolution, as
the doctrinaire interpretation of Lenin's "defeatist' stance in an imperial­
ist war would have required. It served the more mundane Soviet inter­
ests of ensuring that Russia would not be involved in the war while
creating favourable conditions for the post-war negotiations on the future
of Europe. The various communist parties were instructed to prevent the
spread of the war into Turkey and South-eastern Europe.21 The premise
underlying Soviet foreign policy was that Russia should be 'content to be
confined to its own small Lebensraum' .22 Stalin's exposition, to none other
than Dimitrov, the President of the Comintern, of the reasons which had
led him to sign the pact with the Germans was devoid of any ideological
considerations. It amounted to a determination not to become the 'mer­
cenary' of Britain and France. True, he did justify the division of Poland
in what might be seen as an ideological perspective, suggesting in his typ­
ically callous way: 'What harm would have been caused if, as a result of
the dismemberment of Poland, we had extended the socialist system to
new territories and populations?' However, the thin veneer barely con­
cealed Soviet strategic interests or the need to bring the war to a hasty
end before Russia too became involved in the conflict.23
When Dimitrov stubbornly adhered to the orthodox ideological para­
digm, Stalin personally intervened to ensure that the actions of the Com­
intern were subordinated to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy.
Dimitrov was discouraged by Stalin and Zhdanov from entertaining any
illusions about the revolutionary potential of the ""·ar. He was led to
understand that 'in the First Imperialist War the Bolsheviks overestimated
the situation. We all rushed ahead and made mistakes! This can be
explained, but not excused, by the conditions prevailing then. Today we
must not repeat the position held by the Bolsheviks' .24 In no time com­
placency gave way to concern at the setbacks inflicted on the Red Army
in the early stages of the war against Finland in autumn 1939. The
flamboyant revolutionary slogans were replaced by strange equations
such as: 'The activities of the Red Army too are the concern of world rev­
olution.' The Red Army, rather than acting as an icebreaker to advance
world revolution, was assigned the role of 'rendering Finland friendly to
the Government of the Soviet Union' .25
The attention given to Suvorov' s interpretation results from current
Russian views of the events of 1939. But it is inspired by moral judgments,
and focuses on the secret protocols which brought about the division and
seizure of Poland and the occupation of the Baltic countries.26 Stalin was
determined to use the opportunities which the war provided to advance
what he considered to be the Soviet Union's long-term national interests.
Introduction: The Premises of Stalin's Foreign Policy 9

These essentially focused on establishing the Soviet Union's role as a

major European country by revising the Versailles Treaty and addressing
the grievances inflicted on Russian diplomacy since the Crimean War.
Such a moral perspective overlooks the astute observation made by Teddy
Uldricks, a leading expert on Soviet foreign policy, that 'the Kremlin
pursued a diplomatic course that was neither morally nor ideologically
consistent. Moscow's policy, like that of the democracies, was neither pure
and noble nor diabolically cunning.'27
 1

'P ntial Enemies': London and

Moscow at Loggerheads

'The Truce of the Bear'

The outbreak of war aroused some disguised satisfaction in London
at seeing Russia and Germany as partners on the other side of the barri­
cade. The British, as R. A. Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at
the Foreign Office, observed, 'are a proud people, and seem to enjoy
the ''world at arms'' ' against them.1 The self-fulfilling prophecy that
Germany and the Soviet Union would join hands in war against Britain
fed on two potential rather than real dangers. The first was the damage
caused by the Soviet export of war materials to Germany to the funda­
mental British war effort, which depended on the maintenance of an effec­
tive economic blockade. However, rega.rdless of the actual volume of such
trade (which is still debated by historians), it should be_ noted that White­
hall tended to minimize its significance.2 It was also plainly apparent to
the Ministry of Economic Warfare that by imposing an economic boycott
on the Soviet Union Britain would curtail the Russians' manoeuvrability
while increasing their dependence on trade with Germany. Finally, the
Foreign Office conceded that even if the Russians were willing to sacrifice
their partnership with Germany, Britain was in no position to offer ade­
quate economic compensation.3
The other danger had far-reaching repercussions on future events. The
circumstances of the 'Phoney War', when a direct threat to the British Isles
seemed remote, highlighted the implications of Soviet relations with
Germany on Britisl1 imperial and strategic assets in the Near and Middle
East. The traditional irriperialist interests were reinforced by the strong
ideological prejudice shared by Chamberlain and his Cabinet. The Chiefs
of Staff advocated the protection of areas 'likely to be infected by the

10
'Potential Enemies': London and Moscow at Loggerheads 11

Virus of Bolshevik doctrine' .4 On the day of the signature of the

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador in
Berlin, expressed it bluntly in a private letter: 'Now H.M.G. is at the cross­
roads. We have got to help Poland b·ut not to lead her to destruction
because we hate & fear the Nazis. After all we have the British Empire to
think of . . . it comes before Nazis & the shifting sands of Easterr1 Europe.
The bandits will fall out between themselves the1·e in the end.'5
To a degree the British outlook can be explained by the rigid attitude
of the French government. In the midst of an acute domestic crisis, the
French were eager for a spectacular victory, preferably away from their
own borders. Their communications with the Soviet Union had become
overtly aggressive at the beginning of 1940, and the Soviet ambassador
was even declared persona non grata. It was a French initiative which led
a reluctant British delegation to expel the Soviet Union from the League
of Nations on 14 December 1939 and brought forward the planning of a
raid on the Caucasian oilfields. 6
The poor assessment of Soviet intentions was trte result not only of
scant information but also the will to reinforce a deep-rooted concept.7
The pact was conceived as a resurrection of the 'community of fate',
following the tradition of Brest-Litovsk and the Rapallo Treaty. It is inter­
esting to note that Count Werner von Schulenburg, the German ambas­
sador in Moscow, made a differen.t analysis, informing his Foreign
Ministry in the Vvilhelmstrasse in early 1940 that the Soviet Union was
genuinely determined 'to cling to neutrality . . . and avoid as much as
possible anything that might involve it in a conflict with the Wester11
Powers'.8
The concept fed on traditio11al Russophobia and repugnance towards
communism in both tl1e Foreign Office and the ar1ned forces. Since the
mid-nineteenth century, when rivalry over Central Asia and Afghanistan
had come to dominate Anglo-Russian relations, the inetaphor of Russia
as the savage bear had been embedded deep in the British consciousness.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when the Foreign Office consid­
ered embarking on negotiations with the Russians, during the German
invasion of France1 General Ismay, the head of the War Cabinet Secretariat
and later Churchill's military adviser, reminded his close friend Sir Orme
Sargent, the deputy Under-Secretary and 'ideologist' of the Foreign
Office, of Kipling's poem 'The Truce of the Bear '. In this, an old blind
beggar who has been mauled b)' a bear speal<s:

Eyeless, noseless, and lipless - toothless, brokerl

of speech, Seeking a dole at t11e doorway he mumbles his tale
to each over and over the story, ending as he began:
'Make ye no truce with Adam-zad - the Bear that
walks like a man.'
12 Grand Delusion

Horrible, hairy, human, with paws like hands in

prayer, making his supplication rose Adam-zad the Bear!
I looked at the swaying shoulders, at the paunch's
swag and swing, And my heart was touched with pity for the
monstrous, pleading thing.

Touched with pity and wonder, I did not fire then.

I have looked no more on women - I have walked no
more with men. Nearer he tottered and nearer, with paws like hands
that pray - From brow to jaw that steel-shod paw, it ripped my
face away!

But (pay, and I put back the bandage) this is the

time to fear, When he stands up like a tired man, tottering near
and near; When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man­
brute guise, When he veils the hate and cunning of the little,
swinish eyes;

When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like

hands in prayer, That is the time of peril - the time of the Truce
of the Bear! Over and over the story, ending as he began:
'There is no truce with Adam-zad, the bear that
looks like a man.'9

Shackled by preconceived ideas, the British government overlooked

the intricacy of Soviet policy. Chamberlain adopted a fatalistic attitude
which did not exclude the possibility of hostilities with Russia. The policy
wavered between the wish to pursue the traditional 'reserve' policy of
'sitting tight and avoiding friction as far as possible' and the itch to
encounter Russia in the Balkans or in the north.10 The concept drew
further support from the obsessive need of the Chamberlain government,
victims of the 'Munich complex', to atone for past mistakes. Acting on
the unverified assumption that Russia was fully allied with Germany, the
Cabinet seized the opportunity of compensating for appeasement
towards Germany by showing stiff resistance to Russia in Finland. Thus
when the Prime Minister reacted favourably to the Soviet request for
mediation in the conflict, he was reproached by the Foreign Office for
attempting 'another appeasement' . No wonder he condemned the
Russians for their 'usual treacherous and cowardly' methods, 'copied
from the Hitler technique in Poland and Czechoslovakia' .11 Stalin, himself
harbouring deep suspicion towards Britain, could do little but warn her
politicians against 'regarding tl1e Russians as stupid . . . as bears, whose
heads work poorly' . 1 2
'Potential Enemies': London and Moscow at Loggerheads 13

'He Who Sups with the Devil'

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact had thus turned E11gland overnight
from a potential ally into a foe. Stalin's overt hostility towards England,
conditioned by the British intervention in the Civil War in the wake of
the Russian Revolution as well as by the historical legacy of antagonism,
was now enhanced by the British mishandling of the 193 9 negotiations.
In 1941 he would ascribe his hostility to a vivid memory 'of the execution
by the British of 26 commissars close to his home region, in Baku' during
the intervention.13 But Stalin was motivated in the first place by pure
Realpolitik. Vulnerable to the threat posed by the British naval predomi­
nance in the Mediterranean and drawing on past historical experience,
he expected the blow to be delivered through the Turkish Straits. On the
very day of Britain's declaration of war on Germany, Stalin appealed to
Turkey to consider Soviet help 'in case the Straits or the Balkans were
threatened' .14
However, ensuring strict Turkish neutrality was crucial for Germany as
well, since most of the Rumanian oil destined for Germany was shipped
via the Straits to Italian ports. 1 5 The Germans spared no effort to inflate
Stalin's suspicion that 'Russia's enemy in the Straits is and always will be
England' and forestall any agreement between Russia and Turkey whicl1
might lead to Soviet participation in the control of the Straits. Saracoglu,
the Turkish Foreign Minister, who was well known for his Anglophile
leanings, arrived in Moscow on 25 September; but the negotiations, which
were drawn out until mid-October, were marred by the second visit
of the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to the Soviet
capital, when for ten days Saracoglu was practically ignored by the
Russians.
When Saracoglu finally met Stalin the 'heated discussion' revealed that,
while the Turks sought an agreement which would cope with a German
threat, Stalin viewed the danger as coming from Great Britain. The cal­
culated nature of Stalin's policies is clearly evident. He hardly disputed
Turkey's claims in the Dodecanese, which he realized could be fulfilled
only through co-operation with England and France. But he tried in
vain to persuade Saracogl11 that Russia should be Turkey's pivot in the
Balkans, where 'Turkey was in a position to aid the British and the French
but not the contrary ' . 'Events', he went on to explain to 11im, exposing his
pragmatic outlook:

have their own logic: we speak one way and the events proceed in a
different direction. With Germany we divided Poland and England and
France did not initiate a war against us, though this may still happen.
We do not have an agreement on mutual assistance with the Germans,
but if the British and the French start a war against us, we will have to
14 Grand Delusion

fight them . . . Who is to be blamed for the fact that events have turned
out unfavourably for the conclusion of a pact with Turkey? The cir­
cumstantial development of events. The action in Poland contributed.
The French, and particularly the British, did not wish to have an agree­
ment with us, believing they could fight without us. If we are to be
blamed then it is for not having foreseen it all.

It was fear of Britain, rather than Germany, that overwhelmed Stalin.

In the conditions prevailing during the Phoney War, with Chamberlain
still the Prime Minister, he still did not exclude the possibility that
Germany and England would close ranks after all. Moreover, it became
increasingly clear that the embargo strategy employed by England
against Germany would be dircected against the Soviet Union as one of
the major providers of raw material to Germany. Eager to discourage the
Turks from concluding a mutual assistance agreement with Britain, he
warned Saracoglu that he 'should bear in mind that these people fulfilled
their obligations only when it was convenient for them and did not fulfil
their obligations when it was not convenient'. Munich and the guar­
antees to Poland should serve as a warning. Stalin now demanded an
explicit undertaking from the Turks to 'withdraw their forces were France
and Great Britain to get involved in a war against Russia' and allow
Russia direct control of the passage of warships and the transfer of war
,
material through the Straits. Saracoglu, however, adhered to neutrality.
He was finally whisked home in flamboyant style from Sebastopol on
board a Soviet warship - an attempted demonstration of Soviet mastery
in the Black Sea.16 Relations with Turkey deteriorated further when upon
returning to Ankara Saracoglu finally signed a treaty of mutual assistance
'vith Britain and France.17
The Soviet obsession with the Straits cannot be lightly dismissed. It
followed on the humiliating Paris Agreement of 1856, the unfavourable
arrangements imposed by Bismarck in the Berlin Congress of 1878 and
the Montreux Agreement of 192 3 which allowed free passage of com­
mercial as well as military ships while the control of the Straits was
entrusted to an il1ternational commission. The arrangement gave Britain
a clear advantage and as such was resisted by both Turkey, who had lost
her sovereignty over the Straits, and Russia, who felt directly threatened.
The Nazi menace led to a modification of the agreement in 19 3 6. While
the passage of merchant vessels and warships to the Black Sea remained
free in peacetime, the Straits were closed to warships of belligerent coun­
tries as long as Turkey remained neutral. Once Turkey was at war, control
of the Straits was fully entrusted to her. From the Russian point of view
Turkey's new commitment to England made Turkish neutrality a clear
strategic threat. In the new circumstances the Allied contingency plans
against Germany, unfolded by Admiral Drax and the other members of
'Potential Enemies': London and Moscoiv at Loggerheads 15

the Anglo-French mission in the K1�emlin in August, received a sinister

twist. The plans aimed to thwart the Germans by closing the Tu1·kish
Straits and seizing control of the mouth of the Danube on the Rumanian
littoral of the Black Sea. It was now feared by the Ki·emlin that the Anglo-·
French navies might indeed carry out this plan, but direct it against the
So,1iet Union as well as against Germany.18
Soviet apprehension was not groundless. The stalemate on the western
front during the Phoney War led General Edmund Ironside, the British
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to advocate the invasion of Rumania,
thet'eby seizing the oilfields, diverting Germany to the Balka11s and dis-
1·upting the transfer of goods from Russia to Germany. The opening of the
Turkish Straits to the Royal Navy, which would have rendered Turkey
a belligerent, was a prerequisite for the success of the plan. From the
Turkish point of view, however, the major threat was an extension of the
German-Soviet collusion to the Balkans. !_)resident Ismet Inonu, therefore,
co11tinued to cling to benevolent neutrality towards Britain, wrtich he still
regarded as 'the world's strongest insurance firm' . 1 9
Stalin was adequately informed about the Turkish assumption that
'the superiority of the French and British na\1ies' was their most effective
shield. The So,1iet ambassador in Ankara warned Moscow of a fait
accompli, as 'the English might even not ask [the Turks] before embarking
on some adverLture, spreading tl1e fire of V\1ar to the Balkans and the
districts of the Black Sea'. He depicted in sombre colours the hasty
fortification and militarization of the Straits.20 A flood of reports from
various Balkan capitals brought little comfort to Moscow. Suggestions
were made that B1·itain was 'planning a landing in Saloniki [in the wester11
Aegean] to prevent Italian aggression' .21 The veteran Soviet ambassador in
London, Ivan Maisky, fuelled suspicion by revealing that the British had
paid tremendous sums for the pact with Turkey, which was their 'trump
card against the Soviet Union'. He warr1ed_ that it 'created for Britain new
military opportunities in the Balkans and in the Black Sea, possibilities
which in certai11 conditions she can use against us'. 22
Chamberlain's failure to formulate a clear-cut strategic plan for the
conduct of the war in tune with the changing political realities only con­
tributed to the V\'Orsening relations during the Soviet war with Finland
irt winter 1939. The political perceptions which had prevented an agree­
ment with Russia in the previot1s summer remained the yardstick for the
conduct of foreign policy. Alexander Cadogan, the powerful permanent
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, confided in his diary that he had
been wondering 'more and more lately, whether we need be deterred
fr·om any action that Tn e may think advantageous, simply for fear of
finding ourselves in a state of war with R_ussia' .23 The planners of th.e
Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to become actively involved in the hos­
tilities which from the 'purely military point of view . . . makes it more
 Grand Delusion

difficult to achieve our primary object in this war, the defeat of

Germany'.24 However, they were rebuffed by the Northern Department
of the Foreign Office, entrusted with Russian affairs, which seriously
questioned whether the Red Army 'exercised any restraint upon German
military action' and believed it was a propitious opportunity 'to bring
about the complet€ downfall of Russian military power' .25
The indirect assistance provided by Britain to Finland during the
Winter War seriously alarmed the Kremlin. Stalin was alerted by Maisky
to the fact that both the former appeasers and Churchill were 'deeply
convinced that a secret military alliance already existed between the
USSR and Germany . . . a cast-iron agreement, which was bound to lead
Germany and the Soviet Union to an indissoluble alliance'. In Churchill's
overtures he saw a 'complex game . . . a manoeuvre to get [the Soviet
Union] entangled in war ' .26 It was feared that the belief in an imminent
alliance between Russia and Germany would induce the British either to
fight Russia or to embroil her in war with Germany. Maisky had already
disclosed to Halifax that the 'rapidity' of the German conquest of Poland
had come as 'a great surprise' to Russia, who could by no means
'contemplate with pleasure a future in which a powerful and victorious
Germany should be her next-door neighbour' .27 Molotov now urged him
to dismiss the 'ludicrous and insulting' assumption that Russia sought a
military alliance witl1 Germany; 'even a political simpleton', he stressed,
'would not form such an alliance with a power in\'olved in war, fully
aware of the complicity and the risks involved in such an alliance'. Maisky
was further provided with the proposed terms for peace with Finland,
which had been worked out by the Russian military as 'the absolute
minimal and effective guarantees for the security of Leningrad'. Maisky
was to reaffirm the Soviet Union's intentions of remaining neutral as
long as England and France did not 'take arms against her' .28 Seeking
mediation with Finland through Sir Stafford Cripps, the militant left-wing
Member of Parliament, specially flown over from China where he was
on a world tour, was yet another trLanifestation of Russian distress.29 The
Comintern was likewise mobilized to serve Soviet diplomacy by propa­
gating the accusation that Britain and France 'initiated the war against
Germany in an attempt to extend the fighting and convert it into a war
against the Soviet Union'.30
The fear of war with England led the Russians to seek a quick con­
clusion to the war in Finland and a peace settlement, hopefully through
British mediation. The ink was scarcely dry on the agreement when
attention reverted to Turkey and the Balkans. In London, the Phoney War
seemed to provide an opportunity to tighten the embargo as well as 'to
exercise pressure in that part of the world which at present is not open to
us' .31 The British Commander-in-Chief left the Turks in no doubt that the
German threat to Rumania and the Russian to Turkey made it 'of vital
'Potential Enemies': London and Moscow at Loggerheads

importance for H.M. Ships to be able to enter the Black Sea witl1out
delay'. Istanbul, they were reminded, was only 300 miles away from
the Soviet naval base at Sebastopol, while the nearest British base was
some 850 miles away. For the moment the Turkish government resisted
British pressure, well aware that a commitment in advance might co11-
stitute an infringement of the Montreux Convention and render them
belligerent.32
In the meantime reports reached the Kremlin from various capitals
in the Balkans depicting the increased British efforts to direct the 'Little
Entente' against Russia rather than against the Central Powers, for whicl1
it had been initially designed. The role of Turkey in facilitating tl1e
transfer of troops from Syria and Egypt 'through the Dardanelles in pre­
paration of a new Crimean War' became a recurrent theme.33 Suspicions
soared so high that Molotov requested Haydar Aktay, the authoritative
and veteran Turkish ambassador in Moscow, to inform him what was
happening 'behind the scenes of General Weygand's visit to Turkey and
to the strategic regions on the Soviet border' . How could he explain his
Prime Minister's enigmatic comment, when denying rumours of the
deterioration of relations with Russia, that 'we are living today in an
epoch when everyone conceals his intentions'? Before Aktay was able to
answer he was recalled to Ankara for consultations, just as the British and
French ambassadors were withdrawn from Moscow in protest against
the Finnish War.34 Shortly afterwards the British request for passage of
the navy through the Dardanelles was leaked to the press and raised in
Parliament.35 An exaggerated report by the BBC disclosed the joint staff
talks in Ankara concerning the implementation of the mutual assistance
pact.36 In Berlin the Germans too continued to play on Soviet apprehen­
sions by inflating the belligerent British intentions in the region.37
These apprehensions were magnified with the increasing rumours of
Allied plans to bomb the Baku oilfields. Tl1e oilfields yielded 80 per cent
of the aviation oil, 90 per cent of the kerosene and 96 per cent of the petrol
produced by the USSR.38 Earlier on Schulenburg had disclosed to Molotov
that the French troops in Syria were in fact earmarked for operations in
Baku and that attempts had been made to reach an tinderstanding with
the Shah to allow Allied planes to fly over Iranian territory.39 Plans were
indeed being drawn up in London for a joint Anglo-French raid on the
Baku oilt.ields.40 Their destruction was expected to 'react decisively 011
Soviet military efficiency and Soviet national life' .
The possible repercussions of the operation on Russia, and the fact tl1at
it 'would almost certai11ly lead to a definite alliance between Germany
and the Soviet Union', were overlooked. In fact it was noted with obvious
regret that 'in order to make a direct attack on the Caucasus we should
have to pick a quarrel with the Soviet Govern1nent unless they were
stupid enough to give u�s a real cause for taking military action against
 Grand Delusion
•

them' .41 The major reservation concerned the implications for relations
with Turkey. Wl1ile the Fre11ch wished to force the Turkish government
to allow Allied bombers to fly over its territory on their way to Baku, the
British regarded Turkey as the ' ''lynch-pin'1 of that part of the world and
it wd. be risky to ''treat her rough'', as we propose treating other
neutrals'. Reynaud, the French Prime Minister, was little svJayed by such
reservations. He persevered in his de�nd 'to proceed to action in the
Black Sea' artd even deemed the occupation of Bessarabia to be an essen­
tial deterrent against Turkish collusion with Russia.42
To overcome Turkish resistance Churchill, as the First Lord of the
Admiralty, encouraged Halifax to visit the region. He further hoped that
Halifax \iVould persuade the Turks to allow British submarines to operate
in the Black Sea against German and Soviet boats; he had been advocat­
ing such action since October. 43 Before setting off, Halifax summoned to
London the heads of missions from South-eastern Europe for consulta­
tions, fully aware that the gathering could not be concealed and would
'give concrete evidence that we are actively interesting ourselves in the
Balkans' .44 \l\Thile preparations for tl1e consultations were under way, the
German invasion of Denmark and Norway led to a reshuffle in Cabinet,
strengthening the position of Churchill, who was the moving force behind
the Balkan plans.45
The Allies ostensibly aimed at consolidating 'a benevolent neutral I

bloc \'\Tith the object of preventing the sp;:ead of the war to the Balkans'.
They realized, however, that their predomina11ce in the Balkans was
bound to lead to an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union and hoped
that the Turks would 'facilitate possible Allied intervention on their
behalf' through control of the Straits and the free transit of troops.46 Obliv­
ious to the danger lying ahead in Europe, the Chiefs of Staff noted the
'unimpressive' record of the Wehrmacht. Turkey was singled out as
England's most important strategic asset, without whose 'active collabo­
ration, it would be difficult, should it be necessary to undertake active
hostilities against Russia, to attack the vital sources of oil supply in the
Caucasus' .47
None of the ambassadors was enthusiastic about the plans to attack
Baku. They did not expect the Turks to approve such a scheme unless
the Russians advanced beyond the Danube. The new Soviet overtures
were correctly attributed to the fear of British action in the Black Sea.
Trade negotiations, proposed by the Russians, were therefore to be con­
ducted, as Halifax instructed, 'with a stiff upper lip' in a manner which
would not 'prevent us at a ]ater stage from taking action in the Caucasus,
should the Turks agree to co-operate with us there' . The significance of
the London meeti11_ g did not lie in its actual results, which were instantly
rende1·ed obsolete by the Wehrmacht action in the West. Rather, the mere
con,rening of the widely publicized meeting enhanced the Russians'
'Potential Enemies': London and Moscow at Loggerheads 19
•

suspicion and hastened their own intervention in the Balkans.48 Cham­

berlain was far more determined in his oppositior1 to any reconciliatory
measures; 'he who sups with the Devil', he warned the Allied Supreme
Council, 'needs a long spoon'. Right up to the German invasion of France,
l{eynaud conti11ued to advocate the bombing of the Caucasus oilfields,
hoping it would 'produce chaos in Russia'. However, the implications for
relations with Turkey, whose air space would have to be violated, con­
tir1ued to protect Russia. 49

Cripps's Mission to Moscow

Deep-seated prejudices precluded a significant change in Churchill's

policy towards Russia after his assumption of the premiership in May
194 0.50 The one apparent exception v1as the appointment of Sir Stafford
Cripps as ambassador to Moscow. In retrospect Churchill has taken
the credit for the decision to appoint Cripps as an ambassador. The idea,
however, came from Halifax, who had been the driving force behind
Cripps' s earlier initiatives, and was much encouraged by the Russians.
This is obvious from various entries in Halifax's unpublished diary. On
1 7 May he wrote, 'After the Cabinet I talked with [Churchill] in the garden
for a few minutes, partly about an idea I had had to send Stafford Cripps
on an exploratory mission to Moscow, and partly about future prospects
of the war,' and three days later he added: 'I had various office engage­
ments, at the end of which I saw Maisky to ask him to see whether the
Soviet wouid concur in my own idea of sending Stafford Cripps on an
exploratory mission about trade to Moscow. I should be surprised if they
don't, and it may well be that with things going as they are at present
the Russians will want to talk a little bit wider.' Finally on the 26th: 'At 6
o'clock I saw Maisky. The Soviet Government agree to Cripps, but want
him to be an Ambassador. I told Maisky we meant to send an Ambas­
sador, and hardly supposed the Soviet Government claimed to choose
him for us.' As it turned out, that is what indeed transpired.51 In the
light of his subsequent rivalry with Cripps, Churchill would excuse the
appointment on the ground that he did not 'realize sufficient!)' that Soviet
Communists hate extreme left wing politicians even more than they
do Tories or Liberals'. Churchill explained cynically: 'Moscow is the most
expensive Embassy we have. Cripps is the only suitable left-wing man
we have who is rolling in money.'52
If Cripps' s mission ever stood any chance of success, it was dependent
on a categorical reconsideration and definition of the Cabin et' s policy.
Maisky warned him at the outset that the position of an ambassador was
like that of a salesman: 'if he is offering goods of high quality he is assured
of success even if he is an unremarkable man, but if he is offering
20 Grand Delusion

substandard goods he will meet with disaster in spite of the best pos­
sible personal qualities'. Later he was sympathetic towards Cripps' s frus­
tration, which he attributed to the fact that he had not been 'provided
with quality goods', and his customer did not want to buy 'rotten stuff'.
Maisky was unaware that Orme Sargent, the deputy Under-Secretary at
the Foreign Office, used a similar metaphor: he did not expect Stalin to
respond to Cripps, who 'as a suppliant on his doormat' was holding 'his
pathetic little peace offerings of tin in one hand and rubber in the other' .53
At the time of his appointment Cripps, an outcast from his own Labour
Party for having advocated an anti-fascist front with the communists in
1939, was entirely absorbed in the 'formation of the world to be born after
the war'. He foresaw the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United
States as the major powers, with Britain reduced to the position of an
'outpost' in Europe.54 In that respect he saw eye to eye with Stalin, who
never lost hold of his vision of the post-war order. Cripps, who enter­
tained few illusions about Stalin's ideological outlook, assumed that
the only possibility of drawing Russia away from Germany rested 'on the
basis of recognising a continuing friendship and a partnership in post­
war reconstruction'.55 Churchill, however, avoided any attempt to discuss
war aims in Cabinet. One should not be distracted by the simplistic pre­
sentation of the war aims in his memoirs as the annihilation of Nazism
and a return to the status quo ante bellum . This concealed his inherently
J

imperialist outlook and the opportunity offered by the war for re-
establishing Britain's deteriorating international position. Unlike
Churchill, Cripps regarded the war as a catalyst for social and political
change at home. He rebuked Churchill for his lack of vision and for sub­
ordi11ating all issues to the winning of tl1e war. To Cripps, Churchill
seemed to be in the 'pre 1914 era and trying desperately hard to keep
there, falsely assuming that it was possible to look behind and take a
permanent position on the safety valve! !'56 The fundamental political
dispute between Cripps and Churchill, soft-pedalled by Churchill in his
memoirs, is vital for an understanding of the events surrounding the
German invasion and the Grand Alliance at its inception.
Cripps was not alone in spreading his ideas. His political stature
grew after his return to Engla11d in 1942, not only because of his associa­
tion with the heroic resistance of the Red Army, as Churchill wishes us to
believe,57 but as a result of the experience and reputation he had gained
through his mission in Moscow. Cripps' s advocacy of post-war recon­
struction seemed to provide a basis for joint efforts not only with Labour
politicians but also with the powerful emerging group of 'progressive
Conservatives' . Sir Walter Monckton, general director of the Ministry
of Information and later Defence Minister, clearly fuelled Cripps's con­
frontation with Churchill by advising him that from the political point of
view:
•
'Potential Enemies': London and Moscow at Loggerheads 21

I fear that too long a stay in such an u11satisfactory position might injure
your prospects of leading us all a little later on. The fact is that there is
no satisfactory successor or alternative to Winston. I am pretty clear
now that Ernie Bevin will not fill the part. Anthony [Eden] is too con­
ventional a thinker to make a great leader, and one looks in vain among
the rest for the right quality of mind and character . . . I have discussed
you as a leader with the most diverse people, from Nancy Astor up and
down. I find them all attracted by the possibility.58

Indeed, "'Nhen Cripps was recalled to England for consultations at the

beginning of June 1941, a leader in The Times urged the use of his 'excep­
tional capacities nearer home . . . in strengthening tl1e quality of Labour
Party representatio11 in the supreme councils of the nation'. Churchill was
obliged to promise him a seat in the War Cabinet after completion of his
mission in Moscow.
An unusual situation emerged whereby Cripps, a member of a minor­
ity left-wing faction in Parliament, found himself in an exceptionally
crucial role as British ambassador to the sole major power on the Conti­
nent still not crushed by Germany, while remaining an outspoken oppo­
nent of his own government. The appointment was also motivated by
domestic considerations. Rab Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary,
warned Halifax of the 'fairly strong urge in this new Govt. both on Right
& Left for a rapprochement and you will only be pressed if Cripps does11' t
go' .59 The appointment of Cripps, though originally sanctioned by the
Russians, was seen by a desolate government as a last-ditch attempt
to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany after the devastating
collapse of France. The cornerstone of British policy was a determined
attempt to involve Russia in the war.
In essence Cripps obediently followed Churchill's policy of detaching
Russia from Germany. However, unlike Churchill and the Foreign Office,
he assumed that Stalin was aware of the fragility of the pact and was
desperately trying to defer the inevitable clash with Germany. From the
outset of his mission, Cripps was under no illusions about Stalin: for him,
'Lenin was the great world reformer whose noble intentions had been
botched by Stalin'. Stalin, as he confided to the Swedish ambassador
in Moscow, was 'a sly Georgian for whom power was all and who cared
little about the millions of beings he ruled with an iron fist, without any
sign of improvement in the living condition of the masses being notice­
able so far. Power is everything, and in order to stay in power . . . he
would be willing to conclude an agreement with the Pope if it were to
serve his interests.' Consequently, Cripps did not exclude the possibility
that in certain circumstances Stalin might yield to Hitler and make exten�
sive concessions to defer the war which he considered to be a threat to
his regime.60
22 Grand Delusion

In the final analysis, the fall of France and the appointment of Cripps
seem to have bolstered the prevailing British attitude towards Russia
rather than altering it. '"frue, the loss of their allies on the Continent
momentarily inspired the Britisl1 to close ranks with the Russians. But the
measures taken were too little and too late. The Foreign Office was par­
ticularly averse to the appointment of Cripps, still a Member of Parlia­
ment representing the militant left wing, rnaintaining that a 'rude duke'
was bound to have a better reception in Moscow.
In mid-July Orme Sargent preser1ted an important memorandum for
consideration within the Foreign Office which rebutted current specula­
tions that Germany and Russia would inevitably be in opposition. Russia
could have a decisive impact on the course of events only if she were to
intervene directly in the war on the side of Britain:

As regards the somewhat drastic step of urtdertaking a preventive war

against Germany at this stage Stalin is likely to be deterred from it by
fear of German military might, by the desire to avoid war with a great
Power, which, largely for internal reasons, has long been the guiding
principle of Soviet foreign policy, and also by the consideration that
Germany is unlikely to emerge from her struggle with Great Britain
completely unscathed and may well hesitate to undertake the invasion
of the Soviet Union this year, especially if the Soviet Government show
'
themselves sufficiently accommodating.

In order to impede Hitler's triumphant progress, Stalin's best course was

'to continue to collaborate with him and thus keep on as good terms with
him as possible' .
This realistic and astute analysis was, however, distorted by the Foreign
Office's ideological outlook on Russia. Any attempt to disrupt the Ribben­
trop-lviolotov Pact was deemed by Sargent to be a .w aste of time, as
'neither dictator dare turn away lest the other stab him in the back' . As
both Stalin and Hitler considered the British Empire to be 'the ultimate
enemy', it was safe to assume that 'their appetites [would] grow with
eating' . Consequently, there was little point in attempting to separate
Russia from Ge1·ma11y. In short, he expected the two dictator·s to 'quarrel
over the booty, but this is not likely to happen so long as the war con­
tinues, and we sl1ould not therefore count upon such a quarrel as an
element in estimating the difficulties and dangers that Germany may
have to face in the immediate future'. In the absence of a coherent policy,
this memorandum, highly praised by Haljfax, was presented to Churchill
and the va.J.·ious intelligence agencies. Its conclusions gradually emerged
as the governing co�cept in the conduct of relations with Moscow until
the German invasion of Russia.61
 2

'The Scramble for the Balkans

Soviet-Italian Collusion

In view of the heavy defeats inflicted on the Red Army in the early stages
of Operation 'Barbarossa', it is often argued tl1at the stiff resista11ce of
the Finns in the Winter War revealed the weakness of the l{ed Arm)r,
encouraging Hitler to risk war against Russia. However, for contempo­
raries in Germany· and in the countries bordering on the Soviet Union,
Red Army engagements rather demonstrated Stalin's resolve to enter wa1·
wherever he encountered a threat to Soviet vital interests.1 As spring 1940
arrived, resting on the laurels of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and final
\tictory against Finland, Stalin was temporarily relaxed. Count Werner
von Schulenburg, the German ambassador to Moscow, contribu.ted to that
feeling. Tl1ough admitting that he knew little of Hitler's inner thoughts,
he nonetheless was certain that the British would 'soon find out what is
in store for them'. He assured Molotov that the war in Finland had not
injured German interests and even congratulated the Red Army on its
victory.2 Both Ribbentrop and Weizsacker, the director of the German
Foreign Ministry, followed suit.3 In negotiations with Goring, singled
out in tl1e Kremlin as the spearhead of the crusade against Russia, the
Air Marshal not only promised an early delivery of war material but
'strongly underlined the exceptional friendship between Germany and
the Soviet Union'. He even announced the delivery to tl1e Soviet navy of
the modern cruiser Lutzow, from which he was parting 'with a painful
heart'. He quoted Hitler as saying that the pact was 'a solid and irre­
versible act' .4 Stalin further fo·und out that Hitler had reaffirmed the
validity and durability of the division of spheres of interests between
Germany and Russia in the talks he had held in Berlin with Sumner
Welles, the American Under-Secretary of State.5

23
 Grand Delusion

Stalin in fact felt strong enough to suspend the delivery of raw materi­
als to Germany in retaliation for her failure to provide Russia with coal
and military equipment. Recent findings concerning trade between
Germany and the Soviet Union cast doubt on the accepted view that the
treaty was favourable to Germany. Soviet deliveries, when examined
against Soviet production and total German demand, were not very
substantial. They provided the Russians with significant advanced
German technology. Moreover, to a large extent the Russians were obliged
to conduct almost exclusive trade with Germany once the British imposed
a tight economic blockade. Out of one million tons of grain promised to
Germany, only 150,000 tons had been dispatched, and the supply of oil
and coal products fared no better.6 Perhaps for the last time Mikoyan, the
Minister of Foreign Trade, openly cast doubt on German 'honesty', com­
plaini11g that he could 'no longer afford to make a fool of himself, in prac­
tice not conducting a bilateral exchange of goods but unilaterally
delivering goods to Germany' .7 Stalin went one step further in presenting
an ultimatum to Germany. He demanded the conclusion of a sl1ort-term
trade agreement stipulating export of Soviet raw materials of a value of
420-30 million 1narks in exchange for 'industrial and military deliveries
of the same value' .8 This inflated confidence, however, instantly evapo­
rated after the swift German campaign against Denmark and Norway in
early May. The Soviet ultimatum was replaced by an announcement of J

the decision to resume deliveries, followed by the 'hope' that 'Germany

would do the same'. 9 However, the experience of dependence on Stalin's
goodwill for deliveries of raw materials undoubtedly weighed heavily on
Hitler when Operation 'Barbarossa' was contemplated .10
For the moment Stalin was still convinced that fear of Germany and
Italy would persuade the Balkan states to 'look more and more to Russia
as their natural protector' .11 Recognizing the ominous implications of a
clash over the Balkans, Schulenburg departed for Berlin to pave the road
for a visit by Molotov.12 However, Stalin's satisfaction at having avoided
'becoming Germany's tail' led him to a polite rejection of the idea.13 Still
complacent about a German danger, he continued to be haunted by the
threat in the south, where he expected Turkey to serve as a platform for
an Allied attack against the Soviet Union. The message accompanying his
greetings for Hitler's birthday is an early indication of his concern at the
growing reports that the 'fire of war might soon spread' to the Balkans.14
Ribbentrop played on Stalin's known fears, presenting the German
initiatives in the region as a countermeasure to British attempts to force
the Turks to open tl1e Straits to tl1e Britisl1 and Frencl1 navies.15 And yet,
now that the arrangements concerning Northern and Central Europe had
bee11 implemented, the future of South-eastern Europe, ignored by those
arrangements, was awaited with apprehension. The French collapse in
J11ne 1 940 dissolved the Balkan Entente and introduced a dangerous
The Scran1ble for the Balkans

vacuum. The inability of Britain to back her guarantees placed Rumania

and Turkey in a perilous state.16
Molotov's congratulations to Schulenburg 'on the splendid success of
the German Armed Forces' in France stand in contrast to the intense panic
which seized Moscow following the 'rapid progress' of the campaign.17
The accolade was merely a prelude to the feeble excuses presented by
Molotov for the hasty occupation of the Baltic States that same morning,
to 'undermine the British and French intrigues there' . Equally discon­
certing for the Germans was the hasty deployment of the Red Army 'to
guard the borders' of Lithuania, without the enemy being named. The
explanations were so flimsy that Schulenburg preferred to transmit to
Berlin a highly censored version of his conversations.18
The need for the Russians to gain a foothold in the Balkans became
acute as soon as the ominous information that the battle in the V\'est V\'ould
be concluded within two months had sunk in; it was clear that the
Germans might 'in the not too far future . . . turn against the East' .19 The
shattering defeat of France now drew Russia closer to Italy, with V\7hom
relations had been strained since the outbreak of war in September 1939.
Mussolini had feared that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact might be
extended to South-eastern Europe, undermining Italy's ambitions there.
It was no secret to Stalin that Mussolini aimed at 'constructing a bridge
with England and France, thereby nourishing latent Anti-Soviet constel­
lations'. Hitler was rumoured to have blessed the initiative, hoping to
isolate the Russians and make them 'more amenable to comply with their
economic obligations'. Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, e\'en
encouraged the Rumanian government to take a 'firm line on Bessarabia',
promising lavish assistance in the event of an attack.2 Still lulled by 11is
pact with Hitler, Stalin hoped to teach the Italians that it \\'as 'hardly
advantageous for them to seek the further worsening of relations with the
Soviet Union'. Consequently the ambassadors ·were withdrawn from
Rome and Moscow in early January 1940. Relations further deteriorated
when the foreign ministers of Italy and Hungary met in Venice to con­
template the future of the Balkans. Though the conference was not osten­
sibly directed against the Soviet Union, the exclusion of Russia from the
negotiations, which dealt with the various claims on Rumania, clearly
harmed Soviet interests.21
As we have seen,22 the British were eager to set the Balkans ablaze.
Hitler, on the other hand, sought tranquillity while sealing the plans for
the campaign in the West. Moreover, i-11ussolini's attempts to reju\1enate
the Balkan Entente jeopardized Ribbentrop's efforts to reconcile the Axis
to the Moscow Pact. During a visit to Rome in mid-March Ribbentrop
applied pres�ure to Mussolini to maintain the status quo in relatio11s witJ�1
Russia. Laying the foundations for his ambitious Continental bloc,23
Ribbentrop exerted similar pressure on the Russians.24 Ciano, hoV\rever,
 FINLAND

SWEDEN
Leningrad
0
Stockholm

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TERRITORIAL CHANGES - 1938-40

The Scramble for the Balkans

made only half-hearted moves to accommodate the Russians at the end

of April, dissociating Italy from Rumania by revealing that an attempt
had been made to use him as a vehicle to carry Rumanian grievances
against Russia to Berlin.25 Reluctantly Mussolini mellowed, vaguely indi­
cating his willingness to return the ambassadors to their posts.26 For the
time being, however, Ciano was perceived in Moscow to be the genuine
obstacle to rapprochement, and the impasse remained. Molotov preferred
to follow events at his own pace; the Soviet Union, he told Schulenburg,
was not 'the right place for being edgy'.27 'What a paradoxical condition,
is it not?' commented Mascia, the Italian charge d' affaires in Moscow,
during a diplomatic reception, 'that we are enemies with the Soviet Union
and friends with Germany and Germany is at the same ti1ne bound to
Moscow.' He too appeared doubtful whether Mussoli11i would allow the
Russians to 'encroach into this ''Italian life centre'' ' .28
It was; however, the dazzling success of the Wehrmacht in France which
shuffled all the cards and helped Mussolini and Stalin to overcome their
mutual suspicion. The new community of interests rose from the asl1es
of the former British presence in the region. As soon as the war v\ras
unleashed in France, Hans Georg von Mackensen, the German ambas­
sador in Rorrle, anxious to preserve the peace in the Balkans, promised
Gelfand, the Soviet charge d' affaires, that 'the Balkan problem will be
decided together between Germany, Italy and the USSR without war ' .
The successes on_ the battlefield, however, brought about a change of
heart. Though the Russians continued to regard the statement as a
German commitment, Mackensen now described it as a 'figment of
Gelfand' s imagination'. With his hands relatively free, Hitler had become
concerned about an Italian-Soviet collusion which might go beyond his
initial plan and challenge German natural dominance in the region. Dizzy
wjth military success, he expected that a settlement of the outstanding
issues in the Balkans would be effected 'merely by tli_e exercise of the
preponderant power of the victors without striking a blow'. Stalin faced
the bleak prospect of being either left out of the arrangements or crushed
by Gern1an supremacy unless he took the initiative to safeguard Russia's
interests.29
The fear of an Italian advance into the Balka11s from Saloniki after Italy's
entry into the war necessitated a new orientation of Soviet policy.30
Molotov now welcomed the return to Moscow of Rosso, tl1e Italian
ambassador, although he arrived empty-handed, having failed to meet
Ciano before his departure. Molotov regarded the mere entry of Italy into
the war as an asset to the plans to eliminate the British tl1reat to Russia
in the Black Sea, and entertained the hope that 'the voice of Germany and
Italy and that of the Soviet Union would be listened to more tl1a11 a year
from now' .31 Mussolini too abandoned his hopes of benefiting from the
Allies and appeared genuinely anxious to obtain some assurances from
 Grand Delusion

the Russians on the Balkan problem.32 The Allied guarantees in the

Balkans, jeered Ciano, 'could be best compared with a bottle of wine,
which has been preserved for many years with the hope of producing
strong and good wine, but when the bottle is finally opened, it is found
to contain vinegar instead of wine' .33 In Munich, as Stalin found out, Mus­
solini had informed Hitler of his intention to 'bring about the ultimate
improvement of political and economic relations with the Soviet Union' .34
Like Stalin, the Italians expected Hitler to 'inflict a couple of blows on
England', break her resilience and draw the more sensible leaders, such
as Lloyd George, to the negotiating table where a new European order
would be established. This prognosis was confirmed by NKVD agents
within Goring's headquarters. The prospect of an imminent peace con­
ference drove both Italy and Russia to consolidate their common interests
ii1 the Balkans, the Turkish Straits and the Mediterranean. Once the peace
conference convened, Stalin expected Russia to be powerful enougl1 to
redress her past and present grievances.35 The new association clearly
served as leverage against the German predominance in Central and
Western Europe. In Rome the Soviet ambassador courted Mussolini ener­
getically, admiring Italy's age-old heritage. However, he soon came to the
point, suggesting that the end of Anglo-French mastery in Europe made
it 'opportune for the voices of the USSR, Italy and Germany to be heard
in the international arena'. Mussolini himself, by soft-pedalling ideologi-
1

cal differences and dwelling on co1nmon interests, instilled in Stalin the

false impression that Russia's seat at the peace conference was indeed
secure.36
The new partnership was consolidated on the day of the Soviet
invasion of Bessarabia37 tlTiough the reconfirmation of the 1933 non­
aggression pact between Italy and Russia - 'not only in spirit but also to
allow it to have teeth to grind with'. Not surprisingly the terms of an agree­
ment with Italy sought by Stalin resembled the essence of the secret Rac­
conigi Agreement between Nicholas II and King Victor Emmanuel III of
October 1909. In a complementary move Stalin brought about the estab­
lishment of relations with Yugoslavia on 24 June; Yugoslavia had been the
only country in South-east Europe to resist recognition of the Soviet
Union. The move clearly aimed at curtailing German influence in
Yugoslavia while extending Soviet spheres of interest to the region.38 It
gave, warned the German ambassador in Belgrade, 'a strong impetus not
only to the Communist, but, above all, to the Russophile tendencies of the
country. The general feeling was that the alignment with Russia would
provide some protection against the Italian-German danger. '39
Italy and Russia now set out to define their respective spheres of
influe11ce in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Balkans. Rosso pro­
posed to render the Mediterranean 'a free sea in the interest of Italy and
other countries which needed that freedom'. Tacit consent was given to
The Scramble for the Balkans 29

the Soviet claims to Bessarabia, and a place was promised at tl1e peace
conference where the outstanding issues between Rumania, Bulgaria and
Hungary would be solved by peaceful means. The Russian concern over
the Straits was relieved when Rosso renounced any claims on Turkey. The
principle governing the new partnership, as Molotov was quick to sum
up, was: 'what you want is to establish your legitimate rights in the
Mediterranean just as the Soviet Union has the legitimate right to full
control of the Black Sea, which must be exclusively Russian. The present
regime of the Straits can no longer be maintained and has to be altered .'
The prospects for a new order in the Balkans under the aegis of the two
powers directly involved in the region seemed bright.
The principles of Soviet policy in the Balkans were therefore hastily
worked out. The prize for Italy was a recognition of Hungary's claims on
Rumania. As for Bulgaria, Molotov counted on her traditionally close rela­
tions with Russia, which he hoped to invigorate through the satisfaction
of her territorial claims to Dobrudja from Rumania and Thrace from
Greece. Russia was not oblivious to the German interests in Rumania, first
and foremost the oilfields, and was prepared to define the spheres of
influence there together with Italy and Germany. Finally, Molotov recog­
nized the primary role of Italy in the Mediterranean but in ret11rn
expected the Italians to concede the Soviet interests in the Black Sea.40 The
Soviet-Italian understanding undoubtedly paved the way for the Russian
occupation of Bessarabia. But once the Germans diverted their attention
to the Balkans, their overwhelming power was brought to bear on Italy,
bringing to an end the stillborn collaboration with the Russians. 'Any
further Russian participation', Mussolini was warned, might encourage
the Balkan countries 'to pit one great power against another' . The German
interest was to keep the Straits in 'as fluid a state as possible' and con­
front a Tu rkey that possessed 'only a worthless guarantee from England
and was otherwise in sharp opposition to Russia'. 41

The Soviet Seizure of Bessarabia

The occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in the last days of

June 1940 resulted from a desire for security arrangements in the Balkans
and the Black Sea littoral rather than an insatiable Russian appetite, as is
often presented in the literature. It was devoid of any ideological motive
4 2
for expansion per se. As we have seen, Stalin was slow to grasp the threat
wl1ich the German invasion of the Low Countries posed to Russia by
upsetting the delicate equilibrium established between the two countries
through the pact.43 Strangely enough, he expected the invasion to deflect
the more imminent threat in the Black Sea and the Balkans. Molotov
30 Grand Delusion

therefore did rLot e\�en bother to question the German failure to consult
11.im in ad\1ance, as the tern1s of the Ribbentrop-Moloto\1 Pact required.
Unruffled, he accepted the absurd German explanation that the war in
the West \\Tas 'forced upon Germany by an impending Anglo-French
thrust on the Ruhr region through Belgium and Holland', while express­
ing the hope that th� e,rents \'\1ould have 'an impact on tlle next 1 ,000 years
of Gerrnan history' .-±4 He \Vas further mollified by Ribbentrop, who
shortly after tl1e conclusion of the 'var in Norway received the Soviet
ambassador in his pri\1ate lodgings at the Chancellery 'with extreme
friendliness'. Ri-bbentrop skilfully diverted So\riet suspicions by attrib­
uting the '"'ar in the West to British intrigues, quoting from documents
seized in arvik \\Thich described the pressure exerted 011 Sweden and
::.Jon\1ay to allo1'\1 the transfer of British troops to Finland.4J Any attempt
by the Allies to alert Stalin to the German danger was immediately inter­
preted as an attempt to invol\1e Russia in the \r\1ar..u,
Ru... inours of So,'"iet intentions in Bessarabia had been circulating freely
since tl1e outbreak of war.4- Although MolotO\' \r\l"ent out of his way
to deny the purported Soviet 'foul intentions' to set the Balkans ablaze,
he ne\1er abandoned the claim to Bessarabia.48 From the outset he had
made it clear that the annexation v\1as tied up \\ith the Soviet need to
control the mouth of the Danube. For this reason the Turks were urged
as early as October 1939 to condone an invasion of Bessarabia, a com­
pliance \.\'hich \vould pre\1ent the British and Frencl1 from rendering
assistance to Rumania by sailing their fleet through the Bosphorus.49
The Turks, ho1ve\rer, refused to comply, fearing Gerrrtan-Soviet collusion
in tl1e Black Sea. Saracoglu' s stand, '"Then rte would not exclude the
possibility of allo\\mg commercial ships loaded with military equipment
to reach the Black Sea if \var erupted in the region, gave the Russians
pause for thought. Thus the agreement on mutual assistance, signed
beh\1een Turke)' and Britain on the e\1e of the \Var, coupled \vi th the British
guarantees to Ru.mania, rendered Allied ir.. tervention in the Black Sea
likel\r. s\:
..

Britain's immediate concern \\Tas to prevent the Germans from reach­

ing the Black Sea and posing a threat to the Rumanian oilfields. For a
v\- hile she e\'"en toyed \\Titl1 the idea of condoning a Soviet occupation of
Bessarabia, as long as it did not lead to a general flare-up in the Balkans.51
The Rumanians, 1101\Te\1er, regarded the So\Tiet threat as the most men­
acing. The}- exploited to the utmost the indignation against Russia 0\1er
the \\-ar \'\1ith Finland, seeking British military- assistance to counter the
"imminent' occupation of Bessarabia, \\1hich might lead to 'the Bolsl1e\Ti­
sation of Central and South-eastern Europe' .52 In the \vake of the Winter
\\"ar �-1loloto\1 fom1d that the Allies had indeed changed their tune, now
appealing to the Rumanians not to surrender Bessarabia and 'spreading
slanders and erroneous information to S\tvTing the population to assume
]"'he Scrarnble for the Balkans 31

an anti-Soviet attitude' .53 Fear of Britain on the one hand and the wish to
avert an appearance of a Soviet-British plot on the other prevented Stalin
for the moment from implementing his agreement with Ribbentrop on
the future of Bessarabia. The unexpected entanglement in Finland further
discouraged him from embarking on new military adventures.
The looming British threat in the Black Sea led Stalin to seek a solution
of the Bessarabian issue by diplo matic mean s. In mid-February 1940
he approached the Rum anian government with a proposal for a non­
aggression pact. In exchange for territories in Soviet Moldavia Stalin
asked for cor1trol of the mout h of the Danube, and more spec1ficall)l
the ports of Sulina and Constanza.54 King Carol of Rurnania, however,
reacted by rnaking a startling proposal to the British ambassador; he
suggested that Britain could overcome the restricti o11s of the Montreux
Agreement by sending a fleet disguised as a Turkish one into the
Black Sea. Over a lavish dinner of snails ar1d oysters especially ordered
for that purpose from Paris, and fortified by exquisite port, the King
further urged the ambassador to exploit the 'great possibilities in the
Caucasus'.55
Having extended Russia's security arrangements in the Baltic Sea
through the peace imposed on Finland, Stali11 set out to implement the
final stage of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement. Bessarabia had been
ceded to Russia in 1 8 1 2 by the Turks. Part of it had been lost to Rumania
after the Crimean War but regained after the wars of 1 877-8. The Treaty
of Neuilly in 1919 entrusted the entire regio11 to Rumania. Although Stalin
resorted to ethnic and historical reasonings to justify the Russian claim
to Bessarabia, the move continued to be dictated by what he conceived
to be the prevalent British threat in the Black Sea. Tl1e extension of the
Soviet security system to the mouth of tl1e Danube added an indispens­
able depth of defence for Sebastopol a11d Odessa, hardly 40 kilometres
from the Rumanian border. Even the British ambassador in Bucharest
admitted reluctantly that, rather than pursuing territorial claims or con­
testing the control of the oilfields, the Russians wished to obtain the 'right
to garrison certai11 areas in the north and to have representatives and pos­
sibly troops in Rumanian ports'. He adhered to this view, arguing con­
vincingly that:

From the Russian point of view Bessarabia is not only important on

account of ethnog1·aphical considerations. It would have been a
magnificent point de depart for a German attack on the heart of the
Uk1·aine, for a turning mo,rement to\1\rards Kiev and the Prypet marshes
such as the German High Command has used with such successes in
the campaigns in Poland and in Western Europe. The best protection
for Russia against such a manoeuvre would be to acquire the line of the
Carpathians and the Danube Delta. 56
 Annexed by the USSR

Annexed by BULGARIA

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TJ1e Scra1nble for tl'ze Balkans 33

That the Russians' attention was focusE.'d on the control of the Danube is
attested by the fact that they forced the Rumanians to participate in a
special mixed commission which was set up in Odessa within days of the
occupation to demarcate the border at the moutl1 of the Danube. 57
The occupation of Northern Bukovina was also motivated by strategic
considerations. It left Stalin with control of the major railway lines
between the Ukraine and Bessarabia, via Cernauti and Lvov. Schulenburg
made extraordinary efforts to conceal Stalin's strategic considerations
from Hitler, presenting the cession of Bukovina as a move forced on the
Kremlin by Ukrainian circles close to Stalin. He stressed the fact that
Molotov had in fact readily 'waived Russia's claims for Carpathian
Ukraine'. The German ambassador preferred to gloss over the real Soviet
motives, which implied a potential clash of interests with Germany.�8
It no longer proved possible for King Carol to hold off the blow through
a last-minute improvement of relations. Instead, Molotov started pre­
paring the ground for the annexation by registering complaints about
alleged shooting incidents on the border. 59 Stalin carefully timed the
annexation to take place while 'the attention of the belligerent states was
pinned on the western front', and after securing Mussolini's approval.60
Swift action was essential in view of the ample evidence he possessed
about Germany's intentions to tighten her grip on Rumania, possibly
together with the Italians, once the battle against England was over. The
resignation of the pro-Western Foreign Minister, Gafencu, on 30 May 1940
confirmed the impression in the Kremlin that Rumania was swinging
towards Germany. 61 The propitious time therefore seemed to be the end
of June, when, according to intelligence reports put on Stalin's desk, Hitler
planned to launch his attack on England.62 In preparation for his next
move Stalin placated the Germans by renewing the raw-material deliv­
eries which had virtually come to a standstill.63
On 21 June Lieutenant-General Ernst Kostring, the veteran German
military attache in Moscow, briefed the Russian Ministry of Defence
on the harsh terms imposed on the French and the ht1miliation inflicted
on them by the terms of the capitulation in the 'historic wagon' in Com­
piegne.64 Within a day Schulenburg was urgently summoned to tl1e
Kremlin and informed that the question of Bessarabia 'brooked no further
delay'; Molotov was not even prepared to give Schulenburg time to
consult his government.65 The news that Stalin was consideri11g a move
into Bessarabia came as an unpleasant surprise to Schulenburg. With
Germany triumphant in France, such a belligerent step was unexpected,
considering that Hitler could muster sufficient troops 'for a campaign
against the Soviet Union and could pretty easily march up to tl1e Ural
mountains' .66 However, for the duration of tl1e Battle of Britain Hitler
could do little but abide by the undertakings given by Ribbentrop du ri11g
his visit to Moscow. At tl1e same time 11e would exploit the Soviet move
34 Grand Delusion

to the utmost in order to enhance his hold on South-eastern Europe. To

prevent the Bulgarians and the Hungarians from following up with their
own claims, which could endanger German vital economic interests in
Rumania, Hitler took the initiative, presenting 11imself both as a media­
tor and as a saviour of those countries frorrl Bolshevism. King Carol was
strongly advised to concede Bessarabia without resistance.67
On the night of 26 June Molotov presented the Rumanians with an ulti­
matum demanding the immediate evacuation of Bessarabia.68 As a last
resort the Rumanians tried to drag the Germans into the conflict. The
German ambassador in Bucharest warned that, 'senseless' as it migb.t be
from the military point of view, the Run1anians were prepared to set the
Balkans on fire. They seemed to be deliberately protracting negotiations
with the Rt1ssians in the hope that, after the victory in the West, Germany
'might still after all be interested in keeping the Russians out of the
Balkans'. 69 Stalin, however, had prepared for all eventualities. The plea of
the Rumanian government for an extension of the negotiations, made an
hour after the expiry of the ultimatum, was turned down. The Rumanian
ambassador was informed by Molotov that it was 'imperative for the
Soviet troops to start moving in the next morning and for the Rumanian
ones to retreat', completing the evacuation 'in perfect order' vvithin three
days.70 Schulenburg 1vas next informed that the Red Army had already
been ordered to cross the Dniester river and that the orders could not be
rescinded.71
On receipt of the ultimatum King Carol, literally in a tantrum, sum­
moned the German ambassador to the Palace. However, the King's inces­
sant intrigues had robbed him of the respect of any of the major powers.
Ribbentrop bluntly blamed him for playing the belligerents off against
each other: first by receiving British guarantees and then by seeking
Germany's support when her superiority had become obvious.72 To his
great dismay the King found that the Italians were also sympathetic to
the Russian claim.73 He finally tried to enlist British support, painting in
bleak colours the Soviet threat to the Straits. Churchill was urged to act
like 'Lord Salisbury and Mr. Disraeli, when Bessarabia had changed
hands in 1878'. But in London such suggestions were attributed to the
'interest of the Rumanians at the moment to make our flesh creep as
regards Russian intentions' .'74
Eve11tually the Rumanians received an extra couple of hours to com­
plete the withdra\val and were held responsible for the safety of the
railways, bridges, airfields and industrial complexes.75 The potential
claims from Bulgaria and Hungary left King Carol no choice but to place
his fate in German hands. Stalin, delighted with his little coup and
hopeful about Hitler's co-operation in the Balkans, failed to see how his
well-orchestrated move had actually brought Rumania within the
German grasp.76
The Scramble for the Balkans 35

British Schemes fo1" the Balkans

Russian historiography since glasnost tends to side V\rith the Cold War his­
torians in blaming Stalin personally for the Soviet fail1Jre to put up an
effective resistance against Germany. They now claim that, by rejecting
the British and French overtures for a common struggle in the Balkans,
Stalin lost a golden opportunity of averting the war with Germany.77 This,
however, overlooks the context in the Balkans i11 which the proposals
were made. Placing the Balkans on the agenda in close proximity to
the collapse of France was ill-timed, as it exposed the genuine Allied
i11tentions of en1broiling Russia in war. The long legacy of mutual
suspicion and hostility condemned to failure an approach made in such
circumstances.
By the summer of 1941, the Balkans had become not only Britain's last
outpost in Europe but also the key to the defence of her imperial posses­
sions in the Mediterranean and the Near East. In autumn 19 3 9 Churchill,
the First Sea Lord, had beiatedly sought to recruit Russia against
Germany; attempts to ensnare Russia in the war would become his
trademark. The significance he attached to the Balkans had been made
public in a famous radio speech shortly after the conclusion of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement:

I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in

a mystery inside an enigma. But perhaps there is a key. That key is
Russian national interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest
of the safety of Russia that Germany should plant herself upon the
shores of the Black Sea, or that she should overrun the Balkan States
and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of South-eastern Europe. That
wot1ld be contrary to the historic life-interests of Russia.78

He did not conceal from Maisky his plans f:or securing access to the Black
Sea and preventing German control of the mouth of the Danube; fro1n
there he expected Germany to stretch her hands to Asia Minor, Iran and
India.79
Churchill remained oblivious to the threat which his Balkan policy
posed to Russia. Maisk)' reverted to Stalin's dictum of 19 3 9 that Russia
did not intend to 'pull somebody else's chestnuts out of the fire'; it was
clear that in the current circumstances he would be just as reluctant 'to
fight Germany on [Britain's] behalf' .80 However, the renewal of German
expansionism once agai11 led the Russians to seek ways of defusing the
threat of British action in the Straits or in Baku and reaffirming their
neutrality. The means chosen was the conclusion of a barter agreement.
However, the British insistence on restricting Soviet export of war mater­
ial to Germany was perceived as 'an attempt to divert the Soviet Union
 Gra11d Delzlsio11

from the policy of neutrality'. Halifax V\'as in fact satisfied merely \\'ith
ha,ring 'opened the ball v\1ith Maisky' but did not expect immediate
results.81
The crumbling of the French defences re\rived Stalin's fears that
Churchill might be tempted to follo\\1 in Petain' s footsteps and seek peace
v\rith Germany. Dra1ving on the experience of the Crimean War and the
Allied inten1ention in the Ci,,il War, he could not rule out the possibility1
that England might exercise her na\1al supremacy in the Mediterranean
and force her 1vay into the Black Sea, thus confronting Russia \\,ith a \\-ar
on tV\10 fronts. 2 Alternati,1ely, the Allies might be tempted to relie\1e tl1e
pressure in the West by opening a second front in the Balkans. Reports
from Sofia suggested that 'Anglo-French agents' in King Boris's entourage
and the military \Vere frenziedly acti,1e in that direction. 3 NKVD agents
in Istanbul reported the unloading of military equipment and amn1uni­
tion from French, British and American ''essels, \\1hile the Dardanelles
were being fortified. British tankers "''ere reported to be anchored in the
Bosphorus and persistent rumours in Piraeus suggested that a British
squadron was heading for the Black Sea, vvhile Turkish troops ''Tere
deployed on the Bulgarian border.S4 The Turkish suggestion that the pres­
ence of the British fleet near the Straits \\1as aimed at Italv \\"as taken \\1ith
J

a grain of salt. 5
This then \\1as the background to the appointment of Cripps as am­
bassador in MosCO\\T. Ostensibly Cripps arri,1ed, \\7ith so,Tiet blessing,
to negotiate a trade agreement. Stalin, ho1\1ever, \\1as \\1ell a1\1are e\Ten
before Cripps' s arri'1al in Mosc0\\1 that the negotiations 1\\1ere apt to
floV\1 over into politics' and '''ere aimed at 'encouraging the Russians to
double cross the Germans'. 6 The more precise aspiration ,,,. as that the
German, Russian and Italian ambitions in South-eastern Europe might
'cancel each other out, and that it [might] be possible to maintain a kind
of precarious \1acuum' .81 Campbell, the \1eteran ambassador in Belgrade,
\\1as quick to \\1arn that in \Tie\\1 of the 1 \\"elter of Balkan politics' it
'''as 'unprofitable if not una,1ailing for His Majesty's Go\1ernrnent to inter­
fere acti\"elv in the relations bet\\1een the States of the Peninsula . . . An
J

acti,,e and abo\1e all an open inten1ention is dangerous and an}r clear
attempt at 11ustling harmful.'ss Indeed, Cripps' s presence in :0vfosco\\" and
the \1ie\\,. S he \\1 as expressing \1ery shortl)' ga,Te rise to rumours of a
gro1\ring split betv\1een German;1 and Russia. 9 The temptation, ho''Te,Ter,
V\Tas near irresistible.
Obli,rious to the emerging Italian-So,1iet entente, Cripps suggested to
Moloto\11 in their \'er;,. first meeting, in mid-June, to 'bring the Balkan
countries together . . . against German and Italian aggression'.Q(; The ne\\T
French ambassador Labonne, much under the influence of Cripps, made
similar approaches but then refused adamantl)' to discuss the legitimac}­
of the Russian action in Bessarabia. His 01,Tn admission that the French
Tl1e Scra111ble for the Balkans 37

army was 'completely blown to pieces' aroused Molotov's suspicion t11at

his sole aim was to provoke a dispute between Germany and Russia; this
was not alleviated by the fresh memory of the expulsion of the Soviet
ambassador from Paris, and the fact that the French government had been
caught red-handed in various plans to attack Russia.91
Only after the French collapse did Churchill address Stalin directly. He
hoped Cripps would be given an opportunity to discuss in detail the
intentions of the Soviet government 'in the face of the sudden overthrow
of all military and political equilibrium in Europe'. However, the same
circumstances which had led Churchill to approach Stalin made it impos­
sible for Cripps to follow Churchill's instructions to 'be careful not to give
[Stalin] the impression that we are running after him in order to ask him
to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us, or dictating to him where
Russia's real interests lie in the present crisis'. What turned into a des­
perate appeal was enhanced by Churchill's sudden willingness to
acknowledge that the annexation of the Baltic States 'is dictated by the
imminence and magnitude of the German danger now threatening
Russia, in which case the Soviet Govt. may well have been justified in
taking in self-defence such measures as might in other circumstances have
been open to criticism' .92
On 1 J11ly Cripps was invited for an almost unprecedented meeting
with Stalin which lasted nearly three hours. Cripps was unaware that, on
the very day he req11ested an audience at the Kremlin, Stalin was making
what he believed were the final touches to an arrangement with the
Italians in the Balkans.93 As migl1t be expected, Stalin was not impressed
by Churchill's personal letter. Later on Cripps, extremely critical of
Churchill's policies, would admit that the proposals were made 'upon the
basis of getting them to help us out of our awkward hole after which we
may desert them and even join the enemies who now surround them' .94
Indeed the British Chiefs of Staff interpreted Cripps' s ideas as a way 'to
embroil Russia with Germany', but refused to pay the price of relin­
quishing the right to enter the Black Sea. For them the Soviet strategy was
aimed at the 'undermining of British influence in Asia . . . The oppor­
tunism of Soviet policy and the worthless character of any Soviet guar­
antee make it doubtful whether any agreement with the Soviet would
have any lasting value.' Attempts to inspire in the Russians 'a fear of
Great Britain even greater than their fear of Germany' proved no more
successful. 95
This then was the background to Stalin's apprehe11sion about the British
overture, rejecting the proposal which Cripps had made to him to seize
the 'hegemony in the Balkans', hegemony which 11e 'believed to be
p1·etentious and dangerous'. Stalin seemed to attach more significance to
a revision of the navigation regulations in tl1e Straits whicl1 would
bar access to foreign navies at time of war.96 Molotov confided to the
 Grand Delusion

Bulgarian minister that Moscow 'had no intention of looking for such an

advantage but neither did it intend to aba_ndon its interests there'. He
hoped to take the lead in the negotiations concerning Tt1rkey, but only
as part and parcel of a general arrangement in the Balkans in full co­
operation with Germany and Italy.97
The impact of Cripps' s presence in Moscow and his offers to Stalin on
the Balka11s cannot be overestimated. Shortly before Cripps's arrival in
Moscow General Ivan I. Proskurov, the head of Soviet Military Intelli­
gence, the GRU, had attributed the German hold-up of military deliver­
ies to Russia to Germany's concern that Cripps would be carrying 'some
gifts' . 98 However, within days the first report from Rt1ssian Military Intel­
ligence on German intentions to invade Russia was put on Stalin's desk,
before Hitler had even officially presented the plan to the High Command
of the Wehrmacht.99 The still sporadic information consisted of alleged
secret negotiations with Edward, the exiled Duke of Windsor1 in Madrid,
a redeployment of troops in Poland, increased production at the Skoda
armament factories in Czechoslovakia, and the recruitment of Russian­
speaking officers and White emigres in Prague. The military attaches in
Berlin unanimously supported the conclusion.1 00 It lent force to informa­
tion, vvhich had been treated with scepticism in June, that Neurath,
Germany's former Foreign Minister, had intimated to a group of White
emigrants that Hitler 'intended to form two new Russian republics, the •

Ukrainian and the Kazan' and 'establish a new order' in Russia itself. In
more concrete form, Goring's brother had been spotted negotiating arms
deals in Sofia and in Rumania.101
A week later, Proskurov was purged for his failure to alert Stalin to the
German plans in the West.102 General Filip I. Golikov, who replaced him,
provided Stalin with more accu1·ate information about the transfer of
troops to the East which indicated that 'The transfer of German troops into
Eastern Prussia and the former territories of Poland continues according
to various reports of the foreign press and accordirtg to the Gerrrlan mili­
tary attache in Moscow' .1 03 In early July Beria, the head of the NKVD, sub­
mitted to Stalin the report of a special n1ission undertaken by reliable
agents in Poland which confirmed that the deployment indicated early
preparations for a war against Russia. Information gathered from various
frontier districts by NKVD border guards disclosed that high-ranking
German officers had been surveying the districts in the summer months.
The survey was followed up by the construction of new airfields and the
expansion of existing ones, while aircraft transferred from the western
front were being overhauled. Finally, the recent arrival of German air force
pilots in the border area was registered. This alarmed Military Intelligence,
as the information virtually 'corroborated data in our possession ai1d in
some cases virtually duplicated it'. By the end of August it was iearnt that
the Germans contemplated the transfer· of 120 divisions to the East.104
The Scramble for the Balkans 39

1'"'h is intelligence is pe1·haps the best explanation of Stalin's cautious

handling of the mission undertaken by Cripps. 'The choice of this or that
person for the post of an ambassador', warned Molotov, 'was the busi­
ness of the British government'; ·but he thought it was wrong to assume
that 'someone from the ''left'' ¥Ting' would have a preferential attitude. It
was far more important that the new ambassador should 'reflect the views
of the British government' .1 05 To prevent any misrepresentation of the
talks, Stalin made sure that the precise content of his conversations with
Cripps reached Berlin. But Hitler was unimpressed by Schulenburg' s
assurances that Stalin was aware of the 'desperate attempts to sow dis­
trust between Germany and the Soviet Union', and that there was 'no
reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Union' .1 06 Hitler remained
obsessed with the idea that England's resilience was based on expecta­
tions from 'third countries, presumably mainly from the United States,
but perhaps also with the secret hope as to Russia' . This argument was
not a mere pretext for the contemplation of an early offensive against
Russia at the end of July, but reflected the recognition of a genuine poten­
tial threat to the sources of Germany's raw material and above all to her
European hegemony.1 07

The Vien na Award: The German Enc1--oachment in the Balkans

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1940, Hitler wavered over the
future course of the war. The increasing American support to Britain,
Churchill's intransigence and the serious logistical challenges to an inva­
sion of Britain threatened to throw German strategy into disarray. He now
faced a predicament which he had not anticipated in his plans: that
the war in the West might develop into a long war of attrition, which
Germany could not afford because of the lack of raw materials and
resources. The alternative of isolating Britain through the formation of a
Continental bloc, as advocated by Ribbentrop and the 'Easterners' in the
Foreign Ministry, required continued co-operation with the Soviet Union.
As the summer dragged on, tl1e Battle of Britain failed to achieve its aims,
and the implications of Britain's survival sank in. The invasion of Russia,
which had first been a tentative scheme, becarr1e a viable alternative.
Moreover, with England pinned down, the option of launching a suc­
cessful Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union became more attractive.
Insufficient attention has been paid to the role and impact of the
German elites whom Hitler was trying to win over. These included the
adherents of the 'Eastern' tradition, now awkwardly represented by
Ribbentrop, whose Anglophobia had pushed him to devise the alterna­
tive of a Continental bloc, and to a lesser degree sections of the military.
The preliminary planning for 'Barbarossa' was barely under way when
 Grand Delusion

the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) and Ribbentrop induced
Hitler to attempt to isolate England by ensuring German control over the
Continent. Tight control of South-eastern Europe, they believed, could
provide a comfortable hinterland for Germany. Supremacy could be
achieved through the construction of a solid coalition from Gibraltar to
Japan.1os
Schulenburg was by far the most ardent proponent of the Continental
bloc. He believed that Mein Kampf of sixteen years earlier was intended
by Hitler mainly as a propagandist tool against Moscow-oriented com­
munism. Having defeated communism at home, Hitler's plans now
seemed to be advancing 'in a totally different direction than trying to get
at the Soviet regime or expand territorially at their expense'. He was
equally dismissive of the suggestion that Germany needed the Ukrainian
grain as 'groundless nonsense' . His contacts within the Foreign Ministry
reinforced his belief that since the conclusion of the pact Hitler had
become convinced that the Soviet Union 'did not constitute an obstacle
in the gigantic construction of the European Continent on which he now
focused his attention' .109
On the face of it, the conditions prevailing after the end of the war in
the West seemed favourable for the establishment of a new world order
and the extension of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact to South-eastern
Europe. In Japan, the new Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, an ardent
advocate of an alliance with Germany, now sanctioned the 1apanese
expansion southward against the British and the Americans and sought
to regulate relations with Russia through German mediation.110 However,
the Soviet advance into Bessarabia, a move precipitated by the dynamism
of Hitler's policies, was bound to divert Germany to the Balkans.
Schulenburg continued to rebut suggestions that the Soviet annexation
of Bessarabia was motivated by a wish to seize the Rumanian oilfields.
He rather attributed it to Stalin's wish to participate in the new world
order now that the end of war seemed imminent. The important task
therefore was to extend the scope of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact to
prevent a dangerous overlapping of interests in the Balkans.111 This, he
believed, could be realized, as Stalin was not seeking an 'exclusive role'
in the region. 112
Although the contingency plans for a war in Russia had already been
activated, both General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, and Field
Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German
army, recognized that Russia and Germany could collect the booty and
yet 'keep out of one another's way'. The likelihood of reaching an agree­
ment was high as Hitler underestimated the extent of Stalin's interests in
the region: 'Even though Moscow is unenthusiastic about Germany's
great success, she will nevertheless make no effort to enter the war against
Germany of her own accord.'113
The Scrarnble for tl1e Balkans 41

The occupation of Bessarabia momentarily improved the strategic posi­

tion of the Soviet Union in the Black Sea region. Securing control of the
mouth of the Danube removed the threat to Odessa, while the naval and
land routes to Bulgaria and the Bosphorus were safeguarded. To a large
extent the arrangements corresponded to those reached with Finland
after the conclusion of the Winter War, which protected the maritime
approaches to Leningrad. But the move jeopardized what Berlin viewed
as an indispensable economic hinterland. Hitler therefore, perhaps reluc­
tantly, turned his gaze to the Balkans, as he could not allow Russia to
design a new order in the region with Italian assistance.114
A flare-up in the Balkans threatened to u11dermine Operation 'St.a­
Lion', Hitler's plans to invade England, scheduled for mid-August. In
mid-July Hitler therefore subjected King Carol to 'impartial' arbitration
of the various national claims.115 The guns had hardly fallen silent in
France when Stalin was informed that Bulgaria was seeking Germany's
help in gaining Dobrudja and access to the Aegean Sea, as a reward for
adhering to strict neutrality. However, Stalin was looking forward to the
imminent peace conference rather than to a possible military clash with
Germany.116 At the beginning of July the Soviet ambassador in Berlin,
Alexander A. Shkvartsev, warned that the annexation of Bessara bia had
increased Hitler's determination to establish German hegemony in the
Balkans, and that the German High Command was being summoned to
Berlin to devise the military measures to back up such a move.117 Well­
connected sources in Moscow could hardly fail to notice that the Russians
had become 'concerned with the German deployment on their borders .
. . and irritated and afraid at the same ti1ne of the German interference in
the Balkans'. Feelers were extended by the Soviet military to find out
whether the R11manian syndrome was being applied to Bulgaria as well.118
By mid-August the extent of the confrontation with Russia could no
longer be concealed. The various intelligence agencies briefed Stalin
about Hitler's intention to act as a mediator. More alarming was his
alleged declaration that all the territorial adjustments in the Balkans were
provisional and that as soon as England collapsed he would launch an
attack on the Ukraine.119 The NKVD resident in Bulgaria reported that
German barges were shipping heavy armaments through the Danube to
fortify the shores of the Black Sea.120
Bulgaria was pivotal in the Soviet security system since she formed tl1e
land bridge to the Turkish Straits. Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet ambas­
sador in Sweden, perhaps the only Soviet ambassador to speak her mind,
admitted that the Russians were seriously troubled by the Wehrmacht' s
deployment on their border and cot1ld not allow German troops to
advance into the Balkans and pose a direct threat to the Straits.121 T11c
'scramble for the Balkans', as the Bulgarian ambassador was q11ick to
inform Sofia, had comrnenced, reopening the 'Eastern Question'. This
42 Grand Delusion

development \Vas inevitable since Hitler was no longer observing Europe

from Berlin alone but also from Vienna, where he had enthroned himself
as the heir of the revived Austro-Hungarian Empire.122
Bulgaria drifted into neutrality the moment t1:1at war broke out. The
tacit British support of Bulgaria's neutrality concealed a genuirte wish to
use her in the future as a springboard to deny the Rumanian oilfields to
Germany. However, King Boris, not unlike Stalin, saV\' the possibilities
which the war provided for satisfying his country's territorial claims.
He wasted little time in seeking Hitler' s support for Bulgaria's claim
to Southern Dobrudja, were the Russians to occupy Bessarabia. The
Russians had awarded the northern part of Dobrudja to Rumania after
the 1878 war in compensation for Bessarabia, but Rumania a11nexed the
southern part after tl1e second Balkan War of 1913.123 To forestall a British
initiative the Russians had proposed in September 1939 an agreement on
mutual assistance, which was tantamount to arl alliance.124
Antonov, the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow, who had 'let himself
get caught in the Soviet toils', flew in vain to Sofia during the last week
of Septen1ber 1939, to present the proposals personally to the King. 'Had
[Antonov] presented only half of the ideas that he had developed for
n1e shortly before his departure,' remarked the Turkish ambassador, 'he
would have immediately been shown the door by King Boris.' The King
particularly feared the communist threat if the Russians were to gain
a foothold in Bulgaria. But he was no less susceptible to the historical and
ethnic affinity with Russia of the population at large, sentiments which
the Russians 'had not neglected to emphasize' .125 Ten thousar.d copies
of Izvestiia, for instance, were available on the streets in Sofia daily,
while some twenty-six Soviet films were shown in cinemas throughout
Bulgaria.126
TI-Le replacement of Antonov by Christov, an experienced diplomat, and
the appointrrlent of Professor Bogdan Filo\', the former rector of Sofia
University, as the Prime Minister in February 1940 were bad omens for
the Russians. Filov' s Germanophile leanings became more conspicuous
after the fall of France.127 Germany's reliance on Rumanian oil arLd her
association with Italy turned her gaze to the Balkans. Ribbentrop hdd
been pressed by his ambassador in Sofia to wrest the initiative from the
Russians in redressing Bulgaria's grievances.128
Molotov, in the meantime, had been advising the Bulgarian ambassador
to study 'the lessons of what [had] been happening so far to the north and
to the \.\rest of Germany' and cling to neutrality.129 As part of the agree­
ment being forged with the Italians, lte expected Bulgaria to place her
claim for Dobrudja through Moscow. However, Draganov, the Bulgarian
ambassador in Berlin who was closely associated with King Boris, had
little doubt as to the newly established balance of power. Exploiting the
obvious rivalry emerging between Russia and Germany, 11e placed in the
The Scramble for the Balkans 43

Wilhelmstrasse a claim to Dobrudja 011 the very morning that Soviet

troops crossed the Dniester into Bessarabia. The Hu11garians followed
stlit.130 Hitler stole a march on Stalin; Filov was rushed to Salzburg and
promised a settlement of Bulgarian claims 'iI1 agreement with Russia and
Italy or at least witl1 Italy'. When Filov expressed fears that Bulgaria might
be 'swallowed by 11er great Russian neighbour' , Hitler assured him that
'if someone tried to injure German interests the blow would be dreadful'.
He still counted, however, on 'the old attraction of the Dardanelles' for
Stalin, which he intended to satisfy as long as it did not lead to a division
of the Balkans into spheres of influence.131
Stalin was walking a tightrope. To observers in Moscow Molotov's
survey of Soviet foreign policy in the Supreme Soviet in early August 'N'as
'diligent, correct and cautious', yet manifesting 'full independence'. It
clearly aimed at vindicating the agreement with Ger1nany while denying
rumours accredited to the British about a possible breach in relations.
Such rumours were believed to be a blunt attempt to drag Russia into the
war. The thorny issues of the Straits and the discontent about the German
initiatives in the Balkans were conspicuously absent in Molotov's address.
They were, however, amply compensated for by a series of communiques
which reflected the discontent in the Krernlin.132 In private the arbitration
initiative elicited a strong reaction, which Schulenburg preferred to play
down in his reports to Berlin. He tried in vain to persuade Molotov that,
rather than acting as an arbitrator, Hitler was responding to a plea by
King Carol of R11mania; this hardly tallied with the disturbing informa­
tion that Hitler had in fact coerced the Rumanians into ceding Southern
Dobrudja to Bulgaria.133 The law passed during the Soviet session, annex­
ing the Baltic States, and more significantly Bessarabia, to the Soviet
Union, carried a similar message.134
In the absence of any tangible leverage on Bulgaria, Stalin continued to
rally the reliable popular support there. King Boris was unable to restrain
the tumultuous reception given to the Soviet national soccer tearn.135 The
Soviet pavilion at the Plovdiv book exhibition was the most frequented�
A regular rrtaritime line was opened between Odessa and Varna, where
a consulate was established. The British consul in Varna commented on
the popularity of the open-air showings of Soviet filrr1s in the market
square every evening. The public, he reported, 'flock to see these films,
securing their places (standing) very early. Many come in donkey carts
from whicl1. to obtain a better view, and not a few peasants drive in from
neighbouring villages.'136
Schulenburg was, however, prohibited by Ribbentrop from pursuing
further consultations with the Russians on l�umania, where Germany
claimed exclusive economic interests.137 The Russians were further
reminded that they would not ha,1e been able to fulfil their revisionist
aims in Bessarabia without 'taking advantage' of the German victories in
44 Grand Delusion

the West.138 Hitler now exploited the abortive putsch of the Iron Guard in
Rumania to tighten his control over the country. General Antonescu
was endowed with dictatorial powers, forming a government 'acceptable'
to Germany which would abide by the Vienna arbitration and fulfil
Rumania's economic obligations towards the Third Reich. Within a day
King Carol was forced to abdicate and go into exile. An agreement with
Bulgaria was promptly signed at Craiova on 7 September.139 The belated
Soviet offer of all Dobrudja to Bulgaria was rejected. The Bulgarians
perceived their claim for access to the Aegean Sea to be 'of vital
interest and fully justified, far more important for [Bulgaria] than the
Dobrudja one' . 1 40

Clash over the Danube

Most disconcerting for the Russians was their deliberate exclusion from
the arrangements for the final borders of Rumania and the control of the
Danube. The Danubian International Commission, created at Versailles,
dealt with the upper river and was mostly technical. The European Com­
mission, on the other hand, set up in the wake of Russia's defeat in the
Crimean War and within the framework of the Paris Treaty of 1856 was
highly political. The alterations introduced during the 1878 Ber� in Con­
gress enlarged the Danubian interests of Germany and the Austro­
Hungarian Empire. After 1918 the river was virtually governed by the
Rumanians, though they lost some control over it in the Sinaia Confer­
ence of September 19 3 8 when, in the spirit of 'appeasement', Germany
was unanimously co-opted as a member. Together with the Montreux
regime of the Straits, the European Commission undermined Russia's
status as a major European power and constituted a weak point in her
defensive arrangements. From the Russians' point of ·view the mouth of
tl1e river could serve alien navies as an outlet to the Black Sea, which they
regarded almost as an inland sea. Changes in the Straits regime therefore
required a corresponding control over the Danube estuary. The key to
Soviet defence lay in the ability to deny the entry of European navies
into the Black Sea not only at Istanbul but also in the Sulina arm of the
Danube.141
Obviously Stalin's great concern about the control of the river followed
the traditional policies of imperial Russia. The demand for a seat on the
Commission, as Molotov openly admitted, was motivated by a desire
not only to redress Russia's grievances of Versailles, but to reverse 'the
inferior position . . . imposed on Russia after an unhappy war for her . . .
the Crimean!'142 After joining the League of Nations in 19 3 4, the Russians
had continuously pressed for admission to the Commission but had been
rebuffed on the ground that they were not a riparian power with direct
The Scramble for the Balkans 45

maritime commercial interests in the region. Having annexed Bessarabia

they were now legally entitled to a seat and militarily in a position to force
their demand.
The European Commission, with German and British representatives,
had met for the last time in a rather surrealistic session in Galatz at the
end of May; as if oblivious to the changing fortunes of war, it dwelt on
plans for the development of the mouth of the river.143 A mere fortnight
after the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia the Kremlin became privy to
ominous information from German sources in Bucharest that 'now that
Austria had become part of Germany, the Danube was turning into a
German river and the Germans had no intention of allowing the USSR to
become a Danubian Power'. The Germans were said to have assured King
Carol of Rumania that the occupation of Bessarabia 'was 011ly temporary
and would be reversed' .144
The arbitration, as Hitler enlightened Schulenburg, was indeed meant
to banish the Russians from the Danube region.145 In Berlin, however,
the Russian ambassador firmly objected to the Ger1nan attempts to
belittle the significance of the projected Danubian conference, which
was allegedly to be confined to a discussion of the western shores of
the Danube and therefore of little or no relevance to Russia. Russia, he
asserted, had 'now become a Danubian country and was consequently
vitally interested in all Danubian questions'. He proposed to set up a
single unified commission from which 'non-river parties, including Italy,
would be excluded' and whose jurisdiction would extend from the mouth
of the Danube to Bratislava.146 Stalin did not wait for an answer, taking
immediate steps to secure Russia's position as a new Danubian power.
He sought to acquire from the Britisl1, practically banned from tl1e Com­
mission, their ten tugboats, two tankers and tl1irty 3 1,500-ton barges,
lying idle in Galatz.147 The situation became volatile when the Russians
issued a communique accusing the Rumanians of initiating shooting inci­
dents on the border with Russia.148
In Moscow Schulenburg viewed the collision course with growing
concern. He believed that the only way to avoid a colossal co11flict was a
division into spheres of interest of the Danubian region, even tho11gh it
'proved to be more favourable to the Russians than to the Germans' .149
Hitler, heavily engaged in the Battle of Britain and in frenzied diplomatic
efforts to form the Continental bloc, temporarily bowed to the pressure
and invited the Russians to participate in the Danubian conference . .. A..t the
back of his mind lay, as always, the possibility of Soviet-British collusion.
Still nominally members of the Commission, the British had indeed sup­
ported the Soviet application, which they anticipated would 'throw an
apple of discord into the proceedings' .150
The Danubian conference was a landmark which has been glossed over
by historians. To avoid a prema t11re confrontation the Germans acceded
 Grand Delusion

to the Russians' wish to form a new Danubian Contmission for the area
south of Bratislava up to the river 's mouth. But they proposed to reduce
its significance by delaying its convening and confining its activities to
technical matters through interim arrangements.151 Molotov h_ad different
ideas. From the outset he voiced reservations about the inclusion of Italy,
which allowed her together with the Germans free access to the Black
Sea.152 To restrict German-Italian manoeuvrability, the Middle Eastern
Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, under the close guidance of
the Kremlin, worked out in minute detail a scheme which would entrust
the Russians with exclusive control over the mouth of the river. Before
their departure for Bucharest Molotov perso11ally briefed the participants
about the tactics to be adopted. The high-level mission, headed by Arkady
Sobolev, Molotov's deputy, included Major-General V. D. Ivanov, which
reflected the military importance attached to the Danube. Instead of flying
directly to Bucharest, the mission stopped over in Sofia, where Sobolev
pressed King Boris to resist the German demand for Bulgaria to join the
Tripartite Pact. Rather significantly, the delegation then chose to proceed
to Bucharest by train, first making an on-the-spot inspection of the Bul­
garian border region at Ruse, on the Danube.
Severe earthquakes were a bad omen for the conference when it con­
vened on 28 October. T11e Italian declaration of war on Greece on that very
day foreordained deepening German involvement in the Balkan penin­
sula. The Russian stand at the conference was a precursor of I-1. itler' s con­
frontation with Molotov ii1. Berlin; it proved beyond any doubt that, despite
the pressure exerted by Germany, the Russiarls refused to accept German
dominance in Rumania. Sobolev's initial moderation soon gave way to an
obstinate demand for the immediate dissolution of the Four Powers Com­
missio11 of Rurnania, Germany, Italy and Russia and the installation of a
mixed Russo-Rumartian administration of the waterways for the whole
Danube delta. Such an arrangement would have allowed Soviet warships
to na_vigate freely in the Rumanian Suli11a arm and control Gern1an access
to the Black Sea. Russia also demanded the right for the Soviet fleet to
anchor at Galatz a11d Braila, which would give it de facto sovereignty over
the gates to the Black Sea. This solution was rejected out of hand by the
remaining three participants. In view of the impasse it was decided to allow
the German and Sov-.iet delegations to return home for further consulta­
tions. While Sobolev travelled to Moscow, General Ivanov and Novikov,
head of tl1e Near Eastern Department at the Foreign Ministry, exploited the
interregnum to inspect the north-eastern part of Rurnania via Ploesti.
Inevitably, they were shadowed by the Rumanian security service, an
annoying though not unfamiliar experience for the Russian visitors. After
shaking off the surveillance; they made an extensive tour along the Danube
to OrsrLuv, the railway bridge over the river, significantly ending with a
prolonged stay at the port towns on the Black Sea. i53
The Scramble for the Balkans 47

After the failure of the conference, the Russians resorted to unilateral

action. In the middle of Molotov's visit to Berlin they seized a dozen small
islands in the Kilia arm at the mouth of the Danube and full control
of the main stream of Staro Stambul, through which the Kilia waters
reach the sea. Soviet warships further violated the Rumanian part of the
Danubian delta but were fired on by the Rumanians and withdrew. They
made efforts not to alienate the Rumanians, to whom they left control of
the arms at Sulina and St George. They clearly wished to establish exclu­
sive control of navigation on the Kilia arm, the only outlet of the river for
seagoing ships. Sharing the Musura deviation of the main stream witl1
the Rumanians was of little value, as this was too shallow for any major
naval navigation.154
No wonder that the German ambassador in Bucharest warned Berlin
that the Soviet perseverance proved that they did not 'intend to pursue a
policy of reasonable understanding with Germany in the Danube and
Black Sea area but at best one of blackmail'. On the eve of Molotov's visit
to Berlin it transpired that the Russians were after all r:reating 'political
rather than economic difficulties' for Germany in the Balkans.155
 3
On a Collision Course

Drang nach Osten: The Initial Plans

Hitler's decision to attack Russia is indeed enigmatic. It is hardly pos­

sible to detect a direct line leading from his pledge in Mein Kampf to 'ter­
minate the endless German drive to the south and west of Europe, and
direct our gaze towards the lands in the east' to the actual decision to
embark on Operation 'Barbarossa' . 1 The commonly held view bypasses
the difficulty by claiming that Hitler had consistently aimed at the
destruction of Moscow 'as the headquarters of the ''Judaeo-Bolshevist
world conspiracy'' ' .2 The fact that the crusade against Bolshevism and the
extermination of the Jews revolutionized the course of the war in 1941 is
not sufficient in itself to prove steadfast adherence to a blueprint. The
ideological convictions found open expression only once the decision on
'Barbarossa' had been taken, and to a large extent diverted Hitler from a
more rational strategic policy which had characterized his military lead­
ership so far. Perl1aps the only explanation lies with those who highlight
the symbiosis in Hitler's war policy between calculation and dogma,
strategy and ideology, foreign policy and racial policy.3
Even if Hitler's decision on 'Barbarossa' was ideologically oriented, it
was subjected to fixed geopolitical considerations and altering political
circumstances. By unfolding his bitter clash with Stalin in the Balkans it
is possible at least to show how the timing of 'Barbarossa' was directly
related to the unresolved clash over the spheres of influence in that region.
The concrete origins of Operation 'Barbarossa' are still obscure, but the
fact that it germinated independently in two or three places seems to indi­
cate a lack of overall guidance. It is clear though that as soon as Marshal
Petain put his signature to the note of surrender in Compiegne, Halder
On a Collision Course 49

initiated a draft operational study of wa1· in the East.4 Hitler's initial deci­
sion primarily comprised two unforeseen obstacles, which were tied
together in his mind and attributed to Soviet policies: Churchill's brazen
rejection of his peace offers and Stalin's encroachment into the Balkans.
Churchill's refusal to acknowledge the new balance of power appeared
incomprehensible, unless he was 'pinning his hopes on Russia and
America' . The obvious temptation was therefore to solve the impasse by
simply 'crushing' the Soviet Union by force, thus establishing Germany
as 'the master of Europe and the Balkans' .5
Hitler presented the plan to his Chiefs of Staff in an extraordinary gath­
ering at his Alpine retreat at Berchtesgaden, on 3 1 July 1940. The timing
chosen for the operation is indeed problematic, as it coincided with the
planning of the projected invasion of Britain. At first Hitler expected to
drive a wedge between England and Russia through the publication of
the documents of the Supreme Allied Council, seized by the Germans,
which exposed the Allied plans to bomb Bati1m and Baku.6 Once
informed of Cripps's offer to Stalin to assume hegemony over the
Balkans,7 Hitler rightly became concerned that the Russians might 'estab­
lish a connection with Bulgaria' and 'push on to their old historic Byzan­
tium, the Dardanelles, and Constantinople' .8 This obsessive fear was
strengthened when Churchill rejected the peace offer made publicly at the
Reichstag on 19 July.9 Despite Stalin's efforts to belittle the significance of
Cripps's proposals, a plethora of reports from various Balkan capitals
suggested that Stalin and Cripps had in fact reached an understanding
aimed at exerting pressure on Turkey to alter the Straits regime.10
It is intriguing tl1at Napoleon reassured his ambassador in Moscow,
when rumours of war began to spread in 1811, in the following way: 'You
are just like the Russians; you can see nothing but threats, nothing but
war, whereas this is just a disposition of forces necessary to make England
sue for terms before six months have passed.'11 Goebbels's diaries show
that Hitler also used this sort of argument, when convenient, in the case
of France and Greece. It goes without saying that an ideological war with
Russia had always appealed to Hitler, and it is indeed possible that by
the early summer of 1940 he was under pressure of time to consider such
a campaign. But the oral directive at the end of July was still no more
than an ephemeral guideline confined to a general definition of objectives
rather than operational arrangements. 1 2
The rather complex and highly theoretical circumstances leading to tl1e
decision resulted from the outset in operational confusion regarding both
the war aims and the direction in which the overwhelming strike was to
be delivered. The war in Russia was not initially perceived as an end
in itself. This explains one of its major pitfalls: the absence of any clear
political vision as to the outcome of the campaign not only in Russia but
also regarding the status of the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
 Grand Delusion

White Russia once the Soviet UP ion had collapsed.13 Hitler's embryoni�
..

plans had envisaged only a swift and limited war in the autumn. There
is no reason to contest the subsequent recollections of Field Marshal
Wilhelm Keitel, the chief commander of the OKW, and his deputy,
General Alfried Jodi, that Hitler's plan ivas triggered by the increased
Soviet interest in the Ba.lkans. Hitler openly expressed his concern that
further Soviet penetration into Rumania would lead to the seizure of the
oilfields. The centre of gravity lay in the south, thereby also encompass­
ing valuable Soviet economic regions, adding a nev\r dimension and
further confusion to the campaign.14
Prior to the meeting in Berchtesgaden the majority of the Supreme
Command had been opposed to a war, following the traditional dogma
that Germany should avoid war on two fronts. When facing Hitler they
dodged the issue, convinced as they were that in the long run the German
claim fo1� hegemony in Europe ivas indeed endangered by Russia. The
decision was therefore clearl)' taken within the broad context of the 'new
European order'. As a pragmatic decision it was by no means irreversible.
However, 011ce taken, it had immediate political, military and arma1nent
consequences which set the Wehrmacht in motion.15 Indeed, hardly had
the decision been taken when Hitler ordered the expansion of the army
to 180 divisions by spr·ing 1941, regardless of the sacrifice inflicted on the
economy.16 Jodi and Keitel, dizzy with the success in France, 4id not
exclude the possibility that 80-- 1 00 divisions would defeat the Russians
within four to six weeks; but they were still convinced that the operation
could not be executed before spring 194 1 . 17 The delay therefore seriously
eroded the realization of Hitler's original objective.
The military planning, however, gained momentum while other
political alternatives were being sought during the summer and autumn
of 1940.18 The planning division worked diligently. Within a few days
Major-General Marcks proposed his 'Operationsentwurf Ost', assuming
that the line Archangel'sk-Gorky-Rostov could be reached within eleven
weeks.19 By the end of August the embryonic operational plan was
entrusted to General von Paulus; he was assigned the task of preparing
the operational aspects of the campaign such as studies of the terrain, the
availability of forces and ammunition, and the goals of the operation. The
1 30--4 0 German divisions earmarked for the operation were intended,
according to Halder, to destroy the Russian troops in west Russia and
establish a line from which the Russian air force could not menace the ter­
ritories under German control. Tl1e Volga-Archangel' sk line was a remote
20
and vague objective.
The planners pursued their work aware that the war in Russia was
related to the conflicting German and Soviet interests in the Balkans.
Hitler kneiv that an ill wind would blow on relations with Russia after
the conclusion of the arbitration. Orl the eve of the meeting in Vienna he
On a Collision Course 51

therefore ordered the transfer of two ar·moured divisions to south Poland

to stand ready for a 'quick intervention to protect the Rumanian oil dis­
tricts'. 21 A military mission under General Hansen was instructed to
protect the oilfields. The new deployment seemed already to fit within
the plans for war against Russia, as tl1e mission was rather clearly
instructed 'to prepa1·e for the possible employment, later, of stronger
German forces from Rumania' .22 'fhat the Balkans and the economic
resources of the Ukraine remained the focus of the planners is corrobo­
rated by the outcome of the two war games which Paulus conducted in
November and which led to the adoption of tl1e more modest plan
confining the strike to the Dnieper-Smolensk- -Leningrad line. Moreover,
the planners became increasingly convinced that, with the passage of time
and against the background of developments in the Balkans, the opera­
tion which had initially been perceived as a contingency pla11 was des­
tined to be implemented.23
It is totally unwarranted to assume, as is commonly done, that
Molotov's negotiations were doomed with the issue of 'Directive 1 8', on
the very day of his arrival in Berlir1. It is often forgotten that Russia figured
only n1arginally in the directive, which surveyed the entire cou1·se of
German strategy and focused primarily on the delivery of the final blow
against England in the Mediterranean. Irt fact tl1e directive predominantly
addressed issues concerning the establishment of a Continental-bloc
strategy. From our point of view the frequent references to the Balkans
are more significant, as they reveal once again that Bulga1�ia had become
the real battlefield 'between Russia and Germany. When embarking on
the negotiations Hitler had already made up his mind about Germany's
control of Bulgaria. The \'\Tehrmacht was instructed to make preparations,
'in case of necessity', to occupy Greek territory north of the Aegean,
'entering from Bulgaria'. The justification was the need to forestall a
British attack on the Rumanian oilfields from that territory. The directive
ordered the execution of Operation 'Felix' (the occupation of Gibraltar),
aimed at eliminating the British presence in the �1editerranean. It corre­
sponded to the aims of the Berlin meeting in seeking joint action with
Italy in North Africa and the Balkans. The short reference to Russia was
made within the context of the Continental bloc, and aimed at clarifying
her attitude towards the forthcoming period. As we have seen, there were
ominous signs of the Soviet attitude on tl�..e ev·e of the meeting and the
planners were therefore instructed that 'regardless of what results these
discussions will have, all preparations for the East which already have
been orally ordered are to be continued' .24
The directive therefore still reflected wavering on Hitler's part. It was
closely connected to his expectations in the Balkans, as we shall see late1·.
The door for a political arrangernent wl1ich might hasten the collapse
of the British Empire still remained wide open, while the army was
52 Grand Delus ion

reminded that the planning of a military campaign should not be aban­

doned. 25 Halder was in fact reassured by Hitler on several occasions that
the Russians were displaying a friendly attitude and might still join the
Tripartite Pact after the negotiations.26 Historians who are eager to main­
tain that Hitler's decision on 'Barbarossa' was entirely ideological over­
look the fact that it V\ITas by no means an arbitrary and unilateral affair.
The final crucial decision was taken only after the Russians had rejected
the German terms which were a prerequisite for the creation of the
Continental bloc.

Soviet Intelligence and the German Threat

Facing Nazi Germany in 1940- 1 , Stalin was no less curious than histo­
rians are today about Hitler's objectives. While for historians this is a theo­
retical proposition, it became crucial for Stalin after the fall of France. If
Hitler's ideology was an idee fixe then the outbreak of war was inevitable.
If the seemingly pragmatic line was genuine, and naturally Stalin would
tend to project on to Hitler the mirror image of his own outlook, then
war could still be averted or at least postponed if the diplomatic cards
were astutely played. Reaching a lasting arrangement with Germany or
acquiring an adequate breathing space depended on flawless intelligence.
Some attention should thus be paid to the state of the security services at
this juncture. Most networks of the Military Intelligence had been seri­
ously disrupted by Stalin's purges, when not only operators but also
agents in the field had been executed or discharged from the service. All
the heads of the Military Directorate and its subsidiary organizations had
been removed and their places taken by less experienced and less talented
officers.27 On the whole the organization continued to function and even
scored some spectacular successes, such as the recruitment of the
'Cambridge Five' in England, who penetrated both the British security
forces and the Foreign Office. The psychological impact of the purges,
however, was devastating, draining the security services of any form of
independence and free thinkiJ;-lg, so vital for successful intelligence.
The GRU office in Berlin was run by the experienced General Tupikov
and the NKVD by Amiak Kobulov ('Zakhar'); though a novice, Kobulov
enjoyed the full trust of Beria. They cultivated ties with the anti-fascist
groups but also recruited professionals into their ranks. Among these was
Willy Leman, who under the pseudonym of 'Breitenbach' provided infor­
mation straight from the Gestapo. When Dekanozov, a former senior
NKVD officer, was appointed ambassador in Berlin, in December 1940,
he was entrusted with the co-ordination of both tl1e GRU and the NKVD
residency. Eventually fear of provocation drove Stalin greatly to decrease
the intelligence work in Berlin.28 The failure to create any fresh nets only
On a Collision Course 53

enhanced the significance of Harro Schulze-Boysen ('Starshina') and

Arvid Harnack ('Corsicanets'),29 who had been recruited by Kobulov.
Both had been active communists in the anti-fascist Rote Kapelle (Red
Orchestra) since 1935. By 1941 'Starshina' was well established in the
headquarters of the air force with direct access to highly valuable sources.
'Corsicanets', a brilliant economist, was highly placed at the German
Economics Ministry, with direct access to n1ost secret documents relating
inter alia to relations with Russia. Both were uncovered and arrested by
the Gestapo in November 1942, court-martialled and executed.
At least one member of that net, 'Litseist' (pseudonym of 0. Berlings),
was a double agent, and caused considerable damage. His information
was regarded by Kobulov as 'most reliable' and frequently found its way
straight to Stalin and Molotov. However, after the end of the war he was
found to have been provided by the Gestapo with sophisticated disin­
formation, a hodgepodge of genuine and false information designed to
reinforce Stalin's mistaken concepts. Ribbentrop was purported to have
said: 'We can pump whatever information we want into this agent.'30
The significance of intelligence increased once the military plans had
been modified in the autumn of 1940 to accommodate Stalin's conviction
that Germany's aspirations were directed towards South-eastern Europe,
either against Russia or against British interests in the Near East. And yet
one should not overlook his distrust and contempt for all branches of
intelligence and the army in general in the 1939-41 period. Stalin's atti­
tude was described by Molotov in retrospect:

I think that one can never trust the intelligence. One has to listen to
them but then check on them. The intelligence people can lead to dan­
gero11s situations that it is impossible to get out of. There were endless
provocateurs on both sides. This is why one cannot count on the
intelligence without a thorough and constant checking and double
checking. People are so naive and gullible, indulging themselves and
quoting memoirs: spies said so and so, defectors crossed the lines . . . 31

Though he later emerged as a capable officer, General Golikov's earlier

career exposed a lack of professionalism which was all too obvious to
Stalin. Golikov had reached the top after proving himself to be a tena­
cious Bolshevik, fighting with the 'Krasnye orly' (Red Eagles) during the
Civil War.32 He subsequently held a number of key political posts in tl1e
army, including the directorship of the political department of the Co1n­
missariat for Defence. During a deliberately obscured period of his life,
Golikov played a decisive role in the suppression of the 'Leningrad Oppo­
sition' and most likely in the purges of the Red Army in 1937. His appoint­
ment as head of the GRU reflected the havoc prevailing in the armed
forces in the wake of the sweeping purges and was a reward for his
54 Grand Delusion

loyalty.33 Nonetheless, Stalin kept him at arm's length, just as he would

treat his future C1'ief of Staff, Zhukov. During the party conference in
February 1941 he was heard to mutter that he did not rely on Golikov,
V\rho 'as a spy was inexperienced, naive. A spy should be like the devil;
no one could trust him, not even himself .'34 Merkulov, head of the Foreign
Intelligence of tli.e NKVD, did not fare any better. True, Stalin regarded
him as 'brave and dexterous', but complained of him as being 'lacking in
principles and weak'; he wished to please all rather than 'adhere strictly
to a course regardless of the fact tl1at someone will be offended' .35
It is not surprising that such an environment dictated prudence on the
part of the intelligence agencies. Consequently, the constant flow of
intelligence reflected two contradictory features. The raw data, especially
when examined in retrospect, seem to have comprised a steady stream of
accurate and detailed information on the German build-up. However, the
attempts to accommodate the intelligence with the prevailing political
concepts obscured the meaning of the facts. It would be wrong to accept
the conspiracy theories v1hich accuse Golikov of deliberate and selective
manipulation of the evidence. Irtdeed, the suggestion that Stalin was
oblivious to the dangers because he had been shielded from the truth by
Golikov is greatly exaggerated. From the distribution lists it is obvious
that copious information did reach Stalin, and_ he was by no means blind
to the danger. Nor was Zhukov, who later claimed to have been deliber­
ately excluded.36
By the beginning of 1941 five or more reports (donesenia) were received
daily from abroad. Every ten to fifteen days a special review of the reports
was prepared by the GRU. The reports give a clear idea of the threats
facing the country, but there is not always an indication in the archives of
the GRV of which evaluations were actuall)r presented to the Kremlin.
True, the leadership of the GRU was incli11ed to avoid passing outright
judgment on the inevitability of �vVar on the basis of the hard facts at its
disposal. Shortly after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact the
intelligence agencies were discouraged from collecti...�g information point­
ing to German preparations for an attack on Russia. But as the threat
intensified the GRU diligently resumed the collection of raw information
on German mtentions.37
Such intelligence was usually sent L.n up to fourteen copies to Stalin,
Molotov, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Beria, Kuznetsov, the ubiquitous
Generals Mekhlis and Kulik, Shaposhnikov and other concerned parties.
The intelligence emerged from three major sources: the GRlJ, the NKGB
(which had just been separated from Beria's NKVD, charged with
external security and put under Merkulov) and the Foreign MirJstry.
The diverse data converged on the Politburo and particularly on Stalin's
secretariat. All the threads, therefore, led to Stalin. The GRU did not
fur1ction in a \racuum, as Zhuko\1 rather apologetically suggests in his
On a Collision Cou rse 55

memoirs. Significant pieces of evidence obtained by the NKGB were

transmitted directly to the military. On a number of occasions the NKVD
would examine their appreciations in relation to those reached by the
GRU and would communicate back to them: 'Your reports on the recent
transfer of German forces and military transports to the border·s of the
USSR are plausible. They corroborate the tendency of our sources.'38
Soviet intelligence had been scrutinizing the redeployment of the
German troops in France since her capitulation. In September alone a
massive transfer of some thirty divisions to the Russian border had been
detected . During the last week of the month some seventy trains carry­
ing troops, armaments and equipment were dispatched to the East. The
German embassy was further spotted recr11iting White Russians, intel­
lectuals and professionals of clear anti-Soviet inclinations, laying the
foundations for the 'restoration of national Russia'. The aim of the deploy­
ment was predominantly related to future operations in the Balkans, more
specifically in Saloniki and the Turkish Straits. 39
111 the autumn of 1940 the Kremlin instructed the NKVD to activate a
special operational file, named 'Zateya' (Venture), in which information
on German intentions was collated and brought to Stalin's personal atten­
tion.40 In the second part of Septembe1� the security ser,rices were i11un­
dated by top-level reports mapping in detail the German regrouping in
the area of former Poland throughout the summer. The reports included
precise identification of divisions and the location of their headquarters.
Equally significant was the accurate in.fo1·mation on the German con­
struction of barracks and infrastructures to facilitate the transfer of troops
from tr1e West and accommodate them. Small-scale manoeuvres had been
carried out on the theme of 'an attack on a defensive opponent', wl10,
as the report rather laconically mentioned, happened to be located on
the Russian borders. The clear conclusion was that the Germans were
contin11ing their concentration of troops in Eastern Prussia, 'and the
preparation of a theatre for all possible operative directions' .41 'Military
preparations' were spotted as well in the eastern regions of Sloval<ia.
Roads were pa�1ed arLd new rail tracks laid; some 30,000 workers were
involved in these works. Likewise airfields were constructed and a sub­
stantial number of pilots were transferred from the western front to the
East.4?
The collation of intelligence for October, as Stalin became aware,
depicted in minute details the increased transfer of both infantry and
inechanized divisions to the East. The cautious estimate on the eve of
Molotov's n1.eeting with Hitler in Berlin in November was that some '85
infantry divisiorts, in other words more than two-thirds of the entire
German infantry force, were deployed against the USSR'. The evaluation
of German aims, however, was affected by the recent developments in the
Balkans. A recent slackening of trte concentration on the Soviet border
 Grand Delitsion

marked a Ger1nan plan 'to occupy Rumania and further to move into the
heart of the Balkan peninsula' .43 It did not conceal, however, the ominous
reality that while prior to the occupation of France only twenty-seven
infantry divisions were present in Poland, supported by six cavalry for­
mations, seventy infantry divisions could now be specifically identified,
in addition to five motorized and seven or eight tank divisions.44
On the very eve of Molotov's visit, the Berlin embassy and NKGB
residency provided Stalin with contradictory reports on the course of
German policy. The embassy, examining the anniversary of the Ribben­
trop-Molotov Pact, produced a severe critique of the 'New Europe'
devised by Hitler. 'Intoxicated by victory,' it summed up, 'the German
Government, together with the Italians and without the consent of the
USSR, violated the agreement of 23 August 1939 by deciding the fate of
the Balkan peoples.' Rather significantly it ended with a warning that
the Germans regarded the Balkans as 'a new bridgehead for a military
engagement against the Soviet Union'.45 Two days before Molotov's
departure for Berlin, Golikov informed the Kremlin that the Germans had
completed the deployment of fifteen to seventeen divisions in the terri­
tory adjacent to the Danube in preparation for the seizure of Saloniki.
Partial mobilization was taking place in secret in Bulgaria, where the mil­
itary academies had been closed to allow the cadets to join their units.
Moreover, General von Ingelbart was attached to the Bulgarian iChief of
Staff, while fourteen Messerschmitts were transferred to Sofia and kept
hidden. Golikov's categorical appreciation left no room for guessing:

1 . Germany is continuing to transfer its troops to the Balkans. It

cannot be excluded that in the near future Germany will attack Greece,
witl1 the aim of crushing the Italian resistance together with Italy, in
order to seize the Balkan peninsula and exploit it as a springboard for
further actions against Turkey and the English colonies.
2. At the same time Germany is taking measures directed against the
Soviet Union (deploying troops in the regions of Cracow and Lodz and
recruiting Ukrainian reservists).46

The agent 'Meteor' in Berlin corroborated the information, quoting the

opinions of Karl Schnurre, head of the Economic Division of the German
Foreign Ministry, that Hitler intended 'to solve the issue in the East by
military means' .47
From the information heaped up on his desk Stalin compiled two sce­
narios. The first assumed the inevitability of war. The second, which he
found preferable, assumed that preliminary negotiations would precede
a peace conference. In both cases he attached primary significance to the
control of the Straits and a presence in the Balkans. Stalin's state of uncer­
tainty reflected Hitler's own wavering. The ample evidence that the
On a Collision Course 57

Russians possessed on the German preparations for war was contradicted

by Schulenburg' s efforts and by intelligence on Ribbentrop's efforts to
form a Continental bloc. The most important and accurate piece of in­
telligence pointing in this direction was submitted to Stalin by Beria a
fortnight before the Berlin conference. Colonel Kleist, a member of
Ribbentrop's staff, reported that on 22 October Hitler and Ribbentrop had
met in Berchtesgaden and discussed the 'political offensive'. They
expected that the conference would isolate England by 'destroying ai1y
illusions she might be entertaining about possible help from a third party'
and would lead to a compromise peace. France and Spain were expected
to adhere to the Axis, and 'pressure was to be exerted on Russia to reach
a political agreement with Germany which would demonstrate to the
entire world that the Soviet Union is in no way going to remain neutral,
and would actively struggle against England in the establishment of a
new European order' . At a later stage Germany intended to effect a pact
between the Soviet Union and Japan 'to demonstrate to the world the full
ties and unity of purpose between the four powers' and thus discourage
the USA from assisting Britain.48

The Bulgarian Corridor to the Turkish Straits

Thus the Russian approach to the Berlin conference was inspired not by
excessive greed but rather by a recognition of the German threat in the
Balkans and in the Straits. Rosso, the Italian ambassador in Moscow and
confidant of Schulenburg, put it succinctly:

The Germans have raised a barrier: the march to the south has been
stopped, the oil is at the disposal of the Germans, through Constanza
the Germans have reached the Black Sea, the Danube is a German river.
This is the first diplomatic defeat of Comrade Stalin, who was accus­
tomed to make great gains with small risks, and the defeat is even more
humiliating as it hits the dream which throughout the centuries was
closest to the Russian soul: the dream of the southern meridian.49

It belatedly dawned also on the British Chiefs of Staff that by occu­

pying Rumania Germany had not only succeeded in obtaining the oil
resources but had further 'forestalled the possibility of any further
Russian move towards the Straits. She is now well on the way to shutting
off Russia completely from the oceans of the world in tl1e North, in the
Baltic and now in the Black Sea.' Russia was therefore 'likely to take all
steps short of war to prevent German penetration into Turkey and the
Middle East since this would cause a progressively increasing threat to
her interests in the Black Sea and to the Caucasian oilfields' .50
58 Grand Delusion

Perceiving himself to be a great tactician,51 Stalin adopted a remarkably

realistic approach in safeguarding Russian national interests; these appea1·
to be very much within the historical context of the nineteenth-century
struggle for mastery in Europe and the Balkans. The Balkans seemed to
be the front line where Hitler had to be stopped and the control of
the Turkish Straits had becorrte the key to the preservation of Russia's
security. Stalin even identified himself with none other than the historian
Mjliukov, the Liberal Foreign Minister of the provisio11al govern-
1nent after the first revolution and an arch-enemy of Lenin, wl10 per­
severed even after the February Revolution in seeking control over the
Bosphorus. 52
These considerations, rather than insatiable greed and a wish to carry
communism to Europe at bayonet point, were what determined Stalin's
approach to the Berlin conference. Fortunately, a directive for the talks
composed for Molotov in Stalin's dacha, and in his own handwriting,
provid_es a rare insight into the workings of Soviet diplomacy at the
time. To start with, the primary aim of the journey was not to seek an
agreement but to discover 'the real intentions of Germany's proposal of
the New Europe', Russia's role in it, and the German idea of division
into 'spl1eres ot· interest in Europe and also in the Near and Middle East'.
An agreement would be deferred until a future visit by Ribbentrop to
Moscow. The leading theme of the directive, besides Finland (where it
was assumed that the spheres of interest had already been established),
was the intrinsic Soviet security interest in the Balkans. Foremost were
the repeated demands for the establishment of Soviet control of the
mouth of the Danube, coupled with the expression of 'dissatisfaction
witlt the German guarantees to Rurnania ' . The directive culminated in an
ultimatum for Soviet participation in the decision on the 'fate of Turkey'.
Likewise, Molotov was to postulate consultations on issues regarding the
future of Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Though condensed in form,
the instructions leave no room for doubt as to Stalin's overwhelming
interest: 'Bulgaria - the main topic of the negotiations - must belong
by agreement with G. [Germany] and I. [Italy] to the USSR's sphere of
interests, on the same basis as had been done by Germany and Italy in the
case of Rumania, vvith the right for Soviet troops to enter Bulgaria.' The
establishment of Bulgaria as a Soviet sphere of influence, as we will soon
see,53 was a prerequisite for the control of the Straits.
In view of subsequent suggestions that, in Berlin, Germany and Russia
had colluded to divide the British Empire, it should be emphasized that
the directive made 11ardly any mention of Soviet interests beyond the
Balkans and Europe, and in fact the preservation of the British Empire
was advocated. Stalin was much reassured by the poor showings of
Germany in the Battle of Britain and of the Italians in the Balkans and
North Africa and by the fact that 'the British fleet still dorninated the
On a Collision Course 59

Middle East'.54 Maisky' s assertion on the eve of Molotov's departure that

England could not be writte11 off was cardinal to the objectives sought
at the meeting. When tl1e Luftwaffe launched tl1e Blitz on London
Churchill had told the Soviet ambassador that 'it was necessary to wait
the coming three months, and then to see what happens'. Four months
had elapsed and Maisky was prepared to stick his neck out:

England did not only survive, but was even strengthened when com­
pared with the situation after the d.efeat of France. The German plans
for the invasion of Britain miscarried at least for this year . . . In this
way in the 'battle for Britain', Hitler, like Napoleon 135 years earlier,
suffered a defeat, the first serious defeat in this war; the consequences
of it are impossible to foresee thr·ough the information available here.

Maisky even went so far as to suggest that through a slow and ard1ious
process Britain might after all emerge victorious.ss A telegram from Stalin
pursued Molotov on the train en route to Berlir1, reaffirming the
instructions not to broach with Germany any issues concerning the
British Empire.5 6 Later in Berlin Molotov deliberately endorsed Maisky' s
judgrr1ent that Churchill, 11nlike the French leadership, enjoyed the
support of the country and the Empire and tl1erefore that 'it vvas too earl)'
to bury England' . Stalin did not even expect the situation to change dra­
matically if the Greek islands were to fall into Gerrnan hands.57 Moreover
Maisky, who seemed to have an inkling of Halifax's decision to bring
about a severance of relations with the Soviet Union if the conference
were 'to overawe Turkey', intervened with Molotov during his stay in
Berlin, warning of the repercussions of a military solution.s8 So,riet
military experts in Britain did warn Stalin that England had sustained
substantial damage from the German bombardments and that 'industry
and high finance were in favour of a compromise peace'. However, they
too did i1ot expect the crisis to come to a head in the spring, a further
reason for the Russian wish to await events before embarking on
negotiations.59
Hardening England's resistance, thereby di1ninishing the likelihood
of a compromise peace, remained a constant component in Stalin's elabo­
rate diplomacy. 60 In fact Stalin, as Cripps noted, was trying to play
'both games . . . leaving one to Molotov an.d the other to Vyshinsky [the
Deputy Foreign Minister ] ! ' In August 1940 Moscow even proposed a
non-aggression pact with Britain, sin1ilar in patter11 to the Ribberltrop­
:tviolotov Pact. Cripps' s counter-proposals a month later were rejected not
only because Stalir1 anticipated tllat Molotov's talks in Berlin would
'strengthen the bonds between the USSR a11d Nazi Germany', b11t because
of the imminent threat posed to Russia by the German encroachment in
the Balkans.61
60 Gra1zd Del11sio1z

Tl1us control of tl1e Straits remained the cornersto11e of So,Tiet strateg;r.

It cot1ld botl1 forestall tl1e Gern1an incursion into tl1e Black Sea basin and
pre,-e11t Turle�r fron1 beconling a British pa\\Tn once 11ostilities erupted.
Tl1e closer ,,-ar approached the Balkans, tl1e more 'Tague Turkish foreign
polic}T becaine. Eager to a,·oid the fate of Poland and Rumania, the Turks
adl1ered to a strict i1eutralit)T \\·hicl1 perpetuated the balance of fear
bet,,·een tl1e major po\\"ers. German3r, Russia, Ital)- and England all tried
in ,·ain to sound 11er out. It ''Tas possible to maintain the smokescreen onl)­
as 1011g as none of the actors establisl1ed land and na\"al predominance in
tl1e regio11. �1aintaiilin g the delicate balance demanded considerable
diplon1atic skills: imprO\"ement in the position of one pO\\"er led to the
courtir1g of anotl1er b)1 the Turks.
Tl1e real danger facing Turkey after the outbreak of \\-ar \\1as a possible
extension of the Ribbentrop-�1oloto\· Pact to the south. After the \Tienna
A''Tard, and especiali)" after the Italian declaration of ,,,ar on Greece and
the creeping Gem1an encroachment into Bulgaria, the Turkish go,·ern­
n1ent atten1_pted to dri,·e a \\·edge ben,-een the Germans and the Russians
b:T o\-erpla)·ing the threat posed to tl1e Straits b:· each. At the same time
tl1e pact ,,·itl1 Englai1d ,,·as ,,-a,Ted as a deterrent to a possible Russian
pre-en1pti,·e strike.
X either tl1e Turks nor the Russians could \\·atch ''Tith equanimit}· the
emerge11ce of German)1 as a JBlack Sea p0\\1er' . Both feared that German:'
migl1t seize tl1e Straits and gain a hold on Hunga0-, Rumania and
Bttlgaria, ,,-hile Ital3- established Great Albania b:T S\\-allo,,·ing Yugosla\ia
and Greece. For tl1e Russians, tl1at could lead to a siege of the So,Tiet f1eet
u1 tl1e Black Sea.c2 The Germans, 110,,-e,·er, had expertl)" fuelled tl1e mutual
Turco-So,iet suspicion. Tl1e publication in I::t.,estiia of the docun1ents
seized b:r tl1e Germans on the Allied plan to bomb Baku tlue,,· Ankara
i11to a state of panic, since the documents implied tacit Turkish support
of tl1e plaI\. Saracoglu sougl1t in ,-ain to impress on �Ioloto\· that his
go,-ernn1ent had opposed the operation. 03 Akta)·, the ambassador, \\Tas
obser,·ed in �Iosco\\T to be 'depressed and i1en-ous'; despite atten1pts to
n1aintain lus con1posure his e)Tes glo\\·ed \\·ith \\·orr}.,.,. .� �Ioloto\", ,,-horn
he 111et before departi11g to Ankara for consultations in nud-August,
remained con,-inced of Turkisl1 conni,-ance in the Anglo-Frencl1 scheme.
He kept ir1terrogating Akta)' about his alleged inquiries of Laurence
Steir1l1ardt, the ��1erican ambassador in �Iosco,,-, concerning the So,iet
fire-figl1ting facilities in Baku.05
Tl1e �-\F's success in the Battle of Britain ten1porarily· relie,-ed the
te11sion in A11kara; e\·en n1ore so did tl1e German arbitration o\-er
Dobnldja, ,,·hicl1 for the mon1ent blocked the Russian militat)· from
inakir1g an ad,·ance tO\\·ards the Straits.00 But the possibilit}· that the
Russians n1igl1t react to the arbitration b)" making a unilateral cl1ar1ge in
-
tl1e Straits regi1ne could not be e"\.cluded.0 On the e\·e of the Berlin con-
011 a Collision Course

ference the Russians preferred to keep the issue of the Straits open until
they had found out what Hitler's intentions were. As a deterrent they cer­
tainly wished to give the impression that they would act by force were
the Germans to attempt a takeover of the Straits. However, there was an
equal chance that, as Schulenburg impressed on Stalin, an agreement on
the Straits favouring Russia would be reached in Berlin.
Schulenburg had been an opponent of the Nazi regime and its
foreign policy aims. He had been steadily pursuing his own agenda in
the Soviet capital which eventually led him into severe conflict with his
masters in Berlin.68 He had reached the conclusion that Stalin had
replaced his revolutionary vision by 'national Sovietism . . . trying to
grab all he could before it was too late'. In this context he found the
claim for a revision of the Straits to be legitimate. Schulenburg hoped
that Russia could fulfil her aspirations through co-operation with
Germany rather than England. Russia could 'not always remain secluded,
as if in a mousetrap'. H e dismissed suggestions by his critics that
Stalin wished 'to get hold of Constantinople and thus realize the ancient
dream of the Russian tsars of conquering Byzantium and planting
the Orthodox cross on Haghia Sophia' . All Stalin wished for was 'to
obtain free passage for the Soviet Union through the Straits, and make
the Black Sea a Russian Sea'. 'The Fuhrer', he insisted, 'was hardly
Friedrich Barbarossa' and Stalin stood to gain nothing by reaching
Istanbul. He relied on him to seek the preservation of peace in the Balkans.
The Turks were in for 'a very unpleasant awakening', as Hitler had been
heard to threaten that 'These dirty pigs they will yet have to pay dearly.'69
Papen, the German ambassador in Ankara and former Chancellor,
expected indeed that by the end of October the Soviet and German gov­
ernments, 'acting in concert, will have brought about demilitarisation of
the Straits and internationalised Istanbul' .70 As the day of the conference
drew closer the Turks lost their composure, especially after the Italian
invasion of Greece, which brought the war closer to their shores. The war
scare prompted various measures, including a blackout of the quarters in
Izmir facing the Aegean Sea.71 At the same time in Moscow Aktay con­
tinued to inflate the German threat to the Straits, warning that 'Bulgaria
was prepared to become a weapon in the hands of one of tl1e foreign
powers.'72
Stalin did not count on Turkey's ability to resist the pressure of the
powers, even if she wished to do so. With the 'Eastern Question' at the
top of the agenda for the Berlin meetjng, relations with Turkey were put
on hold. The provocative Turkish proposals were rejected on the ground
that the impact of tl1e war on Bulgaria was 'the concern of the Bulgarian
government itself'.73 Their approach to the Russians did not prevent the
Turks from pressing the Germans for 'a fundamental change' in the rela­
tions between the two countries. But, as might be expected, Turkey was
 Grand Delilsion

not V\rillir.g to make a commitment to the 'new European order ' before
the real intentions of the Axis were kno\tVn.74
Throughout October the security services informed Stalin of German
and Italian plans to occupy Saloniki, thereby posing a direct threat to the
Turkish Straits. Saracoglu t8o read to Vinogradov, the Russian ambas­
sador in Ankara, telegrams he had received from all over the Balkans
pointing to joint German-Italian plans to attack Turkey. Tl1e outbreak of
war between Italy and Greece on the eve of the Berlin conference only
reinforced the Soviet fear that Turkey might be dragged into the war
against her will. It was hardly surprising therefore that on the eve of
Molotov's visit to Berlin the Turks went out of their way to convince tl1e
Russians of their 'friendly and loyal' attitude. They undertook that Turkey
would not allow any action which might jeopardize the Soviet Union's
interests, 'not e\1en behind its back', a clear reference to Turkish con­
nivance in the plans to bomb Baku six months earlier.75
It is intriguing that in formulallilg his views on Turkey before
Molotov's \1isit to Berlin, Stalin was much influenced by a report of
the most trusted agent of the NKVD in Istanbul. Stalin had just been
apprised by Beria of the debriefing of 'Omeri' during a recent secret visit
to Moscow. The report focused on the dangers which Turkey posed to
Russia in the Caucasus. Information from inside the Turkish nUlitary
confirmed tb.e intentions of the Allies to bomb Baku and Batum in
the event of a confrontation witl1 the Soviet Union. Perhaps more
significantly, Stalin's antagonism was fanned by the revelation that the
Turkish government was allegedly plotting with ..frotskyites. Quoting
'Omeri', Beria impressed on Stalin the Turkish government's view that
'whatever '"furkey had gained frorr" Russia [a reference to the Agreement
of Friendship of 1921], in terms of both armaments and political support,
had been given by Trotsky' . Stalin had been opposed to the concessions
\Vhich Trotsky had granted tl1e Turks in the 1920s, and therefore the
Turkish government 'always supported Trotsky and other oppositionists
and in tl1e future would continue to support them, as they expected
nothing good but only evil from Stalin and his entourage'. The final
verdict, therefore, was that 'in the event of war activities between Turkey
and the USSR Turkey intended to come out against the Soviet Union with
the aim of seizing and annexing the Caucasus which would become ''the
Caucasian Confederation'' ' .76
The Germans had hoped to pre-empt the Russians by including both
Hungary and Bulgaria in the Tripartite Pact prior to Molotov's arrival in
Berlin. They were successful only \Vith Hungary, whicl1 was of secondary
importance for the Russians.77 Even before the signing of the Vienna Arbi­
tration Stamenov, tl1e Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow, kept his go,r­
ernment \Veil abreast of the Soviet concern \vith German meddling over
Dobrudja.78 King Boris, V\Tho noT�v took control of the conduct of foreign
On a Collision Course

affairs, decided to exploit the auspicious circumstances for making a

claim on Dobrudja. The temptation 'vas well-nigh irresistible, but by
playing the rnajor powers against one another he undermined
Bulgaria's neutral status and facilitated the German stranglehold on the
country and on Rumania. In early August the King had already lured the
Germans into acting by conveying the 'people's opi11ion' that · 'Bulgaria
could get the whole of Dobrudja from Russia' .79 After the settlement of
Dobrudja, Draganov in Berlin presented a new set of claims for an outlet
to the Aegean. Once again the appeal was accompanied by manipulation
of the assumed German-Soviet tension. 'The occupation of Th1·ace
"\Vas presented not only as an anti-B14itish move but also as a way fo1·
Germany to overcome tl1e dependence on the Straits, 'where Russia had
its interests' .80
The key to Soviet security now lay in Bulga14ia, where the altering
balance of power had been followed with trepidation. The steady drift
towards Germany was furthered by rumours emanating from govern­
mental circles about the Russian intention to occupy Burgas and Varna,
the key naval ports on the Black Sea.81 Tl1e Germans, resolved to prevent
a Soviet move, did not allow Anto11escu, the Rumanian Prime Minister,
to delay the implementation of the Vienna Awa1·d. He was to instruct the
Rumanian delegation in Sofia to accept instantly the Bulgarian demand
for Dobrudja.82
King Boris performed a delicate balancing act, following the approach
to Germany with instructions to Stamenov to thank Molotov for the
Soviet position on Dobrudja. Molotov was not really fooled, pointing to
Filov' s speech of a day earlier in which the Bulgarian Prime Minister had
thanked Germany and Italy. Stamenov' s feeble explanation that this was
a recognition of Germany's initiative resulted in tl1e publication of his
approach in Izvestiia the next morning. Molotov did not abandon the race
and now raised the stakes by offering the Bulgarians Northern Dobrudja.
He was of course full)' aware that Bulgarian expa11sion would secure
ter1·itorial continuity bet,vee11 Russia and Bulgaria and eventually the
Turkish Straits. Stamenov therefore rejected the idea, using the pretext
that Rumania's quest for access to the Black Sea was as justifiable as Bul­
garia's to the Aegean, exposing even further Bulgaria' s strong leanings
towa1·ds Germany. Bulgaria was indubitably seeking refuge under the
umb1·ella of the Vienna Award and the guarantees to Rumania. Conse­
quently Russia's ability to transfer troops through Bulgaria if their posi­
tion in the Straits were to be endangered was seriously curtailed.83
The fate of Bulgaria now hung in the balance; her hope of attaining her
territorial claims while remaining neutral vvas fading. The Germans, as
we have seen, i11tended to steal a march on the Russians and present
Molotov with a fait accompli. Pressure was exerted on King Boris to join
the Tripartite Pact prior to Molotov's arrival in Berlin. Judging from his
 Grand Delusion

annotations of cipher telegrams, King Boris was inclined to accept t�e

view of his ambassador in Moscow that the Russians were actually frus­
trated, aware of the German danger but conscious of their military weak­
ness. However, while the Turkish ambassador was of the opinion that the
Russians would not fight the Germans even if they reached Istanbul, the
Russian military attache in Sofia persistently warned that Russia might
well do so.84 Facing what he conceived to be a mortal threat from Turkey,
England and Russia, the King tried to adhere to his 'quasi neutrality'. His
cunning letter to Hitler on 20 October amplified the advantages which
Bulgaria's 'cautious policy' carried for Germany: it foiled British attempts
to form an anti-German bloc in the heart of the Balkans, while a full com­
mitmen.t to Germany might have driven Turkey straight into Russia's
arms. However, when delivering the letter Draganov was warned to bear
in mind 'the true considerations which made Germany offer us an act
which to her seems to be of a demonstrative and doubtful nature while
for us it could be fatal'. The fear of Russia was so overriding that
Draganov was specifically instructed to avoid 'creating the impression'
that 11is government was 'inclined to accept the offer' .85
It is perhaps impossible to decide how inevitable was Hitler 's attack
on Russia. However, it is certain that King Boris's determination before,
during and after the conference brought home to Hitler the extent to
which Soviet influence and interests in the Balkans were impi:r;iging on
his own. This became the major consideration to the final decision to
implement Operation 'Barbarossa' .86 The alternatives of 'war and peace'
now entered the dialogue, tl1ough perhaps in a subtle way. Bulgaria's
adherence to the pact, Draganov was informed, was vital for German
attempts to isolate England. Hitler did not foresee that Russia would be
involved in war in the Balkans, nor did she have a good enough reason
to draw closer to England 'because Germany could provide her more than
England could'. He made allusions to India. He expected that the expan­
sion of the Tripartite Pact would only hasten Stalin's submission. But,
if it came to the worst, Germany possessed large 'unemployed armies'
which could achieve a military success in the south-eastern fla11k of
Europe at any moment.87
King Boris was scarcely reassured. Through Kollontai he learnt that
Stalin, who was concerned with events in the Balkans, intended to put
his relations with Hitler to the test in Berlin. Moreover, the Russian mili­
tary attache in Bucharest continued to express 'open discontent with the
occupation of Rumania', reiterating Russia's intentions of 'standing up
against anybody who may try to grab the Straits', strongly implying that
'Bulgaria had to enter the Soviet sphere of interest' .88 Draganov kept
pressing the King to join the Axis. However, his attempts to set his mind
at rest by qt1oting Weizsacker' s assurance that relations with Russia 'were
very good' were seriously contested by information from Moscow:
On a Collision Course

Schulenburg, Rosso and Togo, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, had

indicated to the Bulgarian ambassador that they did not expect Russia to
be included in the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.89 Moreover, Tirnoshenko, the
Soviet Minister of Defence, was manifestly alarmed by the deployment
of the Wehrmacht on the borders of Rumania and northern Greece, which
implied direct intervention in Bulgaria and eventually in Turkey.90 Having
failed to secure Bulgarian entry to the Axis before Molotov's arrival in
Berlin, the Germans resorted to their familiar crude methods. Some 200
Wehrmacht officers and men in civilian clothes were infiltrated into Bul­
garia to erect an adequate air-warning system, thereby establishing the
spearhead for German military presence there.91
The Italian attack on Greece on 28 October, made without prior German
knowledge a mere fortnight before the Berlin conference, shuffled all the
cards. England was now expected to land in Greece, thereby posing a
direct threat to Germany and Russia. The Russians feared that Hitler
might be tempted to make a dash to Turkey through Bulgaria. The spot­
light was once again focused on the Turkish Straits. But in tl1e short term
attention was also directed towards Bulgaria, which had so far succeeded
in maintaining neutrality and whose next moves were to determine the
fate of the Balkans.92 The unforeseen threat from Italy led the Turks to
secure Soviet support in the event of the war reaching their shores. They
readily exploited the Bulgarian card, warning the Russians that there
were indications that 'Bulgaria was prepared to become a weapon in the
hands of one of the foreign powers' ,93 a clear allusion to Germany. The
Soviet participation in the Berlin conference, however, was governed less
by apprehension of German encroachment than by claims on Turkey
itself. Stalin, who did not trust Turkey,94 did not exclude the possibility
that she would be willingly dragged into the war by Britain, especially if
provided with assistance similar to that given to France and Norway. The
attitude of Turkey to the Soviet Union during the Finnish War, as well as
the alleged tacit Turkish agreement to allow British bombers to fly over
Turkish territory on the way to Baku, left a dark shadow on the relations
between the two countries. Stalin was unlikely to entrust Russian secur­
ity to a paper agreement sustained by Turkish goodwill. In fact, his
evasive reply to the Turkish proposals did little to conceal his real inten­
tions of achieving Russia's security through direct Soviet intervention
using transit rights in Bulgaria.95
Moscow became the scene of frenzied activity. Two days before
Molotov's departure he attempted to forestall Germany by giving guar­
antees to Bulgaria, thus establishing a Soviet presence similar to tl1e
German one in Rumania. The proposal was rejected out of hand by Popov,
the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, but the Soviet ambassador refused to take
no for an answer. He rebutted one by one the Bulgarian reservations and
modified some of the proposals to make them more attractive to the
66 Grand Delusion

Bulgarians. He even resorted to threats, warning that were Bulgaria to

join the Axis it would be tantamount to abandoning her neutrality and
coltld pose a threat to her existence. Finally, to defuse the tension, allevi­
ate Bulgarian fears of the Ge1'man reaction and prevent a recurrence of
the Rumanian syndrome, he made a new proposition which King Boris
marked firmly with his thick pencil on tl1e minutes of tl1e talks. Joining
the Axis, he argued, would 'not make redundant the Soviet proposal for
military assistance but increase the significance of Bulgaria'. So anxious
was the Kremlin to reach agreement that Molotov was even prepared to
exempt the Bulgarians from any concrete military obligations. The
Russians' proposal to Bulgaria of a mutual assistance pact, coupled with
their demand for a seat on the Danubian Com1nission, put Hitler and
Stalin on an inevitable collision course.96

)
 4
The Road to 'Barbarossa'

Molotov's Visit to Berlin

Historians are still disputing the sincerity of Hitler' s negotiations with

Molotov in Berlin in Noven1ber 1940. Their judgment often corresponds
to their views on the ideological motivatio.n for Hitler's policies. Armed
with hindsight of events yet to come, tltey are inclined to propose that
at best Hitler used the negotiations as a tactical manoeuvre to demon­
strate to Turkey, Spain, Italy, Vichy France and the Balkan States that he
had the full backing of Russia for his plans for mastery of Europe. They
therefore could join the Axis without fearing the reaction in Moscow. It is
argued as well that the negotiations were used by Hitler to demonstrate
to his subordinates that the Russians understood only the language of
force. 1
The idea of the Berlin meeting, like the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and
the subsequent abortive attempts to bring Hitler and Stalin together in
May 1941, originated with Schulenburg during a brief visit to Berlin at
the end of September. Schulenburg had been conte1nplating a four-power
pact since the collapse of France. The realization that Russia would not
unilaterally retreat from the Balkans prompted him to act. But it was his
general familiarity with the contingency plans 'to bring about a show­
down with Russia' which prompted him to take the initiative. He got an
inkling of the plans from Hans Herwarth, later to be German ambassador
in London, a senior official at the Moscow embassy. A lonely and child­
less figure, Schulenburg seemed to have 'adopted' Herwarth and his wife,
especially after Herwarth joined the army prior to the French campaign.
While on leave in Berlin after the fall of France Herwarth was told in
confidence by his cousin, a colonel on the German General Staff, of
68 Grand Delusion

Hitler's plans to attack Russia. On the pretext of visiting his wife, wh9
was still employed at the embassy in Moscow, Herwarth obtained
leave from the army (not before promising his commander a full load
of caviar). Schulenburg and Kostring, the veteran military attache, were
'flabbergasted' by the news, but they could not make up their minds
whether to take the information at face value or regard it as a contingency
plan, aimed at exerting pressure on the Russians to increase their indus­
trial output and deliveries. Some verification, however, was obtained
during Kostring' s meeting with Halder later on in the month and from
visitors from the Ministry. Schulenburg maintained, however, that Hitler
and his entourage could still be swayed towards an extension of the
agreement with Russia so long as Russian claims were confined to Turkey
and Iran.2
The harsh Soviet reaction to the Vienna Award throughout September
undermined his scheme. Aware of the direction in which the winds of
war were blowing in Berlin, Schulenburg continued to send the
Wilhelmstrasse highly ambiguous reports of Soviet reactions, concealing
Molotov's doubts as to whether Hitler had acted 'in good faith'. Molotov
had in fact reverted to the proposals made by Mackensen for a tripartite
arrangement in the Balkans. Schulenburg' s plea that the absence of prior
consultations might have reflected Berlin's failure to perceive Soviet inter­
ests was sarcastically dismissed by Molotov; those had been unfqlded on
the front pages of the entire international press. Ignoring his instructions
from Berlin, Schulenburg now initiated a conciliatory move which would
lead to the Berlin conference two months later. No longer able to hide his
own reservations about the German attitude, he decided on a prompt
return to Berlin to iron out the differences.3
Schulenburg was given little assistance by a memorandum handed
to him by Molotov on the eve of his departure that accused the Germans
of breaching the terms of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Molotov exerted
pressure on Berlin by calling for changes in the clauses of the pact
which dealt with prior consultations, thereby hinting that Russia wished
for a free hand in her dealings with the Turks on the Straits. He blamed
the unilateral German action for the widespread rumours that the arbi­
tration was an anti-Soviet move and revealed a growing tension in
German-Soviet relations. Schulenburg' s record of the conversation shows
him forcefully defending the German position, though in reality he was
'strongly in favour of solving the controversies' and was therefore leaving
straight away for Berlin 'to liquidate the misunderstandings' .4
Schulenburg, however, did not get a chance to discuss the issue with
Ribbentrop until 25 September. Ribbentrop was absent in Rome conduct­
ing negotiations with Mussolini on the establishment of the Axis, a poten­
tially thorny issue in German-Soviet relations. Schulenburg certainly
received encouragement from his colleagues in the Foreign Ministry.
The Road to 'Barbarossa'

Weizsacker, himself a convert to the Continental bloc, confided in his

diary: 'The public does not expect an early peace, but rather anticipates
a conflict with Russia. This is denied officially. However, I personally do
believe that the people are right, although I see no sense or necessity of
such a new war, unless in spring 1941 conditions force us to take such a
step. To beat England in Russia is not a programme.'5 The Foreign Min­
istry, however, used trade as the bait for convening the political meeting.
By halting deliveries the Russians could inflict a disaster on the German
war effort. It had been noticed that the Russians were neglecting long­
range projects, concentrating on short-term deliveries in exchange for
munitions and armaments which brought them immediate benefits.6
Hitler now faced the dilemma of whether to attempt to bring the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact up to date through arrangements in South­
eastern Europe or alternatively to proceed with vigorous preparations
for war. Throughout the summer of 1940 he seems to have vacillated.
Whether he would have abided by an agreement which excluded Russia
from Europe and the Balkans and diverted her to the Near East is obvi­
ously a hypothetical question, but there are no indications that the diplo­
matic measures were not executed in earnest. The first move in an attempt
to secure a political solution was the sig11ature on 27 September of the
Tripartite Pact. Japan was counted on to engage the United States in the
Pacific. It was anticipated that Italy and hopefully Franco's Spain would
undermine the British naval dominance in the Mediterranean, while
Russia could be diverted against British imperial interests in the Near
East. Rumania and Finland were destined to provide Germany's basic
raw materials and oil. That his plans concerning Russia did not deflect
Hitler from the war against England is obvious from his instructions to
unleash the Luftwaffe against Britain, as a preliminary to an invasion, the
day after informing his generals about his intention of fighting Russia.
Moreover, the plans to increase the size of the army to 180 divisions were
prepared in the context of the subsidiary strategy and as an attempt to
maintain the combat momentum. While the preliminary general plans
for the invasion of Russia were being drawn up, the OKW was zealously
engaged in preparing the operations against Gibraltar and Egypt. Hitler
hoped to implem.ent a new order through a fresl1 delimitation of spheres
of interest.7
Unlike the Russians, Hitler was not guided by any con.crete agenda for
the meeting. The negotiations were expected to follow his well-known
pattern. The presentation of the general idea of the 'new Europe' would
gradually develop into a rigid proposal for delimitation whicl1 would
exclude Russia from Europe and the Balkans and reflect German military
supremacy. Ribbentrop was briefed only on secondary issues which
might emerge as a result of the discussion of 'high policy' concerning
Russia's attitude to the war, the Italo-Greek conflict, Russia's attitude to
 Grand Delusion

the Axis and the Straits. The draft agreement on delimitation, prepared
by the Moscow embassy, was the sole guideline for the German delega­
tion but was never referred to.8 It tallied more or less with the views of
the Russians: Turkey was to be excluded from the new European order,
while Russia received bases on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus and
Germany on the European. An alternative solution was for Russia to
control only the Bosphorus while a friendly state, such as Bulgaria, would
look after Gerrnan interests in Istanbul.9 Shortly after returning from
his consultations in Berlin, Schulenburg had composed together with
Kostring and Walther, the counsellor at the emb3ssy, a memorandum
which elaborated the dangers of a German attack on the Soviet Union. It
insisted that the Soviet Union was unlikely to initiate war but that, if V\7ar
was forced on her, the entire population would stand firmly behind the
government. It was possible that Russia would lose the Ukraine, Wlute
Russia and the Baltic States, but these would only become a burden for
Germany. This document was submitted on 2 November to Halder, who
marked it 'received', but it is unknown whether Hitler was made aware
of its contents.10 The views of the Moscow embassy, however, were
circulating freely among the higher echelons of the Foreign Ministry, as
best reflected by Wei.rzsacker:

It is argued that withottt liquidating Russia there will be no order in

Europe. But why should it not stew next to us i11 its damp Bolshevism?
As long as it is ruled by bureaucrats of the present type, t11is country
has to be feared less than in the time of the tsars. I consider it
unfavourable to bring war into countries where distances will weaken
our forces. The occupation of Russia will not even gain us corn.II

The eventual exclusion of Schulenburg, the architect of the meeting, from

the talks was a bad omen for the grot1p.12
.
Hitler . s general outline for the negotiations was very different from the
Russians' . True, he still adhered to Ribbentrop's idea of raising the 'West
Wall .. to detach England from her potential allies. But the acid test seemed
to have becon1e the Russian stand on the Balkans. From the Ger1nan point
of view, as Ribberttrop explained to Mussolini, 'the Vienna Award had
plainly indicated to the Russians where the limit for their expansiorl lay'.
The Continental bloc, therefore, was a peaceful and even preferable alter­
native to 'Barbarossa'. The precondition for it, however, was Soviet accep­
tance of Germany's dictation, justified by the military superiority she had
established through her v�ictories in Northern and Western Europe. It was
no secret that the Bosphorus and the Balkans rnarked 'a dangerous over­
lapping of interests' which had to be avoided.13
Hitler, as he revealed to Mussolini on the eve of the conference, did not
intend to accommodate the Russia11s beyond forcing Turkey to yield
The Road to 'Barbarossa' 71

'some' guarantees in the Straits and security arrangements in Baku and

Batum. The talks were clearly doomed to failure, as Hitler expected them
to put the seal of approval on German supremacy in Europe by diverting
the Russians from their 'old goal, the Bosphorus' towards the Indian
Ocean. He was resolved to stop Stalin from advancing 'beyond certain
definite boundaries', more specifically from 'approaching the Bosphorus
via Rumania'. 'One Rumanian bird. in the hand', he summed up, was
'worth more than two Russian birds in the bush'. Stalin's obsession with
the Danube and Bulgaria rendered Hitler somewhat sceptical about tl1e
outcome of the conference. However, he still believed Stalin to be shrewd
/

enough' to bow to German predominance and suppress his ambitions.

Stalin, he felt, had made the wrong calcl1lation in expecting that Europe
would 'bleed white' in a protracted war. With a hundred unscathed divi­
sions deployed on his border, Hitler told his Chief of Staff, Stalin was
bound to acquiesce to the German presence in Finland and Rumania, and
was unlikely to 'represent any problem for Germany even if worst came
to worst' .14 Within the diplomatic community in Berlin it was believed
that after failing to reach an agreement with Britain Hitler was genuinely
following in Bismarck's footsteps in seeking an understanding with
Russia, rega1·dless of the ideological differences. It was even tllought pos­
sible that 'the political co-operation might influence Bolshevism towards
a national socialist trend . . . ' 1 5
.

Paradoxically, the setting up of the Axis during Schulenburg' s stay in

Berlin only helped him to furtl1er his ideas. The Tripartite Part was clearly
a vehicle for the establishment of the Continental bloc and initially
ass11med the inclusio11 of the Soviet Union by giving her 'at the proper
moment and in a friendly manner . . . a free hand towards the south to fulfil
any possible wishes in the direction of the Persian Gulf or India' .16 The pre­
vailing feeling in the Wilhelmstrasse, best expressed by Weizsacker, was:

We annoyed Russia with the guarantees to Romania . . . and yesterday

again with the tripartite pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It is neces­
sary to compensate these surprises to Russia, if we do not want her to
alter l1er attitude towards us. An attack by Russia is not to be feared
because it is not strong enough militarily or as a regime. But Russia
could still open its territory to English intrigues and, more importantly,
stop the deliveries to us.

Not only were the Russians informed in advance about the setting up
of the Axis, but Weizsacker assured the Soviet ambassador that special
efforts would be made to reconcile R11ssia and Japan. 1 7 A similar message
was conveyed directly to Molotov. His attention was drawn to the clause
which clarified that the agreement preserved the special relations with the
Soviet Union. To sweeten the pill, Ribbentrop now promised to address
72 Grand Delusion

Stalin personally and to extend an invitation for Molotov to discuss in

Berlin 'questions relating to the establishment of common political aims
for the future' .18 Ribbentrop belittled the significance of the German activ­
ities in Finland and reiterated that all signatories of the Tripartite Pact
'were from the beginning in complete agreement that their accord should
in no way affect th-e Soviet Union'.19 He promised to elaborate those ideas
in his letter to Stalin. The only drawback was the declaration of the irrev­
ocable a German intention of implementing the guarantees to l�umania
and establishing a German presence there, a clear though subdued deter­
rent to Russia. But the German presence in the Balkans was ascribed to
the threat which the British posed to the Rumanian oilfields. The German
legations in the Balkans were instructed to avoid 'scrupulously' any
action which might give an anti-Russian impression.20
Ribbentrop's letter, which he wished Schulenburg to submit to Stalin
in person, awaited the ambassador's return to Moscow. Schulenburg care­
fully worked on the translation of the text, which he feared might 'cause
serious annoyance to Molotov'. He was finally forced to submit it to
Molotov on 1 7 October, by which time its gist had already been leaked to
the press. The letter, though personally endorsed by Hitler, revealed none
of the 'fresh ideas' Ribbentrop had promised. Ostensibly the suggestion
for bringing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact up to date through the 'delim­
itation of mutual spheres of influence' was prominent, but read carefully
it included a caution to the Russians not to collude with the British in the
Balkans. The 'friendly advice' was backed up by a concealed warning of
the superiority of the Wehrmacht, whose troops 'have routed the British
wherever they accepted battle'. Ribbentrop touched a raw nerve in the
Kremlin by alluding to the recent British plans to bomb Baku and Batum.
The German encroachment in the Balka11s was vindicated as a measure
to check 'British perfidious activities' and a protection of vital economic
needs. It is doubtful whether Stalin was placated by Ribbentrop's account
of the 'completely improvised' arbitration in Vienna, which had had to
be organized 'witl1in twenty-four hours' because of British machinations,
which left 'no time for any negotiations or consultations' . Schulenburg,
the Russian report suggests, had to augment the text to respond to Soviet
expectations. He stressed that the conference in Berlin would be only a
preliminary meeting before the convening of the four powers. He excused
the absence of clearer references to the conference by pointing out that
Japan and Italy had not yet been consulted about it. 21
Stalin was nonetheless visibly relieved by the invitation. He was pre­
pared for Molotov to go to Berlin during the first week of November and
even made a few gestures of goodwill. Thus he withdrew the objections
to Italy's participation in the Danubian Commission, paving the way
for its convention in Bucharest at the end of October, and endorsed the
agreement on indemnities to German citizens of the former Baltic States.
The Road to 'Barbarossa' 73

In his report to Berlin Schulenburg deliberately omitted any mention of

Molotov's manifest suspicion about the presence of the German military
in Rumania, the transit of German troops through Norway to Finland and
the alleged German-Turkish negotiations.22 And yet it could not have
escaped Hitler's attention that Stalin's reply to Ribbentrop's flamboyant
letter was succinct, expressing the hope that relations would be improved
once 'the permanent basis of a long-range delimitation of mutual inter­
ests' was established. Molotov's visit was perceived only as a prelude to
the negotiations to be conducted by Ribbentrop in Moscow, presumably
leading to a second Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. 23
Molotov's forty-eight-hour stay in Berlin has been reconstructed by
historians in minute detail, and there is little need to recapitulate it here.
The prevailing view, however, presents it as a conspiracy to dismantle the
British Empire leading to a division of the entire world rather than a
reflection of the fierce rivalry over the Balkans which has been unfolded
here.24
Molotov's negotiations in Berlin stood in sharp contrast to the pomp
and circumstance which surrounded his departure from the Belorussia
Station in Moscow on 1 1 November, accompanied by a large Soviet del­
egation. The dark overcast sky and irritating drizzle which met Molotov
the next morning, when his special train pulled into the Anhalter Station
in Berlin, was a premonition of things to come. The welcome, however,
was cordial and encouraging. Molotov was greeted by Ribbentrop and
Field Marshal Keitel. The station was decorated with Soviet and Nazi
flags above a large basket of flowers draped in pink. Outside a band
struck up 'Deutschland Deutschland iiber Alles', and the 'Internationale'
was played for the first time since 1933. Molotov was then whisked by a
black Mercedes limousine to the ostentatious Bellevue Hotel. Little time
was wasted and shortly after breakfast the delegation set off for the
preliminary talks at the Reichskanzlerei.25
Starting with the preliminary meeting with Ribbentrop, Molotov made
it clear that the Russians would not be satisfied with Hitler's idea of
defining spheres of influence 'along very broad lines'. Considering the
terms set out in Molotov's directive, it is hardly surprising that he was
not at all tempted by the proposition that Russia seek an outlet in the
Persian Gulf. There followed a long discussion on Turkey and the Straits
(which is most significantly missing from the German protocols) in which
the Russians were offered a revision of the Montreux Convention but
without any further securities.26 The initial impression, as Molotov hastily
cabled Stalin, was that the German 'responses during the talk were not
always clear and require further clarifications'. Ribbentrop deliberately
avoided precise definition of the spheres of influence, preferring tl1e
conclusion of an agreement in principle which could serve immediate
German interests vis-a-vis England.27
74 Grand Delusion

Hitler met Molotov with a Nazi salute, bending his palm unnaturally' .
He invited him to the lounge section of the hall, where Ribbentrop joined
them. Hitler was 'surprisingly gracious and friendly . . . eager to win
Molotov personally and wanted him to share his views'. Considering
Molotov s expectations of rancour, it comes as no surprise that the Soviet
Foreign Minister was observed to be 'relieved at Hitler's amiability' when
he returned to his hotel.28 And yet Molotov's unbending stand confirmed
Hitler's anxieties about the course of Russia's foreign policy- and cast
doubt on the possibility of reaching a peaceful arrangement with her.
Between their two major meetings a cable from Stalin instructed Molotov
not to deviate from the directive, reminding him that 'a peaceful solution
will not be tenabie without Soviet guarantees to Bulgaria and the admis­
sion of Soviet troops into Bulgaria, as means of pressure on Turkey' .29
At their following meeting, Hitler was, as Molotov cabled back to
Stalin, 'markedl)7 agitated' when Molotov reiterated the demand for
the Germans to revoke the guarantees to Rumania, which were 'aimed
against the interests of Soviet Russia, if one might express oneself so
bluntly'. He went on to convey Stalin's demands, virtuaJly verbatim, for
a guarantee to Bulgaria 'under exactly the same conditions as Germany
and Italy had given one to Rumania'. Promising non-interference in her
domestic affairs, he actually proposed to compensate Bulgaria \\7ith access
to the Aegean. Such a solution would have impeded Hitle1�' s plans for the
occupation of Saloniki.
Molotov further in._furiated Hitler when he dug in his heels, alluding
to the revision of the Montreux Cor.vention as a paper guarantee -vvh ile
Russia sought 'a tangible one'. He had been instructed by a second cable
from Stalin, who was vigilantly monitoring the negotiations from
1'foscow, to explain to Hitler that Russia was not interested in access to
the Mediterranean but rather was vulnerable to a possible attack by the
British if they were in a position to navigate unhindered into the Black
Sea. Once again the frame of reference was historical. Hitler was to be
reminded that 'all the events from the Crimean War in the last century to
the landing of foreign troops during the intervention in the Crimea and
in Odessa in 1918 and 1919 mean that the security of the Soviet territo­
ries on the Black Sea cannot be achieved without a solution of the Straits
issue' . Stalin appeared to be still hopeful that a draft agreement on sucl1
lines could be prepared in Berlin and the final touches would be put to it
later in Moscow.30
Hitler, who had been informed about the abortive Soviet approach to
King Boris, glossed over the subject, though not without making the sar­
castic comment that whereas Rumania had asked for guarantees from
Germany and Italy he was not familiar with a similar request made to the
Russians by the Bt1lgarians. He was not reassured by Molotov's serious
reservations about the proposals that Russia associate herself with the
The Road to 'Barbarossa' 75

Tripartite Pact. Molotov's precondition was that the pact be completely

remodelled, as he 'did not object to participating in va1·ious activities of
the four powers but not in the Tripartite Pact, where the USSR was no
more than an object'.
It was left for Ribbentrop to try to pick up the threads in the surrealis­
tic surroundings of the air-raid shelter in Berlin; the heavy British
bombing brought the reality of war home and q11estioned German invin­
cibility. His efforts were directed towards reconciling the Tripartite Pact
with the German-Soviet pact through a definition of spheres of influence
of which, he admitted, he had only a 'rough idea'. He then drew a folded
paper out of his pocket and read aloud tlle proposed agreement. It was a
general document which established the wish of the four powers to define
the respective spheres of interests and called for constant mutual consul­
tations. Several secret protocols defined the territorial aspirations of each
of the parties. As expected, the Russians were diverted to the Indian
Ocean and the only reference to their original aims was a promise to seek
a revision of the Straits regime under German auspices. Molotov stipu­
lated that 'paper agreements would not suffice . . . [Russia] would have
to insist on effective guarantees of her security.' The guarantees to Bul­
garia figured prominently in Molotov's report but only briefly in the
German one, most probably in order not to enrage Hitler further.31
Hitler's drift towards launching an attack on the Soviet Union was a
clear outcome of the intransigence displayed by the Russians in defining
what they deemed to be their essential security demands in the Balkans.
But he still gave Stalin (as the Russian records though not the German
ones reveal) a chance to r·everse his policies. Stalin's handling of the Bul­
garian issue in the wake of the conference, as we shall see, finally sealed
the fate of Russia. Indeed, Ribbentrop and Goring gave reliable testimony
to this effect in their interrogations at Nuremberg.32 Hitler seems to have
lost all interest in the talks at that point, indicating that 'he was not . . .
absolutely sure' whether the joint plans for the dismemberment of the
British Empire 'could be carried out1 •33

Hitler Opts for War

Despite the early impression gained by the Bulgarians and other keen
observers that the negotiations had been successful,34 Molotov's last cable
to Stalin stated unequivocally that the negotiations 'did not produce the
desired results'. He then explained that Hitler had 'a·voided giving an
answer' on Bulgaria by referring the issue to Italy. Equally unsatisfactory
was the discussion of the Turkish problem, while Ribbentrop's projected
trip to Moscow was no longer mentioned. Molotov wrapped up the
report: 'These are the main results. Nothing to boast about, but in any
 Gra11d Delusion

case it does clarify the present mood of Hitler, which one should take
into account.'35 It had become clear, as Molotov explained upon return­
ing to Moscow, tl1at the Germans had hoped 'to lay their hands on Turkey
under the pretext of guaranteeing her security similarly to Rumania,
while sweetening our lips with a promise of revision of the Montreux
Convention in our favour, proposing to us to help them on this matter'.
Henceforward the Soviet intention would be to improve the Straits regime
in direct negotiations with Turkey and 'not behind her back' . In the cor­
ridors of the Kremlin the probability of 'a German expedition against
Egypt, through the Straits and Turkey', was actually discussed.36 As for
the German proposals that Russia should encroach on British interests
in the Near East, Molotov was most incisive: 'The Germans and the
Japanese, it is evident, would very much like to push us towards the
Persian Gulf and India. We refused to discuss the matter as we believe
that such German recommendations are ill advised.'37 And yet, rather
than causing a sense of irrevocable crisis, the new proposals submitted
by Ribbentrop at the last moment38 led to a short-lived complacency.
Negotiations, so it seemed, could proceed at a leisurely pace through
'diplomatic channels'. Molotov was indeed observed to be 'swollen­
headed and puffed up' at a welcome party thrown by Rosso for repre­
sentatives of the 'friendly countries' .39
The proponents of the Continental bloc in Ribbentrop's entourage, as
well as Schulenburg, still expected that Stalin would eventually yield,
give11 the weakness of the Red Army. 'In my opinion,' commented
Weizsacker, 'we can continue to negotiate with them for a long time. War
against Russia is impossible as long as we are busy with England, and
afterwards it will be unnecessary.' Even Halder had not abandoned hope
of a political solution. 40
Hitler, however, emerged from the Berlin conference more than ever
convinced that British resilience was the result of Soviet intransigence.
He was equally disillusioned about the Continental bloc. A prerequisite
for conducting a subsidiary strategy, besides agreement with Russia, was
Spain's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. On 18 November Hitler had been
informed by Ciano that Italy regarded the entry of Spain into the war and
the seizure of Gibraltar as vital for inflicting the final blow on the British
naval presence in the Mediterranean. Meeting the Spanish Foreign Min­
ister the following day, Hitler lied brazenly, boasting of the successful
completion of the preparations for Operation 'Sea-Lion'. Preparations for
the operation had in fact petered out during the summer, to a large extent
as a result of the Luftwaffe's failure to achieve air supremacy during the
Battle of Britain. Though the postponement was conveniently attributed
to exceptionally poor weatl1er conditions, the invasion had been post­
poned 'indefinitely' on 1 7 September. Germany, Hitler claimed, 'would
begin the attack even in winter, if there were a prospect of 3-4 weeks of
The Road to 'Barbarossa' 77

good weather' . Serrano Sufier, the Spanish Foreign Minister, however,

was not to be swayed, announcing Franco's final decision to remain out
of the war.41
Shortly after meeting Sufier, Hitler drafted a telegram to Mussolini,
who had been pressing for assistance after the bungled invasion of Greece
on 28 October. Hitler now reluctantly agreed, promising help later in the
winter but making the revealing reservation: 'In the spring, by the begin­
ning of May at the latest, I should like, however, to get back my German
forces . . . '42 But he still held his cards close to his chest.
He now spoke for the first time of Russia, which 'hung like a threaten­
ing cloud on the horizon and . . . either assumed an imperialist, Russian
nationalist appearance or appeared in Communist international guise,
depending on the countries involved'. And yet he had not abandoned his
idea of creating the 'great worldwide coalition that stretched from Yoko­
hama to Spain'; but he was resolved to hang on to the Balkans, as 'Russia
would march in, just as happened i11 the Baltic. Any vacuum that might
develop would be filled immediately by Russia.' He was no longer relying
on the agreement with the Russians but 'more on instruments of actual
power'. By the spring Germany would have an effective deterrent in the
shape of 186 first-class infantry divisions, including twenty armoured
divisions. The furthest he intended to go was to revise the Montreux Con­
vention, making the Black Sea 'a kind of gigantic harbour for the adjacent
countries, in which these states would have free and unimpeded entry
and egress'.43
The lesson that Hitler had derived from the conference was that Bul­
garia had become tl1e key for tl1e control of the Balkans. To dissuade the
Russians from pursuing their hard line, they were informed shortly after
the conclusion of the conference that Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia
would shortly join the Tripartite Pact.44 Virtually as Molotov was board­
ing the train in Berlin Ribbentrop received assurances from Draganov that
no prior agreement on mutual assistance had been reached with Moscow.
However, he found out from him that although the Bulgarians feared Bol­
shevization they could not ignore the 'traditional Russian policy on the
Balkans - the drive to the Straits. The borders of San Stefano45 showed
that the Russians regarded Adrianople and the whole of Eastern Thrace
as a hinterland in defence of the Straits which they hoped would one day
be in their own hands.' Ribbentrop's reply tha.t Germany wanted 'peace
in the Balkans and with [her] powerful military might [was] in a position
to impose it' was prophetic.46
Hitler allowed little time for the Russians to digest the repercussions of
the Berlin conference. A mere three days after Molotov's departure, King
Boris and Popov, his Foreign Minister, were rushed in clandestine fashion
to Berchtesgaden to pre-empt a Soviet reaction. Hitler exploited the poor
performance of the Italians in the war with Greece to justify his projected
 Grand Delusion

intervention in Greece. He had to prevent the airfields in Thrace and

Saloniki from falling into British hands and posing a severe threat to the
Rumanian oilfields. To Hitler's manifest dismay King Boris, not hiding
his fear of a Russian response, 'appeared less inclined than ever' to join
the pact. He would not corrimit himself beyond words to the effect that
'down here you have a small true friend, whom you do not have to
disown'. The meetin. g nonetheless was of significance in that it proved
Bulgaria's increasing drift towards Berlin.47
It is only too easy to imagine the shock that seized the Kremlin when
news of the visit came in. Molotov and Dekanozov, deputy Foreign 11in­
ister in charge of the Near East, immediately summoned Stamenov, the
Bulgarian ambassador, for an acrimonious meeting in which they left him
in no doubt of Soviet determination to conclude a quick agreement before
the Bulgarians committed themseives to the Axis. They had no intention
of allowing a repeat of the Rumanian syndrome whereby Bulgaria would
become a 'legionnaire state' . Molotov, 'friendlily but forcefully', stated
that the fate of Bulgaria was 'of interest to the Soviet Union and that faith­
ful to its historical obligation the Soviet Union wished to see a strong
Bulgaria' . He first produced the bait, promising to satisfy all Bulgaria's
claims against Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece and moreover to supply
material help. He then warned against those forces in the Bulgarian
parliament which were trying to make King Boris 'a puppet', regardless
of the fact that he was 'clever, fair and genuinely concerned for the inter­
ests of the Bulgarian people'. Molotov did not fail to remind Stamenov
that 'throughout history Russia had always stood for the independence
and sovereignty of Bulgaria' . In that respect 'Russia, in the for:rrL of
the Soviet Union, maintains that policy, fully supporting Bulgaria's terri­
torial claims against its neighbours'. In reporting home Stamenov saw
fit to warn Popov against leaving Russia 'outside to be confronted by a
fait accompli' .48 King Boris, however, knew he had succeeded in escaping
from Berchtesgaden by the skin of his teeth; on the very night of his return
to Sofia he rejected the Soviet proposals, though not before transmitting
their gist to Berlin.49
Hitler, however, still preferred to believe trlat Stalin was 'too clever to
make Russia England's cannon fodder'. To deter the Russians from the
course they had embarked on in Berlin, he hastened to formalize the
German presence in trLe Balkans. General Antonescu now made his own
pilgrimage to Germany and was virtually compelled to join the Axis.
Ominously, however, the talks with Antonescu revealed to Hitler that the
Russians were still refusing to fix their borders with Rumania while
demanding free passage for warships in the Danube as far as Braila,
behind the Rumanian defence line for Moldavia. This merely confirmed
that they were in fact seeking territorial continuity with Bulgaria. More­
over, in conversations with General Keitel it emerged that an imminent
The Road to 'Barbarossa' 79

English threat to the Ball<ans might lead Turkey and Russia to establish
their own security arrangements, probably in Bulgaria.50
The Germans, therefore, continued to exert pressure. On his way back
from Berlin to Ankara Papen stopped over in the Bulgarian capital. He
carried with him a warning from Ribbe11trop on 'the dangers which
Bulgaria may incur' as the result of a guarantee forced on her by Russia,
if Bulgaria did not immediately make it plain to the Russians that she
had chosen to join the Tripartite Pact. As if oblivious to the Gerrr1an and
Russian motives, King Boris still expressed the belief that the dangers
could be avoided if he were allowed 'to play the game in such a way that
Bulgaria would not become the apple of discord between Germany and
Russia'. To prove his commitment to Germany he disclosed Molotov's
offer to restore Bulgaria to the bor·ders of San Stefano, while adding that
11e had no claim to such a crown, which was 'too big for one head' . He
planned a polite rejection of the Soviet proposal, reminding them that
BuJgaria had no enemies. The Turkish threat was now raised as a further
pretext for delaying entry to the Axis, though Papen was reassured that
the negative reply to the Russians should lea.ve 'no room for doubt as to
Bulgaria's ultimate alignment'.51
Though they subserviently passed on to Berlin all their communica­
tions with Moscow, the Bulgarians continued to cling to th.e Russian
danger as the main reason for refusing to join the pact.52 In Berlin Hitler
was becoming impatient. The strategic significance of Bulgaria became
evident when the Italians were routed by the Greeks in Albania on 24
November. Hitler still hoped to dissuade Stalin from giving guarantees
to Bulgaria if the Straits issue could be solved. But, as he told Draganov
in Berlin, 'he preferred to create accomplished facts, especially with
respect to Russia, and it was his firm conviction that Russia would then
try to do business elsewhere'. When Draganov reverted to the Tt1rkish
threat, explaining that the Bulgarians did not 'desire to be compelled to
beat a glorious retreat in English style before the Greeks or the Turks',
Hitler resorted to the brutal language he reserved for such occasions. Con­
stantinople, he told him, was poorly defended and it would 'be wiped
out in an instant, just as Coventry and Bir1ningham had been' . His own
plan was simplicity itself. As Stalin professed to 11ave no interest in Bul­
garia except for the transfer of troops, the issue could be solved by bring­
ing about a revision of the Montreux Convention. For the time being, it
would suffice for Hitler to intimidate the Bulgarians with the threat of a
Soviet occupation, which would 'permeate the country with propaganda
and terror' .53
Rather than waiting passively, the Russians resorted to the German
method of establishing a fait accompli. Through their covert sources they
had found out that King Boris had resisted the German pressure. He was
said to believe, in reference to Poland's experience, that a link with one
Bo Grand Delusion

of the major powers might end in a 'catastrophe for small states' and that
he might still be able to collect the spoils by joining the 'new order' once
it was established, even if he remained neutral.54 To overcome the King's
refusal to conduct open negotiations, Molotov sent his deputy, Arkady
Sobolev, uninvited to Sofia.ss To some degree the mission was prompted
by Kollontai, the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, who had been a fierce
opponent of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and maintained close relations
with Antonov, the Russophile former Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow.
As she told him on the telephone when the news about Sobolev's pres­
ence was announced, it was she who had insisted on this urgent step in
order to 'outstrip and avoid the settlement desired by the [Bulgarian]
Government in favour of the Germans' .s6
The Bulgarians were informed of Sobolev' s arrival in Sofia, on a transit
flight to Bucharest, only a couple of hours in advance.s7 'It is obvious',
Stamenov cabled home, 'that they wanted to surprise Sofia and they were
afraid to be outstripped by Hitler, which is why [Molotov] misled me that
Sobolev was going to Bucharest by plane. My impression is that they are
prepared to do anything if only they could sign a pact with us.'58 Sobolev
was received by Filov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, on the morning of
25 November and a meeting with King Boris was fixed for the afternoon.
Sobolev, aware that the Bulgarians were passing on their communications
with the Russians and eager not to provoke Hitler, did not present the
proposals to Filov in a written form but read them out to him.s9 His twelve
points detailed close collaboration, promising to satisfy Bulgarian terri­
torial claims and to assist in the event of war with Turkey. The most
significant clause, however, spoke of the Russians' 'vital interest in the
Straits related to the security needs of their southern borders'. King Boris
should be in no doubt that Moscow could not allow a repetition of 'the
danger that [had] always been present to Russia through the south'.
Sobolev then raised again the offer of a pact of mutual assistance, made
to Bulgaria in September 1939, which would help 'to realize her national
aspirations not only in Western but in Eastern Thrace as well'. Bulgaria
was asked to co-operate with Russia if a real threat emerged 'for the USSR
in the Black Sea or in the Straits'. While the King was later to use this
clause as a justification of his rejection of the agreement, arguing that
Bulgaria was not in a position to render military assistance, it was quite
clear that what the Russians had in mind was permission to transfer their
troops via Bulgaria. This was accompanied by a pledge not to interfere in
the domestic affairs and sovereignty of Bulgaria. So as not to provoke the
Germans, Sobolev was prepared to drop the objections to Bulgaria's
joining the Tripartite Pact. The real enticement, however, was the
a11nouncement that the conclusion of a pact with the Soviet Union might
'very probably, almost certainly', lead to Russia's own entry into the
Axis.60
The Road to 'Barbarossa'

Stunned, the Bulgarian Prime Minister wished to ascertain whether he

had correctly understood that Russia did not object to Bulgaria's joining
the Axis. However, he was more concerned by the renewed Soviet pro­
posals for a pact of mutual assistance, pretending that he did not even
remember the proposals made in September 1939. After being reminded,
he stated that the proposal was 'so important that time was needed for it
to be studied in depth'. But the general disposition was clear to Sobolev.
Filov constantly referred to 'Bulgaria's complicated situation', hinting at
Turkey's hostility while refusing to mention either Germany or Italy by
name throughout the conversation. He chose this moment to reject the
still outstanding Soviet proposals of guarantees.61 The Bulgarian govern­
ment, Sobolev cabled home, 'is already committed to Germany to the hilt
and that is why it did not want any elucidation from me in connection
with the Soviet proposals'. He further warned that King Boris was
cunning, maintaining a tight hold over his ministers and direct control of
Bulgarian politics.62
In making tl1e offer to the Bulgarians, Stalin was increasingly thinking
in traditional historical terms. He was careful to make the point that,
unlike the case of the Baltic, Russia had no interest in either overrunning
the country or Bolshevizing her. To Dimitrov, the head of Comintern,
himself a Bulgarian, he explained that the approach was prompted by the
threats posed to Russia in the Black Sea. 'Historically the danger has
always come from there', Stalin revealed, 'the Crimean War - the capture
of Sebastopol - the intervention of Wrangel in 1919 etc.' His main efforts
were therefore directed towards Turkey, where he was determined to
secure naval bases so that the Straits would 'not be used against Russia'.
He believed that at the end of the day the Germans, much as they would
have preferred to see the Italians settled there, would have no choice but
to recognize the predominance of Soviet interests in the region. Like Hitler,
he had no scruples about Turkey's fate were she to interfere. What was
Turkey? he asked; 'there are two million Georgians there, one and a half
million Armenians, one million Kurds etc. The Turks make up no more
than 6-7 million.' If necessary, they could be expelled from Europe. But it
was clear to Stalin that Bulgaria stood between him and his objectives. The
conclusion of the pact was bound to act as a deterrent for Turkey, altering
the whole situation in the Balkans. The subordination of the Comintern to
the diplomatic needs of the Soviet Union was once again demonstrated
when Dimitrov was instructed by Stalin to run the most energetic cam­
paign in the Bulgarian parliament and in political circles, demanding the
'immediate and unconditional acceptance' of the Soviet offer.
Dimitrov made a serious mistake. Stalin's intention was to mount a
seemingly spontaneous popular campaign. Dimitrov' s instructions to the
Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, however, dis­
closed, almost verbatim, Sobolev' s proposals, which were printed and the
 Grand Delusion

leaflets distributed widely. Most Bulgarian ministers in fact became aware

of the proposals from the leaflets. Much more significantly, they found
their way to Berlin, where they contributed to Hitler' s already soaring
indignation about Russia.63 Molotov was infuriated by the move. 'Our
people in Sofia', he reproached Dimitrov over the phone, 'spread hints on
the Soviet proposal for Bulgaria. Idiots.'64
wtille Sobolev was presenting his coup in Sofia Schulenburg, deter­
mined to remove the obstacles raised at the Berlin meeting, brought
Schnurre, head of the Wilhelmst1·asse' s Economic Division, to Moscow in
the hope that an economic agreement might produce favourable condi­
tio11s f'o r continuing the political talks. But his plans were frustrated when
Molotov impatiently reverted to politics, producing a written set of condi­
tions for Russia's adherence to the draft agreement of the Four Powers
Pact. Combined with the overtt1res made by Sobolev in Sofia at that very
moment, they indicated that Stalin was not prepared to fulfil the role
assigned to him in Hitler's plans for a Continental bloc. Russia continued to
demand 'immediate withdrawal' of the German troops from Finland and a
change in the regime of the Straits 'within the next few months' through a
conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria and the allocation of
naval and land bases 'within the range of the Bosphorus and the Da1·d­
anelles'. As for the spheres of influence, these were to stretch well into the
Balkans, the Black Sea and south of Batum and Baku, rather than in the
vague direction of the Indian Ocean as had been envisaged by Hitler. More­
over Russia, Germany and Italy were expected to ensure by military or
diplomatic means that Turkey accepted the arrangement. Five secret proto­
cols set down the precise mechanism for the security arrangements and the
establishment of tl1e spheres of influence. The Russians thus produced
their final and explicit definition of their interests in South-eastern Europe
in complete defiance of the German ones. Hitler, victorious and backed by
the unscathed Wehrmacht and the industrial potential of Europe, was
unlikely to yield. A Soviet concession in Bulgaria and the Straits, however,
was bound to render her western front vulnerable and exclude her fro!l1
European affairs for the first time since the reign of Peter the Great.65
The extent of Bulgaria's leanings towards Germany was obvious when
Richthofen, the German ambassador in Sofia, was provided with
Sobolev's proposals, on the very evening of his visit, and told that they
would, 'of course', be rejected.66 But Sobolev's visit had placed the Bul­
garian government in a difficult situation. Popov' s complaints of a severe
gallbladde1· attack and Filov' s sudden 'illness' could postpone a decision
only by a couple of days. When he finally recovered, Filov did 11ot go back
on Boris's undertaking to Hitler, but suggested a postponement because
in the new circumstances it could be "viewed as provocation in Moscow' .
The episode on the whole seemed to confirm Hitler's doubts about the
Russian preparedness to accept his terms.67
The Road to 'Barbarossa'

The written answer to the Russians was submitted by Popov to the

Soviet ambassador, leaving no room for doubt about where Bulgaria's pri­
orities lay. Having established guidelines in his talks with Hitler prior to
the receipt of the Soviet proposals, he argued, 'the engagement of Bul­
garia in negotiations for another pact may cast a shadow on the loyalty
of Bulgarian foreign policy and will not only estrange a country friendly
to us and the Soviet Union but vvill even introduce justifiable suspicion'.
The apprehensions in Moscow were surely not diminished by assurances
that the existence of 'a strong and independent Bulgaria' was an 'effec­
tive enough guarantee for Russia' or· the flimsy claims that joining the
Tripartite Pact with Russia's ally would prevent the war from spreading.
Finally, taking the bait in Sobolev' s offer but without making the expected
response, the Bulgarian government noted 'with satisfaction that the gov­
ernment of the Soviet Union is also posing the question of eventually
joi11ing the Tripartite Pact which1 it seems to us, shows above all that in
this case as well Bulgaria's behaviour could not be interpreted as contrary
to the interests of the Soviet Union.' Needless to say, Richthofen was
promptly supplied with the written reply to tlte Russians as well as
an almost verbatim account of Popov' s conversations with the Soviet
ambassador. 68
Draganov, who had been in Sofia during Sobolev's visit, was now
rushed back to Berlin. He hoped to reinstate Bulgaria's allegiance through
the disclosure of the Soviet proposals. Hitler, however, 'reacted strongly';
he was being driven towa1·ds his fateful decision. He had rio interest in
the Dardanelles, he assured Draganov, as he could not sail into the Black
Sea. However, 'if some day there were a war with Russia he would not
attack the Russians across the Black Sea but wherever it suited him along
the 2,000 kilometres of their common border' . Germany's intervention
was no longer presented as a move against England but rather against
Russia, as Hitler could not allow the Balkan Peninsula to be Bolshevized.
'He wanted to trade with the Balkans and for this he preferred a Rumania,
a Bulgaria, etc., to a Bolshevized desert such as the Baltic States were
now.' Even now he still entertained the 11ope that, if Bulgaria signed the
Tripartite Pact, the Russians would realize they could not accomplish
anything, and would 'withdraw, though angry and protesting'.69
The very next morning Hitler convened his Chiefs of Staff for the first
time since the well-known rneeting of 31 July to discuss in detail the plans
for an attack on Russia. It was at this n1eeting that he altered the opera­
tional codename from 'Fritz' to 'Barbarossa'. While in the autumn the
'peripheral strategy' had been devised as part of a grand Mediterranean
offensive against British dominance, the new plans were confined to tl1e
relief of pressure in a series of uncoordinated operations. The change was
remarkable: the dive1·sionary actio11 became defensive in nature, while the
destruction of I�ussia became the focal point of a new aggressive strategy.
 Grand Delusion

The invasion of Greece, Halder noted, had been 'taken out of its context .

and brought into close relationship with the plans for Russia. Its task now
was to secure Germany's southern flank and eliminate the imminent
danger before the start of the offensive against Russia .' On the same day
Hitler informed Mussolini that the entente with Russia could be resumed
only after the crisis over Bulgaria had been resolved.70 The operational
aims remained markedly vague, to a large extent reflecting the staff plan­
ning of a total war of destruction and Hitler's intention of 'solving the
issue of European hegemony'. In the context discussed up to now, the
concept of 'European hegemony' related directly to the Russians' stead­
fast hold on Bulgaria and the Danube and to a lesser degree their claims
in the Baltic region. From such a geographical perspective, the southern
and northern wings appeared to be the centres of gravity.71 The diver­
gence between the planners' professional outlook and Hitler's political
vision led to his failure to come to terms with their overall objectives, and
to oscillate between the Volga-Archangel' sk line and Moscow. This dis­
crepancy cannot be dismissed out of hand, as it accounts for the serious
confusion surrounding the implementation of the plans in the very early
stages of the campaign in August 1941 .72
Needless to say, the intransigence of the Russians stiffened Hitler's
resolve to resort to force, and racist biases gradually crept in to sustain
the decision. But at present, when a clear-cut decision had no� yet been
taken, the comments were confined to the 'inferiority' of the Soviet soldier
and the communist system. Rather than comprising an ideological incen­
tive, they seemed to be an inducement for the army to pursue the plan­
ning. Indeed, Halder' s awareness a week later that Russia was exploiting
every opportunity to weaken Germany was still accompanied by a hope
of bridging the gap.73
The prospects of reconciliation were receding fast. The Russians not
only rejected one by one the arguments presented by the Bulgarians
against a pact, but further warned them, though in cryptic form, agair1st
joining the Axis. Such a step would be taken as a proof that Bulgaria had
'abandoned its position of neutrality and indicated its active involvement
in the orbit of war against the other group of countries', which obviously
posed 'a military threat to Bulgaria'. Though he promised to consider the
Soviet reservations, Popov gave the clear impression that the die had
already been cast. In Bulgaria, he told the ambassador, ' [we] are close to
the fire of war, and can more clearly feel from where the danger of war
may appear for us as well as for the USSR'. Molotov was further dis­
couraged against falling back on the idea of guarantees.74
By the same token, the Soviet threats were strong enough to force King
Boris to think again. He warned Draganov in Berlin that the Russians did
not 'regard the issue as closed' and were still adhering to their for1ner
demands.75 King Boris now desperately clung to neutrality, hoping to
The Road to ;Barbarossa'

pacify both Russia and Germany. Hitler, however, was infuriated by

the Bulgarians' wavering, which surely emanated from the pressure
exerted on them by the Russians. He was dazed by the incompatibility of
Draganov's account of the negotiations with what had been gathered
through Richthofen. The impression in Sofia was that the Bulgarians were
actually determined to reject the Soviet proposal and join the Axis, though
at an unspecified time in the future. In Berlin Draganov, while not re­
evaluating the commitment to the Axis, wondered whether after all acces­
sion to the Tripartite Pact was 'not congruent with conclusion of a pact
with the Soviet Union'. He further recapitulated the reasons against
prompt Bulgarian accession to the Tripartite Pact.76
Two factors now decided the course of military strategy. The first was
the failure of the Italians in the Balkans, which brought closer the danger
that the British would succeed in establishing bases in the Saloniki region.
The operations against the British in the Mediterranean, forced on Hitler
by the Italian failure in Greece, were now tied to the campaign against
Russia. In issuing Directive 'Marita' for the war against Greece, Hitler was
conscious of the political implications of the military preparations. The
preparations the refore required 'meticulous direction', which had to be
brought to his personal attention.
However, the most significant factor remained the Russians' refusal
to accept German predominance in Rumania, as manifested in the con­
solidation of their position on the Danube delta. In the midst of the hag­
gling over Bulgaria the Danubian Conference resumed its sittings.77
The Russians persevered and in the early hours of the morning of 1 7
December Berlin was informed of the deadlock. The Russians had
presented a written statement which bluntly rejected the joint
German-Italian mediation, further declaring their intentions of establish­
ing exclusive control jointly with the Rumanians over the mouth of the
Danube, effectively controlling the exit to the Black Sea. In Berlin this was
received with 'astonishment'. The positions were 'irreconcilable' and
negotiations were 'for the present exhausted' . Hitler brought about the
immediate adjournment of the conference.78 Keen observers accurately
judged the collapse of tl1e negotiations to be 'the first clash of vital inter­
ests between U.S.S.R. and Germany and therefore of first importance' .79
A similar trend was traced in Finland, where Soviet interference in the
Finnish elections indicated that they were determined to keep the country
under direct control. 80
It was no coincidence, therefore, that the decision on the imple­
mentation of Directive No. 2 1 , Operation 'Barbarossa', was taken on the
morning after the collapse of the negotiations. The directive instructed the
Wehrmacht 'to be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign,
even before the conclusion of the war against England'. The specific
political, diplomatic and military context in which the decision was taken
86 Grand Delusion

casts serious doubt on its ideological dimension. Though the economic

advantages were taken into consideration, the operation clearly did
not aim at creating Lebensraum, as the hinterland had already been estab­
lished in the Balkans and in the rest of occupied Europe. The purpose
was 'to establish a co,rer against Asiatic Russia from the general line
Volga-Archangel', thereby eliminating the potential Russian threat but
more specifically allowing the completion of the campaign against Europe,
in other words securing the exclusive German domination of Europe.81
The deployment of 'Marita' and subsequently 'Barbarossa' started
immediately. The skeleton force in Rumania was promptly strengthened
while a large task force earmarked for southern Rumania, under the
command of Field Marshal List, was assembled. Its task was 'to push
through friendly Bulgaria, if necessary, without touching Yugoslav or
Turkish territory, toward the Aegean coast . . . thereby elinlinating the
English in this area'. By the end of January 1941 some seven or eight divi­
sions were earmarked to be stationed in the area and bridgeheads estab­
lished over the Danube. To allay the Russians' suspicions, they would
eventually be informed that Germany could 'not permit the Ei1glish to
gain a foothold in the Balkans'. 82

Postscript: Preventive War?

The suggestion is occasionally made that the Soviet mobilization in March
1941 prompted the implementation of Operation 'Barbarossa'. We have
seen the complex circumstances in which the decisions were taken. It
should be borne in mind that the planning of 'Barbarossa' was from its
beginning an offensive initiated by the Wehrmacht tl1at completely over­
looked the magnitude of the undertaking and arrogantly underestimated
the capabilities of the opponent. In comparison with previous campaigns,
Hitler assured Keitel, the war with Russia would be 'like child's play in
a sand-box'.83 Consequently, Hitler and the German military a priori ruled
out the possibility of a Russian pre-emptive strike. General-Major Erich
Nlarcks, who was entrusted with the drafting of the earlier version of the
plan, even complained that the Red Army would not do the Germans
'the courtesy of attacking' .84 The presentation of the war as a preventive
measure was first adopted by Hitler in his statement to Stalin on the
launching of tl1e war as well as in his address to the army on that same
day. He repeated it in October 1941, when he inaugurated an appeal for
winter clothing for the soldiers on the Russian front, explaining apolo­
getically that in May 'the situation was so threatening that there could no
longer be any doubt that Russia intended to fall upon us at the first oppor­
tunity' .85 The argument certainly had a considerable effect on those in his
immediate political entourage, who had not been acquainted with the
The Road to 'Barbarossa'

military plans. Thus, for instance, Rudolf Hess wrote to his mother from
captivity in the autumn of 1941: 'A few chosen ones are called upon to
decide the aspect of centuries by perhaps one single deed. I have in mind
the Fuhrer, who decided to forestall the attack of the Bolsl1evists: the full
significance of his decision will only be completely recognised in later
ages.'86 In a desperate attempt to cover up the difficulties encountered in
the execution of the Blitzkrieg in Russia, Hitler repeated in May 1942 that
if he 'had listened to his badly informed generals and waited, and the
Russians, in accordance with these plans of theirs, had stolen a marcll on
us, there would have been hardly a cl1ance of stopping their tanks on the
well-constructed road system of Central Europe'. 87
The presentation of the war as a preventive one was naturally reha­
bilitated by some of the German generals at the Nuremberg trials. In the
appropriate atrnosphere of the budding Cold War, they sought to justify
tl1eir own enthusiastic preparations for Operation 'Barbarossa' by claim­
ing that they had supported Hitler' s decision to launcl1 a pre-emptive war
intended to contain Soviet expansion. 88 However, German intelligence
never pointed in this direction. General von Paulus, V\rho would have
been only too happy to produce such evidence at Nuremberg, rel11ctar1tly
admitted that 'no preparations whatever for an attack b·y the Soviet Union
had come to our attention'. Guderian' s memoirs pass a similar verdict.
Likewise, Field Marshal von Manstein attested that the Soviet military
dispositions did not reveal an intention to strike.89 As early as September
1940, while the plans for the offensive were being drawn up, Lieutenant­
General Kostring informed General Halder that the Red Army was in
ruins after the purges and that it 'wo·uld require at least three years to
reach its pre-war level.90 Nor was German intelligence misled by the clan­
destine mobilization which it was scrutinizing. It expected the Russians
to establish 'defensive concentration points', from wl1ich they could be
expected at best to launch isolated and limited counter-attacks.91 This
assessment was deliberately misconstrued by the propaganda arm of the
Wehrmacht to 'convey the impression . . . that the Russia11s were concen­
trated and ''ready to pounce'' and that the German attack was a military
imperative' .92
The idea of a preventive war as a positive element in military doctrine
was deeply embedded in the Gerrnan rather than the Soviet military tra­
dition. Frederick the Great broached the subject in his L' Antiraachiavel.93
Moltke had elaborated the idea of a preventive war in 1886, when he
advocated a swift campaign to forestall the Russians in Poland. Count
von Schlieffen was in fact relying on his predecessors to provide legiti­
macy.. and condone a preventive war when he argued that 'We find our­
selves in the sa1ne situation as Frederick the Great during the Seven Years'
War. Troops have been eliminated from all of Western Russia. Russia has
lost its capacity for action for years to come. We could noV\T settle accounts
88 Grand Deli£sion

with our most evil and dangerous foe, France, and we enjoy full freedoµl
of action to do so.' Once it dawned on the German General Staff that war
on two fronts was inevitable, they recognized that onJy by resorting to
such mea11s could they achieve the swift destruction of one of their oppo­
nents and the elimination of a potential threat on that front. This legacy
played an important part in the planning of 'Barbarossa'. A 'preventive
war' was entirely foreign to Soviet military doctrine. The 'pre-emptive
strike', which is a completely different proposition, was one of the
manoeuvres incorporated in the 'deep operations' theory, but it was
devoid of any expansionist intentions per se.94
The need to thwart a Russian offensive was entirely a pretext and was
marginal in the last six months preceding the war. Hitler's programmatic
'Lebensraum im Osten' concept once more dominated the scene and pro­
vided a decisive justification for a war against Russia.95 Once the decision
on 'Barbarossa' had been taken and as the war drew nearer, the ideolog­
ical creed closely fitted the strategic aim and was always close to the
surface. As the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka learnt in Berlin in the
spring of 1941, any collaboration by Germany with Russia was excluded
'since the ideological bases of the army, as well as of the rest of the nation,
were completely incompatible . . . A union here was as impossible as one
between fire and water.'96 In March 1941 Hitler explained that the war
could not be seen strictly from the military aspect but that it wa� the final
blow against 'Jewish Bolshevism' .97 Addressing Mussolini a day before
the invasion, Hitler could heave a sigh of relief:

In conclusion, let me say one more tl1ing, Duce. Since I struggled

through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. The partnership
witl1 the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring
about a final conciliation [author's italics] was nevertheless often very
irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed · to me to be a break
with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am
happy now to be relieved from tl1ese mental agonies.98
 5
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans

The British Perspective: Co-operation or Embroilment?

The British attempts to revive the trade negotiations after Cripps's arrival
in Moscow, though obviously aimed at crippling the German war
economy, were also tied in with the developments in the Balkans. Cripps
lost no time in alerting Molotov to the danger lying ahead in the Balkans.
'The entire Peninsula', he told him in the summer, would 'be set ablaze'
once Yugoslavia and Turkey were drawn into the war. Such warnings
were taken from the outset in Moscow as deliberate provocations.
Molotov therefore established a pattern, which would remain in force
until the Great Patriotic War began, of lightly dismissing the German
threat as being 'merely a bluff' . Molotov hastened to warn Maisky not to
fall into the trap set by the British, assuring him that if the situation altered
drastically the actions of the Soviet Union would be swift.1
However, Stalin's readiness to keep the line open to London arose out
of the gradual recognition of Hitler's failure to achieve his aims in
England by either peaceful or forceful means. Like all foreign observers
who lived through the Blitz, Maisky, though a cautious observer, was cap­
tivated by the resilience of Londoners and often conveyed to the Kremlin
the Churchillian spirit of the Battle of Britain. He described in detail the
Luftwaffe's abortive attempts to destroy the transport and industrial
infrastructures as a preliminary to an i nvasion:

All the London bridges are intact. The entire railway system is also
functioning though with occasional halts . . . Every night the Germans
try to bomb the most important London railway stations but so far
without any success. 'The buses, trams, taxis and Underground are
90 Grand Delusion

generally speaking running normally. Some damage was inflicted on

industry, especially the military, though not of any significance.2

Such an impression also emerged from an unusual meeting which

l\1aisky held with Halifax in his cold and damp room, in :rr Jd-October,
hours after a powerful bomb had exploded in St James's Park and all the
windows in the Foreign Office and Buckingham Palace had been shat­
tered. And yet the discussion, conducted in overcoats beside the fire, con­
vinced Maisky that Halifax was still primarily interested in diverting
Hitler to the Balkans, where Russia was expected to carry the burden of
the fighting - a situation not unfamiliar to the one the Russians had faced
in the 1939 negotiations.3
England's survival meant that she would still play a role in the peace
conference. Subsequent Soviet attempts, therefore, were directed towards
the establishment of a common agenda regardi11g Soviet territorial gains
in the Baltic.4 Keeping an open line to Britain was also aimed at pre­
empting the repeated efforts by Hitler to sue for a separate peace. Indeed,
Maisky had gathered from Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate
and Minister of Aircraft Production, that on at least one occasion he
had been approached by a messenger from Hitler with a peace proposal.
Beaverbrook was confident enough that the offers would be rejected so
long as Germany claimed full hegemony in Europe.5 No less i111portant
was the Soviet wish to keep the Germans at bay, as their charge d' affaires
in Moscow found to his dismay when a meeting with Molotov was unex­
pectedly postponed for one hour 'due to pressure of work'; however,
when driving through the gates of the Kremlin, the German diplomat
encountered the British ambassador, who was conspicuously leaving after
a meeting with Molotov.6
It was not, of course, coincidental that tl1.e Soviet approach to England
followed the worsening conflict in the Balkans, in the wake of the arbi­
tration agreen1ent. Cripps was therefore right in reporting home that 'the
resista11ce of Great Britain is beginning to have its effect on the Soviet
Government's attitude' and was responsible for Vyshinsky's 'friendly and
forthcoming' disposition. Once again sheer political opportunism, lacking
in sentimentalism, continued to be tl1e guideline of Soviet policy. 'We are
now living ''in the jungle'',' remained Maisky' s favourite quip; ' ''drawing
room'' language was of no value.' In a more mundane tenor, Vyshinsky
explained that 'international relations were essentially fluid and capable
of development' .7
However, the British and the Russian governments continued to work
at cross-purposes in their traditionally hostile mental en\1ironment. While
the Russians wished to retain their neutrality and cater for their position
in the post-war world, the short-term British aim remained to e1nbroil
Russia in war. Such, for instance, were the attempts of Rendel, the British
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 91

ambassador in Sofia, to goad into action his Soviet counterpart Lavr­

ishchev, whom he described with an air of superiority as a 'rather loutish
creature, obviously terrified of committing himself, but I think with a
good. deal of native intelligence'. The 'amicable' conversation 'took place
in an atmosphere of Caucasian brandy from Mot1nt Ararat (rather good)
and of Soviet cigarettes in cardboard holders (very bad)'. But it is
doubtful whether Rendel's success in making Lavrishchev 'as uncom­
fortable as possible' and in encouraging li�im 'to V\ratch German activities
with an increasingly suspicious eye' served British interests. In all likeli­
hood this was taken as yet further proof of British attempts to spark a
conflict between Russia and Germany.8
When Schulenburg returned from Germany with what later turned out
to be the proposals for the Berlin meeting, the frustrated Cripps sent 'fero­
cious' telegrams to Halifax. It was clear to him that the only chance of
achieving a dialogue with the Russians rested on the post··war arrange­
ments and a recognition that the war was indeed a watershed in inter­
national relations. He warned that it was:

not possible to wipe out the history· of the past twenty years, which has
tat1ght the Soviet Government to look upo11 a GO\lernment led by those
now in the Cabinet as fundamentally hostile to the Soviet Union. They
therefore ex. amine the present situation broadly against this back­
ground of continued hostility . . . they have, I believe, taken the view -
and for this there is plenty of justification in the past - that HMG were
not prepared to acknowledge tlle importance or influence of the Soviet
Union in the rneasure that it deserved. Their exclusion from MuP.ich,
their subsequent exclusion from a�l consultation or exchange of view
in the Far East are only two examples of this.

Since tlte war had done little to convince the Russians that tl1e British atti­
tude had substantially changed, Cripps saw little possibility of bringing
about a change unless the British government was prepared to recognize
the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States.9 Negotiations, however, were
doomed to fail·ure, as Halifax was at best prepared to raise the Baltic issue
as 'a good way of drawing Molotov'. Moreover, with Lend-Lease, the
massive American supply programme to Britain, now in full swing and
likely to be boosted after the re-election of President Roosevelt, the
Kremlir( realized that 'the foreign policy of London was increasingly
dependent on Washington', and Britain was r10 longer capable of making
any decision on tlte Baltic States. 10
Meanwhile, British policy continued to consist of fervent attempts to
cause a rift between Germany and Russia. S11ch attempts were made in
the 'acrimonious 1neetirtg' of the Danube Commissio11 on the eve of
Molotov's departure to Berlin. 11 Instructions were sent to the British
92 Grand Delusion

missions in the Balkans to seek 'action calculated to inflame differences

between Soviet and German Governments over new Danubian regime' .
Cripps likewise openly encouraged the Russians to seize unilateral
control of the mouth of the Danube. He hoped that the Cabinet would
even prevail on Turkey to allow the passage of the Royal Navy through
the Straits to assist the Russians. However, the announcement of
Molotov's visit to Berlin brought the various efforts to an abrupt end.12
Molotov's visit had taken Cripps and most foreign observers in
Moscow 'by surprise'. The immediate reaction in Whitehall was to sanc­
tion the bombing of the Baku oilfields. Cripps, far less passionate though
personally disappointed, attributed Molotov's search for a delimitation of
spheres of interest in the Balkans and the control of the Straits to 'a tem­
porary attitude of expediency' and hoped that in the long run, possibly
the following year, the 'fundamental hostility' would reassert itself.
Halifax persuaded the Cabinet to pursue the moderate line, especially
since intelligence sources had revealed that 'not very much had been
settled at the discussions between Hitler and Molotov in Berlin'. It was
nonetheless proposed to scrap the offer of a trade agreement made to
Russia, on the assumption that it had been used by the Russians as a
trump card in the Berlin negotiations.13
The reshuffle of Churchill's Cabinet on Christmas Eve and Anthony
Eden's return to the Foreign Office raised new expectations, e,specially
against the background of the deterioration in German-Soviet relations
in the wake of the Berlin conference. Shortly after the holidays Maisky
paid a visit to the Foreign Office, to find Eden beaming with excitement.
The gloom which had pervaded Halifax's office had been replaced
by a bright and orderly atmosphere. Eden projected the image of a
triumphant return. He wished to convince Maisky tl1at no major conflict
of interest in foreign policy existed between the two countries. The
ambassador did not beat about the bush, explaining to Eden that a British
recognition of the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States was a prerequi­
site for a significant improvement in relations. It soon became obvious
that tl1e change in the scenery did not entail a change of policy. Like
those of his predecessor, Eden's interests remained tactical, aimed at
detacl1ing Russia from Germany. However, Maisky, who was eager to
exploit the change, deviated from the canon, ad mitting to Eden that
Russia certainly did not wish to see Germany emerging as the victorious
power in Europe. Soviet foreign policy, he explained succinctly, rested on
three principles:

First, they were concerned with promoting their own national interests.
Secondly, his Government wished to remain out of the war. Thirdly, they
wished to avoid the extension of the war to any countries neighbouring
Russia. In general Soviet policy was not expansionist: the Soviet had
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 93

already enough territories. Their actions were purely precautionary, to

ensure a hold upon essential strategic defensive positions.

Maisky, however, mirrored the Kremlin's conviction that Hitler, 'who

was generally cautious', would not encroach on Russian interests in the
Balkans. As for the Soviet need to retain good relations with the Balkan
States and Turkey, he gained the impression that Eden, who constantly
nodded in assent, seemed to wish to intervene and say: 'Well, I also think
so.' Maisky certainly did his utmost to convince his masters at home that
the change was significant.14
The officials at the Northern Department of the Foreign Office were less
enthusiastic about reconciliation with Russia, clinging to Cripps' s pro­
posal to withdraw the offer of a trade agreement. To Eden, however, it
seemed that, if such a communication were made immediately after his
arrival at the Foreign Office, the Russians might well conclude that it rep­
resented a new policy towards the Soviet Union which he had personally
introduced on becoming Foreign Secretary. He therefore urged Cripps to
reconsider the decision.15 It was characteristic of Eden to believe naively
that the mere announcement of his appointment would lead to an
improvement in relations. He overlooked Cripps' s warnings that the
absence of 'concrete suggestions' would be interpreted as a sign of weak­
ness by the Russians, whose policy was 'based on the realities of their
.16
own situation and not on sentiment'
As might have been expected, the new and extended German-Soviet
trade agreement in January and the appointment of Dekanozov as ambas­
sador to Berlin17 further sustained the view of the Foreign Office that
Molotov's visit had yielded greater achievements than initially perceived.
Cripps continued to dispute the assumption that 'the fundamental hos­
tility to Germany or desire to prepare to meet German menace has been
diminished'. He therefore advocated a 'flexible' policy, even if Russian
policy was bound to be subjected to Germany 'for a long time to come'.
His sober evaluation, however, was entirely misconstrued by Sargent, the
deputy Under-Secretary, who tried to persuade Eden to bring his initial
attempts at rapprochement to an end. The anticipation that Stalin would
'buy off and ''appease'' the German ogre' reinforced the fatalistic assump­
tion that a German-Soviet agreement was on the verge of conclusion.
Britain could effect a change only once 'the British Fleet were able to
patrol the Black Sea and British bombers were able to fly over the Cau­
casus' . He could hardly hide his satisfaction that, until such conditions
prevailed, Cripps was bound to 'labour in vain in Moscow'. 18 Eden
was further warned against Maisky's 'calculated indiscretions' and his
'notorious . . . journalistic and Parliamentary friends' .19 All in all, Eden's
appointment led to a change in nuance and style but the political concept
underlying relations with Russia remained unaltered. Cadogan noted
94 Grand Delusion

with relief in his diary: 'Glad to find A. [Eden] not ''ideological'' and quite
alive to uselessness of expecting anything fro1n these cynical, blood­
stained murderers.' Whether benign or not to the Russians, in the next
few months Eden was entirely absorbed in the futile attempt to erect a
Balkan bulwark against Ge1·many, displaying hardly any interest in Soviet
20
affait·s.
As ¥ve have seen Stalir.... though ostentatiously adhering to neutrality,
expected the war to redress what he regarded as historical grievances
inflicted on Russia. For him the yardstick for rapprochement with
England was her stand on the Baltic States and Turkey. When, therefore,
after months of seclusion, Cripps finally gained access to Molotov
but arrived empty-handed, he was rebuffed. As the accumulated experi­
ence from 1939 onwards had proved, Molotov stated bitterly, England
had failed 'to take into account Soviet interests'. Under such circum­
stances he 'showed himself frankly bored and impatient, finally announ­
cing that he had no more to say', and that he 'would not personally
interest himself in Anglo-Soviet relations' until the outstanding obstacles
were removed.
Oblivious to the clear message from Moscow, the Foreign Office refused
to reconsider the question even of de facto recognition of Soviet control in
the Baltic, despite the fact that Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic
Warfare, had reached the conclusion that such a step would 'not preju­
dice our right ultimately to dispute the Soviet position in the Baltic
States' . With little straw to construct his bricks Cripps, as it was observed
in Moscow, had even stopped 'seeking any contact with the gentlemen il1
the Kremlin; ''now it is up to them to call me if they want something'' ' .
Not quite a"\vare as yet of the extent of the tension between Moscow and
Berlin concerning the Balkans, Cripps indeed continued to advocate a
'policy of reserve' until 'developments in various theatres of V\7ar or eco­
nomic pressure t11at we can appl)T in association with America, compel
them to seek some closer relation with us'. 21
In the meantime, in early February 1941, on the eve of Eden's depar­
ture for tl1e Middle East, Cripps was finally instructed to withdraw the
trade offer 'without delay' .22 It was followed by the severance of relations
with Rumania and the recognition of the Cabinet's Defence Committee
that Turkey would not become a belligerent and that her value as an asset
therefore lay in her neutrality. But, more significantly, Churchill and Eden
nOV\7 advocated the establishment of a common strategic platform in the
Ball<ans for the defence of Greece. This entailed a halt of operations at
Ber1ghazi and the transfer of large forces from Egypt to Greece to meet
the expected Germa.n attack frorrt Bulgaria.23 Having lost the initiative
and the ability to react to the German encroachment in the Balkans, the
Russians became attentive to similar British attempts. Various reports
reinforced Stalin's fears that Cl-iurchill \.Vas fervently seeking to draw the
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 95

Russians into action, which in turn would 'bring about a clash of inter­
ests between Germany and the Soviet Union'.24 The obsessive fear of
being dragged into the war in the Balkans became a constant feature in
Soviet evaluations, diverting the Russians from the genuine threat which
they now faced from Germany.

Bulgaria Turns to the Axis

Schulenburg had been shaken by the repercussions of the futile Berlin

meeting 011 the events in the Balkans. Aware of the general direction in
which the wind was blowing, he made great efforts to ensure a suc­
cessful conclusion to the trade negotiations. He returned from Berlin with
Schnurre, hoping to placate I-Iitler by placing 'tl1e big Russian treaty for
1941 I 2 under the Christmas tree in Berlin' . A personal appeal to Ribben­
trop 'and the key military figures' acclaimed the considerable concessions
proposed by the Russians, outlining 'the tremendous advantages which
Germany would reap from such a treaty with 2.5 million tons of grain as
its core'. 25
The collapse of Sobolev' s mission26 cast a heavy cloud over the Kremlin
as well. Stalin remained determined 'to hinder a German penetration into
the Balkans which could threate11 the Straits'. Molotov seized every
opportunity to impress on Schulenburg that the annexation of Bessarabia
had 'rendered the Soviet Union a Danubian co11ntry and consequently her
sovereign right and state interests had to be taken into account'. He came
to one of their meetings in early January? 194 1 , armed with a detailed map
of the three branches of the Danube, and 'stubbornly and intransigently'
demanded that Germany and Italy should prevail on Rumania to accept
exclusive Soviet control of navigation at the mouth of the river.27 Just as
persistent were the demands for concessions in the F'innish nickel
deposits at Petsamo.28
But, to Stalin's dismay, rather than achieving the anticipated negotia­
tions, he was fast losing the battle in Bulgaria without firing a shot. Con­
sequently Dekanozov was rushed to Berlin to replace Shkvartsev, not only
as a prominent ambassador but in a special capacity, retaining his posi­
tion as deputy Foreign Minister. Dekanozov, who was an Armenian,
always posed as a Georgian to endear himself to Stalin and Beria.29 As a
confidant of Stalir1, he had participated in Molotov's meetin.gs with Hitler
while Shkvartsev had been ostentatiou�ly left out. Shkvartsev' s dismissal
was rumoured to be the result of his failure to keep the Kremlin abreast
of the Vienna Arbitration.30 However, although the Germans had been
informed about Dekanozov's assignment he received no preferential
treatment and was kept waiting not only for his credentials but eve11 for
a short interview with Ribbentrop.31
96 Grand Delusion

After only a week in Berlin he worriedly urged Moscow to convey to

tl1e Ger1nans that he had been assigned a special post and to seek an
appointment for him.32 His anxieties were well founded. When he was
finally admitted to Ribbentrop's presence on 12 December, his gift of a
signed photograph of Stalin promised during the visit to Moscow was
especially ironic, since the final touches were at that moment being put
to Directive 'Barbarossa'. Although Ribbentrop professed to admire the
portrait, which he promised to place on his desk to commemorate his
significant visit in the hope that it would lead 'to success also in the
future', he conspicuously avoided contentious issues. In view of Stalin's
recourse to diplomatic means to prevent the outbreak of war, attention
should be drawn to Ribbentrop's assurances that Germany hoped to bring
the war to an end 'within the next year . . . with the fewest possible
victims' . Ribbentrop further expounded Hitler's intentions of focusing on
domestic reconstruction. But, despite the commitment to future negotia­
tions, Dekanozov felt that Ribbentrop was anxious to bring the talk to an
early end.33
The day after signing Directive 'Barbarossa', Hitler finally allowed
Dekanozov to present his credentials at the Reichskanzlerei. After dis­
posing of the formalities Hitler drew the ambassador over to the sofa and
offhandedly attributed the delay to the 'incredibly tense international
situatio11'. Efforts by Dekanozov to rekindle the political discussion were
simply ignored by Hitler, who 'listened silently and occasionally nodded
his head', finally proposing that they should be best discussed 'through
official channels'. Dekanozov' s insistence that his presence during the
Berlin meeting and his familiarity with Molotov's views might hasten
tl1e pace of the negotiations evoked little response. Hitler was apparently
interested only in Dekanozov' s common ethnic origin with Stalin and
his exceptionally young age; at forty-one, Hitler remarked, Dekanozov
was the youngest ambassador in Berlin, where one had to be sixty-five
to assume such a position. It was left for Ribbentrop to suggest, as
Dekanozov was taking his leave, that negotiations would continue with
34
hi m .
As a last resort Molotov now attempted to link the conclusion of the
trade agreement with progress made in the political sphere.35 Hitler's
absence from Berlin during the Christmas holidays deferred any imme­
diate decision. Schnurre was instructed to remain in Moscow and iron out
the final obstacles, though he was discouraged from enteri11g into any
political dialogue. The proponents of the Continental bloc in the German
Foreign Ministry had not yet despaired of a concurrent conclusion of the
two agreements.36 They expected the lucrative trade agreement to lubri­
cate the negotiations' wheels. Weizsacker thus prevented a renewed con­
vention of tl1e Danubian conference to avoid the 'spectacle of a serious
dispute between the Germans and Russians before an international
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 97

audience' .37 The delay, however, rendered Stalin even more susceptible
to the German demands and the trade agreement was finally signed on
1 0 January.38
In an indirect way the agreement contributed to the disinformation
campaign that the Germans had just launched. It elaborated in minute
detail the deliveries that would be made up to August 1942, giving a false
sense of a breathing space in the Kremlin. Moreover, to pacify the Soviet
wish to embark on political negotiations, the agreement was accompa­
nied by a secret protocol settling the Soviet claims on the German borders
from the River Igorka to the Baltic Sea, including the dispute over the
Lithuanian strip.39
Once back home Scl1nurre fulfilled his promise to Schulenburg and
presented to Hitler the case for future co-operation with the Russians.
Hitler listened to him attentively but it transpired that the Balkans were
no longer negotiable, though he preferred to project the impression that
much was 'still in suspense' . While he was prepared to receive Schulen­
burg in Berlin for consultations, the date was deliberately left open and
postponed continuously. By early March Schulenburg was lamenting that
Ribbentrop had once again shelved his request for leave.40 It gradually
dawned on 11im that the absence of instructions on future negotiations
indicated that Hitler had set his mind on war.41
Meanwhile the clash over the Balkans was taking an unpropitious turn.
The Bulgarian government found the hug of the two major powers
unbearable. Rejecting the Soviet proposals, in mid-December they had
pleaded with the Kremlin to understand '11ot only logically but also
emotionally' how an agreement of mutual assistance was bound to upset
the delicate balance of power established in the Balkans.42 Emotions
were unlikely to move Stalin. On a number of occasions Lunin, the GRU
resident in Bucharest, cautioned his Bulgarian counterpart that Russia
could not ignore the presence of thirteen German divisions on the
southern Rumanian border, 'whose objectives stretched beyond the
border in the direction of Bulgaria and the Balkans and perhaps even
against Russia'. He did not even bother to conceal, as was tl1e habit with
Soviet diplomats, that 'relations between Russia and Germany were far
from normal', but for obvious reasons wished to give the impression tl1at
they were developing in a most unfortunate way for Germany'. Russia,
/

he insisted, could no longer remain indifferent to the German penetration

into the Balkans. It posed a threat to the Black Sea, which was 'a Russian
Sea and which had only one natural exit, the Bosphorus and the Dard­
anelles, which must remain under Russian control' . King Boris, going
attentively through the report, underlined Lunin' s bottom line that
Bulgaria was 1the country in which [Russia] has the greatest interests. We
do not wish to control her, as our enemies claim, thinking of the Baltic
countries. There the situation was different as those territories had
98 Grand Delusior1

belonged to the Russian state and today they serve as our living space
providing the exit to the Baltic Sea.' Russian interests were confined there­
fore to Bulgaria's Black Sea coast, along the Varna-Burgaz-Marmara line.
Lunin' s own transfer from Bucharest to Varna was an omino11s reminder
to the King of the stakes tl1at Moscow had in the Black Sea littoral and
naval ports.43 •

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the continued fear of Russia led

Filov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, to dig in lus heels when he finally
recovered from yet another diplomatic illness and made his pilgrimage
to Berchtesgaden in early Jan11ary 194 1 . Wlllie reiterating Bulgaria's
agreement in principle to join the Axis, he wished to postpone tl1e deci­
sion so as not to provoke the Russians. He tried in vain to impress on
Hitler that there was no rush as the Bulgarian government had already
undertaken precautionary steps to prevent a Soviet annexation of the
Bulgarian Black Sea coast. As usual, Hitler tried to alarm Filov by over­
playing the ideological threat which communism posed to Bulgaria. 'The
Rt1ssian bear', interjected Ribbentrop ominously, 'was trying to stick its
paws into the outside world, as it v1ere, through the Dardanelles.' It was
therefore necessary to forestall the Russians by clearly demarcating the
spheres of interest. But Hitler went one step further: were Stalin to pursue
his aims, he would use his troops 'to smash them'. Neither did the Turkish
threat hold water. If Ankara made a move, said Hitler, raising his voice,
he would 'send his Foreign Minister to Moscow or V\7ill call Molotov to
Berlin and then an end will be put to Turkey'.44
The pressure applied to the Bulgarian government, which was desper­
ately trying to cling to non-involvement, led to conflicting statements.
Filov was sent to Ruse on the Danube to deliver 'an astoundingly strong
speech' denying suggestions that Bulgaria was becoming a legionary
/

country' - a direct response to Sobolev's accusations. At the same time

Gabrovsky, the Minister of the Interior, made an equally well-publicized
speech in which he stated that 'Bulgaria did not desire to share the fate
of the Baltic countries' .45 But the die had virtually been cast after Filov' s
visit to Hitler. Shortly after returning to Sofia, Filov advised King Boris
to succumb. Boris, to judge from Filov' s own account; 'was very agitated
and irksome and unusually firm. At first he said that he p1·eferred to abdi­
cate or that we should throw ourselves into Russia's embrace even if we
were to be Bolshevized.' However, after delivering a long emotional
speech, 'the Tsar gradually calmed down and began to accept the cor­
rectness of [Filov' s] reflections'. 46
There was a last attempt to postpone the inevitable, when on specific
instructions from King Boris Draganov tried in vain to back off, arguing
that to all intents and purposes Bulgaria 'was already a member of the
Axis and had even behaved like a silent ally as far as German military
wishes were concerned'. But in fact the King had already capitulated and
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 99

was now tryi11g to exact the price for such a move, an outlet to the Aegean
Sea in Turkish Adrianople (without having to fight Turkey) and even­
tually Saloniki and Greek Macedonia.47
The final German clampdown on Bulgaria coincided with the con­
clusion of the trade agreement, explaining the minor reaction that the
agreement evoked in Moscow. Two days after its conclusion, with no
further cards to play, Stalin resorted to a communique which reiterated
his resolve to preserve Russian interests in Bulgaria while preventing
the war from spreading further into the Balkans. It denied the rumours,
inspired by Berlin, that the entry of German troops into Bulgaria was
carried out with 'the full knowledge and consent of the USSR' . In fact
the comm11nique amounted to a call to the people over the heads of
the Bulgarian government to 'expose' the policy of their leaders, while
'carefully avoiding the appearance of provocation' or the impression that
tl1e Communist Party was acting 'as a subordinate of the Soviet Union
but on its own initiative' .48 The Bulgarian ambassador was even sum­
moned to Vyshinsky at 2 a.m. with a demand for the publication of the
communique in the Bulgarian papers; if it were not published, he was
warned, it would be 'bad' for the Bulgarians. 'I asked what did he mean
b)r ''bad''. He answered that we would soon find out.'49 The communique
was, as Schulenburg reassured Berlin in a desperate attempt to halt the
further deterioration of relations, neither directed against Germany nor
couched as an ultimatum, as it failed to specify the measures which
the Russian government might take if German troops were moved into
Bulgaria.so
Having called the Russian bluff, Hitler proceeded with the military
planning. After ordering the construction of a bridge over the Danube he
wished the troops to be prepared to cross the river by tl1e end of Janua11'.
Two days after the Russian remonstrations, the Bulgarians were promised
an outlet to the Aegean Sea while military talks were initiated in Sofia.s1
So blatant was tl1eir misrepresentation of the arrangements that Schulen­
burg conceded to Molotov that it 'might have satisfied the representatives
in Brazil and in Mexico, but for the ambassador in Moscow it was not
sufficient, and in fact somewhat ill-omened'. He advised Molotov to
instruct Dekanozov to exert further pressure on Ribbentrop.52 Following
Schulenbur·g's advice, . Dekanozov indeed warned Weizsacker that the
Soviet government would 'consider the appearance of any foreign armed
forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the
security interests of the USSR1 •53 There was, however, no need to alienate
the Russians. The move into Bulgaria was, as expected, presented as an
inevitable step to thwart the British. A further attempt was made to lull
Stalin with a promise to seek a revision of the Straits Convention 'at the
proper time' and resume the political discussions 'in the near future' .54
On 23 January Filov finally gave the official positive reply to Hitler. From
100 Grand Delusion

tl1eir own sources at the Bulgarian court, the Russians ascertained that
once German troops crossed into Bulgaria they were unlikely to face any
armed opposition.ss
By the end of the month, the military and diplomatic moves were syn­
chronized and precautionary steps were being taken against a possible
Soviet reaction. Hi..tler ordered the intensive fortification of Constanza, to
protect the oil tanks 'against anonymous bombardment from the sea'.
Later on he instructed the German troops in Northern Dobrudja that
they would be the first to enter Bulgaria in order to protect the Bulgarian
coast. The Bulgarians sought similar measures in Varna and Burgas. The
complementary diplomatic measures, executed under German guidance,
were the Bulgarian-Turkish declaration of non-aggressions6 and the
securing of Yugoslav non-involvement.s7 There was only sporadic resis­
tance to these moves. Moltchilov, the Bulgarian ambassador in London,
begged Stalin to intervene. He would eventually resign his post in protest
against Bulgaria's 'turning from a potential victim of English or German
violence into an accomplice' .58 King Boris no longer ruled his kingdom.
Up to the last minute he still hoped to be able to avoid a situation whereby
Bulgaria 'would become the bone of contention between Germany and
the USSR'. However, as Draganov put it in a dispatch to tl1e King from
Berlin, Boris eschewed even the gesture of 'coating with some sugar this
bitter pill' by informing the Russians in advance of the precise) date of
Bulgaria's accession to the Axis.s9 The British were as helpless as the
Russians. Churchill could do little apart from utter the threat that 'con­
donation of German outrage would condemn Bulgaria to share
Germany's ultimate chastisement' .60
The signs that events in Bulgaria were coming to a head became
obvious when Draganov avoided meeting Dekanozov. When they finally
met the Russians seemed to be concerned mostly with the Turkish reac­
tion towards the Bulgarian access to the Tripartite Pact. But they could
not conceal the danger that they now faced from Germany. Whe11
Draganov suggested that Russia had been exploiting Bulgarian popular
sympathy to extend her control over the country, Dekanozov made the
point that the Soviet Union 'no longer sought imperialistic aims but in
the first place considered its security needs' :

We in the Soviet Union often resort to history, especially in order to

trace from where Russia has been attacked in the past and where the
threat to its existence lies. Yet it is occasionally necessary to revert to
more recent examples. If attention is paid to the 'new order' in Europe,
of which many as well as the ambassador speak, then we notice that it
is self-declared by a certain country and that small countries become
economically subordinate to that hegemonic power in Europe. Worse
still, the 'new order' is reflected in complete political submission of the
Tl1e Curtain Falls on the Balkans 101

small countries to that power, mostly in the military sphere, thus

becoming a garrison of that power.

Their historical legacy led the Russians to regard British intervention in

Greece and in the Balkans with equal suspicion.61
Once the timetable for the transfer of German troops into Bulgaria had
been set, the Bulgarian Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister were
ordered to come to Vienna for a ceremony to mark Bulgaria's entry into
the Axis. Popov felt 'crucified and categorically refused to go to Vienna',
as Filov noted in his diary, though he presented a list of excuses for
staying behind. King Boris never really became reconciled to his own
decision. He blamed Draganov for it and wished him to be withdrawn
after he had signed the agreement 'without offering him another appoint­
ment' .62 In desperation the Russians spared no efforts to scare the Bul­
garians, but to no avail. Vyshinsky' s recriminations were 'harsh and
argumentative, hardly allowing [the Bulgarian ambassador] to insert a
word ' . Citing directly from the Bulgarian papers lying on his desk,
Vyshinsky found the change in tone 'shocki11g' . Zhukov even made feeble
attempts to galvanize the Bulgarian army into action over the head of the
government. 63
Finally on 26 February Molotov obtained full and concrete information
about the German incursion into Bulgaria.64 Two days later, as might have
been expected, Schulenburg was instructed to present the encroachment
in Moscow as a temporary measure aimed at heading off the British in
Greece. Once again his brief report home of Molotov's 'obvious concern'
over the German move did not reflect the acrimonious nature of the
exchange. Molotov refused to accept at face value the reasons produced
by Schulenburg, who tried in vain to impress on him that thwarting the
British in Greece harmonized with Soviet aims. The fact that Russia had
not been informed in advance was clear1 y another ominous sign. 65
Equally disconcerting was the flood of absurd justifications of the agree­
ment by the Bulgarians as 'an instrument of peace' which should not
hamper 'the further development of good relations with the Soviet
Union'.66
To play down the significance of the move the Germans now hastily
convened the International Advisory Committee of the Danube, entrusted
with the river north of Braila. They went out of their way to entertain the
Russians with lavish dinners, excursions and 'a brilliant opera perfor­
mance' of Wagner ' s Ta n nhiiuser. Any discussion of the contentious issues,
however, was deferred to 30 June, by which time, as was well known to
the German negotiators, the Russian claims would becon1e obsolete.67
When on 1 March Schulenburg officially infor1ned the Russians that Bul­
garia was joining the Tripartite Pact there was little left in Molotov's
arsenal but to repeat the barren warning that Russia could not 'remain
 The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 103

be leaked to the Turks and he therefore preferred to resort to reconcilia­

tion. The problem was that a show of weakness might encourage the
Turks to join either the German or the British camp.
The Germans, Bulgarians and British, however, made certain that the
Soviet agenda in Berlin came to light.74 Equally ineffective were Molotov's
attempts to misrepresent Sobolev' s 1nission, attributing it to fears result­
ing from the Italian campaign against Greece. The British provided
Saracoglu with sufficient proof that Molotov had intended 'to use
Bulgaria as a cat's paw against Turkey' and that the Soviet Union was
'very far from having abandoned her ambitions in the direction of the
Straits'. 75 Saracoglu was quick to protest about the proposed Russo­
Bulgarian agreement on mutual assistance, claiming that it violated the
1929 agreement on prior consultations between Turkey and Bulgaria. The
predominant need to stay out of the conflict, however, led him to the cau­
tious policy of issuing a solemn declaration which denied any belligerent
intentions while promising to consult the Russians on issues concerning
either Bulgaria or the Black Sea. But suspicions were too deeply embed­
ded to allow for trust-building measures. ' l:>eace', remarked Molotov sar­
castically, 'was only a subject of rumours and negotiations while as far as
war was concerned, it unfortunately was a reality.'76
Just when the German negotiations with the Russians had reached a
stalemate, a new initiative concerning the Straits was launched by the
Italians. However, Mussolini's unimpressive muscle-flexing, while his
campaign was hitting rock bottom in Greece, only demonstrated to the
Russians the fragility of their own situation. Mussolini had been watch­
ing with growing trepidation the crisis brewing between Russia and
Germany, which improved the position of the latter in the Black Sea and
the Jvlediterranean.77 In Moscow there was indeed surprise when Mus-
. solini expressed his wish not only to restart negotiations but also to move
quickly into the political sphere; he was ready to recognize the Russians'
new borders, their 'rights over the Black Sea, Asia and [their] interests
in the Balkans'. In exchange the Italians sought recognition of their
own rights in the Mediterranean. They even urged that talks should start
immediately, either in Moscow or in Rome, at foreign ministerial or
ambassadorial level. 78
Molotov promptly gave his blessing, though insisting that the negoti­
ations be carried out in Moscow, far from the scrutinizing eyes of the
Germans.79 Within days Rosso confirmed his government's readiness to
80
adopt the proposals made in June 1940. The Italians were further pre­
pared to allow Bulgaria access to the Aegean, while claiming for Italy and
Germany the Rumanian oil and economic assets. Molotov in return put
forward the claim for control of the mouth of the Danube. But the major
Soviet prize was of course the Turkish Straits. Strangely enough, the dia­
logue \t\rith the Italians, as well as the subsequent approach to the Tu rks,
104 Gra11d Delusion

was motivated by a fear of renewed British involvement in the region if

Germany were to assist Italy in the war. The Straits, as Molotov asserted
in the familiar vein, were connected 'with the issues of the security of the
Black Sea borders of the Soviet Union. Russia has suffered an invasion
from the Straits not once and not twice. During the Crimean war the
enemy descended on Russia through the Straits. In 1918 the intervention
against Russia was executed through the Straits. In 1919 the French
attacked Russia through the Straits.' He could easily see how the expan­
sion of the war into Bulgaria might force the British, who had been main­
taining a low profile, to interfere. 'The situation then', Molotov explained
to Rosso over dinner:

will sharpen and the question of Soviet security will become more
serious. Turkey will scarcely keep out of the conflict as it has a Pact with
England. Besides England already has an air base and submarines in
Lemnos at the gates to the Straits. The war will be carried out to the
Black Sea, and this, obviously, will affect Turkey's stand on the Straits.
Such a development is not unlikely in view of the nature of the rela­
tions between Turkey and England.

But he left Rosso in no doubt that Russia intended to realize her interests
8
in the Straits 'by hook or by crook' . 1 J

The fact that Hitler was concealing from Mussolini his decision to
attack Russia only encouraged the latter to make the overture to Moscow.
Hitler had in fact assured him at the end of December that Germany's
relations with the Soviet Union were 'very good' and he did not expect
them to take 'any step to our detriment as long as Stalin lives' . The Duce
chose to ignore Hitler's warning, though, that it was not in Germany's
interest 'to deliver Bulgaria or the Straits themselves to Bolshevism'. But
Rosso, who initially disapproved of the policy pursued by Ciano, made
sure that the precise contents of the proposals were neatly transmitted to
Schulenburg.82
Ribbentrop was amazed to find out how far negotiations had pro­
gressed. In his notoriously crude style he ridiculed the Italian negotiators
for waiving their right to enter the Black Sea while encouraging the
Russians to sail their warships into the Mediterranean. 'The Balkan
policy', he coached Alfieri, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, 'must not be
shackled by too hasty an agreement with the Russians.' Alfieri had in fact
to concede that he 'realized very well that Germany did not want Russia
to get into the Balkans again through the window by the roundabout way
of an agreement with Italy, so to speak, when she had just been ushered
out through the door'. In case the message was not explicit enough,
Ribbentrop chose the occasion to reveal the Soviet attempts to exclude the
Italians from the Danubian Commission.83
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 105

Hitler finally invited Mussolini to Berchtesgaden at the end of January

1941, when he crushed his fading hopes of independence. The Russians,
he warned him, deliberately kept their treaties flexible; 'like Jewish
lawyers, they preferred vague formulations and . . . ambiguous
definitions' upon which they made new claims. Though continuing to
conceal from his ally his plan to attack Russia, he vindicated the German
presence in Rumania as a measure to counter a Soviet attack on either the
oilfields or the Rumanian ports. Mussolini was further humiliated by
written instructions from the German Foreign Ministry that awaited him
in Rome, prohibiting him from pursuing 'any final formulation and com­
mitment' of policies with the Russians without prior consultations. 84 Even
with his feathers plucked, Mussolini continued his pitiful efforts to regain
manoeuvrability b y offering Molotov a revision of the Montreux Con­
vention. This offer, however, which Molotov found to be 'unclear' , coin­
cided with Cripps's attempts at the end of February to mediate between
the Russians and the Turks, and was allowed to lapse.85 The Italians kept
the ball in play but confined their conversations to trade.86
The realization that they might be the next victim of the Germans led
the Turks to modify their attitude to Moscow throughout January. Their
embassies abroad provided Moscow with detailed intelligence on the
German build-up in Rumania, which was believed to reflect a German
plan to cross the Danube into Bulgaria and jointly with them attack
Turkey. The sharp about-turn was, as might be expected, regarded in
Moscow with suspicion, particularly as the seizure of the Straits was pre­
sented as a component in an overall plan to attack the Soviet Union. The
Germans, the Russians were told, 'aimed at preventing the British from
rendering assistance to Russia'. Stalin was now torn between the fear of
a German move to the south and the entrenched concept87 that Britain
was seeking, behind the scenes, to embroil Russia in war with Germany.
The Russian ambassador in Bucharest, well attuned to his masters' voice,
therefore passed the detailed information through such filters, suggesting
that the occupation of the Straits was more likely to be a prelude to
an assault on Egypt and Syria. Similar interpretations accompanied
Dekanozov's reports from Berlin that Turkey would be used as a spring­
board to take Baku.88
There is no doubt, however, tl1at the Kremlin seemed to have been
seized by panic that the Germans might be tempted to continue their
march to the Straits in a mirror image of the Russian objectives. In London
Maisky declared that it was certain that 'his government did not wish to
see any Great Power established in the Balkans', but it seemed to Eden
that he was 'less confident than in the past that this unwelcome event
would not occur' .89 Schulenburg tried in vain to convince Molotov that
this was unlikely to happen unless the Turks entered the war. Molotov
was far more concerned by the fact that the Soviet counter-proposals for
106 Grand Delusion

a settlement, submitted after the Berlin conference, had been left unan­
swered for over two months.90
Lacking a viable military option, as had been demonstrated during
the war games conducted by the Russian military in January 194 1,91
Stalin now resorted to his favourite diplomatic games. There at least
he did not feel he was hindered by incompetent and untrustworthy gen­
erals but held all the threads in his own hands. Away from the limelight,
Maisky had already been urgently instructed in early January to set
the ball rolling in London througl1 Aras, the Turkish ambassador there.
The bait was the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact. So compelling
,.was the fear that Maisky had urged Aras to contact Ankara by telephone;
but the ambassador appeared evasive, proposing to send a courier
instead. Maisky judged correctly that the efforts were 'not serious!',
reminiscent of Admiral Drax' s abortive military mission by the slow sea
route to Moscow in August 19 3 9. The long-awaited negative reply from
Saracoglu arrived a month later, expressing fear of making a premature
move.92
The encroachment into Bulgaria threatened to place the Germans,
rather than the Russians, in Adrianople, just around the corner from tlte
Straits. The Turks clung desperately to non-intervention. Their mutual
declaration of non-aggression with Bulgaria was conspicuously moti­
vated by the concrete German threat, and was aimed at preyenting
Bulgaria from becoming a German pawn.93 lt also served as 'a convenient
weapon' against British attempts to get Turkey involved in war, thus
opening the Straits to the British navy.94 They preferred, however, to
present it as a guarantee against Russia. According to Aktay, Bulgaria
wished to avoid any conflict with T'urkey but 'more significantly , . . had
finally realized what the friendship with the Soviet Union entailed' .95
The Russians, however, were not fooled . They knew perfectly well, as
Dekanozov explained to Draganov in Berlin, that the declaration was
motivated by a German 'threat to the Straits thereby transgressing
Russian interests' . But at the same time they continued, at least outwardly,
to 'categorically exclude a conflict between Germany and Soviet Russia'.
While admittedly resigned to the fate of Bulgaria, they noY\1 'established
a new red line which was Turkey's involvement in the war'. According
to the revised 19 3 6 Montreux Convention, once involved in war the Turks
could open the Straits at "''ill to whatever naval force they saw fit.96
The likelihood of Bulgaria's joining the ...t\xis by the end of January
hastened an understanding between England, Russia and Turkey to bar
the Germans from advancing to the Straits. Despite the unavoidable ups
and downs in rr1ood, reflecting the harsh conditions of diplomatic life
in Moscow, Cripps maintained an unyielding conviction that Russia's
benevolent neutrality towards Germany was motivated only by a need
to boost her military preparedness for a clash which he regarded as
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 107

inevitable.97 Though he did not expect the Russians to prevent the

Germans from reaching the Dardanelles by force, he thought they could
be induced to do so by diplomatic means.98 He easily swayed the 'Club',
Aktay and the Greek and Yugoslav ambassadors, round to his point
of view. On Cripps's advice Aktay indeed made such an overture to
Molotov, ',yho conceded that the situation was 'grave and complicated',
grumbling that 'with_ the eating comes the appetite - German troops are
already on the Bulgarian frontier '. For the first time he now overtly
encouraged the Turks to resist the pressure.
Similar feelers were sent to the British, stating that it 'was not in the
Soviet interest that German influence should spread in the Balkans' and
that no policy was 'perpetual or eternal'.99 The Foreign Office, however,
remained sceptical and suspicious. Like Britisl1 intelligence, 100 it con­
tinued to dismiss any suggestion that mutual 11ostility and varying inter­
ests might result in a head-on clash between Russia and Germany. In
terms which betray·ed ideological perceptions and wishful thinking, it
repeated the well-known doctrine that Russia and Ger1nany were bound
together in regarding Britain as their ultimate enemy. In fact it did not put
it past Stalin to make 'some bargain with Hitler whereby in return for
Stalin abandoning Russian interests in the Balkans + Bulgaria to Germany,
Hitler undertook to give Stalin full support if Stalin tries to wrest the
Straits from Turkey' . 011
It is not hard to imagine the anxiety which seized Stalin and Molotov
when by the end of February Bulgaria's entry into the Tripartite Pact
materialized. As a keen observer of the Kremlin, Cripps thought condi­
tions were now most propitio11s for a new move to draw the Russians
closer to the Allies. The presence of Eden in Turkey, where he was making
a last-ditch attempt to reassemble the shattered remnants of the Balkan
bloc, could facilitate a clandestine meeting in the Crimea with Molotov.
Cripps impressed on Eden the significance of such a visit. Provided they
'v\tere not too frightened to request a visit', the Russians would be
'flattered' and it could 'encourage our friends in South-East Europe'. The
Foreign Office, however, persevered in its opinion that Stalin was in fact
on the verge of concluding a new agreement with Germany. It not only
i·esented Cripps' s initiative but in fact wished to summon him immedi­
ately to London for consultations.1 02 Churchill would not hear of such a
visit, as he was not prepared to trust the Russians with Eden's 'personal
safety or liberty' .1 03
Eden, who was later to collude with (::: r ipps in an attempt to challenge
Churchill's leadership,1 04 was more attentive to Cripps, whose proposals
fitted in well with his own plans. Like Stalin, since taking office Eden had
been convinced that the 'Orang nach Osten' might after all be executed
through the Balka11s and across Anatolia, thus threatening Egypt. The
control of Rumania appeared therefore to be designed 'not only to defend
108 Grand Delusion

the oilfields from any possible air attack on our part, but also to provid .e
jumping off points for an attack on the Straits' . For a while suggestions
that Eden might visit Ankara to establish a Balkan bloc with the partici­
pation of Turkey and Russia were muted in Cabinet. But shortly after
assuming office Eden informed Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British ambas­
sador in Turkey, that he expected the Turkish attitude to hinge 'on their
appreciation of the probable attitude of the Soviet Government' . 'Past
history', he concluded, 'has made it plain that they will do their utmost
to avoid a conflict with Russia, and the key to the situation probably
resides in the degree to which the Russians may acquiesce in, or actively
support, the German scheme.'1 05
As was his habit, Cripps started the move on his own initiative, but his
informal feelers encountered a negative 'official' reply from the Kremlin,
using the pretext that 'time was not yet ripe for the solution of major
issues by way of a meeting . . . more so before it was prepared politically'.
When inquiring whether 'not yet ripe' meant that 'such a moment might
occur in the future', he was given to understand that 'the arrival of such
a moment was not excluded, but it was difficult to tell tl1e future'. Cripps,
however, went one step further, asking the Russians to arrange for him
to fly to Istanbul to meet Eden and bring about a Turco-Soviet under­
standing. The Russians appeared keen to facilitate his mission. Clearly
they hoped firstly to sustain a new Balkan bloc, perhaps to deter tl1e
Bulgarians from putting their final signature on the agreement with
Germany, and secondly to prevent closer Anglo-Turkish co-operation
from which they would be excluded. For a moment the gesture was
perceived in London by the very few supporters of Russia in the Foreign
Office as a breakthrough in Anglo-Soviet relations, so much so that
Maisky found them to be 'excessively naive'. 'Do they really think', he
confided in his diary, 'that we can express overt exceptional interest in the
negotiations between Eden and Cripps in Ankara in the present state of
Anglo-Soviet relations?' Nonetheless it could hardly be denied that the
fervent interest in his journey evinced, more forcefully than ever before,
the awareness of the German danger.1 06
Early the next morning, 1 07 Cripps was ushered into a large twin­
engined Douglas, especially assigned for his mission, at Moscow's inter­
national airport. This was by no means routine, since air travel was
restricted by stringent war regulations and this was in fact the inaugural
flight to Istanbul across the Black Sea. It was no coincidence that the first
fuelling stop was made at an enormous air force base where some eighty
or more fighter planes were out in what seemed a deliberate display. The
fear of a British bombing of Baku had not subsided. The rest of the flight,
at a good altitude just above the clouds in the direction of Kherson and
Burgas, was uneventful. Landing, Cripps could recognize the narrow
entrance to the Bosphorus Straits, that very crucial water passage. Flying
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 109

low over the hills surrounding Istanbul, the plane finally glided over the
Sea of Marmara towards Yeshilkoy, missing by only ten minutes a fierce
gale and thunderstorm. There was a large welcoming party of military,
naval and air personnel and civilians. After racing through the narrow
streets of the old town and crossing to the eastern side on board the British
ambassador's yacht, Cripps just caught the night train to Ankara.
Cripps reached Ankara in the early hours of the morning and immedi­
ately conferred with Knatchbull-Hugessen. Eden, who had been enter­
tained at a cabaret until 5 a.m., turned up only later in the morni11g,
obsessed with his favourite plan of forming a Balkan bloc with
Yugoslavia. Eden seemed to Cripps to have been influenced by the lavish
hospitality bestowed on him to believe an agreement with Turkey was
in his pocket. The talks, however, did not get very far, as lunch at the
embassy was a crowded occasion. The evening was taken up by a folk­
lore show arranged specifically for Eden. Cripps, however, was not so
easily discouraged. H e embarked on the special night train taking Eden
to Istanbul, hoping to be able to raise the Russian issue en route.
The journey was camouflaged as a return to Egypt. After 'a magnificent
send off with bands troops & a cheering crowd' the train set off on the
Adana line to the east. After three quarters of an hour it returned, blinds
down, at full speed through Ankara station on the line westwards to
Istanbul. The luxurious train was well stocked with food, drinks and
smoking facilities, which made it conducive for Cripps to persuade Eden
to reconsider the decision concerning the Baltic States. Though polite and
attentive, Eden did not commit himself but promised to reach a decision
within days of his return to London.
Cripps spent a good deal of his day in Istanbul 'seeing all sorts & kinds
of people from refugees & secret service agents to members of our staff
& journalists'1 08 and even paid a short visit to the Sultan's Palace, which
was opened specially for him. He then boarded the night train to Ankara,
where he was due to meet Vinogradov, the Russian ambassador. Vino­
gradov had been little impressed by his brief and perfunctory encounter
with Eden during a ball thrown in his honour by the Turks. He thought
Eden created a 'tremendous superficial clamour' while talking 'in gener­
alities', completely oblivious to Balkan intricacies. Moreover, he enter­
tained a gullible 'faith in Turkey's loyalty'. He did not appear too keen to
discuss Russian affairs, leaving them for Cripps to take care of.1 09 Cripps
found the young Vinogradov to be 'lively and very pleasant - also I
should think intelligent'; their talks culminated in a joint memorandum
for Saracoglu' s consideration. Vinogradov' s co-operation gave tl1e unmis­
takable impression that the Russians had become anxious to re-establish
closer contact with Turkey and in fact were eager to discuss material and
military aid to her. Cripps left Ankara in the evening, 'fourth successive
night to be spent on the line! !', convinced that 'a useful piece of work'
110 Grand Delusion

had been done which 'at least reopens the chances of some in1provements
in the Turco-Russian position'.
The consequences of Cripps's initiative could barely be perceived at the
time. Eden's reluctance to take on any tangible commitments, coupled
with his manifest impotence, enhanced the growing suspicion in Moscow
that together with Churchill he was trying to save England's skin by drag­
ging Russia into the war.11 0 At least this was the impression made on Vino­
gradov by the considerable British efforts to induce the Russians to issue
a public declaration of support for Turkey, inevitably directed against
Germany, and based on the somewhat dubious hunch that Eden's visit
had confirmed the 'loyalty of the Turkish Government to the obligations
it had taken on itself'. Cripps and Knatchbull-Hugessen expected that
the 'Turks would immediately deploy their troops in Thrace. The Russians
preferred the Turks to produce concrete proposals and even implied
that the Soviet government would 'consider sympathetically' a Turkish
request for war materials.111
The Russian archives reveal that, like Britain and the Balkan countries,
the Russia11s were indeed seriously concerned about the fun1re moves
of Germany. The fear of England lingered on, as she had now become
directly involved in the Balkans and the abandoning of 'Sea-Lion' revived
the prospects of a separate peace. The Turkish hope of thwarting the
German threat rested on an Anglo-Soviet collabo1·ation which might
bolster Yugoslavia's resolve to resist Germany, checking her further
expansion.
•

Stalin used dubious means in seekjng a rapprochement with Turkey

through British mediation. On the one hand he wished the Anglo-Turkish
co-operation to rem.ain powerful enough to stop Hitler's advance beyond
Adrianople. On the other hand Ertgland remained a potential enemy
in the region and her own occupation of the Straits had to be prevented.
The impression that 'Eden had failed to receive from Turkey an under-
,

taking to join England if Germany moved into Greece' was therefore

received with considerable relief. And yet attempts by friends of Russia)
like R. A. Butler, to impress on Stalin that the entrance of Ger1nany into
the Middle East 'posed tren1endous dangers 11ot only for England but
also for the USSR' was conceived simply as a deliberate attempt at
provocation.112
The convoluted Turkish manoeuv"res conducted indirectly through
the embassy in London vaguely hinted at a possible 'Soviet-Turkish
''alliance'' ' . Such moves were actually meant to discourage the Russians
from executing unilateral military actions while also serving as a deter­
rent against Hitler. With the threat now no longer theoretical Maisky did
not swallow the bait, insisting that any alliance had to culminate in a
military agreement.113 The likelihood of such an agreen1ent under British
sponsorship was in any case small, as Churchill had never been an enthu-
The Curtain Falls on the Balkans 111

siastic supporter of the Balkan bloc. 114 He discouraged Eden, who was still
hopping from one capital to another in the Middle East, by conveying the
pessimistic evaluation of the Defence Committee about the likelihood of
averting the 'fate of Greece unless Turkey and / or Yugoslavia come in
which seems most improbable' . The British had in fact become resigned
to their 'ignominious ejection' from Greece and the Balkans.115
Nothing, however, could stop Cripps. Immediately upon his return to
Moscow, on 6 March, he was received most cordially by Vyshinsky for
an tinusual two-hour talk. Vyshinsky ·was eager to find out whether 'the
Turks would resist a possible German attempt to occupy the Straits'; he
was no less obsessed with the idea that Turkey too might join the Axis,
which Cripps vehemently denied. Vyshinsky not only feared provocation
but was concerned by the fact that Cripps had actually returned from his
meeting with Eden empty-handed. Nor had the Turks put forward a. ny
concrete proposals, while Cripps was virtually trying to revive the old
proposal to form a Balkan bloc put to Stalin in July 1940. Impetuous by
nature, Cripps harmed his own case by driving home his belief that the
Balkan episode was only a prelude to 'the more important plan of attack­
ing the Soviet Union'. The message relating to Turkey must have been
read in that context; Cripps warned Vyshinsky that t1:1e continued sur­
vival of Turkey depended entirely 'on the material and moral support
which England and Rtissia could render' . Whether it was taken to be cred­
ible is doubtful, since Cripps admitted he had gathered it from rumours.
Cripps now produced his double-edged weapon, raising the alarm ii1
Moscow to new heights, in the form of a warning that an attack on the
Soviet Union would 'enable the Germans to reach a peace with Engla11d
whereby they would abandon Belgium and France for the sake of the
Soviet Union'. Not only were Cripps's motives questioned by the
Kremlin, but he faced stiff criticism at home. The Foreign Office, perhaps
correctly, anticipated that 'part of the price the Soviet Government might
expect Turkey to pay for any assistance would be concessions at the
.116
Straits' On the other hand, the Kremlin had ascertained from its own
sources in the Balkans that, though the Turks did not intend to fight
outside their borders, they would 'not abandon even one inch of their
ter1·itory without a fight'. The Turkish military attache was questioned at
the Soviet Ministry of Defence about the possible Turkish reaction to a
German advance into Thrace and then to the Straits. His answer too was
unequivocal: 'Naturally defend ourselves!' But again the question of
provocation came up when he warned the Turks that were the Germans
to reach the Bosphorus Soviet interests would 'be at stake as well . . . it
would clearly be only a first step in an overall plan to attack the Soviet
Union and then the British would not be able to help you' .117
Stalin was now torn between his wish to prevent the Germans from
reaching the Straits and his fear of being provoked by the British into
112 Grand Delusion

entering the war prematurely. The fallacious forecast that the Germans
would proceed with the occupation of the Straits prior to mounting an
attack on Russia only enhanced his suspicions of British provocation.
The intrinsic interests in the Straits, however, overcame the hesitations.
Despite the fear of a rebuff, the Russians finally made the initial move.
On 9 March Aktay, the ambassador in Moscow, was handed a declaration
which stated that 'should Turkey be subjected to an attack by any foreign
power and needed to resort to arms to defend its borders, it could count
on her non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and on the full under­
standing and neutrality of the Soviet government' . The assurance
reflected Stalin's wish for the best of both worlds. Gone were the not too
far distant days when he had hoped to seek a revision of the Straits regime
with German co-operation. While tenaciously adhering to neutrality, he
sounded a faint warning to Berlin. It was received with obvious relief by
Aktay, as 'the silence of the Soviet Union left room for various guesses
and apprehensions' . 118
Cripps was informed of the declaration minutes after it had been deliv­
ered to Aktay in an 'unexpectedly cordial and long' meeting with
Vyshinsky. To him it was 'indicative of a decision taken during the last
few days . . . to increase [Soviet] resistance to German penetration in the
Balkans rather than of any compliance by the Soviet government or any
decision to reach a fresh arrangement with Germany on the question' .
Though not attaching undue significance to the declaration, he believed
it was important in a country 'where everything is done indirectly and
by hint or suggestion'. As long as the balance of relations was tilted
against Russia, however, he did not expect any dramatic changes: 'a fine
day in late winter' , he cabled home, 'is often heralded as the beginning
of spring when in reality spring is far off'. But, as a man of vision, he
insisted that 'the situation is so fluid that . . . we must be prepared to take
immediate advantage of any change that occurs in the political atmos-
.

phere here'. The British government, as he concluded a long and argu­

mentative telegram to Eden, were 'bound, as realists, to accept the fait
accompli in the Baltic States'. In Eden's absence the Foreign Office
regarded the declaration merely as one of benevolent neutrality, an under­
taking not to 'seize the opportunity of stabbing [Turkey] in the back'. The
genuine aim was 'to draw Turkey into the Balkan war'.119
Churchill would not even hear of pressure on Turkey. Before the
Cabinet was due to discuss Cripps' s proposals he told Cadogan that he
'didn't like it. He thought this Russian declaration shd. be a comfort to
the Turks, but he doubted whether the latter shd. be encouraged to push
the Soviet further - that might only result in a recoil.' 120
Hitler swiftly nipped the new alignments in the bud. Saracoglu was
informed that the presence of German troops in Bulgaria was a precau­
tionary move taken to 'eliminate the British influence on the European
The Curtain Falls on tl1e Balkans 113

Continent' . He was assured that the measure was in no way 'directed

against the territorial or political integrity of Turkey'; Hitler had
specifically ordered the troops to be deployed at some distance from the
Turkish border and he expected the Turkish troops to act likewise. The
exchange of letters excluding the use of force between Hitler and Inonii,
the President of the Turkish Republic, paralysed the Russians completely,
the more so when Inonii went one step further, undertaking not to cede
territory to any foreign power. 121
The intense suspicions led Stalin to assume, once Hitler's letter had
entered the public domain, that the development had actually been
devised by the British to ensnare the Soviet Union in war. Besides, the
Russians were only too eager to avoid an overt conflict with the Germans.
Vinogradov therefore was quick to change the tune, rejecting the wide­
spread rumours that the Germans planned to seize the Straits 'with a view
to ultimate conflict with the Soviet Union'. As if oblivious to the reasons
which had led to the Soviet initiative a mere two weeks earlier, he was
convinced that 'Germany had always given assurances of good intentions
towards the Soviet Union', but he did not neglect to mention that the
Soviet Union 'was admittedly keeping her eyes open'; though resolved to
keep neutral she 'would not remain idle if her interests were threatened' .
The possibility of a British conspiracy to involve Russia in war was
revitalized, as was the alternative of peace overtures to Germany.122 And
yet, with Hitler's commitment now in their pocket, the Turks somewhat
defused the tension by finally acknowledging the Soviet declaration on
1 7 March, reciprocating with a similar undertaking to refrain from hostile
activities if the Soviet Union were to find herself at war.123
The new understanding were immediately undermined by Hitler, who
seized the occasion to disclose to the Turkish ambassador in Berlin in
great detail the demands made by Molotov to him in November for bases
on the Dardanelles and the positioning of troops in Bulgaria. Indeed, in
Ankara 'the greatest impression was made by the Fuhrer' s statements that
Russia had demanded the right to intervene at the straits as a condition
for accession to the Tripartite Pact'. A victorious Hitler found it only too
easy to appear the guardian of Turkish interests by preventing 'the liqui­
dation of the Balkans and Turkey by Russia' . 124
The situation was further complicated by the awareness that in certain
circumstances the agreement for mutual assistance between Turkey and
Britain might be diverted against the Soviet Union in the Black Sea region
and the Caucasus. It was precisely such an occurrence which the decla­
ration set out to prevent. Indeed, in secret talks with Eden in Nicosia it
was agreed that if Turkey were invaded by Germany RAF fighters could
at once use the airfields in Thrace and Yeshilkoy, the main airport of
Istanbul, not to mention those in Antalya.125 Merkulov, the head of the
NKGB, had assembled for the Kremlin a pile of reports on activities of
114 Grand Delusion

clearly anti-Soviet character carried out by Turkish intelligence in north­

ern Turkey and the Caucasus. A special bureau had been set up in
Erzerum to co-ordinate the work of the agents involved in the espionage.
The bureau was indeed working on plans to transform the Caucasus into
an autonomous region under Turkish protection. The most concrete infor­
mation related to instructions by the Turkish General Staff to its intelli­
gence arm to collect material on the dislocation and deployment of the
Red Army in the Caucasus area, as well as on the state of the railways,
roads and bridges leading from the Caucasus to Turkey. They further
sought information on the positioning of Soviet artillery and naval forces
in the region and displayed particular interest in the fire-fighting facili­
ties in the oil-production regions.126
All the Russians could do was resort to verbal protests. The exchange
of undertakings to honour the non-aggression pact between the two coun­
tries received wide publication in the Soviet papers on 25 March.127 In his
endless efforts to salvage the shattered relations between Germany and
Russia Schulenburg went out of his way to dismiss the declaration as 'an
insignificant episode', but Rosso, always more outspoken, could not but
see in it an expression of Russia's dissatisfaction with the German posi­
tion on the Balkans. It was a warning to Germany, related to the negoti­
ations under way with Yugoslavia,128 and a 'platonic help to Turkey'.
Hitler clearly did not share Schulenburg's view. To him it was an 1

'unfriendly act', but his response lay in the divisions deployed on the
border rather than in a paper agreement.129

•
 6

The Red Army on Alert

The Soviet Defence Plans

The euphoria and sense of relief which were briefly evident after the
signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact quickly evaporated when the
ineptitude of the Red Army became apparent in the conduct of what
were essentially minor battles in Poland and Finland. It gradually
sank in that the time and space gained by the pact would barely be
sufficient. The effects of the purges on the preparedness of the army
were suddenly exposed. Stalin could 11ardly ignore the drain on the officer
corps. Between May 1937 and September 1938, some 36,700 men had
been purged in the army and 3,000 in the navy: 90 per cent of district
chiefs of staff and deputies, 80 per cent of corps and divisional com­
manders and 90 per cent of staff officers and chiefs of staff. There was
also a marked decline in the educational and intellectual standard of the
survivors. By the time of the German attack 75 per cent of the officers and
70 per cent of the political officers had been in active service for less than
one year.1 Indeed, the training and experience necessary before command
of a division was given required a number of years, but the pressure of
circumstances forced undeserved early promotions. However, even in the
dire circumstances the reconstruction of the army had to be a gradual
process which ruled out adventurous strategies, even if these had been
contemplated.
Equally damaging to the war preparedness was the undermining of the
unique Soviet military doctrine during the purges. A short digression is
called for here. I n devising a new approach in the stimulating revolu­
tionary environment of the 1920s and early 1930s, the architects of the Red
Army had conceived an entirely original doctrine which addressed both

115
116 Grand Delusion

universal requirements and the specific features of Soviet national needs.

These radical innovations were developed by the prodigious trio of
Generals Tukhachevsky, Triandafilov and Isserson. The salient character­
istic of the doctrine was the refinement of the prevalent Clausewitzian
categorization of warfare into strategic and tactical levels by the intro­
duction of an intermediate level, labelled the 'operational' .2
What distinguished the doctrine was not only the invention of a new
'operational level', comfortably tucked in between 'strategy' and 'tactics';
it was the theoretical assumption of the existence of ingrained tension
between the two levels1 between the 'goal' and the 'means' used to accom­
plish it, between pinning down the enemy (skovyvanie) and the strike
(udar). Thus, unlike the European notion, which distinguished rather
mechanically between defensive and offensive means of war, the Russian
established a cognitive harmonious relation between the two. 'Opera­
tional skill' was the ability to recognize the existence of such tensions and
reconcile them in a given situation in order to attain the objective. From
the early 1920s it was fully recognized that a basic component in the
exploitation of the inherent tension was the study and implementation of
defence as a prerequisite for a successful offence.
The introduction of the 1929 Polevoi Ustav (Field Regulations) assigned
the forward detachments, the light screen groupings, with a combination
of tasks ranging from reconnaissance to allow for regrouping of the main
thrust, to actual engagements aimed at preventing the enemy from
seizing key positions and introducing chaos into its offensive deploy­
ment. The range of activities of the forward detachments depended on
the degree of mechanization, as they would need to maintain close contact
with the main covering force for support.3
In 1936 Tukhachevsky published his Problems Concerning the Defence of
the USSR, which analysed these problems. There was nothing sinister,
aggressive or ideological in the comprehensive association of defence and
offence; the two were in fact intertwined. Even if the strategic goal was
defensive in nature, the operational manoeuvres of 'deep operations'
employed in achieving it could assume a dynamic orientation.4 Thus
Soviet strategy in the event of an invasion was committed, rather ambi­
tiously, to the prompt transfer of the war to the enemy's territory. The
objective of the defence was to seize the initiative from the opponent and
establish preconditions for a counter-offensive.5 These concepts were
incorporated in the 1936 Field Regulations, which visualized the 'simul­
taneous use of tank, mechanized, air and air assault forces to strike and
penetrate the entire depth of the enemy's defences, through its tactical
defences, into its operational depths'. The prerequisite for the successful
implementation of such a goal was the creation of an effective mobile
force, which in turn necessitated rapid industrialization and a major
reform in the armed forces. This in itself required a major expansion of
The Red Army on Alert 117

the armoured corps and the creation of airborne divisions co-operating

with the ground forces. It must be remembered that industrialization
was not aimed at boosting the military. The technological revolution in
weaponry was a spin-off of industrialization and not the main cause of
it. By 1933 the change was marked by the development of multiple group­
ings of mechanized and tank forces which were to be engaged in both
operational and tactical combat.6
The concept reached its maturity with the introduction of 'deep opera­
tions', which exploited the tension inherent in the operational level.
It envisaged the deployment of armoured and mechanized formations,
echeloned in depth, co-operating jointly with infantry and artillery in an
attempt to break through the enemy lines and subsequently to exploit the
initial success by developing operational manoeuvre activities in the rear
of the enemy's deployment. To break through the impasse, the theory
created suitable conditions for the coveri11g forces on the border to ini­
tiate a swift counter-offensive with the aim of destroying the main body
of the enemy's forces on his own territory. The key to the effective con­
version of tactical successes into victories lay in the pursuit of successive
operational manoeuvres.7
The army was therefore deployed in depth to start with. The covering
forces were positioned in a linear fashion along the border, around the
strongholds. The mechanized formations and infantry divisions were con­
centrated as a second echelon in depth, and the third echelon served as
the base for the recruitment of further troops while the operations were
in progress. The task of the forward detachments was therefore to absorb
and mitigate the initial shock while identifying the general trends of the
enemy's manoeuvres. Their activities served as the anvil upon which tl1e
initial counter-offensive of the first echelon could be mounted to disrupt
the deployment and manoeuvres of the enemy. The tl1ird stage led to the
deployment of the second echelon (mostly mechanized and armoured) in
counter-offensives in depth leading to the removal of the threat posed by
the opponent.8
Recognition of the severe deficiencies of the military led to a swift reor­
ganization of the army/s High Command shortly after the Winter War.
The meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on 28
March 1 940 witnessed a sensational event when Defence Commissar
Voroshilov 'spoke quite frankly about [the army's] shortcomings' . The
entire Chiefs of Staff were seated on the stage and subjected to criticism
of their performance. The attempt to blame it on the harsh wintry condi­
tions was seen as a poor excuse. Russia, they were reproached, was a
northern country and the greatest victories had been achieved in winter:
'Alexander Nevsky against the Swedes, Peter the First against the Swedes
and Finns, Alexander the First and the victory over Napoleon. There were
very many good traditions in the old army, which need to be utilized. '
118 Grand Delusion

The key to recovery lay in competent military leadership, but the plenum
established that the reality was grim: 'The commanders 60 per cent are
-

good; 40 per cent idiots, characterless, cowards, etc.'9

On 8 May, Timoshenko, who had commanded the Karelian troops in
the Russo-Finnish war with remarkable success, was promoted to
marshal and replaced Voroshilov as Commissar of Defence. Both Hitler
and Stalin continued to overestimate British power and watched with
alarm the British foothold on Narvik, which was in fact precarious. Above
all Hitler's defeat of Denmark had i11troduced uneasiness and confusion
in Moscow. The General Staff had been in the middle of implementing
demobilization plans and addressing the shortcomings revealed during
the Winter War, and no new operational plans were contemplated.10 The
demobilization plar1 of 9 May, which had been prepared by Voroshilov, is
of the utmost historical significance. It was submitted to Stalin the day
before the German attack on France and reveals that the Red Army had
been preparing a massive demobilization which had been interrupted by
the diversionary wars in Poland and Finland . After the conclusion of the
war on 4 April, efforts were renewed to reduce the troops in the Cau­
casus and the Odessa and Kiev military regions to their previous
strengths. As a result of the mobilization carried out during the Polish
and Finnish campaigns, the army had increased by 1,736,164 soldiers.
However, rather than continuing to swell the ranks, efforts were made to
reduce further the size of the army through demobilization 'in order to
discharge the extra people called up from the reserves'. As far as the
artillery was concerned, specific recommendations were made to place
'the status of all corps on a peacetime level', with the sole exception of
four corps which were diverted to the Caucasus. Altogether 153,000
gunners were to remain mobilized in peacetime. Corresponding measures
were taken in the cavalry. Both the air force and the tank divisions, the
Politburo determined, 'which have been on a war footing, [should] be
returned to peacetime status' . The sole exception to this trend was the cre­
ation of three tank brigades to be stationed in the Baltic countries and two
in the Caucasus region. All in all, 686,329 soldiers out of a total of 3,200,000
were to be immediately discharged.11 This demonstrates that no master
plan for exploiting the attrition of the belligerents for military expansion
had existed in the earlier stages of the war.
The war in France abruptly changed Soviet perceptions and produced
a major shift in policy. The measures taken by Stalin from mid-May
onwards were triggered by the realization of the growing German
menace. The urgent reorganization measures taken by the military during
the second half of May were clearly prompted by the sensational victory
of the Wehrmacht, which to all intents and purposes meant the collapse
of the western front. They were embarked upon as soon as the extent of
the German success in France was understood and gathered momentum
The Red Army on Alert 119

after the fall of Paris. In his memoirs Kl1rushchev vividly depicts the panic
that seized Stalin when the news of the occupation of Paris reached the
Kremlin; Stalin, he recalled, 'let fly with some choice Russian curses and
said that now Hitler was sure to beat our brains in' .12
The extent of the deterioration of Soviet-German relations in the wake
of the peace of Compiegne is often overlooked. It is highly debatable
whether Stalin's apparent compliance with the German successes indi­
cated that he was 'blinded by ideological preconceptions' and unable to
distinguish between major and minor dangers. It is equally questionable
whether he viewed the annexation of the Baltic States as a 'reward for
loyalty to Hitler' .13 The more likely explanation, as was astutely observed
by the American charge d'affaires in Moscow, is that Soviet policy was
'largely defensive and based upon tl1e fear of possible aggression by
Allied or associated powers . . . and possibly upon uneasiness over tl1e
prospects of a victorious Germany' .14
Facing the almost unscathed Wehrmacht, the Russians placated the
Germans and avoided any provocation.15 Molotov's congrat11lations to
Schulenburg on tl1e 'splendid success of the German Wehrmacht', given
great prominence in Churchill's history of the war, reflects a desperate
attempt to mollify the Germans and forestall any move eastwards.
Molotov's words were only a preface to the flimsy explanation of the
annexation of the Baltic States and the 'extremely urgent' demand for a
solution of the Bessarabian question.16 In any case, the diplomatic acqui­
escence went hand in hand with the hasty reinforcement of Soviet
defences.17 It is patently obvious that the assumption of control of the
Baltic States on 15 and 16 June was connected with events in France. The
anti-German aspects of the headlong transfer of troops to the western
front, the overnight conversion of public institutions into military estab­
lishments and the transfer of the command of the Baltic fleet to the
forward naval bases in Tallinn could hardly be concealed and were i1ot
lost on the Germans.
The occupation of the Baltic States lengthened the contiguous border
with Germany and in theory made it more difficult to defend. However,
it redressed the problem of the disappearance of the buffer zone which
had previously fulfilled the needs of Soviet defence. It clearly improved
Russia's strategic position by preventing the formation of a 'Baltic bridge­
head' which could serve as a springboard for an attack against Leningrad
or Minsk, as had indeed occurred during the Civil War. Moreover, despite
his claim, Stalin made intensive efforts to expand the fortified positions
along both the new and the old Soviet borders.18
The occupation of the Baltic countries poses serious moral questions.
The Sovietization of the tl1ree states had little to do with ideology, but it
was a rather mendacious and cynical method of gaining control over the
occupied territories. The oppressive means so characteristically employed
120 Grand Delusion

by Stalin aggravated the injustice and had a long-lasting effect on

Moscow's relations with these countries. However, while the occupation
can and should be condemned on moral grounds, it was dominated by
the threat hanging over the Soviet Union. 1 9
Whe11 the prospect of war was suddenly driven home, the Russian lead­
ership, committed to remaining out of the war, became seriously con­
cerned about its initial phase. The brilliant German execution of Blitzkrieg
tactics in the West and later in the Balkans raised the possibility of a sur­
prise attack which might undermine the Russian army's ability to seize the
initiative. It was no longer improbable that the Germans would complete
their deployment before corresponding measures were carried out on the
Russian side. Zhukov and others attest to how after the fall of France the
General Staff spent sleepless nights devising plans which would accom­
modate the 'operation in depth' with the defence requirements of the pro­
jected battlefield. The new mobilization plans were embarked upon in
earnest only on 22 May, when the German army appeared invincible, and
therefore they can hardly reflect an aggressive disposition. They reversed
the trend which had been in force up till then of discharging a large part
of the army. On the same day, plans were hastily laid for speeding up the
construction of the T-34s to replace the Russians' vast stocks of obsolete
tanks now that the contribution of the German armour to the successful
Blitzkrieg had been fully comprehended. The plan, obviously qn emer­
gency one, was updated in early July.20
In none of the reforms can revolutionary jargon or practice be detected.
Voroshilov, who had proved his inability to command large formations,
was replaced as Defence Commissar in the second week of May by Tim­
oshenko, who was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.
This was followed by the final restoration of the old imperial ranks in the
army and the release from prison of some 4,000 officers detained during
the purges, who took up command posts. One of those released was
Colonel, later Marsl1al, K. K. Rokosovsky, who was to assume command
of a newly formed mechanized corps. Among the 1,000 officers promoted
in June were K. A. Meretskov and G. K. Zhukov, who were now promoted
to the rank of army generals on the way to their consecutive appointments
as Chief of Staff. Newly appointed lieutenant-generals who were to gain
reputations later in the war were Koniev, Vatutin, Yeremenko, Sokolovsky,
Chuikov and Golikov. The High Command of the navy, which had suf­
fered severe casualties during the purges, was similarly restored with the
appointment of Nikolay G . Kuznetsov as Chief of the Naval Forces and
L. M. Galler and I. S. Isakov as new admirals. None of them had gained
sufficient experience to function adequately in their new posts by the time
the Great Patriotic War broke out.
Equally significant was the introduction of a new disciplinary code.
A rigidly traditional approach replaced the communist code, which
The Red Army on Alert 121

assumed egalitarianism and motivation through ideological commitment.

Indeed, Timoshenko' s concluding address to the Military Conference
of December 1940 focused on the need to instil discipline and raise
the morale of the armed forces as a precondition for success in what
was now termed 'modern war' .21 In addition, all 'bourgeois' forms and
courtesies, notably the salute, were reinstated. All the changes were incor­
porated in the 'Disciplinary Regulation' of August 1940. This was fol­
lowed up by the abolition of the dual command, depriving the political
commissar of the power and control he had enjoyed over his military
counterpart.22
Rather than maintaining the major western theatre of war, which could
have served as a springboard if the Russians were to strike against the
German concentrations, four new groups were created, while the western
one was divided into the Leningrad, Baltic, Special Western, Special Kiev
and Odessa military districts. Each of these was to be transformed into a
forward headquarters entrusted with the defence of that zone.
The only defence plan that preceded the outbreak of the Second World
War was composed by Marshal V. M. Shaposhnikov, the Chief of Staff,
in 193 8 and assumed a threat on two fronts: the predominant one of
Germany, Italy, Finland and the Baltic countries in the western sector, and
the subsidiary Japanese one in the east. The threat on the western front
could be translated into two variants, either a German strike north of the
Pripet Marshes along the Minsk-Smolensk axis heading to Moscow, or a
move to the south if economic considerations were in fact preponderant.23
The state was indeed gradually moving on to a war footing but
in a markedly defensive manner. In July the newly formed Chief War
Council finally brought the 193 8 plans in line with the situation as it was
evolving after the fall of France.24 They were reviewed by General A. M.
Vassilevsky on Shaposhnikov's instructions on 19 August, still antici­
pating rather elusive potential dangers to Russia in the west and east. The
new directive, however, took into account the fact that the consequences
of the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact now drove Italy,
Hungary, Rumania and Finland into the German camp, forcing Russia to
face a coalition which extended the geographic arena. Tl1e political and
strategic turmoil in the Balkans was thus gradually shifting the focus from
the ce11tre to the flanks. But Shaposhnikov' s directive still anticipated the
main blow to fall on the central sector, north of the River San, along the
Vilnius-Minsk and Brest-Baranovichi axes. A German advance towards
Kiev and Lublin seemed less likely. The task of the Soviet military was
therefore defined in very general terms as 'bringing about the defeat of
German power, concentrated in Western Prussia and in the Warsaw
region' .25
The intensifying conflict in the Balkans in the next month led to a
modification of the plan by Timoshenko and the newly appointed Chief
122 Grand Delusiort

of Staff K. A. Meretskov. It was presented to Stalin on 1 9 September. As

've have seen,26 collation of information by the GRU towards the end of
August indicated that the German build-up indeed posed a genuine
tl1reat to Russia. However, with the redeployment of German troops in
the East now in full swing, General Jodi reinforced Stalin's mistaken eval­
uation through a disinformation campaign which depicted 'the main
point of deploy1nent as the southern sector while forces in the north
remained relatively small' .27 The tendency was now to explain the con­
centration as a move to reinforce Germany's eastern borders with the
USSR, which had been neglected during the campaign in France.
However, the patterns of the build-up drove home the alarming fact that
Hitler was encroaching on vital Russian interests in the Balkans. This
seems to have contributed in autumn 1 940 to the diversion of the Soviet
effort to the southern borders.28
In mid-August the first extensive report on the redeployment of
the German troops in the East since the conclusion of the campaign in
France was prepared by the border NKVD. Despite earlier warnings,
the report was passed over in favour of an assessment which related
to the events in the Balkans. 'It is noted among the German wire opera­
tors (radio-telegraph) and the civilian population', the report concluded,
'that some of the troops transferred from France will be directed to
the Balkan peninsula, against the British, with the aim of seifing the
naval ports of Rumania.'29 The agents of the GRU in the Balkans corrob­
orated the political appreciation, pointing out that the Balkans remained
'the decisive centre of political events, particularly since a direct clash
of intrinsic German and Soviet interests arose there'. They quoted the
German ambassador in Belgrade, who 11ad told a small circle of
confidants: 'For the Germans the Balkans are the most significant asset
and they ought to be included in the new order of Europe; but as
the USSR would never agree to that a war with her was inevitable.'
Dozens of rumours in this vein were circulating freely in the diplomatic
community.30
In shifting attention to the southern arena, the planners no'v to some
extent revived the ideas developed in the early 1930s by Svechin, the
prominent military theoretician. Svechin had assumed an Anglo-French
coalition to be the major threat to the USSR. Drawing on the experience
of tl1e Crimean and the Civil Wars, he expected the main thrust to come
from the Black Sea while the strike in the Ukraine was considered to
be a complementary one. Auxiliary strikes were anticipated across the
Pripet Marshes and in the Baltic. The theory had been discarded by
Tukhachevsky when the Nazi menace became dominant. However, it con­
tinued to prevail even after Germany replaced Britain as the main threat
in the region towards the end of 1940, clearly reinforced by the German
incursion into tl1e Balkan peninsula.31
The Red Arn1y on Alert 123

Like its predecessor in August, the directive assumed an acute German

threat. It was governed not only by the stormy relations in the Balkans
but also by the early concentration of nearly 100 German divisions on
Rumania's northern border. The two major variants of the German offen­
sive remained a major strike from Prussia north of the River San and a
drive in the south towards Kiev, with supporting action in the north. But
the shift of the ce11tre of gravity to South-eastern Europe had significant
ramifications. The pattern of their concentration put Hitler in a conve­
nient position to pursue the two variants. He could collaborate with the
Italians by deploying them in the Balkans, thus presenting the R11ssians
'with a considerable threat'. Such a coalition would be augmented by the
incorporation of the armed forces of Hungary and Rumania in the war
effort and the full exploitation of the economic resources of the Balkan
States. Moreover Hitler could use the deployment as a bridgehead for an
il1vasion of the rich agricultural and industrial territory of tl1e Ukraine. It
was, as the directive indicated, in the south-western sector tl1at 'one ought
to expect the main strike of the united forces of the oppo11ent'. The shift
to the south had a lasting impact; in fact the deployment directives issued
32
by the army's chief planner, General Vatutin, on 1 3 June 1941 still failed
to recognize the most lethal threat and organized the main reserve force
of the second echelon in a south-western direction . When the Germans
launched their offensive north of the Pripet Marshes, the Red Army had
to execute complicated manoeuvres in an attempt to transfer the troops
from Kiev to the main western front.
The relative scarcity of the troops, now facing a threat extending from
the south to the north along the entire border, produced severe tension in
the defensive system. With the political events in the Balkans firmly
entrenched in their minds, the planners wavered, producing two alter­
natives. Events in the Balkans, nonetheless, gave precedence to the
southern variant, which in a way was geared to i·emove the tension on
both sectors, by deploying the 'main force of the Red Army . . . south of
Brest-Litovsk so that a powerful strike in the direction of Lublin, Cracow
and further to Breslau in the first stage of the war would cut off Germany
from the Balkan States, tear her away from her important economic base,
and produce a decisive influence on the Balkan States on the issue of their
participa tion in the war' . Tearing Germany from the Balkan States
acquired 'exclusively a political significance' . The second variant fol­
lowed the previous directive and proposed to deploy the army north of
Brest-Litovsk, with the task of 'inflicting a defeat on the main forces of
the German army within the limits of Eastern Prussia and seizing the
latter' . The plan11er however showed his own preference by pointing to
the unpreparedness of the arena and the difficulties involved in carrying
out the blow which were bound to encourage the Balkan States to join the
war against Russia, opening a front in tl1e south.
124 Grand Delusion

While the emphasis thus swung to the south, the fluidity of the situa­
tion was recognized as well as the fact that the deployment would
'depend on the political conditions existing in the opening stages of the
war' . The directive reflected the contentions in the Balkans but preceded
the German unilateral arbitration on 30 August33 which paved the way
for their complete domination of the peninsula. Following the arbitration
Timoshenko and Zhukov, commander of the Kiev Military District, intro­
duced to Stalin in early October alterations to the plan, which set the
priorities by establishing the south-western front as the major arena.
Measures were now taken to hasten the fortification of the new 'Molotov
line', so that 'in the future, on account of the hopefully established new
defence zones in occupied Poland, more troops could be released to
strengthen the basic concentration in the south-east'. Likewise special
measures were taken to improve the railway and road communications
leading to the south-west.34 By December, when news of Hitler's decision
on 'Barbarossa' started trickling in, it was already taken for granted that
'the main strike of the unified power of the opponents' would come from
the Balkans. 35
The predominance of the south-western deployment, therefore, was
not, as is occasionally suggested, a simple premeditated attempt to
overrun and occupy the Rumanian oilfields. Rather, it was a concentra­
tion of troops at the spot where the major threat, a German occul?ation of
the Rumanian oilfields and a swift drive into the Ukraine and Baku, was
anticipated. From autumn 1940 to spring 1941 the build-up of the troops
on that flank was indeed logical. After all, it was only on 17 March
1941 that Hitler abandoned his idea of a double encirclement-pincer
manoeuvre in the Ukraine and opted for a major concentrated thrust in
the central sector.36 Consequently the plans underwent only minor alter­
ations in February 1941 following the war games of January, and served
as the basis for the mobilization plan.37

The Bankruptcy of the Military

The initial complacency in the Kremlin following the Berlin conference
was soon overridden by the looming threat as the struggle for the Balkans
intensified. On the morning of 5 December 1940 Dekanozov, the newly
appointed ambassador to Berlin, went through the mail as was his daily
practice. He was suddenly struck by an anonymous letter containing
significant military information about Hitler's intentions of attacking
the Soviet Union in the spring of 1 941 .38 A week later Stalin was made
familiar with the contents of a speech delivered by General Keitel in Berlin
to corps and division commanders. Though admitting that a neutral
Russia 'did not pose a danger for Germany in the East', he reconfirmed
The Red Army on Alert 125

Hitler's irritation at Stalin's 'refusal to p·ursue negotiations on the ''new

European order'' a11d in general on the division of the world into ''spheres
of influence'' ' . The information further disclosed Hitler's resolve to seize
Saloniki and transfer troops through Bulgaria 'regardless of whether
Russia agreed or not' .39 Stalin's attention was apparently also drawn to
Hitler' s speech to his High Command on 1 8 December, which was rich
in anti-Soviet innuendoes and mentioned the war in the East as tl1e aspi­
ration of the Third Reich.40
The most dramatic piece of intelligence, however, reached Stalin in the
middle of a conference of the High Command which he summoned in
mid-December to discuss a long list of shortcomings unveiled by a special
committee of the Central Committee. A mere eleven days after the issue
of Directive 2 1 on Operation 'Barbarossa', General Tupikov, the military
attache in Berlin, alerted Moscow to its existence:

TO THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
BERLIN, 29 December 1940

[name deleted] informed that [name deleted] has learnt from most well­
informed high military circles that Hitler has given the order to prepare
for war with tl1e USSR. War will be declared in March 194 1 .
Instructions have been issued to verify the information.

Confirmation swiftly followed: Tupikov stood by his sources, which were

'based not 011 rumours, but on a special written directive by Hitler' that
was 'exceedingly secret and known only to a few people'. Molotov's visit
to Berlin reminded the informants of the 1939 trip by Colonel Beck, the
Polish Foreign Minister, summoned to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler after
the plans for the occupation of Poland had already been finalized. Both
the letter and the evaluation were dispatched to Stalin personally.41 He
was also aware of instructions to the Luftwaffe to initiate an extensive
programme of reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory in the border
regions.42
A summary survey by the Ukrainian and Belorussian chiefs of the
NKGB depicted tl1e establishment of an Army Quarters Command post in
Warsaw, massive transfers of troops and conversion of civilian institutions
into barracks, fortification of major rail junctions and installation of anti­
aircraft defences. Of similar significance was the dramatic rise in border
incidents with the Germans: while there were twenty-two minor incidents,
which were quickly solved by the local commanders, between the signing
of the agreements with Germany up to June 1940, this number had risen
to 187 in the second part of 1 940.43 An intercepted telegram from the
Japanese embassy in Bucharest disclosed information from the German
126 Gra11d Delusion

ambassador: 'The situation has reached the decisive pr1ase. Germany has
completed its full deployment from Finland to the Black Sea and is con­
\rinced of an easy \7ictory. Rumania, too, as far as possible, is carry ing out
preparations so that she \-Vill be in a position to take part immediately.'44
Alarmingly, the threats \vere accompanied by reports on the unpre­
paredness of the Red Army for war. In early December Timoshenko even
complained to the Central Committee that no operative plan for war had
been deposited V\7ith the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, the Chief of Staff
had not been briefed about the situation on the borders. In a subsequent
report Merkulov warned about the dismal state of the troops on the
eastern borders.45 Stalin reacted by con\1ening an extraordinary confer­
ence of the High Command of the Red Army at the end of December in
MosC0\\7•46 The intensi,,e sessions touched on all aspects of the reorgani­
zation of the armed forces: the training programme, 'operational art', the
armoured and mechanized units, the air force and so on. Though
the \1arious lectures showed remnants of the sophistication reached by the
So,riet military in the 1930s, an oppressive atmosphere and Stalin's
instructions on the need to devise 'new war ideologies' led at the end of
the day to a general confusion.
Despite the taboo against Tukhachevsky, Zhukov, as well as Timo­
shenko, clung to his theories like a life belt. They expected the Red Army
to be able to contain the enemy in the initial phase of the war and later
to exploit the success \Vhile inflicting the 'main strike' (udar). However,
confidence in the doctrine had been somewhat undermined b)' fear of
Stalin and e\1en more so by fascination V\.,ith the Blitzkrieg tactics employed
in the West. Worse still, since most of the architects of the novel theory
had been purged, the ability to grasp the doctrine fully and translate it
into action \Vas limited. It was not until the Battle of Kursk in summer
1943 that it was finally restored to its full scope, paving the way for
impressi\1e Russian \rictories.47 Tne temptation to transfer elements of the
'miraculous' German prescription into V\.,hat Stalin and some of his gen­
erals termed the 'modern contemporary war' was almost irresistible. Gen­
erals Romanenko, Stern, Pavlov and Zhukov now almost fanatically
advocated the augmentation of the armoured formatiorLs, compl aining
about the slow pace of production.48
Zhukov, and to some degree Timoshenko in his concluding words,
came closest to ad\Tocating full rehabilitation of Tukhache\1sky's theories.
Zhuko\1 could see no substitute for the creation of a proper operational
defensi\1e zone, in V\Thich it \vo1.tld be possible to reorganize the rear effec­
tively and recruit forces for operational manoeuvres. The manoeuvres
V\1ere to be conducted at a depth ranging from 8-10 kilometres for an
infantrvJ
di\rision to 80-100 kilometres for an armv. J
Defence was therefore
to be pursued in stages: first the containment of the enemy, then the dis-
ruption of the offensive logic and the counter-offensi,.,e leading to the
The Red Army on Alert 127

annihilation of the opponent, and finally synchronized strikes to extend

the breakthrough in various directions.49
In closing the conference, Timoshenko did nothing to play down the
direct danger posed to the Russians by the 'most powerful' army ii1 the
'vorld. Nonetheless, it was probably fear of Stalin that led him to put
on a display of confidence, conveying to those present the feeling that
'although the war with Germany might be difficult and long, the country
had all it needed for a struggle to full victory'. This conclusion to a certain
extent diverted attention from the rather severe shortcomings which had
been revealed during the conference, especially by Zhukov's outspoken
criticism of the Defence Ministry.50
Hardly had the conference ended when the commanders were sum­
moned unexpectedly to the Kremlin. Stalin wore a grim look; Zhukov
could not fail to notice that 'it was not the same Stalin' that he had met
after his victo1·y over the Japanese at the Battle of Khalkin-Gol in autumn
1939. Members of the Politburo were present as well. Stalin opened rather
orninously by describing how he had spent a sleepless night following
Timoshenko's concluding talk. He cut short Timoshenko's comment that
the lecture had been submitted to him in advance: 'You don't reallv think
./

I have time to read every paper which is tossed at me.' Molotov then pro­
posed that Timoshenko prepare a new directive for the Red Army. This
new directive, inspired by the war games that followed shortly, led to the
spring mobilization and the deployment of the army on the western front
on the eve of the war. 51
Of the two war games conducted during the first two weeks of January
1941, the second, which has come to light only recently, was the most
significant. In this game, as will be discussed in some detail below,
Zhukov led the 'Reds' counter-attacking on the south-western front.
This had been the scenario most dreaded by Stalin. The eventual
build-up and deployment of the troops was derived from the games.
When the three operational directives issued on 22-23 June 1941 are
carefully scrutinized, it is apparent tl1at they were lifted directly from
the war game documents. Indeed, Anfilov, the renowned l�ussian mili­
tary historian, concedes that when General Pavlov, commander of the
western front, was faced with the German thrust, he took out the 1941
war game papers and tried to make sense of them while preparing his
response.52
The significance of the war games can hardly be overestimated.53 They
tested the plans which had been diligently worked out beforehand, exam­
ining the major theoretical questions of offence and defence in the context
of potential external threats. They further comprise an accurate repre­
sentation of the state of Soviet strategic thinking on the eve of the war.
Neither of the two major games presumed a Soviet aggressive or pre­
emptive strike. On the contrary, 'the set-up created for the games', as
128 Grand Delusion

attested by General Zakharov, 'was marked by dramatic episodes for

the eastern side; it very much resembled the events which occurred on
our borders in June 1941 following the treacherous attack of the
German-Fascist forces on the Soviet Union' .5.i
Both games, therefore, postulated a German offensive on various
fronts and exploFed defensive responses.55 The first, on 2-6 January,
anticipated that the Germans would strike in the central and northern
sectors. The main thrust of the 'Blues' (the Germans) was carried out
by about 160 divisions under Zhukov's command south of Brest and
towards Vladimir-Volynsky and Tarnopol'. A diversionary attack was
executed in the north by sixty divisions, aimed at distracting the Reds
from the main drive. The force was launched from East Prussia towards
Riga and Dvinsk and from the Suwaki and Brest region towards Bara­
novichi. The Soviet defence was under Pavlov's command. Though the
Germans penetrated deep into the Soviet defences, they failed to develop
the offensive manoeuvres and the attack petered out. But the alarm was
raised when Pavlov was unable to repel the enemy and the game ended
inconclusively with the Germans well established inside the Soviet
defences.
The second game was wider in scope and was conducted on 8-1 1
January. Pavlov and Zhukov now changed roles. While the first game
focused on a narrow sector comprising the Baltic countries, the second
was based on the revised operational plar., assuming that the south­
western front and the Balkans would be the main theatre of war. They
handled larger battle orders which assumed that the main strike would
be delivered in the south, posing a serious threat in the rear. Unlike
Pavlov, Zhukov conducted the defence according to the 'deep operations'
doctrine; containing the main attack in the south, l1e inflicted his main
strike on the Blue troops, virtually in the rear of the opponent, creating a
split between the main German thrust and the rear and causing a major
disruption. However, he failed in his subsequent attempts to use the
reserve troops to roll up the German offence through manoeuvring,
mostly because of the huge space which had to be covered.56
The games shook the confidence displayed at the conference and
exposed the vulnerability and deficiencies of the defence. The umpires of
the games drew unflattering conclusions about the performance of the
army:

The results of the first game demonstrated that the operative-strategic

outlook of most of the commanders of the highest level was far from
perfect and demanded further painstaking and persistent effort in
sharpening the sense of direction and management of large formations,
thorougl1 mastering of the character of current operations, their orga­
nization and planning, and then executing then1 in practice.
The Red Army on Alert 129

In view of this harsh judgment Stalin could have had few hopes of con­
ducting a military adventure. The most that might be achieved was that
the basic deficiencies of the defence as exposed in the games could be
rectified before the Germans moved on to the offensive.57
To varying degrees, both games brought about a 'dramatic moment' for
the Red forces, resembling the situation which they eventually encoun­
tered on 22 June 1941. The senior officers who had participated in the
games were about to return to their units when they were summoned to
the Kremlin on 1 3 January. Once again members of the Politburo were
present as well. Obviously shaken by the results of the games, Meretskov
gave a confused, illogical and inadequate report. Stalin interrupted him
halfway through, remarking that in war it was necessary not just 'to do
arithmetical calculations but also to take into account the operational art
of the commanders' . An attempt by Pavlov to defuse the tension, declar­
ing in a jocular way that the setback to the Reds had happened 'only in
war games', made Stalin lose all interest in the rest of his presentation.
Meretskov was then subjected to a merciless rebuke by Stalin. 'The
trouble', he concluded, 'is that we do not have a proper Chief of Staff,'
and he there and then dismissed the stunned Meretskov. The next after­
noon, Zhukov was rushed to the Kremlin directly from the war games
and informed of the Politburo's decision to appoint him as the Chief of
Staff. He assumed his position, after collecting his gear from Kiev, on 3 1
January, though not before a wide purge of the High Command and the
transfer of various senior commanders from command posts.58 Though
Zhukov had been criticized during the conference for his uncritical adher­
ence to the offensive theories, his relative success in the war games and
particularly in the crucial south-western wing, together with the prestige
he had gained at Khalkin-Gol, seems to have won Stalin's approval.
Zhukov was also the only officer present at the meeting who attempted
to draw concrete lessons from the games, reviving the modernized oper­
ational theory and advocating the establishment of the strongholds
( ukraplenie raiony, or URs) at some distance from the front, increasing the
manoeuvrability of the operational level and preventing a static defen­
sive war.59 Neither the games nor the military conference succeeded in
solving the essential strategic problems that arose once it was recognized
that the Soviet Union was already facing the 'most threatening war
period' . Specifically, it continued to be assumed that 'defence will essen­
tially play an auxiliary supportive role in the achievement of the desig­
nated goals'. Little attention, therefore, was paid to the possibility of
60
fighting a battle to escape an encirclement.
The unpreparedness of the armed forces as revealed by the conference
and the war games, coupled with the NKVD reports on the state of the
fronts, helps explain Stalin's desperate attempts to postpone the war, and
his cautious handling of the deployment in the months preceding the
130 Grand Delusion

war. 61 Likewise, the resort to diplomacy as the best means of out­

manoeuvring Hitler became even more pronounced after the loss of the
Balkans. An equally significant factor was the realization that industry
could not cope with the new demands at such short notice. An investi­
gation carried out by the NKVD during the war games disclosed that the
master plan for the construction of railways had fallen far behind. Nor
had the emergency plans ordered by the Red Army's Chief of Staff been
fulfilled: no co-ordinated plan existed for the administration of the rail­
ways during the first months of the war. The handling of the mobiliza­
tion plans in this context had not even been discussed, and the railways
leading to the front line cot.lid not handle more than 30 per cent of the
traffic anticipated. In the central sector of Minsk, for instance, no more
than 16.7 per cent of the budget allocated for the improvement of the rail­
ways had been used. On average less than 1 2 per cent of the plans for the
expansion of the railways had been accomplished. Heavy tanks had to be
transferred to the fro11t on 60-ton platforms; only 387 such platforms were
available, and not a single one had been constructed in 1940. Only about
50 per cent of supplies ii1dispensable for the construction of an adequate
transport system to the front, such as rails, telegraph posts and railway
sleepers, were available. Finally, the alarm was sounded that work on
the Baltic mobilization system had 'not even started' .62 Intensive mea­
sures were indeed taken by the SNK to give a boost to the 'prod u,ction of
defensive materials' throughout 1941, placing great emphasis on the con­
struction of new industrial complexes which could cater for the new
demands.63

The Gathering Clouds

Contrary to the prevailing view, the Soviet intelligence community pre­

ceded its V\1estern counterparts in providing precise and accurate infor­
mation on German intentions at the end of 1940.64 The rapid pace of
events in the closing months of 1940 gave way to a temporary lull in early
194 1 . This was partly a rest1lt of the suspension of the diplomatic dialogue
with Germany. On the military side it reflected the fact that winter con­
ditions prevented major troop movements, giving rise to speculation.
But the lull did not lead to complacency. The recognition of the immi­
nent danger and the need to combat it effectively by improved intelli­
gence and counter-intelligence led to a major reform of the security
services in early February. The Ministry of the Interior was divided: the
NKVD was entrusted with interior affairs while the NKGB focused on
external issues.65 Merkulov, the newly appointed director of the NKGB,
was quick to draw Stalin's attention to the fact that tl1e German High
Command was 'pursuing systematic preparations for a war against the
The Red Army on Alert 131

Soviet Union'. A briefing of senior German officers, with the aid of oper­
ational maps, revealed that the intention was to detach the European part
of the USSR from Leningrad to the Black Sea and to establish there a state
with a gover11ment friendly to Germany. The war aimed at ensuring com­
plete control of the industrial centres of Russia.66 The general report was
backed up by numerous items of strategic intelligence. A typical case was
t11e report of a visit paid by an Obergruppenfiihrer, wearing the Iron
Cross1 to a doctor in Bucharest. Once loosened up he confided that the
plans for an attack on England had been abandoned. The German army,
he explairted, consisted of 10 million drafted men who were 'bored' and
longing for battle. The war machine could not remain 'unemployed'. He
then unfolded the plans:

We shall march through the Ukraine and the Baltic regions. The entire
continent of Europe will fall under our influence. The Bolsheviks will
have no space but beyond the Urals; the Fiihrer has decided to strike
and free Europe from the enemies of today and tomorrow. Our cam­
paign against Russia will be a military walkover. Governors of Odessa,
Kiev and other major cities 11ave already been appointed.67

From Berli11 'Starshina' warned that ai1· surveillance of the Soviet

Union 'was proceeding at a full pace'. The planes, taking off from
Bucharest, Konigsberg and Kirkenes, were covering the entire length
of the border. The photographs were collated in the Intelligence Depart­
ment of the air force. The possibility of Russian resistance was dismissed
out of hand, and the common belief was that the Red Army would
collapse within eight days. Stalin's continued focus on his south-western
borders was fully justified, as most of the information indicated Hitler's
intention of depriving Russia of her economic and industrial basis in
the Ukraine. Once the Ukraine collapsed, the Wehrmacht was expected
to move into the Caucasus and northwards towards the Ural Mountains,
completing the operation within twenty-five days.68 The appreciation
vindicated 'Corsicanets', wl10 had concluded that Halder was confident
of a 'lightning seizure' of the Ukraine and considered the capture of the
Baku oil indL1stries intact to be a 'light task'. Moreover, a four-year plan­
ning committee had been instructed to prepare a list of the economic
resources which Germany might gain from an occupation of European
Russia.69
The still vague strategic intelligence was 1nore than compensated for
by concrete operational information. The GRU adhered to the view that
the German High Command was 'continuing with great intensity the
work on the engineering preparations of the war theatre against the USSR
and on the replacement of old units with increasingly fresh ones'. It
was now estimated that the reorganization of the Wehrmacl1t would
132 Grand Delusio11

substantially augment the German war machine to 250-60 infantry

·
divisions, twenty tank divisions and fifteen motorized ones.70 In mid ­
February, Kobulov, the Berlin resident of the NKGB, dispatched a special
intelligence report which was circulated to the Politburo and the Central
Committee. It revealed the strenuous efforts of the Wehrmacht to increase
the army to eight million men by recruiting and mobilizing the resources
of the occupied territories: over a short period twenty-five new infantry
divisions, five tank divisions and five motorized divisions had been
created. Similar trends were discerned in all the countries bordering
Germany. The report warned that with the approach of spring Russia
would encounter strong measures of mobilization on all fronts, leading
to the expansion of the armies along the border. 71
In mid-March, Golikov sent Stalin a most alarming report, this time
focusing on Germany's industrial potential, which raised the possibility
that she might be able to conduct war on two fronts simultaneously.
Golikov was now daily receiving disturbing reports in this vein from his
attaches in various capitals. The emphasis placed on the economic side
of the campaign in these reports, did not, however, detract from their
political significance. The military attache in Bucharest, for instance,
reported that a German major had told a friend: 'We have completely
altered our plans. We aim at the East, at the USSR. We shall seize the Soviet
grain, coal and oil. We shall then be invincible and will be able to c;ontinue
the war against England and the United States.' The Wehrmacht appeared
to be synchronizing the attack on the Soviet Union with the Rumanian
army, scheduling its commencement for within three months.72
The reports by Golikov continued to depict in sombre colours the reor­
ganization and expansion of the German armed forces during the winter
months. Since September 1940, he warned, the number of infantry divi­
sions had increased from 228 to 263. Five new tank divisions had been
added to the fifteen in existence while five motorized divisions had been
added to the previous ten. He then provided exact figures on their allo­
cation within the various units, adding illuminating tables to drive home
the message. He found the increase to be noteworthy, bearing in mind
that during the Battle of France the Germans had had only two or three
tank divisions. Golikov further warned of the large strides taken by the
Luftwaffe in the development and production of new types of aircraft.
Here too a minutely detailed table exhibited the improvements and inno­
vations introduced to aircraft such as the Heinke! N-113, the Focke-Wulf
FB-187 and 198 and the Messerschmitt 'Jaguar ' . Golikov overestimated
the German production capabilities, expecting them to release some
25,000-30,000 planes within a year. He also expected the German air force
to produce bombers with a range of 1 ,700-2,000 kilometres, able to fly at
an altitude of 61000-7,000 metres and at a speed of 75ok.m.h. Further
ominous information indicated that the Germans had accelerated the pro-
The Red Army on Alert 133

duction of the advanced Mark VII tanks and had improved the heavy
ones seized by the Germans in France. Equally horrifying was the minute
description of the development of chemical warfare, to the extent that 'the
military chemical industry can envisage the mass usage of gas at any
moment'.73
Shortly afterwards the NKVD informed the government (usually a
euphemism for Stalin and Molotov and occasionally the Politburo) and
the Central Committee that information obtained from within the German
headquarters revealed that Halder did not expect any difficulties in over­
powering the Russians. The report attributed the anticipated campaign
to the need for raw materials, which Germany hoped to derive from
the Ukraine. Such reports are particularly striking when compared with
the general and circumstantial nature of the information available to
British intelligence at the time, dwarfing the significance of Churchill's
warning:74

The Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, Lt.-Gen. Halder, predicts

certain success and the swift occupation by German forces of the Soviet
Union, and above all of the Ukraine, where according to Halder' s esti­
mate successful operations will be facilitated by the better condition of
the railways and roads. Halder also sees as an easy task the occupation
of Baku and its oil industry, which the German will apparently be able
to restore quickly following war damage. Halder feels that the Red
Army will not be in a position to put up any serious resistance to a
lightning attack by German forces and will not even be successful in
destroying their stores.
The estimates of Col. Bekker, on the other hand, underline the enor­
mous economic effect that will be achieved as a result of military oper­
ations against the USSR.75

Concurrently counter-intelligence reported a significant rise in the

rumours indicating that a German offensive against Russia might indeed
precede the subjugation of Britain. Cripps was quoted as having received
such assurances from General John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, and Eden during his visit to Ankara.76 When the focus of attention
shifted to South-eastern Europe, military attaches in the Balkans
confirmed that the Germans had decided to postpone the attack on
the British Isles and together with Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria to
seize the Ukraine and push towards Baku in April-May.77 A German
informant disclosed in Bucharest that Hitler, backed by a vast military
machine craving action, was determined 'to strike and liberate Europe
from todays foes. Our advance into Russia will be a military stroll.'
He dismissed out of hand the suggestion that Hitler was determined to
avoid a war on two fronts and mocked the idea that he was committed
1 34 Grand Delusion

to friendship between the two countries: 'That is how it was before, but
now we do not have two fronts. Now the situation has changed.
We will smash the English little by little witl1 air power and submarines.
England is no 1011ger a front.'78 So far as the nature of the blow was
concerned, information originating from the Luftwaffe staff suggested
that the Germans might launch an air strike at the end of April or
beginning of May.79
The trickle of operational intelligence turned into a flood in mid-March,
reflecting the German encroachment into the Balkans in preparation for
Operation 'Marita'. The intelligence reinforced the Soviet obsession with
the threat they faced in the south-western theatre. Stalin seems to have
been entirely overwhelmed by the events unfolding in the south, which
he undoubtedly hoped would pin Hitler down. A largely accurate assess­
ment of the German build-up in the Balkans reached Moscow in mid­
March. It depicted the intensity of the process, which had caused severe
traffic congestion.
It would be wrong to assume, however, that the corresponding
build-up on Russia's western borders was overlooked. The reports
continued to depict, though laconically, the concentration there of some
100 divisions.8° From Berlin Stalin was informed that the Luftwaffe
had speeded up its consolidation in tl1e eastern arena. Sources close to
the General Staff disclosed that 'the decision has been taken, by the
Germans to take military action against the Soviet Union in the spring
of this year. The Germans are counting on the fact that the Red Army
will be routed and will not be in a position to destroy the grain.'81 Reports
from Paris revealed that the infantry had been transferred to the East
and replaced by inexperienced troops.82 The move was corroborated
by reports from Vichy of the transfer of infantry and tank divisions,
which had been earmarked to participate in the invasion of Britain, from
northern France to Rumania and Bulgaria.83 Just as alarming was a
report from Vienna that General Antonescu had discussed with Goring
the possible participation of Rumania in a German offensive against the
USSR.84
An easy judgment would therefore be to present Stalin, as Churchill
does in his memoirs, as a 'simpleton'. However, although much of the
data conveyed a fairly coherent picture of the German menace, a supple­
mentary body of evidence, while not dismissing the danger, questioned
the inevitability of war and raised various scenarios relating to the con­
ditions in which such a war would erupt. The all too familiar human flaw
of intelligence now came into play; the information was either tailored to
confirm the views held at the top, or was presented in an ambiguous way
so as to accommodate political expectations through selective reading.
Tl1e yardstick for both was the overbearing fear of a premature and
unnecessary embroilment in the Balkans.
The Red Army on Alert 135

The 'war season' opened in spring 1941 with Hitler's engagements in

the Balkans, which a priori confirmed the assumption that war against the
Soviet Union was 'unthinkable prior to the defeat of England'.85 Such an
appraisal did not follow strategic logic but rather fell prey to Hitler's
intensive disinformation campaign diverting attention from the regroup­
ing of the troops, paralleled by the resumption of air raids on London.86
As was most aptly put by the Soviet military attache in Budapest, the
rumours of war were 'fabricated' by British propaganda. For Germany
the war with England was 'ample', and she was only 'interested in peace­
ful econonlic relations with the Soviet Union'. 87
In presenting his fortnightly report on 20 March Golikov promptly set
the tone for the Kremlin's evaluation: 'The majority of the intelligence
reports which indicate the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union in
spring 1941 emerge from Anglo-American sources, the immediate
purpose of which is undoubtedly to seek the worsening of relations
between the USSR and Germany.' He now presented, without further
commentary, sixteen reports which he thought deserved 'special atten­
tion'. 'These, however, were heavily edited to conform with what he
believed to be Stalin's preconceptions. The almost axiomatic assumption
of the summarized reports was the belief that Germany would not launch
an attack on Russia before England was defeated. Some focused on a
struggle presumed to be taking place within the German leadership on
the issue of war.88 The long report played down information concerning
the actual German plans for tl1e campaign, as it was assumed that war
could still be averted or at least postponed by diplomatic means. On the
whole it corresponded to the evaluation which had directed the war
games in January. The only marked divergence was fresh information
gleaned from Swedish sources in Berlin, which later proved to be totally
accurate. Its reliability, however, appeared suspect, coming as it did from
Cripps.89 It actually depicted with great precision the three thrusts along
the entire front, with the focus now moving to the centre, even naming
the commanders in charge and pinpointing the date of the attack to 20
May (Hitler was later forced to revise the date because of the Balkan
diversion and delays in the deployment). But Golikov gave more promi­
nence to {other sources' which assumed that Germany would attack the
Soviet Union only 'after the victory over England', striking from two
directions, in the north, probably from Finland, and from the Balkans.
Golikov did take some precautions, mentioning the dissonant views from
Rumania that Hitler had actually char1ged his plans and intended to
attack the Soviet Union before completing the campaign against England,
as the front in the West had virtually ceased to exist. However, one should
not place too much weight on this digression, which paled in com­
parison with the fact that the entire document was summed up with the
definite conclusion that 'the opening of hostilities against the Soviet
 Grand Delusion

Union will occur in the wake of the victory over England or after the co_n­
clusion with her of a peace advantageous to Germany' . Even more
insidious was the firm assessment that 'rumours and documents sug­
gesting the inevitability of war against the Soviet Union this spring
should be evaluated as disinformation, emanating from the British and
also possibly from German intelligence'.90 These, then, were the prevalent
views in Moscow as the curtain fell on Yugoslavia in early April, demon­
strating even more starkly the threat of war.

)
 7
At the Crossroads:
The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat

Following his usual custom, Hitler diverted his attention to Yugoslavia as

soon as Bulgaria fell in his net. In the spring of 1941 control of Yugoslavia
became crucial for his operational plans: the country was destined to
provide a shield against Russia on the left wing in the forthcoming cam­
paign in Greece and the right wing in Operation 'Barbarossa'. This was
dictated by the exigencies of Operation 'Marita', the occupation of Greece.
The build-up 11ad fallen behind schedule and the transfer of troops via
Yugoslavia was critical if Operation 'Barbarossa' was to be embarked
upon in early summer. Control of Yugoslavia was expected to shorten the
length of the campaign by allowing a rapid occupation of Saloniki, thus
keeping Operation 'Barbarossa' more or less on schedule. 1
Milan Gavrilovic;, the leftist leader of the Serbian Agrarian Party,
arrived in Moscow in June 1940, shortly after the fall of France, eager to
enlist Soviet support in detaching the Regent Prince Paul from Germany.
During his first visit to the Russian Foreign Ministry he went as far as to
advocate the creation of a Balkan Union governed by Slavophile ideas, in
which the Russian language would replace the diverse Slavic dialects. In
his memoirs General Sudoplatov, the deputy director of Foreign Intelli­
gence, claims that together with Fedotov, the director of Counter­
intelligence, he 'formally recruited' Gavrilovi<; as an agent.2 Whether or
not this is true, Gavrilovic; certainly co-operated closely with the Kremli11,
though he was suspected from the outset of conniving with Cripps to
embroil Russia in war with Germany.
Because of their fear of provocation the Russians at first ostentatiously
confined their conversations with Gavrilovi<; to 'ethnography, geography,
literature, art, linguistics and a historical debate on the origins of the
Serbian people' .3 Virtually in exile and estranged from his own Foreign

1 37
 Grand Delusion

Ministry, Gavrilovi<; gradually inspired the Russians to seek the support

of the Yugoslav military, which disapproved of the government's veering
towards Germany. Clandestine talks were indeed initiated in Paris at the
end of September 1940;4 the Yugoslav Chief of Staff wasted little time in
submitting his shopping list. In an unprecedented move the newly
appointed Yugoslav military attache was received by Marshal Timo­
shenko, the Defence Minister, and the Chief of Staff General Meretskov.5
After the fiasco of Molotov's visit to Berlin, the offer of armaments
assumed a more concrete forn1. Lieutenant-Colonel Bozhina Simi<;, who
had fought with the Red Army during the Civil War, was selected to lead
a military mission to Moscow. Reports from the Soviet mission in Bel­
grade testified that 'in parades and in the barracks, the officers are openly
singing our military songs in praise of Stalin'.6 Feelers were also made
through the Yugoslav embassy in Ankara. The German guarantees to
Rumania had certainly brought the two countries together by barring
Soviet movement into the Balkans, now placed under total German
domination.7
Hitler, ltowever, took swift measures to nip Soviet influence in
Yugoslavia in the bud. Shortly after Molotov's visit to Berli11 Cincar­
Markovi<;, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, followed the well-worn path
trodden by the other Balkan leaders to Berchtesgaden, where he was
warned by Hitler of Russia's Pan-Slavic ambitions, 'borrowed from the
testaments of Peter the Great and the Empress Catherine' .8 By then,
however, Yugoslavia's subservience to Germany had been determined, as
the German minister in Belgrade i11formed Berlin, by the 'unqualified
recognition of Germany's military supremacy on the Continent, and
growing realization of the senselessness of Russophile tendencies' .9 For
the time being Hitler's wish to harness Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact
was frustrated by the fear of her armed forces that Yugoslavia would be
used as a springboard for the invasion of Greece.1 0 The split between the
military and the politicians was to play a major role in Yugoslavia's rela­
tions with Russia following the dramatic coup in March 194 1 .
The continued drift of the Yugoslav government towards Germany in
early 1941 led the Russians to stall the armaments transaction. To avoid
provocation which might lead to a collision with Germany, Molotov cau­
tioned Soviet diplomats in Belgrade against British and German attempts
to 'draw them into conversations which might later give them a basis
.11
for speculation making use of the Soviet Union in their own interests'
The harsh measures taken in Belgrade against 'communist subversion'
and the expulsion of the Tass correspondent there did little to ease the
.12
atmosphere
With time running short for Hitler after Bulgaria's entry into the Axis,
the Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetkovi<; was ordered to Berchtesgaden
together with Cincar-Markovi<;. Cvetkovi<;, in the now predictable
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat 139

pattern, tried in vain to defer a decision on joining the Axis by pointing

out the Soviet concern and exploiting the increasing Soviet-German
tension. Ribbentrop not only dismissed such suggestions but assured
his guests that Stalin was 'a sensible, clear-thinking man' who knew
perfectly well that a conflict witl1 Germany would 'lead to the destruction
of his regime and his country' . Hitler cunningly discouraged Cvetkovic;
from playing the Russian card by disclosing to him that in Berlin Molotov
had offered Bulgaria territorial changes at Yugoslavia's expense. By
the end of the visit the scene was set for a meeting of Hitler with Prince
Paul, who was also subjected to Hitler's regular mixture of threats and
cajoling.13
The diplomatic game, at wluch Stalin had so far excelled, was faltering
in early 194 1 . With Rumania and Bulgaria already orbiting Germany,
Yugoslavia alone stood between Russia and Germany in the Balkans.
Stalin had been carefully monitoring the strategic debate in London
concerning British assistance to Greece. It did not escape him that on
their OV\7n the British could not possibly reactivate the Balkans against
the 'unemployed German army'. Eden, for instance, had been inciting
Maisky, warning tl1at Yugoslavia's drift to Germany and 'the loss of
Salonika would be a threat to the Straits, in the future of which Russia
had a historic interest' . Stalin therefore had become increasingly obsessed
with what he conceived to be a British scheme to lead Russia into a pre­
mature confrontation with the Germans in the Balkans. Moreover, by
focusing his attention on the British and the Yugoslavs he underrated the
real danger lurking around the corner.14
Stalin had been informed about the guarantees which Hitler was off­
ering Yugoslavia in return for joining the Axis. As he expected the
Yugoslav politicians and court to yield to the pressure, he attributed the
forthcoming visit to Moscow of the military delegation headed by Simi<;
to a British plot.15 Moreover, the popular sympathy for Russia in
Yugoslavia seemed to be effectively checked by Prince Paul's pro-British
sentiments and Cincar-Markovic;' s pro-German leanings. Gavrilovic;' s
proposals for co-operation were dismissed therefore as feelers 'of an
exploratory nature'; after all, his standing with the Yugoslav government
was poor while his skills in diplomacy were said to be 'confined at best
to playing chess' .16 Within the Cabinet Tupanjanin, deputy leader of the
Agrarian Party, himself on the NKVD' s payroll, questioned the sincerity
of the Yugoslav initiative, as the two countries had 'only just got on to
nodding terms' .17
In the meantime Stalin was briefed by 'Sophocles', the military attache
in Belgrade, about Prince Paul's agreement to join the Axis during his
meeting with Hitler in early March. Reliable sources in the palace
re\realed that, in an attempt to discourage the Yugoslavs from playing
the Russian card, Hitler 11. ad disclosed to the Prince his intentions of
 Grand Delt£sio11

abandoning the plans for war against England in favour of seizing

the Ukraine and Baku in April-May. But equally significant V\ras the
disclosure by 'Sophocles' that 'the real power in Yugoslavia novv lies in
the hands of the General Staff, -vvithout whom the Council of Ministers
\!\Till undertake nothing' .1 The apparent defiance of the government
by the armed forces raised nevv hopes. These vvere reinforced by Simic;' s
attitude in his secret talks at the Ministry of Defence, where he favourably
considered co-operation to counter the German threat. Moreo\1er, suspi­
cion of England was somewhat alle\1iated by the Yugoslav refusal to allow
Eden and General Dill to '.'isit Belgrade, -vvhich indicated their intention
of 'holding the scales even' . 19 The German ambassador himself fore­
V\rarned the Wilhelmstrasse that the Yugoslav government was sitting in
.2u
continuous session,.. 'and not for drinking coffee'
As in the Bulgarian case, Soviet efforts \Vere directed toV\rards the mobi­
lization of popular support in Belgrade; this \-Vas done both through
diplomatic channels and through the Comintern. Lebedev, the Soviet
ambassador in Yugoslavia, V\1as charged with exposing the insincerity of
the Yugosla\1 go\1ernment' s overtures to Russia, which concealed the
German-Yugoslav activities �ehind the scene'. 21 Tito, the leader of the
Yugoslav Communist Party, \-vas instructed 'to mobilize the Party against
the capitulation to the Germans. Support the movement for a mass oppo­
sition to the incursion of the German military into Yugoslavia. Demand
friendship with the So'.1iet Union.'22 Public opinion Y\Tas moulded in
Belgrade to press the government to make concrete propositions.
Concurrently, Tupanjanin, folloV\ing instructions from Moscow, leaked
information on the forthcoming negotiations with the military. Gavrilovic;
exerted direct pressure on Cincar-Y!arkovic;, pointing to the se\1ere
domestic repercussions which the failure of the negotiations might have.
He tried to lure the Prime Minister, suggesting that if proposals made by
the government \\Tere e\tentually rejected in Mosco\v the people \\7ould
then blame the Russians and not the government at home. He further sug­
gested that the government would be exonerated if the Russians were to
agree in principle but impose harsh conditions and drag out the negoti­
ations. But it seems that his main objective in setting the negotiations in
motion was to put the Russians to the test: to find out to vvhat extent the
manifest discontent of the Soviet military with the Germans was endorsed
by the Kremlin.23
The British Foreign Office V\ras not far off the mark in suspecting Stalin
of 'playing Y\1ith Yugosla\ria . . . in order to impress Hitler \\1ith a \Tie\\! to
extracting better conditions from him'. '}-i The military negotiations in
Mosco\\' v\1ere marked by the So\1iet resolve to establish a military alliance
'"'hich V\rould restore the equilibrium with Germany and force Hitler to
the negotiating table.25 There is a certain similarity to the motives \\1hich
had led Chamberlain to guarantee Poland after the German occupation
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat

of Prague in March 1939. Both sides, however, acted prudently. Stalin,

perhaps in a mirror image, continued to suspect the Yugoslavs of using
the negotiations with the Russians as a card in their negotiations with the
Germans, and the British of trying to ensnare Russia in war. He was fully
aware of Eden's efforts during his prolonged tour of the Middle East to
form a defensive bloc of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.26
This was only aggravated by Cripps' s unceasing attempts to alert the
Russians to the German danger. Unaware that the die had been cast by
Prince Paul, Cripps pursued his attempts to enlist Russia's help. Already
during his consultations with Vinogradov in Ankara he had suggested
that the Germans might carry out their advance against Greece through
Yugoslavia. He did ' not exclude the possibility that the Yugoslav army,
which was 'not bad', might even give assistance to Britain. He was of
course hoping to give Eden's idea of a Balkan bloc a new lease of life.
Cripps suggested that England take part in the clandestine military talks
under way in Moscow, the existence of which Vinogradov of course
would not admit.27 Shortly after his return from Turkey, Cripps indeed
found out from Gavrilovic; that Simic;' s talks had revealed that the mili­
tary authorities in Moscow were 'most anxious' to reach a military agree­
ment with Yugoslavia.28
Cripps sprang into action as soon as news of the Regent's decision
to join the Tripartite Pact reached the embassy in the afternoon of 22
March 1941. He depicted the German objectives to Vyshinsky in sombre
colours, as had become his habit. Vyshinsky, who received the news
'very seriously', promised to communicate with his government. Cripps
did not stop there, sending Gavrilovic; to Vyshinsky with a proposal to
issue a communique which would repudiate the common belief that tl1e
Soviet Union was 'abandoning the Balkans and Yugoslavia to Germany's
sphere of interests' .29 Cripps' s zeal did little but invigorate Stalin's suspi­
cion of a British plot. On Cripps' s return to the Kremlin in the evening,
expecting to continue the 'friendly discussion', he was snubbed by
Vyshinsky when he started elaborating the obstacles to German designs
in the Balkans if Yugoslavia were to be encouraged by the Russians
to preserve her independence. Vyshinsky also chose this moment to
produce a catalogue of supposedly hostile British acts against Moscow.30
Gavrilovic; himself was recalled to the Foreign Ministry at midnight,
where he found Vyshinsky to be 'obviously anxious and sympathetic but
also afraid'. Vyshinsky seemed to fear that the efforts to induce Russia to
intervene after the irreversible decision had been taken by Yugoslavia
were a trap.31
German disinformation convinced Stalin of the wisdom of his policies.
In Ankara, Papen, the German ambassador, strongly denied the rumours
of German intentions to use Yugoslavia as a springboard to occupy
the Straits. He went further to mollify the Russians, suggesting that the
 Grand Delusion

association with Yugoslavia was exclusively aimed at checking the British

in the Balkans and the Black Sea, and that Germany could 'win the war
only if it went hand in hand with the Russians' .32
The cards, however, were reshuffled on 27 March; General Sushan
Simovi<;, the co1nmander of the Yugoslav air force, executed a bloodless
coup in Belgrade with the support of the armed forces. Prince Paul was
deposed and exiled while the young King Peter was installed on the
throne. To close observers it was patently clear that the coup came as a
surprise in Moscow. There could hardly be a covert or overt' Soviet
/

involvement in a coup orchestrated by the British Special Operations

Executive. Although General Solomon Milstein, deputy director of the
GRU, accompanied by a few 'illegals' had been especially sent to Bel­
grade, his task in the affair, if any, was confined to monitoring 'British
plots' .33
Despite his excellent sources, Stalin had not been privy to Hitler's
harsh and irrevocable decision to 'smash Yugoslavia militarily and as a
state', even if Operation 'Barbarossa' had to be postponed by four weeks.
Hitler, however, faced a surprise as well, since he assumed that Russia
would not react. 34 Stalin found it increasingly difficult not to be swayed
by the popular S1.1pport enjoyed by the i11surgents. The Yugoslav govern­
ment were at a loss in their attempts to curb the widespread demonstra­
tions against the pact. The Soviet ambassador could hardly hide his
excitement in reporting home that 'the entire population of Belgrade
swarmed the streets, waving the national flags' and was allowed to
'openly express its feelings'. Moreover1 the masses seemed to be pinning
their hopes on the Soviet Union. The association with Moscow, Lebedev
commented, was related to expectations of an 'abrogation of the shame­
ful pact with tl1e Axis and in particular with hated Germany . . . From the
early hours of the morning thousands of people had been gathering in
front of the Soviet embassy raising banners calling for· an ''Alliance with
the Soviet Union!'' ' Later on the demonstrators moved to the neighbour­
ing German embassy, shouting hostile slogans and breaking the windows
of the German tourist bureau. The numbers of demonstrators 'increased
so markedly that by the evening the crowds could no longer reach the
embassy but they continued to call for an ''Alliance with the Soviet
Union!'' '35
Further reports reflected the bitter criticism of the government's pro­
German policies. The army was being mobilized when the Yugoslav del­
egation returned from Vienna in disguise, avoiding Belgrade's main
railway station. Carried away by the defiant spirit of Belgrade, Lebedev
rather prematurely supposed that the coup had brought an end to the
extensive German political presence in Yugoslavia; he already cherished
the hope tl1at it would lead to a dramatic reversal of the political trend
not only in the Balkan States but over the entire European Continent.36
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coilp d'Etat 143

The impression was corroborated by General Golikov, the director of Mil­

itary Intelligence. He too emphasized the pro-Soviet nature of the demon­
strations, which were dominated. by slogans such as 'For a unio11 with the
Soviet Union' and 'To the health of Stalin and Molotov'. He now expected
the army to reject the secret clauses of the agreement, which granted
German troops free passage in the south of the country, and did not
exclude the possibility that Yugoslavia might withdraw from the Axis. His
appreciation that the forty-eight divisions just mobilized were deter­
mined and competent to thwart a German invasion certainly enjoyed the
support of the Chief of Staff .37
Though undoubtedly relieved, Stalin was not quick to display the
brazen military defiance of Ge1�many that is commonly portrayed in
the literature. He remained cautious, as it was an open secret that the coup
had not brought about a full reversal of Yugoslav policies. After assum­
ing power Simovi\ informed tl1e King of his intention of adhering to the
Axis. He was quick to reassure the German ambassador that Yugoslavia
stood for 'continued co-operation with the Axis Powers, particularly with
Germany', and a 'return as far as possible to a policy of netttrality' .38
Stalin's limited objective re1nained therefore to manipulate the surge of
popular support as a means of deterring Hitler from spreading the war,
and the British from exploiting the volatile situation. In the absence of a
direct dialogue with the Belgrade government prior to the coup, Russian
attempts to inhibit Yugoslavia from joining the Axis were conducted
through the Communist Party. In the new circumstances urgent steps
were taken to dampen popular enthusiasm. Dimitrov, the J.>resident of the
Comintern, was promptly instructed by Molotov to call off street demon­
strations which, he feared, might be 'exploited by the British as well as
by the domestic reactionaries' .39 Tito was instructed to watch over 'the
unruly British warmongers and Great Serbian chauvinists, who are
pushing the country into military slaughter by their provocations'. Stalin
clearly hoped to redress the shifting balance of power by preserving
Yugoslavia's sovereignty, preventing her from becoming 'ammunition in
the hands of the British imperialists as well as . . . tl1e slaves of the German
and Italian aggressors' .40
In the meantime Gavrilovi\' s standing in Moscow was enhanced by his
appointment to a ministerial post in the newly formed Cabinet. By sheer
chance his departure home, in protest against the signature of the pact,
had been prevented by bad weather.41 As soon as the new regime had
established itself Simovi\ sent the Russians an oral offer of a mutual assis­
tance pact which was tantamount to a 'real alliance'. A stronger appeal
was made the same evening by the new Defence Minister in a clandes­
tine meeting with the Soviet ambassador which took place at his own
lodgings. Ili\ reiterated his intention of establishing 'full political and mil­
itary co-operation with the Soviet Union'; he pledged the army's resolve
144 Gra11d Delilsion

to 'resist to the end' a German invasion. The breach between the govern­
ment and the armed forces seemed to be growing.42
On 31 March a landslide of intelligence reports, including a major one
by Merkulov corroborating an alarming report by Golikov about the pos­
sibility of war, arrived on Stalin's desk.43 The pressure from the Ministry
of Defence to pursue the Yugoslav negotiations increased. In the early
hours of the following day, Lebedev arrived at Simovic;' s apartment
accompanied by Sukhonin, the military attache, and a translator. He
informed the Prime Minister that Molotov had just accepted the offer of
a pact and wished a delegation to proceed swiftly to Moscow to conclude
the agreement. Simovic; wasted no time in telephoning Ninci<;, his Foreign
Minister, instructing him to appoint Gavrilovic; as the head of the dele­
gation so that negotiations could start even before the arrival of its other
members.44
When Lebedev met Nincic; the next morning, he gained the impression
that the Cabinet was split. He suspected that in a last-ditch attempt to
avert the conflict the Yugoslav government wished to use the Soviet lever­
age in Berlin. Somewhat naively, they anticipated that Hitler would leave
Yugoslavia alone if Stalin were to notify him that 'the Soviet Union had
immense sympathy towards the Yugoslav people' . On the other hand, the
fact that the Cabinet was determined to resist the British pressure to open
a new front in the Balkans certainly put Stalin's mind at rest.4;) In Moscow
feelings were mixed about the possibilities raised by the coup. Timo­
shenko seemed to entertain high hopes of the Yugoslavs' ability to resist
a German invasion, while Stalin perceived a limited agreement as a card
in his complex diplomatic game. Maintaining Russia's neutrality and
achieving recognition of her spheres of interests remained his prime aim.
The limited objectives were reflected even in Zhdanov's guidance to the
Comintern. 'The Balkan events', he stated, 'do not alter the general situ­
ation . . . We do not endorse the German expansion into the Balkans. This
does not mean that we withdraw from the pact with Germany and stand
by England.'46 The coup offered a heaven-sent opportunity of deferring
confrontation with Germany: a prudent agreement with the Yugoslavs
might deter Hitler and lead him to the i1egotiating table. If, however, hos­
tilities were to break out, Russia could still adhere to neutrality while
ensuring that the Yugoslavs tied down the Wehrrnacht for two months or
more, thus postponing the war with Russia for at least a year. This
explains the Soviet offer of munitions and supplies to Yugoslavia before
the magnitude of the defeat had become apparent.47 Thus the parameters
for the negotiations were established prior to the arrival of the Yugoslav
delegation in Moscow. They were subordinated to the common wish of
both governments to avert war rather than mount effective resistance to
Hitler. Far from annulling the agreement with Germany, efforts were
made to modify it to 'conform with Yugoslav interests' .48
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat 145

In the meantime hasty arrangements were made for the Yugoslav del­
egation to reach Moscow via Istanbul. However, visa formalities absorbed
an entire morning a11d the two officers were able to start their journey
aboard a special plane only around midday on 2 April. Torn between their
wish to react and fear of provocation, the Russians asked for the identi­
fying marks to be removed from the plane to prevent its recognition.
After a flight from Belgrade over Saloniki to Istanbul, the delegates were
diverted by an incomprehensible mistake to Ankara. A short delay
occurred before they could proceed to Odessa, finally landing in Moscow
in the early afternoon of 4 April.49
Stalin had hoped that a mere demonstration of solidarity with
Yugoslavia would suffice to inhibit Hitler from attacking her. While the
delegation was on its way the situation had altered dramatically. An
increasing flow of ominous intelligence unveiling the offensive German
deployment on their borders led the Yugoslavs to raise the stakes by
seeking a full military-political alliance with Russia. Naturally the pro­
posal had to be brought before Stalin, but Vyshinsky had little doubt that
'it was scarcely expedient to sign such agreements' . It was better for the
Yugoslavs to watch out for provocations, whether British or German,
while displaying a show of force, as 'the independence of a country was
best protected by a strong army'. Gavrilovic; insisted, however, that his
government 'firmly wished and expected an alliance with the Soviet
Unjon' .50 Indeed, Lebedev was summoned by the Prime Minister and con­
fronted with a fait accompli: the Yugoslav government regarded the agree­
ment as 'already in existence even if in practice it may have not yet been
signed' . Simo vie; counted on Stalin to present 'a strong Soviet demarche
in Berlin to stop a German intervention, or in any case provide Yugoslavia
with time to complete the mobilization'. As the outbreak of hostilities
could no longer be ruled out, the Russians were invited to place troops
and munitions in Yugoslavia. To goad Stalin into action Simovic; even
parted with fresh information obtained from Prince Paul, who had been
told by Hitler during their recent meeting about his intention of attack­
ing Russia.51
The dilemma facing Stalin became acute during 2-4 April in view of
a flow of startling intelligence. From inside Goring's headquarters the
agent 'Corsicanets' revealed that events in Yugoslavia were taken 'most
seriously' by the military. The Luftwaffe staff was 'conducting active
preparations for actions against Yugosla,1ia', which he expected to occur
imminently. The extensive campaign had even led them 'provisionally' to
abandon the preparations against Russia. He further raised expectations
in Moscow by suggesting that the Luftwaffe staff feared that the cam­
paign might last three or four weeks, 'delay the attack on the Soviet
Union and even threaten to miss the opportune moment for action against
the Soviet Union' .52 From Belgrade 'Sophocles' suggested that the
 Gra11d Delusion

Germans were applying psychological pressure on the Yugoslavs to dis­

courage them from further association with Russia. The Yugoslavs were
informed of Hitler's intention to 'start a war with the Soviet Union in May
and within 7 days reach Moscow' . Their military attache in Berlin gleaned
the information that the offensive would be conducted by three army
groups, under Field Marshals Rundstedt, List and Beck, which eventu­
ally turned out to be the precise German plan. However, Stalin's tactics
could still be defended, as the report assumed that an offensive would
be preceded by an ultimatum to the Soviet Union to join the Axis and
to offer economic concessions. It was now vital not to make any false
move.53
Negotiations with the Yugoslav mission were opened under the
shadow of these reports in the early afternoon of 4 April. It was now
apparent that the Russians were utterly opposed to the idea of a military
alliance which the Germans were bound to perceive as a blatant provo­
cation. They clung to the feeble technical excuse that such an agreement
required 'a serious mutual examination of the forces available for such
an arrangement'. Instead they opted for a treaty of friendship and non­
aggression. To test the water Molotov informed Schulenburg, as the
clauses of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact required, of the decision to sign
such a pact. Schulenburg's report home deliberately glossed 0\7er the dra­
matic tenor of the conversation. The tum of events in Yugoslavia now
threatened to jeopardize his efforts to enthrone Hitler as the modem Bis­
marck. In his earlier reports Schulenburg had dismissed the rumours of
Soviet military intervention as an 'evil Yugoslav intrigue' .5-1 Hoping to dis­
suade the Russians from proceeding with the negotiations, he warned
that the proximity of the agreement to the events in Belgrade might 'create
an undesirable impression in Berlin' . Molotov sought to emphasize the
limits of the agreement, which 'was not even as far-reaching as the
German-Yugoslav Treaty', and implied the continued adherence of
the Yugoslavs to the Axis.
The Russian records, however, reveal the intense and sour tone which
characterized the meeting. Schulenburg apparently warned Moloto\1 that
the \riolent demonstrations in Belgrade against Germany were bound to
be viewed in Berlin as a 'hostile act'. He dropped strong hints about
German intentio11s, expressing his doubts about the validity of the
Yugoslav-German Pact, whose signatories had already been imprisoned
in Belgrade. Molotov's vehement attempts to defend the Russians' own
agreerr�ent, which had been arrived at 'after prolonged deliberations' and
aimed at maintaining good relations with Germany, fell on deaf ears.
Schulenburg could only 'hope that MolotO\' and not he was right'. To his
colleagues he expressed the fear that this time the So\riet protest went 'too
far'. The news of his imminent departure to Berlin for consultations could
of course be taken either as a sig11 that the ne'"' policy of containment was
At the Crossroads: Tlie Yugoslav Coitp d'Etat 147

producing results or, more likely, as a warrting that relations were steadily
deteriorating.�5
As a precautionary measure Vyshinsky prompted Gavrilovic; to put
Schulenburg' s mind at rest. But their meeting further revealed the in­
accuracy of the Kremlin's evaluation. Assuming that Hitler had not
been 'receiving sufficient and reliable information from his closest ass­
ociates about the situation' ,56 Gavrilovic; used his new ministerial position
to insist that the n1essage reach the German leader personally. Gavrilovi�
spared no effort to admonish the Germans for the force employed in
coercing the Yugoslavs to adhere to the Axis. It was 'too much', he
protested, 'to ask from the people, that you regard as being a lower
race, and who have a serious debt to the Allies, not only to abandon
their neutrality, which we wish to keep, but to help you to fight precisely
those Allies and love you'. But the personal message to Hitler dovetailed
with the Soviet position. While reaffirming the commitment to the
Axis, he nonetheless demanded that the pact should not 'harm
Yugoslavia's vital interests and honour'. He ended with a warning
'against committing larger mistakes than the first one. We shall fight with
the courage of desperation for every inch of our territory and to the last
soldier. We do not claim that we shall be able to defeat Germany but soon
enough we shall put Germany and Italy in a very difficult situation.'
Gavrilovic; made a similar approach to Rosso, expecting Mussolini 'to use
his influence on Berlin to avoid a clash that will be very serious for both
countries' .57
The negotiations had become so delicate that telegrams between
Moscow and Belgrade were now shown only to Stalin and Molotov per­
sonally, while Vyshinsky, in charge of the negotiations, \Vas acquainted
only with their general content. As we have seen, Stalin's display of force
over Yugoslavia was aimed at bringing Hitler back to the negotiating
table. The meeting with Schulenburg, corroborated by the latest intelli­
gence reports, sounded the alarm. He therefore now seriously wavered
between the fear of provocation and the wish to see Yugoslavia fight.
Russia could not possibly acquiesce to Constanza, Burgas and now the
Yugoslav tributaries of the Danube being in German hands. As the last
independent stronghold in the Balkans, Yugoslavia's collapse would open
the way for the Germans to proceed straight to the Turkish Straits, while
shielding their right wing if they should proceed against Russia.
However, the fear of provocation, intensified by Schulenburg' s warning,
and the suspicion that Gavrilovi� was acting 'under the influence of
Cripps' remained overwhelming.58
The little hope still entertained by Gavrilovic; was thus dashed when
he was summoned again to Vyshinsky in the late afternoon. He was
amazed to discover that without prior warning the Russians had
modified the main clause of the agreement, virtually reducing it to a
statement oi neurralit:- rather than a non-aggression and i1iendship pact.
He ,,-as no: impressed b:- \'";:shinsk:-·s assurance that the ·mere public
aiu1vlLY\c erneilt constituted an imrorrant step to,,-ards the reiniorcernent
oi ,LDeace m the Ba:kans , and the meeting
.......
ended inconclusi,-e1,-. In a •

follo,,--up n1eeting the 1Ughl:- strung Ga\Tilo,ic; condemned the ne,,­

R1iss1an propo:,al -as a substantiall:- ,,-atered-do,,n ,-ersion oi the onginal
propo:,al oi a political-militar:- alliance. He thereiore postponed the
3igning oi the agreement set ior the ne"'"t da�-, pending further consulta­
tions ,,J.th Belgrade. For the Russians a hast:- conclusion ot the agreement
beiore German'\- made an,- militaD: mo,-e ,,-as essential to clear the ajr in
-
- .

therr �iealings
�
''rith her· Ga\'Tilo,ic ,,-as ,,-amed beiore taking
� v
his lea,-e
that time ,,-as runnin g out and that 'i;\-hat ,,-as possible toda:·. could be
in1possible ton1orro,,- .=- _- \t Stalin's dacha members oi the Politburo
gathered that night and endorsed the agreement, expecting the 'l ugosla,­
go,-emment to iolloi;,- suit.�,..
'-'

The ne\.t morning

'-'
iound Stalin conrident that he had shrei;,-dl,-
-
beaten
the Gern1ans and the British at their O\\li ....
game....
He had succeeded
in establishing '--'
So\1et interests \is-a-\is Hitler ''-ithout firing
.......
a single
v
sho: a\ - oiding the pirrall oi being dragged into a prema ture ,,-ar. Indeed.
'-- '- \...J\...i

it ,,-as noticed in the Russian Foreig11 \ finistr:- that in comparison ,,;:J.th

the last iei;,- da:-s \ foloto\- appeared e\.cited and quite op timistic . He
n1ade it dear that General Sin10,ic; s dreams about a pact oi mutual assis­
::ance ..-.\-ere incongnious i;,;:J.th So\iet aims.;;,. The op timism. ho,,-e,-er, ,,-as
short-li,-ed, as the earlier disagre
v
emerl :s ben,-een the \ ugosla,-s
'--"
noi;,-
resarfaced. \\hen negotiations
'-'
resumed the \ugosla,-
......
rrJssion persisted
m its demands for the origi
......
..nal iriendshio
J:.
agre
.......
emen� to be reir1�tared.
::\01,,- that Russia ,,-as not to be in,-o:,-ed clirectl,-
-
in hostilities. ,�,-shinsk,-
- .

-;,,-as prepared to concede that a supplen1enta_r:- agreement ben,·een

'i 11gosla\-ia and Bntam ,,-ould be e:'\pedient : it could elimin ate the like­
·

lihood oi a separate peace and deier the danger of a German attack on

-

Russia.--
\ \1th the Drobabili:\-
J.
oi ,,-ar increasing
'* \....)'
b,- the hour, the 'i ugosla,-
'* \...,.;
go,--
\,..,oo>

err1mer.. � ,.,-as hr::e encouraged

.......
b,-
.
lebede,--� nonco rn.mi ttal statements
tl1at the So\1et l_-ruon ,,-as alread:- pursuing a �truggle to secure peace
ior \ :lgosla\ia and ,,-as endea,-ouring to la�- the necessar:- political ioun­
dations to consolidate such a peace in the iumre . ::\egoriations had in iact
beer1 pu: on hoid, as lebede,- learnt in the e\-ening. Rather than Jitin g
r}Le despondent sprrits oi the people, the agreement ,,-as likel:- to ,,-orsen
\ ligosi.a\ia s pos1non . -� ...::\ trear:- oi neurralir:- could not possibl:- sen·e
\ugo�la,-
.......
interests, as ir in iacr ga,-e
.......
Hitler a tree hand in a ,,-ar against
v

Y ugos:a,ria.
..._
The oiier ,,-as thereiore reiecteci
.
and Ga\WO\ic "'
,,-as
u1strJcted to 1nsist on the conclusion oi a iriendshio
..._
and non-aggre
V'-'
s sion
::- act. Tne \ l:S:
... ..._
os:a,-s had m ici.ct n"lade a las:-dirch altemrit
...
to reconcile rhe
Gerl.:�ru� \·.-ho T,,-ere iniorme� :hat the negotiations
.......
in \ Iosco\\- had been
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat 1 49

sparked by the momentary 'excitement' of the uprising but had been

opposed by the entire Cabinet, which 'did not want an understanding
with Moscow, but one with Berlin'.64
The signing of the agreement had originally been scheduled for 10 p.m.
on 5 April. By midnight Dekanozov informed Stalin from Berlin that a
German invasion of Yugoslavia was imminent.65 Inquiries at the Ministry
of Communication revealed that no telegram had reached the Yugoslav
delegation that night. Feverish activities followed. At one o'clock in the
morning Gavrilovic;, who was taking refuge at a late-night reception orga­
nized by the American ambassador, was located.66 He was, however,
evasive and disinclined to co-operate, informing Vyshinsky on the phone
that he did not expect the government to respond until later in the
morning. Vyshinsky would not take no for an answer. Special arrange­
ments were made for Gavrilovi<; to speak directly to Simovi<; by phone
from his own embassy.67
Gavrilovic; had become so suspicious that he could not discount the
possibility that the Russians were in fact setting a trap for him. The con­
versation therefore assumed a rather surreal character:

'This is General Simovic;.'

'From where are you speaking, General?'
'From where? Why do you ask?'
'Where are you, General? At home or in the office?'
'But why are you asking that?'
'I have to know, General.'
'I am at home.'
'In which street? What is the number of the house?'
'But you know very well where I live! We are neighbours!'
'It does not matter. Just give me your address.'
' 2 Gladstone Street.'

'Good,' replied Gavrilovi<;, only now convinced at last that he was indeed
speaking to the Prime Minister. Very quickly a profound disagreement
emerged. The Prime Minister, who had had no response from the
Germans and was constantly primed with intelligence on the forthcoming
assault, was now desperate to conclude the agreement:

'Sign whatever the Russians are proposing to you.'

'I cannot, General. I know what is my duty and what is my job.'
'You have to sign.'
'I cannot, General, trust me.'
'Sign, Gavrilovi<;!'
'I know what I am doing, General. I cannot sign this document.'
'All right. If you want an order, then I am ordering you to sign.'
 Grand Delusion

'I know what I am doing, trust me.'

Gavrilovic; then slammed down the receiver.68

Within a minute the phone rang again. Novikov, the head of the Near
Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was at the other end.
Gavrilovic; insisted that the line was poor and he could not ascertain
whether he had actually spoken to General Simovic;. He 'thought' that he
had been instructed to sign the agreement, but he 'nonetheless wished
that the mention of neutrality be removed'. When Vyshinsky appealed to
him Gavrilovic; persevered, now attributing to his government the wish
'to exclude the mention of neutrality from the agreement'. Gavrilovic;,
however, knew perfectly well that the 'telephone conversation had
undoubtedly been recorded and reported to Stalin' . This was probably
why Vyshinsky persisted in his demand that the entire delegation
assemble at the Kremlin at 2.30 a.m. Gavrilovic; resorted to delaying
tactics, regretting that the members of the delegation could not be located.
This hardly proved a serious challenge to the 'Protocol Department' of
the Foreign Ministry, which worked closely with the NKVD in shad­
owing foreign diplomats, and the Yugoslavs were promptly traced to the
Moscow Restaurant, the American embassy and so on. To avoid any
further hitches N ovikov himself was ordered to drive them to the
Kremlin. On the way he learnt from Gavrilovi<; that 'the mission did not
expect to receive the instructions from the government, and did not con­
template signing the pact', a message which he duly passed on to his
superiors.
•

Fearing the worst, Gavrilovic; was ushered into Molotov's office where
he was pleasantly surprised to find an easy-going and cheerful Stalin.
Turning to Stalin, Molotov unexpectedly announced that he proposed to
'make an amendment by removing the word ''neutrality'' throughout'; he
pinned the blame for the bungle on Vyshinsky. They appeared so anxious
to conclude the agreement that there was no time for the revised version
to be tra11slated into Serbo-Croat, and the retyped Russian one was signed
around 3 a.m. on 6 April. As the main addressee was Germany, the signing
was announced on the radio within an hour. Stalin insisted, however, that
the date of the signing should be 5 April, so as not to suggest that it had
been signed with preknowledge of or concurrently with the German inva­
sion of Yugoslavia.69
The participants then retired to watch a newsreel while Molotov impro­
vised a banquet which lasted until 7 a.m. Stalin's nonchalant reaction to
the German threat to Yugoslavia and Russia, 'Let them come. We have
strong nerves!' is widely quoted but not in the right context. As we have
seen, it was fear of the invasion which had led Stalin to seek the agree­
ment. The Russian objective was to deter Germany; now that the inva­
sion of Yugoslavia seemed inevitable the aim was to prolong the breathing
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat

space and defer the attack on Russia by stiffening Yugoslav resistance.

Stalin went out of his way to display exaggerated confidence; he
described in great detail the innovations introduced into the Red Army
and its ability to assist the Yugoslavs. His personal intervention was cer­
tainly effective, as it brought about a dramatic change in Gavrilovic;' s view
of him: 'He has a superb will, he controls everything, he grasps every­
th�g, his soul is full of force and energy. The incomparable Stalin, oh
velikij (great) Stalin.'70
In negotiating with the Yugoslavs Stalin had reluctantly accepted the
views of the military and Molotov that an agreement might still deter
Hitler from a long war of attrition. As the Yugoslavs were parting from
Stalin in jubilant spirits, Hitler unleashed the attack on Yugoslavia in a
ferocious bombardment of Belgrade which turned the city into ruins.
Despite the intelligence he had received, Stalin appeared to be surprised
when news of the German attack came in.71 Two hours after leaving the
Kremlin he called Molotov from his dacha. An argumentative conversa­
tion followed in which Stalin urged Molotov to cancel the banquet sched­
uled for the evening. Stalin argued that the attack had put the agreement
in a new perspective and that the banquet was bound to have a 'brazenly
provocative character' .72 The fact that neither Pravda nor Izvestiia
appeared that morning until nearly midday reflected the disagreements
and apprehensions. When the papers came out Molotov's line still pre­
vailed and attempts were made to extract the utmost from the agreement
without provoking Germany. Observers perceived it as a 'significant
moral and political support for Yugoslavia's policies of resistance',
reflected by the 'unusual measure of publishing a 5 column photograph
of the ceremony . . . such a picture has not appeared since the signing of
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact'.73 But the commentary was most carefully
tailored for transmission to both Yugoslavia and Germany, going out of
its way to explain that the friendship clause was aimed at 'strengthening
the peace and preventing the spread of war' . The frenzied activities which
had led to the conclusion of the agreement were concealed, while
attempts were made to present it as a natural outcome of the break­
through in relations achieved a year earlier. But at the same time it was
a statement of the Soviet stakes in Yugoslavia, where 'the main tributaries
of the Danube constitute the main roads leading from Italy, Germany and
Hungary through Belgrade to Saloniki and Istanbul'. But perhaps most
significant was the concealed warning of a prolonged war if hostilities
were not brought to a speedy end.74
At the same time Stalin's ever-present fear that the British were trying
to entangle him in war resurfaced. The ink on the signature had hardly
dried when Simi<; was asked to 'promptly replace' the Yugoslav military
attache because of his alleged pro-British leanings. A month later Timo­
shenko bluntly accused the Yugoslav military mission of 'serving as
 Grand Delusion

British provocateurs' by misleading the Russians into believing that the

signature of the agreement would 'contribute to peace and strengthen the
Yugoslavs' will to resist and increase the German reservations against an
attack' while in fact leaning towards Britain.75
In the meantime attempts to bolster the Yugoslav resistance without
implicating the Soviet Union directly continued. The Ministry of Defence
immediately offered a rather impressive list of fighter planes, both short
and long range, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, a number of mountain
batteries, and mortars. The explicit preference for equipment which could
be used effectively in mountain warfare reflected the Soviet hopes of a
prolonged war of attrition.76 The Yugoslavs were further led to under­
stand that the reversion to the 'friendship' formula was made so as not
to give the Yugoslavs the impression that if war broke out the Soviet
Union would 'simply wash its hands and be indifferent to the fate of the
country' .77 The initial boldness of the Russians can be partly attributed to
the mild German reaction. With Operation 'Marita' rolling, the Germans
made great efforts to keep Stalin at bay. Schulenburg was instructed to
inform Molotov of the operation 'without any special emphasis, in an
objective and dispassionate manner'. Significantly, there was no allusion
to the fresh Soviet-Yugoslav agreement, while the invasion was presented
as a measure of forestalling Anglo-Yugoslav co-operation. Moreover, to
disguise the plans for 'Barbarossa' the Germans announced their inten­
,
tion of withdrawing from Yugoslavia as soon as their aims in the Balkans
were achieved.78
But the shocking realization that the German campaign in South-east
Europe was progressing even more effectively than the previous one in
France drove home the severity of Russia's plight. Within three days of
the savage bombardment of Belgrade the German forces had cut through
the Yugoslav resistance in Skopje and captured Saloniki. Owing to the
success gained on this front and General Kleist' s armoured advance on
Belgrade, the main thrust of the 2nd Army commenced ahead of plan. On
the evening of 10 April, two days early, German troops completed the
occupation of Zagreb and by 13 April they were in full control of Bel­
grade. The war in Greece was conducted in similar fashion and on 2 3
April, after the Greek Prime Minister had committed suicide, the army
surrendered. The British fared no better. They started their retreat on 16
April; by 25 April the swastika was hoisted over the Acropolis and four
days later the double campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece was com­
pleted with the arrival of German forces at the southern tip of the Pelo­
ponnese. The aftermath was the descent of German paratroopers on Crete
on 20 May. Cania fell on 27 May and by 1 June the last British soldier was
evacuated from Souda Bay.79
While the campaign was drawing to a quick conclusion, Stalin was
informed by the NKVD sources within the German embassy about
At the Crossroads: The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat 153

Schulenburg' s concern that the agreement was 'a significant change in the
course of Soviet foreign policy' . Schulenburg had been pondering what
on earth had possessed Stalin to conclude an agreement with a power
which was on the verge of being annihilated.80 Stalin watched with great
trepidation the fate of Belgrade, the swift advance of the Germans and
the occupation of Skopje a mere two days after the outbreak of hostili­
ties.81 Two days later he was informed that the Greeks too were 'extremely
pessimistic' about their ability to resist. The 100,000-strong British army
in Greece had not been engaged and the prevailing view in Athens was
that all the British plans for Europe had collapsed.82 At midnight on 1 1
April Gavrilovi<; confirmed reports from various Yugoslav embassies
abroad about the gravity of the situation; most of them, including that in
Moscow, had been cut off from Belgrade.83 The next morning Stalin flexed
his muscles for the last time, warning Hungary in the pages of Izvestiia
against exploiting the situation and joining the plunder.84
The Yugoslav episode had serious repercussions. Stalin's varied
manoeuvres to renew the negotiations with Hitler from a position of
strength collapsed once Yugoslavia and Greece had been devastated. The
miscalculation was obvious; he now confronted the almost untouched
Wehrmacht deployed earlier than he had expected along his entire border
before the dialogue he sought with Hitler had been opened. His subse­
quent desperate attempt to remedy matters and appease Hitler while
avoiding provocation was perhaps the most significant direct cause of
the calamity which befell the Russians on 22 June. It further worsened the
already hazardous relations between Stalin and the military. Before his
expulsion from Russia, at the end of May, the Yugoslav military attache
was summoned to the Ministry of Defence. Timoshenko did not conceal
from him that he expected a war to break out. He was further explicitly
told that his expulsion reflected a need to pacify the Germans. He
emerged from the meeting convinced that Timoshenko's position had
been shaken by his staunch support of the agreement with Yugoslavia and
his belief that the Yugoslav army would be able to withstand a German
onslaught for at least a month to be followed by protracted guerrilla
warfare. Consequently his name had almost disappeared from the papers,
even from the army's Red Star.85
At the height of Glasnost, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
released some documents related to the negotiations.86 It misled the
reader into assuming that the title 'Pact of Friendship and Non­
Aggression' was extraordinary in itself. Pi.s we have seen, Stalin had gone
out of his way to reject the military alliance proposed by the Yugoslav
armed forces and even attempted to downgrade the friendship agreement
to a neutrality pact. Throughout the conflict, the leaders of the Yugoslav
coup were split on the nature of their association with Russia. They ended
up by playing the German, British and Soviet cards simultaneously and
1 54 Grand Delusion

seeing their political achievement crumble within a week. History,

however, has applauded both sides, presenting a rather romanticized
myth of a last-minute resolve to hold back the onslaught of Nazi
Germany.

...

I
 8

Churchill' s Warning to Stalin

British Intelligence and 'Barbarossa'

Tl1e belief in Moscow that Churchill had set out to draw Russia into the
war was strengthened by the crushing defeats inflicted on Britain on the
battlefield. It was against this background that Churchill sent Stalin
his famous warning about German intentions. Churchill's powerful
account of his abortive message overshadows the abundance of the other,
far more important evidence about 'Barbarossa' which did reach Stalin.1
His interpretation of the dramatic events surrounding the warning has
been uncritically repeated ever since. The warning is the event which
first comes to mind when the drama leading to the war is unfolded. Prior
to the opening of the vast material on the Second World War in the British
archives in the mid-197os, Churchill's voluminous history of the Second
World War, with its persuasive but excessively self-centred and therefore
occasionally misleading interpretation of events, was regarded as author­
itative and was even frequently quoted by Soviet historians. The relations
with Russia on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, in which Cripps played
a prominent part, are a typical example. They were portrayed in the light
of the Cold War, Cripps' s major political challenge to Churchill in 1942
and their continued political rivalry after the war. The warning provides
Churchill with a starting point for a highly tendentious account of
the events leading up to the German invasion of Russia which has
since captured the in1agination and minds of readers. He passes
judgment on Stalin and his commissars as the 'most completely out­
witted bunglers of the Second World War' while glossing over the British
failure to consider the significance of Russia as a potential ally in the
war.2

1 55
 Grand Delusion

Cripps' s rancorous squabbles with Churchill should be viewed within

the framework of the protracted debate in England on the course of
Anglo-Soviet relations, described earlier.3 In Ankara Cripps had urged
Eden to dispel the Soviet suspicion that Britain was conducting a 'hope­
lessly hostile policy towards Russia through conclusion of a political
settlement of the Baltic issue' . He also took the unusual step of appealing
directly to the Cabinet, warning that it would be 'disastrous to lose an
opportunity here through the lack of instructions'.4 The Cabinet had not
even touched on relations with Russia for months until Attlee brought up
Cripps' s telegram on 3 1 March. By then Churchill, to judge from his own
account of the warning to Stalin, had come to realize the significance that
Russia was to assume in the next phase of the war. However, his alleged
foresight is not perceptible in the records of the discussion in Cabinet, and
the issue remained within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office.5 Eden,
still in Athens, casually endorsed the Foreign Office's advice to reject
Cripps's 'imprudent and useless initiative'.6
The evaluation of intelligence on German intentions was held back by
the political concept entrenched in the Foreign Office.7 The analysis of the
ample intelligence on the German deployment and intentions, some of
which emanated from decrypts of the German code, was hindered
by these preconceived ideas. Since the beginning of the war Military
Intelligence had remained in close touch with the Foreign Office and
had adopted a corresponding appreciation of Soviet-German relations.
Cadogan, the permanent Under-Secretary who in the absence of Eden
represented the Foreign Office in Cabinet, was in almost daily direct
contact with the Chiefs of Staff. Victor Cavendish-Bentinck was not only
the Foreign Office's representative on the Joint Intelligence Committee
but also chaired it. Moreover, the Foreign Office's weekly summaries were
circulated among the different intelligence branches, forming a political
guideline for the collators.8
The evaluation of the forthcoming conflict was also hampered by the
extremely poor information available on the Red Army, summarized by
a highly prejudiced Chief of Staff. Military Intelligence was influenced not
only by the prevailing political concept but also by an enduring image of
the Russian army; this had been reiterated in dozens of assessments, some
going back to the Crimean War but most dating to the First World War.
The assessments had not been modified in light of the vast theoretical,
technological, structural and strategic reforms which the Red Army had
undergone since the revolution. A disparaging attitude was thus inherent
and did not stem only, as is commonly argued, from the purges of 1937-8.
The rather timeworn final verdict, based on similar papers written in the
1920s and in 1935, stated that 'though the forces are large, much of their
equipment is obsolescent. They suffer from certain inherent failings which
would serve them ill against the Germans, and their value for war is low.
Churchill's Warning to Stalin 157

They are, however, at their best in defence, and, on land, have vast terri­
tories on which to fall back.'9
Thus early reports from varied sources on Hitler's bellicose designs in
the East were dismissed out of hand. These were held to be based on 'mis­
leading rumours' serving the interests of 'wishful thinkers'. The expla­
nation arrived at, in harmony with the political concept, was that the
Russians' collaboration with Germany was in fact so close that they were
'ready to yield to the mere threat of force' . 1 0 An alternative explanation
attributed the unusual deployment of German troops in the Balkans to
a defensive move against Russia. I11formation from Moscow that the
January war games of the Soviet General Staff were based on the assump­
tion of a German attack on Russia was discounted.11
More pronounced rumours of an impending German invasion of
Russia came in March from several capitals and suggested that a German
turn eastwards was 'within the bounds of possibility'. Cavendish­
Bentinck did not rule out a German invasion: 'Hitler may occasionally
for opportunist motives depart from the principles laid down in Mein
Kampf, but sooner or later they are proved to be the basis of his policy.'
But such rare heresies were disregarded. The 'doubtful just anonymous
talk', explained Cadogan, was disseminated by the Germans to 'intimi­
date' the Russians and therefore could not serve as a 'very sure guide'
for re-evaluation.12 A detailed account from Stockholm of the German
intentions, concluding that 'all military circles in Berlin are convinced
of conflict with Russia this spring and consider success certain', was
passed over by the Foreign Office, dismissed as 'the usual contradictory
rumours' .13
When the growing traffic of intelligence could no longer be ignored it
was conveniently attributed to a 'war of nerves' waged by the Germans;
its aim was 'to produce an atmosphere of nervousness in Moscow which
would militate against any possible Russian interference in the Balkan
project, or to prepare the ground for an attempt to squeeze further accom­
modation from the Soviet Government' . Doubt was expressed whether
'Red Riding Hood will now pluck up courage to face these dangers';
Russia was rather expected 'to appease the big bad wolf by a policy of
further accommodation' .14
Cripps' s different political outlook enabled him to perceive the German
menace to Russia. In early March 1941 he returned from his short visit
to Ankara 15 firmly convinced, as he told fellow ambassadors, that Russia
and Germany would be at war 'before summer ' . Cripps expected Hitler
to overcome the opposition to a war on two fronts and attack Russia
before England became too strong for Germany to form another front. In
an off-the-record press conference Cripps predicted that Hitler would
attack Russia 'not later than the end of June'. Cripps' s first explicit
report to the Foreign Office about the German intentions was transmitted
 Grand Delusion

on 24 March, at a time of growing tension over Yugoslavia. This infor-

mation was both prophetic and accurate, considering the early date
.

of its origins, and was obtained from a source in Berlin through Vilhelrn
Assarasson, the well-informed Swedish minister in Moscow.16 The evalu­
ation of the information and the ideas for its exploitation illustrate
the British assessment of the brewing conflict and the repercussions on
Soviet foreign policy, and are worth examining at some length. The gist
of the report confirmed Cripps' s impression that the Germans were deter­
mined to 'attack Russia by a blitz and to get hold of all Russia up to the
Urals' :17

6. German plan is as follows: the attack on England will be contin­

ued with U-boats and from the air, but there will be no invasion. At the
same time a drive against Russia will take place.
7. This drive will be by three large armies: the first based at Warsaw
under von Bock, the second based at Konigsberg, the third based at
Cracow under List.18
8 . Everything is being arranged with the greatest care so that the
attack can be launched at a moment's notice. It would not be surpris­
ing if the attack took place in May.19

Cripps hoped that if employed cautiously and wisely the infor,mation

could draw the Soviet Union closer to England. It was just about pos­
sible that the Russians might comprehend their difficult situation and
consider changing their attitude. Cripps, however, maintained that the
information should be disclosed indirectly to Maisky through a third
party, such as the Chinese or the Turkish ambassador. An 'indirect and.
secret' approach, he advised, 'would be more impressive than a direct
com1nurlication, the motive of which they would suspect'. His proposal
was immediately brushed aside by senior officials, who regarded the
information as 'part of the ''war of nerves'' against Russia, designed to
force her into a closer partnership with Germany' . The chairman of the
Joint Intelligence Committee, Cavendish-Bentinck, rejected the report.
From the German point of view, the occupation of Russia was 'rather a
large mouthful. The War Office have no confirmation of any increase in
the German forces facing Russia, nor has there been the slightest move­
ment of German aircraft in that direction. It would therefore appear that
these German threats against Russia are intended to intimidate the Soviet
Government into making an alliance with Germany . . . and mislead us.'
Although the information continued to turn up from various quarters,
Military Intelligence, faithful to its concept, dismissed it as a plant by the
Germans.20 A more even-handed appreciation of German intentions did
•

circulate in the different branches of Military Intelligence, but in the

existing climate it was written off as 'not convincing' .21
Chitrchill's Warning to Stalin 1 59

The 'Cryptic' Warning

According to Churchill, it was with 'relief and excitement' that he came
across a report from one of Britain's 'most trusted sources' that 'illumi­
nated the whole Eastern scene like a lightning flash'. The reference is to
information obtained by the British through Ultra, the machine they had
devised to decipher intercepts of German signal traffic. The intercepts
indicated that three armoured divisions and other key forces had been
ordered to move from the Balkans to the Cracow area the day after
Yugoslavia joined the Axis22 and had been recalled when the Germans
learnt of the ensuing coup in Belgrade. The sudden transportation of
massive armoured formations to Poland and then swiftly back to the
Balkans, argued Churchill, could 'only mean Hitler' s intention to invade
Russia in May . . . The fact that the Belgrade revolution had required their
return to Roumania involved perhaps a delay from May to June.'23 But
was Churchill's perception really a stroke of genius? Was this particular
report indeed the sole reason for his change of mind about the German
intentions and for the decision to send a personal warning to Stalin? Had
Churchill become aware, unlike the rest of the intelligence community
and the Foreign Office, of the danger lurking for Russia around the
corner? How did Churchill come to predict June as the likely date for the
invasion? The answers to these questions reveal the devastating impact
which Churchill's warning had on Stalin's own evaluation of the danger
lying ahead.
Like Stalin, Churchill had established a procedure whereby raw intel­
ligence reports were collated for him. These were further sifted by Major
Desmond Morton and presented to Churchill daily in a special red box.
The intelligence included intercepted telegrams from hostile as well as
friendly embassies, but above all intercepts of the German signals traffic
obtained through Enigma. While the naval code had been broken and
information was flowing regularly and smoothly to Bletchley Park, where
the vast deciphering operation was taking place, the Wehrmacht' s
communications traffic was still difficult to decrypt. Up to Operation
'Barbarossa' only fragmentary reports on the German build-up were sub­
mitted to Churchill.
In view of the dramatic events in Yugoslavia, Churchill was preoccu­
pied by the desperate attempts being made by Eden and General Dill to
raise an effective barrier against Germany's penetration into the Middle
East and South-eastern Europe, and particularly to divert her from
Turkey.24 Like Stalin, Churchill examined Germany's intentions towards
Russia in relation to the develop1nents in that region. Late in the evening
of 28 March he relayed to Eden, then in Athens, detailed instructions
on Britain's overall strategy. Only the final item made a passing and
highly hypothetical reference to the possibility of a German-Soviet
160 Grand Delusion

confrontation. 'Is it not possible', he suggested, 'that if a front were

formed in the Balkan peninsula Germany might think it better business
to take it out of Russia ?'25 In other words, the Balkans and the Middle
East were perceived by Churchill to be Hitler's main objectives, while
effective resistance in the Balkans might divert Hitler to Russia.
The next morning, however, Churchill reverted to his previous a ppre­
ciation when he was presented by Major-General Sir Stewart Menzies, the
Chief ('C') of MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, with an intercept from
Enigma. The intercept included the transit orders from Rumania to the
Cracow area for three of the five armoured divisions located in the south­
east and for two motorized divisions, including the SS division. The
movement was to commence on 3 April and to end by the 29th. As we
can deduce from the now-available intelligence reports to Churchill, it
was 'C' who, in his usual succinct language, enlightened Churchill to the
fact that the directive was issued prior to the Yugoslav coup d'etat and that
'it would therefore be of interest to see if it is still carried out' .26 Churchill,
however, did not immediately see the implications for the German plans
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He most certainly, despite his retrospective
claim, did not send the 'momentous news at once' to Stalin. Instead he
hastened to transmit the gist of the information to Eden, assuming that
Eden could do with a trump card to convince the reluctant Greeks, Turks
and Yugoslavs to form a solid front against Hitler. His reading, t�erefore1
stressed the southward direction of the German movement1 which he
believed would divert the Wehrmacht, at least temporarily, from Russia:
•

The bad man concentrated very large armoured forces etc to over-awe
Yugo and Greece and hoped to get former or both without fighting.
The moment he was sure Yugo was in the Axis he moved three of
the five Panthers towards the Bear believing that what was left would
be enough to finish Greek affair. However Belgrade revolution upset
this picture and caused orders for northward move to be arrested in
transit. This can only mean in my opinion intention to attack Yugo at
earliest or alternatively act against the Turk. It looks as if heavy forces
will be used in Balkan Peninsula and that Bear will be kept waiting
a bit.27

It needed time, but even more significantly outside influence, to really

drive home tl1e full implications of the intelligence before Churchill acted
on it. It should be noted that Churchill replaced Eden at the Foreign Office
during his prolonged absence in the Middle East and was there­
fore shown all important communications. It was when he drafted the
telegram on strategy to Eden that his attention was drawn by Cadogan
•

to information corroborating the Enigma reports.28 Cripps's most detailed

telegram on the subject was shown to him as well; both the projected date
Churchill's Warning to Stalin

of the invasion and the decision to alert the Russians correspond to

Cripps' s telegram rather than to the Enigma decrypt. A definite shift
of policy occurred no earlier than 3 0 March, when the possibility of a
German invasion of Russia figured more prominently in a second
telegram from Churchill to Eden. However, this was only after both Air
Intelligence and the government code and cipher school had analysed the
Enigma report and reached a similar conclusion. Even then Churchill
refrained from active participation in the long-delayed discussion on
Anglo-Soviet relations of 31 March described above.29
The decision to adopt Cripps's proposal and present the Russians
with the accumulated evidence took even longer to materialize. Churchill
was most likely influenced by further reports received from Belgrade
on 30 March and from Sumner Welles, the American Under-Secretary of
State, on 2 April. They confirmed news from Athens, where Prince Paul
had sought refuge after the coup, that Hitler had revealed to him during
their meeting at Berchtesgaden on 4 March his intention to take military
action against Russia. It also emerged that Goring had disclosed to
Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, during the latter's visit to Berlin
that Germany intended to attack Russia in the spring regardless of
the outcome of the campaign against England.3° Cripps, convinced that
the German threat was real and as usual itching to act, suggested on 31
March that, if confirmed, the revelations could 'be used here to good
effect'.
A careful distinction should be made at this juncture between Cripps' s
reservations about passing on the information and those of the Foreign
Office. Cripps was mostly concerned that the Russians might interpret
it as an attempt to drag them into the war. The Foreign Office did not
expect a German attack and was therefore reluctant to initiate a step
which might play into German hands in the phantom negotiations.
The new information threatened to undermine the entrenched concept
that a Soviet-German alliance was in the making. If the Russians were
to accept the warning, an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement would become
the order of the day. No wonder, tl1erefore, that on the very day that
Churchill was contemplating his warning to Stalin, Cadogan, fully sup­
ported by Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern Department at
the Foreign Office, objected to the proposals made by Cripps and Halifax
to alert the Russians to the danger. There was no point, he noted in the
final minute, of repeating warnings to the Russians unless this was likely
to have 'a good effect, from our point of view, if they interpret it as
meaning that they will be attacked in any case, and regardless of any con­
cession which they may make to Hitler' . In short, the transmission of
intelligence would be useless until the Russians were 'strong enough to
react in the right way to it' .31 By now the political concept had infiltrated
the intelligence agencies and come to dominate their thinking. On 1 April
 Grand Delusion

Military Intelligence concluded that 'the object of the movement of

German armoured and motorized forces was undoubtedly to exert
military pressure on Russia to prevent Russian interference in German
Balkan plans' .32
When considering Churchill's warning to Stalin, it should be borne in
mind that the Prime Minister had hitherto displayed an almost complete
lack of interest in Russian affairs. 33 Moreover, his zeal in warning the
Russians stood in sharp contrast to the position he had previously
maintained. In February, when British prospects seemed brighter, he
had opposed the half-measure of alerting the Russians, ''vhile odds seem
heavily against Britain in Greece' .34 His intervention now was motivated
by the thought that Germany might have altered her overall strategy.
Churchill's sudden entry into the arena, however, 'vas somewhat capri­
cious and did not take account of the delicate political framework into
which his message was to fit. His move set Moscow on a course which
would soon take a serious toll in the response to tl1e German threat. The
message which was intended to draw Stalin's attention to the change was
finally drafted only on 3 April and ran as follows:

I have sure information from a trusted agent that when the Germans
thought they had got Yugoslavia in the net, that is to say, after March
20, they began to move three out of the five Panzer divisions from
Roumania to Southern Poland. The moment they heard of the Serbian
revolution this movement -vvas countermanded. Your Excellency will
readily appreciate the significance of these facts.

It was, as aptly described by Churchill, 'short and cryptic'; its 'brevity and
exceptional character' were intended, as he recalled later on, to 'give it
special significance and arrest Stalin,.s attention'.35 Cripps was asked to
submit the warning if it could be delivered to Stalin 'personally'. 36
The Foreign Office, which acted as the communication channel between
Churchill and his ambassador in Moscow, was entrenched in its concept
and reluctant to accept the new turn of events. Sargent and Cadogan,
obviously anxious that Cripps might commit himself further than desired
if allowed unhindered access to Stalin, hastened to provide him with a
'line on which to speak'. As Cripps did not know the source of the evi­
dence, the Foreign Office's briefing only weakened the very effect which
Churchill had intended for the message. The instructions embodied two
schools of thought: Churchill's own and the sceptical position of the
Foreign Office. Cadogan started by recapturing the essence of Churchill's
warrung:
•

The change in German military dispositions surely implies that Hitler

through the action of Yugoslavia has now postponed his previous
Churchill's Warning to Stalin

plans for threatening Soviet Gove1·nment. If so it should be possible

for Soviet Government to use this opportunity to strengthen their
own position. This delay shows that the enemy forces are not unlim­
ited, and illustrates the advantages that will follow anything like a
united front.

The ambivalence, however, was striking. In the second paragraph

Cadogan argued that by applying substantial pressure Hitler hoped to
extract further concessions without really intending to attack Russia. The
first draft was so unsatisfactory that Churchill lumself replaced the
paragraph, stressing the military significance of the information. Even
then the instructiorts did not reflect Churchill's sense of urgency or his
interpretation of the fresh intelligence. Moreover, while Churchill's
warnh1g conformed with Cripps's advice not to imply an appeal to relieve
Britain from her distress in South-east Europe, the instructions clearly
did so:

2. Obvious way of Soviet Government strengthening its own position

would be to furnish material help to Turkey and Greece and through
latter to Yugoslavia. This help might increase German difficulties in
Balkans and still further delay the German attack on Soviet Union of
which there are so many signs. If, however, opportunity is not now
taken to put every possible spoke in the German wheel danger might
revive in a few months' time.
3 . You would not of course imply that we ourselves required any
assistance from Soviet Government or that they would be acting in any
interests but their own. What we want them to realise, however, is that
Hitler intends to attack them sooner or later, if he can . . . 37

Churchill misleads the reader into believing that he did not hear
from Cripps until 1 2 April.38 Just as puzzling is his deliberate omission of
the dramatic signature of the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty on the very day that
his warning reached the British embassy in Moscow, rendering it obso­
lete. Tl1e agreement clearly indicated that Stalin was conscious of the
looming German menace, terrified of any attempt to provoke the
Germans and equally suspicious of British attempts to embroil Russia
in war.39
As early as 5 April Cripps informed Churchill that it was 'quite out
of the question in the present circumstances to try to deliver personally
any message to Stalin'. He reminded Churchill that he had been pre­
vented from seeing Stalin since their first and only meeting in J11ly 1940.
Convinced by the force of the argument, Churchill agreed that the
message should be handed to Molotov instead.40 His telegram, however,
crossed another one sent by Cripps. Developments in Yugoslavia had
 Grand Delusion

raised serious reservations about the wisdom of handing over the

warning. Cripps informed Churchill of the steps taken by the Russians
to publicize the Yugoslav agreement and the significance attached to it.
In view of the obvious Russian awareness of the German danger, Cripps
pressed Churchill to reconsider the dispatch of the warning. He and
the Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav ambassadors had been feeding Stalin
with similar information. 'In existing circumstances,' he stated emphati­
cally, 'I think it wiser not to interfere further at the moment as all is going
as well as possible in our direction.' The Foreign Office, which for entirely
different reasons was reluctant to alert the Russians, was quick to acqui­
esce in Cripps' s forceful arguments in favour of withdrawal of the
message.41
The matter was allowed to lapse. The Foreign Office's reluctance to alter
its outlook as a result of the events in the Balkans was all too evident.
Churchill's intervention raised the suggestion of providing Cripps with a
compilation of fresh reports which might be invaluable if the Russians
were to respond favourably. But the unchallenged assumption of an
impending Soviet-German agreement continued to impede a balanced
judgment. In view of the importance attributed by Churchill to alerting
the Russians, it is worth quoting at some length the evaluation of the
reports by the Joint Intelligence Committee, the essence of which was as
follows: ;

Following considerations must however be borne in mind:

( 1 ) These reports may be put out by Germans as part of the war of
nerves.
(2) A German invasion would probably result in such chaos
throughout Soviet Union that the Germans would have to reorganise
everything in the occupied territory and would meanwhile lose sup­
plies which they are now drawing from the Soviet Union at any rate
for a long time to come . . .
(3) Germany's resources, though immense, would not permit her to
continue her campaign in the Balkans, to maintain the present scale of
air attack against this country, to continue her offensive against Egypt
and at the same time to invade, occupy and reorganise a large part of
the Soviet Union.
(4 ) As yet no information has been received of movements of
German aircraft towards the Soviet frontier, an indispensable prelimi­
nary to a campaign against the Soviet Union . . .
(5) There have been indications that German General Staff are
opposed to war on two fronts and in favour of disposing of Great
Britain before attacking Soviet Union.
(6) Soviet-German agreement for supply of oil during 194 1 has just
been concluded.
Churchill's Warning to Stalin

Cavendish-Bentinck finally rejected the idea of passing the material to

Russia, as the reports were no more than a 'hotch-potcl1 of pretty
unconfirmed and probably untrue information'. The scanty evidence was
confined to 'preparations as distinct from intentions'. The political
concept, which rejected the evidence of an impending German-Soviet
clash, clung tenaciously to unconfirmed fragments of evidence pointing
to a forthcoming German-Soviet alliance.42
While this evaluation was taking place in London, Cripps had exploited
the favourable climate to convey to Stalin, through Gavrilovic;, the infor­
mation obtained from Prince Paul about his meeting with Hitler. The
Yugoslav ambassador attested that it was taken seriously by the Russians.
Indeed, the NKVD' s intercepts of the telegrams of Aktay, the Turkish
ambassador, confirmed the information obtained through the Swedes and
Hitler's revelations to Paul. In fact most of the sources which served the
British, apart from Enigma which in any case could not be disclosed, were
at the Russians' disposal.43 Seeking a special interview with Molotov,
Cripps protested, would mislead him into assuming that 'I was trying to
make trouble with Germany. It might very well diminish seriously the
strong effect of Prince Paul's conversation.' Unexpectedly Churchill over­
ruled Cripps's reservations, insisting that it was his 'duty' to make Stalin
reflect, even if he had the information from other sources, that 'the
engagement of German armoured divisions in Balkans 11as deferred that
threat a11d given Russia breathing space. The more support that can be
given to Balkan States, the longer will Hitler's forces be tied up there.'
Once again the warning was clearly connected to the support which Stalin
was expected to render to the British in the Balkans.44
On 8 April, in response to a suggestion that he should approach
Molotov, Cripps reiterated his previous argument, supported by evidence
that the Russians had been briefed about the content of Prince Paul's
interview with Hitler, 'which they obviously believed and of which they
took great notice' . Further evidence indeed came in from the military
attaches in Moscow and Ankara that a partial mobilization had been
carried out in the Red Army. If he were to seek a special interview with
Stalin, Cripps argued, the Soviet leader would be bound to relate it to
events in Yugoslavia and assume that Britain was 'trying to make trouble
with Germany'.45
As Cripps had been left without definite instructions in reply to his first
communication, Cadogan was now inclined to countermand the delivery
of the warning altogether. In the meantime Eden had returned to England
from his extended Middle Eastern tour. A decision on the recognition of
Soviet annexations in the Baltic was now long overdue. It was 'a difficult
hand to play', Eden conceded, but he swiftly succumbed to the view
held in the Office that under heavy pressure from Germany Stalin would
'prefer to yield to Hitler's threats and blandishments rather than risk
166 Grand Delusion

an open breach which such a policy would involve' . Concessions in

the Baltic were therefore destined to be 'the seal for a rapprochement
and in no sense an attempt to buy such a rapprochement'. For this reason
he tended to agree with Cripps that the warnings would be counter­
productive.46
Unexpectedly, however, Churchill again intervened; ignoring Cripps's
arguments, he stated once again that it was his 'duty' to convey the facts
to Stalin. It was irrelevant to the importance of the facts if they or their
message were 'unwelcomed'. Instructions on these lines were accordingly
sent to Cripps, stressing the military significance of the breathing space
which Russia had gained while Hitler was tied up in the Balkans.
Although Churchill's instructions were mandatory, Eden, on his first day
in the Foreign Office after the Middle East mission, went through the file
and in a last-minute alteration directed Cripps to forward the message
but still left the final decision to his discretion. Curiously enough, the
blatant haggling is entirely absent from Churchill's account.47
Although Churchill presents the warning as of paramount significance,
it should be borne in mind that the prolonged wrangle over its delivery
was only incidental to the intensive activity on the international scene,
which was suppressed in the memoirs. Cripps had in vain been pressing
the government to define their policy towards Russia in the event
of a change in the international constellation. After the signature, of the
Yugoslav-Soviet pact, coinciding with Churchill's message to Stalin,
Cripps resumed his canvassing in favour of a de facto recognition of
Russian control of the Baltic. In his memoirs Eden competes with
Churchill for the distinction of having been the first to lay the founda­
tions of the Grand Alliance. The evidence of German intentions and
Russia's varied attempts to stem German aggression proved that 'tl1e time
had come for a smoothing out of relations' with Russia which, Eden
assures us, ranked high on his list of priorities.48 This, however, was not
the case. Cadogan easily convinced Eden to reject Cripps' s proposals. The
events referred to in Eden's memoirs were not considered to be 'definite
evidence' showing that the Russians had abandoned the policy of co­
operation with Germany. On the contrary, Eden still presumed that Stalin
was likely to yield to Hitler's threats rather than risk an open breach, and
was reluctant to 'indulge in useless gestures' . Cripps' s role was reduced
to close observation of events in order to discern the turning point, when
it might be possible to effect a change in relations.
Sensing that an opportunity had slipped away, Cripps now complained
bitterly that he had been provided with 'few cards to play here, but most
of the possible ones had been taken away by His Majesty's Government'.
Left to his own devices, he was set, as he wrote home, to do 'my best on
my own initiative if I can get these people to listen to me' .49 It was easier
said than done; with Yugoslavia tottering towards collapse, the RussiarLs
Churchill's Warning to Stalin

became even more sensitive to any attempt to drag them into the war.
None of the pretexts used by Cripps led to a meeting with Vyshinsky.
Finally, after a 'rather stiff letter' to Vyshinsky, he was su1nmoned to the
Foreign Ministry in the middle of a lunch given by the Swedish ambas­
sador on 9 April. Cripps, however, was not permitted even to start a polit­
ical conversation; Vyshinsky seemed to have withdrawn into his shell. On
his return to the embassy Cripps wrote a personal letter to Vyshinsky.50
The letter, more than ten pages long, deplored the Soviet habit of seeking
security zones for their own frontiers rather than securing the neutrality
of the Balkans as a bloc. Though the letter preceded the major setbacks
to the British forces in Greece, when seen against the background of
the calamity there it was bound to enhance Stalin's suspicion of attempts
to bring him into the war in order to relieve the pressure on Britain.
The most striking sentence in Cripps' s letter, therefore, was his re­
commendation that:

the current moment is the most crucial from the point of view of the
Soviet Government, because inevitably the question arises of whether
it would be better to wait and meet the undivided might of the German
armies alone, when they can choose the time to take the initiative, or
whether it would be better to take immediate measures to unite Soviet
forces with the still undefeated armies of Greece, Yugoslavia and
Turkey, with feeble British assistance in manpower and resources.
These armies would number over 3 million men and would trap a very
great number of German forces in difficult terrain.

Cripps was in fact driving home the essence of Churchill's message, that
it was 'perhaps the last opportunity for the Soviet Government to take
action to prevent a direct attack upon its frontiers by the German
armies' .51
It was only after delivering his own warning that Cripps received
Eden's instructions to go ahead with the delivery of Churchill's warning.
Cripps now dropped one of his customary bombshells, disclosing the
private warning he had just given to Vyshinsky. He feared that in the new
circumstances the Russians would not understand 'why so short and frag­
mentary a comn1entary, on facts of which they are certainly well aware,
without any definite request for explanation of Soviet Government's atti­
tude or suggestion for action by them, should be conveyed in so formal
a manner' . Delivery of the message, he stated emphatically, 'would be not
merely ineffectual but a serious tactical mistake'. While great amazement
was expressed in the F'o reign Office at Cripps' s inexplicable action in pro­
ducing his own full-dress political letter to Vyshinsky, it was agreed that
there was no point in pursuing the matter any further. On 1 5 April Eden
presented Churchill with Cripps' s reply, together with a short note
168 Grand Delusion

concurring that 'there may be some force in Sir S. Cripps' s arguments

against the delivery of your message'. Churchill, however, overruled all
these reservations. He informed Eden that he 'set special importance on
the delivery of this personal message from me to Stalin. I cannot under­
stand why it should be resisted . The Ambassador is not alive to the mil­
itary significance of the facts. Pray, oblige me.' There was another short
delay while Eden was out of London until Cripps was finally instructed
on 1 8 April to deliver the warning despite his reservations. He was to use
any channel and include such of the supplementary comments of the
Foreign Office as were 'still applicable' .52 The warning finally found its
way to Stalin in the Kremlin only on 21 April.
Churchill's and Eden's retrospective claim that the warning was intrin­
sically connected with the laying of the foundations for the Grand Alliance
is arguable. The ruling political concept at the Foreign Office had not been
shaken by the dramatic events, the accumulating intelligence reports or
Churchill's intervention. A marked 'strict reserve' attitude and a refusal to
initiate fresh negotiations remained the declared policy of the government.
Goaded by Cripps, Eden did inform Cabinet on 21 April of his intentions
to embark on fresh negotiations, but added that he 'was not very sanguine
of good results'. He did not intend 'to put the Soviets in good humour'
with Britain in the hope that 'something might emerge' .53 Churchill, as
if oblivious of the motives which had prompted him to insist ,on the
delivery of his warning to Stalin, was not in favour of proceeding with
'frantic efforts' to demonstrate 'love' but rather advocated 'sombre
restraint' .54 Eden hastened therefore to concur with the Prime Minister that
there was 'nothing to be gained from further attempts with Russia now' .55
The doggedness with which Churchill clung to his warning is easy
to understand if examined in the context of the disastrous military set­
backs inflicted on Britain. The need to enlist Russia was dictated by the
reverberations of these events on the domestic front as ·well as on British
stature in the Balkans and the Middle East. It was no coincidence that
Churchill's interest in the Enigma intercept increased on 1 April, just as
he received General Wavell' s cable depicting the success of Rommel's
offensive in Cyrenaica, 'rather sooner and in more strength' than he had
expected, forcing him to retreat. Churchill was immediately struck by the
consequences of the defeat, hastening to warn Wavell that 'far more
important than the loss of ground is the idea that we cannot face the
Germans and that their appearance is enough to drive us back many
scores of miles. This may react most evilly throughout Balkans and
Turkey . . . By all means make the best plan of manoeuvre, but anyhow
fight.'56 The early haggling over the delivery of the warning coincided
with the decision to bring the faltering offensive in the Western Desert to
a temporary halt while diverting troops to Greece. The decision was
geared in many ways to rally a despondent public opinion rather than
Churchill's Warning to Stalin 169

follow tactical or strategic considerations. Obviously, the only chance

of checking the Germans in Greece, especially after the opening of the
Yugoslav front on 6 April, was through the introduction of a Russian
threat in the rear.57
Wavell proved unable to stabilize the line, conceding the acute danger
facing Tobruk on 7 April. Churchill reacted swiftly, accusing Wavell of a
failure to 'strike the right note for our public'; London was the place
'where opinion has to be held'. The atmosphere at home had become so
oppressive that Wavell was instructed by Churchill to hold Tobruk 'to the
death V\-·ithout thought of retirement' .58 The brevity and cryptic drafting
of the message to Stalin had been explained by Churchill as a means of
attracting Stalin's attention and establishing confidential contact with
him. After 10 April, when the battle in Greece took a turn for the worse,
he no longer seems to have attached much significance to this argument.
On that day Eden returned empty-handed from the Middle East and a
gloomy Cabinet learnt that 2,000 men, among them three generals, had
been taken captive in Libya. The prevailing feeling of despair was rein­
forced by the renewed bombing of London. Tl1e prospect of a sudden dra­
matic event on the eastern front provided the only ray of hope. Bearing
this in mind, and completely unconcerned about the effect on the
Russians of a public declaration of supposedly secret information,
Churchill expressed his belief on the radio on 9 April and again in Par­
liament on the 27th that Hitler might suddenly divert his campaign in
the Balkans to seize 'the granary of the Ukraine and the oilfields of
the Caucasus' .59 This corollary to the supposedly secret message entirely
cancelled its effect.
On 1 5 April Churchill admitted that the Germans appeared to be so
successful in their offensive that they now posed a serious threat to Egypt.
He could not both maintain the defence of Egypt and pursue the resis­
tance in Greece.60 By the time of the delivery of the warning the situation
had become so severe that Churchill was gravely concerned about 'the
fate of the war in the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal, the frus­
tration or confusion of the enormous forces we have built up in Egypt,
the closing of all prospects of American co-operation through the Red
Sea'. Finally on 22 April \Vavell regretfully informed Churchill that the
'time has come to prepare public in official communique for impending
Greek collapse' .61 For Churchill the possible loss of Egypt and the Middle
East amounted to 'a disaster of the first magnitude to Great Britain,
second only to successful invasion and fi11al conquest'. The situation had
become so acute that Wavell was instructed that in the ensui11g battle 'no
surrenders by officers and men will be considered tolerable unless at least
50 per cent casualties are sustained by the Unit or force in question . . .
Generals and Staff Officers surprised by the enemy are to use their pistols
in self-defence.'62
 Grand Delusion

Rumours of War and a Separate Peace •

Mistrust of British intentions increased in direct proportion to the wors­

ening military situation. During the winter, when military operations had
come to a halt, the Russians anticipated that Hitler would consolidate
Germany's economic position by executing selective military operations
in the Middle East. Once the 'war season' opened he was expected to
concentrate the decisive effort against Britain. By April, however, it had
become obvious that a stalemate had occurred on the Anglo-German
front. On the other hand, after the defeat inflicted on England in Greece,
it did not seem conceivable that the British would ever be in a position
to force a decision on the battlefield. A compromise peace seemed
plausible. 63
The crucial task of Soviet diplomacy and intelligence, therefore, was the
early detection of any signs pointing to a separate peace. Maisky was one
of the few Mensheviks holding high office to survive the purges; his
popularity in London at the height of the policy of collective security
probably saved his life, and he was fully conscious of this. His former
association with the Mensheviks had taught him prudence and he went
out of his way to demonstrate his loyalty to Stalin. He was rewarded for
this when in February 1941 he was elected a full member of the Central
Committee of the Party. His appointment, Molotov stressed, reflected the
appreciation that Maisky 'performs well as the ambassador plenipoten­ •

tiary in difficult conditions and it is necessary to show that the Party

values diplomats wl10 implement the will of the Party'.64 The significance
of Maisky' s reports has been underrated. Few diplomats were so well
regarded in London. His intimate knowledge of the political scene in
England was crucial for the Kremlin's assessment of British policies on
the eve of the war.
Once the Balkans were set ablaze Maisky' s reaction was that of extreme
caution and reserve. 'Let us li·ve and see' became his favourite catch­
phrase; it was 'difficult to be a prophet these days' and he had no inten­
tions of making 'a guess through a coffee cup'. And yet a careful
examination of his contacts, diary entries and telegrams to Moscow gives
a clear insight into the views held by the Kremlin. The most important
task of Soviet diplomacy was to neutralize the bad blood which threat­
ened to impair German-Soviet relations.65 Most of Maisky' s visitors,
among them Vansittart, the former permanent Under-Secretary at the
Foreign Office, went out of their way to impress on him that the Soviet
Union might well be the next victim. Maisky, well attuned to the Kremlin,
tended to see in such approaches the British obsession with seeing
Germans everywhere, 'even under the bed'. He faithfully informed
Moscow of his firm handling of such blunt efforts to involve Russia in
war.66
Churchill's Warning to Stalin

Maisky was undoubtedly sceptical about the likelihood that Churchill

might sue for peace. He nonetheless purported to have detected a well­
orchestrated campaign of the British government and press to 'frighten
the Soviet Union with Germany'. He was particularly disturbed by
Churchill's public annourlcements on 9 and 27 April, mentioned above,
in which he warned of a future German move against Russia. 'Since
when', Maisky wryly asked Churchill's intimate adviser Brendan
Bracken, 'does Churchill tend to take the interests of the Soviet Union so
closely to his heart?' In the complicated situation, warned Maisky,
Churchill's statements were 'a source of embarrassment and even tact­
less. They were having an opposite effect in Moscow to what he intends.'
Maisky' s suspicions were only reinforced when he found out that
Churchill did not really possess any concrete evidence about the German
intentions. It was clear, concluded Maisky, 'that the campaign of the
British Government and the English press on the approaching German
attack on the Soviet Union was unsubstantiated and evidence that: ''Der
Wunsch ist der Vater des Gedankens." ' 67 Lloyd George told Maisky that
he found the Prime Minister 'depressed and restless'. Neither the defeats
in Libya nor the trerr1endous German successes in the Balkans had been
anticipated by him. Churchill, he thought, was living 'in the certainty of
a German assault on the Ukraine and is only waiting for the USSR to fall
into the English basket like a ,,.ripe fruit'' '.68
When in early May Churchill was asked by a sceptical Prytz, the
Swedish ambassador to London, how England intended to win the war,
Churchill responded with a charming fable:

There were two frogs, an optimist and a pessimist. One evening

they were hopping around the meadow and happened to notice a
wonderful smell of milk from a nearby dairy. The frogs were tempted
and jumped through an open window. They thought they were in luck
and jumped right into a large jar of milk. What could they do? The pes­
simistic frog swam round in circles, saw that the sides of the jar were
high and slippery and could not be climbed, and so became panic­
stricken. It turned over on to its back, folded its legs, and sank to
the bottom. The optimistic frog did not '-vant to perish in such an
inglorious way. It also saw the high, s1nooth sides of the container,
but resolved to put up a fight. Throughout the night the frog swam
and thrashed its legs in the milk until it was thoroughly churned up.
And what happened then? As you might have guessed, by morning the
optimistic frog had churned a large piece of butter from the milk
and so was saved.

In Maisky' s memoirs, with obvious hindsight, he uses the tale to depict

Churchill as the leader wl10 stood firm against all odds. But at the time,
 Grand Delusion

as is obvious from his diaries, he formed a different impression. While

the memoirs end with that heroic story, the diaries reveal that Prytz was
little impressed by Churchill's sense of drama. He told Maisky explicitly
that Churchill lacked any grand strategy and relied on improvisation. He
seemed to have little idea of how to win the war. In the absence of any
concrete gains for Churchill to point to, Priutz formed the impression that
the imminent clash between Germany and Russia had indeed become the
British Prime Minister's fixation. In the case of a German-Soviet war
Churchill was 'prepared to enter into an alliance with anyone who might
be advantageous, be that the devil, Satan himself'. Maisky had therefore
become convinced that the lack of alternatives was increasingly prompt­
ing Churchill to ensnare Russia in the war through the spreading of
rumours.69
In view of the growing German concern over the rumours,70 urgent
measures were taken to dispel them. At a reception held at the Soviet
embassy in Washington, the ambassador, Umansky, drew Halifax aside
and several times complained bitterly that 'hostility to Soviet Russia
survived in British Government circles, as also the spirit of Munich' .
Umansky launched a virulent attack on Churchill, commenting that in his
last broadcast he had made what could be, 'with respect, only described
as a gaffe. He had spoken as though Germany not only would but could
swallow the Ukraine with the greatest of ease. This was both absurd
and offensive.' With members of the German embassy within earshot,
Umansky boasted of the achievements of the Red Army at Khalkin-Gol,
emphasizing that Russia was not Daladier' s France.71
The sense among the Russians that one false move, a military provo­
cation or a diplomatic blunder, might begin a war now led to prudence
bordering on paranoia. Incidentally or not, Maisky' s actions were clearly
curtailed after the fall of Yugoslavia and Churchill's warning, with the
rising fears of provocation and a separate peace. Like the rest of the Soviet
diplomatic staff, he was closely monitored by a large contingent of NKGB
at the embassy. He could hardly conduct an interview without an eaves­
dropper and often had to take his guests for a stroll to the end of the back
garden of the embassy if he wished to speak freely. 72 After his meeting
with Eden on 16 April, he was always accompanied, undoubtedly under
instructions from Moscow, by his new counsellor, K. V. Novikov, who
seemed to Eden to be 'a Kremlin watch-dog'. Maisky noted Novikov's
presence at all his meetings, even in his shorter reports. Whether Novikov
was employed by the security forces or by Narkomindel to watch over
Maisky, this unprecedented procedure clearly hindered his contacts with
Eden, as he himself suggested in jocular fashion in his diary:

Eden telephoned, invited me and asked me to come alone, because

E[ den] would be alone. I answered him that I did not see any reason
Churchill's Warning to Stalin 1 73

not to bring N[ovikov] with me. When we were in the reception area,
the secretary emerged and stated that it would be better for N. to wait
in the reception area. However, I went in to see E. with N. Seeing us
together, E. blushed deeply with irritation, which I had never seen in
him so far, and shouted: 'I don't want to be rude, but it should be said,
that today's invitation is for the ambassador alone, not for the ambas­
sador and the counsellor.' I replied that there were no secrets between
me and N ., and I did not understand why he could not accompany me
in the discussions. E . heatedly said that he had no personal animosity
towards N., but that he could not set an undesirable precedent; if the
Soviet ambassador could arrive with his counsellor, then other ambas­
sadors could also do the same. If it was possible to bring a counsellor,
then why not bring 2-3 secretaries? Then the ambassador would not
come alone, but bring an entire delegation. That would be unworkable.
E. had never received an ambassador other than on his own, and he
had no intention of changing his practice. I shrugged my shoulders. N .
remained, but E . sat red-faced and sullen throughout our conversation.
The situation ended up by being impossible. If such a scene is repeated,
I will have to take my leave and return to the embassy.73

There was little question as to whom Maisky feared more, Stalin or Eden.

The Bogy of a Separate Peace

The belated attempts to secure Soviet involvement in the Balkans,

epitomized by Churchill's warning, undoubtedly revived in Moscow the
memories of the events of the late summer of 1939 and enhanced the sus­
picion of an attempt to shift the war to the eastern borders. This coincided
with the revival of fears of a separate peace. On 1 7 April, before
receiving Churchill's final instructions to deliver his warning, Cripps
complained to Eden that a perilous situation had arisen, due to a large
extent to the government's failure to make up its mind whether it was
prepared to make 'any or what bid for close relations' with Russia. Con­
sequently, as a result of the debacle in South-eastern Europe, Russia
became more susceptible to pressure from the Axis. Without waiting
for instructions from London, Cripps now addressed Molotov with a
fourteen-page memorandum of inducements and threats as a last resort
to bring the Russians into the Allied orbit. This impulsive approach, it
should be stressed, was dictated by a wish to thwart the activities of
Schulenburg, who had left unexpectedly for urgent consultations in
Berlin.74 Cripps feared, as he forewarned Eden, that Schulenburg might
return from Berlin 'very soon with a new offer to Soviet Union on a large
scale in exchange for her whole-hearted economic co-operation with
174 Grand Delusion

Germany, and with an alternative veiled threat as to what will happen if

the Soviet Union refused' .75
In delivering the message Cripps, in his characteristic sermonizing
style, lectured Vyshinsky on the policy that he believed Russia should
follow. All the ingredients savoured of provocation. Cripps did not
confine hirnself to alerting the Russians to the danger, which he believed
was no longer a hypothesis but rather concrete German plans for the
spring. He resorted to what he recognized as the 'delicate' device of
drawing the Russians towards Britain by playing on their fears of a sep­
arate peace. As events soon proved, the Foreign Office was right in object­
ing to the use of this 'double-edged weapon which may encourage Stalin
to cling more tenaciously to his policy of appeasement' .76
His insinuations of a possible separate peace if Russia did not alter her
policy had lasting if not fatal consequences:

It was not outside the bounds of possibility, if the war were protracted
for a long period, that there might be a temptation for Great Britain
(and especially for certain circles in Great Britain) to come to some
arrangement to end the war on the sort of basis which has again
recently been suggested in certain German quarters, that is, that
Western Europe should be returned to its former status, while Germany
should be unhampered in the expansion of her 'living space' to the east.
Such a suggestion might also receive a response in the United States of •

America. In this connection it must be remembered that the mainten­

ance of the integrity of the Soviet Union is not a direct interest of the
British government as is the maintenance of the integrity of France and
some other Western European countries.

He was, however, careful to add, though this would be entirely lost on

Stalin, that 'at the moment there was no question whatever of the possi­
bility of such a negotiated peace so far as His Majesty's Government are
concerned' . Vyshinsky did not feel the need to consult his government
before turning down Cripps's memorandum, which embodied the lethal
combination of both a 'separate peace' and an attempt to drag Russia into
the war. He rejected it explicitly on the ground that the 'necessary pre­
requisites for discussing wide political problems did not exist'. Vyshin­
sky had also prepared for Cripps a reply to his detailed personal letter of
1 1 April which comprised only four lines in much the same vein.77
So deep-seated now were the Russian apprehensions and preconceived
views that in reporting personally to Stalin Vyshinsky claimed to have
noticed that Cripps acted with 'nervousness which could hardly be con­
cealed' . The ambassador complained of his treatment and regretted
having disclosed the information about the German threat. Hardly con­
cealing his own hostility, Vyshinsky had advised Cripps that it was 'up
Churchill's Warning to Stalin 1 75

to him' to decide what information to disclose, but he would hardly

encourage him to make extraordinary approaches before the conditions
were ripe for a political discussion. The Bulgarian ambassador was told
bluntly by Vyshinsky on the same day that Stalin 'would not allow the
Soviet Union to become involved in the war' . Stalin had also gleaned from
inside the British embassy that the rumours of war were being spread
'with the aim of intimidating the neutral states, and the Soviet Union in
particular' .78
These threats only reinforced a report from the NKGB informant within
the embassy about Cripps's off-the-record press conference on 6 March,
after his return from Ankara, in which he expressed his belief that Hitler
might attack Russia, risking a war on two fronts. But it was equally likely
that he might:

attempt to conclude a peace with England on the following terms: the

restoration of France, Belgium and Holland and the seizure of the
USSR. Such terms of peace stand good chances of being accepted in
England, because, as in America, there are influential circles who would
like to see the USSR destroyed, and if the situation in England wors­
ened, they will compel the Government to accept Hitler's peace terms.79

Cripps had indeed cont1ded in his American counterpart, Steinhardt,

as well that he could easily envisage his government's connivance in a
German invasion of Russia in return for peace.80 That he genuinely
believed in the possibility of a separate peace was to a large extent a result
of his isolation in Russia and his absence frorn London during the Blitz,
when Churchill had established t1nshakeable authority as a national
leader. As a witness of Churchill's 'finest hour', Maisky was inclined to
play down the possibility of a separate peace in defiance of the views held
at the Kremlin.81 This led him to waver perpetually between his own
convictions and the views whicl1 he thought Stalin expected to receive.
Consequently, as will become clear, his vacillation too contributed to the
Kremlin's false appreciation of the approaching dangers.
The day after raising with Molotov the possibility of a separate peace,
Cripps was finally forced to transmit Churchill's message. In view of his
letter to Vyshinsky of 1 1 April and the interview with him on 1 8 April,
he did not find it advisable to pass on the additional information, which
could only be seen as repetitive.82 Uneasy after the ill-fated accord with
Yugoslavia, the Russians had become obsessed with the thought that
Churchill was attempting to drive a wedge between them and Germany.
To rule out any clandestine collusion with Britain they were quick to leak
the essence of Cripps's memorandum to the Germans.83 The official re­
action was expressed by blunt accusations in Pravda against the U11ited
States and Britain in the same spirit.84 The fear that Britain might obstruct
 Grand Delusion

a political solution with Germany also stemmed from the sense of hope­
lessness in London which, as Maisky noted in his conversations with
British leaders, was overwhelming.85 The prediction of the Northern
Department of the Foreign Office that after the dispatch of the warning
'further approaches to the Soviet Government will be worse than useless,
since they will be take11 as proof that our position was desperate and thus
reinforce the tendencies of Molotov to compromise with the Germans'
was indeed borne out.86 Widespread rumours, some of them planted on
Soviet intelligence, only intensified the feeling in the Kremlin that the
British might not even assist Russia in the event of a German attack: they
would 'either rapidly conclude peace with Germany or halt military
action against her'.87 By the time Churchill's warning reached Stalin it
clearly had an adverse effect, only deepening Soviet suspicions. 'Look at
that,' Stalin told Zhukov, 'we are being threatened with the Germans, and
the Germans with the Soviet Union, and they are playing us off against
one another. It is a subtle political game.'88
Maisky was assigned the task of verifying with Eden the contents of
Cripps's memorandum, which had clearly paralysed Moscow. In an
unprecedented move it had been transmitted to Maisky in toto. The warn­
ings and memorandums were perceived in Moscow to be a deliberate
attempt to embroil Russia in war on the side of Britain by creating a sem­
blance of negotiations. The second memorandum was particularly dis­
concerting in that Maisky had warned Eden only a week earlier that such
documents were couched 'in the wrong sort of terms to make any appeal
at all'; the new one sounded 'like a bad joke'. Diverting the discussion
from the Balkans to the Baltic issue was expected to put British intentions
to the test. A British statement on this issue would have been a snub to
the Germans and proof that a separate peace was not on the agenda. In
the same vein Maisky steered the discussion to the Middle East in an
'

effort to find out whether the army had deliberately slackened its efforts.
Butler displayed a clearly defeatist outlook, confessing that after the fall
of Yugoslavia the situation of the Anglo-Greek forces 'is becoming cata­
strophic'. His rather vague optimism that 'hard months lie ahead for
England but that in the final account she will nevertheless emerge victori­
ous' was hardly a solace.89

Aftermath
It is doubtful whether Churchill's message to Stalin constituted a
warning. The military significance which Churchill attached to his
message is also disputable. He insisted all along that, rather than being a
warning of German intentions, the note to Stalin was an exposition of the
deficiencies and weaknesses of the German army. Had the Russians acted
Churchill's Warning to Stalin 1 77

upon it, they might still have faced similar consequences, as was clearly
demonstrated by the brilliant double campaign of the Wehrmacht in
Yugoslavia and Greece. When Operation 'Marita' was contemplated the
Wehrmacht had an ample pool of troops to draw on. Naturally prepara­
tions for 'Barbarossa' were disrupted, but only fifteen divisions out of the
enormous force of 152 earmarked for Russia were actually diverted for
the operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. Because of the leisurely pace of
the build-up for 'Barbarossa'90 most of the divisions assigned for Russia
had not yet departed. In practice only four divisions were detached and
sent to the south ahead of their scheduled deployment in the East. Only
the 14th Division out of the five divisions earmarked for the south, whose
movement had alerted Churchill, had started rolling east before being
ordered to change course. As the military historian M . van Creveld has
most convincingly proved in his debunking of the established myth,91 the
Greek diversion, far from overstretching the Wehrmacht, only produced
a negligible delay of the build-up for 'Barbarossa' .92
The circumstances of Churchill's somewhat distorted presentation
of his warning are closely linked to two critical developments which
coincided in October 1941 : Cripps's unprecedented challenge to his lead­
ership and Stalin's mounting dismay at the absence of a major concrete
British contribution to the war effort against the background of the
renewed German assault on Moscow. The combination was particularly
threatening in view of the massive popular support of Russia in Britain
and dissatisfaction within the War Cabinet among Churchill's closest
colleagues, notably Beaverbrook and Eden. There is virtually no reference
to the challenge in Churchill's memoirs. Cripps complained of the
'petulant and irrelevant telegrams' which were not 'worthy' of Churchill.
He continued to oppose Churchill's strategy, which he described as the
execution of 'two relatively unrelated wars to the great benefit of Hitler
instead of a single war upon the basis of a combined plan'. To Churchill
it had become evident, as he told Beaverbrook, that Cripps was 'prepar­
ing his case against us' .93 Cripps's ceaseless pressure for diversionary
action reached its peak in mid-October when the Defence Committee,
hitherto Churchill's stronghold, considered favourably the redeployment
deep in the Caucasus of two divisions originally earn1arked for North
Africa.94
The origins of Churchill's published version of his warning to Stalin
date from this turbulent period. It was sparked by Beaverbrook' s recol­
lection of Stalin's complaints at the Moscow conference at the beginning
of the month of not having been warned about 'Barbarossa'. In a note
to Beaverbrook Churcl1ill now exploded in a denunciation of Cripps' s
'effrontery' in withholding the message in April. Reflecting on the whole
episode, Churchill assigned 'great responsibility' to Cripps for his 'obsti­
nate, obstructive handling of this matter' .95 The fury had of course little
 Grand Delusion

to do with the warning but reflected the recent bickerings and bitter
exchanges. Churchill also used the occasion to exonerate himself from
blame for the low ebb to which his relations with Stalin had sunk. Had
Cripps followed his instructions, he argued, 'some kind of relationship
would have been constructed between him and Stalin'. This interpreta­
tion, a mere six months after the events, already ignored the political
atmosphere in mid-April. Churchill1s accusations seemed so far from the
mark that they were contested even by Eden, despite his well-known
timidity in communications with Churchill. At the time, he put it deli­
cately to Churchill, 'the Russians were most reluctant to receive messages
of any kind . . . The same attitude was adopted towards the later mes­
sages \Vhich I gave to Maisky.'96 Notwithstanding those reservations, the
exchanges vv?ith Beaverbrook were incorporated almost verbatim, except
for Eden's defence of Cripps, in Churchill's war memoirs.
It is interesting to compare Cripps' s dilemma with that of Laurence
Steinhardt, the American ambassador in Moscow, who was placed in a
similar situation in early March. The still neutral Americans had better
intelligence sources in Berlin and throughout South-east Europe. By the
beginning of March they had sufficient indications of an offensive
German deployment to warrant an approach to the Soviet government.
Weighing the pros and cons, Steinhardt dissuaded Cordell Hull, the
American Secretary of State, from taking this course, arguing that
the move would be regarded by the Russians as 'neither sincere nor
independent' .97
 9
Jap an: The Avenue to Germany

Russia's abortive stand on Yugoslavia and Hitler's punitive campaign in

the Balkans shattered Stalin's dream of establishing Soviet predominance
in the region. Worse still, the reality of the danger now facing Russia was
being driven home. Intelligence reports from varying sources had been
accumulating on Stalin's desk. At the end of March the Director of Foreign
Intelligence of the NKGB warned Marshal Timoshenko of the seriousness
of the German intentions. He cited twenty-one clear indications of move­
ment and concentration on the border of German troops since the end of
February and especially during March.1 On the same day he informed
Stalin unequivocally that NKGB' s undercover agents and corroborating
evidence revealed "the acceleration of the transfer of the German troops
to the Soviet border '. The railway system, as well as requisitioned trans­
port, was employed to full capacity to achieve the transfer not only of
troops but also of artillery and ammunition from inside Germany to the
border. Hasty measures were being taken to improve the roads leading
to the border regions.2
By mid-April the NKGB had compiled such a long and impressive file
on German troop concentrations that it felt confident enough, regardless
of Stalin's known views, to enlighten Military Intelligence. This was fol­
lowed a week later by the incredible report of forty-three fresh violations
of air space by German flights. The sheer number of flights in less than a
fortnight, and the fact that in many cases they penetrated more than 220
kilometres into Soviet territory, ruled out the possibility that they were
the results of navigation errors.3 Despite his tendency to agree with Stalin,
Golikov conceded that in the first two weeks of April alone a massive
movement of troops from Germany towards the Russian borders had
been detected; they were now encamped in the Warsaw and Lublin

1 79
180 Grand Delusion

districts. The intelligence led to an unequivocal conclusion: 'The transfer

of forces and the stockpiling of ammu11ition and fuel are continuing on
the borders with the USSR.'4 The trend could no longer be ignored; the
figures presented to Stalin showed that since February the Germans had
increased their presence on the border by thirty-seven infantry divisions,
three or four tank divisions and two motorized divisions.
However, German disinformation, confusion over troop movements
during the subsidiary campaign in Greece and Yugoslavia and the
leisurely pace of the deployment still made it possible for Stalin to doubt
Hitler's ultimate personal objective, of which he barely had any infor­
mation. The effectiveness of intelligence is determined by the access of
the policy-makers to the collators and the ability of the latter to sustain
a high degree of autonomy. Generally speaking, and in Stalin's case
even more markedly, the collation of intelligence tends to be governed
by a conceptual framework projected by the politicians downwards. The
providers of the intelligence sift through the sea of information at their
disposal, seeking to present the leadership with adequate responses to the
issues that engross them. The selection process thus inevitably deflects
the providers, and in turn the politicians, from the more vital data. The
results are often counter-productive and indeed disastrous.
What obsessed Stalin after the fall of Yugoslavia was less the likelihood
of war and more the prospect of averting a military clash through the
creation of a climate conducive to a political settlement. The archival
material supports Sudoplatov' s recollections that almost half of the infor­
mation available to the GRU and the Russian security services suggested
that war could be avoided, and that rumours of war were being spread
in an attempt to embroil Russia. 'The thickness of this file', he attests,
'grew day by day, as we received further reports of British activity to
stimulate fear among the German leadership that the Soviet Union was
coming into the war.'5 It is necessary therefore to precede any discussion
of Stalin's attempts at appeasement with a review of those files.6
From mid-April onwards, the nature of the reports presented to Stalin
resembled an a-la-carte menu, from which he could choose the most
appealing intelligence. Merkulov, the chief of the NKGB, chose to present
Stalin with every piece of intelligence, to a large extent the reports of
'Starshina', which suggested the existence of a split between the political
and military leadership in Germany. Comparison of the warnings in their
raw state with the final ones submitted to Stalin indicates that by and large
they were geared to the sustaining of the appeasement process. Informa­
tion from within the German establishment was misconstrued to create an
atmosphere conducive to further negotiations with Hitler.
Since the outbreak of war the Soviet legation in Berlin had been sug­
gesting the existence of a breach within the leadership. Sustained by the
'powerful industrialists', Hitler seemed to be bent on continued co-
Japan: The Avenue to Germany

operation with the Soviet Union. Only a negligible hard core of Nazi
ideologists were believed to be motivated by anti-Soviet designs in their
desire to expand the Third Reich.7 In early March 1941 the various intel­
ligence agencies naturally focused their attention on the growing evi­
dence and rumours of a German plan to invade Russia. The prevalent
tendency was to admit that though some circles in Berlin might be advo­
cating war, and perhaps even making war plans, it was inconceivable that
the German leadership, aware of the might of the Red Army, would
condone such an outcome.
This imaginary rift within the German leadership had two supple­
mentary consequences: it appeared to open a window of opportunity for
a political settlement, while rendering the Russians excessively suspicious
of British attempts to provoke them into a premature war.8 Faced with the
conflicting intelligence, Stalin increasingly favoured the reports which
depicted a breach. It was no coincidence that the wave of rumours of war
was compared by the Russians to what they believed had been a similar
campaign pursued deliberately by the Western democracies after Munich
to divert Germany to the East.9 At the same time, the vociferous rumours
within the diplomatic community in Moscow of an imminent war 'aimed
at the southern districts of the USSR, rich in grain, coal and oil', were to
a large extent dismissed as a deliberate provocation, attributed to Eden's
fervent attempts to form a Balkan bloc.10
Stalin's attention was drawn to a report from 'Corsicanets' that Ribben­
trop, and presumably Hitler, supported the unanimous recommendations
of the four-year planning committee that Germany 'stood to gain much
more' by pursuing trade with Russia than through the occupation of her
territories. The real threat seemed to be from the armed forces, which were
examining the issue from a strict military-strategic point of view and
appeared to be trigger-happy. Though the preparations for war were obvi­
ously continuing and the deployment of the German army on the Soviet
border closely resembled its deployment on the Dutch border before the
invasion of the Low Countries, the danger did not seem imminent, as
Turkey was marked as the next victim before Germany turned against
Russia.11
The Soviet spy Richard Sorge, because of the romantic aura surround­
ing his activities, is often quoted as the most reliable source of the warn­
ings. As a confidant of Ott, the German ambassador in Tokyo, and his
military attache, Sorge had access to precious information. With few
exceptions his reports to Moscow have been quoted selectively by histo-
1·ians, highlighting those fragments which eventually turned out to be
accurate. However, what in retrospect may be recogI1ized as perfectly reli­
able data were mixed with misleading trends, reflecting the German
embassy's partial and often false recognition of the reality. As always,
rumours and evaluations were interwoven. The contradictory nature of
 Grand Delusion

the information therefore \vould allow Stalin to follow his policy of

appeasement, \1indicating his hope to avoid the outbreak of hostilities.
Sorge' s first significant report, on 10 March 1941, focused on the pres­
sure exerted on Japan to 'invigorate her role in the Tripartite Pact' against
the So\,,.iet Union rather than making a move southward. The inforrna­
tion, obtained from a special courier V\1ho had just arrived from Berlin,
added that such an approach V\1as 'particularly prevalent in military
circles', corroborating the erring assessment in the Kremlin of the situa­
tion in Berlin. The '"Taming was further \vatered down by the axiomatic
assumption that the German military vvould launch a war only 'once the
present one was over' . From Stalin's point of vie\v, therefore, such infor­
mation, though indeed exposing the danger, suggested that the breathing
space until England's defeat could be exploited if the split within
Germany \Vere encouraged.1' In May Sorge briefed Mosco\v that Hitler
\\1as resol\1ed 'to crush the So\riet Union and keep the European part of
the Soviet Union irt his hands as the ra\'\1 material and grain resources
necessary for the German control of Europe'. The statement, however,
\.\1as modified to lea\1e room for diplomatic manoeu\1Tes, suggesting that
-vvar \-\rould become 'ine\1itable' only if the Russians were to cause further
problems. The disparaging attitude of the German generals to\vards the
Red Army and its defensive capabilities could also be addressed through
a careful shO\.\'" of force and confidence, such as that e\1inced in Stalin's
speech to the graduates of the \.Var academies on s May.13 Later in the
month Sorge told his superiors that a group of German officials, fresh
from Berlin, were con\rinced that \var would start at the end of May; they
V\rere instructed to return to Berlin, on the Trans-Siberian express, before
that date. But the same dignitaries also expressed their opinion that the
danger of \\1ar in 1941 had receded.1-i
Finally, in one of his rrtost famous reports, Sorge hastened to warn
:Moscow in early June that the German ambassador in Tokyo had
been informed by Berlin that 'the attack against the So\riet Union
V\Till begin in the second part of June'. He \'Vas ' 95 per cent certain' of the
outbreak of \\1ar. The ambassador had been con,rinced of such a de\1el­
opment by instructions to him to · · · e the transmission of important
data via Russia and to reduce the transportation of rubber through the
S0\1iet lJnion to the minimum. A follo\.v-up telegram, of \Vhich the origi­
nal has not come to light so far, some\\1hat reduced the significance of the
iriformation. Sorge traced its origin to Lieutenant-Colonel Scholl, the
German military .;
attache, '"rho had left Berlin almost a month earlier,
on 6 May. From Stalin's point of \rie\\11 this date \Vas prior to the 'break-
through' in the 'negotiations' \\rith the Germans. When pressed by Sorge,
the German ambassador in Tokyo admitted that he possessed no cor­
roborating information from Berlin. Scholl, hO\'\Te\'"er, had re\1ealed to him
that the planned attack \'\1as prompted by 'a major tactical mistake' by
Japan: The Avenue to Germany

the Red Army; the Soviet army was deployed in a linear form rather than
in depth.15
The illusion of a breach within the German camp was deeply rooted
not only in Moscow. In mid-March, Stalin was shown a report from an
agent within the British embassy of a confidential press conference held
by Cripps. Cripps told the journalist that relations between the Soviet
Union and Germany had 'deteriorated markedly' and war had become
'inevitable'. But, more significantly, he too now elaborated the 'split'
between the German military and Hitler, who was opposed to a war on
two fronts. Cripps expected Hitler to seek, and perhaps achieve, a sepa­
rate peace with England, thus paving the way for a campaign in the East.
Paradoxically such information, coupled with similar innuendoes made
directly by Cripps, only encouraged Stalin to seek a rapprochement with
Hitler to forestall such an agreement.16
Rumours of Soviet-German negotiations emanating from the well­
informed Swedish legation in Berlin were widespread among diplomats
in Moscow. Virtually all of them described in their reports the two ten­
dencies discernible in Germany: 'one favouring rapprochement with the
USSR by combining diplomatic and military threats, and the other advo­
cating a direct military seizure of the economic resources of the USSR'.
The almost unanimous view was that while the German army and people
'favoured action against Russia', it seemed that Hitler preferred to achieve
his aims with his customary techniques of intimidation and cajoling. The
month of May was therefore expected to witness either war or full co­
operation.17 This assumption had become so popular that in May Halifax
transmitted to London information originating in Berlin, according to
which:

Russia, feeling her weakness vis-a-vis Germany, was gradually giving

way and was preparing to give Germany economic privileges in the
Ukraine and Baku area. Ribbentrop was believed to be in favour of such
an arrangement but the German military were said to oppose it since
they felt it would give Russia a breathing spell in which to strengthen
her military position. These quarters thought it would be more to
Germany's advantage to attack Russia now while she was still
unprepared. Hitler was said to be still undecided between these two
theories.18

In his extensive report to Stalin on 20 March, 19 Golikov elaborated at

length the hypothesis of the split. He argued that two tendencies were
prevalent among the Germans:

The first - the USSR at present is weak both in military and domestic
affairs and therefore it is wise to seize the convenient moment and
 Grand Delusion

together with Japan get rid of the USSR and Soviet propaganda, and
the sword of Damocles which is constantly hanging over Germany; the
second - the USSR is not weak, the Russian soldiers are strong in
defence as history has demonstrated. One should never take risks. It is
better to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union.

Roughly speaking the German armed forces, led by Goring, were believed
to be pressing for war against Russia and ad vacating a separate peace
V\rith Britain. Some reports had indeed suggested the existence of clan­
destine conversations and feelers on both sides; tracking such efforts
'vould ob\1iously become uppermost in the order of priorities of the intel­
ligence agencies. Hitler and Ribbentrop were believed to be more cau­
tious, and Hitler's decision therefore was not conceived as a foregone
conclusion. Some reports, well represented in the pot-pourri, suggested
that Hitler had been weighing three alternatives as to where he should
employ his idle 228 divisions in 194 1 : he could invade England, attack in
North Africa or indeed turn against the Soviet Union. Ample room was
given to those reports that suggested that the war aims would be limited,
such as gi\1ing assistance to Rumania and Finland in regaining the terri­
tories they had lost to the Soviet Union.20
The prominent position of 'Starshina' in the German Air Ministry, an
ob,rious asset, was also a draV\1back. While he was well placed to provide
a steady flow of both strategic and operational information, 'Starshina' in
fact portrayed a one-sided picture seen from tl1e Ministry's perspective.
His relative ignorance of developments in other arms of the military led
him to inflate the role of the air force as the spearhead in the campaign
against Russia. He promptly postulated a scenario whereby Goring
appeared as the most vocal advocate of the anti-Soviet camp, often press­
ing for '''ar against Hitler's will. In his reports to Moscow he depicted in
li\1ely colours the clash between Goring and Ribbentrop, a clash that had
'gone so far as to sour their personal relations'. This view naturally led
him to unfounded speculation, such as his theory that, while Brauchitsch
seemed to propagate the idea of war, 'the majority of the German officer'
corps 'vas opposed to Hitler and among them the idea of an attack against
Russia was not popular'.21
A V\1eek later Merkulov submitted to Stalin and Timoshenko a digested
revie''' of the latest intelligence, formulated in such a way as to silence
the '-vvarmongers' and facilitate reconciliation with Germany. While the
first part of the report did not dismiss the danger of war, it suggested that
the German \rictories in orth Africa V\1ere reviving their hopes of
'winning the war against England by way of striking their communica­
tion lifelines and oil resources in the Middle East'. In the second and most
important part, the report from 'Starshina' of the rift betV\reen the armed
forces and the politicians was given prominence. However, the presumed
Japan: I'he Avenue to Germany

weariness of the troops led him to the conclusion that the strike power of
the Wehrmacht 11ad declined in comparison to 1939. The third section
chose to bring to the fore a report which described the despondency
within the Luftwaffe in face of the qualitative superiority of the Russian
bombers and fighter planes.22
Stalin's reading of the foreign intelligence also enhanced his interpre­
tation. Via Anthony Blunt, one of the 'Cambridge Five', he was able to lay
his hands on at least some of the Foreign Office's weekly intelligence
reports. The report he received for tl1e week of 16-23 April indicated that
'the German preparations for war against Russia continue, though so far
there is no absolute evidence that the Germans intend to attack the Soviet
Union in summer 1941' .23 Indeed, a synopsis of reports gathered by the
residency in London on the British intelligence evaluation of German
intentions corroborated the split theory. The intelligence paper on
'German Plans and Perspectives', covering the period of 4-1 1 May, dis­
closed from sources close to Himmler that a lightning campaign was
aimed at occupying Moscow and setting up a government which would
collaborate with Germany. If these were the aims of the war, Stalin could
still hope to convince Hitler that he was his best partner if negotiations
were resumed. More significant from Stalin's point of view was the addi­
tional information, contradicting the earlier evaluation, which supported
the prevailing view in London that Germany was seeking to come to
terms with Russia. The report disclosed that, while the German army was
pressing for war, the politicians advocated negotiations. 'Led by Ribben­
trop,' it concluded, 'they claim that in negotiations with Russia it is pos­
sible to obtain all that Germany needed, i.e. participation in the economic
and administrative control of the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Germany
will gain more from a peaceful solution than from co11trol of occupied
territory, deprived of the Soviet administrative apparatus.'24
Deliberate disinformation also contributed to the faulty evaluation,
spreading rumours of the Wehrmacht's continued preparation and con­
centration of forces for an invasion of Britain.25 But the disinformation that
bolstered the self-deception proved the most effective. ' Litseist' continued
to send his usual blend of accurate and false information. After giving
fairly accurate though general information about the size of the forces
facing Russia, he resorted to a soothing message. War between the Soviet
Union and Germany, he assured the residency, was 'unlikely', despite the
popular support it enjoyed in Germany. Hitler could not risk a war 'which
might break the unity of the Party' . Working effectively on Soviet
susceptibilities, he explained that Hitler was opposed to a war which
might cost him at least six weeks, even if he were to be the victor, since
during this time England might become stronger with the help of the
United States. The concentration of troops was therefore merely a demon­
stration of the 'resolve to act'. Hitler assumed tl1at Stalin was 'compliant'
186 Grand Delusion

and \'\70uld do e\'erything to bring to an end the intrigues against

Germany, and in the first place 'increase the dispatcl1 of goods and in par­
ticular oil'. Germany stood to gain little from the war, as it was bound to
introduce ha\70C in Russia. True, the Germans were confident of their
abilit)' to beat the Russian army, \.Vhich had proved itself 'entirely unfit'
both in Finland and in Poland; if forced to fight the Germans would find
themselves in the So\riet capital and in control of the entire European part
of the So\riet Union '''ithin six weeks. Howe\rer, 'Litseist' dismissed the
idea as a contingency plan.2b
Very SV\,.iftly the 'split theory' V\7as elaborated and incorporated into an
'ultimatum theory' . As early as 2 April 'Starshina' transmitted informa­
tion emanating from 'Litseist' that Hitler was determined to 'use the grain
and oil resources of the Soviet go\'ernment' . As a sophisticated double
agent, 'Litseist' was of course forwarding a mixed bag. It "''as clear that
in the mood pre\railing in the Kre mlin the V'.'Ord 'use' might imply nego­
tiations, \\'hile the build-up could be explained as a means of pressure.
'Starshina' himself attributed the V\'ar preparations to a 'demonstration'
of German resol\'e. The focus of Stalin's attention was obviously .;
directed
to hi:; appreciation that 'the actual initiation of military activities V\7ill
be preceded by an ultimatum to the So\riet government V\1ith a proposi­
tion to join the Tripartite Pact'. Hitler \'\Tas expected to launch the V\,.ar
only if Stalin ,,refused to fulfil the German demCL.�ds'. The need to act
prudently \\7as dictated by the suggestion that the ultimatum would be
presented as soon as the battle of Yugosla\ria and Greece \Vas decided.
The telegrams \Vere \\rithheld from Stalin until 14 April, V\'hen his mis­
calculations in Yugosla\ria V\1ere exposed \'\Tith the victorious entry of the
Wehrmacht into Belgrade. Beria and Merkulo\1 o\rerruled the decision of
the three-member analytical committee of Foreign Intelligence not to dis­
seminate the information on \.\Tar V\Thich did not tally \'\7ith the vieV\1 held
at the top. Within days, indeed, a second telegram again referred to an
ultimatum. The 'ultimatum theory' vvas thereafter adopted by the NKGB
and fitted in only too i;vell \\Tith Stalin's O\\.'n vieV\7S. 21 Very shortly a similar
interpretation spilled over into the diplomatic communityr,, inflaming it
e\'en further. 28
A month later, on the e\'e of the negotiations V\rith the Germans,
described belO\\T, the Berlin residency con\'eyed a soothing message, origi­
nating from i;'\Tithin the Ministry of Economy, that ,,the Soviet Union '"ill
be asked to join the vvar against Britain on the side of the Axis. As a guar­
antee she \Vill be asked to cede the Ukraine,, and perhaps the Baltic coun­
tries.' Such a report naturally de\1alued contradictory information, such
as that Hitler had told high-ranking officers: 1n the near future extraor­
dinary e\'ents \\'ill take place ,,,. hich \\W appear to some to be completely
incomprehensible. But the measures \.Vhich \\1e contemplate are a neces­
sity, as the red mob raises its head O\�er Europe.'">Q
Japan: The Avenue to Germany

The primary task which Stalin would he11ceforth set for his intelligence
agencies would be to glean the nature of the demands Germany was
likely to present. By and large, these focused on the German need to
ensure a more intensive flow of Soviet deliveries. 'Litseist' continued to
provide sophisticated disinformation, treading the thin line between cred­
ibility and deception. As the deployment could no longer be concealed,
he admitted that the army was already fully prepared for the war and
only waiting for marching orders. But the related data could be inter­
preted in varied ways. The German connivance in the pact with Japan
was explained as a manoeuvre to gain time. Hitler seemed to be con­
cerned that Japan, following the Italian precedent, might despite her
weakness launch an adventurous war against Russia and drag Germany
into a premature conflict. The wish to avoid war rendered Stalin suscep­
tible to any information which suggested that Hitler was prepared to
convert the military solution into a political one. According to 'Litseist',
Hitler was motivated by the scarcity of commodities, mostly oil and
wheat, for which he had to rely on the Soviet resources. For him the
Ukraine was 'the granary of the entire European Continent'. Moreover,
a breathing space was assured by Hitler's decision to postpone the war
'pending the developments in the Balkans and the success of the cam­
paign against Egypt'. 30
Shortly after the invasion of Yugoslavia, the residency passed on to
Moscow information extracted from a major, designated 'X', that Hitler
had made up his mind to attack the Soviet Union now that the war with
Britain was being protracted, so as not to face a stronger Russia in the
future. The possibility that war with Russia would precede the war with
Britain now gained prominence but was cushioned by the ultimatum
theory. Corroborating information was abundant. For instance, a certain
Franz Kosh, a worker in one of the electricity factories in Berlin and a
provider of reliable information, insisted that Hitler was aiming at a com­
prehensive trade agreement for ninety years, in return for which Germany
would agree to Turkey and Finland becoming Soviet republics.31 'Mazut',
a former Latvian and a director of one of the leading Rumanian oil com­
panies, reported that the German disappointment with the trade relations
with Russia was leading them to seek in Europe 'conditions which would
force the USSR to make considerable concessions to Germany' .32
Stalin was acquainted with such reports while impatiently waiting
the outcome of Schulenburg' s consultations with Hitler in Berlin.33 Indeed
corroborating information from a l·eliable source suggested that the
special planning committee in Berlin had reached the conclusion that
the shortage of economic resources would force Germany 'to exploit
the bread and oil reservoir of the Soviet state'. Some even suggested
he might seek the creation of a free Ukrainian state, subservient to
Germany.34
188 Grand Delusion

By early May many intelligence reports were going all out to accom- ·

modate the Kremlin. While the overwhelming evidence pointed to war

in mid-May, 'Starshina' continued to adhere to the damaging evaluation
that 'initially Germany will present the Soviet Union with an ultimatum
with demands for wider exports to Germany and the cessation of com­
munist propaganda. In order to fulfil these demands German commissars
will be sent to the industrial and agricultural centres in the Ukraine and
several Ukrainian regions will be occupied by the German army.' The
suggestions of what the terms might be provide an insight into the extent
of the submission that Stalin was considering when embarking on the
false negotiations with Schulenburg. The 'war of nerves', as a further
telegram from Kobulov explained, was carried out through misleading
rumours. 'Starshina' still assumed the majority of the Germans officers,
and some circles within the Nazi Party, to 'really be opposed to a war with
the Soviet Union'. Such a war made no sense and could 'lead to Hitler's
downfall' .35
On instructions from Moscow the embassy in Bucharest dismissed
information abo11t German consultations with the Rumanian Chiefs of
Staff as a stage in the 'so-called German preparation of an attack against
our state'. Moreover, the 'tendentious and unreliable' rumours were
traced to English sources. It was even suggested that 'the British had
deliberately allowed the Germans to occupy the Greek islands situated
near the Straits, thereby posing a threat to the Soviet Union and dragging
11er into the war' . The British thus hoped to achieve two aims: 'on the one
hand the destruction of the USSR, and on the other, the weakening of
Germany. Both suited them. '36 Indeed, this seemed to be confirmed in a
series of intercepted telegrams from Cripps which were transmitted to
Stalin. Cripps impressed on Eden that Hitler's next steps depended to a
large extent on whether he could obtain complete obedience from Russia,
which he believed would 'become obvious in the near future', a clear
reference to Schulenburg' s return from Berlin. He believed that so long as
Russia did not provoke the Germans Hitler was likely to defer war. For
tl1at same reason he suggested a number of measures to drive a wedge
between Germany and Russia, measures which would alarm Stalin and
certainly divert him from the genuine danger.37
The diversion of the war to the Balkans and the Anglo-German
entanglement in Greece encouraged speculation that Turkey might be the
next victim, perhaps paving the way for the seizure of Egypt, the Suez
Canal, Syria and Iran and possibly also Spain and Gibraltar.38 Even
reliable age11ts, like 'Dora' in Zurich who later gained fame for his accu­
rate warnings, submitted misleading information. His sources in Berlin
suggested that war would break out only once the entry of the British
navy to the Black Sea was blocked and the Germans were settled in
Asia Minor. It seemed therefore that Gibraltar and the Suez Canal were
fapa11: The Avenue to Germany 189

Hitler's next objective in an attempt to expel the Royal Navy from the
Mediterranean.39 Partially at least the concentration on Russia's south­
western border was explained as pressure to allow the transfer of German
troops through so11thern Russia to Iran and Iraq. Such an axis, threaten­
ing British imperial assets, might also divert the British from an objective
appreciation of the German threat.40
Upon Schulenburg' s return to Moscow 'Starshina' anxiously informed
the Soviet government that he had found out from the office liaising
between the Air and Foreign Ministries that a decisio11 had 'finally been
taken for an attack on the Soviet Union' which was expected 'any day' .
Even more disconcerting was the suggestion that Ribbentrop, 'who so far
has not been a supporter of an attack on the USSR, recognizing Hitler's
strong resolve on this question, has now assumed a position in support
of an attack against Russia' . Moreover staff talks were in progress with
the Finnish air force while the Bulgarians, Hungarians and Rumanians
had been asking for defensive rneasures.41 It is most likely, however, that
Stalin was not even shown the telegram. On the other hand, he was
briefed on that very day that Funk, the Minister of the Economy in Berlin,
had completed a survey of German economic resources. His conclusio11s
certainly delighted Stalin; they stated that, unless peace with England
were concluded within the year and economic co-operation restored,
Germany would have to 'widen the economic ties with Japan and the
Soviet Union, particularly with the latter, by force if peaceful means fail'.
The future co-operation depended on the Soviet ability to increase
deliveries of raw material.42
Facing the obvious dangers, Stalin had to strike a delicate balance
between submission to Germany and a display of self-confidence in order
to discourage the Germans from reacting to his weakness. His intricate
political game, which in hindsight, against the background of the inva­
sion, seems absurd, was grounded in the logic of the unfolding events.
Stalin was rarely challenged by his entourage, since his 'divide and rule'
method of government and his projection of his own reasoning on to that
of his rivals, coupled with extreme suspicion even of potential allies, led
to self-deception of colossal proportions. The increasingly reduced alter­
natives led him to adhere more tenaciously to his own convictions, stifling
divergent opinions and coercing the entire political a11d military system
to conform to 11is views. 43 Moreover the evaluation was sustained by
ample evidence which confirmed his political outlook. Only a marginal
part of it was the result of deliberate deception by Hitler.44 Far more
significant were misleading directions presented to 11im by oppo11ents of
Hitler's policy, Schulenburg in the first place and to some extent eve11
Ribbentrop. Ultimately Stalin remained convinced that sophisticated.
political manoeuvres could avert or at least postpone the war. This he
hoped to achieve through the revival of Ribbentrop's invitation for Russia
 Grand Delusion

to join the Axis, submitted to Molotov in Berlin prior to his departure in

November 1940.
The decision to avoid a conflict with Germany at all costs seems to have
been reached a mere two days after the conclusion of the pact with
Yugoslavia. Molotov ordered Dekanozov to renew negotiations cau­
tiously with Weizsacker for bilateral relations. Weizsacker for his part
noted that Dekanozov 'did not utter one word of criticism of our inter­
vention in Yugoslavia'; on the contrary, he seemed to be interested in the
visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, to Berlin, which he was
assured was a continuation of efforts to expand the Tripartite Pact which
had as 'its purpose to prevent the war from spreading' .45 The ambassador
in Vichy was used to convey to the Germans the Soviet intentions of
adhering to the letter of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Russia pledged
not to make 'any obligation either military or political with respect to
Yugoslavia', and strongly wished to avoid the experience of 1914 when
defence of Serbia dragged her into war.46
The most significant reaction to the fall of Yugoslavia was the hasty con­
clusion of a neutrality pact with Japan on 13 April, during Matsuoka"s
return trip from Berlin via the Russian capital. The conclusion of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact had had immediate and direct repercussions on
Soviet policy in the Far East. The close collaboration with China petered
out. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Kuomintang and head of state of
nationalist China, failed even to tempt the Russians with a proposal for
a military alliance and the right for Russia to place garrison forces on
Chinese territory.47 His special military envoy, who arrived in Moscow in
late April 1940 with a more concrete proposal to form a common platform
'to crush Japanese aggression', was denied access to Stalin and returned
to China empty-handed .48 These approaches were perceived by Stalin as
British attempts to ensnare Russia in war.49
The gradual drift away from China coincided with reconciliatory
approaches to Japan.50 Molotov was cautious in responding to the
Japanese initiatives, fearing, as he frankly revealed to Togo, the Japanese
ambassador in Moscow,. that it might be used by the Japanese as leverage
in their talks with the Americans.51 He changed his tune, however, when
the fall of France appeared imminent. Rather than the bilateral relations
which had hitherto been on the agenda, he now wished to move to the
'major issues, linked with the various changes which occur in the inter­
national situation and those which may happen in the future' .52 This led
to a quick demarcation of the Manchurian border, to the dismay of the
Chinese, which Molotov anticipated would hasten the dissolution of
the old 'Anti-Comintern Pact' .53 These early moves cleared the air and
encouraged further co-operation when Prince Fumimaro Konoe became
the Prime Minister in July 1940 and brought about an improvement in
relations with both Germany and Russia. The new tripartite under-
Japan: The Avenue to Germany

standing, he hoped, would provide Japan with a 'golden opportunity' to

exploit the upheaval in the international arena to expand southward.
Matsuoka, who as representative of Japan in the League of Nations had
proved to be an enthusiastic proponent of better relations with Russia,
was appointed the new Foreign Minister.54 Matsuoka's grand designs
in foreign policy matched those of Stalin and Ribbentrop. He hoped
that the conclusion of a Tripartite Axis would pave the way for the
creation of a 'four-power entente' with the Soviet Union. He shared
Ribbentrop's vision of the new world order in which Europe, Asia and
Africa would be divided into spheres of influence of the four powers. He
expected the Germans to act as the brokers in bringing about the new
order. The move southward against the British imperial assets was
strongly encouraged by Berlin. The German ambassador promised the
new Foreign Minister that Germany would 'do everything within her
power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer her
good offices to this end'. 55
But it was really the increasing tension in the Balkans and the creation
of the Axis in autumn 1940 which led to a more active Russian policy.
In a rare move Molotov invited Togo for breakfast during which
both finally agreed that in order for Russia to be associated one way or
another with the Tripartite Pact the differences between the two countries
should be resolved.56 Stalin had been informed by Beria of Hitler's inten­
tions of effecting a pact between the Soviet Union and Japan 'to demon­
strate to the world the full ties and unity of purpose between the four
powers' and thus discourage the United States from assisting Britain.57
Stalin, however, did not wish to commit himself to the neutrality pact pro­
posed to him by the outgoing ambassador in Moscow before he gained a
clearer impression of Hitler's plans during Molotov's forthcoming trip to
Berlin.58
Matsuoka wasted little time. Lieutenant-General Tatekawa, professing
to be 'a strong man seeking to reason with the Russians without a diplo­
matic turn of phrase', was sent to Moscow to effect a change. To the
Swedish ambassador he seemed like 'one of those Buddha statues that
can be bought in the market for a couple of rubles - but his stomach is
majestic and is the only vital thing in the otherwise immobile little
person' . Tatekawa' s appearance was misleading, because it concealed a
dynamic personality. He saw an advantage in his military position, as he
believed that in time of war 'countries could only communicate with each
other holding a sword in the hand' .59 Already at his first meeting with
Molotov on 1 November he proposed a non-aggression pact analogous
to the Ribbentrop-Molotov one. Aware of Konoe's need to remove
the threat of a second front in the north, Stalin was not in a hurry.
Himself preoccupied with the post-war arrangements which he hoped
would soon be settled in Berlin, he wished to receive an appropriate price:
 Grand Delusion

Japanese recognition of Russia's sovereignty over northern Sakhalin

and of her fishing rights, thus reversing the humiliating Portsmouth
Agreement in 1905 following the destruction of the Russian navy. Such
terms, Molotov impressed on the ambassador, were only 'fair compensa­
tion' for allowing Japan 'to have her hands free to move south', while
Russia was risking alienation of the United States and China.60
After the failure of Molotov's negotiations in Berlin Stalin remained
cautious, reluctant to bring down on himself the wrath of both the British
and the Americans. Moreover, the Japanese, eager to conclude the agree­
ment, had reverted to their proposal of a neutrality pact while deferring
the contentious issues to a later date. Stalin therefore adopted delaying
tactics, drawing the Japanese into exhaustive and tedious negotiations on
the fishing rights.61 Once the fishing convention was concluded at the end
of January Stalin moved on to equally arduous negotiations on a trade
agreement.62
On the whole the negotiations with the Japanese mirrored the devel­
opments on the western front, which since mid-February had presented
an imminent threat. The stalemate in the negotiations and the circulating
rumours of a war which might draw Japan into hostilities with Russia led
Matsuoka to take the reins in his hands. Ostensibly, the European tour he
now made was aimed at co-ordinating Japan's moves with those of her
Axis allies. But over 'a cup of tea' at his own residence Matsuoka confided •

to the Russian ambassador that he regarded the meeting with the Soviet
leadership during a stopover in Moscow as 'the most important aim of
his trip'. He ascribed the secrecy of the meetings in Moscow to the oppo­
sition at home, though in reality it was directed at the Germans, who he
feared might exert pressure on Japan to move against Russia. A keen trav­
eller, he asked the Russians to provide him with a railway carriage with
a kitchen and a sleeper to facilitate the long trans-S�berian journey.63
During his trip he drank vodka and evinced confidence in his diplomatic
ability by telling his entourage how he would 'make puppets of Hitler
and Stalin'. As the train ploughed through the barren snow-covered
plains, Matsuoka 'composed short poems, full of subtle twists of thought,
or meditated silently while sipping weak powdered tea' .64
For Stalin, who was set on exploiting his diplomatic skills to avert the
danger of war, the proposed visit was a godsend in his efforts to restart
the dialogue with Hitler, stalled since Molotov's visit to Berlin. He cer­
tainly was encouraged by Matsuoka's announcement in parliament that
he intended to make a 'serious effort to bring about a fundamentally
improved relationship' with Russia, in harmony with the ideas of the
Tripartite Pact.65 Tatekawa was thus informed in Moscow that the time
had come to 'move from the small issues to the regulation of cardinal
questions' . Tatekawa indeed hoped this could be accomplished during
Matsuoka's stopover in Moscow.66 There was certainly a sense of collu-
Japan: The Avenue to Germany 193

sion when Schulenburg and Rosso were excluded from a series of dinners
to which the Japanese ambassador invited Molotov on his own.67
Matsuoka' s concern about the Germans was relieved to some extent by
Ribbentrop himself. Still cultivating his dream of establishing the Conti­
nental bloc through the raising of the 'Great Wall' from the Atlantic to the
Pacific Oceans, he continued to press the Japanese to capture Singapore
and divert the war effort to the Pacific. To do so he had to conceal from
the Japanese the plans to attack Russia, which might pose a threat to Japan
as Germany's ally and involve her in an unwanted war. Ribbentrop even
confessed to Oshima, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, his hopes of
reviving the negotiations with Russia and achieving her inclusion in the
Axis.68 Consequently the level of negotiations was raised just before Mat­
suoka' s departure; arrangements were made for unprecedented meetings
between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Stalin, both on the former's
way to Berlin and on his way back.69 On his arrival in Moscow on 24
March, Matsuoka cautiously raised with Molotov the idea of a non­
aggression pact. However, the Foreign Ministry had drawn Molotov's
attention to the fact that the 1937 non-aggression pact vvith China pro­
hibited the Russians from concluding a similar one with Japan. He there­
fore proposed a neutrality agreement instead.70
At his meeting with Stalin Matsuoka recalled his efforts to bring about
a non-aggression pact with Russia in 1932, which had been foiled by
hostile public opinion at home. He and Konoe were now 'determined to
bring about the improvement of relations between the two countries'.
Matsuoka appeared extremely eager to win Stalin over, developing an
elaborate theory which depicted the Japanese system of government,
though ruled by an emperor in a capitalist environment, as 'moral com­
munism'. The present government sought through its association with the
Tripartite Pact to bring about 'the destruction of the Anglo-Saxons' and
with it 'capitalism and individualism'. If Stalin shared such views, he sug­
gested, Japan would be 'prepared to walk together hand in hand' with
him. Stalin was certainly amused by the exposition but was aware of the
more practical openings. He clearly wished to use Matsuoka as a go­
between, asking him to convey to Ribbentrop the message that the Anglo­
Saxons had never been Russia's 'friends, and nowadays he most likely
would not wish to befriend them'.
Stalin further stressed that differing ideological outlooks should not be
an obstacle to rapprochement between the two countries. It was evident,
however, that Matsuoka preferred to defer the actual negotiations until
after he had sounded out Hitler.71 The prospects seemed bright. At a
reception given for the Japanese Foreign Minister that same evening 11e
openly spoke of the need to cement the Axis and find an appropriate way
for Russia to join it. He strongly hinted at his intentions of paving the way
for such an arrangement during his trip to Berlin.72 Moreover, Stalin's
194 Gra11d Delusion

suspicion, fed by \\"ild rumours that Matsuoka might \'isit London in

search of an agreement \\7ith the British ,,... hich \\rould free his hands to
fight Russia together \Vith Germany, \\1as countered by denials from
Majsk\"' .,
in London. -3
Matsuoka' s meetings in Berlin beh\... een 27 and 29 March coincided 1-vith
the coup in Yugosla\Tia. It placed the German leadership in an uneasy posi­
tion. While ''rishing to discourage Japan from signing the agreement in
:Yfosco-Y\T, the Gern1ans \\7ere equally eager for her to launch an attack
on Singapore. The Japanese clearly deemed it necessary to conclude an
agreement '"Tith Russia before embarking on ,.\.. ar. Hitler therefore con­
cealed from Matsuoka the plans to attack Russia, \\Thich might tempt the
Japanese to postpone the expedition south ai1d clajrn booty in Russia. But
Matsuoka soon realized that the larger scheme of recruiting Russia to the
crusade against the Anglo-Saxon \\7orld \\,.ould not be realized. The Soviet
position on the Balkans, Ribbentrop cornplaL�ed to him, '"'as unacceptable,
as 'Germanv J
needed the Balkan Peninsula abo\"'e all for her O\\.,.n econornv J

and had not been inclined to let it come under Russian domination.' If
,
Stalin, \\Thorn at one point he described as 'sl;.,. , did not V\,.ork in harmony
\\rith \\That the Fiihrer considered 'to be right, he ''rould crus11 Russia'. Yfat­
suoka did make unsuccessful attempts, in his typical roundabout '",.ay, to
reverse the trend, disclosing to Hitler that during his con\rersations \\Tith
Stalin he had been told that 'So\riet Russia had ne,,. er got along \veil \Vith
Great Britain and r.e\rer \\"'Ould'. But he ,,...as ad\ised rather firrnl\.r not to
J

bring up the issue of Russia's accession to the Axis in the talks in Yfosco\\7,
'since this probably \\rould not altogether fit into the frarne\\Tork of the
present situation' . In the last meeting, Ribbentrop, probably'" under the
impact of the e\Tents in Yugosla\Tia and under direct instructions from
Hitler, cautioned :vfatsuoka more specifically7 not to conclude a non­
aggression pact \\ith Russia, as German;1 could engage Russia if there
''Tere a Russian attack on Japan ,,... hile the latter pursued her goals in the
south. His final \'\7o rds upon their dep arture contained a clear hint at
'Barbarossa', though maintaining the ambivalence. He could not assure
the Japanese Emperor 'that a conflict bet\\'"een Gern1an)r and Russia \.\,.as
inconcei,-able. On the contra1)1, as matters stood, such a conflict, though
not probable, still \\-ould ha\1e to be designated as possible.':4
Yiatsuoka certainly recei\red the message. Though Hitler hardl;r
touched on the issue during their meeting on 1 April, Yfatsuoka '"Tent
out of his ,,..a)' to apologize for the miniature conference ''rhich had
taken place in Yfosco\\T. He failed to mention that the initiati\Te had
come from him but zealouslv calculated that if the translations '"Tere
.,

taken into account, then he had 'con\"ersed ''ith �foloto\" for perhaps
ten minutes and ''ith Stalin for t\\7ent}"-£i\"e minutes'. \\lhil e gi\mg a fairly
accurate account of the talks, he significantl;- neglected to mention that
he had offered Stalin a non-aggression pact.� Yiatsuoka dre,,- some
Japan: The Avenue to Germany 19 5

encouragement from his talks in Rome with Ciano, who never tired of
gnawing at the German drive to supremacy. Matsuoka was in fact praised
for his efforts to explore the possibilities for extending the Tripartite Pact
and encouraged to further 'clarify and improve the relations between
Japan and the USSR'. 76
Matsuoka returned to Moscow on 6 April and met Molotov the
following morning. The dramatic events in Yugoslavia between the
two visits had brought about a marked change in Stalin's outlook.77 By
the time of Matsuoka's departure on 1 3 April, the day the Wehrmacht
entered Belgrade, Stalin had come to grips with the German menace
and his desperate need to resume negotiations with Berlin. The Japanese
avenue, therefore, had become a vital one. No wonder therefore that
Matsuoka found Molotov at their first meeting to be 'considerably
softer' .78 Matsuoka no longer beat about the bush; he had no interest
in negotiations on trade and fishing rights, which he was leaving for
his ambassador to handle. His visit was motivated 'not by coincidental
current mutual interests but by the wish to improve relations for the
next 50-100 years'. In short his 'uppermost desire was to conclude a
non-aggression pact, overlooking other outstanding issues'. He was cer­
tainly not reluctant to exploit the tension in German-Soviet relations, sug­
gesting that 'to conclude the pact now would produce a good master's
strike - that v\rhich in a baseball game is called a ''master-hit'', when the
ball is hit, with maximum strength, and directed with a strike in the right
direction' .
The obvious appeal for the Kremlin was that the move would consid­
erably improve its bargaining position vis-a-vis Germany. Matsuoka
further lulled the Russians by suggesting that the possibility of a joint
attack on the Soviet Union had not been discussed in Berlin. Molotov
however continued to make the conclusion of a neutrality pact condi­
tional on the return of southern Sakhalin, which Russia had lost in the
1905 war with Japan: in other words the revision of the Portsmouth
Agreement, giving Russia full control of the Sakhalin Islands. Those con­
ditions, which had prevented the conclusion of the agreement for more
than a year, clearly demonstrate the prominence attached by Stalin to a
comprehensive agreement which would be part and parcel of the final
post-war order. The meeting therefore ended inconclusively, though
not before Matsuoka revealed his intention to postpone his departure by
one week to the 13th, the next weekly departure of the trans-Siberian
express.79
After preliminary consultations, Matsuoka appeared ready to settle for
the neutrality pact but Molotov, well aware of Japan's desperate need to
conclude such an agreement, made it conditional on the liquidation of the
Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin. Unwilling to compromise,
Matsuoka revived the German offer for Russian access to the warm
 G7·a11d Delilsio11

\'\Taters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, \vhich he belie\red
'\1ould reduce the concession in northern Sakhalin to a 'small issue'.
egotiations had clearly reached a stalemate. That night, after dinner
\Vith Moloto\11 Matsuoka boarded the 'Krasnaya strela' train to Leningrad.
He certainly hoped that his absence from the capital \Vould exert pres­
sure on the Kremlin to reconsider its decision.80
On his return to Moscov,., on 1 1 April Matsuoka con\1eyed to MolotO\'
the Emperor's readiness to conclude the neutrality agreement, but
refused e\.,en to consider the liquidation of the Japanese concessions in
Sakhalin. Moloto\1 gambled on the urgent Japanese need to neutralize the
Russian threat b)1 bringing the talks to an end, regretting that it \\1ould be
'necessarv "'
to \\1ait for more conduci\1e circumstances to conclude a
political agreement'. Matsuoka pla;1ed his cards v\1ith iron nen1es. He pre-
sented Moloto\1 V\rith a draft letter he had composed on the train from
Leningrad \\1hich he suggested Moloto\1 should submit on the day the
neutrality agreement \\1as signed, expressing a hope that a similar one
relating to the concession issue would be signed before long. He dis­
played no anxiety \\1hen :vfoloto\1 dug in his heels. The rest of his tirpe in
Mosco''T until the departure of the trans-Siberian express ''Tas spent on
touring the cit;1, \1isiting technological institutes of the Academy of Science
and the motor industry and e\1en paying a \1isit to a reticent Zhuko\11 the
arch-enemjT and hero of Khalkin-Gol, on \\Thom he made a 'bad impres­
sion'. The e\1ening of 12 April \\'"as spent at the theatre enjoying a pro­
duction of Chekho,"s T71e Tl11·ee Siste1·s.81
V\Thil e Matsuoka sa\1oured the treasures of the Hermitage and the
Kremlin and re\rieV\"ed the technological inno\'ations in Mosco\'\'", Stalin
\\"itnessed \\Tith gro1\1ing concern the disastrous consequences of his mis­
calculations over the Yugoslav issue. He had just recei\Ted reports that the
Greeks had become 'extremely pessimistic' about their abilit}r to resist,
\\Thile the 100,000- strong British army in Greece had not ;Tet engaged the
Wehrmacht. The \"ie\i\7 in Athens \\1as that the entire British plan for
Europe had 'collapsed and great concern \Vas expressed over the future
course of the \\"ar'. 2 Moreo\"er, a stream of intelligence reports indicated
the intention of the \Vehrmacht to pursue the 'Drang nach Osten' as soon
as the Balkan campaign \\1as concluded. According to the residenC)1 in
Berlin, Matsuoka \\"as belie\1ed to ha\re come there to confirm the
fulfilment of the alleged promise of a \\1ar against Russia made to Japan
\\1hen she joined the Tripartite Pact. 3 The futile sho\\T of force in
Yugosla,Tia, about \\1hich he had had serious resen'"ations to start \\1ith,
no\\" ga,Te \\.,.a)T to an urgent need to appease the Axis.
Emerging from the theatre, Matsuoka \\1as \\"hisked off to the Kremlin,
''"here Stalin \\1as \\"aiting for him. Matsuoka repeated his desire to con­
clude the neutrality agreement, ,,.,.hich he belie,.,.ed to be 'useful and expe­
dient not only for Japan, but also for the USSR', but 1 \\Tithout any attached
Japan: The Avenue to Germany 197

conditions and produced as a diplomatic Blitzkrieg'. Stalin feared that the

Tripartite Pact was the main stumbling-block for the conclusion of the
agreement. Matsuoka, however, put his mind at rest, leading him to
believe that Ribbentrop had impressed on him that the agreement was
bound to improve German-Soviet relations. On the whole, as in his pre­
vious meeting with Molotov, Matsuoka was keen to present the neutral­
ity pact as a component in the overall scheme of integrating Russia in the
tripartite arrangements. In an attempt to divert the Russians from the
Sakhalin issue, he elaborated once again the arrangements proposed to
Molotov in Berlin to divide Asia into spheres of interests between the two
countries. This interested Stalin far more than Matsuoka' s descriptions
of Japan's 'moral communism'. The significance he attached to the agree­
ment was not the expansion of the creed but rather the fact that 'co­
operation between Japan, Germany and Italy on the major issues was
possible' . For the moment he attributed Hitler's reluctance to turn the
Tripartite Pact into a four-power pact to a conviction that he could win
the war on his own. The moment chosen for the conclusion of the neu­
trality pact with Japan, therefore, not only reflected Stalin's fear of a war
on two fronts; he truly saw in it 'a first step, and a serious one, to future
co-operation on major issues'. Stalin confessed that he had had his sus­
picions about Japanese aims, but he was now convinced that there were
no 'diplomatic games', and that Japan was 'genuinely and seriously inter­
ested in improving relations with the Soviet Union'. Stalin then praised
Matsuoka for his 'sincere and direct speech'. It was 'very rare to find a
diplomat who speaks openly what is on his mind. What Talleyrand told
Napoleon was well known, that ''the tongue was given to a diplomat so
that he could conceal his thoughts'' . We, Russians and Bolsheviks, think
differently and believe that also in the diplomatic arena it is possible to
be open and sincere.'84 Extraordinary efforts were made to secure a swift
confirmation by the Emperor of the agreement, which was signed in a
jubilant mood in the afternoon of 1 3 April; unusual photographs of Stalin
and Matsuoka, arm in arm, were to adorn the papers tl1e next morning.
The rather surreal farewell scene at the Yaroslavsky railway station
deserves to be described in detail, as it conveys vividly the growing self­
deception which now marked Stalin's hope of avoiding calamity.85 Stalin
was convinced that he had succeeded by a masterly stroke in outwitting
his opponents. In his eagerness to see Russia embroiled in war with
Germany, Cripps interpreted the agreement and Stalin's boosting of
Matsuoka's vanity at the station as a proof of the 'lengths to which Russia
would go to try and secure her Eastern frontier in the light of the danger
in the West' .86 This int,erpretation was common at the time and has been
repeated since, to a large extent by Russian historians, wl10 prefer to see
in the gesture, as in the case of the agreement with Yugoslavia, a stand
against Hitler rather than excessive appeasement of Germany.87
 Grand Delusion

The weekly trans-Siberian train had been kept waiting for an hour and
a half while the celebrations continued at the Kremlin. When Matsuoka
and Tatekawa finally arrived at the station, around 6 p.m. ,, they were
woozy from the refreshments consumed at the Kremlin during an
impromptu banquet following the conclusion of the agreement. They had
hardly entered the station when, to the amazement of the large corps of
diplomats and journalists,, Stalin, who was rarely seen in public and had
certainly never seen off any of his guests,, appeared at the station. He was
dressed in his military coat,, leather boots and overshoes and his brown­
visored cap. Staggering a couple of steps behind him was Molotov, who
'kept saluting all the time, shouting: I am a pioneer, I am ready!' If we are
to accept the judgment of the Bulgarian ambassador, he was 'the least
drunk' of the participants.
An alert journalist left an accurate and lively description of what
followed:
•

Stalin began embracing the Japs, patting them on the shoulders and
exchanging expressions of intimate friendship. As few of the Japs
or Russians could speak each other's language, the most frequently
heard remark was 'ah . . . ah,,. Stalin went up to the aged and diminu­
tive Japanese Ambassador-General, punched him on the shoulder
rather hard, with a grin and an 'ah . . . ah', so that the General, who has
a bald and freckled pate, and is not more than four feet ten in height,,
staggered back three or four steps, which caused Matsuoka to laugh
in glee.

But the most significant gesture occurred when Stalin, noticing Colonel
Krebs of the German embassy, suddenly detached himself from the
Japanese group. Tapping Krebs on the chest and looking up at his face
searchingly for a few seconds,, he asked him: 'German?' The six-foot
German officer,, towering over the diminutive Stalin, stood at attention
and mumbled an embarrassed affirmative in poor Russian. Slapping him
on the back and shaking his hand, Stalin declared with deep conviction,
'We have been friends with you and we shall remain friends with you',
to which Krebs answered ,, 'I am sure of that', though the Swedish
military attache noticed that he 'did not seem so convinced of it' .88 It
immediately dawned on the Bulgarian ambassador, who was fluent in
Russian and a keen observer of the Kremlin,, that Stalin was sending
signals about his decision to associate himself with the Axis. He wondered
whether Matsuoka 'did not play the part of a mediator between Russia
and Germany' .89 Indeed when Stalin took leave of Matsuoka for the third
1
time, he shook his hand firmly and embraced him, declaring in a some­
what cracked voice: 'We shall organize Europe and Asia.' Stalin then
personally accompanied Matsuoka into his carriage and stayed on the
Japan: The Avenue to Germany 199

platform until the train left the station. The members of the Japanese del­
egation were so touched by the special honour bestowed on them that
they accompanied Stalin to his car; as the Rumanian ambassador noticed,
'the little Ambassador, Tatekawa, standing on a bench, waved his hand­
kerchief and cried in a strident voice: ''Spassibo! Spassibo! (Thank you!
Thank you!)'' '90
Before leaving Soviet territory Matsuoka sent a warm personal letter to
Stalin from the Manchurian border station which well conveys the his­
torical significance of the episode. H e described the great impression he
had formed of Russia, her people and her achievements. 'The unofficial
yet heartfelt scene on the occasion of the conclusion of the Pact remains,
undoubtedly, one of the happiest moments of my entire life. The kind­
ness of your Highness, expressed in your personal appearance at the
station to see me off, will always be valued as a sign of genuine goodwill
not only towards me but towards my people.' Another letter followed the
ratification of the agreement, congratulating Stalin on his courage in the
execution of the 'diplomatic Blitzkrieg' .91
The agreement was an avenue for the revival of the talks with the
Germans. 'The Balkan victories', the Turkish envoy Aktay reported
home, 'have penetrated with lightning effect tl1e dark skulls of the
Soviets . . . the flattering of the Japanese by Stalin in the Soviet-Japanese
agreement has been done purely and simply to win the heart of Germany.'
Stalin, he concluded, was 'about to become a blind tool of Germany'.92
Matsuoka was indeed genuinely interested, like Ciano, in warding off a
German attack on Russia once Japan was set on the drive southward. The
Japanese spared no effort in impressing on Ott, the German ambassador
in Tokyo, that Matsuoka had 'found Stalin to be absolutely desirous of
peace. Stalin . . . had assured him that there could be no question of Russia
making a deal with the Anglo-Saxon powers.'93 A further telegram from
the German embassy in Tokyo emphasized that the Russians now
appeared to be impressed by the German successes and 'had become
ready to conclude a pact. Therefore Russia decided on going hand in hand
with the Powers of the Tripartite Pact. The Tripartite Pact has only now
become the sterling instrument of the policy of the Axis Powers and Japan
through the long sought for Russo-Japanese Agreement.'94
It was hardly a coincidence that Stalin chose this crucial moment, fol­
lowing Matsuoka' s visit and during Schulenburg' s visit to Berlin,95 to free
himself from the ideological constraints which limited his political
manoeuvrability. The German invasion of Yugoslavia had b1·ought about
a split within the Yugoslav Communist Party on the issue of whether the
war should be defined as a defensive one. Earlier it had proved impos­
sible to harness the Party to Moscow and restrain it from acting against
the Germans in the wake of the coup. The ideological haggling seemed
too hazardous; the benefits 1·eaped from communist supporters in general
200 Grand Delusion

were marginal and in the case of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria even counter­
prod uctive.96 The unequivocal message now was that state interests rather
than Messianism dominated the Kremlin. It was high time, urged the
Russian ambassador to Vichy France, 'to stop seeing the hand and eye of
Moscow everywhere' . The Soviet Union, he succinctly explained, was
pursuing a realistic rather than a sentimental policy. Sentiments, he said,
'we save for small children and little animals, but in practice we do not
conduct a sentimental policy in relation to any country, be it Slav or not,
be it small or big' .97
At midnight on 20 April, after an exuberant performance by Tadjikii
dancers at the Bolshoi,98 the members of the Politburo returned to the
Kremlin for a routine nocturnal meeting to which Dimitrov, the President
of the Comintern, was summoned as well. Stalin chose the occasion to
propound his latest views on the prospects for world communism, which
shook the foundations of the Comintern by advocating 'national
communism':

the Communist parties should become completely independent rather

than sections of the C[ommunist] I[nternational]. They should be trans­
formed into national Communist parties, under different names -
Workers' Party, Marxist Party, etc. The name is not important. It is
important that they should focus on their own people and concentrate
on their own basic and specific tasks. All of them should have a Com­
munist programme, they should be based on Marxist analysis but not
dependent on Moscow, for us to solve all the current problems which
vary in the individual countries. The International was created under
Marx in the expectation of an approaching international revolution. The
Comintern was created by Lenin in such a period too. Today, national
tasks for each country have top priority. Do not hold on to what was
yesterday. Take into account exactly the new conditions which have been
created.99

Little time was lost in implementing the decision. The next morning
Dimitrov and members of the Praesidium of the Comintern started
drafting the new conditions for admission to the Comintern which were
to replace the militant Twenty-one Conditions introduced by Lenin in
1921 . They now emphasized: 'the full indepe11dence of the various Com­
munist Parties, their transformation into national parties of Communists
in the given countries, guided by a Communist programme, not deciding
on tl1e concrete tasks by their own convictions but in accordance with
the conditions of their countries, and taking responsibility for their
own decisions and actions' .100 Stalin next saw to it that the usual com­
munist slogans on display in the May Day celebrations were replaced by
ones which emphasized values of nationalism and national liberation.101
 Japan: The Avenue to Germany 201

Dimitrov was warned by Zhdanov that Stalin regarded 'uncritical

cosmopolitanism' as a 'fertile ground for spies and for agents of the
enemy'; he expected the changes to be 'implemented genuinely, so that
they do not seem as if only the clothes are changed but the rest stays
the same. It should not look as if the Executive Committee of the Com­
intern is dismissed but in fact there continues to exist an international
directing centre' .102 Stalin's position on the very morning of 22 June
demonstrates how far was his mind from a revolutionary war. He was
indubitably relieved to instruct Dimitrov that though the Comintern
might still remain open 'for a while . . . the parties in the regions may
create a movement for the defence of the USSR. Do not bring up the ques-
. tion of the socialist revolution. The Soviet people will carry out a patri­
otic war against Fascist Germany. The issue at hand is the defeat of
Fascism.'103
 10

. 'Appeasement' :
A New German Soviet Pact?

The overwhelming need to pacify Germany was symbolized by Stalin's

unprecedented appearance at the station to see Matsuoka off. The act was
of particular significance as it was known that Schulenburg, 'uneasy and
disturbed by dark forebodings', was leaving that same evening for Berlin,
hoping to 'defer any hurried and ill-considered decision' . 1 It was Schu­
lenburg who had initiated the consultations in Berlin, although both
Ribbentrop and Weizsacker later claimed to have fathered the idea.2 The
urgency was dictated by the realization that Stalin's stand on Yugoslavia
had finally provided Hitler with the pretext for pushing ahead his plans
to solve the conflict with Russia by force. The opposition to this course
briefly created an uneasy alliance within the Foreign Ministry. Hitler,
like Stalin, exercised power by driving wedges between . the military, the
politicians and the civil service.3 It was hard not to be aware in Berlin of
the growing rumours of an impending military campaign which plainly
reflected Hitler's intense suspicion of Russia.4 However, neither Ribben­
trop nor his Foreign Ministry was aware of the extent of the military
preparations under way, let alone the directives on 'Barbarossa'. All they
knew was that Hitler had lost interest in the diplomatic process, and he
was manifestly keeping his distance from the Foreign Ministry. Conse­
quently, the advocates of the Continental bloc lost much ground but still
sought ways of reversing the decision.
The increasingly isolated Ribbentrop reluctantly joined hands in spring
1941 with his professional diplomats in a last, though pitiful, attempt to
dissuade Hitler from attacking Russia. Various sporadic and uncoordi­
nated attempts were made to deflect Hitler from the course he had taken.
Both Weizsacker and Ribbentrop seem to have entertained hopes that
Germany's allies in the Axis could be recruited to deter Hitler. However,

202
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 203

Hitler concealed his plans from his allies to forestall an open debate on
his strategy. The opposition's moves could obviously be pursued only
in a covert fashion through insinuations. Weizsacker, for instance, had
repeatedly approached Dino Alfieri, the Italian ambassador in Berlin (and
an influential member of the Fascist Council in l�ome), with hints of a pos­
sible war. In a meeting with Ribbentrop on 1 5 May Mussolini commented
that 'it seemed to him advantageous that a policy of co-operation with
Russia should be pursued',5 though he also clearly relished the idea that
the Germans might 'lose a good many feathers in Russia'.6 Perhaps more
significant were the attempts made by Weizsacker to enlighten Matst1oka,
who was also deliberately kept in the dark about German intentions
during his visit to Berlin. Both Ott, the German ambassador in Tokyo, and
Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Naval Forces, con­
spired in this move.7
Schulenburg could not bring himself to believe that Hitler had opted
for war and was even doubtful whether he was 'aware of the rumours of
war ' . He despised Ribbentrop, whom he blamed for 'trying systemati­
cally to isolate Hitler from him and make him depend on his own infor­
mation and advice'. Since the appointment of Ribbentrop Schulenburg
had exchanged only a couple of words with Hitler when they bumped
into one another by sheer chance during I\1olotov' s visit to Berlin.8 Before
setting out for his mission, Schulenburg produced a forceful memoran­
dum jointly with the senior members of his staff: Hilger, counsellor at the
embassy; Tippelskirch, his deputy; and General Kostring, the military
attache, advancing arguments against an invasion of Russia. Schulenburg
held on to his belief that what united Russia and Germany was the wish
to prevent the Anglo-Saxon bloc from assuming dominance in Europe.
He tended therefore to dismiss the rumours of war as 'pure fantasy', a
product of British propaganda. He strongl)' believed that 'anything the
Germans stood to gain from a war with the Soviet Union could be
obtained in an easier and safer way through peaceful negotiations'.
Though Schulenburg shared the common belief that the Wehrmacht could
crush the Red Army, he W�trned that an occupation would introduce
uncontrollable chaos into Russia. Personally he did not believe that Hitler
would laL1nch an attack 'before England was defeated'. While sl1aring
these appreciations, Rosso, more cynical and less idealistic, gave a forlorn
warning, which Schulenburg tended to dismiss, that 'we have see11
sufficient examples that the fools whc) now rule the world are capable of
committing any folly' .9
Schulenburg further distorted, as had become his habit, a report to the
Wilhelmstrasse on the Japanese pact. It was worded in such a way as to
enhance his own credentials during the forthcoming visit to Berlin by
faithfully reporting Stalin's own views. He underlined the conciliatory
nature of Stalin's moves, relaying his pledge to Matsuoka that 'he was a
204 Grand Delusion

convinced adherent of the Axis and an opponent of England and

America'. Schulenburg then described in most dramatic fashion Stalin's
meeting with Krebs. But, more significantly, he pointed out that Stalin had
also specifically looked out for him and manifestly threw his arms around
his shoulders and sciid: 'We must remain friends and you must now do
everything to that end!' 1 0
Schulenburg' s colleagues at the embassy continued to bolster his
efforts after his departure through a series of telegrams which stressed
the co-operative Russian attitude. On 15 April they informed the Foreign
Ministry that the Russians were now pressing for a solution of the
boundary dispute in the Baltic area in conformity with the proposals pre­
viously made by the embassy. It was, they pointed out, an 'unconditional
acceptance of the German demand'; they added that the Soviet attitude
seemed 'very remarkable' .11 A similar approach was made on the
same day to solve the border disputes with Rumania.12 A day later
Tippelskirch telegraphed once again, for no apparent reason other
than to convey the view held by members of the Japanese embassy
in Moscow that the pact was 'advantageous not only to Japan but also
to the Axis, that the Soviet Union's relations with the Axis will be
favourably affected by it, and that the Soviet Union is prepared to co­
operate with the Axis'. He again referred to the extraordinary scene
at the railway station on the day of Matsuoka's departure, which to
him indicated that Stalin had exploited the opportunity 'to show his atti­
tude towards Germany in the presence of the foreign diplomats and
press'.13 A week later he informed Berlin that relations between Finland
and the Soviet Union had 'recently become more serene' and that the
Russians were no longer pressing for concessions in the nickel mines of
Petsamo.14
When Krebs complained to the liaison officer of the , Red Army that
Yugoslav officers were continuing to appear in Moscow in uniform,
Gavrilovi� was promptly asked to evacuate them from Russia. Krebs was
reassured that their presence in Moscow 'had no political relevance as
the Yugoslav army and government had now ceased to exist'.15 An impor­
tant incentive for a breakthrough in Berlin was a Tass communique, pub­
lished on 19 April, which clearly bore the trademark of Stalin. It went a
long way to expose the Soviet desire for a new agreement with Germany.
The agreement with Japan was attributed not to the German threat
but rather to the proposals made to Molotov in Berlin the previous
November 'that the Soviet Union should join the Three-Power Pact' . 'The
Soviet government', it continued, 'did not at that time [author's italics]
think it was possible to accept the proposals', clearly implying that cir­
cumstances had changed.16
Prompted by Schulenburg' s arrival in Berlin, the German Foreign
Ministry seized upon Stalin's new conciliatory attitude to broacl1 the
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 205

topic directly with Hitler and the Wehrmacht. Karl Schnurre, the archi­
tect of the trade agreements with Russia, participated in these moves.
On 21 April he approached the High Command of the Wehrmacht and
conveyed the 'complaints' of Alexei Krutikov, the Deputy People's
Commissar for Foreign Trade, who happened to be visiting Berlin, that
'Germany did not provide enough rolling stock for transporting the goods
delivered by the Soviet Union from the German-Soviet border' . He even
mentioned the possibility of increasing Soviet deliveries. 17
Hitler repeatedly deferred seeing Schulenburg.18 On 21 April
Weizsacker, who had 'almost entirely got out of the habit of trying to
achieve [his] aims through Ribbentrop', swallowed his pride; behaving,
as he put it, 'like a sneaking crawling creature without claws', he sought
an urgent interview with Ribbentrop. Despite Ribbentrop's reluctance to
meet him, Weizsacker arrived in Vienna for a ten-hour stay and conferred
with him at the Imperial Hotel that very evening. Weizsacker fully
endorsed Schulenburg's memorandum, which had been transmitted to
Hitler, and warned Ribbentrop that a war against Russia 'would end in
disaster' . Though Ribbentrop remained noncommittal, Weizsacker gath­
ered from his entourage that he by no means shared Hitler's views.19
The efforts finally bore fruit when Ribbentrop intervened personally
with Hitler and secured an interview for Schulenburg.20 By the time the
meeting took place, Ribbentrop seemed to have been firmly converted to
the cause. He was, however, playing his cards cautiously, preferring to
gain an impression of Hitler's state of mind before committing himself
any further. On the eve of the meeting he sent instructions to Schulen­
burg from his special train to take notes of his conversation with Hitler
and to dispatch them promptly to him.21 In the meantime he urgently
contacted Weizsacker by telephone from Salzburg and requested the
Ministry's views on Schulenburg's memorandum, as he himself was con­
templating a paper for Hitler on the subject. Weizsacker had approached
Ribbentrop with elaborate arguments against a war at least twice during
the winter of 194 1 . On 6 March l1e had prepared a long memorandum in
which he set out his arguments against the war in Russia and had even
advocated a military alliance. The memorandum, however, had never
been transmitted to Ribbentrop. He now dictated the gist of it on the tele­
phone, maintaining that 'Germany could not expect to beat England in
Russia.' His main reasoning ran as follows: 'A German attack on Russia
would only give the English a new moral lift. It would be interpreted
there as German uncertainty as to the success of our fight against
England. We would thereby not only be admitting that the war was going
to last a long time yet, but we might actually prolong it in this way, instead
of shortening it.'22
Little is known, however, about the nature of Schulenburg' s meetings
during his fortnight's stay in Berlin. Although Hitler's military directives
206 Grand Delusion

were not laid before him, one may surmise that Schulenburg was exposed
to the myriad rumours circulating in Berlin and was able to gather infor­
mation through his circle of friends in high places, both in the army and
in the Foreign Ministry. On the eve of his meeting with Hitler he had
dinner at Schnurre's home. Schnurre, who had made an abortive
approach to Hitler earlier, appeared most sceptical of Schulenburg' s
ability to move Hitler. 23
On the afternoon of 28 April Schulenburg was finally received by Hitler
on his own at the Reich Chancellery. His memorandum lay sealed in an
envelope on the desk. Throughout the meeting Hitler ignored it, instead
making general observations on the international situation.24 Mistrustful
of Schulenburg, and careful not to divulge his genuine plans, Hitler was
scornful of the Russians, wondering 'what kind of devil had possessed
them' in concluding a friendship pact with Yugoslavia. Hitler restrained
his overzealous ambassador by levelling various accusations against
Stalin which would later be employed as pretexts for the attack on Russia.
Stalin's meddling in the Balkans was one such subject, but the main invec­
tive focused on the alleged Russian mobilization. Hitler, as Weizsacker
recalled later, 'had the effrontery on this occasion to pretend to Schulen­
burg, in the same way as he had to Matsuoka, that the German military
preparations in the East were defensive'. 25 When Schulenburg insisted
that those moves were guided by Russia's 'urge for 300 per cent security',
this was imm ediately repudiated. Schulenburg attempted unsuccessfully
to draw Hitler out by suggesting that 'Russia was very apprehensive at
the rumours predicting a German attack on Russia'. Nor was he able to
impress on Hitler that Stalin was anxious to conclude an agreement and
was prepared to make further concessions. Barely half an hour after its
beginning the Fuhrer brought the meeting to an end, though not before
dropping the casual remark: 'Oh, one more thing: I do not intend a war
against Russia!'26
Schulenburg left for Moscow, on Ribbentrop's personal plane, in time
for the May Day celebrations at the Kremlin. Hilger, the counsellor at the
German embassy, writing his memoirs long after the events described
here, when his memory had been refreshed by a historian, recalled how
Schulenburg drew him aside as soon as he landed in Moscow and told
him that 'the die was cast' ai1d that Hitler had deliberately lied to him.27
This statement has diverted historians for decades from the final and
crucial chapter in Schulenburg' s efforts to avert Hitler's move. Though
sceptical about Hitler's sincerity, Schulenburg was still hopeful that he
could produce a coup in Moscow. In the end he achieved the exact oppo­
site, reinforcing Stalin's mistaken but convenient belief that it was still
possible to prevent the war. As the dramatic events of the following days
would testify, Schulenburg undoubtedly entertained hopes of persuading
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 207

Stalin to launch a personal initiative which might dispel Hitler's manifest

suspicion and restore mutual trust.
Schulenburg returned from Berlin armed with what would prove to be a
lethal conviction, reinforcing Stalin's erroneous assessment, that certain
/

people in Hitler's entourage prevailed on him once and for all to have a
showdown with the Soviet Union, but others, among them Ribbentrop, res­
olutely advised him against such a move, ir1 any case not before England
was brought to her knees. Hitler seemed to be leaning towards the latter
view but was of course resolved to keep his options open.' Walther, coun­
sellor at the embassy, who had accompanied Schulenburg to Berlin, further
revealed upon his return that an armed conflict with Germany 'was
improbable this year'. If the Russians were to proceed \vith provocations
similar to that in Yugoslavia, then 'he would not know what the Fuhrer
would be forced to do' . In the present circumstances he expected Germany
to come to an understanding with the Russians, though they would hardly
be in a position 'to say anything in these matters'. However, as Schulenburg
did not bring any concrete proposals he at first did not initiate any
approach and waited to be summoned to the Kremlin.28
Stalin continued to work tenaciously to ward off the German danger.
Fear of Germany had become so acute that Zhdanov even implored Stalin
to postpone tl1e May Day parade in Red Square so as not to provide the
Germans with 'the pretext to attack'. But the more urgent problem facing
Stalin was to quash the wild rumours about the inevitability of war, espe­
cially those which belittled the might of the Red Army, suggesting that the
Wehrmacht could 1cut through Russia like a knife through butter'. The
rumours might easily tip the scales in favour of an adventurous crusade
against Russia.29 Negotiations towards a pact with Germany had to be
purs·ued from a position of strength. In mid-April Stalin had ordered the
security services to accompany the German military attache on an exten­
sive tour of the Soviet military-industrial plants in Siberia and to spread
information in Berlin about Soviet technical and military might.30 Since the
fall of Yugoslavia, when the threat of war had become imminent, Soviet
ambassadors had been instructed to deny resolutely the rumo11rs of war
and at the same time to remind their interlocutors that they surely were
1oblivious to the might of the Red Army, to its fighting capacity' .31 Kollon­
tai, renowned for her anti-Nazi stand, was se11t to the Swedish Foreign
Ministry to dismiss the rumours of a possible war as 'completely ground­
less'. Even more remarkable was her rebuttal of suggestions that Russia
contemplated 'any counter-measures to the German actions in the Balkans
. . . even if Germany attacked 1urkey'. This was a particularly embarrass­
ing submission, considering that the entire squabble with Germany in the
past year had revolved around control of the Straits. Her admission was
no coincidence, as Vinogradov too 'resolutely' assured the Turks that were
208 Grat1d Delitsion

Germany to interfere in Turkey the Soviet Union would remain 'totally

passive' .32 When, for instance, a most reliable source enlightened the
Soviet ambassador in Bucharest about the massive German concentration
on the Moldavian border, the 'rumours' were nonchalantly dismissed as
'exaggerated, hardly reflecting the intentions of German military circles,
as the latter can overlook neither the military might of the Soviet Urtion
nor the danger which faced them' were they to attack Russia.33 In Wash­
ington Umansky too made efforts when in the company of German
officials to show confidence in the ability of the Red Army to face the
Wehrmacht.34 In Moscow Vyshinsky dismissed a warning by Steinhardt,
insisting that relations with Germany were governed by agreements
which were fully observed. The Russians were not 'faint-hearted people'
and were 'powerful enough to defend themselves'. 35
It is within this framework that Stalin delivered his now famous speech
to the graduates of the Military Academy on 5 May. The speech and the
following toasts have been the focus of bizarre interpretations suggesting
that Stalin was preparing the Red Army for an aggressive war against
Germany. 36 The speech, however, was delivered at the height of the
appeasement campaign and neatly dovetailed with it. Its aim was to act
as a deliberate deterrent, discouraging the Germans from launching the
war through a brazen show of confidence, while at the same time invig­
orating the army in case a war did break out. Because of its demonstra­
tive nature the gist of the speech was deliberately leaked and was
reported by the foreign legations.37 It reflected the need to confront the
increasing rumours of the dismal state of the Red Army. Numerous
reports warned that the Wehrmacht was 'drunk with success'; the pre­
dominance of the German mechanized forces meant that the occupation
of the country up to Moscow and the Urals should not 'pose serious
difficulties'. The belief in the weakness of the Red Army, therefore, "\Vas
encouraging the Wehrmacht to advocate a war with Russia before the
completion of the campaign in England .38
The speech thus mirrored the instructions mentioned earlier for the
Soviet diplomats to inflate the strength of the Red Army. It further sought
to bolster morale in the army. Earlier in the year Zhdanov had been
warned by the military that the peace-oriented propaganda and the
'pacifist mood' were diminishing the 'war spirit . . . and the nation's
awareness of the capitalist encirclement' . It was therefore recommended
that the 'essential international tasks' of the army should be geared
towards 'the defence of the Soviet Union - the motherland of the world
proletariat'. The press and the schools were entrusted with a campaign to
prepare the population for war. However, rather than using re\rolu­
tionary themes, traditional ones glo rify ing Russia's heritage were re\1ived.
The showing of plays like Sz£vorov or Field Marshal K11ti12ov and the study
of the war of 1812 and the deferlce of Sebastopol "\\1ere encouraged.39
Stalin, Mi11ister of Defence Voroshilov a11d politburo members at
Stalin's dacha.

Foreig11 Minister Molotov at his desk.

Churchill and Maisky at a lunch party in the Winter Garden of the
Soviet Embassy, London.
•

Ambassador Maisky with his aides at the Embassy.

 :.:', .•
9, :.:
.

f
i',
Ai
.

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.

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Count von Schulenburg with Molotov at the signature of the

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

Milan Gavrilovi<;, the Yugoslav ambassador i11 Moscow with his daughter,
returning to Moscow after the coup in Belgrade to take cha1·ge of the
11egotiations on a neutrality pact.
Defence Minister, Marshal
Tirnoshenko, exarnining
artill eT)r units,
\\'"atched b)
J
7 Chief of Staff,
General Meretsko,� (7'ight),
and his successor,
General Zhuko\T, in the
summer of 19±0.

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_ J\8.HO aa.gi :me o n;-ca apK e n YT<X "'eEl!a a11ax

ca�JLe Ji.if! •
about Hitler's decision
on ' Barbarossa', from
the S0\7iet militan,.
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attache in Berlin I

29 December 19-±0.
Molotov reviewing the guard of honour in Berlin railway station,
November 1940.

Molotov entertained by Hitler in Berlin, November 1940.

\

The Luftwaffe's bombing of Belgrade, 6 April 1 94 1 .

King Boris of Bulgaria visiting Hitler at Berchtesgaden. •

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, boarding the tra11s-Siberian
train at Vladivostock heading for Moscow.

Matsuoka watches over Molotov signing the pact of neutrality with

Japan in April 1941.
 General Zhuko,- at the front, � Ia,- 1 9-±1 .
-

The former British ambassador to Belgrade Sir Ronald Campbell

(le!f) and Sir Stafford Cripps, recalled for consultations b;- the
Foreign Office, 1 2 June 19-±1.
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 209

The threat of an imminent war clearly required drastic indoctrination

of the armed forces, who had been brainwashed by slogans of 'non­
involvement' and 'peace'. Following the lead taken by Stalin in his speech
to the cadets, Shcherbakov, the newly appointed Politruk (political com­
mander) of the Red Army, set the trend. In a major directive he revived
Lenin's justifications of a war which would extricate the Soviet Union
from capitalist encirclement and 'hasten the final victory of socialism'.
Regardless of the clearly geopolitical and pragmatic considerations which
had led to the division of Poland, the absorption of Bessarabia and the
Baltic States, these were now presented to the ranks as the ultimate victory
and achievement of Leninist ideas. But Lenin's ideas of 1915, when he
had actually deplored the idea of a 'defensive war' and advocated non­
intervention in the imperialist war, were now twisted to justify the 'offen­
sive' spirit.
Defence through strategic retreat and exploitation of depth had been
inherent in the Soviet military doctrine as a preliminary to a counter­
offensive. Defence and offence were therefore tied together in insepa­
rable continuous operational manoeuvres. However, since the purges of
the military the academies had been prohibited by Stalin from pursuing
theoretical studies. Simplistic slogans had virtually replaced doctrine in
an attempt to conceal the bankruptcy of the military. 'Shedding little
blood and on foreign territory', Molotov wryly reflected on this period,
'was already a propaganda slogan. Agitation governed our ordinary
policy, and it was necessary, nothing was done without it.'40 The revival
of Lenin's corrupted slogans therefore should be examined in the context
of the imminent German threat, rather than as the fulfilment of a mes­
sianic dream. Indeed, the slogans emphasized the need to indoctrinate the
troops in 'the spirit of fiery patriotism, revolutionary resoluteness, and
steadfast preparedness to launch a shattering attack on the enemy'. This
could be best achieved through 'revitalizing the feeling of patriotism
among the people, the infinite love of the Socialist motherland, in the
spirit of fearless readiness to make sacrifices'. The directive stressed
the need to idolize courage and eradicate fear of the enemy.41
In the speech Stalin expounded at great length and in minute detail the
tremendous strides made by the Red Army from the technological and
operational points of view. He then cast doubt on the invincibility of the
Germans. According to him, Germany's weakness was due to her failure
to recruit allies, alluding, as he had done during the negotiations with
Matsuoka, to Russia's possible role. '"fhe short toasts proposed by Stalin
are what have attracted undue attention. They were aimed mostly at
boosting morale and indeed raising the alar1n in view of the threat facing
Russia. When in early June Timoshenko tried to exploit the speech to
activate the operational plan, he was told explicitly by Stalin: 'This I
said for the people, it is necessary to raise their vigilance, and you must
210 Grand Delusion

understand that Germa11y will never fight on her own against Russia.'42
The first two toasts were in the nature of slogans, calling for the
intensification of theoretical studies and exalting the artillery, which was
'the god of modern warfare'. The third one, however, much in line with
the main speech, stated confidently that with the completion of the mod­
ernization and reconstruction of the army, it could 'move from defence to
attack' . However, the text, quite apart from the context of the speech,
remained defensive in nature, concluding that 'the defence of our country
must be carried out in an attacking fashion . . . The Red Army is a modern
army, and a modern army is an army of attack.'43 This of course was little
more than a rather crude revival of the operational theories discussed
earlier, which had been suppressed during the purges, a boost of morale
and more significantly a clear message to Germany.
Confidence had been manifested in a similar way in the open. In his
traditional speech on May Day Timoshenko too intertwined in a sophis­
ticated manner a show of force with a call fo1� the 'liquidation of war and
the restoration of peace . . . the faster the better' . The Germans were
expected to recognize in the Red Army a force which had to be reckoned
with, especially now that it had been put on 'war readiness' footing.44
The resort to deterrence may have been a result of a report by 'Starshina',
submitted to Stalin, on the impressions gained by a delegation of the Luft­
waffe to Moscow. The Germans had been struck by the advanced pro­
duction line of the new Iliushin-18 with its 1 ,200 h. p. engine, of which
they did not have an equivalent. Apparently their report had come as a
'nasty surprise' to Goring, who followed the 'clear course in support of a
war against the USSR', as it pointed to the 'risks and the futility of such
an adventure' .45
The attempts at deterrence, however, paled in comparison with the
efforts to appease the Germans, for instance the ardent flirtation with Vichy
France. In the middle of the crisis over Yugoslavia a new ambassador
arrived in Moscow from Vichy. Bergery, who had started on the left with
Leon Blum, had made a co11siderable move to the right. 'An advocate of a
100 per cent co-operation with Germany', he provided an excellent channel
for Stalin to sound out the Germans, the more so as it was an open secret in
Moscow that he intended to use his ambassadorship as a springboard to
the position of Foreign Minister.46 In Vichy the new but experienced Soviet
ambassador Bogomolov wasted little time in stating that France, being
'lonely and isolated', would appreciate 'the friendship of a major power
like Soviet Russia'. The Rt 1ssians, he stated, cultivated good relations with
the Germans and desired similar relations with France.47
What particularly appealed to the Russians was Bergery' s search, with
German connivance, for manoeuvrability. He expected the Germans to
realize that a European bloc could not be achieved under the hegemony
of a single nation but only with the 'co-operation of various nations' . 'The
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 211

new Europe', according to him, would necessitate 'the co-operation of

France and Russia . . . it was impossible to reconstruct Europe without the
intellect and resources of Russia.'48 The investment seemed to pay off
during the meeting of Admiral Darlan, the deputy of Petain, with Hitler
in Vichy in mid-May, which was closely scrutinized by Bogomolov. Wl1en
Bogomolov returned to Moscow to report to Stalin in person, Bergery
used the occasion to impress on him, witl1 his 'rhetorical elegance and
logical sharpness', that Russia should participate actively in the schemes
for a revised Europe. He even produced from his briefcase the six-point
proposals on co-operation submitted to Hitler, the essence of which was
the maintenance of France's economic independence and co-operation
with respect to a peacetime rather than wartime economy.49
But appeasement was primarily directed towards Germany. In the
expectation tl1at Schulenburg would bring concrete proposals from Berlin,
Stalin assumed the premiership of the Soviet Union on 5 May. The lessons
of the bungle over Yugoslavia clearly contributed to his decision. It was
the necessity of removing the constraints which his position as General
Secretary of the Communist Party imposed on the conduct of the delicate
negotiations with the Germans, rather than Stalin's wish to take control
of the military, which motivated his assumption of the role of Prime
Minister. Only he could project with full credibility the loyalty to
Germany which would deprive her of any excuse to reproach Moscow.
Already during the negotiations with the Japanese Stalin seems to have
assumed the position of head of state, which he was so careful not to do
earlier on, preserving the separation between the state and the Party. The
communique of 1 7 April on the agreement with the Japanese stated that
'Comrade Stalin had on 12 April a conversation on Soviet-Japanese rela­
tions with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Molotov was present [author's
italics]'. As a complementary step a couple of days later the Red Army
reinstated the old tsarist forms and withdrew the revolutionary jargon
and symbols, while the Soviet 'polpreds' abroad regained their traditional
ambassadorial status.50
Indeed, when endorsing the decision on 4 May, the Plenum of the
Central Committee, after disposing of the customary cliches on the need
to achieve 'full co-ordination of the workings of the Soviet and Party orga­
nizations', spoke of the need to enhance the 'authority of the Soviet organs
in the present strained international situation' in fortifying the 'defence
of the country'. 51
These events fitted in only too well with Schulenburg' s own ploy. On
3 May he informed Berlin that the front page of the latest Pravda displayed
a photograph of the government's tribune at the May Day parade, where
Dekanozov was given the honour of standing next to Stalin. He impressed
on his superiors that it certainly indicated 'the special recognition
accorded to the ambassador in Berlin' .52 Stalin's assumption of the
212 Grand Delusion

premiership came as a godsend, confirming that his 'realistic policy'

towards Germany would continue and be fostered.53
On 7 May Schulenburg took the unusual step of inviting Dekanozov
and Pavlov, the director of the Western Department of Narkomindel, for
breakfast at his own residence, away from potential informers in the
embassy. Various historians have claimed that during their clandestine
meeting Schulenburg divulged to Dekanozov Hitler's intention of attack­
ing Russia. A. Mikoyan, the Politburo member and Commissar of Foreign
Trade, whose memoirs have given rise to a number of false interpreta­
tions of Stalin's policies at the time, suggested that Schulenburg gave
Dekanozov a clear-cut warning. Over breakfast, Schulenburg is supposed
to have approached Dekanozov and to have rather bluntly told him: 'Mr
Ambassador, perhaps this has not ever occurred in the history of dip­
lomacy, as I am about to disclose to you the state secret number one:
convey it to Mr Molotov, and he, I hope, will inform Mr Stalin that
Hitler has decided to launch an attack against the Soviet Union on 22 June.
You will ask me why am I doing it? I was brought up in the spirit of Bis­
marck, and he always objected to a war with Russia . . . ' When informed
of the meeting, Stalin is alleged to have told the Politburo in the evening
that 'We must consider that disinformation has reached the level of
ambassadors.'54
Much as this revelation captures the imagination, it is not borne out at
all by the actual records of the meeting. It also contradicts Hilger' s evi­
dence that Schulenburg was reluctant to embark on the initiative, fearing
that he would be 'tried for treason if it leaked out that we were about to
warn the Russians'. It seems that both eventually made an approach with
the intention not of actually warning the Russians but of indicating, as
Hilger attests, 'the seriousness of the situation' and attempting to push
Stalin into a diplomatic initiative which would 'involve Hitler in negoti­
ations which would rob him, for the time being, of all pretexts for
military action' .55 This conforms with Molotov's seemingly accurate rec­
ollection that Schulenburg 'did not warn, he hinted. A tremendous
number of people hinted that a conflict was imminent. But to believe
Schulenburg . . . so many rumours were being spread!'56
The initiative was, of course, not a dramatic warning, though this was
what he wished the reader to believe; Hilger was writing too close for
comfort to the Nuremberg trials. Rather it was a result of Schulenburg' s
extended attempt to prevent the war. There were in fact three meetings,
on 5, 9 and 1 2 May, which he telescoped into a single one, introducing
further confusion.57 The dynamics between the three meetings are crucial
for the understanding of the policies pursued by the Kremlin in the month
preceding the conflict.
Over breakfast Schulenburg produced the bait by referring to Hitler's
most recent speech, which summed up the campaign in the Balkans.58
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 213

Hitler, 11e impressed on Dekanozov, had reiterated the statement made to

Molotov in Berlin that Germany entertained neitl1er territorial nor direct
political ambitions in the region, and was only reacting to the events
taking place there. It is indeed striking that Schulenburg deliberately con­
cealed from Dekanozov the extent of Hitler's fury over the Neutrality Pact
with Yugoslavia. In doing so he was eager to re-establish a common plat­
form for renewed negotiations. He disclosed only that during his visit
to Berlin, Hitler had been puzzled by the agreement, which he found
'difficult to comprehend and strange'. Dekanozov did not deny that the
pact with Yugoslavia had been aimed at advancing Soviet interests in the
Balkans, which the Russians hoped to achieve through a dialogue with
the Germans. He reminded Schulenburg that before concluding the agree­
ment with Yugoslavia the Soviet Union had received assurances that the
Yugoslav government 'was set on preserving its good relations with
Germany and wished to live in peace with all its neighbours but in the
first place with Germany, and that the Yugoslav government had not
therefore renounced its adherence to the Tripartite Pact'.
Schulenburg hinted at the severity of the situation, conceding that
although he had tried hard to convince Hitler that Soviet policy was
aimed at preserving normal relations with her neighbours he had not
'
succeeded in doing so 100 per cent, and he was left with a somewhat
unpleasant resentment about the recent activities of the Soviet govern­
ment'. But this comment, rather than comprising a warning, served as a
prelude to the scheme he now devised to shore up the crumbling rela­
tionship. Slightly twisting the line of Hitler's argument, Schulenburg
impressed on Dekanozov that Hitler had justified the German concen­
tration of troops as a counter-measure to the recent rumours of the
Russian mobilization and deployment of the Red Army and the inevi­
tability of an armed conflict. The memory of the Russian mobilization
of 1914 which had hastened the outbreak of war was undoubtedly still
uppermost in his mind. Schulenburg clearly hoped that by resorting
to personal diplomacy he might be able to prod the Russians into initiat­
ing measures which could help to undo the obvious damage in Berlin
caused by Russia's recent moves in the Balkans. Stalin's overtures of
appeasement convinced him that it was still possible to solve the inten­
sifying conflict in the realm of diplomacy. The move, however, had to be
initiated by Stalin personally.
Having been provided with little straw to build his bricks, Schulenburg
chose to focus on the rumours. The use of the 'rumours' as the spring­
board for a more general agreement was sensible. Schulenburg' s long
absence in Berlin had given rise to speculation in Moscow and T.Jondon.
This seemed to have deflected both Stalin and the British from a correct
evaluation of the prospects ahead. The German disinformation effort
after Schulenburg' s return to Moscow was particularly directed at the
214 Gra11d Delitsion

ambassador himself and the Russians. Berlin seemed most anxious to

quell the wave of rumours of an impending war, and such rumours were
firmly denied in correspondence with Schulenburg. He was thus misled
into believing that the German concentration was 'a rear cover for the
Balkan operations' . During his visit to Berlin he gained the impression
that the rumours were being spread by forces interested in the outbreak
of hostilities and were intensifying Hitler's mistrust of Russia. Going
through the papers which had accumulated on his desk during his long
absence in Berlin, Schulenburg's attention had been drawn to an urgent
directive of the Chief of Staff which warned him that the 'rumour­
mongering' was 'very detrimental to the further peaceful development
of German-Russian relations'. The embassy was instructed to quell and
deny the rumours.59
On the very eve of the meeting Schulenburg was urged by the head of
the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry to quash the rumours,
which were being deliberately spread by the British 'to poison the wells'.
He was even led to believe that eight divisions would be transported from
east to west in the first half of May. 60 His practical advice to Dekanozov,
therefore, was to defuse official pronouncements, such as the Tass com­
muniques, which seemed 'to pop up like mushrooms after rain' in the
wake of any development in the Balkans. Rather than displaying a con­
viction that Hitler was set on war, Schulenburg referred a couple of times
to Hitler's restraint and explained that the 'precautionary measures' on
Russia's western front were a reaction to her own mobilization. This
partly explains Stalin's reluctance to deploy Russian forces in an overt
and effective way which might be conceived as provocation in Berlin.
Schulenburg therefore wasted little time after breakfast in conveying to
Dekanozov his impression of the disastrous effects which the rumours
were 11aving. He warned him strongly that 'rumours of an imminent war
between the Soviet Union and Germany were of an ''explosive nature''
and should be suppressed and ''broken to the bones'' '. He did not fail to
mention, though, that the initiative was his own and was not sanctioned
by the government. It was left to the Russians to advance concrete
proposals. Thus from Schulenburg' s point of view the unprecedented
approach set the scene for improving relations rather than betraying
state secrets. Dekanozov, who found it difficult to believe that such an
important communication had been made on Schulenburg's own initia­
tive, certainly saw the importance of the event. He too took advantage of
the general tone of the conversation to revive negotiations, reminding
Schulenburg that Moscow was still expecting a reply to the No\rember
proposals. Most significantly, it was decided to reconvene this informal
forum.
The call to counter the rumours fell on fertile ground. Two conflicting
sets of rumours concerning the German concentration of troops were cir-
'Appeaseme11t': A New German-Soviet Pact? 215

culating. The first assumed that the co11centration was a lever in the forth­
coming negotiations which might possibly end in a military alliance. The
other assumed that a war was imminent, but in Moscow these rumours
were attributed to incessant attempts by Britain to embroil Russia in war.
While the campaigns in the Balkans could be explained in rational terms,
the war against Russia would be conducted for entirely different motives.
The lack of definition of the military objectives of the campaign meant
that means and ends were interwoven. This peculiar characteristic of the
planning made it extremely difficult for the Kremlin to perceive the exact
nature of the German threat, even when intelligence was abundant. The
evaluation of the German deployment, as well as of the various diplo­
matic overtures, was further undertaken by Stalin with the fear of war
in mind and coincided with growing public criticism, in Britain, of
Churchill. In Southern Europe the remnants of the British expeditionary
force had been withdrawn to Crete, where a disastrous battle was about
to commence. The earlier British victories over the Italian forces in North
Africa had turned into a rout once General Erwin Rommel had bypassed
the besieged fortress of Tobruk and started his advance towards
Cairo and the Suez Canal. The Germans had mastery of the skies in the
Mediterranean, imposing an effective siege on the strategic British naval
base at Malta. Meanwhile heavy losses were being inflicted on the mer­
chant navy in the Atlantic, threatening England's lifeline.
Considering Stalin's frame of mind at the time, it is most likely that he
suspected Hitler was using Schulenburg, as part of the war of nerves, to
secure better terms in the forthcoming negotiations. And yet, as in 1939,
when informal feelers had been made in Berlin by the Russians, Stalin was
afraid that an overt statement might be used against him in possible
German-British negotiations and that he would become a laughing­
stock. However, far from dismissing the information obtained from
Schulenburg, Stalin now acted on it. Within a day Pravda published a
denial of the allegations that the strong concentrations of military forces
on the western border of the Soviet Union signalled a change in relations
with Germany. The campaign to crush the rumours was executed system­
atically. The Japanese ambassador, for instance, was told by Molotov 'that
the rumours of an impending German attack on the U.S.S.R. were simply
British and American propaganda and entirely without foundation. On
the contrary, relations between the two countries were excellent.'61
Schulenburg related Stalin's assumption of the premiership to his own
initiative but could not inform Berlin of his unauthorized move. After his
traumatic meeting with Hitler in Berlin, he realized that the only hope of
averting war now rested on a direct dialogue between Stalin and Hitler.
He remembered the only positive observation by Hitler during their
meeting - that Stali11 was 'the soul of Russian consensus politics and
of mutual understanding with Germany'.62 He now contemplated
216 Grar1d Delitsion

a campaign on t\vo fronts. In Mosc0\'\7 he \vould encourage Stalin to

approach Hitler directly, \vhile in his reporting to Berlin he \vould assume
the point of \rie\'\Y of a detached observer and emphasize the conciliatory
Russian attitude, thus preparing the ground for Stalin's approach. His
telegrams to Berlin should therefore be read in this vein. As Hitler seemed
to be implacable about the events in Yugosla\..ia, it was essential for
Schulenburg to erase the memory of recent developments and present
them as a deviation. Molotov \Vas chosen as the scapegoat. Schulenburg
presented the changes in the Russian government as 'a considerable
abridgment of his former authority'. He attributed it to 'the recent
mistakes in foreign policy \Alhich had led to a cooling of the cordiality of
German-So\riet relations [a clear hint at the Soviet pact \\rith Yugoslavia],
for the creation and presenTation of V\7hich Stalin had consciously stri\ren,
\\"hile Yfolotov' s OV\'n initiative often expended itself in an obstinate
defence of individual positions' . After reiterating the significance of
Stalin's ne\\" appointment, Schulenburg prepared Berlin for his next coup
by predicting that 'Stalin will use his neV\" position in order to take part
personally in the maintenance and development of good relations
bet11\7een the Soviets and Germany' . He also chose the occasion to convey
Bergery' s ideas on the need to incorporate the So\1iet l.Jnion in a recon­
structed Europe.63
Still V\1aiting for a response from Berlin, Schulenburg \Vas invited by
Dekanozov" for breakfast at the magnificent guesthouse of the Foreign
Ministry1 at Spiridon0\7ka on 9 May. While Schulenburg appeared im­
patient and eager to exploit Stalin's neV\7 position to ad\1ance his plans,
DekanoZO\', on instructions from Stalin, acted cautiously, trying to strike
a delicate balance behveen a display of confidence in the forthcoming
negotiations and a readiness to yield. A\vare of Hitler's complaints,
Dekanozov launched into a speech on SO\"iet grievances but was cut short
by Schulenburg. 'After all,' he reminded him, 'vvre have not met \vith the
,..ie\\1 of conducting a legal debate. At present, as diplomats and politi­
cians, \.Ve ought to deal \\Tith the situation that is arising and contemplate
which counter-measures can be taken.'
This \\1as the signal for Dekanozo\1 to mo\re ahead \'\7ith a V\"eil-thought­
out plan \vhich was clearly sanctioned if not devised by Stalin. A feeler,
in response to Schulenburg' s suggestion of the pre\1ious meeting,
had been published in the press that same morning, dismissing the
rumours of alleged concentrations of So\iet troops on the V\Testem border
as 'a sick fantasy' . Stalin, it stated, had 'set himself a foreign policy goal
of O\Tervv"helming importance for the So\tiet Union, \vhich he hopes to
attain by his personal efforts' .<H Dekanozov no\\" advocated the publica­
tion of a joint German-SO\"iet communique \vhich \vould establish that
the recent rumours of the deterioration in German-Soviet relations
and e\Ten the possibility of a military conflict \'\"ere groundless and spread
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 217

by elements hostile to Russia. Indeed, the quashing of rumours as a pre­

requisite for any later agreement stood behind the infamous communique
of 1 3 June.65
Schulenburg, however, was anxious to raise the stakes and create the
maximum impact in Berlin for Stalin's new position. His suggestion was
that Stalin should address Matsuoka, Mussolini and Hitler with identical
personal letters which would explicitly state that he had assumed the pre­
miership to ensure that the USSR would 'conduct in the future a friendly
policy towards them'. It was suggested that in the second part of the
letter to Hitler Stalin should propose a joint denial of the rumours of the
impending attack, in the spirit of Dekanozov' s proposal; 'The Fuhrer will
then send a reply, and in the opinion of S[ chulenburg] the issue will be
resolved .' While luring the Russians to act Schulenburg no longer con­
veyed, as has been suggested, that his approach was a personal initiative.
On the contrary, he appeared confident that were Stalin to realize his
intention of addressing Hitler personally with a letter, Hitler would dis­
patch a courier in a special plane and the matter would 'proceed very
fast'. Dekanozov could hardly be expected to exceed his authority and
obviously had to consult Stalin. Arrangements were therefore made for a
prompt third and decisive meeting.66
Stalin acted forcefully to back up his conciliatory diplomacy. He has­
tened to send a Soviet representative to Baghdad to the rebellious gov­
ernment of Rashid Ali. The latter, sustained by tl1e Germans, had seized
power in Baghdad on 3 April. On 8 May, the Norwegian and Belgian min­
isters at Moscow received arrogant notes that their credentials were no
longer valid. They were promptly expelled from Moscow and recognition
of their governments-in-exile withdrawn. The new governments were
recognized by Stalin instantly. While the clandestine talks were taking
place Gavrilovic; was unexpectedly summoned by Vysl1insky and
informed of the decision to withdraw recognition of his government.
Gavrilovic; was indeed in a 'bad mood and aggravated' . He nonetheless
confessed that he 'well understood what Soviet diplomacy was attempt­
ing to achieve'.67
Unknown to Schulenburg, events had been following a completely dif­
ferent course in Berlin. As Schulenburg was heading from Moscow airport
to his residence, Ribbentrop's special train pulled into Friedrichstrasse
station. On the evening of 29 April a courier had flown to Ribbentrop in
Vienna with the report prepared by Schulenburg of his conversations with
the Fiihrer.68 Though the tone was ominous, Ribbentrop still hoped he
could sway Hitler, as he had done after Molotov's visit, from the course
contemplated. To his great concern he found Hitler determined to nip
the negotiations in the bud and not to allow them to undermine the
preparations for 'Barbarossa'. Hitler demanded that Ribbentrop 'support
his attitude unambiguously'; he warned him 'against further demarche,
218 Grand Delusion

and forbade me to talk to anyone about it; no diplomacy, he said, would .

make him change his mind about Russia's attitude, which was quite clear
to him, and it might well deprive him of the weapon of tactical surprise
for an attack' .69
Faced with Hitler's intransigence, Ribbentrop adopted a typically
yielding posture. Ribbentrop transferred his frustration to Weizsacker,
blaming him for adopting a 'negative attitude' at the crucial turns of
history. Weizsacker, however, continued to believe, even after Hitler's
rejection of the memorandum, that Ribbentrop remained 'in principle
opposed to war with Russia' .70 Indeed, on the very eve of 'Barbarossa'
Ciano found Ribbentrop resigned to the idea of a war, though he was 'less
ebullient than usual, and had the nerve to recall his enthusiastic praise of
the Moscow agreement and of the Communist leaders, whom he com­
pared with those of the old Nazi party' . 71
Weizsacker was left in no doubt of Hitler's determination and
Ribbentrop's subservience. On 1 May he was told by an informant in
Hitler's entourage (probably General Geyer) that the Fuhrer had decided
that 'Russia can be defeated as it were incidentally and without affecting
the war against England. England will be defeated this year, with or
without the Russian war. The British Empire will then have to be sus­
tained, but Russia will have to be rendered innocuous.'72
Schulenburg, who had left Berlin in great haste, was not briefed about
the aftermath of his interview with Hitler.73 With his initiative gaining
momentum, he had sent feelers to Weizsacker in a personal telegram on
7 May. Wishing to render his clandestine overtures semi-official, he hinted
,,
at the possibility of conveying to Stalin the German government s
,,
congratulations. Moreover, playing on Hitler s anxiety about relations
with Vichy France,74 he exerted pressure by conveying the essence of his
conversations with Bergery, who was openly advocating a Continental
bloc 'in which the great Soviet Union and its abundance of raw materials
must be included'. Rather cunningly, Schulenburg also used the whip.
In Berlin he had been exposed to the evaluation that a lightning campaign
in Russia might lead to a swift occupation of Moscow and the toppling
of the communist regime. However, as he had gathered in Berlin from
Werizsacker, the army was of the opinion that, while it would be rela­
tively easy to take Moscow, any campaign towards the Urals would
encounter severe difficulties.75 He therefore added a postscript, dis­
closing in a detached manner that the absence of air-raid drills in Moscow
confirmed information that 'the Soviet government has for some time
already prepared a wartime capital ''somewhere'', equipped with all the
frills (means of inter-communication, etc.) which it can reach in a very
sllort time. It will in any event not remain in Moscow.' This was a clear
allusion to Napoleon's disastrous experience when he encountered the
scorched-earth tactics of Alexander II in 1812. Finally, sounding out Berlin
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 219

about the possibility that preparations for war were continuing unhin­
dered, Schulenburg referred to the need to make the necessary arrange­
ments to safeguard the safety of the employees of the embassy if
hostilities did break out.76
On 1 2 May, Dekanozov returned to Schulenburg's apartment for their
third breakfast meeting inside a week. This time he seized the initiative
at the outset, solemnly announcing Stalin's and Molotov's agreement
to send the personal letter to Hitler. Stalin's impatience is attested by
his request that, in view of Dekanozov' s departure for Berlin on the
same day, Schulenburg and Molotov should waste little time and jointly
draft the text of the letter.77 However, an hour or so before Dekanozov' s
arrival Schulenburg had received two unexpected communications by
courier from Berlin,78 which seemed to undo his efforts. The brief one
from Weizsacker indicated only too clearly which way the wind was
blowing. The only suggestion of Schulenburg's communication which
had been acted upon was his suggestion that arrangements be made for
the safe evacuation of his staff in case of the outbreak of hostilities; 'at a
given time', he was now told, this suggestion 'will be brought to light'.
Schulenburg was then informed laconically but very bluntly that the rest
of his proposals had not been presented to Ribbentrop 'because this
would not have been a rewarding thing' . The second letter, from Ernst
W ormann, director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry,
demonstrated that following his confrontation with Hitler Schulenburg' s
moves were now being closely watched. He was reprimanded for his
disclosure in Moscow of the nature of his talks in Berlin, and for the
manifest pessimism reflected in rumours that Schulenburg was 'packing
[his] private belongings in cases' .79
Reconstructing the conversation, Dekanozov reported that from the
outset of the meeting Schulenburg 'did not take the initiative a11d did not
strike up a conversation on the subject of our previous talks. He only
mentioned that he had a pile of dispatches that morning including a
letter from Weizsacker and Wormann which, however, did not hold any­
thing new or interesting'. Schulenburg listened, 'quite emotionless', to
Dekanozov' s proposals, which he obviously assumed to be a major break­
through, and answered that he had conducted the negotiations in the last
couple of days 'on his own initiative and without authority' . He was
not empowered to conduct negotiations with Molotov and was 'also
doubtful whether he was likely to receive such instructions' . He appeared
rather concerned that reports of Stalin's latest moves to reconcile
Germany were conspicuously missing from the German press.
The tenor of the conversation was a strange blend of hints about the
likelihood of war with equally persuasive attempts by Schulenburg to
maintain the momentum and disinformation. All this was to add to
the already confused state of rnind at the Kremlin. As they sat down
220 .
.
Grand Delusion

for breakfast Schulenburg and Hilger made cynical and jocular com­
ments which Dekanozov perceived as hints about 'the retirement of
Schulenburg from the political scene' . And yet Schulenburg was eager
to salvage his initiative by raising a number of alternatives:

It would be good if Stalin himself were on his own initiative and spon­
taneously to approach Hitler with a letter. He, Schulenburg, would be
visiting Molotov in the near future (on topics concerning arrangements
in the Baltic Sea), but he has no authority and has not got the right to
discuss those issues in his meeting. It would be good if Molotov himself
could open his meeting with him [Schulenburg], raising this issue or
perhaps I [Dekanozov] would receive consent here in Moscow to make
a similar proposal in Berlin to Weizsacker or to Ribbentrop.

This restraint, contrasting with the offers made a couple of days earlier,
undoubtedly baffled Stalin. On the one hand Schulenburg, just back from
his conference with Hitler, might indeed have been reflecting the German
attitude but simply trying to exert pressure in an attempt to achieve better
terms. It was equally possible to assume that the issue was not yet settled
in Germany and that a cautious policy might yield an agreement. On the
other hand it might just as well prove to be a trap set for Russia, and a
premature approach might be used as a trump card in future negotiations
with Britain. Indeed, during the meeting Schulenburg made the entirely
speculative assessment that 'in his own opinion the day was not far off'
when England and Germany were 'bound to reach an agreement and
bring the calamity and destruction and bombing of their cities to an
end'.80 This statement was no doubt repeatedly re-examined in the
Kremlin that very evening, when news came on Radio Berlin of Rudolf
Hess's flight to Scotland on a self-appointed peace mission.81
Schulenburg had been most hesitant in pursuing his activities in the
first place,82 and the reprimand from Berlin produced an immediate
effect. Shortly after Dekanozov's departure he composed two letters. The
reply to Wormann was highly defensive, denying the various accusations.
He assured him that his 'very costly rugs' were still 'lying in their old
place, the pictures of my parents and other relatives are hanging on the
walls as before and in my residence nothing at all has changed, as every
visitor can see for himself'. He then made a gesture which had never been
his practice, ending the letter with a 'Heil Hitler' greeting. Weizsacker in
Berlin acted similarly, complaining that Schulenburg' s moves were natu­
rally held against him, and admitting that perhaps he should have fol­
lowed the recipe of tl1e opposition in the army by 'avoiding raising
doubts'. He then went on to express his confidence in the triumph of the
Wehrmacht.83 In a letter to his friends the Herwarths, Schulenburg
confided that same day that 'the matter of great interest to us is still as
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 221

threatening as ever. We expect the crisis to come to a head around the end
of June.' There was therefore 'no longer much work to be done . . . The
awesome silence appears to us frightening: is it the lull before the storm?'
As he had hinted to Dekanozov earlier that day, he was already resigned
to returning to Germany and furnishing the Falkenberg castle which he
had just acquired. 84 •

In his second telegram to the Foreign Ministry Schulenburg still per­

severed in his efforts to defuse the crisis. It prepared the ground for the
possibility tl1at Stalin might initiate a move through Deka nozov. Berlin's
attention was therefore once again drawn to the 'extraordinary' appoint­
ment of Stalin as Prime Minister and to the 'prominence given to
Dekanozov' during the May Day parade, which should be regarded 'as
a special mark of confidence on the part of Stalin'. There followed a
forceful presentation of the conciliatory Soviet moves, completely over­
looking Schulenburg's own role in them, leading to the inescapable con­
clusion that:

It may be assumed with certainty that Stalin has set himself a foreign
policy goal of overwhelming importance for the Soviet Union, which
he hopes to attain by his personal efforts. I firmly believe that, in an
international situation which he considers serious, Stalin has set himself
the goal of preserving the Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany.85

The same message appeared in the report of his meeting with Molotov
on 22 May. He did not cease to impress on Berlin that the moment Stalin
became Prime Minister he and Molotov, 'the two strongest men in the
Soviet Union', held positions which were 'decisive for the foreign policy
of the Soviet Union' and their policy was, 'above all, directed at the avoid­
ance of a conflict with Germany' .86 Later on he provided Berlin with a
one-sided report of Stalin's speech to graduates of military academies,
concluding that he appeared 'anxious to prepare his followers for a ''new
compromise'' TvVith Germany'.87
In the final analysis Schulenburg' s activities in early 1941, and particu­
larly in the crucial month of May 1941, kept alive Stalin's hope of a pos­
sible diplomatic solution to the conflict and diverted him from the lethal
danger lurking around the corner. Moreover, Stalin had become even
more convinced that in desperation Churchill was now trying to drag
Russia into the conflict by spreading the rumours of an 'inevitable war' .88
Rather than providing a warning, as is often believed, the clandestine
negotiations reinforced Stalin's belief in the likelihood of appeasing
Hitler. Suspicious as ever, Stalin even mounted a bold operation to
intercept the German couriers carrying the diplomatic bags at the Hotel
Metropole. While one was locked in a bathroom, the other was jammed
in a lift as the contents of the bag were photographed. Schulenburg's
222 Grand Delusion

reports stressed, as we have seen, his confidence in Stalin's wish to pursue

negotiations.89
It is therefore quite understandable that in Moscow Tatekawa expected
Hitler and Stalin 'to meet somewhere on the border' .90 According to
Zhukov, when he came to see Stalin in early June, he saw on his desk the
letter addressed to Hitler.91 When Dekanozov failed to reach Ribbentrop
after his return to Berlin on 14 May, he sought the good offices of
Meissner, who had forged close relations with Kobulov, the NKGB resi­
dent in Berlin. Fluent in Russian which he had acquired during a long
stay in Russia, Meissner was a rr1an of the 'old school' who had served
under President Hindenburg and was considered to be close to Hitler.92
He had participated, though as a minor and marginal figure, in the talks
with Molotov in Berlin.93 The semblance of negotiations, which petered
out by the first V\reek of June, briefly continued to beguile Stalin as to the
possibility of reaching a new agreement with the Germans. According to
Berezhkov, the young first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Berlin,
he actually 'hinted that the Reichskanzlerei was working out some new
proposals for strengthening Soviet-German relations, which the Fiihrer
intended shortly to present to Moscow' .94
However, the sense that a single false move, whether a military pro­
vocation or a diplomatic blunder, Il'ight trigger a war now led Stalin to
prudence bordering on paranoia. It further hampered the work of the
intelligence agencies as war drew closer. Schulenburg' s suggestion in
his talks with Dekanozov that the rumours might be a trigger for war
introduced a further complication, inhibiting the embassies from seeking
information on German intentions and robbing the Russians of crucial
information. The outstanding case was the desperate and futile attempt
made by the British to pass to Maisky information obtaD.1.ed from 'Ultra'
on the very eve of the war.95 But this happened in every Soviet embassy:
the ambassadors simply adhered farlatically to their instructions and
information was sieved and crudely interpreted to fit in with the views
held at the top. For instance, when the Finnish ambassador in Istanbul
provided his Russian colleague with precise information on the presence
of 125 divisions on the Russian border, he was cut short by a cyPical
reaction from Vinogradov: 'Perhaps Mr Ambassador could tell us
whether he personally counted the divisions?' Rather than pursuing the
conversation, he proudly and obediently reported to Moscow that he 'had
no intention of continuing the talk on that subject and diverted it to a dif­
ferent topic' .96
The bulk of the intelligence submitted to Stalin on German intentions,
as distinct from the actual preparations for war on the ground, increas­
ingly asswned ambiguous meanings when read against the preconceived
ideas. A case in point was a meeting between the Turkish President Inonu
and Papen, in which the former displayed concern about a possible
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 223

meeting of Hitler and Stalin. The German ambassador put his mind at
rest, suggesting that even if 'mutual relations between Germany and
Russia were improved' Germany would 'continue to check Russia and
was strong enough to conduct a war also on the eastern front' . Rather
than identifying the threat, obvious to us in view of the eventual German
invasion, Stalin tended to see in the report proof that such a meeting and
the improvement of relations were indeed on the agenda.97
Even intelligence which in retrospect seems to us decisive could in the
present state of mind in the Kremlin be regarded as ambivalent. The
reliable and skilled military attache in Bucharest gleaned from an informer
who had been a guest of the German General Staff that the rigorous
preparations for the campaign had been completed and the outbreak of
war was expected in June. He believed that if war did not come in 1941 it
could be considered a 'miracle'. But he then raised the possibility, which
would prove more attractive to Stalin, that Hitler 'was playing an
extremely subtle game'. This was accentuated by the fact that Hitler
seemed to be avoiding making any clear statements on his intentions vis­
a-vis Moscow or holding negotiations with countries bordering on Russia.
Neither did he discuss the war with the Japanese. The information that
'not even a single person has the slightest doubt of a quick victory over the
USSR' could be perceived as part of the war of nerves. Such an interpreta­
tion was further corroborated by the admission that it was recognized in
Berlin that an occupation of the Soviet Union might lead to a disastrous
disruption of the economy. It was therefore left to Stalin to agree or dis­
agree with the informer's ' belief' that war had become 'inevitable' and
that the German army would be in Moscow 'earlier than assumed'.98
It is not surprising therefore that when four German deserters from the
infantry, artillery and navy crossed the lines and gave an accurate and
detailed description of the German pattern of deployment, Merkulov pre­
ferred to give a rather tendentious description of the mood and political
attitude of the soldiers. He stressed the weariness of the troops and their
craving for home. At least twenty of their comrades had been court­
martialled for desertion. Many of the soldiers evinced sympathy towards
/

the Soviet Union' and were afraid of facing 'the strong Red Army, with
its abundant fleet of planes and tanks, over a huge territory'. In the naval
unit fascist propaganda was most effective but coupled with it was 'a
growing anti-war feeling' . Some soldiers expressed their view that Hitler
was 'dragging Germany into a war, from which the working class would
gain i1othing'. It was coupled with subdued information about some units
which 'still preserve the war spirit and are prepared to fulfil all the direc­
tives of their commanders . . . among them they mention ''the imminent
war'' with the Soviet Union' .99
What Dekanozov chose to bring out in his reports home was the general
belief that German industrialists were opposed to the war and that the
224 Grand Delusion

Soviet Union intended to concede territory to Germany. The Russian wife

of the Chinese counsellor, who was sitting next to Dekanozov at a dinner
in Berlin, told him that 'she would hate to see the Ukraine given to
Germany . . . she had heard of it from the Germans themselves'. Likewise
the daughter of the Turkish counsellor felt 'very sorry for the Caucasus',
which would be given to Germany. Dekanozov chose to quote at length
the views of Gerde, the Turkish ambassador, who believed that the
German government was in a 'hopeless situation', short of oil and grain
and possessing a huge unemployed army. The deployment of the troops
in the Balkans and in Rumania was directed to the north, but he assumed
that it was aimed 'at exerting pressure on the Soviet Union' . He further
misled Dekanozov by suggesting that General Brauchitsch had been
inspecting the trains directed to the West, leading him to the conclusion
that the 'move of troops to the Soviet border was done with the aim of
diverting attention from the activity contemplated in the West'. Antici­
pating fresh negotiations, Dekanozov was eager to trace the origins of
the rumours and the extent to which they mirrored the views held by the
government.100 In a subsequent report he notified the Kremlin that:

Parallel to the rumours circulating about the imminent war between

Germany and the Soviet Union, rumours were spread in Germany of a
rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union, either on the
basis of far-reaching 'concessions' on the part of the Soviet Union, or
on the basis of 'division of spheres of influence' and undertakings on
the part of the Soviet Union not to interfere in European affairs. This is
related to Stalin's assumption of the premiership.

He clung to commentaries in this vein on the neutrality agreement with

Japan and Stalin's most recent recognition of the governments in the occu­
pied territories.
That the Kremlin was indeed geared towards the resumption of nego­
tiations is clear from Dekanozov' s long citations from those newspapers
which pointed out that, as he put it, 'the present policy of the USSR fully
supports the ''new order'' in Europe' . He was just as zealous in for­
warding information which suggested a growing rift within Germany.
According to him the 'smarter and more solid people (in the first place
the German industrialists) appeared worried by the worsening relations
with the Soviet Union, stressing their satisfaction with the present eco­
nomic ties with the USSR. On the other hand, the military circles . . . took
a more aggressive stance towards relations with the Soviet Union.' As far
as the terms of the agreement were concerned, Dekanozov suggested that
the most frequent rumours, coming from various directions, spoke about
'the leasing of the Ukraine for 5 , 35 and 99 years'. Perhaps the most
significant observation was his stated belief that the rumours emanated
'Appeasement': A New German-Soviet Pact? 225

from and were spread by the German government. However, the sheer
volume of the rumours introduced enough doubt in his mind to suggest
that it might after all be 'a continuation of the ideological (and concrete)
preparation for a war against the Soviet Union'.101
At the end of May Timoshenko and Zhukov were summoned to the
Kremlin, and they assumed that Stalin was at last prepared to allow them
to put the army on 'war readiness' status in view of the alarming intelli­
gence reports. They were dumbfounded when Stalin passed on to them
Schulenburg' s appeal to allow groups of Germans to search for graves of
German soldiers who had perished in the First World War. It was plain
to Zhukov, as he angrily pointed out to Zhdanov, that the purpose was a
survey of the regions which the Germans intended to attack. Timoshenko
seized the opportunity to raise the increasing infringements of Soviet air
space and asked for permission to shoot down the German planes. Yet
Stalin clung to the belief that the German army was acting on its own ini­
tiative. 'I am not sure', he said as he brought the discussion to an end,
'that Hitler knows about those flights.' Overriding Zhukov's reservations,
he seemed satisfied by Hitler's recent explanation that inexperienced
young pilots were encountering navigation problems. Moreover, he
informed Zhukov of a secret personal meeting which Dekanozov had had
with Hitler, who had assured him that the transfer of the troops to the
border was aimed at regrouping them for the offensive against the West
and misleading London. The 'ultimatum theory' was further recruited to
suggest that the Germans might be trying 'to scare us'. Even when tl1e
number of flights increased dramatically in early June, Stalin suggested
that !v1olotov should acquaint Hitler through Schulenburg with the state
102
of affairs.
The need to conform with the Kremlin had now become overriding. In
his concluding report for May Golikov, as if unaware of the hard facts
accumulating on his desk, revised his earlier appreciation of the German
priorities in the wake of the Balkan campaign. The German High
Command was now carrying out, in the following order: first, the restora­
tion of the western groupings for the struggle with England; second, an
augmentation of the force against the USSR; third, consolidation of the
reserves placed at the disposal of the High Command. He grossly exag­
gerated the number of divisions earmarked for the invasion of Britain,
fixing tl1em at 122 to 126, as compared with the 120 to 122 divisions which
were deployed against the Soviet Union, while forty-four to forty-eight
were kept in reserve. The deployment of the troops on the Russian border
still gave prominence to the south-western front. The twenty-nine divi­
sions in the Middle East, he argued, were adequate to continue opera­
tions there while simultaneously regrouping in the West, in anticipation
of a main operation against the British Isles. Finally, by establishing that
'the regrouping of the Gerrnan army, in the wake of the campaign in the
226 Grand Delusion

Balkans, has essentially been completed', he turned a blind eye to the

significant transfer of troops to the borders in the three weeks preceding
the attack.103
The security services were now faltering as well. During a banquet
given by the Japanese ambassador the increasing probability of a German
attack was rumoured, with 15 or 20 June tipped as likely dates. Various
scenarios for the attack were discussed. However, the chillingly accurate
information was then fitted into the conceptual framework of the
Kremlin, assuming that the war would follow an Anglo-German agree­
ment, possibly on the basis of the proposals submitted by Hess in London.
Moreover, it was almost taken for granted that war would be preceded
by severe demands for the Soviet Union to join the Axis and render
Germany 'more effective economic support'. In the final analysis, it
seemed that the 'threat of war' was employed 'to exert pressure' on the
Soviet Union.104
•

•
 11

'The Special Threatening

Military Period'

On the Alert

There were no means by which the full extent of the German build-up
could be grasped on the ground before the second half of April. The initial
phase of the German deployment was confined to mobilization and the
creation of infrastructures for deployment. It was executed at a slow pace
from mid-December to March. The second phase proceeded at moderate
speed from mid-March to mid-April, while the massive third and fourth
phases, including the transfer of the motorized units, commenced at tl1e
end of April. The movement of the reserves was to start only after hos­
tilities had actually begun.1 The gradual but systematic Russian mobi­
lization and deployment were a direct response to the German menace,
now clearly reflected by abundant military intelligence.2
Zhukov, barely installed in his new post as Chief of Staff, was increas­
ingly disturbed by the intelligence pouring in. He was particularly frus­
trated by the limitations imposed on him. The minute attention paid by
Stali11 to tlle diplomatic 'great game', through which he hoped to spare
Russia from war, contrasted sharply witl'l the scant interest he displayed
in military affairs and in the activities of his new Chief of Staff. Stalin's
totalitarian regime was based on separation of the various governmental
bodies. The Red Army was not, ther·efore, acquainted with the political
process and was rarely aware of its in1plications. Stalin's dacha, his office
in the Kremlin and to a lesser degree the Politburo were perhaps the only
places where the military and political spheres converged, but both
Zl1ukov and Timoshenko were only occasionally present there. In fact, as
the war drew nearer, significant items of intelligence seem to have been
withheld from the army, presumably to deter it from pressing for action.3

227
228 Grand Delusion

At the end of February Timoshenko arranged for Zhukov to meet Stalin.

'Take into consideration', he warned Zhukov, as they set out for Stalin's
dacha, 'that he will not listen to a long lecture. All that you have told me
in three hours has to be said in ten minutes.' Stalin was entertaining
Molotov and other members of the Politburo. The Chief of Staff's work
was not made any easier by the fact that Stalin was now leaning heavily
on his old comrades, Generals Mekhlis and Kulik, devoted and servile but
lacking any substantial military record. Zhdanov and Voroshilov were
also kept on hand to bolster Stalin's own outlook on military affairs.4
Intimidated by his surroundings, Zhukov confined himself to the short
comment that 'considering the complicated military-political situation it
was necessary to take urgent measures in time to remedy shortcomings on
the western front'. 'Are you eager to fight the Germans?' interjected
Molotov, but Stalin hushed him, allowing Zhukov to complete his presen­
tation before dinner was served. The atmosphere at the dacha did not
mirror Zhukov's trepidation. Dinner, as was the case with Stalin when
entertaining at home, was simple: thick Ukrainian borsch, buckwheat por­
ridge ('kasha') and plenty of stewed meat, followed by stewed and fresh
fruit. Stalin was in a jovial mood, cracking jokes and sipping the light
Georgian wine, Khvanchkara, which he offered around, though the major­
ity preferred brandy. On taking leave of Zhukov Stalin encouraged him to
proceed with the planning, though warning him against 'wild umealistic
plans for which Russia lacked the means' .5
The initial deployment plan, therefore, was diffuse and restrained.
The revised timetable called for completion of the mobilization by 15
July.6 To a large extent the planners were working, not unlike their coun­
terparts in Germany, in a political void. However, unlike the Germans,
they did not enjoy the leadership's support, and were therefore deterred
from using their imagination and initiative in seeking ways to counter
the threat. The plan, as submitted to Stalin by longhand in a single copy
on 1 1 March, was a natural outcome of the mobilization order and lacked
ingenuity. Only when the threat became concrete from April onwards
did Zhukov persistently though unsuccessfully attempt to alter it. Up
to the outbreak of war the plan underwent only minor modifications to
accommodate the speed, volume and position of the German troops, in
line with the detailed fortnightly reports provided by Golikov. Those, as
we have seen, were increasingly tailored to conform with the views held
at the top.
The framework of the March plan was remarkably defensive. It estab­
lished at the outset that 'the highly complex political situation in Europe
compels us to turn our undivided attention to the defence of our western
borders'. In evaluating the threats facing Russia, Zhukov stressed the
continued threat of a war on two fronts: 'Under such circumstances, the
Soviet Union needs to be ready for a war on two fronts: in the West -
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 229

against Germany, supported by Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Finland,

and in the East - against Japan, as an overt enemy or as an enemy assum­
ing the position of ''armed neutrality'', which can always be turned into
open conflict.' The German threat was still conceived as a potential one,
as Zhukov admittedly lacked any documentary evidence of the German
operational plans, but it was certainly the overwhelming one. If Germany
were to abandon the plans to attack Britain she could muster some 200
divisions, including 165 infantry, twenty tank and fifteen motorized divi­
sions, for deployment on the Soviet border. Zhukov seems to have over­
estimated the vast force that might face Russia, assuming that together
with her allies Germany could deploy some 233 infantry divisions, more
than twenty tank divisions comprising 10,810 tanks, and fifteen motor­
ized divisions, supported by 1 1,600 planes and 20,050 guns. The estimate
of the Panzer Gruppe would have been right in the May 1940 terms,
assuming that each division comprised some 500 tanks. Unknown to the
Russians the Germans had doubled the number of their tank divisions in
194 1 by cutting the number of tanks in each division by half.
7
The assumption, still based on the plans of October 194 0, was that the
Germans would launch an offensive in the south-western sector with tl1e
final objective of seizing the Ukraine. Such a strike might be assisted by
supportive strikes in the centre and north from East Prussia in the direc­
tion of Riga and Dvinsk or in the central sector in the direction of Brest.
But, in contrast to the commonly held opinion, it should be stressed that
Zhukov did not exclude the possibility that the major blow might origi­
nate from Warsaw and fall on the central sector on the Riga-Dvinsk axis.
The decision taken was to deploy most of the army in the west and south­
western sectors, leaving only a strong skeleton force in the east to deter
the Japanese and paralyse their offensive if they were to launch a war.
Forty infantry divisions, of which six were mechanized and seven
armoured, were assigned to the East, while Zhukov was left with 1 7 1
infantry, twenty-seven motorized, fifty-three tank and seven cavalry divi­
sions to cover the entire western front.8 Stalin's initial reaction was to
reject even the amorphous plan presented to him, fearing that it might
provoke the Germans. However, he gave the plan his blessing when faced
with the accumulating intelligence by the end of March, the time of the
German move against Yugoslavia and Greece.9
To understand Zhukov's shift towards a more vigorous deployment
from the end of April onwards, attention should be paid to the evolving
nature of the intelligence landing on his desk. The warnings of agents like
Sorge and 'Starshina' have gained them a romantic aura. However, the
most vital military intelligence came from the hundreds of observers dis­
persed along the entire German side of the western border at the pivotal
rail and road junctions. They painstakingly delivered to Moscow an
updated and precise picture of the German deployment. Likewise, the
230 Grand Delusion

military attaches and Military Intelligence submitted a steady stream of

fairly accurate information. Although, as we have seen, 10 the strategic
intelligence directly affected Stalin in his attempts to avert war through
diplomatic means, the hard facts provided by the observers were scruti­
nized by Zhukov and his staff and determined the nature of the army's
response. The army enjoyed some latih1de in devising the means to
encounter the threat, of which Stalin was of course fully informed, as long
as it did not impinge on his political manoeuvrability.
In mid-March the NKGB, which handled the monitoring activities,
instructed the agent 'Sidrov' to collate the evidence accumulated in the
field. His vivid and detailed report drew attention to the numerous trains
allotted for the transfer of troops to destinations in the East along the
entire Soviet border. He witnessed the tremendous congestion which
the additional military traffic was inflicting on the main lines running east
from Germany, Vienna and Budapest. Much of the traffic originated not
in Germany but in the occupied Western countries.11 The traffic from
Berlin to former Poland was now almost exclusively reserved for the
military, and civilians needed special permission to travel. The movement
was conducted mostly at night to conceal its magnitude. Since 3 March
some three or four train echelons had made the daily journey from west
to east carrying troops and equipment, while boats were unloading
military material in the Polish ports.12 ,
The pressure on the key railway stations in former Poland increased
during April and the construction of new hangars and airstrips in the
border regions, as well as great efforts in widening and improving the
roads and railway networks, were observed.13 The close watch kept on
the traffic disclosed in mid-April the return of troops who had been
engaged in Yugoslavia through Budapest to Vienna. After a short recu­
peration they were redeployed in Poland and on the Russian border. The
Hungarian army had been put on alert, while the soldiers spoke freely of
a campaign to seize the Ukrainian Carpathians.14
In the last week of March 'Corsicanets' revealed that the Germans were
continuing to make an extensive photographic survey of the border areas,
especially in the vicinity of Kiev. He expected the war to erupt at the end
of April or beginning of May. The choice of the date was governed by the
wish to attack while the wheat was still green to prevent the retreating
Red Army from setting fire to it. However, the reader should remember
the ambivalent nature of the reports from Berlin.15 While Timoshenko
and Zhukov would regard the reports as deadly serious, Stalin and Beria
tended to focus on the final verdict of 'Starshina' that 'the likelihood of
war is only 50 per cent, and can still be attributed to a ''bluff'' policy' .16
Another significant disclosure, made by 'Starshina' early in April,
was that the planning division of the German air force had completed
its plans for the attack on the Soviet Union. The war would start with a
'The Special Threatening Military Period'

heavy bombardment of railway junctions1 crossroads and comrr1unica­

tion centres and concentrations of troops1 rather than industrial targets,
which the Germans hoped to seize intact and exploit after the short
campaign. The bombardment was aimed at disrupting communication
lines and the transfer of the reserves to the front. 'Starshina' stood by
the authenticity of the information, which he drew from documents
passing through his own hands. However1 in view of Stalin1 s conviction
that a split existed within the German leadership, it should be noted
that 'Starshina' did not definitely establish whether war would break out,
noting that · 'the final decision, to which he was not made privy1 rested
with Hitler'. Though 'Starshina' described the attack as 'imminent',
he did not exclude the possibility that the anticipated campaign in
Yugoslavia might bring about a delay. As far as the planning was
concerned, he continued to misinform Moscow that the main effort would
be towards the Ukraine with supportive action from Prussia.17 The gist
of the information was accurately transmitted to the Red Army, though
it was given to understand that it did not yet 'provide a sufficient base
to assume that the offensive had been finally decided by the supreme
leadership' . 1 8
The military attaches, especially those posted in the Balkan countries,
constantly supplied exceptional information. A great part of it never
reached Stalin but found its way to the armed forces. Towards the end of
March, for instance, a childhood friend of Antonescu' s nephew disclosed
that Hitler had revealed to the Rumanian leader during their meeting in
January his decision to attack Russia1 and the information was confirmed
by Goring during their recent meeting in Vienna. May was tipped as the
critical month.19
In his fortnightly report in early April Golikov made no effort to conceal
the grave threat posed by the build-up of the German war machine along
the entire border. Moreover1 he recognized a clear shift towards the central
western front, where eighty-four divisions had already been identified.
New headquarters had already been established in Allenstein in Prussia
and in Zakopane1 some eighty-five kilometres from Cracow.20
The increasing number of reconnaissance flights deep into Soviet terri­
tory was most disconcerting. At the end of the month the Russians cap­
tured from a pilot who made a forced landing near Rovno exposed films
and a torn map of the Soviet border districts which clearly indicated the
object of his flight. Anxiously waiting for Schulenburg to bring new pro­
posals, Stalin forced Timoshenko to make 'an exception . . . and give the
border troops orders not to fire on German planes flying over Soviet ter­
ritory so long as such flights do not occur frequently'.21
On 1 5 April, following the fiasco in Yugoslavia, Golikov submitted a
second portentous report. Though lacking any analytical assessment, the
laconic document was detailed enough to depict the significant change in
 232 Gra11d Delzlsio11

the patter11 of the German deployment. Golikov' s opening sentence, as

\Vas his practice, set the tone for the entire report:

A major transfer of troops has taken place by railway, roads, motor

columns and organized marches between 1 and 1 5 April, from the heart
of Germany, from the V\1estem districts of East Prussia and from the
General Gubernia [Poland] towards the Soviet borders. The concen­
trations are mainly in East Prussia, in the \1icinity of Warsa\v and
in the districts south of Lublin. Within 15 days the German army in the
eastern borders has increased by three infantry divisions, two motor­
ized ones and seventeen thousand armed Ukrainian nationalists and
one formation of paratroopers. Tl1e total number of German divisions
•

of all sorts in E. Prussia and Poland alone amounts to 78 divisions .

Golikov then identified the various formations and their locations, ending
V\rith the ominous conclusion that 'the transfer of troops is continuing, as
'"1ell as the accumulation of ammunition and oil on the borders of tl1e
USSR' . 22 A couple of days later the military attache in Budapest found out
from a trusted source that the Germans no\1\1 possessed 265 di\1isions: 180
infantry, ten motorized, eighteen tank, fi\1e paratroop, six mountaineer
and t\1\10 to three ca\ralry di,risions, and some forty unspecified divisions.
Of these he believed only seventy-five remained on Russia's \'V-restem
front, and forty-five \Vere concentrated in the Balkans. The bulk of the
army J
confronted the Russian central and northern sectors.23
Zhukov could hardly afford to remain idle V\1hen confronted by this
ominous intelligence. However, in the Kremlin Stalin continued to be
obsessed \\rith efforts to reconcile the Germans and V\1as engulfed by deep
suspicion of the British efforts to embroil Russia in \'\rar. Zhuko'' therefore
set out to accomplish the in1possible task of boosting the defensi\1e plan
of the previous month without aggra\1ating the Kremlin. The conciliatory
introduction of his ne\v directive to General Pa\rlov", the commander
of the \\1estern front, V\1as aimed at Stalin and assumed that the non­
aggression pact V\rith Germany 'safeguards peace in our V\1estern borders.
The So,"iet Union does not intend to attack Germany and Italy. Nor does
it appear that those States intend to attack the So\1iet Union in the
near future.' Zl1uko\1 \vent to great lengths to reconcile Stalin's obsessive
fear of pro\'Ocation \\1ith the genuine threat posed by German)'· Tongue
in cheek, he pointed out the danger posed to Russia 'not only by
such opponents as Finland, Rumania and England, but also possible
opponents such as Germany, Italy and Japan'. But he d\\1elt on the recent
e\"ents in the Balkans, the German incursions into Bulgaria, Rumania and
Finland, the continued concentration of the German troops on the Russian
border, and the gro\'\ring po\'\1er of the Axis \\1hich under different
circumstances co1.1ld be di\"erted against the So\1iet Union. Consequently,
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 233

the directive drove home the military' s main concern: that the defence of
the western borders of the Soviet Union had assumed 'exceptional
significance'.
Zhukov presumed that the Germans would be able to muster for the
campaign in the East some 200 divisions, comprising 165 infantry, twenty
tank and fifteen motorized divisions. Misled by their incursion into the
Balkans and Southern Europe, and assuming Hitler to be driven by eco­
nomic interests, Zhukov expected him to 'try to seize the Ukraine' by
delivering a major blow in the area enclosed between Berdichev and Kiev.
The offensive could be sustained through subsidiary assaults from West
Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga, or from Brest to Volkovysk and Baranovichi.
However, Zhukov did not exclude the possibility that the main assault
might be carried out from Prussia, via Warsaw, in the direction of Riga or
Kovno and Dvinsk, with supportive action towards Minsk.
The main challenge for Zhukov, which he was unable to meet until
the outbreak of war, was the need to cope with the double threat in the
central and southern regions, in view of the tremendous extent of the
battlefield. It should be borne in mind however that one reason for
the failure of the Russians to perceive the German intentions sprang
from the unresolved dispute within the German High Command on the
final aims of the campaign. While Guderian sought to deliver a mortal
blow on Moscow, Hitler strove to occupy the Ukraine and Leningrad. The
compromise plan provided for a war in two stages. The success of the
plan depended on the ability of the V\7ehrmacht to destroy the bulk of
the Soviet army and prevent it from retreating in an orderly way across
the Dniepr and then regrouping. To gloss over the conflicting views,
it was decided to re-examine the objectives once the German army had
regrouped on the Leningrad-Orsha-Dniepr line. The forces were there­
fore initially distributed more or less evenly between the three military
districts. Army Group North under Field Marshal von Leeb, comprising
an armoured striking force, a Panzer Gruppe and the 16th and 18tl1
Armies, was entrusted with the destruction of the Soviet troops in the
Baltic countries and the capture of Leningrad. The powerful Army
Group Centre, under Field Marshal von Bock, consisted of thirty-five
infantry, nine armoured and six motorized divisions. Their orders were
to break through the Brest-Grodno-Vilna-Smolensk line and capture
Smolensk. Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Gerd
von Rundstedt, with thirty-two infantry, five armoured and three motor­
ized divisions, was expected to strike at Kiev. Pondering with his
advisers on the pattern of the German deployment, Stalin could obviously
reach a variety of conclusions, none of which necessarily involved a
shift to the centre or north. He received little assistance from Soviet
intelligence which, as \Ve have seen, continued to produce conflicting
evidence.24
 234 Grand Delusion

The specific directive to General Pavlov elaborated the vague guide­

lines of the March deployment plans. One should not lose sight of the fact
that the directive was drafted in the midst of Stalin's appeasement efforts
and, as we have seen, Zhukov was forced in the opening phase of the
document to water down the threat considerably to conform with the
Kremlin's views. Since he was robbed of the initiative, such as a pre­
emptive strike, Zhukov had to devise a response to a German attack. Even
under such circumstances he adhered strictly to the 'deep operations'
principles introduced by Tukhachevsky25 in devising his master stroke. In
the initial stage of the war, assuming a German attack, the covering forces
based in the strongholds (ukraplenie raiony) were expected to contain the
•

enemy, absorb the extensive blow and conduct 'a stubborn defence' . To
counter the two German efforts, he planned to move on to the offensive
by striking at the concentration of the enemy in the Lublin-Radom region,
moving on to occupy the crossing points on the River Visla. To sustain
the main effort an auxiliary blow would be delivered in the direction
of Warsaw leading to its occupation and establishing the defence on the
River Narev. The success of such operations was bound to lead to the
encirclement and annihilation of the main German concentration east of
the Visla. By the tenth day of the operation the Red Army was expected
to be settled on the Visla.
Considering the exigencies under which Zhukov was acting, Jonly a
single copy of the directive, handwritten by General Vassilevsky, deputy
Chief of Staff and head of the Planning Division, went out and Pavlov
was instructed to keep it under lock and key. The plan was to be put into
action once a ciphered telegram with the words 'start implementing'
reached his headquarters. Only then would the war machine start rolling,
putting into effect the following stages: first, the plan for the covering of
the borders and defence during the entire period of the concentration;
second, the plan of concentration and deployment; third, the plan for the
iinplementation of the first operation by the 13th and 4th Armies and
the plan for the defence of the 3rd and 10th Armies.26 For the moment,
anticipating the negotiations with Schulenb11rg,27 Stalin confined himself
to administrative measures. On the evening of 23 April at his offices
in the Kremlin, he discussed with Zhukov and Meretskov, and the
ubiquitous General Kulik, the formation of three army groups to cope
with the potential German threat.28 For the moment Zhukov took only the
emergency, though marginal, step of reinforcing the central sector
through the deployment of the 231st and 224th rifle divisions in full battle
readiness.29
The euphoric expectations of a breakthrough on the diplomatic front at
the beginning of May turned by the end of the month into despondency.
The ominous silence in Berlin was broken only by the deafening sound
of the colossal German war machine settling along the entire length of the
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 235

Russian border. It was becoming well nigh impossible for Golikov to

manoeuvre between Zhukov, alarmed by the signals of an imminent war,
and Stalin, seeking a window of opportunity to start the negotiations with
the Germans. At the end of April Golikov sought from the military attache
in Berlin, General Tupikov, an overall appraisal of German intentions.
Pondering over the 150 telegrams and the two dozen reports which he
had sent to the GRU in the previous three months, Tupikov marked the
continuous and steady transfer of troops to the eastern front as the single
most important and persistent feature of German policy. His report was
backed up by an accurate table of the deployment of the German troops,
giving preference to the northern and central sectors of the Russian border
over the south-western, Balkan or Middle Eastern theatres. Just as indi­
cative and alarming for him was Hitler's brazen disregard of Russian
interests, mostly in the Balkans. But even his report was not void of
ambivalence which could encourage an alternative appraisal. Tupikov
recognized in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact an effective stabilizing force
in relations with Germany, though he believed it to be a temporary
respite. Tupikov too tended to attribute the incomprehensible German
undertaking to a desperate need to control the economic resources of
Russia, quoting Goring's aides that 'when rats are hungry they will gnaw
through steel armour to reach their bread'. The situation l1ad become
so acute that German scientists were purported to be 'working on trans­
forming sewage into edible food' . Tupikov, who was set on warning Stalin
about the military danger, failed to realize that such an appraisal still left
the door in the Kremlin wide open for an agreement on further conces­
sions through political means and undermined Zhukov's position. But the
bottom line clearly established that 'in the immediate German plans for
the war, the USSR is next in the queue' .30
Another ominous sign was evidence of systematic German attempts at
recruiting Russia's neighbours. An internal memorandum at the Foreign
Ministry described Antonescu' s overt hostility towards Russia; he was
being encouraged by the Germans to revive the revisionist claim to
Bessarabia. The reports from the region pointed to the 'German rein­
forcement of the Rumanian border and the Black Sea shores and the con­
centration of troops in Moldava while measures were undertaken to
defend the oil regions from air attacks'. There was little doubt about 'how
far the plans of immediate war and the preparedness of Germany for war
against the Soviet Union have gone'.31 German officers in Rumania even
disclosed that the war against Russia would take place in mid-June.
Under German supervision new airbases were being quickly built, while
co-ordination was established with the Rumanian officers in preparation
for the occupation of Bessarabia.32 Precisely accurate information sup­
plied by the NKGB depicted the various measures taken by the Germans
'to hasten the preparation of the theatre of war' on the Soviet-Hungarian
 Grand Delusion

border. High-ranking German officers were surveying the region and

photographing the Soviet posts and bridges on the River Bug. This infor­
mation went hand in hand with the well-documented systematic
transfer of troops to the border since 27 March. Factories had been con­
verted to produce scarce war materials and were now working 'around
the clock'. Metal domes to shield guns had been stripped from the
Maginot Line in France and transferred to the Russian border. Recon­
naissance flights were on the increase. Agents had been instructed to
obtain information on the location of staff headquarters, radio stations
and airfields. Finally, when meeting local peasants on 10 April, the
German commander of a border post was alleged to have said: 'Greece
has surrendered, soon we shall seize Yugoslavia . . . One month of rest
and we start a war against Russia.'33
For the moment, Golikov persisted in alerting the Kremlin to the
'intensifying concentrations against the Soviet Union along the entire
length of the western and south-western borders, including Rumania and
also Finland' . The schizophrenic situation was reflected in his periodical
report of 5 May. On the one hand he dwelt on the stupendous German
efforts: the fact that they had increased their forces in two months by
thirty-seven divisions, while doubling their armoured divisions from
six to twelve. And yet he also diverted attention to the extension of
operations against England in the Near East (Turkey and Iraq) and
North Africa, not excluding the possibility that Spain would be the next
victim.34
The residency in Warsaw described how preparations for war were
being conducted openly in the city and its vicinity. Between 10 and 20
April, troop formations were seen marching eastwards through the city's
main streets, day and night, while artillery, planes and heavy machines
were transferred to the front on shuttle trains. Warsaw was preparing for
air raids: car lamps were blackened, windows blocked and civil defence
organized. Vehicles had been confiscated, while schools had closed early
for the summer vacation and other civilian institutions were being con­
verted into military hospitals. The German officers in former Poland were
studying the Russian language and exploring topographic maps of
Russia. Todt, the famous engineer of the Siegfried Line, had been put in
charge of the construction of fortifications on the border which employed
no fewer than 35,000 Jews on forced labour.35 The unceasing flow of accu­
rate field intellige11ce increased from mid-May onwards. It dovetailed
the final stages of the German deployment. A typical report consisted of
dozens of short snippets of accurate information such as: 'on 25.4.41 8
infantry divisions were spotted and identified making their way to
Sokalsky' . In addition, the Ukrainian NKGB provided precise informa­
tion on road construction, the fortification of railway stations and junc­
tions, and related preparations for war.36
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 237

Emergency Deployment
The formidable German concentration placed Zhukov and Timoshenko
in a serious dilemma: the pace, volume and extent of the German deploy­
ment appeared to be outstripping the corresponding Russian efforts. They
desperately sought means of closing the gap. On the night of 1 2 May, after
discussing with Dekanozov the disappointing consequences of his last
clandestine meeting with Schulenburg, and perhaps even as a reaction to
the hints dropped by Schulenburg on Hitler's intentions, Stalin ordered
the two generals to the Kremlin. In a meeting which lasted for almost two
hours and which was attended by Molotov as well, Stalin reluctantly con­
sented to restricted measures to bolster the defence mostly of the Kiev
and Western Military Districts. The next morning the 16th, 19th, 21st and
22nd Armies, a total of about 800,000 troops, supported by the 21st Motor­
ized Division, were ordered to move from the rear to the front. Well aware
of Stalin's sensitivity, Zhukov conducted the transfer in an exceedingly
discreet fashion to avoid provocation.37
The deployment seems particularly restrained compared to the plans
issued by Zhukov a month earlier,38 when his identification of the weaker
links in the German deployment had led him to propose a counter­
offensive once war broke out. The present directives seemed primarily to
address the need to react to the German deployment by covering the
entire border space in anticipation of an onslaught. The plans defined the
most susceptible regions and sought means of thwarting the German
threat. The deployment orders divided each military region into five or
six covering districts. The framework set for the instructions, delivered to
the various front commanders, assumed a German offensive and
instructed the troops, somewhat optimistically, to:

prohibit enemy land and air intrusion, cover and protect the mobiliza­
tion and deployment of the main force by conducting a stubborn
defence along the borders, detect enemy mobilization and deployment,
gain air superiority and disrupt enemy force concentration, protect
Soviet mobilization and concentration of forces against enemy air
attack, and block any actions by enemy air assault or reconnaissance­
diversionary groups.

The troops were allocated their specific covering regions and placed in
the appropriate strongholds. They were instructed to bring the strong­
holds to war readiness while creating the necessary conditions for the
deployment of the covering forces in the buffer zone leading to the border,
to confront and engage the Germans once hostilities erupted. The recog­
nition of the vulnerability of the Siavena-Yassy-Beltsy-Bapniarka axis,
overshadowing the danger posed to Kishynev, Galatz, Volgrad and
 Grand Delusion

Tiraspol, exemplified the shift from the Balkans to the Ukraine as the per­
ceived ultimate objective of the German plans.
The deployment orders for the Odessa military region called for the
formation of a defensive line from Korzhenits to the mouth of the Danube
at Kilia and along the Black Sea shores up to the Straits. The naval
forces in the Black Sea were ordered to intercept a naval assault in the
direction of Odessa, the Crimea and the Caucasus, reflecting Stalin's con­
tinued fear of British connivance in a German attack. The constraints
under which Zhukov was operating are clearly discernible. In executing
the deployment he warned the front commanders that 'the first crossing
of the state borders' would be undertaken only by a 'specific instruction
of the Chief of Staff', coming into effect on receipt of a cipher telegram
with the words 'start carrying out the covering plan for 1941'. The direc­
tives themselves were issued in only two copies in longhand, one remain­
ing with Zhukov and the other deposited in the safes of the commanders
of the various fronts.39 On the field level the new deploy1nent orders were
amalgamated with Zhukov's April directive. Indeed, on 14 May General
Pavlov issued more specific instructions to the army commanders. The
commander of the Grodno area was specifically ordered to contain the
Germans while generating favourable conditions for a counter-strike
by the mechanized corps. E'\1en then, the strike at the rear of the enemy
was aimed specifically at disrupting the German ability to pursue their
attack.40
There is little doubt that, given sufficient time to deploy the army effec­
tively· on the border, Zhukov would have organized the defence in the
only fashion which Soviet doctrine recognized: a combination of defen­
sive and offensive measures. Indeed, a mere three days after implement­
ing the additional deployment measures and against the background of
the Yugoslav fiasco, Zhukov attempted to persuade Stalin to seize the ini­
tiative. Since he was not privy to the intricate diplomatic game, Zhukov
was becoming increasingly restless about the cautious mobilization plan
imposed on him. On 15 May, he and Timoshenko prepared yet another
directive, a direct sequel to that of April. Whereas in April he had still left
very vague the crucial issue of the 'early period of the war', the timing
of the counter-blow, this time Zhukov wished to seize the initiative in exe­
cuting a pre-emptive strike. His point of departure was in no way ideo­
logically motivated or expansionist. The plan had the clearly defined and
limited aim of pre-empting the German blow which he now believed to
be inevitable. Rather than seeking the destruction of the German state or
even armed forces, the plan sought the disruption of the German offen­
sive. Zhukov may have raised the idea with Stalin at their meeting in the
Kremlin at midnight on 14 May, but it was more likely to have been
discussed in a two-hour meeting together with the deputy head of the
Planning Division, General Vatutin, on 19 May.41 The idea clearly origi-
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 239

nated with the military and was rejected by Stalin outright, as it

jeopardized his attempts to bring about a political solution.
Stalin's failure to prepare for the German onslaught primarily reflected
the unappealing political choices which the Soviet Union faced both
before the Second World War, in 1939, and on the eve of the Great
Patriotic War, in 194 1 . Only with hindsight is it perhaps possible to point
to alternatives which might have been pursued. Even then the blow could
at best have been softened, but not averted. The extent of the German mil­
itary successes both in France and in the Balkans were unforeseen by all
the players in what Stalin referred to as the 'great game'. Even before the
war Stalin believed, according to Molotov, 'that only by 194 3 could we
meet the Germans on an equal footing'.42 Stalin's prudence in the conduct
of the military preparations was dictated to a great extent by the belief
that astute politics and adequate preparations might delay if rtot avert
hostilities. Once the reality of war sank in, rather than resorting boldly to
the newly devised doctrine or allowing the military to do so, Stalin in his
typical style of leadership issued muddled instructions which responded
to changing circumstances. He thus failed to create the proper e11viron­
ment for military planning which would have reconciled the doctrine
with the strategic goals.
Zhukov's pre-emptive plan is in fact an unsigned draft, with correc­
tions inserted in the margins by Zhukov himself. Its limited aims can
be inferred from the framework set for the operation i11 the opening
paragraph:

Considering that at present Germany is keeping its army fully mobi­

lized, with the rear deployed, it is in a position to circumvent us by
mounting a surprise attack. To prevent this, I think it is essential not to
allow the German High Command to seize the initiative on any
account, to forestall the deployment of the enemy, and to attack the
German army at the moment when it is in the middle of deployment
and before it has successfully completed the organization of the front
and the co-ordination of the movement of the various forces.

Zhukov probably hoped to repeat the relative success he had scored

during the second war game in January, when his south-western front
was in a position to drive westwards to the River Vistula. The plan con­
tained elements of the 'deep operations' theory which he had
implemented successfully in the Battle of Khalkin-Gol.
Zhukov envisaged that the Red Army would be able to confront the
estimated 100 German divisions, assembled in depth in the central
western sector from the borders to Warsaw, with 1 52 of its own. The exe­
cution of vast encirclerrtent battles through tactical manoeuvrings was
expected to cause havoc among the German concentrations in the central
 Grand Delusion

western sector and isolate them from their left wing. While executing the
manoeuvres the Red Army was expected to gain control of the German
part of Poland and East Prussia. The initial success would pave the
way for successful battles of encirclement against both the northern and
southern flanks of the German army.43
In an unusual move Stalin summoned to the Kremlin on 24 May the
High Command, among them Timoshenko, Zhukov, Admiral Kuznetsov,
Vatutin and the commanders of the major fronts, General Kirponos
(including the senior members of his staff), commander of the Kiev Mili­
tary Region, and Pavlov. In a meeting which lasted for almost three hours
they most probably discussed the problems related to the German threat
and the measures to counter it. Stalin, however, refused to go beyond the
emergency measures already undertaken.44
It has been suggested that if Stalin had accepted the recommendations
Russia would have fared better in the initial stage of the war. But Stalin's
caution appeared reasonable, not only because of the political considera­
tions described here but also in military terms. Zl1ukov' s estimate was
based on the concentration of the German forces in mid-May. He could not
complete his own deployment before the end of June, by which time his
forces would have been greatly outnumbered by the Germans. Perhaps
even more sobering were the lessons drawn from the war games, which
)

had exposed the unprepared state of the Russian army. In retrospect

Zhukov admitted that his proposal had been a terrible mistake: if the Red
Army had been allowed to strike at that time it would have been destroyed
instantly.45 Zhukov later challenged Marshal Vassilevsky, who in an inter­
view which was suppressed for almost twenty years had argued that
Stalin made a mistake by not deploying the entire covering forces and the
second echelon on the border. Zhukov marked in the margins of the inter­
view, which is deposited with the Politburo archives, .t hat 'Vassilevsky' s
opinion does not fully correspond with reality. I believe that the Soviet
Union would have been beaten, early on, if we had deployed all our forces
on the borders on the eve of the war, and the German troops would have
been able to accomplish their plan, encircle and destroy them at the border
. . . Then Hitler's troops could have stepped up the campaign and Moscow
and Leningrad would have fallen in 1941.'46
The deployment, as an emergency measure, was conducted in great
haste and in a most disorderly fashion. It was executed prematurely, while
the armies and their auxiliary forces had not yet been built up to their
war strength, and were poorly equipped. This was well understood in
Moscow and enhanced Stalin's resolve to postpone the war as long as
possible. As early as 29 April Kirponos warned Zhukov that the
February mobilization plan 'was not being fully completed'. Four days
after the mobilization had been ordered Lieutenant-General Purkaev
informed Zhukov from Kiev that the plans for supplying the armies with
'The Special Threatening Military Period'

ammunition and provisions were proceeding 'extremely slowly'. It

looked as if the supply programme for the entire year would not be
attained. On 6 June, the commander of the 5th Tank Division complained
that although mobilization orders had been issued his manpower was far
from the required strength and he did not possess any operational instruc­
tions. He concluded therefore that the 'delay in the increase of staff does
not render it possible to complete the implementation of the mobilization
orders in accordance with the mobilization plan for 1941'. On the same
day the Deputy Chief of the Baltic Military District informed Zhukov that
the logistical difficulties, failure to establish the proper material infra­
structure and lack of communications 'do not allow for the fulfilment of
the mobilization plan' .47
The reluctance to embark on a bold defensive policy is hardly surpris­
ing. On 1 7 May Zhukov and Timoshenko, in co-operation with Zhdanov,
issued a report on 'the results of battle training inspection for the winter
period of 1941 and orders for the summer period'. The report exposed
the shortcomings uncovered in the inspection of the army in the winter
of 194 1 . These failings cast further doubt on the ability of the Red Army
to execute a pre-emptive strike at this stage. The inspection revealed
that the army on the whole did not display particular vigilance, battle­
readiness, steadfastness in defence or preparations to repel an armoured
invasion. The report reflects a desperate attempt to put the house in order.
A reappraisal of the defensive goals brought home the gloomy realization
that only a few of them had been attained throughout the winter. The
surveys carried out by the Defence Commissariat and the military dis­
tricts established that most units had failed to implement the directives
on mobilization. Consequently, a new set of orders which were expected
to form the basis for training during the summer of 1941 clearly displays
a defensive disposition and the ineptitude of the armed forces. Tl1e orders
of the commanders of the motorized infantry and the tank corps show
even more bluntly that very basic techniques, including communications
and co-ordination, accuracy of fire and night combat, had not been
mastered.48
An effective defence relied on a system of strongholds which were
hastily raised along the new 'Molotov Line', some 300 kilometres west of
the former border. The vital task of these URs, constructed at some dis­
tance from the border, was to serve as the outposts for the covering forces
of the first echelon, and provide them with logistic and fire support in
the initial stage of the war. The covering forces were expected to seize the
area leading to the border, contain the enemy, absorb the first blow and
create favourable conditions for the second echelon to deliver counter­
blows. The plan had been worked out in the autumn of 1940 but failed
to 'address the new political and military problems' arising out of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. It was further hampered by the major
 Grand Delusion

strategic mistake of assuming Hitler's main strike to be directed against

Kiev rather than the Belorussian front.49
During 1938 thirteen strongholds, manned by twenty-five machine-gun
battalions totalling 1 8,000 men, had been established. Eight more were
added before the German invasion of Poland. The introduction of the new
strategic plans in 1940-1 was accompanied by the construction of twenty
densely fortified regions along the new border. The decision to dis­
mantle the old line and remove the guns to the new ones was taken
personally by Stalirl. The project, however, encountered endless technical
problems in the transfer of the equipment from the old fortifications to
the new ones.so
The Military Council of the Red Army met twice in February and March
1941 to discuss means of accelerating the construction of new
fortifications. In early March the Politburo exerted further pressure in. an
attempt to remove the obstacles which seemed to be hindering the com­
pletion of the defence posts. Responsibility for their construction was
duly stripped from the Engineers' Corps and entrusted directly to the
former Chief of Staff, Shaposhnikov.51 In mid-April the political authori­
ties of the Red Army reviewed the dire situation of the URs and reached
the grave conclusion that 'overwhelmingly they are not militarily ready'.
The Defence Ministry was blamed for the failure to furnish the strong­
holds with the adequate weaponry systems and equipment. The General
Staff duly issued a directive on the need to accelerate construction, in
which some 1 40,000 labourers were engaged daily. The directive opened
by conceding that 'despite the series of orders placed by the General Staff
of the Red Army, the installation of the fortified defences in the long-term
military constructions and the bringing of those fortifications to military
readiness are proceeding at an unacceptably slow pace' .52
The government allocated 10 million rubles, a tremendous sum in those
days, to hasten construction of the fortifications on the new line. As late
as 4 June, tl1e Politburo intervened, pressing for the hasty completion of
the URs by October 194 1 . The first ones, to be staffed by 45,000 men, were
expected to be ready on 1 July and the remainder, accommodating 75,000
men, in October. The effort was well under way when it was disrupted
by the German invasion.s3 Alarming gaps of 50-60 kilometres continued
to exist between the strongholds, leaving the covering forces without pro­
tection. The failure was not only a result of the shifting borders but was
due to the absence of construction materials such as concrete, timber and
barbed wire, aggravated by the lack of time.54
Until May Stalin sided with Voznesensk)', the head of State Planning
and deputy Prime Minister, who had long found the demands of the
General Staff excessive. In view of the pressure mounted by the Chief of
Staff in the spring, Stalin agreed to inc1·ease production considerably to
provide for the newly mobilized armies.ss Only in early MayT did Stalin
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 243

agree to introduce major changes in the armoured formation through the

creation of twenty new mechanized corps. Putting the economy on a war
footing, the stupendous effort to increase the production of armaments
and ammunition during the second half of 1941, and the hasty conver­
sion of industries followed. The lion's share of the production of the new
KV3 and improved T-34 tanks was to be accomplished towards the end
of the year, clearly reflecting Stalin's recognition that he had no adequate
response to the Germans in the summer of 1941 and the belief that he
could postpone the war to the following year. Even so, the Russians could
at best produce 2,800 T-34s by the end of the year.56
There was little to commend in the state of the air force. In April the
government conceded in a report to the Politburo that 'the accidents and
disasters in the Red Army's air force have not only not been reduced, but
in fact increased because of the slackness of the pilots and the com­
manding officers which has brought about the breakdown of the basic
flying regulations'. The 'lack of discipline' led to the death of two or three
pilots in accidents per day. Timoshenko was further reprimanded for
having assisted Rychagov, the air force commander, in deliberately con­
cealing from the Politburo the poor state of the air force.57 As for the pro­
duction of the LAGG-3 fighter plane, 593 of which should have been
constructed, the Chief of the Air Force conceded to Stalin that progress
was not being made according to the plan. Out of the mere 158 manu­
factured, many were found to be defective.58
At the end of May, a couple of days after the miniature military con­
ference at the Kremlin, Zhukov and Timoshenko were summoned to a
Politburo meeting at which they expected at long last to be briefed about
the looming danger. Stalin informed them that:

The German ambassador von Schulenburg has approached us with a

request from the German government to allow them to conduct a search
for the graves of soldiers and officers who perished in the First World
\!\lar in combat with the old Russian army. For the search for these
graves the Germans have formed several groups, which will assemble
at agreed points rnarked on this border map. You are to arrange control
to ensure that the Germans do not extend their search deeper or wider
than the designated areas. Order the districts to maintain tight contact
with our border guards, who have already been briefed.59

At that meeting Zhukov and Timoshenko did eventually air their concern
about the German build-up and repeated their wish at least to intercept
the increasing number of German aircraft flying reconnaissance flights
over Russia. Stalin objected, advancing Schulenburg' s explanation that
these were errors of navigation by inexperienced and newly recruited
German pilots.
244 Grand Delusion

Zhukov nonetheless passed a rather lenient verdict on Stalin's behav­

iour. Though pinning the blame on him, he was quick to explain that
'There is nothing simpler than providing a new interpretation of events
when the past and its consequences are already known. And there is
nothing more complex than investigating the intricate issues, weighing
the varying opposing forces, the multitude of conflicting opinio11s,
information, and facts which were available at a given historical
moment.'60 Zhukov eventually reached the conclusion that in Stalin's
mind 'loomed the threat of war with fascist Germany, and his entire
thoughts and actions were based on a single desire - to avoid war or to
delay its outbreak, which he was certain he could achieve . . . In these
difficult circumstances J. V. Stalin's desire to prevent war was trans­
formed into a belief that he could successfully wipe out the danger of war
by peaceful means. Counting on his ''wisdom'', he proved to be too clever
by half and did not comprehend the devious tactics and plans of Hitler's
government.'61
Until the end of May 1941, the various channels of intelligence tended
to submit balanced and fairly accurate reports on the German deploy­
ment. However, Stalin's refusal to come to terms with the magnitude of
the danger and the priority he gave to the efforts to avoid provocation
were making their mark on the intelligence agencies. Golikov' s fort­
nightly report of 15 May was a turning point. While not oblivious to the
imminent danger, he now chose to dwell on the reinforcement of the
German forces earmarked for action against England in the Middle East
and Africa.62 At the end of the month, Golikov presented Stalin with a
detailed chart of the German deployment that was bound to lead to an
ambiguous reading of the situation. It can plausibly be surmised that by
that time he had become aware, against the background of the deepen­
ing rift between Stalin and the Chief of Staff, that Stalin was on edge
whenever a suggestion was made that the Germans might be on the brink
of war. Consequently it became increasingly difficult to distinguish
between what Stalin dismissed as 'rumours' and 'hard facts', even if they
conveyed the same message. This ambivalence was reflected in the incon­
gruous attempts to see parity between the German deployment in the
West and in the East.
According to Golikov's numerical estimates (he did not attempt to
evaluate the quality), the Germans possessed 1 22 to 126 divisions ear­
marked for the war against England in the West and a similar number,
1 20 to 122 divisions, on the eastern front. The picture was not entirely bal­
anced, as forty-four to forty-eight divisions were kept by Hitler in reserve
close to the front and could be thrown into the battle at short notice. The
divisions in Norway could also be lined up against Russia. All in all, three
spearheads now threatened Russia: in western Russia twenty-three to
twenty-four divisions (eighteen or nineteen infantry, two armoured and
'The Special Threatening Military Period' 245

three motorized divisions); in the central sector twenty-nine divisions

(twenty-four infantry, four armoured and one motorized); in the
Lublin-Krakovsky region thirty-six to thirty-eight divisions (twenty-four
or twenty-five infantry, six armoured and five motorized); in Slovakia
five mountaineer divisions; while four divisions were deployed on the
Ukrainian Carpathian border. The remaining forces were allied troops.
Golikov now went out of his way to attune himself to Stalin's precon­
ceived ideas, concluding rather bluntly that the Germans had exhausted
their efforts in the Middle East and were regrouping their forces in France
for 'launching a major operation against the British Isles'. Considering,
however, that the armies were equally divided between two fronts, the
final analysis left the alternatives wide open. It simply noted that 'the
regrouping of German forces after the Balkan campaign has essentially
been completed'. Obviously such reporting proved fertile ground for the
cultivation of the erring concepts in the Kremlin.63
The conflicting appreciations were mirrored by the diplomatic com­
munity in Moscow. Gafencu had learnt from Bucharest that the 'inevitable
and imminent' attack would start on 15 June. The Turkisl1 ambassador,
Aktay, held a similar view. Even the new Vichy ambassador, Bergery,
claimed to have authentic information that Hitler had decided to embark
on a holy crusade against Bolshevism. Cripps, who found it 'too good to
be true', also relied on similar information originating in Stockholm that
war would erupt on 15 June. On the other hand, Schulenburg and his staff
were showing 'happy and satisfied faces' as if denying the existence of
the threat. Rosso received a telegram from Berlin stating, according to a
well-known source, that 'negotiations were going on between Russian
and German negotiators in Konigsberg, touching among other topics on
the right of transfer of German troops through the Ukraine' . The Swedish
ambassador, a veteran and keen Kremlin-watcher, wondered whether the
fact that the rumours had surfaced both in Bucharest and in Stockholm
did not indicate that they emanated from German sources, and were
'aimed at keeping Moscow in a state of tension which might reduce
Stalin's resilience in the event of German pressure . . . This is why the
German embassy on the face of it denies knowledge of the initiation of
any Soviet-German negotiations. Such contacts may well be taking place
not through official channels.'64
 12

The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

The Conspiracy

The flight of Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, on a peace mission to England

on 10 May 1941 is one of the most bizarre episodes of the Second World
War. A significant aspect of the affair, largely overlooked by historians, is
the impact it had on the Soviet evaluation of B1Aitish and German inten­
tions on the eve of 22 June 194 1 . In Moscow the mission was examined
against the background of Churchill's warning, Cripps' s incessant threats
of a separate peace ai1d Schulenburg' s fresh overture. The persisting belief
in some sort of Anglo-German collusion, and the failure to eradicate the
mutual suspicion between the new allies after the German invasion of the
Soviet Union accounts for Stalin's obsessive demand that Hess should be
kept imprisoned in Spandau until his death, long after t�e other war crim­
inals had been released. The extent of Stalin's suspicion of Hess first
emerged in the autumn of 1942. At the peak of the debate on the opening
of the second front, he accused Churchill of keeping Hess 'in reserve' . 1
Cripps, then a member of the War Cabinet, was instr11cted to prepare a
most comprehensive and accurate account of the event, which did not put
Stalin's mind at rest, perhaps because the censor insisted on the omission
of references to the interviews conducted by Lord Simon and Lord
Beaverbrook with Hess in 1941 . The fact that such interviews had taken
place was well known to Stalin.2
Stalin's interpretation of the Hess affair, perpetuating the Soviet obses­
sion about British schemes to compel Germany to fight Russia, came to
the fore during Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944. After the two
leaders had carved up Eastern Europe in precise percentages, wined and
dined, Stalin reverted to Hess. Churchill gave a light-hearted, though
accurate, account of the ensuing conversation, in which he said:
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 247

Hess thought he could be the man to save England for Germany. So

Hess, who had been forbidden to use any aircraft at any time because
he was crazy, managed to get hold of a machine and flew over. Hoped
to use the Duke of Hamilton, who was Lord Steward! ! to be taken
directly to the King. Stalin then rather unexpectedly proposed a toast
to the health of the British Intelligence Service which had inveigled
Hess into coming to England. H e could not have landed without being
given signals. The Intelligence Service must have been behind it.

Stalin would not budge from this position, despite Churchill's indigna­
tion. He simply argued that British intelligence might not have shared the
information with Churchill. After all, the Russian Intelligence Service, he
insisted, 'often did not inform the Soviet Government of its intentions and
only did so after their work was accomplished . . . '3
This notion coincided with numerous conspiracy theories which have
gained respectability in the West. The theories have run wild, ranging
from a suggestion that it was actually not Hess but a 'duplicate' who
made the mission to England to an accusation by highly acclaimed his­
torians that Hess did not die a natural death in jail but was poisoned by
his captors. Outstanding in this genre is Ten Days to Destiny: The Secret
Story of the Hess Peace Initiative and British Efforts to Strike a Deal with Hitler
by John Costello, which was published in 1991 and immediately trans­
lated into Russian. The book epitomized and perpetuated the various con­
spiracy theories which have since been discredited with the opening of
4
the closed British files on Hess in the summer of 1992.
The 18,000 pages of documents on the Hess affair made available by
the British Public Record Office, when read in conjunction with archival
material of the Russian security services, reveal a deliberate disinforma­
tion campaign carried out by British intelligence which misfired and led
to misinterpretations both at that time and subsequently. And yet the
huge collection basically confirms the two crucial assertions made in
Churchill's account of the episode in his memoirs. Hess, Churchill wrote,
'came to us of his own free will, and, though without authority, had some­
thing of the quality of an envoy'. His second verdict, which is most rele­
vant for our story, is that 'considering how closely Hess was knit to Hitler,
it is surprising that he did not know of, or that if he knew he did not
disclose, the impending attack on Russia . . . '5 The archival material,
however, does make a remarkable revelation, which had previously been
hinted at only by fragments of evidence, 6 that the affair was manipulated
by the British Foreign Office and British intelligence in an attempt to
disrupt the negotiations that they believed were about to start between
Hitler and Stalin. The impact of the resulting statements on Moscow at
the time was undoubtedly much more significant than the issues which
became the pivots of the conspiracy theories.
 Grand Delusion

The Mission
Hess took off in a Messerschmitt Bf110, an aircraft which the British called
the ME 1 10, from Augsburg at 5.45 p.m. on 10 May. The daring flight and
the navigation involved considerable skill. Hess parachuted out over
Eaglesham in Scotland, dressed in the uniform of a captain of the German
air force, after dark had fallen. He landed 12 miles from the Duke of
Hamilton's estate. Despite later attempts to claim that he carried a formal
peace proposal with him, no documents were found on him other than a
photograph of himself and his son and the visiting card of the celebrated
expert on geopolitics, Professor Karl Haushofer, whose son Albrecht was
most probably the driving force behind the mission.7
Tl1e archival material establishes beyond doubt that the Royal Air Force
was not expecting Hess and therefore did not set up a secure corridor for
him. Moreover, the defences in that region were by no means as dense as
is often suggested. The plane was in fact detected at 15,000 feet just after
10 p.m. and was pursued by two patrolling Spitfires, which lost touch
with him as their speed was slower than his. By the time Hess had reached
the west coast of Scotland he was also chased by a 'Defiant' night fighter,
which was just about to catch up with the Messerschmitt when Hess
baled out.8
If indeed, as is claimed by Costello and others, Hess's landing was
anticipated in Scotland by SIS (also known as MI6), this would have been
reflected in the treatment he received in the early hours after his arrival.
It should be remembered that Hess landed very close to the Duke of
Hamilton's estate, and that if he was expected he could not possibly have
been 'lost' for hours. His reception, however, was totally bungled, which
demonstrates more than anything else the bewilderment which his arrival
caused. The information regarding Hess's parachuting r.eached the Home
Guard through the Giffnock police stati9n, which had in turn been
informed by passing observers that a plane had crashed near Eaglesham
House at 23.12. Hess's capture was a completely uncoordinated affair. An
officer who resided at the scene took two gunners from the nearby camp
and set off for the scene of the crash. By then Hess had been detained in
the cottage of the ploughman on to whose land he had parachuted. The
parachutist, identifying himself as Alfred Horn, was taken by car to the
Home Guard headquarters.
Shortly after midnight the Home Guard approached the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders with a request for an escort to transfer the pilot
into the army's custody. Surely no one was expecting Hess, for the duty
officer instructed the Home Guard to place him in the Giffnock police cell
for the night, despite their remonstrations that Horn seemed to be 'of
some importance and that he should be taken in care by a Military Unit'.
An inquiry by Military Intelligence into the affair later discovered major
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 249

flaws in the handling of Hess which would not have occurred had his
arrival in England been orchestrated by the Secret Intelligence Service.
Little was done to establish that the prisoner was an officer and therefore
had to be interrogated in an appropriate fashion. Air Intelligence com­
pletely ignored the information submitted to them at 1 a.m. on 1 1 May
that the prisoner claimed to be an important figure and was anxious
to make a statement to them.9 Finally, after further urging backed up by
the information that the pilot was carrying a message for the Duke of
Hamilton and was willing to talk to the right party, the army agreed to
receive him. The police detective inspector who had come to collect him
withdrew only after he had conducted his own private investigation
and examined Hess's belongings.
This interrogation was carried out with the assistance of a certain
Group-Captain Donald, who happened to be on the scene when Hess was
brought in. Donald drafted Roman Battaglia, a member of the Polish
consulate in Glasgow, to act as an interpreter. 'It seems incredible',
reproached 'C', the head of SIS, 'that this should have been permitted.'
Battaglia noticed that the pilot was the spitting image of Hess but this
was denied by him. Hess was on the whole calm but slightly distressed,
probably as a result of being interrogated by Battaglia, who spoke English
'somewhat stiltedly', in the presence of some fifteen or twenty Home
Guards. As the early stages of a prisoner's interrogation are obviously
vital, it is perhaps worth describing the ambience of the scene as recorded
in Battaglia' s debriefing by Military Intelligence. He was puzzled:

that no attempt was made, so far as he knew, to check up on [Hess's]

own identity or integrity; that of the fifteen or twenty persons present
there seemed to be no official interrogator, and that he [Battaglia] was
asked to put questions from all corners of the room, some of which he
considered offensive and which he refused to ask. No accurate report
was made of the interrogation, and people wandered round the room
inspecting the prisoner and his belongings at their leisure.

It gradually dawned on those present that the prisoner was not an ordi­
nary pilot, as his uniform was of particularly good quality and had not
seen service. Accordingly, 'a certain measure of extra courtesy' was now
afforded to Hess, who was conducted to Maryhill Barracks at about
2 a.m.10
Once Hess's identity had been established, Military Intelligence was
taken to task by 'C' over the mishandling of the affair. He was particu­
larly indignant about the interrogations after midnight despite Hess's
insistence that he was carrying an important message. Intelligence was
quick to shift the blame on to the Duke of Hamilton, stating that 'it can
only be assumed that the decision to do nothing until [later in] the
 Grand Delusion

morning was taken by Wing Commander the Duke of Hamilton' . This .

suggestion has persisted and has given rise to extravagant claims that
Hamilton was iI1volved in the machinations of SIS; it may have derived
from a letter which Albrecht Haushofer, the renowned German expert on
geopolitics, had sent to Hamilton in the autumn of 1940 and which had
been intercepted and examined by Military Intelligence. By sheer coinci­
dence the letter, which was a peace feeler, had reached its destination a
couple of days before Hess's arrival. A coincidence does not necessarily
amount to conspiracy.
There may have been a number of reasons for the fact that Hamilton
did not immediately interrogate the prisoner at 3 a.m. To start with, it
is entirely possible that Hamilton was not informed on the phone that
the pilot identifying himself as Alfred Horn was carrying a political
message. Hess was not the only German who was shot down that night
in one of the heaviest German night raids. It was by no means normal
practice for a station commander to carry out an interrogation in the small
hours. Moreover, Hamilton retired to bed only after going through a list
of Luftwaffe officers he had met during the Olympic Games in 1936,
but he could not find a Horn there. The delay, therefore, was negligence
at worst.II
There is another facet to the episode which should be discussed in this
connection. Even if Hamilton did guess that the pilot was Hess,1 which
is most unlikely, his reaction would not be surprising. As a respected
wing commander V\1ho was trying to shake off his past association with
the appeasers, he was suddenly faced with the embarrassing reality of
being the object of Nazi peace overtures. The Hess affair threatened to
release tl1e genie from the bottle. I2 His embarrassment was to be aggr·a­
vated when a German public announcement linked him with Hess's
mission, creating an unfounded impression of complicity. Random letters
examined by the censor reflected this feeling. '"fhe following is just one
example: 'I wonder if there is any truth in the tale that this wretched
man was intimate with the Duke of Hamilton. There seem to be far too
many of our nobility mixed up with the Nazis.'13 I-Iarnilton's sensitivity
was so acute that he put the government in an awkward position by suing
the veteran communist leader Harr)' Pollitt for his statement that he,
Hamilton, was 'a friend of Hess'. In view of their suspicion the commu­
nists, probably on instructions from Moscow, saw here an unusual oppor­
tunity for Hess to be subpoenaed and cross-examined in public.14 Indeed,
the need to 'help to clear the Duke of Hamilton from the unfortunate
and ignorant suspicions that have surrounded him' was fully
recognized . 15 When Cripps prepared a report on the affair for the Cabinet
in November 1942 he made a point of exonerating Hamilton, mentioning
that 'the Duke's conduct in relation to Rudolf Hess had been in every
respect honourable and proper '.
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

Hamilton finally met the imprisoned pilot at 1 0 a.m. the next day, when
Hess revealed his true identity. Hamilton, however, was unable or
unwilling to remember meeting Hess during his visit to Berlin. He cer­
tainly had not had any contact with him since. During their private con­
versation Hess divulged the gist of the information he had come to
impart, stating that he was 'on a mission of humanity and that the Fuhrer
did not want to defeat England and wished to stop fighting' . Though he
emphasized that his views were close to those of Hitler, Hess insisted that
the mission was his own initiative.16 This statement, which would be
constantly repeated, 17 leads us to the critical issue of Hitler's alleged con­
nivance in the mission. Maisky preferred to leave the question open in
his memoirs: 'Who is Hess? A camouflaged emissary from Hitler or a soli­
tary psychopath? or is he the representative of some grouping within the
Nazi top leadership, disturbed at the prospect that the war may drag out
too long?'18 The British archival material now released contradicts the
frenzied speculations which had proliferated over the years and to a con­
siderable degree harmed Anglo-Soviet relations. Some desperate attempts
are still being made to salvage segments of such theories, but to no avail.
In his recent work on Hess, 19 Peter Padfield incorporated many of the
ideas raised by Costello. But by the time the book was ready for publi­
cation the archives had been opened and 11e was obliged to add an
extensive epilogue which disavowed the bulk of his earlier arguments.
He did, however, attempt to salvage the theory that Hess had come with
Hitler's connivance by enlisting evidence obtained by a French war
correspondent, a certain Andre Guerber, shortly after the war. Guerber
claimed in a newspaper article to have found documents 'in the ruins
of the Berlin Chancellery at the end of the war which definitely estab­
lished that it was Hitler himself who decided to send Hess to Britain'. He
alleged that Hess had actually been provided with a draft peace treaty,
p1�inted on Chancellery paper, which was confiscated from him shortly
after his arrival. Guerber' s version, comprising a four-point draft agree­
ment, has never been produced. On his own admission, only the fourth
point differed substantially from the oral proposals actually made by
Hess: it purportedly proposed that Britain should maintain an attitude
of benevolent neutrality towards Germany during the German-Russian
war.20
Once the British archival material had been released and proved to be
entirely innocuous, only unfettered speculation could sustain the old con­
spiracy theories. Padfield quotes the testimony of a certain John Howell
who told him of a man of German origin, whose name cannot be
divulged, who was invited with a couple of other German-speakers by
Ivone Kirkpatrick, a German expert at the Foreign Office, to analyse the
terms of the precise peace proposal which Hess brought with him from
Germany. They were written in German on Chancellery paper together
 Grand Delusion

with an English translation. The committee, he further claims, met in

extremely clandestine circumstances at the BBC headquarters in Portland
Place. According to the informant, the 'first two pages of the ·proposals
detailed Hitler's aims in Russia, outlining his precise plans for conquest
in the east and the destruction of Bolshevism' .21 The informant may well
have confused the paper with the one prepared by Hess for his meeting
with Lord Simon, which is the occasion on which he put his ideas down
in writing.22
It is argued that the existence of formal proposals from Hess proved
such an embarrassment to Churchill or to British intelligence that they
simply ordered their removal from the inventory of Hess's belongings
upon arrival. The report of the Home Guard on the detention of Hess
specified: 'Captain Barrie took with him the articles which had been taken
from the prisoner and which were inventoried. Copy of the inventory is
attached to this report.'23 The consecutive numbering of the pages in the
original Military Intelligence file shows that it has not been tampered
with. The file itself, as compared to those of the Foreign Office, was tat­
tered to start with. It is most likely that the inventory list had not been
attached to it in the first place.
Those who claim that Hess came as part of an elaborate scheme devised
in Berlin are eager to show continuity. One such claim is that Hess had
been sent to Madrid by Hitler on 20 April in an attempt to establish
contact with the British government. It most probably relies on the fact
that the British ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, was a notori­
ous appeaser and would have welcomed such an approach.24 A close
examination of the archives repudiates such a claim. The Foreign Office
approached the embassy in Madrid with a request for information
regarding the 'reports from Vichy that Hess has flown to Madrid with a
personal letter from Hitler to Franco'. The rumours referred to an arrange­
ment concerning the right of passage of German troops to Gibraltar. The
second telegram of 25 April rejected such rumours. Frank Roberts, a
future ambassador to Moscow then at the European Department of the
Foreign Office, stated that 'the scare of last weekend has turned out to be
at least premature' . This referred, however, not to Hess's visit but to the
threat to Gibraltar, which obsessed the British at the time. The informa­
tion was actually contradictory in nature. A visit by Hess to Spain would
have been associated with possible clandestine contacts with British intel­
ligence sources or even with the British ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare,
but the right of transfer of troops naturally implied belligerent action
against Britain. In response to a query put by Military Intelligence, Frank
Roberts, rather than giving credence to the rumours, clearly stated that
he could not 'confirm report that Hess has met German Ambassador in
Barcelona. If Hess has come here his arrival has been kept remarkably
secret and his presence in town is not even rumoured yet.' He further
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 253

commented that Hoare would have reported 'automatically' if such

rumours had a basis.25 The view in Moscow was that the rumours con­
cerning Hess's peace negotiations in Spain were mischievously spread by
the British to divert attention from the grievous situation and ensnare
Russia in war.26
The archival material tends to prove that Hess did not come with
Hitler 's authorization, nor was he lured by British intelligence. Moreover,
he did not carry with him any formal proposals. On the first anniversary
of Hess's arrival in England, after he had been interrogated and put under
twenty-four-hour surveillance and monitoring, Cadogan passed a clear­
cut verdict: 'By now, it is pretty clear that Hess's escapade was a mad
venture on his own, and that the German authorities knew nothing about
it beforehand.'27 Cadogan must have known; he had been placed in charge
of co-ordinating the handling of Hess by all departments including the
security services. Hess himself confessed in a letter to Haushofer that
'There is no denying that I have failed. But there is no denying that I was
my own pilot [author's italics] . I have nothing to reproach myself with in
this respect. At any rate I was at the helm.'28
One source which seemed to sustain the idea that Hess had left
Germany with Hitler's full knowledge was a newspaper interview with
lus wife at the end of the war. But her evidence was based on her recol­
lection of Hess's last meeting with Hitler in Berlin on 4 May, when 'their
voices were raised but . . . they did not actually quarrel' .29 The fragmen­
tary nature of the evidence stands in contrast to Hess's voluminous cor­
respondence with his family during the war and does not lend force to
such claims. In a long letter to his mother Hess described the meticulous
preparations for the flight, stressing that 'the many evenings which I
spent secretly [author's italics] with maps, tables, slide-ruler and drawing
board were worth while'. In another letter he gave his reason for not
taking off from Berlin; Hitler had apparently prohibited him from flying
from there without prior permission. 'I might just as well', he explained
to her, 'have had myself taken into custody right away. But it was fortu­
nate that nothing came of the flying near Berlin. I could not have hidden
my activities and the Fuhrer would have heard about them sooner or later.
My plan would have been stopped and I should have blamed myself for
carelessness.'30 Even if by some remote chance it does turn out that Hess's
mission had official German backing, it is patently clear that the British
government had no knowledge of this, nor did they assume Hess to be
Hitler's official emissary.
The real inspiration behind Hess's mission was almost certainly
Haushofer. The extent of Haushofer' s direct and immediate involvement
is still somewhat obscure, but the letter he was forced to write in Bercl1t­
esgaden on the day of the flight demonstrates his influence on Hess and
the contacts which Hess was to make in England.31 The recent book by
254 Grand Delusion

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton shows very clearly the line leading from.
Haushofer to Hess. At his very first meeting with the Duke of Hamilton
Hess credited the Haushofers w-ith the mission.32 Hess later repeated this
information in casual conversations which he held with his medical
officer.33 In the first letter to his wife from prison, Hess asked her to 'write
to the General [Hat1shofer] - of whose dreams I often think'.34 The inspi­
ration he received from Haushofer comes through in a letter Hess
addressed to him: 'you said you did not think I was mad but ''sometimes
daring'' . You can believe me when I say I have not regretted for one
moment my madness and daring. Some day, the last part of your dream
which 'iVas so dangerous for my plan will be fulfilled and I shall appear
before you.'35 Equally revealing �Nas his disclosure that the decision
matured in December 1940 and that he had already made a number of
abortive attempts to fly to England. It is indeed possible that he made up
his mind once Hitler reached the decision to attack Russia (if he was
aware of it) and after the collapse of the Berlin talks in which he took part.
Alternatively he may have been appalled by Ribbentrop's idea of the
Continental bloc, which envisaged the participation of the Soviet Union
in the carving up of the British Empire.

F'ictitious Negotiations j

After Hamilton's debriefing of Hess, attention shifted to London.

Cadogan, who would be personally entrusted with the handling of the
affair and to whom 'C' and other branches of intelligence were made sub­
ordinate, learnt of the affair later on 1 1 May, though the identity of Hess
was still kept secret: 'a German pilot landed near Glasgow, asked for the
Duke of Hamilton. Latter so impressed he is flying to London & wants to
see me at No 10 tonight . . . Half an hour later heard P.M. was sending
to meet His Grace at airfield and wd bring him to Chequers.'36
Hamilton's initial idea was to see the King. He flew his O'"vVn plane to
London on the evening of 1 1 May but upon arrival was persuaded by
Cadogan to see Churchill first.37 He was driven late at night to see the
Prime Minister at Ditchley, where Churchill was watching an American
film with close friends. Before even taking off his flying jacket, Hamilton
i11sisted on drawing Churchill aside and revealing to him the pilot's iden­
tity. All the evidence points to the fact that Churchill was taken completely
by surprise. He treated Hamilton as 'though he were suffering from war
strain and hallucinations' . In characteristic fashion, Churchill then wel­
comed him in and said, 'Well, Hess or no Hess I am going to see the Marx
Brothers.' However, once the film had ended at midnight, he spent over
three hours questioning Hamilton and pondering on the repercussions of
Hess's presence in Britain.38
The Flight of Rudolf. Hess to England 255

It should be emphasized that at no time did Churchill even envisage

negotiations with Hess. At this challenging crossroads it was essential to
extract the utmost propaganda value from the mission and avoid making
a false move. From the outset he insisted that Hess 'like other Nazi leaders
is potentially a war,-criminal and he and his confederates may well be
declared outlaws at the close of the war ' . He was further determined to
prevent a pilgrimage of politicians who might be entertaining a hope of
an early peace. He therefore instructed that Hess 'be strictly isolated in a
convenient house not too far from London, fitted by ''C'' with the neces­
sary appliances, and every endeavour should be made to study his men­
tality and get anything worthwhile out of him'.39 A few days after his
arrival Churchill ordered the transfer of 'my prisoner', as he now called
Hess, to London. Incidentally, those who still adhere to the conspiracy
theory should note that as soon as Hess was declared a prisoner of war
he passed into the custody of the army rather than the security services.40
Churchill demanded that he should be 'informed before any visitors are
allowed', a move clearly designed to prevent visits by appeasers. He
instructed that Hess be kept 'in the strictest seclusion, and those in charge
of him should refrain from conversation' . 'The public', he warned, would
'not stand any pampering except for intelligence purposes with this noto­
rious war criminal' .41 Churchill later pledged in communications with
Roosevelt that he would not consider I-Iess's proposals, which he defined
as 'the old invitation to us to desert all our friends in order to save tem­
porarily the greater part of our skin' .42
On the morning of 1 2 May Eden took Hamilton across from 10
Downing Street to Whitehall and together with I vone Kirkpatrick of the
Foreign Office, who had met Hess in Berlin, they examined the array
of photographs brought along by Hamilton and established that they
appeared to be of Hess. As a precautionary measure Kirkpatrick flew back
with Hamilton to Scotland to identify Hess personally. For the time being
the press was not briefed on the unfolding drama. Kirkpatrick not only
recognized Hess but also won his confidence; Hess probably gained the
fleeting impression that his offer was being taken seriously. Still unaware
that he had made the wrong bid, Hess expounded the reasons which had
led him to fly to England. Skilfully guided by Kirkpatrick to the subjects
which interested the government, Hess insisted that he 'had come here
without the knowledge of Hitler in order to convince responsible persons
that since England could not win the war, the wisest course was to make
peace now. But he emphasized his long acquaintance with Hitler and that
the views reflected his.' Hess further elaborated the plan whereby
England would give Germany 'a free hand in Europe, and Germany
would give England a completely free hand in the Empire . . . '
Kirkpatrick was less successful in drawing Hess out on Russia. He set
a trap by contending that Hitler would not be at liberty to deal with
 Grand Delusion

Russia if she belonged to the Asian continent. Hess avoided the issue by
making the cryptic and misleading comment, reflecting his ignorance of
the plans, that 'Germany had certain demands to make of Russia which
would have to be satisfied, either by negotiation or as the result of a war.'
He saw fit to add, however, that 'there was no foundation for the rumours
now being spread that Hitler was contemplating an early attack on
Russia'. Hitler's policy was to make the utmost use of Russia while she
could be of service to him; and he would select the moment for pres­
enting his demands. The reader should bear in mind, in view of the
various conspiracy theories which have emerged, that this was the most
extensive comment Hess ever made on Russia, and as such it concealed
more than it revealed of Hitler's genuine plans. More significantly, it
confirmed the evaluation of Military Intelligence that negotiations would
precede war.43 It should be mentioned that Hess was indeed astonished
when news of the attack was broken to him, muttering: 'so they have
attacked after all' .44
All the evidence from Hitler's headquarters depicts very vividly the
surprise and rage with which the news of Hess's disappearance was
received. Scl1midt, his interpreter, reported that it was 'as though a bomb
had hit the Berghof' (the Fuhrer' s villa at Berchtesgaden). Similar testi­
mony was provided by Generals Keitel and Halder and by Albert Speer.
The harsh treatment given to Hess's adjutants, Pintsch and Leitgen, by
the Gestapo is yet another indicator. Arrests were also made among the
staff of the Augsburg airfield. Later on, when Hess's association with
astrologers and anthroposophists had been established, numerous arrests
were made and the organizations suppressed. Albrecht Haushofer, who
had inspired Hess in the first place, was rushed to Hitler and forced to
write down a detailed account of his contacts with Hess.
The initial British hope of exploiting the confusion in Germany by
maintaining silence did not mate1·ialize. To steal a march on the British,
the Germans released the news on the radio at 8 p.m. on 1 2 May. They
announced that Hess, 'apparently in a fit of madness', had taken off in
a plane and was missing. The announcement was deliberately vague,
as the Germans possessed no information whatsoever on his fate. Hitler
had in fact been assured by the Luftwaffe that his chances of reaching
England were slim.45 As soon as the news came on the German radio,
Churchill, 'immensely excited', called Eden, eager 'to issue something at
once', and indeed a statement was made around midnight. 46 The Germans
hit back with a detailed communique the next morning. They further
released the contents of the letter Hess had left for Hitler, expressing his
devotion to the Fuhrer. The disclosure of genuine information was the
Germans' best hope for disrupting possible British propaganda, which
might imply that the flight indicated a growing rift within the German
leadership. 47
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 257

Churchill had hoped to derive the utmost benefit from Hess in his
favourite way, by making a dramatic announcement in Parliament,
diverting criticism and buoying up optimism. The people, he explained,
could be 'both entertained and cheered by this remarkable episode, and
it is certain that the action taken by the Deputy Fuhrer in quitting
Germany and his chief at this juncture will be the cause of deep-seated
bewilderment and consternation throughout the ranks of the German
armed forces and throughout the Nazi party and the German people'.48
As soon as the Germans had made their revelations, Churchill dictated
and then meticulously edited a six-page statement. If he had delivered
the speech, many of the unfortunate and long-lasting consequences of the
affair might have been averted . But the statement remained on paper. It
does, however, reflect the extent to which Churchill was prepared to
divulge the truth about Hess a11d the precise nature of his proposals,
including his offer of a division into spheres of influence and the uncom­
fortable claim that he had come to England because of tl1e prevailing
feeling 'that there was a strong peace or defeatist movement in Great
Britain with which he might negotiate'. Churchill further intended to
dispel the disastrous rumours, which endured until the opening of the
archives in 1992, by disclosing that Hess 'represented himself as under­
taking a self imposed mission to save the British nation from destruction' .
Moreover, the statement would have displayed the government's resolve
to reject negotiations with Hess, whom Churchill intended to describe as
'the confederate and accomplice of Herr Hitler in all the murders, treach­
eries and cruelties by which the Nazi regime imposed itself on Germany
as it now seeks to impose itself on Europe'. The status of Hess as a 'war­
criminal whose ultimate fate must, together with that of other leaders of
the Nazi movement, be reserved for the decision of the Allied nations
when victory has been won' would have been established. The point
should be made here that Churchill's main consideration was the impact
of the revelations on Germany and tl1e United States, while that on Russia
was completely overlooked . Typically for Churchill, the only important
detail that he did not disclose was Hess's condition that Churchill's gov­
ernment be toppled before negotiations were opened.49
The statement which was finally released from 10 Downing Street,
together with a brief radio announcement, was hardly reassuring. The
public was left gasping for information by the pledge that 'as soon as
[Hess] is recovered from his injury his statement will be carefully exam­
ined'. Churchill further fuelled the public imagination with his admission
that so far it was impossible to 'account for Hess's escapade'. He expected
Parliament to understand that even if an explanation was forthcoming it
might 'not be in the public interest that I should at once disclose its
nature' . In supporting Churchill's wish to come out with a detailed state­
ment, Major Desmond Morton, his closest adviser on intelligence, foresaw
 Grand Delusion

the consequences of maintaining silence: 'In my opinion great value could

accrue were an official statement and propaganda to be issued at once.
The longer we wait the rottener the apple.'50 But Cadogan had already
succeeded in convincing Eden that it was best to keep Germany guessing
and draw out more from Hess 'by pretending to negotiate and avoiding
making a hero out of him'.51
The brevity and restraint which characterized the statement only raised
questions and fuelled the conspiracy theories. The public, deprived of the
gist of Hess's proposals, was left in the dark about the nature of the
mission and the government's reaction to it. Indeed, the Minister of Infor­
mation Duff Cooper had earlier advised Churchill that 'the interest in the
Rudolph Hess story has assumed such proportions that he considers it
most important to issue information about it in instalments whenever
possible'.
The thirst for news was phenomenal. Roosevelt implored Churchill to
provide him with information, as 'from this distance I can assure you that
the Hess flight has captured the American imagination and the story
should be kept alive for just as many days or even weeks as possible'.
Similar suggestions were made by Halifax from Washington.52 Roosevelt's
comments accurately reflected the tension in Moscow. On 14 May
Churchill reiterated his intention of addressing Parliament. The Foreign
Office, however, stood fast. An uneasy feeling prevailed in the Office in
view of the resemblance between Hess's revelations to Kirkpatrick and
the 'comparatively accurate German account of the ostensible reasons' for
Hess's flight to Britain. It was argued that the proposed statement would
'confirm the German wireless'. The German people were likely to 'heave
a sigh of relief and say ''So that really is the reason why our dear Rudolf
left us. Foolish of him: but he's not a traitor and we must not fear he is
betraying our secrets." ' Churchill's statement also conflicted with the
Office's intention of launching a disinformatio11 campaign, focusing on a
fancied rift within the higher Nazi echelons. Churchill, however, pre­
vailed in his wish to make the statement. Late at night he called Eden
again and dictated to him the statement he intended to make. Edert left a
vivid picture of what then happened:

I struggled out of bed & redrafted it & telepho11ed it. A few minutes
later Winston telephoned he did not like it & Duff [Cooper] was most
upset. On the other hand Max [Beaverbrook] agreed with me. Which
was it to be - his original statement or no statement? I replied 'no state­
ment' . 'Alright no statement' (crossly!) & telephone was crashed
down.53

The line adopted, therefore, was to 'give out very little and so leave the
Germans guessing as to what Hess may be doing - and saying' .54 To
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 25 9

Eden's amazement, Churchill made one more attempt to issue a struc­

tured statement in Cabinet on 1 9 May, but with Beaverbrook' s help he
succeeded in 'strangling the baby' a third time. 55
Eden returned to bed, convinced that he had dissuaded the Prime Min­
ister from the idea. The Ministry of Information, however, could not resist
exploiting the opportunity to the best of their ability. They continued to
exert pressure on Churchill to reap the utmost advantage from Hess
through a personal statement.56 The following day Beaverbrook briefed
the press over lunch and confidentially disclosed that Churchill had
refrained from making a public statement because 'what was wanted at
the moment was as much speculation, rumour, and discussion about Hess
as possible' . Although the draft telegram prepared for Churchill to Roo­
sevelt recommended that 'it is desirable that the press should not roman­
ticise him and his adventure', Churchill added in longhand: 'we think it
best to let the Press have a good run for a bit & keep the Germans guess­
ing' .57 The leading papers naturally embellished the news, especially
when Hess was transferred from Scotland to the Tower of London. To
some it signalled an im1ninent interview with the Prime Minister. This
new wave of rumours fitted in all too \veil with the rumours and specu­
lations which had been paramount since mid-April. As often happened
with Churchill, he lost much of his interest in Hess once he was not
allowed to have his own way. Besides, he had become totally engrossed
in the war in Crete and the great naval battles wl1ich would culminate in
the sinking of HMS Hood and the Bismarck. His only in�1olvement was an
attempt to satisfy Roosevelt's curiosity by providing hint with an accu­
rate digest of the interviews conducted with Hess so far.58 On the whole
the diplomatic corps irt London tended to reject the idea of a separate
peace, but many remained convinced that Hess had co-ordinated his
mission with I-Iitler. To a great extent this V\ras the result of a lamentable
speech by Ernest Bevin, a Labour leader and member of the War Cabinet,
which they tended to regard as representing the official view in the
absence of an official statement.59
Shortly after Hess's arrival Kirkpatrick had suggested that 'in view of
the reservation that Gerrr1any could not negotiate with the present Gov­
ernment, it might be possible to let Hess think that there was a chance of
turning out the present administration and if he could be put in touch
with perhaps a member of the Conservative Party who would give him
the impression that he was tempted by the idea of getting rid of the
present administration, it might be that Hess would open up freely'.60 The
idea was taken up when it was observed that Hess had sunk into a depres­
sion once he realized that his plan had misfired. He constantly professed
anxiety that he had 'fallen in to the hands of a clique of the Secret Service'
and was being treated as an ordinary prisoner of war. Cadogan' s corre­
spondence with Churchill proves beyond doubt that Hess had not
260 Grand Delusion

brought any plans from Hitler's Chancellery. One of the major tasks;
therefore, was to 'obtain light on the question whether Hess was sent here
by Hitler as part of any plan for a peace offensive'.6 1
On 26 May Eden asked Lord Simon, the Lord Chancellor, to interview
Hess. Simon was told to admit to Hess that the government was aware
of the interview, but he was to imply that his relations with Churchill
and Eden were strained. The ploy did not comprise genuine negotiations.
The framework for the interview was clearly set up by Simon, who
insisted on its being a 'piece of ''intelligence'' work' with the clear and
limited aim of giving Hess 'a favourable opportunity of talking freely
about his ''mission'' and of seeing whether in the course of unburdening
himself he is led to give any useful information as to the enemy strategy
and intentions' . Like Hamilton, Simon was extremely susceptible to insin­
uations about his past association with the appeasers and therefore
sought assurances that 'in no circumstances would the interview be
known outside' .62
Churchill hoped that Simon would be able to find out the reasons for
Hess's obvious concern about the international scene and why he 'so
earnestly desire[d] a patched-up peace now'.63 Although Cadogan and 'C'
entertained only scant hopes, the Foreign Office intended to draw Hess
out, particularly on Hitler's intentions towards Russia.64 Coaching Simon
before his interview, Kirkpatrick worded the questions he was to put to
Hess. They were markedly influenced by the prevailing Foreign Office
concept. Simon was advised to provoke Hess by asking him what was the
use of concluding peace with Britain if Germany was 'going to sign up
with Russia and bring Russian bolshevism into Europe. If Germany was
solely interested in Europe she should abandon her designs against
Russia since Russia was an Asiatic Power outside Germany's sphere of
influence.' By posing the question in such a manner, �t v\laS hoped that
Hess would reveal whether Germany was indeed seeking an agreement
with Russia or preparing for war.65
Lord Simon indeed stood the best chance of drawing out information
from Hess, and their interview therefore deserves close scrutiny. Before
Simon's identity was disclosed Hess appeared most suspicious. He
demanded that two German witnesses be present as well as the Duke
of Hamilton, whom he assumed to be 'outside the political clique or
Secret Service ring which is preventing him from meeting the proper
Peace people and the King' .66 In due course Hess was informed that the
negotiator would be Lord Simon. He was led to believe that, as Lord
Chancellor, Simon enjoyed a measure of constitutional independence.
Hess was also reminded that the two had met in Berlin when Simon,
then Foreign Secretary, had visited Hitler. Hess was delighted and
'appeared to be a changed man . . . he had an agreeable recollection of the
chief negotiator' .67
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

After a poor morning, refusing to eat his lunch and complaining that
his breakfast milk had disagreed with him, Hess was fortified by a glass
of port and a little glucose. Simon was driven to the Tower by 'C' in
the early afternoon. He entered with Kirkpatrick, under the respective
pseudonyms of Ors Guthrie and McKenzie, and conversed for three
hours with Hess, who assumed the cover name of 'Jonathan'. Why
the pseudonyms were necessary is a mystery, since Hess knew their real
identities. David Irving says that they were used to fool the guards,
but in that case it is unclear why Hess himself needed a pseudonym.
Nevertheless, Simon had studied all the material supplied by Hess and
was well versed in it. He was told that Hess had arrived with no formal
proposals. Once Hess had learnt of the forthcoming 'negotiations', he had
jotted down copious notes. These he would later submit to Simon as his
official proposals.68
The opening round of their conversation convinced Simon that the
statement which Hess had prepared so assiduously for a couple of days
in anticipation of their meeting contained little that was new. The scrib­
bled outline he submitted to Simon does not at all tally with suggestions
that Hess had brought with him written proposals which included clear
references to Operation 'Barbarossa' and the future of Russia.69 Simon's
categorical judgment was, as he reported to Churchill, that 'Hess has
come on his own initiative. He has not flown over on the orders, or with
the permission or previous knowledge, of Hitler. It is a venture of his own.
If he achieved his purpose and got us to negotiate with a vision to the
sort of peace Hitler wants, he would have justified himself and served the
Fuhrer well.' He further gained the correct impression that Hess had been
outside the circle of politicians conducting the war, and knew little of
strategic plans, as his sphere was really party management. Hess's plan
was at best a 'genuine effort to reproduce Hitler's own mind, as expressed
to him in many conversations' . Analysing the interview, MI6 experts
formed the opinion that Hess was in fact incapable of countering any
arguments, especially of a political nature.70 This dovetailed with the
impressions gained by Sumner Welles, the American Under-Secretary of
State, from his meeting with Hess on 3 March. Welles had been shocked
by Hess, whom he had expected to possess 'a powerful and determining
influence in German affairs'. It had turned out that Hess 'was merely
repeating what he had been told to say to me . . . and that he had neither
explored the issues at stake nor thought anything for himself'.71 Thus the
failure to extract information from Hess finally put the seal on tl1e 'semi­
official conversations' . In Cadogan' s blunt words, Hess had become a
'gramophone record' .72
Any suggestion, therefore, that the silence and disinformation were a
sinister cover-up of Hess's debriefing is not borne out by the evidence
now available. As the German troops were crossing the Soviet border, SIS
 Grand Delusion

conducted a thorough examination of the scanty material obtained from

Hess and reached the conclusion that it had been 'sucked quite dry, and
no more flesh can be got off these bones' .73 The mishandling of the affair
resulted from disagreements about its potential for publicity and propa­
ganda. The thought of a cover-up was not raised at any stage, simply
because there was little to conceal. Major Desmond Morton, reflecting
Churchill's ow11 thoughts, advocated an official statement which would
incorporate the accumulated evidence. If it were up to him, he told Eden,
then 'whoever is put in charge of the publicity on the subject should have
access to all the documents in the case and . . . it will not be a matter of
one stilted Government communique' .74 Going through the extensive
'Guthrie-Jonathan' transcripts, Churchill reached the conclusion that
Hess's statements were 'like conversation with a mentally defective child
who has been guilty of murder or arson'. He did not even share the
common view that Hess was 'in fact ret1ecting Hitler's inner mind' but
was amused by the fact that 'he gives us some of the atmosphere of
Berchtesgaden, which is at once artificial and fetid' . By now Churchill had
lost interest in making a public statement.75
It should be assumed that the consistency of Hess's statements in scores
of interrogations, and the constant recording by SIS of even his least
audible mumbles, verifies his version of events. The chief psychologist of
the British army, who was called in to observe Hess, gained 'a strong
impression that the story was in general true' . He further noted that
Hess's lack of fluency in English made it difficult for him to tell a con­
vincing story that was completely untrue. He also suspected that his
mental condition was far from stable: 'he is of a somewhat paranoid type.
He has an abnormal lack of insight or self criticism. He is also of an intro­
spective and somewhat hypochondriacal type. This man gives me the
impression of being lacking in balance, a psychopathic personality . . . '76

'Running the Bolshevik Hare'

Britain's failure to extract usef1.tl information for propaganda meant that

all efforts were directed towards tli.e exploitation of Hess in the Russian
context. Even before a decision was taken to exploit Hess vis-a-vis the
Russians, the silence maintained by the British over the affair had given
rise to rumours which were to affect the Kremlin long after it had ended.
In October 1942 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Cripps's successor as British
ambassador in Moscow, related the suspicions to the fact that the Rus­
sians had been left in the dark. He asked Churchill how he would feel if
Ribbentrop were to fly to Russia while England was left guessing about
the nature of his mission.77 Hess, as Clark Kerr explained, was like 'a
skeleton in the cupboard' whose occasional rattlings continued to disturb
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

the public mind. It seemed as if Hess was delibe1·ately being kept by

Churchill as a trump card for negotiations on a separate peace if the war
reached a critical stage.78
The diversion of the Hess affair to the Russian sphere should be related
to the final decision taken on the night of 14-15 May 1941 by Eden and
Beaverbrook, in which Churchill grudgingly acquiesced, to play up the
propaganda value of the Hess mission. The stage was set for the con1plex
game of using Hess in an attempt to alter Soviet policies. As soon as Hess
landed in Britain, Cripps informed the Foreign Office of the interest which
the Hess mission had e\roked in Moscow. Fully aware of the explosive
nature of the Hess affair, he proposed to use the golden oppo1·tunity'
/

either to play orL Soviet fears or to allay them:

1 . Hess incident has no doubt intrigued the Soviet government quite

as much as anybody else and may well have aroused their old fears of
a peaceable deal at their expense.
2. I am, of course, unaware to what extent, if at all, Hess is prepared
to talk. But on the assumption that he is, I very much hope you will
consider urgently the possibility of usin.g his revelations to stiffen the
Soviet resistance to German pressure either (a) by increasing their fears
of being left alone to face the music or (b) by encouraging them to think
that the music, if faced now and in company, will not be so formidable
after all; or preferably by both, for the two tltings are not really
incompatible.

Halifax too favoured the idea of exploiting any information which

pointed to a split within the German leadersh.ip to exert pressure on the
R·ussia.ns. At that point Sargent, the architect of the Foreign Office concept
governing Anglo-Soviet relations, appeared to be resolutely opposed to
the idea of alluding to a separate Artglo-German peace which might drive
the panic-stricken Stalin into German arms. Cripps was therefore to sit
tight and v\rait to see when and whether any information from Hess would
be available.79
However, when within a few days it was realized that the prospects
of exploiting Hess for propaganda purposes in Germany were limited,
Sargent reverted to Cripps's own idea. As Hess was withholding what­
ever information he had on German intentions in Russia, this could be
done only through the deliberate spreading of disinformation. The pro­
posed disinformation would indicate the existence of a split within the
Nazi leadership regarding the German plans in Russia. It would state
that Hess, unlike Goring and Ribbentrop, whom he seemed to abhor,
remained 'one of the most fanatical of the Nazis'. He was determined to
prevent any agreement between Russia and Germany in his capacity as
the custodiarl of the pure doctrine of Nazism.80
 Grand Delusion

The eagerness to embark on such a course, regardless of the obvious

risks involved, is closely tied to the intelligence evaluation of the German
build-up on the Russian frontier. One should remember that the
exploitation of the Hess affair against Russia was motivated to a large
extent by the mistaken evaluation of British intelligence, which like Stalin
did not fully grasp the likelihood of a German-Soviet war until the end
of May 1 941 . It still held fast to the view that the German deployment in
the East was a prelude to negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Joint
Intelligence Committee pointed to some indi cations which suggested
'that a new agreement between the two countries may be nearly com­
plete' . The most up-to-date information suggested that 'Hitler and Stalin
may have decided to conclude a far-reaching agreement, the basis of
which is not yet clear, for political, economic, and even military col­
laboration'. The possibility of war was therefore confined to 'a Soviet
failure either to agree to German demands or to implement any agree­
ment reached'. The resentment and frustration prevailing at the Foreign
Office was a recognition that diplomacy was 'completely hamstrung' .
In the case of Russia, grudgingly confided Cadogan, one could do nothing
'unless you can (a) threaten (b) bribe it. Russia has (a) no fear of us
whatever and (b) we have nothing to offer her. Then you can juggle with
words and jiggle with drafts as much as you like and you'll get
nowhere.'81 This conclusion finally led both the Foreign Office and the
security services to the idea of exploiting Hess 'mendaciously' ,82 to dis­
courage the Russians from concluding an agreement with Hitler. The
effectiveness of such a policy, needless to say, depended on the actual exis­
tence of such negotiations. As Stalin himself had just been misled by Schu­
lenburg into believing that reconciliation was indeed the order of the day,
the Hess affair reassured him of the correctness of his own evaluation
while raising the constant fear that England and Germany might indeed
close ranks. Considering that the debriefing of Hess virtually lasted
until the German attack on Russia, the affair clearly had disastrous
repercussions on Stalin's state of mind in the crucial month leading up to
the German-Soviet war.
On 1 6 May Sargent returned with a new paper which formulated his
views more succinctly and effectively. The disinformation he wished to
employ against the Russians rested on the following premises:

Hess considers himself the custodian of the true and original Nazi doc­
trine, the fundamental tenet of which is that Nazism is intended to save
Germany and Europe from Bolshevism; Hitler has now been persuaded
by the later adherents of the Party, who are mere opportunists, and by
the Army to try and reach a settlement with the Soviet Union to the
extent of bringing her in as a full Axis partner; this was more than Hess
could stand and hence his flight to this country.
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

If this was effectively transmitted to Stalin, he could be led to believe that

Hitler was luring him into the German orbit simply in order to obtain a
foothold in Russia. Once Hitler had improved his position he would
attempt to topple Stalin and thus appease the more extreme elements in
the Party. A Foreign Office decision on this course was delayed, however,
not because of the possible implications for the Russians, but because of
the fear that the disinformation might reach the Germans, whom the
Office still wished to keep guessing. Moreover, Eden rightly foresaw that
disinformation might actually encourage the Russians to seek an agree­
ment with the Germans more vigorously once they found out that Hitler
was set on negotiations.83
And yet it soon emerged that Hess's debriefing was not yielding any
material and Hess was 'saying nothing of note!' The only alternative
therefore was to use him against the Russians by the release of snippets
of disinformation. It now occurred to Sargent, itcl1ing to act, that the best
method of deceiving the Russians would be to use 'some underground
channel'. Cadogan enthusiastically endorsed the idea provided it would
not 'simply scare the Russians too much!' Following in Eden's footsteps,
he was clearly alluding to the much dreaded German-Soviet inilitary
alliance. 84
The directive to MI6 'for the exploitation of the Hess incident through
underground channels abroad' was finally endorsed by the Foreign Office
on 23 May. It was welcomed as 'a clear warning to the Soviet Govern­
ment to beware of Hitler's present offers of collaboration and friendship'.
In many ways the hint, as seen from the Kremlin, resembled Churchill's
warning and the threats made by Cripps in Moscow. It warned them that
if they succumbed to German demands Hitler would reap benefits from
the agreement, but the Russians would eventually be left to fight on their
own. Cavendish-Bentinck, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Com­
mittee, took effective steps 'to ensure that the above whisper reaches
Soviet ears forthwith' through SOE and other channels. The appropriate
directives for the 'whisper campaign' were sent to the British embassies
in Stockholm, New York and Istanbul on 23 May; it was 'designed for
Russia only and to be spread only through channels leading direct to
Soviet' . The campaign was backed by 'as many ''whispers'' as possible',
spread independently in co-ordination with the guidelines set in the
directive.85
The Political Intelligence Department at tl1e Foreign Office also felt that
no real dividends were being received from the Hess affair. They exerted
pressure to extract the utmost from Hess's anti-Bolshevik feelings. The
question facing the Foreign Office was whether to persist with the
'whisper campaign' which had just been launched, or whether to alert
the Russians officially to Hess's genuine information. The views of Eden
and Cadogan prevailed, despite attempts by Duff Cooper to present the
266 Grand Delusion

issue for discussion at ministerial level, and the 'whisper campaign' con­
tinued unhindered until it was finally annulled by the German invasion
of Russia.86
The new line very soon started circulating freely. Eden briefed the
leading representatives of the British press at the Foreign Office and
impressed on them that 'Hess was very earnest about his mission, and
that the mission indicated a split within the German leadership.' The rep­
resentative of The Times came out of the meeting convinced that Hess was
trying to 'get a peace plan over' and that he had been officially authorized
by Hitler to do so. Such views now circulated more widely in London.87
By 10 June, just as Simon was interviewing Hess, the disinformation was
no longer confined to 'whispers' . Eden misled Maisky into belie\TL'lg that
'Hess fled from Germany because of a quarrel he had,. not with Hitler
himself, but with several senior personages in his entourage, such as
Ribbentrop and Himmler'.88 Paradoxically, this line suited only too well
Stalin's self-deception concerning his ability to defer the war.
The 'whisper campaign' had only just been initiated when Cripps, who
had not been informed of the trivial nature of Hess's debriefing, made his
own bid to exploit the affair. As usual, his acute observation and
analysis of the situation did not match his restless mode of operation. 'I
am left fairly hopeful that the Soviet Government would not concede any­
thing that V\1ould vitally affect their war preparedness or preparations,'
he cabled to Eden, 'since I believe them to have no illusions about
Germany's ultimate intentions where they are concerned and to be deter­
mined to resist at points where in their own estimation they must either
do so or go under.' He was convinced that 'in view of the Soviet Gov­
ernment's evident reluctance to face a war with Germany at the present
stage, the temptation to ''run things too fine'' in border-line cases must be
very great'. Cripps therefore estimated that the Russians' action in such
cases depended on their evaluation of relative British and German
strength. He hoped to use the information gleaned from Hess to 'influence
Soviet Government's decision on such border-line cases and particularly
to discourage them from speculating on extraneous factor mentioned
above - in other words to convince them that they have something to dig
their toes into now, but may have nothing that will hold them later on' .89
Although Cripps was discouraged from initiating independent moves,
he was duly briefed about the disinformation, which on the face of it
seemed to follow his advice:

We are putting it about through covert channels that Hess's flight indi­
cates growing split over Hitler's policy of collaboration with the Soviet
Union and that if pursued he will insist on short term benefits knowing
that he will be forced to abandon it and to break any promises which
he may have made to the Soviet Union, so that in the end their last state
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

will be worse than their first. They will have lost potential friends and
made concessions and will be left to face Germany single handed in a
weakened state.90

The friction between Duff Cooper and Eden continued throughout

May. Eden was under constant pressure from Maisky to curtail the
rumours and was determined to stop the semi-official leaks from the
Foreign Ministry. On 5 June Eden reimposed the official guideline of
observing silence over the affair, while the Foreign Office retained
the right to use secret propaganda and 'invent and run Bolshevik and
other hares'. Little attention was paid to Cadogan's wry comment that
'whispers can be much more irresponsible and even, without disad­
vantage, conflicting and confusing'.91 Eden's attempts to rein in Military
Intelligence and the Ministry of Information were ineffective; up to the
German invasion both worked hard to alter the decision. To Military Intel­
ligence it seemed that if the main object was 'to keep the Germans guess­
ing' then 'silence is no good and something must go out'. Likewise Duff
Cooper continued to deluge Churchill with requests to make a public
statement.92

Hess as Perceived by the Kremlin

Khrushchev reminisced that, when news reached the Kremlin of Hess's

flight, Stalin agreed with him that he was 'on a secret mission from Hitler
to negotiate with the British means of cutting short the war in the West
to free Hitler's hands for the push East' .93 Such a thought certainly crossed
Stalin's mind, but the Hess mission posed a much more serious challenge
to him. If Hess was Hitler's emissary, then the nightmare of England
and Germany closing ranks in a crusade against Bolshevik Russia would
materialize and the vast German deployment on the Soviet border would
assume a new and menacing posture. However, Stalin's self-deception
inevitably led to a differing conclusion: paradoxically, the mission re­
inforced the assessment of a split within the German leadership which
might hasten the opening of the 'negotiations' with Germany.94 The
silence and secrecy surrounding the mission fitted in only too well with
what were conceived in Moscow to be the ceaseless British attempts to
bring Russia into the war. However, the possibility of a separate peace
could not be taken too lightly. The tendency in the Kremlin was therefore
on the one hand to play down any suggestion that Hess was on an official
mission, and on the other to belittle his potential as a British tool in the
search for a separate peace.
The first information which came under scrutiny in Moscow was the
official British statement. The heavily pencilled markings of the NKGB' s
268 Grand Delusion

senior officer on a copy of the statement seemed to discount the pos-:

sibility that Hess was acting on Hitler's orders. Duff Cooper's assertion
that the flight in the first place manifested 'the differences of opinion
within the National-Socialist movement' was underlined. Similar atten­
tion was drawn to reports from the Swedish press explaining the mission
against the background of an ongoing debate within the German leader­
ship and economic and industrial circles there. A powerful group, asso­
ciated with Goring, was supposed to be 'striving all along to reach peace
with England'. Significantly, the NKGB then emphasized that the reports
of Hess's arrival in England coincided with current rumours of a pos­
sible meeting between Stalin and Hitler. Hess was presented as 'the oppo­
nent of Hitler's policy of friendship with the USSR' who sought a
dialogue with the British 'before the meeting of the dictators took place'.
The final marking endorsed the assumption that Hess was 'making a per­
sonal attempt to conclude peace' in order to forestall the German-Soviet
agreement.95
Hess had already been identified as an obstacle to rapprochement
with Germany during his brief meeting with Molotov in Berlin.96 The
NKVD had then inquired into his standing within the leadership and
came up with a most denigrating report. They could not find anyone who
would attest to his 'propaganda or administrative talents'; he was simply
described as a 'trustful person' who enjoyed Hitler' s sympathy. 'I?erhaps
he has some extraordinary capabilities,' the NKVD officer in charge of the
investigation ironically summed up, 'but as it happens no one has yet
detected them.' He merely saw fit to note, perhaps for purposes of future
extortion, Hess's 'scandalous' past. Hess, he explained, 'used to belong to
a group of ''hots'' (homosexuals) who nicknamed him ''Black Bertha'', by
which he is known not only in Munich but also in Berlin. Marriage has
not helped Hess much, as Berliners refer to his wife as ''he'' and to him
as ''she''.' In short, Hess was 'an insig11ificant person iri a most conspicu­
ous position', whose influence was declining.97
A day after Hess's landing in London 'Litseist', the Gestapo double
agent working for the Berlin residency, contributed his small but cus­
tomarily effective input. The intricate intelligence of 'Litseist' had been
working on two themes: the existence of a split within the German lead­
ership and the idea that any military action would be preceded by nego­
tiations. He now presented Hess as a lunatic who had spent four to seven
months in the past two years in sanatoriums, and confirmed that he had
been devoid of actual power for some time. As a 'bitter opponent of the
Soviet Union' and 'a11 enthusiastic supporter of England', he had devel­
oped the idee fixe that he could become 'the new Christ and save the
world' .98
Kobulov, the head of station in Berlin, who had been informed by
.

Dekanozov, just back from Moscow, about the 'negotiations' currently

,
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

under way, made full use of the fragments in the reports of 'Starshina'
which drove home the 'existence of discord at the top'. The widely cir­
culating rumours in Berlin suggested that Hess was 'connected with
Goring'. His information, attuned to Stalin's perceptions, suggested that
the participation of Goring at Hitler's press conference on Hess's flight
was merely a demonstration aimed at refuting such rumours and pre­
senting a united front at the top.99
In a subsequent report Kobulov covered himself by raising the pos­
sibility that Hess had flown to England 'in an excellent state and . . . with
the definite knowledge and at the suggestion of the German Govern­
ment'. He had been informed by the agent 'Frankfurter' that he had learnt
over dinner with an unnamed general that the flight 'was not an escape
but was done with Hitler's connivance; a mission with peace offers to
England'. However, the lion's share of his reports pointed out that as 'an
uncompromising enemy of communism and an opponent of rapproche­
ment with the USSR', Hess had flown 'on his own initiative' to convince
the British to bring the war to an end and allow the transfer of troops to
the East.100
While the information from Germany, despite some ambiguity, tended
to confirm Stalin's belief that the mission indeed exposed the split within
tlle German leadership, the reports from London were far less decisive.
Maisky was of course aware that the salient and lasting feature of Stalin's
foreign policy in the inter-war period, originating in the Allied interven­
tion during the Civil War, was a pathological suspicion of an Anglo­
German crusade against Russia. Since the fall of France, Stalin had been
particularly exasperated by the continued inclusion in Churchill's Cabinet
of the 'Men of Munich', who might tip the scale towards a peace with
Germany. Cripps had been harping on these fears for some time. After
the fall of France he had in desperation persuaded Halifax that Maisky
should be led to believe that the British response to peace overtures by
Hitler would depend on the progress made in the negotiations between
Russia and Britain.1 01
Soviet intelligence had been keeping a close watch on all possible har­
bingers of a separate peace. For instance, it had suggested in July 1940:
'The former English King Edward together with his wife Simpson is cur­
rently in Madrid, from where he maintains ties with Hitler. Edward is
discussing with Hitler the possibility of the formation of a new English
government and the conclusion of peace with Germany, on the condition
of the creation of a military alliance against the USSR.'1 02 The new insin­
uations of a separate peace during the last week of April 1941 caused
unprecedented anxiety in Moscow which Maisky could hardly ignore.
After the debacle in Greece and Crete, which provoked mounting criti­
cism and dissatisfaction in England, Maisky was instructed to keep vigi­
lant watch on the appeasers in the government.103 He fervently sought to
 Grand Delusion

dispel the rumours of peace feelers in a series of meetings with Beatrice

Webb, R. A. Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and Sir Walter
Monckton.104
Maisky' s difficulty in assessing the situation and reconciling his obser­
vations with the concepts prevailing in Moscow became more acute as
the rumours of an impending war gained momentum. The events of the
month preceding Hess's arrival were complicated by Churchill's warning
and Cripps' s ultimatums. With a host of circulating theories to choose
from, Stalin read the reports of his ambassadors selectively. In turn the
ambassadors, and Maisky in particular, had become experts at accom­
modating the Kremlin by providing the desired commodity veiled in
ambiguity. As we have seen, throughout the second part of 1940 Maisky
maintained that Churchill enjoyed massive support for continuing the
war 'at least for now', while the appease1·s vvere 'still' not playiJ.1g an
important part. He did not, however, believe for a moment that
Churchill's staunch resistance was a matter of principle; Churchill was
simply reluctant to conclude an agreement which might perpetuate
Britain's lack of success on the battlefield. But Maisky no longer ruled out
the possibility that a shocking defeat which underrniJ.1ed the British
Empire (he was undoubtedly alluding to the fall of Egypt) might lead to
the 'betrayal of the ruling class, somewhat similar to that of Petain and
his group' .105 In the new circumstances, in the spring of 1941, he confided
in his diary that the situation was too fluid to allow the Russians to feel
comfortable since 'at present, when the English bourgeoisie wants to carry
on with the war, Churchill appears to them to be a godsend. But later on
he could become a great obstacle if and when they desire to conclude
peace.'106
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Maisky's normally assiduous
entries in his diary, which was constantly under observation, were sus­
pended for a while. His dispatches in the wake of Hess's arrival in
England make an outstandingly slim volume. Maisky' s sparse reports
contrast with the extremely busy schedule he maintained in an attempt
to make sense of the affair. Stunned by the news on the wireless of
•

Hess's arri"t1al in England, Maisky encountered only speculation; no

one could say 'anything plainly' .107 At the Foreign Office Butler was
puzzled and reticent, informing the ambassador that conversations with
Hess had 'not yet begun', and expecting them to start within two or
three days.108 In the absence of any tangible information, Maisky made
only a brief commentary on the Hess affair in his dispatch to Moscow
of 15 May. The impressionistic evaluation was aimed at echoing the
expectations in Moscow that 'a very strong anti-Soviet' attitude char­
acterized the debriefings; Hess appeared to be very critical of the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. It was however difficult to draw any working
conclusion from his dispatch, except for the second part, which relayed
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England

Hess's admission tltat he had come on his own initiative and that he had
not divulged any secrets to the British. Like the rest of the world, Moscow
impatiently awaited i11formation concerning Hitler's intentions towards
Russia.109
Overwhelmed by the ominous silence, Maisky returned to Butler on the
pretext of the urgent need to discuss the repatriation of Soviet sailors and
boats held in British ports. Although he hin1self had not yet been given
authoritative information, Butler now expressed his personal opinion
that Hess had come to England on his own initiative and not as Hitler's
emissary. He then developed a hypothesis which was later adopted as
deliberate disinformation: he could not exclude the possibility that in
launching his mission Hess might have been backed by a powerful group
within the higher echelons of the Party. The mission seemed to indicate,
therefore, that support for Hitler was not unanimous. Butler further reit­
erated his belief in the government's strong resolve to carry on the war.
If Hess had 'the strange idea that he would find a mass of ''Quislings''
he1·e waiting only for Germany to stretch out its hand, then 1:1e is already
or soon will be convinced of his mistake'. He further ruled out a meeting
with Churchill. A few days later, Butler elaborated his theory even further
by suggesting, of his own volition, 'that there was a quarrel between Hess
and Hitler, as a result of which Hess decided to make his flight to England
in the hope that here he would succeed in finding influential circles pre­
pared to make peace with Germany'. Maisky now felt confident enough
to dismiss Hess's hopes as a 'fantasy' .110
The NKGB' s reports from London dovetailed with those of Maisky.
Anatole Gorske, who ran Burgess, Maclean and Philby (of the 'Cambridge
Five'), transmitted a report from Philby ('Sonnchen') that Hess had
'arrived in England declaring he intended first of all to appeal to
Hamilton . . . a member of the so-called Cliveden set'. He appeared to be
well informed on Kirkpatrick's initial interview with Hess but failed to
provide details of any peace proposals that Hess might have been bearing.
His report led to instructions to the various NKGB stations to verify wl1at
was the nature of the offer and whether it had received Hitler's blessing
or perhaps that of the military who were opposed to Hitler.111 After further
probing, the London i·esidency regretfully admitted that they were 'not
in possession of precise information concerning Hess's stay in England'.
Philby, however, had succeeded in extracting some informatiorL from Tom
Dupree, the deputy chief of the Press Department of the Foreign Office,
though he could not verify it. According to his source, up to the evening
of 14 May Hess had not given his interrogators any valuable information
concerning his flight. In conversations with officers of British Military
Intelligence, Hess declared that he had arrived in Britain to 'conclude a
compromise peace which would halt the attrition of both belligerents
and prevent the final destruction of the British Empire, preserving it as a
 Grand Delusion

stabilizing force'. The disconcerting element from Stalin's point of view

was Hess's declared loyalty to Hitler and the false information about a
secret visit paid by Beaverbrook and Eden to Hess. Dupree assumed that
Hess was actually 'aiming at the creation of an Anglo-German alliance
against the Soviet Union'. Seizing on Churchill's announcement in Par­
liament that 'Hess is my prisoner', Philby believed 'that the time for peace
negotiations had not yet arrived, but that later in the course of the war
Hess could become the centre of intrigues for a compromise peace and
would therefore be useful for the peace party in England and for Hitler'.
Significantly, this part of the telegram was strongly marked for attention
at the Lubianka, the headquarters of the NKVD in Moscow.112
The effect of the 'whisper campaign' could be clearly discerned in early
June, when the NKVD established for the first time that there was 'good
reason to believe' that Hess had been involved with the British 'Intelli­
gence Service' . It appeared that 'the ruling circle ( Hitler, Ribbentrop,
Himmler and Keitel) are pursuing the so-called ''policy of Bismarck'' in
relation to the USSR and their hand has been strengthened after the flight
of Hess. The group (Goring, Brauchitsch, Rosenberg) of the pro-British
tendency continue to impress on Hitler the disastrous policy of co­
operation with the Soviet Union.'113
As seen from the Kremlin, Hess's mission was dramatic in the sense
that it might augur the long-sought-for negotiations with the Germans, if
indeed Hess had not come on Hitler's authority and represented those
segments of the Nazi elite who were opposed to the conciliatory Rapallo
line pursued by Hitler. Alternatively, he might indeed be a genuine envoy
paving the way for a coalition war against Russia. As was 11is habit on
such occasions, Maisky clearly preferred to sit on the fence, as he found
it difficult to 'sift the most probable from the mass of tales, reports,
guesses, suppositions, rumours, etc., surrounding th�s strange, almost
romantic story' .114 To follow the wishful thinking of Moscow was dan­
gerous in view of Cripps's extemporaneous warning of mid-April, which
suddenly seemed to be substantiated. During an intimate dinner with thE
Webbs on 23 May, Maisky reverted to Cripps's long memorandum which,
he claimed, had irritated his government. He then made the obvious con­
nection by attempting to elicit the Webbs' reaction to the possibility of a
separate peace:

Would England hold out - would there not be a powerful section of the
ruling class in favour of a negotiated peace with Hitler? He gave us
what he believed to be the truth about the Hess affair. Hess had been
quite frank about his mission; though he refused to say that it was with
the assent of Hitler. He wanted to persuade the British government to
give way: the British and the Allies would be beaten in the war for the
domination of Europe, though it would exhaust Germany in doing it.
The Flight of Rudolf Hess to England 273

Germany must remain the dominating force in Europe; Great Britain

must keep her E mpire, except a few minor concessions in Africa. Then
Germany and Great Britain could stop the spread of Bolshevism which
was a Devil.115

He emerged even more concerned from a dinner which he had a deux

with Lord Beaverbrook, the powerful associate of Churchill in the War
Cabinet. When probed about the mission, 'Beaverbrook unhesitatingly
answered: ''Oh, of course, Hess is an emissary of Hitler." ' Beaverbrook
then paraphrased Hess's 'peace with honour' proposals but distorted
their context by inflating their anti-Soviet Lias, claiming that the pro­
posals were presented as a defence of civilization against Bolshevik bar­
barism. Beaverbrook also remained noncommittal when the prospects of
a separate peace were discussed. True, he dismissed out of hand the
present overture: 'Hess apparently thought that he would only have to
unfold his plan to make all those dukes run to the king, dump Churchill,
and create a ''reasonable government'' . Idiot!' However, he suggested
that Churchill believed that Hitler genuinely wished for peace. Playing
the German card like Cripps before him, Beaverbrook concluded
ominously that the future would show whether peace would materialize.
He merely conveyed his belief that the British government 'would con­
sider peace with Germany on ''acceptable terms'' ', though he was scep­
tical whether such terms were 'likely to be offered at this stage'. What
Maisky deduced from the talk was that a vigorous prosecution of the war
depended not on Churchill's inflexible will but rather on the nature of the
German proposals.116
Though the thought of a split within the German leadership conformed
with Stalin's own evaluation, the confusing and contradictory informa­
tion kept him most apprehensive about Hess. By mid-June the intelligence
reports on the German build-up had spilled over into the press, which
frenziedly produced diametrically opposed assessments. These coincided
with the disinformation planted on Soviet intelligence about the coun­
terfeit negotiations with Simon. As a result of various comments by Eden
at the beginning of the month, the Kremlin became apprehensive that the
British might be tempted to sign a separate peace if they assumed that
negotiations between Russia and Germany had begun. On 5 June Maisky
informed Eden that 'no negotiations were under way' between Germany
and the Soviet Union but failed to convince him. Eden insisted that he
possessed information indicating 'serious negotiations on questions of
tremendous significance' between Russia and Germany.117
On the very day that Hess was interviewed by Lord Simon, Maisky
bumped into Lloyd George in the corridors of the House of Commons.
Lloyd George appeared disheartened about the course of the war. 'The
time has come', he confessed to Maisky,
2 74 Grand Delusion

to think abo·ut a compromise peace. On what terms? Lloyd George pro- ·

posed that the conclusion of peace might become possible if Hitler were
to agree that Danzig, Silesia, Austria and Alsace-Lorraine would be
included in [Germany's] territory, plus a protectorate over some por­
tions of Europe and Poland and in addition some sort of 'adjustments'
in Belgium and Holland. The proposals produced by Hess were
absolutely unacceptable - categorically answered the old man - if Hitler
were to insist on them, the continuation of the war was inevitable.118

A few hours later in Whitehall, Maisky learnt from Eden that no nego­
tiations were contemplated. Eden stated solemnly: 'Hess is destined to
spend some time in an English jail - until the end of the war.' But within
a few days Maisky 'vould learn to his horror from Beatrice Webb that Lord
Simon, the apostle of 'appeasement', had been entrusted with Hess's
debriefing.119
The evaluation which most accurately reflected Maisky' s genuine
views about I-less in the wake of the German invasion was his belief that
Hitler had wished to enlist British support in the war against Russia by
presenting himself as the saviour of Western civilization in the crusade
against communism. The objective of Hess's flight therefore seemed to be
to prepare the ground for an Anglo-German alliance on the eve of that
war or du1·ing its initial stages. The final verdict in Moscow was that Hess
had come on Hitler's orders with peace proposals 'vhich were related
to Operation 'Barbarossa' but that he had miscalculated the British
response.120 This nri.isapprehension was in fact shared by the Russians up
until the conflict but was dispelled by Churchill's famous speech on 2 2
June, promising British aid, to the Russians' great relief. Tragically, it had
distracted Stalin's vigilance on the eve of war and diverted him from the
real danger lurking around the corner.

'
 13

On the Eve of War

'Mobilization Is Warf'

The recently released uncensored version of Zhukov's memoirs, and the

fragmentary reminiscences of Tirnoshenko, give a vivid picture of the
Kremlin on the eve of the war. Reading them together with the directives
of the General Staff in the fortnight preceding the attack, one is left in
no doubt that the two were fully alert to the danger lurking around
the corner. They sought in vain to disn1pt the offensive German de­
ployment by fully implementing their mobilization and deployment
plans. However, after the mobilization of mid-May, Stalin consistently
restrained his Chief of Staff, fearing that the situation rnight quickly get
out of hand.
The urge to act in the Defence Ministry reflected the alarming nature
of the intelligence. On 2 June Beria transmitted to the government dis­
concerting evidence of the 'war measures' undertaken by the Germans
along the entire Soviet border. The report, a collation of material from
NKGB sources from Belorussia, the Ukraine and Moldavia, showed the
exact location of the various German armies, their headquarters and their
patterns of deployment. Beria further disclosed that in early May Hitler,
accompanied by Goring and General Halder, had attended naval
manoeuvres in the Baltic Sea, and later in the month had spoken to a gath­
ering of 600 high-ranking officers in Warsaw. But the sombre assessment
was unJikely to shake the Kremlin, as its corollary assumption was: 'With
the capture of Crete the next stage of the Anglo-German war will come
to an end. If Germany really starts a war against the Soviet Union, then
it will probably be the result of an Anglo-German agreement which will
lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities between Germany and

275
 Grand Delusion

England. It is possible that this may indeed be the proposal of peace

between Germany and England which Hess has brought to England.' This
was more likely to intensify Stalin's desire to steal a march on the British
and reach an understanding with the Germans.1 The firm evidence from
the Ukraine of the massive build-up continued to be represented as a
prelude to an ultimatum.2
From early June it had become increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye
to the massive deployment in the border area. Golikov, whose factual
reports were disparaged by the political leadership, felt particularly vul­
nerable. He therefore sought the assistance of the NKGB in validating his
ominous discoveries. Above all he wished to deduce 'the plans for mili­
tary operations against the Soviet Union (in a variety of forms such as
documents, rumours etc.)' .3 Impressive as it was, the intelligence was
largely tactical, while strategic information was rare and inconsistent.
Formidable detailed reports arrived within days from the Ukrainian and
Baltic NKGB. On 5 June alone, 100 heavy tanks were spotted moving east
from Warsaw. Infantry divisions were individually identified, precisely
enough to draw up a detailed map of the German deployment facing the
Kiev Military District. Equally precise was the information originating in
the Baltic region, where train spotters traced the congested traffic of both
troops and armaments from the Warsaw region to the border. The remark­
ably illustrative catalogue ran as follows: 'On 25 April the 35th irtfantry
division reached West Prussia from Bulgaria. The staff of the 34th regi­
ment of that division is established in Gelenburg, the staff of the 3rd bat­
talion in Kolmafeld, the staff of the 10th companies of the 34th regiment
in Rostenburg . . . ' and so on. There was also evidence of logistical prepa­
rations: the refurbishing of airfields and hangars in the border areas and
the creation of depots of petrol and ammt1nition. The intentions could be
construed indirectly: the German commanders spoke openly of the immi­
nence of war against the USSR. At a ball given by one of the German divi­
sions stationed in Rumania, to which Rumanian officers were also invited,
the commanding general said: 'Gentlemen officers, the time has come to
unite our forces to return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and seize
the Ukraine. This is our aim - a battle against communism.'4 A colossal
transfer by rail of two motorized divisions and reservists from the north
to the Soviet border was detected, followed by precise informa tion on the
recruitment of reservists on a massive scale in Finland.5
A special agent of the NKGB travelling by train from Berlin to Moscow
through Poland brought home his candid impressions. He found the
border area to be saturated with strong German formations, many hidden
in the forests. Along the entire Soviet border, to a depth of some 200 kilo­
metres, extensive works were in progress to replace the rail tracks with
the German gauges, while strategic roads were repaired and paved. All
bridges were fortified and guarded by light artillery. Dozens of echelons
On the Eve of War 277

of soldiers were marching to the front, in full gear and armed. They gave
him the impression of being young and fit, twenty to thirty years old,
'properly dressed and well nourished'. They appeared to be 'strike units
which had already tasted battle'. Numerous long convoys, each consist­
ing of 20-100 vehicles, were on their way to the borders. Between the sta­
tions of Kolo and Kanin he observed a column, some twenty kilometres
long, of large trucks at a fixed distance from one another of ten to fifteen
metres.6
The various reports were rounded up and presented to Stalin in a more
concise form on 12 June. In a nutshell they depicted the intensified
German efforts to achieve dense deployment of the troops in the regions
bordering the Soviet Union. Oil and supplies were organized in special
depots near the border. He was also informed that a furtl1er batch of
twenty-three high-ranking officers had visited the border area, carefully
observing and photographing its Soviet side.7 The NKGB further pre­
pared a compelling memorandum which reviewed the flagrant violation
of Russian air space by German planes since October 1940. Of 185 recon­
naissance flights, ninety-one had occurred between May and mid-June.
Similar complaints reached Zhukov from the Northern Fleet. The flights,
penetrating to a depth of 100 kilometres, happened to be over large con­
centrations of the Red Army. On the ground almost 10 per cent of the
2,080 people who had crossed the border illegally turned out to be agents
of German intelligence.8 Intercepted telegrams wrapped up the picture.
The Japanese consul in Konigsberg provided useful observations from
one of the major junctions through which the Germans were transferring
the main forces from Berlin to the eastern front. Thus on a single day, on
9 June, he witnessed seventeen special military trains in transit (twelve
carrying mechanized units, three tanks, one field artillery and one
medical equipment).9
The steady and massive transfer of troops to Poland coincided with
information on mobilization in the Balkans; the civilian population
was warned of possible prolonged air raids.10 Perhaps most significant was
Golikov' s sudden recognition of the need to pay 'SPECIAL ATTENTION
. . . to the continued increase of the German troops on Polish territory'.
Hence, a mere fortnight before the invasion, Soviet intelligence finally con­
sidered the possibility that the blow might fall in the central sector, on the
Minsk-�1oscow line, rather than in the Ukraine.11 Kobulov in Berlin was of
a similar opinion. He identified the presence of the main headquarters of
the army groups in Konigsberg, Allenstein, Warsaw, Lublin and in tl1e
region of Zamost-Krasnostav-Yanov south of Cracow. Moreover, tl1e
crack German units were earmarked for Chenstokov, Katowitz, Cracow,
Lodz, Poznan, Breslau, Danzig, Stettin and Bromberg, in the central­
western sector. Nevertheless the Achilles heel of his report was the
failure to obtain the actual plans; only 'Starshina' could lay his hands
 Grand Delusion

on these, but at the risk of compromising the entire Berlin intelligence

net.12
The steady stream of intelligence was not ignored by Zhukov and
Timoshenko or by the commanders in the field. Zhukov was forced to
cancel an order which, the NKGB cornplained to Stalin,. had been issued
by Kirponos to the commanders of the covering forces, to deploy their
troops in the buffer zone between the strongholds and the border. Such
an order, Zhukov warned in tune with Stalin, might 'drive the Germans
to an armed confrontation' .13 Kirponos, however, was still restless and
asked for permission to carry out special measures to strengthen the 'war
readiness' of the Kiev Military District. By 1 July he intended to move
a number of rifle divisions to a forward position and bring into full
operation the new airfields constructed on the border. He believed that
with great effort he could secure an effective defence of his front by
October-November. For the moment, however, 11e even lacked the half
million n1bles he desperately needed for building the infrastructure for
the reii1forcement.14
While restraining the local comn1anders from initiating unilateral
moves, Zl1ukov encouraged them to pursue their preparations as long as
these did not provoke Stalin's rage. To shorten the time needed to bring
the covering forces to combat readiness once the war alert was sounded,
the local commanders were instructed to organize and prepare the muni­
tions and equipment for war. The feedings of the rnachine-gurL belts;
which had been piled in boxes in storage, had become damp and needed
drying. In the emergency situation they" were to be dried and changed
every two months. Half of the shells and hand grenades in the reserve
stores were to be unpacked and distributed to the artillery units of the
covering forces, v\thich were to be kept at full readiness. Food was to be
prepared and packed in personal kits, and field kitchens artd other logis­
tics set up. Hali of the tank units were ordered to be fuelled and ready
for combat action. The time of war alert was reduced to two hours for the
rifle divisions and three for the motorized and artillery divisions.15
A re-examination of the state of mobilization by Vatutin, in charge of
the Planning Division of the Red Army, revealed that 303 divisions had
been mobilized so far. Of these, 186 divisions were deployed along the
western front, out of which 1 20 were rifle, forty tank, twenty mechanized
and six ca valry
.. divisions. They were more or less e,renly divided between
the southern, central and northern fronts. The second strategic echelon, a
reserve placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command in the Moscow
vicinity, was still in an embryonic state. As for the air force, out of the 159
wings in the West, eighteen were positioned in the north, thirteen in the
north-west and twenty-one on the central western front (fifty-two alto­
gether), as compared with eighty-five placed on the south-western front
and twenty-nine left at the disposal of the Supreme Command. Mobi-
On the Eve of War 2 79

lization was therefore still incomplete in the sense that a second echelon
had not yet been formed, while the need to secure a long border led to a
thin cover of troops and dangerous gaps.16
On the night of 1 1-12 June, Zhukov and Timoshenko requested to put
into motion the deployment plan which tl1ey had devised during April
and May. It would have allowed the covering forces to move into the most
forward position and create favourable conditions for conducting the
defensive war. Stalin rejected their proposals outright, suggesting they
should consult the press the following day. One can only imagine how
flabbergasted they were by the Tass communique of the next morning
denying the likelihood of war.17 The responsibility for readying the army
for battle, however, rested on their shoulders. When they persisted in their
demands to put the troops on war alert, they were told by Stalin that 'we
have a non-aggression pact with Germany; Germany is busy up to her
ears with the war in the West and I am certain that Hitler will not risk
creating a second front by attacking the Soviet Union. Hitler is not such
an idiot and understands that the Soviet Union is not 1-.>oland, not France
and not even England.' Stalin flew into a rage: 'Are you proposing to carry
out mobilization in the country, alert the troops now and move them to
the western borders? That means war!' Timoshenko and Zhukov left the
Kremlin with heavy hearts.18
On 13 June Zhukov and Timoshenko brought up to date the defence
plan for the covering forces in the Baltic and Western Districts. The plan
assumed that the Germans had completed their build-up, and recognized
that the main threat emanated from the central sector. The tasks set for
the district commanders clearly reflect the nature of the threat and the
defensive disposition of the troops:

II. Tasks of the Covering Forces

a) Holding off an incursion, whether by land or by airborne forces,

of the enemy into the territory of the Baltic Military Defence District.
b) Tenacious defence along the state frontiers and borders of the
fortified areas to halt the attack of the enemy and to permit the mobi­
lization, build-up, and deployment of the forces of that district.
c) Establishing the defence of the coastline and the islands of Dago
and Ezel in collaboration with the Kiev Military District front to prevent
the landing of enemy naval commandos . . .

The other instructions followed the same pattern. The rest of tl1e docu­
ment dealt with the actual deployment of various covering forces and
their co-ordination with the URs. The shortcoming of the plan was the
heavy concentration of large forces close to the border, detached from the
strongholds and yet too far from the regions which they were to defend.
280 Grand Delusion

The option of earmarking the first echelon for operations in depth in

counter-offensive fashion, which had been the key to Zhukov's opera­
tional system, was not adequately exploited .19
Stalin's refusal to allow the covering forces to assume combat positions
was compensated for by the reinforcement of the first echelon of the
various fronts. The reinforcement was carried out under the strict con­
straints imposed by Stalin. As a result of a late-night meeting with Stalin
on 1 1 June, Zhukov was permitted to transfer to the western front the 5 1st
Rifle Corps incorporating the 98th, 1 1 2th and 153rd Divisions, and the
63rd Corps incorporating the 53rd and 148th Divisions, together with
the 22nd Engineers Regiment. The transfer was to be completed by 2 July.
The conditions set for the reinforcement were stringent measures
to conceal the move so that it would not be conceived by the Germans
as a provocation. Only members of the Military Council of the Western
District were to be acquainted with the transfer,, and no mention of
the units' arrival over the telephone or telegraph was permitted. The
logistical support with which they were provided at the front was
assigned to them not by the numbers of the units but by special codes.20
Within a day Zhukov undertook similar hasty measures to bolster the
defence of the Kiev Military District through the deployment of the 16th
Army there. The movement, scheduled to commence immediately,, was
expected to be completed by 10 July. Strict measures were undertaken to
enforce the secrecy of the move. Specially selected officers were put in
charge of the disembarkation of the troops. Draconian disciplinary mea­
sures were imposed on the station and the immediate neighbourhood.
The echelons were to scatter immediately upon arrival at their various
destinations. All marching was to be carried out in small formations
rather than waiting for entire divisions to concentrate. Zhukov requested
daily reports on the progress of the deployment and the fulfilm ent of
the instructions.21 The following day, having restrained Kirponos from
implementing the defence plan, Zhukov nonetheless issued instruction
for putting the district on 'war preparedness' by 1 July.22 Less attention
was directed to the north, though the Baltic regions were reinforced by
three light armoured trains.23
Finally,, on 19 June, Zhukov issued emergency directives to ensure the
camouflaging of military installations. Now that an armed clash seemed
imminent, it appeared that the fighter planes had not been properly
camouflaged. The artillery and mechanized units too were defenceless,
positioned in large groups in set linear patterns that made them an easy
prey for the enemy. The tanks and armoured cars had been painted in
bright shiny colours and could therefore be detected not only from the air
but also from the ground. Warehouses and other military structures were
not properly camouflaged. An immense scheme was drawn up to correct
all those shortcomings: grass was to be planted at all airfields by 1 July
On the Eve of War

to make them harmonize with the natural surroundings, airstrips were to

be coloured and the whole airbase made to match the surroundings. All
buildings were to be painted, while the oil tanks were to be dug under­
ground. The planes were to be dispersed within the airfields and
camouflaged. Mock airfields were to be constructed at distances of 500
kilometres along the borders, with forty to fifty dummy planes on each
of them. The operation was to be completed by 15 July.24

A Middle East Diversion: The Flaw in British Intelligence

Basking in their own misconception of an imminent German-Soviet

alliance, the British never seriously considered a war in the East as a
source of salvation; they had rather pursued their futile efforts to contain
Hitler in the Balkans, hopefully with the help of Turkey. No major shift
in British strategy, and certainly not in the European arena, was consid­
ered when the probability of an imminent war sank in, a mere fortnight
before the German attack. The Middle East and North Africa continued
to be regarded as the arena where Germany could ultimately be defeated.
The developing conflict on the Soviet borders was consequently exam­
ined in the framework of the peripheral strategy, aimed at maintaining
the predominance in the Middle East. 25
What the British and the Russians shared on the eve of the German­
Soviet war was a conviction that a German ultimatum and possibly
an agreement would precede hostilities. Even when Cripps conveyed
accurate information on the German plans to Eden early in March,26 he
undermined the effectiveness of his warning by suggesting that it might be
'a part of the war of nerves . . . the Germans are arranging this campaign
whereby through promises and intimidation they would force [Russia]
finally into an alliance. Attack will be made only if pressure fails in its
effect.' The 'war of nerves' theory conformed so well with the dominant
British concept that it inhibited the Foreign Office from passing on warn­
ings to Moscow, fearing they might be 'playing the German game'.27
Just as was happening in Moscow, the evaluations of the Joint Intelli­
gence Committee infiltrated into the various embassies, where they gave
rise to reports in much the same spirit. The thick files at the Foreign Office
that hold the warnings are full of such reports. On 1 May, to take just one
example, the British ambassador in .Japan informed Eden that he had
learnt 'from a reliable source' that 'German attack on Soviet Russia is not
imminent but that recent rumours have been put about by German Gov­
ernment: a) To increase Soviet fear of invasion, b) To force Soviet to join
Tripartite Pact, and c) To stimulate deliveries of raw material.' The over­
bearing concept distorted even the most straightforward information by
denying the inevitable. ' ''Max's'' outfit thinks', the ambassador related to
 Grand Delusion

his sources, that 'invasion is certain but believes there is at least an even
chance that Stalin will not resist', thus assuming a priori the existence of
the ultimatum syndrome. Even ,.when German sources 'scouted the idea
that this was all part of '"Nar of nerves', the ambassador insisted th.at 'this
nevertheless would seem to be the more likely explanation'.28
A few eyebrows were raised at the complacency, in view of the
vast preparations undertaken by the Gerrnans. Professor Postan, the
renowned medievalist from Cambridge and head of the Russian Depart­
ment of tl1e Ministry of Economic Warfare, dared to suggest that Hitler
was set on wa.r 'almost entirely for military reasons, i.e. because it was
desired to settle with the Soviets, and from a military standpoint the
present campaigning season was held to be a far mo1·e favourable occa­
sion than in subsequent years'. To reconcile the increasing stream of hard
information with the preconceived concept, the intelligence agencies pre­
ferred to sit on the fence, assuming that no decision had yet been taken
'as to whether Russia should be attacked or merely persuaded by th.reats
to comply vvith German wishes'.29Though he did not press home his argu­
ments, Cavendish-Bentinck, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Com­
mittee, wondered why the German High Command was putting such a
heavy strain on the economy by augmenting the size of the army to 250
divisions. 'The Russians', he commented:
l

are at the best of times maddening people to deal with and Hitler, who
is both revengeful and spiteful, must have a number of scores to pay
off as a result of the chicane!)' and double-crossing which the R.ussians
have doubtless perpetrated since Augu. st 1939 whilst they felt that they
had the Germans at a disadvan.tage. Moreover Hitler has a tendency
sooner or later to revert to the tenets enunciated in 1\ifein Kampf': on
revient toujours a ses premiers amours!30

C:hurchill likewise po11dered whether the massive concentration did not

indicate Hitler's resolve to seize the Ukraine and Caucasus, 'thus making
sure of corn and oil'. But he too wavered, suggesting that 'either war or
a show-down' was near.31
Any evidence which challenged the concept was cast aside. When, for
instance, a Swedish businessman reported that Goring had revealed that
Germany would attack Russia on about 15 June, Eden nonchalantly com­
mented: 'June 15th has been tipped so often that it is becoming suspi­
cious.' Similar information from Kollontai, t1:1e Soviet ambassador in
Stockholm, was rejected on the ground that 'Mme. Kollontai' s denial of
knowledge of political conversations does not count fo1· much.'32 Even
when the likelihood of an invasion was finally driven home, it was given
a differe11t meaning in the Foreign Office: 'Our latest intelligence of mil­
itary movements etc. points definitely to final German preparations for
On the Eve of War

an attack upon Soviet territory; in other words, it points to a German

intention to put such far-reaching demands to Stalin that he will either
have to fight or to agree to a ''Munich'' .'33 In the month preceding the
German attack British efforts were therefore primarily directed to fore­
stalling the phantom negotiations. Ironically their blatant efforts only
strengthened Stalin's illusions of the viability of such an agreement. Con­
sequently, by way of feedback both the British and Soviet intelligence
systems were nourishing the other' s erring appreciations.
Eden and Cripps were tireless in their efforts to obstruct the 'agreement'
which they expected Schulenburg to conclude after his return from Berlin
in early May. Hitler was believed to be preparing some sort of a show­
down with Stalin, sustained by a considerable troop concentration on
the border. He would then summon Stalin to the border and present an
ultimatum for immediate acceptance. Cripps, at least, expected Stalin to
go a long way to appease Hitler out of fear of an Anglo-German recon­
ciliation.34 Rumou1�s in Moscow of Schulenburg' s despondency after his
return from Berlin did little to undermine the concept. The fact that he
was already packing his belongings could mean that he was being
'replaced by a more hard-boiled Nazi who will be better at tl1reats and
pressure'. 35
To reduce to the minimum the damage such an agreement would inflict
it was necessary to anticipate its terms. Misled by the dynamics of the
war, whereby Hitler seemed to be systematically building a springboard
for extendi11g the war into the Middle East, many observers expected
Turkey to be the next victim. Such an eventuality could lead to disastrous
consequences for British strategy by allowing the Germans to sweep into
the Middle East through the back door.36 Though professing to possess
only a 'vague' idea about German intentions, Saracoglu, the Turkish
Foreign Minister, was insisting that the Germans and Russians were
'already in pour parler or . . . are on the point of opening conversations
which might even lead to alliance to war' . I-le expected Russia to reach
an agreement which would be 'made on the back of a certain number of
countries amongst which Turkey must be counted' .37 As rumours and
reliable information had by now become totally intermingled, it was no
time before Cripps too suggested that 'conversations of some sort' were
being conducted in Berlin, and their likely outcome would be an arrange­
ment for the Germans to transfer troops via southern Russia to the Middle
East and Iran. 38
On 23 May the Joint Intelligence Committee noted rather worriedly that
'whereas a few weeks ago rumours were current throughout Europe of
an impending German attack on the u-.s.S.R., the contrary is now the case.
There are some indications which suggest that a new agreement between
the two countries may ·be nearly complete.' The 'far reaching agreement'
seemed to encompass 'economic, political and military issues'. The
 Grand Delusion

political co-operation, they established, was 'directed towards the seizure

of the Middle East' .39 Three days later, Military Intelligence felt confident
enough to suggest that the essence of the agreement was 'the delimita­
tion of spheres of influence in the Middle East, and . . . German troops
assembling at Lvov are to move through the Soviet Union to Iran with
Russian consent' .40 The first measures taken were therefore to warn
the Turks of the 'German trap' and advise them to do 'nothing likely
to arouse Soviet suspicion or resentment or to drive Stalin nearer to
Germany' .41
The crushing defeat in Greece and Crete, however, reduced Britain's
leverage on Turkey. For Hitler, on the other hand, a non-aggression pact
with Turkey had become vital for executing Operation 'Barbarossa' . Such
an agreement, undermining Turkey's association with Britain, would
eliminate a potential threat to his right wing. The bait was an offer of
Greek Thrace in return for the right to transfer troops and war materials
via Turkey. Like the Bulgarians, the Turks persisted in their opposition to
any terms which might compromise their relations with the Russians.
They feared that such an agreement might either prompt an Anglo-Soviet
collaboration or lead to an uprising, similar to that which had occurred
in Yugoslavia.42
Eden was caught off-guard. He had failed to grasp the extent of the
Turkish suspicion of Russia since Molotov's visit to Berlin; moreo:ver, he
was bent on the idea that a Soviet-German agreement at Turkey's expense
was in the making. His desperate attempt to bring Turkey and Russia
together ran aground. The Turks, as was noted in the Foreign Office, had
made 'the most of their case for distrusting the Russians' . On 16 June
Cadogan had to admit a failure in the belated attempt to resuscitate the
remnants of the Balkan entente. He had realized that the Turks were 'on
the point of signing an agreement with the Germans without, apparently,
saying anything to Moscow'.43
Hitler postponed the pact with Turkey until the very eve of Operation
'Barbarossa'. A demand was then made to the Turks to sign the agree­
ment 'at once'. As a means of inhibiting a Soviet reaction, as well as soft­
ening up the Turks, the claims Molotov had made earlier to bases on the
Bosphorus were leaked to the press. The haste with which the agreement
was signed allowed the Turks to confine themselves to a strict non­
aggression pact, maintaining their neutral position and avoiding the noto­
rious secret treaties to which their Balkan neighbours had been sub­
jected.44 The Turks were manifestly relieved by the announcement of war.
Saracoglu, as Papen informed Berlin, 'had to disconnect his telephone
in order to escape from congratulations' . Until the very last moment
they had obviously feared a Soviet-German agreement on the lines pro­
posed by Molotov during his visit to Berlin, which would divert the war
to the Mediterranean and compromise Turkey's sovereignty.45 This was
On the Eve of War

undoubtedly a remarkable achieveme11t for Turkish diplomacy, though in

the final account, as in the nineteenth century, Turkey's vital geopolitical
position rendered her a playground for the great powers. Her ability to
retain her neutrality throughout the war was a result not only of ingeni­
ous diplomacy but also of the unexpected breakdown of the German war
machine on the Russian front.
The British government were resolved to prevent a German-Soviet
agreement which would undermine their Middle Eastern strategy. Stalin
had attempted to placate Germany by his recognition of Rashid Ali's
German-oriented government after the coup d'etat in Iraq in early May,
and this lent force to the idea that a new Soviet-German community of
interests was in the making. Maisky was warned by Butler that such
moves made an 'extremely unfavourable impression' .46 However, efforts
by Eden to extract information on Stalin's intentions from Maisky in their
meeting on 2 7 May were fruitless. Maisky, clearly in a straitjacket, accom­
panied by his 'shadow' Novikov, resorted to the customary complaints
about the press campaign which encouraged rumours ranging from
suggestions that negotiations on a German-Soviet military alliance were
under way to a warning of an imminent German attack on the Ukraine
and the Caucasus. While Eden was hardly comforted by such an
approach, Maisky was not reassured by Eden's announcement of the
forthcoming evacuation of Crete, which obviously put England in a
vulnerable position as far as a possible peace with Germany was
concerned.47
By June the British examination of the brewing conflict on the eastern
front was undertaken almost exclusively from the Middle Eastern per­
spective. Cripps feared that after the crushing defeats inflicted on Britain
Stalin no longer felt inhibited from pursuing dynamic policies in the
Middle East. Rather than making 'really dangerous economic conces­
sions', he was likely to be tempted to allow the Germans to transfer troops
through southern Russia to Persia and the Near East. Only a 'vigorous
policy in the Middle East' could stave off such a development.48 He told
Eden that Stalin was not 'affected by any pro-German or pro-anything
feeling except pro-Soviet and pro-Stalin. He is no more friendly or antag­
onistic to us than to Germany and he will always use any country that he
can to attain his objective which is to keep out of the war as long as he
can without jeopardising his regime or Soviet power in so doing.' Both
however agreed that the clue to future events lay in developments in
the Near East.49The Cabinet was alerted to the possibility that Stalin might
yield to German demands and undermine British interests by allowing
the Wehrmacht a 'free passage for troops North of the Black Sea and
through the Caucasus into Iraq or Iran. Such a move would turn the flank
of our position in the Middle East, and if carried out in the near future
might develop before we could take effective steps to counter it.'50
286 Grand Delusion

Eden's pressing concern was to avert a Gem·Lan-Soviet agreement

without arousing suspicion in Moscow that he was trying to embroil
Russia in war. His anxiety was acute,, as he believed that the German pres­
sure on the Russians had reached such dimensions that they would 'give
way unless their sl<in [was] asked of them'.51 In his conversations with
Maisky he tried to project the feeling that England had the 'power and
determination to preserve [her] position and interests in the Middle East'.
Obviot1sly the st1dden diversion to the Midd_le East was entirely lost on
the Russians, who in fact were not engaged in negotiations with the
Germans. The British Corrtmander-in-Chief in the Middle East was
instructed to prepare for the occupation of Iraq,, which would enable the
Royal Air Force to make 'the biggest blaze ever' in the Baku oilfields. The
idea of tl1reatening Russia with the bombing of Baku, which might have
had disastrous consequences for the Grand Alliance,, was dropped once
again only because of considerations related to the violation of Turkish
and Iranian air space.52
Mutual suspicion was now leading both sides to fatal misunderstand­
ings, f11rther deflecting them from a proper evaluation of the danger
looming ahead. The need to maintain supremacy in the Near East was
demonstrated by the occupation of Syria in early June and by Churchill's
constant badgering of General Wavell to launch Operation 'Battleaxe',, his
counter-offensive against Rommel, in the midd_le of the month.5� Refer­
ring to the Soviet recognition of the rebellious regime of Rashid Ali in
Iraq, Eden reiterated to Maisky at their meeting on 2 June the British gov­
ernment" s resolve to maintain supremaC)' throughout the Middle East,,
including Irar1 and AfghanistarL. He hoped that Germany would not
succeed in introducing a conflict between Russia and Britain in that
region. Maisky was far more interested in finding out whether England
intended to submit to Germany in the Middle East as she had done in
Greece and Crete. Familiar with Stalin's frame of mind, he hastened to
inform him of seemingly conflicting interpretations in Cabi11et of the
German intentions towards Russia. Churchill apparently was now sug­
gesting that co11crete evidence, rather than rumours, showed clearly that
the German army was offensively deployed on the Soviet borders. This
could only confirm the suspicion in Moscow that in extremis Churchill was
trying to draw Russia into war, at the very crucial and delicate mornent
when Hitler's proposals were eagerly anticipated in the Kremlin. Maisky
therefore underlined the other view, expressed by Eden, that the deploy­
ment looked like 'the prelude to an attack on the Soviet Union' though
he was inclined 'to think that the given concentration is one of Hitler's
chess moves i n the ''v\rar of nerves'' with the Soviet Union and Turkey'.
Under these circumstances, rather than focusing on the substartce of the
warning and in line with strict instructions from Molotov, all Maisky
could do was to insist that 'Comrade Stalin is not a coward' and that
On the Eve of War

therefore there was no point in scaring Russia with Germany. The Red
Army, he reminded Eden, was well equipped 'and would not have to fight
with sticks as it did last time'. To Eden it seemed that 'while Mr. Maisky
delivered this statement with e1nphasis, I had a feeling that he might be
trying to convince himself as he went along' .54

The Tass Communique

In view of the threat posed to British interests in the Middle East by the
hypothetical German-Soviet accord, Cripps was unexpectedly rushed
home for consultations. His recall was aimed not at laying the founda­
tions for an Anglo-Soviet alliance in view of the anticipated war (as has
been subsequently suggested), but rather at finding ways to discourage
the Russians from making concessions to Germany in tlle Middle East.ss
The manner in which the decision was executed is indeed puzzling. When
Eden had returned from the Middle East in mid-April, an almost open
rebellion erupted in the Northern Department against Cripps's 'occa­
sional unwillingness to carry out his instructions, combined with his ten­
dency to take independent and unannounced action'. The demand was
then made for Cripps to return li.ome without delay, not only for consul­
tations but mostly for 'instruction'. Eden however ruled out such a course,
probably impressed by the suggestion that once in London Cripps might
be 'bitten by politics here and not wish to return'. Cadogan also expressed
mild concern about the interpretation which the Russians might give to
Cripps' s recall. It was thus admitted that Cripps 'should not give up his
post under a cloud and therefore a hurried evacuation of his piggery
seems fairly difficult to arrange' .56
Considerations of Cripps' s personal safety 011 his flight to England
were behind the decision to withhold the announcement of his recall.
However, once the news was leaked to the press, Soviet sensibilities were
not taken into account. The announcement was carried by all the news
agencies on 6 June and 'caused considerable sensation among journalists
of all nationalities in London and speculation as to the reason for the
journey became wild'. The speculation generally assumed a 'sudden
worsening of Anglo-Russian relations'. After all, it was widely believed
that the Russians were in the midst of intensive negotiations with the
Germans, and it never crossed the minds of officials in Whitehall that the
Russians themselves might suspect that similar negotiations were taking
place in London.s7
Maisky promptly sought reassurance from Whitehall; his suspicion,
however, was further aroused when Eden nonchalantly explained that
it was the 'habit to seek to maintain contact with the more distant
Embassies' and that 'it would be most useful for all concerned if [Cripps]
288 Grand Delusion

could come home and get a view of the picture here' . The statement
conflicted with information Maisky had received from the Foreign
Ministry in Moscow. In a last-ditch attempt to prevent the Russians from
submitting to the purported German demands, Cripps had made what
turned out to be yet another unauthorized threat to Vyshinsky during a
fifteen-minute meeting. Convinced that the Russians were on the brink of
concluding an agreement with Germany, he revealed that he was leaving
for consultations but might never resume his post in Moscow. Stalin and
Molotov were given another chance to consult him if they so wished
before his departure. Cripps took his leave by thanking Vyshinsky 'for
the barren year' .58 His departure coincided with the evacuation of
employees and families of the embassy staff amid growing rumours of an
imminent German-Soviet clash. Lady Cripps herself accompanied her
husband, while his daughter was evacuated to Teheran. Cripps's recall
was accompanied by a vociferous British press campaign which was
leading the Russian government to 'a different conclusion', that the
British were indeed set on ensnaring Russia in war. Maisky urged Eden
again to control the press as a precondition for any rapprochement.59
Maisky was so concerned that he hastened to ascertain the reasons for
Cripps's return. The prominence given to the Hess affair during his con­
versations leaves one in little doubt as to the repercussions it had on the
interpretation of the recall. Maisky further displayed a marked interest in
the British reaction to German involvement in Syria and Iraq, which had
become a test case for British determination to remain on the battlefield.
He wished to know wl1y the British army was not 'already acting vigor­
ously in Syria. A timid policy would not only be likely to fail, but would
have unfavourable effects in various countries including Russia.'60
The interpretation given to Cripps' s recall coincided with circumstan­
tial evidence implying that the Americans were pressing Churchill to con­
sider the German peace feelers and sacrifice Russia. On almost the same
day that Cripps left Moscow, John Winant, the recently appointed Amer­
ican ambassador to London, departed to Washington for consultations.
This revived speculations, triggered by the Hess affair, that a separate
peace was being discussed.61 Such rumours emanated from credible
sources like ex-President Herbert Hoover. What further alarmed the Rus­
sians was that Winant' s arrival precipitated a marked deterioration in
American-Soviet relations: on 10 June two Soviet assistant military
attaches were ordered to leave the United States.62
There was also a revival of interest in Hess, who was then being inter­
viewed by Lord Simon. Given the extreme suspicion prevailing in
Moscow, the recall of Cripps, combined with the disinformation on the
nature of his journey spread by the Foreign Office, seemed to lend force
to the hypothesis that some kind of arrangement might after all be
worked out behind the scenes, allowing Hitler a free hand in the East.
 On the Eve of War

There was always an outside possibility that, even if the peace proposals
were left unanswered, Britain might signal to the Germans her wish to
remain uninvolved if war with the Soviet Union broke out. Moreover, the
Germans might be provoked into a diversion to the East if they suspected
that Cripps's recall indicated consultations about a possible Anglo-Soviet
rapprochement. The memory of the punishment inflicted on Yugoslavia
for her approach to Russia was still vivid.63 This reinforced the feeling in
Moscow that Germany was being encouraged to resolve her conflict with
•

Russia by force.
The risks run by Stalin had now reached a new peak. He could hardly
contain the military from initiating active defensive measures while the
intelligence agencies, under tremendous pressure, were bringing home
terrifying news. He could no longer turn a blind eye to the German
deployment. Pushed into a corner, he now tended even more vigorously
than before to displace the danger by regarding the British as the genuine
villains, set on depriving him of political gains by triggering a premature
war. The only munition left in his dwindling arsenal was the initiative he
had contemplated with Schulenburg a month earlier. If it were successful
the issue of a Tass dementi might trigger a German reaction. The two­
fold aim of the communique were therefore to draw a denial from the
Germans and to demonstrate to them that Russia was not colluding with
the British but was conforming with Hitler's wish to quash such rumours.
Molotov gave an accurate, though succinct and incomplete, explanation
of the reasons which led Stalin to issue the communique: 'The affair of
the Tass communique was a last resort. If we had succeeded in delaying
the war beyond the summer it would have been very difficult to start it
in the autumn. So far diplomacy had proved successful in delaying war,
but no one could predict when it would fail. However, keeping silent
would certainly provoke an attack' .64
In l1is memoirs Maisky exaggerates his own warnings to Stalin. He
deliberately deludes the reader into believing that on 10 June he trans­
mitted to Moscow an 'urgent' ciphered telegram of specific intelligence
he had obtained from Cadogan, the British permanent Under-Secretary
at the Foreign Office. He claims therefore that it was with 'extreme amaze­
ment' that he received Stalin's response in the form of the communique
published on 14 June. The communique, however, was a logical culmi­
nation of Maisky's own views, which attributed the rumours to Churchill
and the British government. The meeting with Cadogan, which raised
doubts about the validity of his appreciation, took place only on 16 June.65
Maisky repeats a couple of times in his memoirs that 'the shaft in the
direction of Britain with which the Tass communique began left no room
for doubt that it was the reply to the warning given by Cadogan' .66 His
obsession with the communique stands in sharp contrast to the skimpy
coverage of the events leading to the war. The emphasis conceals the fact
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On the Eve of War

that the significant meeting with Cadogan, in which he received the

detailed evidence on German concentrations, took place not on 1 0 June,
as he claims, but rather on 16 June, after the publication of the commu­
nique. Maisky's blatant falsehood is aimed at covering his own contribu­
tion to the self-deception which affected the Kremlin on the eve of the
war.
The clue to his distortion is to be found in the communique' s frame of
reference and its extremely careful wording. The 'shaft' which suppos­
edly puzzled Maisky read: 'Since before Cripps' s arrival in London and
especially after he had arrived there [author's italics] there have been more
and more rumours of an ''early war'' between the Soviet Union and
Germany . . . All this is nothing but clumsy propaganda by forces inter­
ested in an extension of the war.' Indeed Vyshinsky insisted in retrospect
that 'following Cripps' s arrival in London the British press started dis­
seminating rumours on the forthcoming attack of Germany on the Soviet
Union'. The communique referred therefore to rumours from London
'before and after the arrival of Cripps to London' .67
Cripps had reached London only on the night of 1 1 June, and the com­
munique referred to headlines in the British press on 1 2 June which
implied that 'a certain sharpening of German-Soviet relations vvas dis­
cernible' .68 Under the headline 'Sir S. Cripps Returns; Possible Talks with
Russia; Hope of Better Relations', the Sunday Times, fo11 instance, com­
mented that Russia was striv-ing to improve relations with Britain to
thwart German aggression.69 In practice it would have been Maisky
himself who compiled and evaluated the British press's commentary for
Moscow's benefit. Indeed, in a conversation with I. McDonald, the po­
litical correspondent of The Times, on the evening of 1 2 June, Maisky
bitterly deplored what he believed to be the 'Foreign Office stunt in all
the newspapers of yesterday morning. Such an official campaign . . .
would be bound to have the worst possible effect in Moscow'.
McDonald's efforts to establish his independent standing fell on deaf ears.
'The Ambassador', concluded McDonald, 'seemed a little hurt that I
should try to pitch such a cock-and-bull ston; at him; he clearly disbe­
lieved it.'70
Fully tuned to the Kremlin, Maisky attributed to Churchill the swelling
wave of rumours prompted by Cripps's sudden arrival in Londo11. In a
letter to Eden he confirrrted that the communique was prompted by the
rumours concerning an impending war which had been circulating since
Cripps's return 'and particularly in connection with the press report that
in his talk with the Prime Minister, Sir Stafford expressed the opinion that
war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was unavoidable in the near
future' .71 He was driven to that conclusion by Churcl1ill' s briefing to
the chief editors of the national dailies on 7 June. Hard pressed on the
progress of the war, Churchill proposed 'that it was best to follow the
 Grand Delusion

natural course of events. A clash between Germany and the Soviet Union
is inevitable. The concentration of German forces on the Soviet border is
proceeding at an accelerated rate. We need to bide our time . . . ' Maisky
believed that Churchill there and then instructed Duff Cooper, the Min­
ister of Information, to launch a campaign about the imminent conflict.72
The News Department of the Foreign Office gained the clear impression
from their contacts with the Tass representative in London that the Soviet
embassy suspected the government of spreading the reports of an immi­
nent clash in an attempt to push Russia into the war. The belief in the
Kremlin that in desperation Churchill was trying to drag Russia into war
had become so overwhelming that an internal Foreign Ministry memo­
randum scrutinizing Maisky' s telegrams of the entire year detected clear
hostility as the guideline of British policy.73
Maisky thus echoed his master's voice from the Kremlin in continuing
to believe that Churchill was the obstacle to Soviet accommodation with
Germany. In conversation with a British diplomat, he further provided
a reasonably accurate picture of the terms of the agreement Stalin
anticipated:

if it was a mere matter of supplying three million or four million more

tons of fodder - here he waved his hand contemptuously towards the
mountains of imaginary fodder which he saw littering Kensington
Palace Gardens [where the Soviet embassy in London was located] -
Moscow might be ready to give it. 'We are always ready to drive away
the fires of war when they approach our threshold,' he said, 'and we
choose the means that best suit our interests. But we certainly would
not allow inspectors on our railroads or technicians in our factories.
That is a foolish suggestion and Stalin would certainly not agree to it.'74

On the following day, still before the issue of the· dementi, Maisky
expressed to Eden his concern over the 'type of reports' which were
unlikely to be taken by his government to represent independent opin­
ions.75 There was obviously a grain of truth in tl1is assumption. Unknown
to Cripps and possibly to Eden, the press had been briefed on the subject
by the Foreign Office itself .76 The motive for the release can only be
guessed at but Cadogan at least cherished the hidden hope, intimated in
his diary, that the Russians would not 'give way and sign on the dotted
line . . . as I should love to see Germany expanding her strength there' .77
The rumours might indeed prompt suspicion that Britain aimed at
encouraging the Germans to push east; they especially seemed to reflect
the intelligence appreciation that the Blitzkrieg in Russia would be 'a cam­
paign of little difficulty', estimating that the capture of Moscow and
'
rounding up of Soviet forces would be completed in between 3 and 6
weeks' .78
On the Eve of War 293

As is now obvious, the object of the subtle Tass communique issued on

14 June was to ward off provocation and conciliate Berlin. The Foreign
Office could not but notice the 'grovelling attitude' of Stalin, which was
more suited to 'a small Balkan country than a great Power' . Kollontai was
perceived to have 'changed her tone; she was no longer harping on Soviet
Union's strength to resist all attacks, but rather upon the fact that Soviet
Union's relations with Germany were perfectly friendly'.79 The accusing
finger was clearly pointed at Britain, though she was not named; the
rumours were ascribed to forces 'hostile to the Soviet Union and
Germany, interested in the further extension and spreading of the war ' .
The bait waE? put out for Germany to place her demands in the forth­
coming negotiations. In the meantime, to avoid any provocation, the
German concentration of troops was ascribed to the redeployment of
troops after the Balkan campaign, whose objectives were 'not related to
Soviet-German relations' . An advocate of peace, the Soviet Union
remained loyal to the neutrality pact with Germany and the rumours of
war were 'false and provocative' . The Soviet counter-measures were then
attributed to the summer manoeuvres of the Red Army.80
The unequivocal message that no Soviet-British entente was in the
making was at the least expected to produce in London a confirmation
and further quashing of the rumours. In Berlin it was expected to evoke
a German denial of belligerent intentions, if not to draw Hitler to the
negotiating table. However, it was not even reproduced by the German
papers. The only reaction to the communique came from Wehrmacht
circles, where it was 'seen as highly ironical' .81 On the night of 14 June
Vyshinsky was sent to chat with Schulenburg but the conversation, which
dealt with minor bilateral matters, failed to elicit from Schulenburg 'even
a single word' in response to the communique.82 In England the commu­
nique resulted in a harsh official remonstration against the accusations
levelled against Cripps, as the rumours seemed to have originated 'from
the Soviet side of the frontier' .83
 14

..
Calamity

Self-Deception
The tension mounted in Moscow with the continued flow of intelligence
pointing to an imminent outbreak of hostilities. It had become extremely
difficult for the collators of intelligence in Berlin to ignore the evidence of
Hitler's intentions. The confusion surrounding the events leading to the
war and Stalin's misplaced confidence in his ability to avert the war are
seen only too well in Dekanozov' s reporting from Berlin shortly after his
return from Moscow. While in the past he had been punctilious in alert­
ing Stalin to the danger ahead, he now, like Golikov, appeared extremely
cautious. He carefully cited the two sets of rumours circulating in Berlin.
The first pointed to the inevitability of a war between Germany and
Russia. The other predicted a revival of the old tradition of rapproche­
ment between the two, based on a renewed division into spheres of
influence and the Soviet Union's undertaking not to interfere in European
affairs. Stalin's assumption of the premiership and recognition of the gov­
ernments of the countries occupied by Germany were hailed as a prelude
to the resumption of talks. On the other hand, Dekanozov was informed
of Hitler's and Keitel' s recent trip to Danzig and the transfer of the army's
headquarters to the East. But in his final assessment Dekanozov played
down tl1e information, which was 'partially disseminated through the
rumours of war with the Soviet Union'. Though attempting to cater to
Stalin's known prejudices, Dekanozov could hardly conceal his own eval­
uation that the German government was 'clearly preparing the country
for a war with the Soviet Union, drawing the attention of the population
to the resources of the Ukraine and spreading run1011rs of the weakness
of the Soviet Union, while simultaneously examining the reaction of the

294
Calamity 295

German people'. Indeed, a week later }1e was on track again, with a bleak
survey of the 1 70 to 180 divisions, the bulk of the German army, con­
fronting the Red Army along the entire border. While until the end of May
the transfers to the front had mostly consisted of motorized vehicles, since
then they had been replaced by heavy artillery, tanks and planes. His
agents had witnessed with horror a massive transport of troops and
equipment on the night of 12-·13 June. 1
The Germans now boosted their disinformation efforts, which proved
a lethal weapon in the atmosphere of increasing suspicion and uncer­
tainty. The conflicting sets of run1ours in Moscow and in London played
into Goebbels's hands. In his diar)' he commented with great satisfaction
that as far as Russia was concerned, 'we have been successful in produc­
ing a tremendous torrent of false reports. The newspapers' speculations
have confused issues and they can no longer confirm wh.at is true and
what is false. This is the atmosphere we need.'2 I. F. Filitov, the Tass cor­
respondent in Germany, and according to German intelligence sources the
deputy head of the NKGB residency in Berlin, was instructed on 1 2 June
'to clarify whether or not Germany is actively pursuing negotiations on
peace with England and whether or not to expect an attempt in the longer
term to secure a compromise with the United States'. He was to give the
impression that 1V\1e are all convinced that it is indeed possible to main­
tain our peace policy. There is still time . '3 TJnlike Dekanozov, who
. .

watered down his reports but still warned of the danger, Filitov produced
an appreciation of the rumours which fitted in well lArith Stalin's expec­
tations. He qualified the danger by stating his firm belief that Hitler had
produced 'a gigantic bluff'. He did not expect war to 'suddenly erupt
tomorrow' but rather the Germans to exert pressure 'in the hope of deriv­
ing some benefits which Hitler needs for continuing the war . . . '4
The rumours turned out to be a godsend for Hitler. With tlle Fiihrer's
blessing Goebbels wrote a long article entitled 'Crete as an Example', elab­
orating on the presumed German preparations for a war in the Mediter­
ranean. It attracted much attention and was widely quoted before the
edition was abruptly withdrawn from the newspaper kiosks, creating the
impression that the article disclosed state secrets. It was in fact so clever,
Goebbels boasted, that 'it was possible to extract from it any'"thing that an
enemy might wish to believe at a given moment'. The Germans further
exploited to the utmost the press campaign in E!lgland by the publication
of scores of articles which implied that adequate foundations had been
laid for continued negotiations witl1 Moscow. While the communique
from Moscow was ignored, Goebbels encouraged the 'uninterrupted
spreading of rumours: peace with Moscow, Stalin is expected in Berlin,
an attack against England itself will be mounted in the near future'.5
On 9 June Kobulov informed Stalin that 'Starshina' believed that
the rumours on negotiations ·were being deliberately spread by the
 Grand Delusion

Wehrmacht and the Ministry of Propaganda to conceal the preparations

for war. But the accurate information was still overshadowed by the 'ulti­
matum theory' . Lieutenant-Colonel Heimann, head of the Russian section
of the Air Staff, was quoted as saying that Hitler would 'present the Soviet
Union with demands for German economic control over the Ukraine,
delivery of bread and oil and the use of the Soviet fleet against Britain'. 6
It was followed two days later by a revelation that the final decision to
invade Russia had been taken, but whether it would be preceded by
demands on the Soviet Union was 'unknown'. Goring's staff was ordered
to transfer his headquarters from Berlin to Rumania. The second line of
the air force was transferred from France to the Poznan region. The
German and the Finnish General Staffs were believed to be in the midst
of 'intensive negotiations'. Documents which had passed through the
hands of 'Starshina' revealed that the Germans would invade Russia in
the north from West Prussia and in the south from Rumania, creating
large pincer movements which would lead to the encirclement and anni­
hilation of the Red Army. To understand the pressure under which
Kobulov ('Zakhar' ) was working, attention should be drawn to his des­
perate attempts to convince Stalin in concluding his reports that the re­
commendation of 'Starshina' to pre-empt the Germans was not a
'provocation', but rather words 'straight from the heart' .7
The following day Kobulov reinforced the warning with fresh evidence
from 'Starshina' concerning the 'conclusiveness of the decision on a sur­
prise attack'. He quoted directly from 'Starshina': 'the leading circles of
the German Ministry of Aviation and in the Staff of the Air Force are con­
vinced that the issue of the attack by Germany on the Soviet Union is
definitely decided. Regardless of whether any demands are put to the
Soviet Union in advance - we should take into account the possibility of
a surprise attack.'8
When Merkulov presented Stalin on 16 June with further evidence from
'Starshina' which indicated that the final measures for the attack had been
taken, Stalin exploded, suggesting that 'the ''source'' in the Staff of the
German Air Force should be sent to his f****** mother! This is no source
but a disinformer.' He further dismissed out of hand the revelation that
Rosenberg, the notorious author of Hitler's anti-Soviet chapter in Mei11
Kampf, had already selected the various administrators who would
run the Soviet economy after the occupation. According to 'Starshina',
Rosenberg had promised that 'the name of Russia would be wiped off
the geographical maps'.9 When on 9 June Timoshenko and Zhukov dis­
cussed with Stalin a wide array of intelligence, Stalin was scarcely moved;
'And I have different documents', he interrupted and tossed back their
compilation of intelligence reports. He further dismissed the information
provided by Sorge, joking that in Japan Sorge had 'set himself up with
some small factories and brothels and even deigned to report the date of
Calamity 297

the German attack as 22 June. Are you suggesting I should believe him,
too?'10
And yet the harsh reactions only proved that Stalin's confidence had
been shaken. When compelling reports on the imminent war finally
reached Stalin on 1 7 June, coinciding with the information obtained from
London, Stalin hastily summoned Merkulov and Fitin, the head of
Foreign Intelligence, to the Kremlin. Stalin wished the reports to be
redrafted, as they seemed 'contradictory' . They were 'ordered to prepare
a more convincing and conclusive summary of all intelligence informa­
tion' .11 The document 'Calendar of information obtained through ''Corsi­
canets'' and ''Starshina'' from 6 September 1940 to 16 June 1941' was
consequently prepared on 20 June. It reached Merkulov's hands hours
after the Germans attacked. Subsequently it was returned by Fitin to the
head of the German department of Foreign Intelligence and buried in the
archives for posterity.
Stalin simply refused to come to grips with the reports, challenging as
they did the wisdom of his politics in the preceding two years. Obviously
a large number of tlle reports were now tailored to his whims, while the
agents had to find a way to retain their integrity and perform their duties
by conveying the warnings as well. The final result, however, was
counter-productive. While pointing to the likelihood of war, they kindled
the hope in the Kremlin that it would still be possible to delay the war.
Stalin now clung to scanty and contradictory intelligence which depicted
shortcomings in the combat readiness of the Wehrmacht. He further
argued that the Germans were unlikely to start hostilities while their
armour, air force and artillery units were still stationed far from the
border.12
He also clung to the fact that varied dates for the invasion were being
proposed. The contradictory data seemed to justify Stalin's cautiousness
in implementing the deployment plans. 13 The surveillance of Schulenburg
also led to equivocal conclusions. On 9 June, for instance, Stalin gleaned
from an intercepted telegram that although Schulenburg had received
no instructions to start negotiations, he had not been informed about
possible hostilities. Moreover, the German ambassador kept reiterating
that Russia was 'painstakingly fulfilling its obligations which would
make it difficult for Germany to pick a pretext for an attack on the Soviet
Union'. 14
Though seriously fettered, the intelligence agencies continued to drive
home the danger in a fairly unequivocal way in the last few days leading
to the war. On 18 June the NKGB reported the hasty evacuation since 10
June of thirty-four members of the German embassy, together with their
wives and children and personal belongings. The exodus was continuing,
and visas had been sought for more members. Secret Service papers had
been sent to Berlin in advance, while others were being burned in the
 Grand Delusion

embassy's courtyard. The evacuation, Stalin was told, reflected the

'intense nervousness and concern in Moscow in connection with the pre­
vailing opinion that the relations between Germany and the USSR have
worsened, and that a war will break out in the next few days'. On 12 June,
the employees of the embassy had been assembled and given instructions
for their departure from Moscow. The communique had brought a tem­
porary relief, but the absence of a reaction hastened the evacuation.15
Intourist was flooded with requests from the various German missions
for seats on outgoing flights.16 Schulenburg was reported to be 'in a very
pessimistic mood', fearing that as a result of his rebuff by Hitler during
their meeting in Berlin he might shortly find himself in a concentration
camp. He could not even exclude the possibility that within a week he
would 'not be among the living' .17 His personal messenger returned to
Moscow empty-handed. Consequently members of the German embassy
accelerated their packing while making arrangements for evacuating their
families. In a telegram intercepted by Soviet intelligence, Rosso informed
Rome that 'an armed conflict was inevitable and that it might occur within
18
two to three days, perhaps on Sunday [22 June]' .
Sorge' s output increased as well. The courier from Berlin had informed
the German military attache in Tokyo that 'he was convinced that the
war against the Soviet Union would be postponed to the end of June at
the latest' . 1 9 On the very eve of the war Sorge hastened to inform Golikov
that Ott, the German ambassador to Tokyo, had disclosed to him that war
with Russia had become 'inevitable' . The Japanese General Staff was
already discussing what would be Japan's position once war broke out.20
On the day before the invasion, the NKGB produced its now customary
crop of fresh information on the 'unceasing transfer of troops, armoured
divisions and mechanized forces from deep in Germany through Warsaw
to the Soviet borders'. The number of trains was specified with their exact
location, and the German troop units were identified by their numbers
and affiliations. As the NKGB had discovered, the last-minute task
assigned to German agents was to inform on the state of the railwa;1
system and roads in Russia, the pattern of deployment of the Red
Army, the armaments used by the units deployed on the border and so
on. German officers were conducting intensive indoctrination of their
troops, focusing on the betrayal by the Soviet Union and the approach
of war.21
As we have seen, Zhukov and Timoshenko had been pressing Stalin
since 10 June to put the army on full alert. On 18 June the two pursued
the argument further in a meeting 'i\Thich lasted for more than three hours
in Stalin's offices, in the presence of members of the Politburo. Timo­
shenko' s retrospective recollections of the meeting leave a vivid impres­
sion of Stalin's process of decision-making and his ruthless, impatient and
insulting handling of the military. Timoshenko and Zhukov arrived in
Calamity 299

the Kremlin equipped with maps which depicted in minute detail the
German cc,ncentrations. The poised Zhukov spoke first, describing the
anxiety among the Soviet troops and pleading with Stalin to put them 'in
full military readiness'. The more he spoke, the more irritable Stalin
became, knocking out his pipe nervously on the table. He finally sprang
up, walked towards Zhukov and shouted at him: 'And what, have you
come to scare us with war, or do you want a war, as you are not
sufficiently decorated or your rank is not high enough?' Zhukov imme­
diately lost his composure and sat down. Timoshenko, however, persisted
in warning that to leave the troops in the present state of deployment
would produce havoc if the Wehrmacht struck. This provoked Stalin into
a tirade which reveals his brutality but provides a glimpse into his inner
thoughts:

Stalin returned to the table and spoke harshly: 'It's all Timoshenko' s
work, he's preparing everyone for war, he ought to have been shot, but
I've known him as a good soldier since the civil war . . . ' I told [Stalin]
what he had told everyone at the meeting with the Academy gradu­
ates, that war is inevitable. 'So you see,' - Stalin said addressing the
Politburo - 'Timoshenko is a fine man, with a big head, but apparently
a small brain' - at this he showed his thumb. 'I said it for the people,
we have to raise their alertness, while you ha\re to realize that Germany
on her own will never fight Russia. You must understand this.' And
he left.
Then he opened the door and stuck his pock-marked face round it
and uttered in a loud voice: 'If you' re going to provoke the Germans
on the frontier by moving troops there without our permission, then
heads will roll, mark my words,' and he slammed the door.2L

Preventing provocation had obviously become vital for Stalin in his

attempts to avoid the war. His restless mi11d and ruthless style of gov­
ernment sought means to avoid the pitfall. Since April the local NKGB
had reported that Ukrainian nationalists were 'spreading provocative
rumours'. These suggested either that the Soviet Union 'was preparing
an attack on Germany', linking it with the conclusion of the neutrality
pact with Yugoslavia, or alternatively that Germany was 'preparing an
attack on the Soviet Union' .23 Ukrainian schools, Stalin was further
informed, were being encouraged to teach the history and geography of
'Independent Ukraine', maps of which were hung on the walls of many
educational institutions in Cracow. Rumours had it that 200 active
Ukrainian nationalists had bee11 sent to special courses in Berlin to
prepare them to administer the 'Independent Ukraine'. 24
Early on, the head of the Ukrainian NKGB had expressed his fear that
in time of war those nationalists might act as a fifth column. Under the
300 Grand Delusion

leadership of Stephan Bendera, a 1,000-strong force had been armed by

various criminal elements and was already engaged in hostile activities
against the Soviet regime by terrorizing the local population. Hiding in
the forests during the day, the organization terrorized the kolkhoz popu­
lation at night, targeting especially the unprotected homes of those who
had been sentenced during the purges.25 An intercepted telegram from
the Japanese consul in Konigsberg seemed to confirm these suspicions.
Apparently various courses in Russian had been organized by the
Germans at local universities. Some 2,000 members of the 'Ukrainian
Union', who had been working at the Siemens factory in Berlin, were
returned to Poland. Indeed six of these, who were finally sent to the
Lvov area, were arrested by a Red Army border patrol.26 Later in May,
120 members of various kolkhozes at a distance of sixteen kilometres
from the border were reported as not leaving for work in the fields in
view of 'the provocative rumours on the imminent outbreak of war
with Germany'. In Moldavia, the report noted, 'hostile elements spread
provocative rumours on market day that the Red Army, retreating under
the threat of a German invasion, was stealing the peasants' livestock on
the way. The peasants fled the market place in panic back to their villages
to lock in their livestock.'27
The negotiations with Schulenburg in mid-May had alerted Stalin to
the danger that rumours and provocations might in fact trigger a war not
desired by Hitler.28 The activities of the nationalists seemed particularly
hazardous, as they could be exploited by the German army which, Stalin
believed, was eager to drag Hitler into war. Clutching at his concept, and
assuming that the activities of the 'counter-revolutionary elements' were
being used by 'foreign intelligence for spying purposes', Stalin instructed
the NKGB to arrest 'provocateurs' and imprison them in special camps
for periods ranging between five and twenty years. Five categories of
•

people were specified, among thern members of nationalist organizations,

former counter-revolutionaries, policemen and former governmental
officials. Nor were their families spared. Merkulov ordered the immedi­
ate construction of special camps to which the suspects would be 'quickly
dispatched' . This operation, wide in scope, took priority even over the
gathering of intelligence at this very crucial stage of the Wehrmacht' s
deployment. Merkulov took charge personally, assisted by 208 officers
who were released from their training at the higher school of the NKGB
in these provinces. The whole operation was to be wound up within three
days.29 On 22 May Beria issued instructions to the border NKGB to launch
a sweeping operation aimed at 'bandits, spies and anti-Soviet revolu­
tionaries' . Some 12,000 suspects and their families were rounded up that
very night and sent to camps in the East. In the next two weeks the NKGB
harnessed all its resources to curtail the activities of these organizations
in the hope of eliminating the threat of provocation.30
Calamity 301

The lack of adequate military or diplomatic means to deal with the

ominous situation sidetracked Stalin into attempts to eliminate the danger
of provocation. A working paper of Foreign Intelligence suggested that the
subversive activities of the Ukrainians and particularly the Poles were led
by former Polish officers whose hope was to exploit an armed conflict with
Germany to achieve their aims. The activities of those organizations was
alleged to be co-ordinated by German intelligence. Strangely enough, all
Jewish and Zionist organizations were marked as subversive anti-Soviet
elements rather than potential victims of Nazism. This was based, in addi­
tion to deep-rooted anti-Semitism, on an assumption that the 'Revisionist'
wing of the Zionist movement was a 'Fascist Jewish Organization' with
pro-British leanings. Their party was alleged to be modelled on Italian
fascism. Moreover, they were bourgeois in their outlook, and if Russia
became involved in war with Britain they could be expected to join hands
with her in sabotaging the Red Army in the rear.3 1
On 1 6 June Sudoplatov, deputy director of Foreign Intelligence, was
ordered by his superior, Fitin, just back from consultations at the Kremlin,
to create a special task force to counter any German attempts at provo­
cations on the border of the sort which had triggered the war in Poland.
The next day Merkulov proudly announced the successful purge of the
'anti-Soviet social elements' in the newly absorbed Baltic territories. In the
course of the campaign, 14,467 people were arrested in the Baltic republics
alone, while 25,71 1 were exiled to Siberia. Until the very last minute, the
NKGB continued to invest great efforts in identifying the alleged sources
of subversion and sabotage inspired by Germany. 32

London: 'This Avalanche Breathing Fire and Death'

On 9 June British intelligence came across fresh evidence which led it to

the conclusion that 'German concentrations against Russia are being
pressed with the utmost speed and vigour'. Eden decided to release the
information in order to 'encourage Russian resistance', obviously to a
German ultimatum.33 From his ambassador in Stockholm he learnt that
'while Soviet-German relations have been strained during the last three
weeks a solution is likely to be found soon and a delegation of Soviet
Military representatives is expected in Berlin to sign a Soviet-German
Military pact. The message is unofficial and presumably sent in order to
ascertain whether Soviet authorities will deny it, affirm it or remain
silent.'34 Hitler's 'apparent decision not to drive home the advantages
gained by his conquest of Greece and Crete, but to stage a major threat
to Russia' was indeed difficult for the Foreign Office to digest. I t seemed,
as Eden admitted, 'the most astonishing development on the grand scale
since the war began'. Indeed Cadogan, who had assumed that there was
302 Grand Delusion

'always method in [Hitler's] madness', confessed that he too was puzzled.

by the intelligence. Eden remained sceptical: 'But if Russia fights, a big if,'
he commented.35
To discourage the British from assuming that German-Soviet negotia­
tions were in progress and therefore hastening their own negotiations
with the Germans, Maisky informed Eden on 10 June that 'no military
alliance was in existence between Germany and l�ussia, nor was one con­
templated. More than that, the Soviet Government were not at present in
negotiation with the German Government about any new agreement,
either economic or political.' The volunteering of this information posed,
however, a serious dilemma. If the concentration meant war tl1e British
might be tempted to initiate their own peace effort or encourage Germany
to turn east.36 The Russians obviously hoped that their assurances would
encourage the press to drop the topic. Instead they were faced with a
plethora of speculation revolving arourLd Cripps' s recall.
Maisky' s hunch that Britain was desperately trying to entangle Russia
in war seemed to be confirmed by his interview with Eden after Cripps' s
return on 1 3 June, just before the release of the Tass communique. Maisky
was under the strong impression that there was a 'campaign in the press
related to the arrival of Cripps . . . and he expressed regret that the mea­
sures undertaken by Eden to put to a stop the ''speculations'' in the papers
on this subject, about which he had informed me on 5 June, had not been
successful' . It obviously confirmed his feeling that Chu.rchill was drum­
ming up the rumours. Maisky warned E.den, even before the publication
of the communique, that 'the type of reports which had appeared yester­
day would not be understood in Moscow and would be resented there' .
Eden, however, had summoned Maisky this time to inform him of the
increasing flow of intelligence in the previous forty-eight hours. The con­
centrations, he stressed, 'might be for the purpose of a war of nerves, or
they might be for the purpose of an attack on Russia'. He appeared des­
perate to impress on Maisky his conviction that the nature of the intelli­
gence now showed that the Germans did plan to attack. However, against
the background of the press campaign, Maisky was quick to reject Eden's
proposal of assistance, which could have been yet another attempt to
embroil Russia in war. The offer, he remarked, presupposed 'intimate
collaboration' between the two countries, which he believed was 'pre­
mature' . Eden, however, persevered, explaining that, whereas previously
he had shared I\tfaisky' s interpretation, the newly available information
had made him change his views. Burdened with the heavy responsibility
of correctly assessing the nature of the information, Maisky pressed Eden
for further evidence on the German intentions 'at an early date, either to­
day or during the week-end'. The urgency of Maisky's request was lost
on Eden, who had promised to consult Churchill and the General Staff
before transmitting the intelligence.37
Calamity

'"fhe decision to part with momentous evidence obtained through

Enigma was finally sanctioned by Churchill late on Sunday 15 June, a
week before the German attack. The Joint Intelligence Committee handed
Cadogan the latest and most up-to-date paper on the likelihood of war,
which was based on the collation of all available intelligence, including
the Enigma reports. This was an extremely generous gesture, as the report
could, if studied carefully, compromise the source of the intelligence. They
further provided him with a map showing a conservative estimate of the
forces facing each other on the border, with the sarcastic comme11t that 'a
comparison of this map and M . Maisky' s remarks to the Secretary of State
during their last interview is very funny'. As Maisky was away for the
weekend, the transfer of the information was delayed until the next
morning.38
Maisky was therefore astounded \Vhen he was summoned to the
Foreign Office on Monday morning to face Cadogan' s detached and
monotonous recital of 'precise and concrete' evidence. What disturbed
Maisky was not so much the realization, subsequently so graphically
depicted in his memoirs, that 'this avalanche, breathing fire and death,
V'Jas at any moment to descend' upon Russia, but rather the soothing
content of his previous communications. He therefore hastened to cable
Moscow, reversing his earlier appreciations.39 Even then Maisky, as
attested in his memoirs, was inhibited from making a precise report by
the perceptions prevailing in Moscow:

Of course, I did not accept Cadogan's communication as 100 per cent

true. Information from military intelligence is not always accurate; the
British were interested in war being let loose in the east, and might
deliberately heighten the colours in order to have a bigger effect on the
Soviet government. For these reasons I made a considerable discount
in my mind from what Cadogan had told me. Nevertheless, the Under­
Secretary' s information was so serious, and the reports he had com­
municated were so precise and concrete, that (it seemed to me) they
should give Stalin serious food for thought, and lead him urgently to
check them and, in any case, give strict instructions to our Western fron­
tier to be on guard!

Despite the censorship, Maisky's cable gave rather accurate information

on the various stages of the German build-up on the Soviet borders in
May and June. The British Chiefs of Staff, however, seriously under­
estimated the magnitude of the deployment in comparison with the
information available to the Russians, and assumed that the Germans
possessed eighty divisions in Poland, thirty in Rumania and five in
Finlan.d and northern Norway, 115 divisions in all, excluding the mobi­
lized Rumanian army.40
 Grand Delusion

The Russians were skating on thin ice by winning over the Germans
but undermining their position in England. That could be particularly
dangerous if negotiations on a separate Anglo-German peace were in
full swing. They were now clearly wavering in their appreciation. The
attitude of the British government to the developing crisis had been
central to the Kremlin's own evaluation. Despite the atmosphere of
despair prevailing in the Kremlin, Stalin's belief in British provocation
on the one hand and in a German ultimatum which would precede an
attack on the other remained unshaken. This was discouraging his
entourage, intelligence sources as well as Maisky, from formulating a
clear-cut evaluation. Maisky's appraisals between 10 and 1 5 June there­
fore played on Stalin's obsession with provocation, as echoed in the
famous communique, and lulled him into ignoring the real danger in the
military sphere.
Pondering with his advisers on the absence of reaction to the commu­
nique, Stalin was faced on 16 June with Maisky' s revised appreciation
after his talks with Cadogan. The repercussions were swift. On the
evening of 1 6 June the British charge d' affaires made a courtesy call at
the Kremlin, his first since Cripps' s departure. In an attempt to minimize
the effect of the communique, Vyshinsky assured him that the reference
to Cripps was not personal vindictiveness; it 'merely registered a fact and
did so in careful words' . It was possible that Cripps' s arrival in )London
'had stimulated [newspaper editors'] imagination', as it was remarkable
that after his arrival on 1 1 June the British press 'gave more prominence
to these reports than before' .41 When Cripps warned Maisky on 1 8 June
that his return to Moscow would be 'largely influenced' by Soviet expla­
nations of the references to him in the communique, he was assured of
the Russians' 'greatest personal regard' for him.42 Within hours Maisky
addressed Eden with an apologetic and conciliatory message almost iden­
tical in wording to that given in Moscow.43
The stopover in Stockholm had cast some doubt on Cripps' s belief in
an imminent agreement. During dinner at the home of the British ambas­
sador in Stockholm, the general director of the Swedish Foreign Ministry
was startled by Cripps' s theories of a possible Soviet-German agreement.
To enlighten the British government he told Cripps of intercepts of the
Wehrmacht' s orders to the troops in Norway. He argued 'with great
emphasis' that the Germans were set on attacking Russia during the week
between 20 and 25 June.44
Cripps was invited to present his views to the War Cabinet, which dis­
cussed Russia for the last time before the outbreak of hostilities on 16 June.
Eden and the Chiefs of Staff treated Cripps to lunch at the Savoy before­
hand. The outlook still remained most uncertain. The army expected
Hitler to destroy the Russian military immediately. Cripps thought
Britain would be better off 'if Soviet is not involved this year & remains
Calamity

a potential threat', but Eden did not believe Hitler would permit it. Faith­
ful to the collective wisdom of his Office, he anticipated that Russia would
'accept harsh terms of ''collaboration'', or be attacked'.45 It was 'not
outside the bounds of possibility', Sargent continued to believe, 'that in a
few days' time Stalin and Hitler will reach an agreement according to
which, in return for the concessions which the Soviet Government
will have to make to Germany, Stalin will be allowed to recoup himself
by annexing Turkish territory beyond the Caucasus or by asserting a
privileged position in the Dardanelles'.46 Churchill continued to waver,
hardly expecting hope to emerge from the East. 'According to all the infor­
mation I have been able to gather,' he wrote to the South African Prime
Minister, 'Hitler is going to take what he wants from Russia, and the only
question is wheth.er Stalin will attempt a vain resistance. I have increas­
ingly good hopes of the United States.'47
The absence of any concrete information led the Cabinet to adopt the
view that 'Germany intended to deliver an ultimatum to Russia when her
military concentrations were complete.' Maisky was accurately informed
of the Cabinet's views by Brendan Bracken, Churchill's unruly adviser.
Two schools of thought seemed to have emerged . Cripps, as the Soviet
ambassador had learnt from him before, feared that although the
Wehrmacht was at its peak the Red Army needed another year to reha­
bilitate itself. He showed sympathy for Stalin in recommending that the
Russians stay out of the war for a while. Churchill, on the other hand,
believed that the Red Army could pose some challenge to Germany,
which might be 'a great help for Britain'. This confirmed Maisky' s fears
that Churchill's appreciations were still coloured by 'wishful thinking', a
desire to see Russia involved in war. Until the very eve of the war Maisky
therefore continued to warn Stalin, with some justification, that the
Cabinet as a whole was 'eager for the USSR to take part in the war' .48 He
was, however, becoming increasingly nervous about the nature of his
reports, especially since his meeting with Cadogan.
Two days after the Cabinet meeting, Maisky lunched with Cripps and
his wife Isobel. Maisky put it to them bluntly that Britain wished to get
Russia involved in the war against Germany. Cripps not only denied this
but told Maisky that all he desired was for Russia to display towards
Britain 75 per cent of the neutrality that she did towards Germany. As
Maisky hastily informed Molotov, Cripps had now become convinced,
despite his performance in Cabinet, 'of the inevitability of a military
conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, which will occur no later
than mid-July'. Maisky still tried to put on a brave face while curiously
clinging to the concept held by the Foreign Office: the build-up was
simply 'one of Hitler's moves in the ''war of nerves'' . . . But a war? An
assault? An attack? I find it difficult to believe. It would be crazy!'
Maisky's feeble denials 'did not make a great impression' on Cripps, who
 Grand Delusion

produced powerful arguments which certainly unsettled Maisky who

ended by saying that he:

possessed absolutely reliable information concerning Hitler's plans.

And if he were successful in defeating the Soviet Union, then after­
wards he would turn with his entire might on England. The members
of the British government with whom Cripps discussed this fact feel
that before an attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler will present us with a
definite ultimatum. Cripps doesn't agree with this. Hitler will simply
attack us without prior warning, because he is interested not in this or
tl1at quantity of goods, resources, etc. which he wants to obtain from
the Soviet Union, but in the destruction of our country itself and the
annihilation of the Red Army.49

Cripps formed the distinct impression that, compared to their meeting a

few days earlier, Maisky 'seemed much less confident that there would
not be a war'. He nonchalantly concluded that their conversation had
brought about 'a complete deflation of the Soviet Ambassador who now
seemed very depressed'.50 The same impression was gained by Geoffrey
Dawson, the editor of The Times, who found Maisky suddenly convinced
of a German invasion.51
\
I

22 June 1 94 1 : The Long Weekend

Assarasson, the Swedish ambassador to Moscow, doyen of the diplomatic
community in Moscow and a keen Kremlin-watcher, provided the best
description of the atmosphere in the Kremlin on the last days of peace:

No one either knows or is prepared to say a thing about what is hap­

pening, if anything is indeed happening on the diplomatic front. One
suggests that negotiations are under way, a second that they have
not started yet, and a third that there won't be any negotiations but
an ultima tum . Some say that the demands, whether they have been
made or not, concern the Ukraine and the Baku oil wells, while others
suggest they are concerned with different issues. Some suggest that the
demobilization and disarming of the Ukraine are part of the demands.
Most believe that war is inevitable and imminent; some believe that a
war is intended and desired by the German side. A few think that there
won't be a war, at least not presently, and that Stalin will make exten­
sive concessions in order to avoid the war. The only certain thing is that
we face either a battle of global significance between the Third Reich
and the Soviet Empire or the most gigantic case of blackmail in world
history.52
Calamity

Stalin seemed to be suppressing all thoughts of war. His behaviour,

however, displayed to people like Khrushchev that he was restless and
seriously worried. He now took to heavy bouts of drinking, to which he
also subjected his entourage. Moreover, unlike his usual habit he sought
constant company, which seemed to banish from his mind the night­
marish thoughts of an imminent war. Prolonged dinners and gatherings
at his dacha replaced the working sessions in the Kremlin which had pre­
viously characterized his routine.s3 Up to the very last minute Stalin con­
tinued to believe that the German army was trying to provoke the conflict.
As Kollontai admitted on the day of the invasion, Stalin 'certainly hoped
and believed that a war would not break out without prior negotiations
during which a solution to avoid war would be found' .s4 He had,
however, lost the initiative and was practically paralysed.
The 'total silence' from the Kremlin and the reticence of the national
press reflected the wish to prevent even the semblance of provocation.ss
Since the issue of the communique, Gafencu wrote home, Moscow had
been living 'under the silence of Hitler. 'fhe war of nerves is at full blast,
worsened by the news from Finland and Rumania about more and more
significant military preparations.'56 Schulenburg was living under the
same shadow, convinced that a war would not serve German interests.
But the common view in the German embassy, with which Stalin certainly
concurred, was that 'when the gun is loaded it may go off even if not
intended'; they entertained the illusion that it was Hitler's tactics 'to keep
the King in constant check without forcing a checkmate'. Schulenburg had
even sent his counsellor, Walther, as a last resort to Berlin to find out
whether a meeting could be arranged between Hitler and Stalin.57
In the lull Stalin continued to contemplate the arrangements which he
might be able to extract in the peace agreements. Bogomolov, his trusted
ambassador in Vichy, who had just returned from consultations at home,
explained that 'the new partition of the territories in Europe and the estab­
lishment of new States in place of those which existed before the war will
not become definite until the new frontiers are confirmed by the peace
treaties involving the countries directly interested'. Stalin had been visu­
alizing two scenarios. If Germany were to emerge as the victor of the war,
Poland 'would be wiped off the map'; if Germany were defeated it was
obvious that 'Poland would be reconstituted as an independent State and
its borders fixed by treaty with the Soviet Union' .ss Over tea at the Quai
d'Orsay General Sousloparov, Bogomolov' s military attache, expressed
the 'profound conviction that the Germans will not attack the Soviet
Union and further refuted the existence of tension between Berlin and
Moscow'. He admitted that it had originally appeared that the British
were spreading the rumours, but it was now 'incontestable that the
rumours have been propagated if not directly through the German infor­
mation services then certainly with their consent'. He reflected accurately
308 Grand Delusion

the views held by Stalin that the reason for the rumours seemed to be the
'pressure which the German Government is expected to exert on Moscow
to increase considerably the delivery of grain, oil products and other raw
materials, indispensable for continuing the war' .59
Maisky was spending the unusually hot weekend at Bovington, the
house of his friend the former Republican ambassador of Spain. He was
not beguiled by the serenity of the British countryside. The burden of
responsibility which had fallen on him in the previous two months was
difficult to bear. The most recent disclosures of Cadogan and Cripps ques­
tioned the essence of his consistent reports to Moscow. Many other Soviet
ambassadors may well have shared that feeling. Pondering on the
rumours, statements, cajolery and threats of the last month, Maisky, like
Stalin, continued to vacillate:

But perhaps this is artificially inflated by British speculations? Maybe

this is British 'wishful thinking'? Yet another attempt to disrupt our rela­
tions with Germany and drag us into war on their side? Frankly speak­
ing, I don't really believe that Hitler will attack us. To make war on
Russia has always been very difficult. An invasion always ends tragic­
ally for the initiators. One only has to recall the Poles (during the Time
of Troubles), Charles XII, Napoleon, the Kaiser in 1918. Russian geogra­
phy has not changed all that much. And in addition, and this is espe­
cially important, we have a powerful army, and we have tanks, aircraft,
artillery . . . We have the same instruments of war which Germany has
and which, for example, France did not possess. We are strongly united
at home in a way that France was not. We will be able to stand up for
ourselves. Is it at all possible that in such circumstances Hitler will risk
an attack on us? You know that would be tantamount to suicide.

Shortly after lunch Maisky was recalled to London, where Cripps gave
him further evidence of the forthcoming attack, which was duly dis­
patched to Moscow. Cripps disclosed that information obtained from a
reliable intelligence source (the source was Enigma) ' bears witness to the
rapid approach of the moment of ''action'' on the part of Germany. That
all German ships berthed in Abo and other Finnish ports had received
orders to set sail.' He expected Hitler to attack the next morning or the
following Sunday. Hitler, Cripps explained to Maisky, would derive a
slight advantage from attacking on a Sunday when the enemy was in a
lower state of alert. Cripps promised Maisky, though it would be taken
in Moscow with a grain of salt, that Britain 'would not slacken its war
effort'. In a manifestly schizophrenic fashion Maisky continued to dismiss
the likelihood of war, much as he had done during his conversations with
Eden on 13 June, suggesting that 'the entire scene, as illuminated by you,
looks no more than highly hypothetical'.60
Calamity 309

The winter had been unusually long in Moscow and snow had still
fallen in the second week of June. On this particular Saturday the warm
sun suddenly broke through and crowds thronged the parks on this long
white night. The air of uncertainty weighed heavily on the Kremlin
during this weekend. 'The situation is unclear,' the distressed Molotov
confessed to Dimitrov, 'a great game is being played. Not everything
depends on us.' 61 Although he admitted in conversation with the Turkish
ambassador that the situation had become 'confused and uncertain', he
too was under orders from Stalin to display robust confidence that the
'Soviet Union had no reason for anxiety' . 62 Stalin arrived at the Kremlin
in the early hours of the afternoon well aware that he was no longer the
master of events.
The precautionary and surreptitious military moves were accompanied
by desperate diplomatic efforts to impress on the Germans what the com­
munique had failed to do. Saturday 21 June was an exceptionally warm
and pleasant day in Berlin too. Most members of the Russian embassy
were resting and swimming in the serene surroundings of the Potsdam
and Wannsee parks. The few left at the embassy were suddenly alerted
and set to frenzied activity. A protest at the increase of German recon­
naissance flights over Soviet territory was to be lodged personally with
Ribbentrop, significantly accompanied by expressions of Soviet readiness
to embark on negotiations. The hectic efforts to open a dialogue in Berlin
were aimed at gaining direct access to Hitler, to acquaint him with the
gravity of the situation. Dekanozov had failed to do so in a meeting he
forced on Weizsacker on the evening of 1 8 June. All efforts, however, to
establish contact with the Wilhelmstrasse were futile now. Ribbentrop had
deliberately left Berlin early in the morning, giving specific instructions
that Dekanozov be kept at arm's length. 63 The Russian ambassador was
to be told that as soon as he returned from the country Ribbentrop would
contact him. The constant telephone calls from Moscow urging the staff
of the embassy to expedite communication brought no response.
Consequently Schulenburg was rushed to the Kremlin at 6 p.m.
Molotov had clearly lost much of his composure, complaining about the
massive German violations of Soviet air space. He wished to find out why
members of the German embassy and their wives had left Russia, giving
rise to rumours of imminent war. Why did the German government not
react to the 'peace-loving' Tass communique? What had caused German
discontent with the Soviet Union, 'if it actually exists'? Molotov was
unable to get any response to his pleas. Schulenburg, however, dropped
his final hint about the German intentions, which obviously he did not
report home. He admitted that 'posing those issues was justified', but
unfortunately he was in no position to answer, as Berlin 'kept him entirely
in the dark'. Rather pathetically, Molotov whined tl1at 'there was
no reason for the German government to be dissatisfied with Russia'.
 310 Grand Delusion

Schulenburg ominously repeated that he was in no position to answer the

questions. His own ray of hope was the news he had heard on the British
radio that Dekanozov had met Ribbentrop a couple of times during the
day. But Molotov, who had also been tuned in to the BBC, regretfully
denied such developments, parting from Schulenburg even more
baffled.64 Dekanozov finally forced a meeting with Weizsacker at 9 . 30 p.m.
and handed him a note, similar to the one Schulenburg had received in
Moscow, specifying some 1 80 cases of German reconnaissance flights over
Soviet territory since the latest Soviet complaint in April. The flights, the
note stated, 'had assumed a systematic arld intentional character'. The
expression of confidence that 'the German government will take steps to
put an end to these border violations' clearly reflected the conviction in
Moscow that Hitler could curb the army. Weizsacker gained time by
proposing that Dekanozov await the official response.65
Zhukov was spending the day with Timoshenko at the Ministry of
Defence. As Molotov was conferring with the German ambassador,
Zhukov received an urgent call from the Chief of Staff of the Kiev
District, informing him of a German sergeant-major who had just crossed
the border and revealed the attack plans for the next morning. Stalin,
anxiously waiting to hear from Molotov, suggested that he should come
to the Kremlin together with the Defence Minister in forty-five minutes.
'

When they reached the Kremlin at around 7 p.m. Stalin met them on his
own. He now seemed worried but was still toying with the idea that the
German generals had sent the defector deliberately 'to provoke a conflict' .
Some members of the Politburo had assembled in the meantime and in
response to a query by Stalin Timoshenko proposed to activate the direc­
tive setting the covering forces in motion. Stalin found it to be too blunt:
'It is premature to issue the directive, as it is perhaps still possible to solve
the problem by peaceful means.' He preferred to issue a shorter, more
general warning wl1ich Zhukov hastened to prepare: The last-minute
instructions to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 10th Armies, sent at
2.30 a.m., though still drafted prudently to satisfy Stalin's obsession with
avoiding provocation, nonetheless stirred the covering forces:

1 . A surprise attack by the Germans is possible during 22-23 June

1941 on the LVO (Leningrad Military District [M. D.]), PRIBOVO (Baltic
M. D.), ZAPOVO (Special Western M. D.), KOVO ( Kiev M. D.), ODVO
(Odessa M. D.) fronts. The attack may be preceded by a provocative
action.
2. The task of our forces is to refrain from any kind of provocative
action which might result in serious complications.
3 . I order that:
a) During the night of 22 June 1941 the firing positions of the fortified
regions on the state border are to be occupied secretly.
Calamity 311

b) Before dawn of 22 June 1941 all aircraft stationed in the field aero­
drome are to be dispersed and carefully camouflaged.
c) All units are to be put in a state of military preparedness without
calling up supplementary troops. Undertake measures to ensure black­
out of cities and targets. No further measures are to be carried out
without specific instructions. 66

Some steps, however, were taken. Zhukov was assigned overall command
of the south-western and southern fronts, where the main German
onslaught was still expected to fall. His predecessor as Chief of Staff,
Meretskov, was appointed commander of the northern front. 67
Stalin had been subjected to endless warnings since the beginning of
the month, and had been pressed during the entire week to issue direc­
tives alerting the troops. That Sunday, disconcerting as it might have been,
did not seem different to him. After conversing for another fifteen minutes
with Molotov and Beria, he felt confident enough to return early to his
dacha at 1 1 p.m. 68 Zhukov and Timoshenko felt differently. They returned
from the Kremlin to the Ministry of Defence and communicated with the
various fronts, keeping them all alert. Around midnight their attention
was drawn by Kirponos to a second deserter who had swum across the
river and informed the NKGB border police that the attack would start
at 4 a.m. Stalin, who was promptly informed at his dacha, was little
moved and retired to bed.
At 3 . 30 a.m. the coded telephones started ringing at the Ministry of
Defence, bringing news of heavy German shelling along the entire fron­
tier. Stalin was speechless when Zhukov contacted him on the phone;
only his heavy breathing could be heard. Despite Zhukov's insistence
he refused to sanction any counter-measures. By 4. 30 a .m., when
Zhukov and Timoshenko were on their way to the Kremlin, the German
artillery had been pounding Soviet cities, the Soviet air force had been
annihilated on the ground and the war machine had started rolling into
Russia. At the Kremlin the two Soviet commanders encountered a 'very
pale' Stalin, 'sitting at the table clutching a loaded unlit pipe in both
hands'. Present were also the ubiquitous Mekhlis and Voroshilov,
Molotov and Beria. Stalin was clearly 'bewildered' but desperately
hanging on to his misconception, suggesting it might still be 'a provoca­
tion of the German officers'. He was little moved by Timoshenko' s
attempts to bring him down to earth, and ignored the Marshal's insis­
tence that rather than being a local inc.ident this was an all-out offensive
along the entire front. Stalin simply dug in his heels, suggesting that 'if it
were necessary to organize a provocation, then the German generals
would bomb their own cities' . After some reflection he added, 'Hitler
surely does not know about it.' As a last resort he wished Molotov to
speak to Schulenburg.
 312 Grand Delusion

In the meantime Schulenburg himself was seeking an urgent meeting

with Molotov. Between 3 and 4 a.m. a phone call had arrived at Molotov's
secretariat from Schulenburg' s office. Stalin's all-powerful secretary
Poskrebyshev received the information and alerted Stalin and Molotov.
Molotov left Stalin's office and went upstairs to his office.69 Schulenburg
had received a top-secret telegram instructing him to destroy the
embassy's radio set and all the cipher material. He was to meet Molotov
at 4 a.m. as the first salvo landed on the Soviet troops, and make to him
a detailed statement underlining alleged Soviet hostile acts against
Germany since the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Hitler
deliberately did not couch the statement as a declaration of war, wishing
to present the attack as a defensive reaction to alleged Soviet aggression.70
While Molotov was meeting Schulenburg Stalin continue to ward off
Zhukov's pleas to activate the deployment plans. At exactly the same time
Dekanozov was rushed to see Ribbentrop in an official car put at his dis­
posal by the Germans. He was informed that 'under the impression of the
serious threat of a political and military nature which was emanating
from Soviet Russia, Germany had since this morning taken the appropri­
ate counter-measures in the military spheres' . The war which Stalin had
, been so anxious to avert had now descended on Russia. As he was taking
his leave, Dekanozov was pursued by Ribbentrop, who was in a mani­
festly distressed and maudlin state. The Foreign Minister begged the
ambassador to impress on Moscow that he had tried to no avail to prevent
Hitler from embarking on war. Throughout the war, Hilger later attested,
Ribbentrop would seize opportunities of recapturing 'something of his
moments of glory . . . he never ceased dreaming about another chance to
talk with Stalin' .71
Schulenburg drove to the Kremlin at around 5 a.m. He found Molotov
'wearing a tired and worn-out expression'. Even at this trying moment,
Schulenburg retained his integrity. He skipped the catalogue of accusa­
tions, informing Molotov that it was 'with the deepest regret' that he had
to inform him of what he himself had not known when he had met him
a couple of hours earlier, that the German government felt obliged to take
'military measures' to counter the Soviet concentration of troops on the
border. He added that he could 'hardly conceal his despondency, caused
by the inexcusable and unexpected action of his own government'. He
reminded Molotov of the utmost efforts he had made to preserve peace
and friendship witl1 the USSR. Still hoping that the situation was a
prelude to negotiations, Molotov wished to know what was the status of
the oral note, as it obviously was not an official declaration of war. Schu­
lenburg, however, robbed him of any hope, bluntly telling him 'that he
believed it meant the beginning of war'. Molotov tried in vain to explain
that the concentrations were only part of the summer manoeuvres. He
further revealed the Kremlin's state of mind by complaining that 'until
Calamity 313

the very last minute the German gov·ernment had not presented any
demand to the Soviet government' . Showing little interest in the arrange­
ments for the evacuation of the two embassies from Moscow and Berlin,
all Molotov wished to know was 'why did Germany conclude a pact of
non-aggression, if she so easily breached it?' Schulenburg then took leave
of Molotov 'in silence, but with the customary handshake' .72
Even when Molotov returned with the bleak news Stalin inhibited the
military from implementing the defensive plans, endorsing a special
directive which still specifically forbade the troops 'with the sole excep­
tion of the air force' to cross the German lines. He was clearly under the
illusion that the war could be delayed. But, given the surprise attack and
the absence of preliminary preparations, it was impossible to implement
the deployment directives effectively.73
By seven o'clock members of the Politbu1·0 had gathered at their
Kremlin offices. Stalin was discussing the situation in an adjoining room
with Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Malenkov. Though Stalin
appeared calm and self-confident, he entrusted Molotov with the official
announcement on the radio. It was only then that the various diplomatic
efforts to redress the situation were abandoned and the various theatres
received the green light to implement the deployment directives. They
called for the execution of 'deep operations' in which the air force, which
had just been struck a terrible blow by the Luftwaffe, was expected to
take the lead in disrupting the deployment of the German forces and air
force in the rear at a depth of 100-150 kilometres.74 These orders were
never carried out.
* * *

Well into the morning of 22 June Stalin did not exclude the possibility that
Russia was being intimidated into political submission. As Molotov con­
fessed to Cripps a week after the eruption of war, the Kremlin had not
anticipated that war 'would come without any discussion or ultimatum'.75
It is interesting to note Stalin's reaction of surprise to the ominous news
from the front on tl1e morning of 22 June. The Germans, he grumbled,
'just descended on us, without using any pretexts, not carrying out any
negotiations; simply attacked basely like thieves'. He also seemed to
justify his policy on the eve of the war by producing Schulenburg' s expla­
nation for the attack, which claimed that the Germans 'consider them­
selves threatened by the concentration of Soviet forces on their eastern
borders and have implemented counter-measures' .76
Stalin was equally puzzled by the fact that Britain had not joined in a
crusade against Russia. As long as he believed he could avert war, the
probability of an alliance with Britain seemed remote. Mesmerized by the
recent German successes in the Balkans, he was even more reluctant to
make the slightest move which might be interpreted by the Germans as
 Grand Delusion

provocation. His suspicion of Britain had been intensified by the Hess

affair and the various warnings by Cripps and Churchill. When the British
charge d'affaires paid a visit to the Kremlin early on Sunday 22 June, he
found the Russians not only, as might have been expected, 'exceedingly
nervous', but also 'excessively cautious'.77 This explains the silence and
confusion which engulfed Maisky in the early days of the war. Maisky
heard of the invasion on the BBC morning news and even had to post­
pone a meeting with Eden until 11e became acquainted with Soviet policy
through Molotov's radio address. 78
Over the weekend preceding the attack, Churchill had for the first time
displayed some interest in the Russian war. Operation 'Battleaxe' against
Rommel had just foundered and a war in the East, as Eden suggested,
could prove useful: 'We need a breathing space & could use it.'79 Churchill
was preoccupied with how to renew the attempt 'to regain the initiative
in Libya and disengage Tobruk' . He hoped he would be able to send the
crucial 100 cruiser tanks with a special convoy 'if and when the enemy is
engaged against Russia' .80
When the Soviet-German war broke out Maisky posed Eden a series
of questions which betrayed the same concern: 'Could he assure his Gov­
ernment that our position and our policy were unchanged? He felt sure
that Germany would seek to combine offensive action on Russia with a
peace move towards the Western Powers. Could the Soviet Government
be assured that our war effort would not slacken?' Churchill gladly
responded to Maisky' s modest request. He had never considered the
peace proposals, and would be less likely to do so now that Germany was
tied up on the eastern front. His rhetoric in the famous broadcast speech
on the day of the invasion concealed the absence of any major shift in
strategy by referring to the more pressing Soviet anxiety, the Russians'
astonishing belief in British connivance in the German attack: 'We will
never parley, we will never negotiate, with Hitler or any of his gang. We
shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him by
air . . . '81 Maisky' s reaction to the speech in his diary clearly reflects his
relief: 'A powerful presentation! A wonderful presentation . . . The
essence of his speech - a warlike, decisive speech, no compromises or
agreements! War to the end! This is exactly what is needed today.'82
The Politburo of the British Communist Party issued a statement on the
same day, before it had been briefed by Moscow and before hearing
Churchill's pledge of assistance, claiming that Hitler's attack was 'the
sequel of the secret moves which have been taking place behind the
curtain of the Hess mission' .83 Soviet suspicion of British connivance
in the German attack was expressed by prominent members of the Soviet
embassy in London on several occasions, even after Churchill's speech. If
Churchill and Eden were forced to retire, they insisted, those who would
take over 'would make a separate peace with Germany at the expense of
Calamity

Russia'.84 Nor was Cripps surprised to find Stalin, at their first meeting
after the invasion, apprehensive about a possible separate peace. After all,
he disclosed in his diary, 'we have tried to make them [apprehensive] in
the past so as to prevent them going too far with the Germans' .85 'All
believed', recalled Litvinov in Washington a few months later, 'that the
British fleet was steaming up the North Sea for a joint attack, with Hitler,
on Leningrad and Kronstadt.'86
 ..
Conclusion

Stalin was little affected by sentiment or ideology in the pursuit of foreign

policy. His statesmanship was rooted in Russia's tsarist legacy, and
responded to imperatives deep within its history. 'I am reading at break­
fast now a life of Tsar Alexander and his entanglement with Napoleon at
the time of Tilsit & after,' wrote Stafford Cripps in his diary a mere month
before the German invasion, 'and it is really very remarkable how similar
the strategy of Hitler is vis-a-vis Russia to that of Napoleon vis-a-vis
Alexander! It looks very much sometimes as if history would repeat
itself.'1
True, Stalin's system of government was characterized by an idiosyn­
cratic and despotic choice of methods. Who would dispute the disastrous
impact of Stalin's purges of the military in the 1930s and his meddling in
the workings of the High Command? Yet it would ' be a mistake to
attribute Soviet foreign policy in the wake of the Ribbentrop-Molotov
Pact either to the whims of a tyrant or to relentless ideological
expans1on1sm.
• •

Stalin's policy appears to have been rational and level-headed - an

unscrupulous Realpolitik serving well-defined geopolitical interests.
Marx's battle cry for the international proletariat in 1848, that they had
'little to lose in this revolution but their own chains', evoked far less
resonance in Stalin than Palmerston's famous dictum of the same year
that 'we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our
interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our duty to
follow.' As Henry Kissinger put it in his characteristically succinct way,
'Richelieu or Bismarck would have had no difficulty understanding
[Stalin's] strategy.' And yet the traditional 'unrestrained balance-of-power
policy' was blended with a Metternich-like belief that relations between
Conclusion

states 'had to be determined by consensus among like-minded rulers' .2 It

is not surprising that in the execution of his foreign policy Machiavelli
rather than Lenin was Stalin's idol; here was a man who had The Prince
specially translated for him.
Strict neutrality rather than commitment to Germany was regarded by
Stalin as the crowning success of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Having
signed the pact under duress, Stalin was evidently determined to extract
the utmost from it. He sought to redress the imbalances which he felt
had been inflicted on Russia not only at the Versailles peace conference
and in the inter-war period, but also throughout the nineteenth-century
struggle for the mastery of Europe. Stalin did not expect that Germany
and England would exhaust themselves in the war, but he certainly hoped
that they would lose a few feathers. While establishing his own agenda
for the peace conference, he believed he had secured a sufficient
breatlung space to improve the military preparedness of the Red Arm.y, a
vital bargaining counter in the anticipated negotiations. The policy was
exclusively geared towards the attainment of what he regarded as
Russia's national interests. The gist of this policy was the idea of 'spheres
of influence', which ipso facto undermined sovereignty. The creation of a
buffer zone along the entire Western border was a legacy of the Russian
tsars, who perceived free access to the Black Sea in the south, the Baltic
Sea in the north and the Pacific Ocean in the east as fundamental to
Russia's status as a major European power and the defence of her vul­
nerable borders. The smaller states, tucked uncomfortably between
Russia and Germany along the entire buffer zone from Finland in the
north to Turkey in the south, had adapted their policies to the realities
dictated by geopolitical factors. Failure to do so led to disastrous conse­
quences and usually ensued from a mistaken evaluation of their ability
to resist or of the extent of the support they were likely to receive from a
third party. Ultimately the victims of the 'power game' could at best enlist
international indignation.
During the Phoney War Stalin appeared confident of the arrangements
he had sec11red along his Western and Northern European borders. More­
over the breathing space he had gained seemed to allow him sufficient
time to bolster his military machine. His gaze, however, was directed at
the Balkans, the Turkish Straits, the Okhotsk Sea and the Kuril Islands in
the Far East.
In view of the eventual formation of the Grand Alliance, it is rarely rec­
ognized by historians that the Russians regarded the Germans and the
British with equal suspicion. Churchill's assumption of the premiership
in May 1940 was not reassuring to the Russians. He did little to challenge
the Foreign Office' s fatalistic concept which excluded the possibility of
collaboration with Russia for the duration of the war. In London it was
taken for granted that the neutrality pact would eventually mutate into a

•
 Grand Delusion

inilitary alliance between Russia and Germany. The effect of hostilities

between Britain and Russia on the grand strategy of the war received only
perfunctory consideration. Indeed, the Soviet Union was twice brought
to the threshold of war with Britain: during the Soviet-Finnish war and
again when the Allies decided to bomb the Soviet oilfields in Baku. Such
plans, in which Churchill was personally involved, were forestalled only
by the German occupation of Norway, Denmark and France.
The appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as ambassador to Moscow was
a last-ditch attempt to prevent the crystallization of a Soviet-German bloc
after the disastrous collapse of France. But it was also, as Stalin accurately
perceived, an attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany in
the Balkans. Cripps, whose ideas on post-war Europe coincided with the
views held in Moscow, was however an outspoken opponent of his own
government. His bitter haggling with Churchill and the civil servants
at the Foreign Office, observed by Stalin, culminated in the execution
of conflicting policies, further obfuscating the picture in the paranoiac
atmosphere in the Kremlin.
Well into 1940 it was British naval predominance in the Mediterranean,
rather than the German threat, which seemed to oppress Stalin. Drawing
on the historical experiences of the Crimean War and the Allied inter­
vention in the Civil War, he feared that Turkey might serve as a spring­
board for an Allied attack against the Soviet Union. From his vantage
point only full control of the Black Sea littoral and the mouth of the
Danube could complete the security arrangemertts he had achieved
through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.
The dazzling victory of the Wehrmacht in France shattered Stalin's
confidence. He now faced the bleak prospect of being either left out of the
peace arrangements or crushed by German supremacy unless he took the
initiative to safeguard Russia's interests. The threat that Hitler might
establish hegemony over Europe by sheer military predominance drew
Stalin closer to Mussolini. By presenting a united front they hoped to con­
solidate their common interests in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea, with Germany's blessing. The new community of interests
further arose out of the vacuum created by the fading Anglo-French
presence in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Yet once the Germans
diverted their attention to the Balkans, and in particular the economic
resources of Rumania, their overwhelming power was brought to bear on
Italy, finishing off the collaboration with Russia.
It was the growing Soviet-Italian understanding which paved the way
for the Russian occupation of Bessarabia. The expansion to the mouth of
the Danube, rather than being an irredentist move, gave the Russians
control of the river and served as a springboard for a further advance
towards the Straits. For Stalin, securing the land-bridge was pivotal for
the implementation of any revised arrangement concerning the Straits.
Conclusion

Most alarming for the Russians was their deliberate exclusion from the
arbitration arrangements forced on Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in
Vienna on 30 August, arrangements which determined the borders of
Rumania and set the mechanism for the control of the River Danube.
Those arrangements undermined the status of the Soviet Union as a major
European power, exposed a vital gap in her security arrangements and
terminated her aspirations in the Black Sea.
There is therefore little to support the claim that, during his visit to
Berlin in November 1940, Molotov conspired with Hitler to divide the
entire world. The directive for the talks, dictated to Molotov in Stalin's
dacha and taken in longhand, was confined to intrinsic Soviet interests in
the Balkans and the Turkish Straits and dominated by considerations of
security. It is indisputable, though, that security was to be achieved partly
through the annexation of territories with little respect for their sover­
eignty. Stalin specifically opposed the dismemberment of the British
Empire, which he anticipated at the peace conference.
From the Berlin meeting onwards Stalin was torn between a desire to
prevent the Germans from reaching the Straits and a fear that any asso­
ciation with the British in the Balkans might provoke the Germans and
be deliberately used by the British to embroil Russia in a war. Stalin's
resort to elaborate diplomatic moves reflected his awareness of the weak­
ness of the Red Army, seriously crippled by the purges of 1937-8. Steady
preparations wer-e therefore under way to improve Russia's military pre­
paredness and, far more significantly, her bargaining power in the
impending peace conference, which he hoped would topple the Versailles
order and restore Russia's position as a major power. By the time the
peace conference convened, Stalin expected Russia to be powerful enough
to redress her past and present grievances.
The acute sense of a German threat to Russia led Stalin to walk a
tightrope, desperately seeking both a political arrangement and a remedy
for the Red Army. The key directives of the General Staff for 194 1 , exam­
ined here for the first time, reveal that Stalin, who was fully informed of
the extent of German deployment, made frantic attempts to reform the
army in the spring of 194 1 . Those measures were debated in great detail
at a special meeting of the High Command in the Kremlin in December
and put to the test in two complex war games in early 194 1 . Both assumed
a German invasion of Russia and their conclusions were implernented in
the mobilization and deployment plans which were prepared by General
Zhukov, the newly appointed Chief of Staff, in the spring of 1941. The
sophisticated new military doctrine, devised in the mid-193os under the
leadership of the ill-fated General Tukhachevsky, was now revived. Great
efforts were made to hasten the fortification of the borders acquired in
1939-40, but this had been only partially achieved when the Germans
attacked.
320 Grand Delusion

In mid-April 1941 the head of Military Intelligence, General Golikov,

submitted to Stalin an alarming report on the massive movement of
German troops towards the Russian borders. Stalin conceded that, despite
vast strides, the Red Army was far from ready for battle. The turnover in
the High Command had disrupted the reconstruction of the army: three
Chiefs of Staff served in the single year preceding the war. A stream
of reports from division commanders revealed severe shortcomings.
The only solution therefore was a temporary accommodation with the
Germans. The conclusion of the Friendship Agreement with Yugoslavia
in early April 1941 was not a rebuff to Hitler, as other writers have main­
tained hitherto. Riding the wave of popular support in Belgrade after a
coup d 'etat had brought a non-compliant government to power, Stalin
hoped to deter Hitler from carrying the war further east and lead him
back to the peace conference. The dramatic negotiations between the
Yugoslavs and the Russians were in fact subordinated to their common
wish to avert war rather than mount effective resistance to Hitler.
If, however, hostilities were to break out, Stalin could still revert to
neutrality while encouraging the Yugoslavs to tie down the Wehrroacht
for at least two months, after which weather conditions would force the
Germans to postpone the campaign until the next spring. The high expec­
tations of the Ministry of Defence, backed by Molotov, proved unfounded
when Yugoslavia was occupied a mere ten days after the German
invasion. Stalin was confronted by an almost untouched Wehrmacht,
deployed earlier than expected along the entire border before the dialogue
with Hitler had begun.
Attention should be drawn to two aspects of Stalin's appeasement.
One was the dramatic decision to dissolve the Comintern, which was
regarded as a major stumbling-block to future collaboration with
Germany. The other was the Neutrality Pact with Japan, signed in April
194 1 . The significance of the pact was not, as has hitherto been suggested,
in relieving the threat of war on two fronts. Rather it was a positive
move, sustained by similar attempts to reconcile Italy and revive
Ribbentrop's idea that Russia should join the Axis. A surprising
discovery from the Russian archives is the fact that these forlorn hopes
were cultivated by the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Werner
von Schulenburg, later a leading member of the attempted coup against
Hitler in 1944. After failing to convince Hitler of the folly of a war
against Russia, Schulenburg made unauthorized overtures in Moscow
to prevent the war. Over a number of clandestine breakfast meetings
with the Soviet leadership, he encouraged Stalin to take measures
which he believed might lead to a renewal of the negotiations started by
Molotov in Berlin in the previous autumn. Schulenburg, like Cripps and
Maisky, deflected Stalin from the real danger by constantly stressing
the need to placate Germany through the quashing of rumours of war
Conclusion 321

originating in London. He reinforced Stalin's well-founded suspicion

that, after the fiascos in Greece and North Africa, Churchill was keen
to see Russia dragged into the war to alleviate the German pressure on
Britain.
Stalin's refusal to reckon with the potential consequences of a miscal­
culation, while adamantly pursuing his appeasement and avoiding
provocation at all costs, was perhaps the single most significant factor in
the calamity which befell the Russians on 22 June 194 1 . It had severe
repercussions in that it increased the mistrust he harboured towards the
military in the crucial month preceding the German attack on Russia.
More than ever he now clung to diplomacy in an attempt to appease
Hitler and delay if not avoid a war. The Yugoslav episode marked a water­
shed. Like Chamberlain before him, Stalin was mesmerized by the
German might and opted for the diplomatic solution. But, drawing on the
experience of British 'appeasement', he did not neglect the military and
was in the process of restoring the army when war erupted.
The wish to seek an agreement with Germany at all costs was also
strongly motivated by the fear that British provocation might entangle
Russia in war. Contrary to Churchill's account, the massive German con­
centration in the East was consistently interpreted in London, as late as
the first week of June 1941, as pressure mounted by the Germans to secure
positive results in the negotiations that Britain imagined must be under
way with Russia. The evidence presented here shows that Churchill's
warning to Stalin of the German deployment in April, rather than being
a landmark in the formation of the Grand Alliance, in fact achieved
the opposite. Stalin was diverted from the main danger, suspecting
that Churchill was bent on drawing Russia into the hostilities.
His false evaluation was reinforced by Cripps's unauthorized diplomatic
initiatives. Cripps believed that the only effective method of bringing
the Russians closer to Britain was to play on Soviet fears of a separate
peace. The warnings, backed by rumours which derived from the Foreign
Office, were extremely ill-advised, as they played on Stalin's underlying
fears.
Despite the purges which had crippled the Soviet intelligence services,
they remained very effective. However, they were not immune to the uni­
versal limitations of intelligence: the way in which it is analysed, sifted
and forwarded to the leadership, and misperceptions which lead to ten­
dentious reading of the material. There was sufficient ambiguity in the
vast intelligence offered to Stalin for him to be convinced that the attack
might be deferred, or at best unleashed at a time of his own choosing, if
he played his diplomatic cards well. The intelligence indicated a possible
split between Hitler and the Wehrmacht: while Hitler hoped to achieve
his aims through negotiations, the Wehrmacht sougl1t war. This only
strengthened Stalin's belief that to declare a general mobilization and
322 Grand Delusion

deployment on the border would be tantamount to an act of war. Stali1�

was not really misled by German intelligence or by his own services. He
was clearly suffering from self-delusion, constantly inventing rational
justifications for his misconceptions.
In the light of these events, the flight of Rudolf Hess to Scotland on 12
May 1941 on a peace mission emerges as a key to the understanding of
the Soviet attitude to the approaching conflict. The most recent docu­
ments released by the British government reveal an incredible attempt
by MI6, encouraged by the Foreign Office, to use Hess 'mendaciously'
through covert intelligence sources to prevent the Russians from con­
cluding an agreement with Germany. This disinformation seemed to cor­
roborate Stalin's evaluation that a split indeed existed within the German
leadership, and that Hess was seeking peace with Britain in order to con­
vince Hitler to withdraw his reservations about a campaign against
Russia. British intelligence hoped that the information would inspire
Stalin to join forces with Britain before it was too late, rather than seeking
an agreement with Germany. The message had the opposite effect in the
Kremlin, enhancing the belief that the rumours of war were indeed fab­
ricated in London in an attempt to involve Russia in an unnecessary
conflict.
This, then, is the context in which Zhukov's directive of 1 5 May for a
pre-emptive strike against Germany should be examined. The directive is
of course a centrepiece in the case produced by the 'revisionists' . They
assume that the plan had originated with Stalin himself and was 'appro­
priately signed' , thus proving Soviet strategy to be 'offensive', that is
aggressive. And yet the directive was never even initialled, while the
following day Zhukov issued a signed second directive for a defensive
deployment of the Red Army in anticipation of a German attack. It is this
directive which, with minor alterations, remained in force until 22 June.
Moreover, a thorough analysis of Zhukov's proposal divests it of its sin­
ister character. Adopting the highly sophisticated doctrine of 'operational
art' devised in the mid-193os by the prodigiously talented Generals
Tukhachevsky and Triandafilov, the directive called for an udar, a well­
defined and restricted strike, deep into the rear of the German concen­
tration. It was conceived not as a springboard towards the seizure of
the heart of Europe, but as a limited operation aimed at disrupting the
German build-up and therefore of a defensive nature.
The events on the very eve of the war assumed a dramatic and men­
acing character. The effective German disinformation campaign and the
misunderstandings coincided with Cripps' s sudden recall to London for
consultations in suspicious circumstances in early June. This lent force to
the hypothesis that some kind of arrangement was being worked out
behind the scenes, allowing Hitler a free hand in the East. Just as
alarming was circumstantial evidence implying that American pressure
Conclusion

was being exerted on Churchill and Eden to sacrifice Russia in exchange

for peace proposals. Finally there was always an outside possibility that,
even if the peace proposals were left unanswered, Britain might signal to
the Germans her wish to remain uninvolved if war with the Soviet Union
broke out. But to Stalin, who now realized he could not face a military
encounter, the more likely hypothesis was the split theory. While the army
and the ardent Nazis were pressing for war, Hitler and Ribbentrop still
adhered to the spirit of the pact with the Soviet Union and believed they
could obtain from Stalin both commodities and perhaps even tacit
support against the British by peaceful means. Stalin remained unshaken
in his belief that the British were attempting a provocation and that
no German attack would take place without a previous ultimatum. His
known views paralysed his immediate entourage, the various branches
of the intelligence services and his ambassador in Berlin from pressing
home the extent of the danger. The devastating nature of the intelligence,
the obsessive fear of provocation and the realization that the Red Army
could do little to hold off the Wehrmacht contributed to the calamity
which befell the Russians at dawn on 22 June 194 1 .
When Zhukov telephoned Stalin at his dacha to inform him of the
German attack, Stalin still appeared to believe that the Wehrmacht was
provoking a war without Hitler's authorization. His first directive there­
fore prohibited the army from fully implementing the deployment orders.
Once the reality of war sank in, he was convinced that the British had
connived in the attack. It was only two weeks later, after a severe nervous
breakdown and a recognition of his miscalculations, that Stalin was able
to regain the reins of power and embark upon the arduous road of restor­
ing his leadership and harnessing national support in the defence of the
'Motherland'.
Stalin's failure to prepare for the German onslaught primarily reflected
the unappealing political choices which the Soviet Union faced before the
outbreak of the Second World War, and even more so on the eve of the
Great Patriotic War. It was however aggravated by Stalin's self-deception
and miscalculation, a reflection of his authoritarian rule. And yet, even
with hindsight, it is hard to devise alternatives which Stalin could have
safely pursued. If he had made a pre-emptive strike, the blow would at
best have been softened but definitely not averted. The extent of the
German military successes both in France and in the Balkans was unfore­
seen by all the players in what Stalin referred to as the 'great game' .3 Even
before the war, Molotov attested, Stalin 'had felt that only by 1943 could
we meet the Germans on an equal footing' .4 It is even more likely that his
initial hope was for Russia to avoid the war altogether and reap the fruits
of the peace conference which he anticipated would be convened some
time in late 194 1 .
 ..
Notes

Preface 2. V. Suvorov, Icebreaker: Who Started

the Second World War (London,
1. P. M. H. Bell, John Bull and the Bear: 1990), pp. 344-5 and 327. The
British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy staunchest support of his views in
and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 Russia is in V. A. Nevezhi:r;i, Gotovil
(London, 1990); see also striking li Stalin nastupatel'nuiu voinu protiv
examples in A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Gitlera? (Moscow, 1995), and by
Strategie (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 105, the same author, Sindrom nastu­
and L. Maury, 'Stalin the Appeaser: patel'noi voiny (Moscow, 1997). A
Before 22 June, 1941', Survey, 76 representative differing view is E.
(1970), p. 76. Those episodes gain I. Ziuzin, 'Gotovil li SSSR preven­
prominence in the voluminous tivnyi udar?', Voenno-istoricheskii
work of A. Read and D. Fisher, The zhurnal (hereafter VIZh), 1 (1992),
Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and and Iu. A. Gor'kov, 'Gotovil Ii
•

the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941 Stalin uprezhdaiushchii udar

(London, 1988). It reinforces the protiv Gitlera v 1941 g.', Novaia i
previous misleading interpretation, noveishaia istoriia, 3 (1993).
anecdotal in nature, by perpetuat­ 3. See, for instance, G. Gorodetsky,
ing as a guideline statements by 'Was Stalin Planning to Attack
Molotov such as that 'The friend­ Hitler in June 1941?', Journal of the
ship of the peoples of Germany and Royal United Services Institi1te,
the Soviet Union, sealed in blood, 1 3 1 / 3 (1986), pp. 19-30.
has every reason to be lasting and 4. Mif 'Ledokola': nakanitne voiny
firm' (see p. 426). In fact merely 150 (Moscow, 1995).
pages of the voluminous book deal 5. For a fascinating, most powerful
witl1 the period from the signing of presentation of this problem, see N.
the pact to the invasion of Russia, Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead:
none of which is based on Soviet The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World
sources. A similar disposition is in War II in Russia (New York, 1994). I
in A. M. Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, have taken the liberty of repro­
Predators: German-Soviet Relations, ducing some of her ideas in this
1922-1941 (New York, 1997). section.
Notes to pages x-xi

6. Gunter Gillessen, 'Der Krieg der (Freiburg, 1984); see in particular

Dikta toren: ein erstes Resiimee pp. 307-8. A rather critical view of
der Debatte iiber Hitlers Angriff the Centre's handling of 'Bar­
im Osten', Frankfurter Allgemeine barossa' is in Berghahn, 'Das Mil­
Zeitung, 25 Feb. 1987. Similar i targeschich tlicheF or sch ungsam t
interpretations had earlier passed in Frei burg', Geschichte und
almost unnoticed. See, for instance, Gesellschaft, 14 (1988). An extensive
H . Seraphim, Die deutsch-russischen cover story in Spiegel, 6 (1996), was
Beziehungen, 1939-1941 (Hamburg, devoted to the exposition of those
1949), p. 38; P. Fabry, Der Hitler­ views.
•

Stalin Pakt, 1 939-1941 (Darmstadt, 8. E. Topitsch, Stalin's War: A Radical

1962), pp. 427-30, and see a New Theory of the Origins of the
thoughtful critique in H. Koch, Second World War (New York, 1987).
'Hitler's Programme and the See a discussion of the problem in
Genesis of Operation ''Barbarossa'' my ' ''Unternehmen Barbarossa'':
', Historical Journal, 26/ 4 (1983). Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der
7. Nolte, 'Vergangenheit, die nicht Legende vom deutschen Praven­
vergehen will'. The major con­ tivschlag', Vierteljahrshefte fUr Zeit­
tributions to the debate were geschichte, 4 (1989), pp. 645-73. R. C.
compiled in 'Historikerstreit': Die Raack, Stalin's Drive to the West,
Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold
Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistis­ War (Stanford, 1995), and 'Stalin
chen Judenvernichtung (Munich, Plans for World-War-II', Journal of
1987); W. Maser, Der Wortbruch, Contemporary History, 26/ 2 (1991).
Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite 9. A critical survey of the current
Weltkrieg (Munich, 1 994); W. Post, drifts is in B. Pietrow, 'Deutschland
Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche im Juni 1941 - ein Opfer so­
und sowjetische Angriffspldne 1940-1 wjetischer Aggression?', Geschichte
(Berlin, 1996). Nolte has been indi­ und Gesellschaft, 14 (1988). Pietrow
rectly assisted by recent works of rightly observes (p. 1 1 9) that Hoff­
distinguished Sovietologists who man's evidence emanates mostly
have been attempting to equate from unrepresentative samples of
Stalin's extermination of the Kulaks debriefings of prisoners of war, a
with Hitler's Final Solution; an suspicious source to start with.
illustrious example is R. Conquest, 10. Especially the works of H. Arendt
The Harvest of Sorrow (New York, and K. Friedrich. A most recent
1986). The obvious political and ide­ example, though a refined one, is
ological penchant of the debate the otherwise insightful book by
explains why the Frankfurter Allge­ Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin:
meine Zeitung and Der Spiegel had Parallel Lives (London, 1991).
been digesting it ad nauseam. 11. W. Churchill, The Second World War,
Hoffman's work, within the frame­ vols I-IV (London, 1948-50), III,
work of the official history of the P· 316.
German armed forces is 'Die Rote 12. The best compilation of their views
Armee bis Kriegsbeginn 1941', in is in S. Bialer, Stalin and his Gener­
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite als: Soviet Military Memoirs of World
Weltkrieg, herausgegeben vom Mil­ War II (New York, 1969).
itdrgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. 13. See for instance a discussion of
Bd. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion this in the still authoritative and
(Stuttgart, 1983). Hoffman's pre­ eye-opening study of J. Erickson,
dispositions and bias could be dis­ The Road to Stalingrad (London,
tinctly detected in his earlier book 1975), p. 77. A reflection of the
Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee spectrum of the prevalent opinions
 Notes to pages xi-5

can be seen in the journal Soviet is '"feddy J. Uldricks, 'Russia and.

Union, 18/1-3 (1991), devoted to Europe: Diplomacy, Revolution,
the issue with articles by leading and Economic Development in the
historians of Soviet foreign policy 1920s', International History Review,
such as A. Dallin, J. Haslam and 1 (1979), on which this summary
G. Weinberg. draws. The standard and balanced
14. See Bibliography for details of the work on collective security is still I.
archives and collections. Haslam, The Soviet Union and the
15. A pioneering and inspiring work, Struggle for Collective Security,
which set a new standard for 1933-39 (London, 1984). For an
diplomatic history by extending analytical approach to the debate
the scope of the geographic and see B. R. Posen, 'Competing Images
thematic themes is D. C. Watt, How of the Soviet Union', World Politics,
War Came: The Immediate Origins of July 1987.
the Second World War, 1938-1939 5. R. A. Savushkin, Razvitie Sovetskikh
(London, 1989), especially chs 16 vooruzhennykh sil i voennogo
and 17. iskusstva v mezhvoenny period (1921-
16. See L . Bezymensky, 'The Secret 1941) (Moscow, 1989), pp. 9-10.
Protocols of 1939 as a Problem 6. Suvorov, Icebreaker. A typical
of Soviet Historiography', in G. similar view in the West is in Robert
Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revo­
Policy, 1917-1991 : A Retrospective lution from Above, 1928-1941 (New
(London, 1994). York, 1990), chs 10-21. I have
17. A first breakthrough was in G. made extensive use of the brilliant
Roberts, The Soviet Union and the and (overall) balanced ''iew of the
Origins of the Second World War: period by T. Uldricks in1 'Soviet
Russo-German Relations and the Road Security Policy in the 1930s', in
to War, 1933-1941 (London, 1995), Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign
and a much less satisfactory treat­ Policy. As significant and level­
ment in Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, headed is the contribution by G.
Predators. Roberts, The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's
18. Archives of the Russian Foreign Pact with Hitler (London, 1989).
Ministry (hereafter AVP RF), f .017a, 7. See the authoritative work of Anita
Maisky' s diary, op.1 p.2. d.8. Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and
the Eastern Front, 1939 (Cambridge,
1987), and her essay 'The Eastern
Front and the British Guarantee to
Introduction: The Premises of Poland of March 1939', European
Stalin's Foreign Policy History Quarterly, 14 (1984).
8. Two recent works which bring
1. Public Record Office, Foreign forth a revised and updated
Office (hereafter FO) 3 71 1 1 779 account of appeasement are J.
N319 and N560/53/38, minutes, 27 Charmley, Chamberlain and the
Jan. and 1 1 Feb. 1926. Lost Peace (London, 1989), and A.
2. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Parker, Chamberlain and Appease­
Trotsky, 1 879-1921 (Oxford, 1970), ment: British Policy and tlie Coming
P · 327 · of the Second World War (London,
3. Piatyi vsemirnyi ko·ngress Kommunis- 1993).
ticheskogo lnternatsionala, stenogra­ 9. Suvorov, Icebreaker, p. 27. See a
ficheskii otchet, I I (Moscow, 1925), more subtle way of presenting the
pp. 33-4 and 66. same message in W. Leonhard,
4. By far the best overall survey of Betrayal: The Hitler-Stalin Pact of
Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s 1939 (New York, 1989).
Notes to pages 5-10

10. E . L. Woodward (ed.), Documents See also S. Pons, Stalin e la guerra

on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, inevitabile, 1 936-1941 (Turin, 1995).
3rd Ser., V (London, 1952), p. 104. 21. On the danger see below, pp. 89-94·
11. FO 800/279 Su/39/221, Henderson 22. AVP RF, f.077 op.20 p.109 d.3
to Sargent. 1.15-17, record of meeting between
12. C. A. Macdonald, The United States, Sharonov, Soviet ambassador in
Britain and Appeasement, 1 936-1939 Budapest, with Rashichev, Yugo­
(Oxford, 1981); W. J. Mommawn slav representative in Budapest,
and L. Kettenacker, The Fascist Chal­ 1 1 Jan. 1940. See also Komintern i
lenge and the Policy of Appeasement vtoraia mirovaia voina (Moscow,
(London, 1983); T. Taylor, Munich: 1994), pp. 122-4, the Executive
The Price of Peace (London, 1979). Committee of the Communist
13. A. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence . International on the war in the
(New York, 1975), pp. 25o-64. Balkans, 28 Sept. 1939, J . Attfield
On the Soviet fear of continued and S. Willia ms (eds), 1 939: The
appeasement see for example S. G. Communist Party of Great Britain
Desiatskov, 'Uitkholl i Miunkhen­ and the War (London, 1984),
skaiia politika', Novaia i noveishaia and David Childs, 'The British
istoriia, 3 (1979), and E. M . Zhukov, Communist Party and the War,
'Proiskhozhdenie vtoroi mirovoi 1939-41: Old Slogans Revived',
voiny', Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 1 Journal of Contemporary History,
(1980). 12/ 12 (1977).
14. Russian proposals submitted to 23. Dimitrov' s diary, 7 Sept. 1939. See
Halifax on 18 April in Woodward, also F. I. Firsov, 'Arkhivy Korn­
Documents on British Foreign Policy, interna i vneshniaia politika SSSR
1 9 1 9-1939, v, pp. 228-9. 1939-1941 gg.', Novaia i noveishaia
15. Ibid., pp. 205-6. istoriia, 6 (1992), p. 25.
16. Russian Military Archives, papers 24. Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina, I,
of the Military Intelligence (here­ pp. 88-9, 99-101 and 1 13-14. See
after GRU. GSh RF), op.9157 d.2 also a description of the meeting in
ll.418-3 1 . Stalin was further pro­ Dimitrov's diary, 25 Oct. 1940.
vided with intercepts of Schulen­ 25. Dirnitrov's diary, 21 Jan. 1940.
burg' s telegrams of that time which 26. See for example 'Alternativy 1939-
confirmed the information. See for go', and 'Ribbentrop-Molotov'.
example ibid., Il.447, 453 and 454· Bezymensky, 'Secret Protocols',
17. D. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and PP· 75-86.
Tragedy (London, 1992), p. 3 5 1 . See 27. T. Uldricks, 'Evolving Soviet Views
also 'Alternativy 1939-go', Izvestiia, of the Nazi-Soviet Pact', in R.
2 1 Aug. 1989. Another illuminating Frucht (ed.), Labyrinth of Nation­
and fresh interpretation is in alism: Complexities of Diplomacy
'Ribbentrop-Molotov', Voprosy istorii (Columbus, Ohio, 1992), pp. 331-
KPSS, 8 (1988). 60.
18. See the excellent discussion in I.
Fleischhauer, Diplomatischer Wider­
stand gegen 'Unternehmen Barba­
rossa' (Berlin, 1991), pp. 14-28. 1. 'Potential Enemies': London and
19. On Stalin's realism in pursuing Moscow at Loggerheads
foreign policy see Conclusion, pp.
13-14. 1. FO 371 24855 N 1 523 / 1523/38, 1 1
20. This is argued forcefully by J. Mar. 1940.
Haslam, The Soviet Union and the 2. Public Record Office, Cabinet
Struggle for Collective Security in Papers (l1ereafter CAB) 66 I 2 and 3,
Europe, 1933-39 (London, 1984). WP(39) 90 and 134, 1 3 and 20 Nov.
 Notes to pages 11-16

1939. See also the whole file FO 371 717, Potemkin on meeting Aktay, 25
24851 N*/ 181 /38. Oct. 1939. Two useful works on the
3. FO 837I 1098, 25 Apr. 1940. 1939 tripartite negotiations are F.
4. CAB 84/8 JP(39)49, and CAB 65/ 1 Marzari, Western-Soviet Rivalry
43(39)6, 6 and 10 Oct. 1939. in Turkey, 1939', Middle Eastern
5. FO 800/279 Su/39/221. Studies, 7 (1971), pp. 63-80, 201-20,
6. For a survey of Franco-Soviet and Ct1rtright, 'Great Britain, the
relations see FO 371 24853 N3413/ Balkans, and Turkey'; see also A. L.
341 /38, Halifax to Campbell, 18 Macfie, Turco-Soviet Talks, pp. 43 1-4,
Mar. 1940, and CAB 21 / 1051, who quotes the report leaked by the
Halifax to Campbell, 1 1 Dec. 1939. Turks to the Germans concealing
On the expulsion see CAB 2 1 / 1051, that their own approach was actu­
Butler to Halifax, 22 Dec.; CAB ally directed against Germany. On
65/2 105 and 108, and 1 1 2(39), 6 the Soviet perception of the British
and 8, 12 Dec. 1939. On the Baku threat see V. Ia. Sipols, 'Tainye doku­
episode see below, pp. 18-19. menty ''strannoi voiny'' ', Novaia i
7. See Bell, John Bull and the Bear. noveishaia istoriia, 2 (1993).
8. Documents on German Foreign Policy 17. Selim Deringil, 'The Preservation
(hereafter DGFP), VIII, p. 79. of Turkey's Neutrality during the
9. CAB 2 1 / 962, 30 Mar. 1 940. Second World War: 1940', Middle
Kipling's poem is quoted as it Eastern Studies, 18/ 1 (1982), p. 30.
appeared in Ismay's document. 18. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 35-7, 7 Sept.
10. FO 371 23678 N4571 and 5240/ 1939.
57 I 38, FO minutes 18 Sept. and 17 19. Curtright, 'Great Britain, the
Oct. 1939. Balkans, and Turkey', pp. 443-55,
11. CAB 65 /6 66(40)1, 12 Mar.; Cham­ and Deringil, 'Preservation of
berlain papers, NC 18/ 1 / 1 144, Turkey's Neutrality', p. 310. A. L.
letter to Ida, 23 Feb. 1940. Macfie, 'The Turkish Straits in
12. Presidential Archives, Moscow, f.45 the Second World War, 1939-45',
op.1 d.298 1.1 1-18, Stalin's conver­ Middle Eastern Studies, 25/2 (1989),
sation at the Kremlin, 29 Jan. 1940. P· 238.
13. The Archives of the Swedish 20. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 263-70 and
Foreign Ministry (hereafter UD:s 373-80, Terentiev to Stalin, MolotO\'
Arkiv 1920 ARS), HP I 517 /LXXI, and Voroshilov, 6 Nov. and 7 Dec.
Assarasson to FM, Oct. 1939. 1939.
14. MID, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki, 21. Ibid., pp. 92�3, Prasolov, charge
1939 god (hereafter DVP, 1939), d' affaires in Sofia, to FM, 16 Sept.
XXII, 2, p. 12, Molotov to Terentiev, 1939.
3 Sept. 1939. 22. Ibid., pp. 273-4, report by Maisky,
15. L. H. Curtright, 'Great Britain, the 8 Nov. 1939.
Balkans, and Turkey in the Autumn 23. D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of
of 1939', International History Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945
Review, 3 (1988), p. 436. The most (London, 1971), pp. 247-8.
informative and comprehensive 24. CAB 84/ 2, 19 Feb. 194 1 .
analysis of Turkey's foreign policy 25. M . Kitchen, British Policy towards
is in B. R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Soviet Unio11 during the Second
the Cold War in the Near East: Great World War (New York, 1986), p. 19.
Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Kitchen's typically lively and enter­
Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, taining style does not conceal a
1994). most penetrating and critical view
16. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 146-53, of British policy.
record of Saracoglu's meeting with 26. AVP RF, f.069 op.24 p.68 d.7 1.9-19,
Stalin and Molotov, 1 Oct., and p. Maisky to Molotov on meeting
Notes to pages 1 6-19

Butler, 26 and 30 Jan., and FO 371 R3769/ 5 /67, Le Rougetel to FO, 23

24843 N1390/30/ 38, Butler on Mar. 1940.
meeting Maisky, 30 Jan. See also 37. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.4
AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.1 d.8 1.18-21, 1.148-54, record of Tikhomirov' s
Molotov on meeting Aktay, 1 1 Jan. (first counsellor in Berlin) meeting
1940. with M. F. Kleis, 4 Mar. 1940.
27. Dalton, the British Minister of 38. Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi
Economic Warfare, in Dalton Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1 941-1945
papers, Box II 5 / 2, memorandum (Moscow, 1961), I, pp. 74 and 741.
by Boothby, on meeting Maisky, 17 39. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 1.3-8,
Sept.; FO 371 23678 N5297/57/38, Molotov's record of meeting Schu­
5 Oct. 1939. On Maisky' s extraordi­ lenburg, 7 Jan.; see also Filimov,
nary position in London see S. Soviet ambassador in Iran, to FM,
Aster, 'Ivan Maisky and Parliamen­ 011 meeting Ettel, the German
tary Anti-Appeasement, 1938-39', ambassador in Iran, 4 Mar. 1940,
in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George in AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.333 d.2284
(London, 1971). 1.97-100.
28. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.326 d.2238 40. Charles Richardson, 'French Plans
1.44-53, Molotov to Maisky, 21 Feb. for Allied Attacks on the Caucasus
1940. Oil Fields January-April 1940',
29. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.11 d.109 1.3-8, French Historical Studies, 8 / 1 (1973).
record of Cripps meeting with 41. FO 371 24846 N3698/40/ 38, 25
Molotov, 1 6 Feb. 1940. Mar. 1940.
30. See for example instructions to the 42. The plans are in FO 371 24846
Austrian and Czech CP, 31 Jan. N3698/ 40/ 38, 23 Mar., and see
1940, in Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia minutes by Sargent and Cadogan
voina, I, pp. 252-7 and 277-80. on 26 Mar. 1940 in 24887 R3836/
31. CAB 70(40) in FO 371 24887 R35 18/ 5 / 67.
5 I 67, 16 Mar.; Public Record Office, 43 · FO 371 24887 R3940/5 /67; see also
War Office (hereafter WO) 208/ Deringil, 'Preservation of Turkey's
1754, report by Major Kirkman, 6 Neutrality', p. 31, and Macfie, 'The
Mar. 1 940. Turkish Straits in the Second World
32. FO 371 25014 R1777 and 2781/ War', p. 240.
242/ 44, Admiral Philip to Halifax, 44. FO 371 24887 R3963, R4010 and
7 Feb. 1940. R4130/5 /67, FO minutes, 3 1 Mar.
33. AVP RF, f.077 op.20 p.109 d.3 l.26-8, 1 940.
Sharonov (Hungary) to FM on 45. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d.2233
meeting Csaky, 1 3 Feb., and f.084 1.306-7, Maisky to FM, 5 Apr. 1940.
op.20 p.131 d.5 1.29-32, record 46. FO 371 24888 R4466 / 5 /67, memo­
of Sergeev's (the Soviet charge randum on Allied military policy in
d'affaires in Athens) meeting with the Balkans, 6 Apr. 1940.
Papadakis, the head of the Infor­ 47. FO 371 24888 R4666 /5/67, Chiefs
mation Section of the Greek FM, 21 of Staff (hereafter COS) mem­
Feb. 1940. orandum to the Head of Missions
34. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.1 d.9 1. 1-4, Meeting in London, 9 Apr. 1940.
record of Molotov's meeting with 48. FO 371 24888 R4467/ 5 /67, record
Aktay, 2 Mar. 1940. of the Meeting of British Head of
35. FO 371 25014 R3636/242/ 44, Missions from South East Europe,
Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 21 8 Apr. and CAB 99/ 3 SWC(39/ 40),
Mar. 1940. 22 Apr. 1940.
36. FO 371 24887 R3285 /5 /67, 49. CAB 99/ 3 SWC(39/ 40), 22 Apr. The
Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 1 3 extent to which the Russians were
Mar. 1940; FO 371 24887 R3681 and aware of the plans is clear from
330 Notes to pages 19-23

AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d. 2234 suggests that Cripps, who rather
1.50-1, Maisky to FM 20 Apr. 1940.
, naively expected Stalin to align
50. See Chapter 2. with England, became disillu­
5 1 . FO 371 24847 N5689/ 40/38, 29475 sioned in Moscow. The leading
N/941/29/38 and 24849 N5788/ thread of Weinberg' s approach is
93/ 38, FO minutes, 2, 4, 10 June based on his earlier book Germany
1940. See also Churchill, Second and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941
World War, I, p. 1 18. (Leiden, 1954).
52. J. Wedgwood papers, note by 61. FO 371 24582 N6029/ 243/ 38, mem­
Wedgwood's daughter Helen on orandum by Sargent, 17 July,
a letter from Cripps, 27 Feb. 1942. minute by Halifax, 18 July. Other
Churchill, Second World War, II, typical examples are FO 371 24844,
p. 1 18. 24846, N2779/ 40/38 and N5937/
53. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, 2 30/38, FO minutes 8, 1 1 and 13 Mar.,
Mar. 1941; see Sargent's minute in 3 July; 24853 N7279/283/38,
FO 371 24844 N5853/30/38, 28 memorandum, 24 Nov. 1940; 29135
June 1940. W53/ 53/ 50, 'Weekly Intelligence
54. Letters by Cripps in Monckton Summary', 15 Jan.; 29479 N 1 3 16 and
papers, Box 3, pp. 75-7, 1 1 5-18, 2 1324/78/38, minutes, 3 Apr.; 29481
and 25 Sept. 1940, Box 4, p. 68, 13 N2171 and 2466/78/38, minutes 13
Feb. 1941, and in Cripps papers, and 27 May; WO 208/ 1761 Joint
letters to Monckton, 5 and 20 Jan. Intelligence Committee (hereafter
1941. On Cripps's mission see JIC) (41)218, 23 May 1941.
H. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps as
British Ambassador in Moscow,
June 1941-January 1942', English 2. The Scramble for the Balkans
Historical Review, 370 (1979) and 383
(1982). 1. See for instance the position of
5 5 . FO 800/322, Cripps to Halifax, 10 Turkey, Afghanistan and the
Oct. 1940. Scandinavian countries in AVP
5 6 . Monckton papers, Box 3, pp. 75-7, RF, f.06 op.2 p.1 d . 10 1.46-8 and
1 1 5-18, 2 and 25 Sept. 1940, Box 4, 54-5, record of Molotov's meetings
p. 68, 13 Feb. 1941; Cripps papers, with Assarasson and with 0.
letters to Monckton, 5 and 20 Jan. Maseng, Norwegian ambassador in
1941. Moscow, 25 Mar., f.059 op.1 p.314
57. Churchill, Second World War, IV, d.2160 1.221 _:3, telegram from
P· 56. Terent' ev to FM 19 Mar., and f.071
,

58. Monckton papers, Box 3, p. 1 18, 25 op.22 p.192 d.6 l.5g-61, record of
Sept. 1940. Mikhailov' s (Soviet ambassador
59. FO 371 24841 N5812/5 /38, Butler in Afghanistan) meeting with Hans
on meeting Maisky and FO Pilger, the German ambassador
minutes on appointment of Cripps, there, 21 Mar. 1940. M . Hauner
16 May, and CAB 65 /7 127(40)1, 18 sheds light on the perceptions
May 1940. of the threat in his 'The Soviet
60. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 5 16 / Threat to Afghanistan and India,
LXVIII, Assarasson to FM, 1 5 May 1938-1940', Modern Asian Studies,
1940; on Cripps' s abortive efforts 15/2 (1981), pp. 287-309.
see my Stafford Cripps' Mission to 2. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.15_5
Moscow (Cambridge, 1984). G. 1.35-43, record of the meeting, 5
Weinberg in his undeniably impres­ Mar. 1940.
sive and enlightening A World at 3. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.4 l. 190-1,
Arms: A Global History of World War a note by Shkvartsev on meeting
II (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 162-4, Weizsacker, 1 5 Mar. 1940.
Notes to pages 2 3-7 33 1

4. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64 14. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 1.41-2,
d .668 1.49-56, Tevosian on meeting Skavrets to FM on meeting Skirpa,
Goring, 29 Mar. 1940. Lithuanian ambassador in Berlin,
5. AVP RF, f.059 op. 1 p.315 d.2174 19 Apr. 1 940.
1.156-60, Shkvartsev to Molotov, 6 15. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.315 d.2174
Mar., and f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 1.264-6, Shkvartsev to FM on
1.54-9, record of Molotov's meeting meeting Ribbentrop, 20 Apr. 1940.
with Schulenburg, 1 1 Mar. 1940. 16. See for instance, Archives of the
6. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64 Bulgarian Foreign Ministry (here­
d.668 1.72-8, record of Mikoyan's after AMVnR), d.40 p.34 op.it
meeting with Hilger, 21 Apr. 1940. pop.272 1.82.
See the works of G. M. Ivanitsky, 17. A discussion of the seizure of the
'Sovetsko-germanskie torgovo-eko­ Baltics and the military repercus-
nomicheskie otnosheniia v 1939- s1ons 1s on pp. 119-20.
• •

1941 gg.', Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 18. AVP RF, £.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 l.206-8;
5 (1989), pp. 28-39, and especially V. DGFP, IX, p. 154, record of
Ia. Sipols, 'Torgovo-ekonomich­ Molotov's meeting with Schulen­
eskie otnosheniia mezhd u SSSR i burg, 1 7 June 1940.
Germaniei v 1939-1941 gg. v svete 19. AVP R F, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 l.120-1,
novykh arkhivnykh dokumentov', Tikhomiro to FM, 7 June 1940.
Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 1 (1997), 20. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.329 d.2266
pp. 29-41 . 1. 149-50, Gelfand to FM 25 Feb.,
,

7. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64 and FO 371 24968 R462/ 9/ 37,

d.668 1. 58-64, Mikoyan on meeting Hoare to FO, 8 Jan. 1940. See also
Schulenburg, 5 Apr. 1940. earlier revelations by F. Marzari,
8. Presidential Archives, f.56 op.1 'Prospects for an Italian-led Balkan
p.298 1.29-32, record of Stalin's Bloc of Neutrals', Historical Journal,
meeting with Ritter, 8 Feb., and 4 (1970).
AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.315 d.2174 21. DVP, 1 939, XXII, 2, p. 328, Kukolev,
1.1 53-4, Shkvartsev to FM, 5 Mar. Soviet charge d' affaires in
1940. Bucharest, to FM 22 Nov. 1939, and
,

9. Presidential Archives, f.03 op.64 AVP R F, f.059 op.1 p.329 d.2266

d .668 1.68-70, and DGFP, IX, pp. 1. 5-6 and 53-4, Gelfand to FM 3 ,

157-8, records of Tevosian' s meet­ and 18 Jan., and p.330 d.2269 1.1
ings with Ritter, 12 Apr. 1940. and 7, Potemkin to Gelfand, 5 and
10. DGFP, IX, pp. 82-3 and 1 1 0-12, 16 Jan. 1940.
Schulenburg to FM and response 22. See pp. 15-16.
by Ritter, 6 Apr. 1940. 23. See pp. 39-40, 68-71.
11. FO 837 / 1 1 27, Dalton on meeting 24. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.329 d.2266
Maisky, 25 May 1940; see also V. 1.196, Gelfand to FM 1 1 Mar., p.315
,

Assarasson, I skuggan av Stalin d.2174 1.1 75-9, Shkvartsev to FM

(Stockholm, 1963), pp. 28-9. on meeting Ribbentrop, 14 Mar.;
12. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 l.16-17, op.2 p.14 d . 155 l.1 15-18, and DGFP,
Shkvartsev on a breakfast meeting IX, p. 317, records of Molotov's
with Schulenburg and Hilger at the meeting with Schulenburg, 5 May
German embassy in Moscow, 5 1940.
Apr. 1940. 25. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.330 d.2267
13. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 1.6, 1.49-54, Gelfand to FM on meeting
report by Pavlov, Soviet charge Ciano, 29 Apr. i940. See the
d' affaires in Berlin, 26 Mar., and Bessarabian affair on p. 29£.
UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 5 1 6 / 26. DGFP, IX, pp. 471-3, Ribbentrop to
LXVII, Assarasson to FM, 8 Mar. FM 30 May 1 940.
,

1940. 27. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.330 d.2269

332 Notes to pages 27-30

1.57-8, Molotov to Gelfand, 1 May, M. Knox, Mussolini U11leashed,

and f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 l.18g-<J4, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in
and DGFP, IX, p. 359, records of Fascist Italy's Last War (Cambridge,
Molotov's meeting with Schulen­ 1982), tends to overlook the
burg, 31 May 1940. episode which was a cornerstone in
28. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1547 I the diplomacy of both countries,
XXX, Assarasson to FM 27 May
, even if proved barren in retrospect.
1940. 37. See below, p. 29. On the association
29. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 l.197-8. between the invasion and the
See also DGFP, IX, p. 512, record of rapprochement see M. Toscano,
Molotov's meeting with Schulen­ Designs in Diplomacy (London,
burg, 3 June 1940. 1970), pp. 164-5.
30. AVP RF, f.077 op.20 p.109 d.3 l.60-2, 38. AVP RF, f.3a d.6, Yugoslavia,
record of Sharonov' s meeting with exchange of notes between the
Csaky, 1 1 June 1940. Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on
31. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.20 d.228 the establishment of diplomatic
1. 1-2, record of Molotov's meeting relations, 24 June 1940. See also N.
with Rosso, Italian ambassador in V. N ovikov, Vospo1ninaniia diplo­
Moscow, 13 June 1940. ma ta: zapiski 1938-1947 (Moscow,
32. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 516/ 1989), p. 39·
LXVII, Assarasson to FM on con­ 39. DGFP, X, pp. 21 5-16, Herren to FM,
versations with Rosso, 10 June 23 July 1940.
1940. 40. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.20 d.229 1. 1-6,
33. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.20 d.226 1.3-4, record of Molotov's meeting with
Gorelkin, Soviet ambassador in Rosso, 20 June, and f.059 op.1 p.330
Rome, to FM on meeting Ciano, 22 d .2269 1.84-5, Molotov to Gorelkin,
June 1940. 27 June. See also AMVnR, d.40 p.34
34. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.330 d.2267 o.1t p.272 1.141-2, Tilev, Bulgarian
1.190-1, Gorelkin to FM on meeting ambassador in London, to FM 27 ,

Anfuz o, 1 8 June 1940. June 1940. The Italian text is given

35. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2175 in full by Toscano, Designs in Diplo­
1. 301-2, Shkvartsev to FM, on macy, pp. 150-8.
meeting Kleist, head of Ribben­ 41. DGFP, X, pp. 416-19, 486-7, 495-6
trop's bureau, 12 July, and f.0125 and 501-2, exchange of telegrams
op.24 p.118 d.5 1.67, Lavrentev to between Mackensen and Ribben­
FM on meeting Gidzhi, Italian trop, Aug. 1940.
ambassador in Bucharest, 22 July 42. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.20 d.229 1.9-12,
1940. record of Molotov's meeting with
36. AVP RF, f.06 op.02 p.20 d.226 l.24-6, Rosso, 25 June 1940.
Gorelkin to FM on meeting Mus­ 43. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2175
solini, 24 July, and d . 14 1.140-1, l. 71-3, Shkvartsev to FM on
record of Molotov's meeting with meeting Weizsacker and Ribben­
Lorenzo, 24 July 1940. G. Petracchi, trop, 10 May 1940.
'Pinocchio, the Cat, and the Fox: 44. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 1.122-4
Italy between Germany and the and 1.1 70-5, records of Molotov's
Soviet Union, 1939-1941', in B. meetings with Schulenburg, 10 and
Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War: 17 May 1940.
Ger1nany, Soviet Russia and the 45. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 1.64-8,
World, 1939-1941 (Oxford, 1997), Shkvartsev to FM on meeting
pp. 499-523, gives a lucid view of Ribbentrop, 4 May 1940; based
the negotiations but unjustifiably also on ar1 unpublished paper on
plays down the significance of the Russian security services by
the June-December 1940 overtures. General Sergei A. Kondrashev.
Nates to pages 3 0-4 333

46. AVP RF, f.0129 op.2 p.23 d.293 24 May, and Novikov, Vospomi­
1.10-12, record of Umansky's meet­ naniia diplomata, p. 45. See also
ing with Welles, 13 May; see also similar impressions gained by
f.059 op.1 p.320 d.2199 1.12-15, Schulenburg and Kostring in
U mansky to FM (shown to Stalin), DGFP, IX, pp. 396-7, 21 May, and of
1 June 1940. Campbell in Belgrade, in FO 371
47. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 132-3, 24889 R 5894 I 5 I 7, 8 May. See also
Kukolev, 27 Sept. 1939. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP / 1548/
48. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 l . 1 0-15, XXXIII, Assarasson to FM, 14 June
record of Molotov's meeting with 1940.
Schulenburg, 25 Jan. 1940. 62. GRU GSh RF, op.918 d.4 1.119-20,
49. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 224-6, Ter­ report by the 5th Dept of the
entiev to FM 26 Oct. 1939.
, RKKA , 23 June 1940.
50 . Ibid., pp. 235-8, Terentiev to FM, 27 63. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155 1.181-
Oct. 1939. 4 and f.059 op. 1 p.319 d.2194
51. Ibid., pp. 347-9, Maisky to FM, 29 1.86, telegram from Molotov to
Nov. 1939. Lavrentev, 23 June 1940. See also
52. FO 371 24968 R9/9/ 37, Halifax to DGFP, IX, pp. 412-14, record of
Hoare (Bucharest) on Cadogan' s Molotov's meeting with Schulen­
meeting with Tilea, Rumanian burg, 25 May 1940.
ambassador in London, 9 Jan. 1940. 64. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64
53. DVP, 1 939, XXI I, 2, pp. 396-8, d.674 1 . 1 28, record of Osetrov's
Kukolev to Molotov, 1 1 Dec. (Ministry of Defence) meeting
1939. with the German military attacl1e,
54. FO 371 24890 R6246/ 5 /67, Halifax General Ernst Kostring, 21 June
to Hoare on conversations with 1940.
Tilea, 22 May 1940; and further 65. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.14 d.155
proposals in AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.1 1.209-15, and DGFP, X, pp. 3-4,
d . 10 1 .82-3, Molotov on meeting record of Molotov's meeting with
Davidescu, Rumanian ambassador Schulenburg, 23 June 1940.
in Moscow, 2 Apr. 1940. 66. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 516/
55. FO 371 24887 R3236 and R35 3 1 / 5 / LXVII, report by Assarasson to the
67, Hoare to FO, 8 Mar. 1940. FM on a meeting with Schulen­
56. FO 371 24968 R675 1 / 9 / 37, Halifax burg, 28 June 1940.
to Cripps, 26 June, and R5673/ 67. DGFP, X, pp. 7-9 and 12-13,
9/ 37, Hoare to FM 24 Apr. 1940.
, instructions to Moscow and Bucha­
57. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata, rest by Weizsacker, 24 June 1940.
p. 43· 68. An excellent description is in
58. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1t pop.272 Novikov, Vospo1ninaniia diplomata,
1. 147, Tilev to FM, 4 July 1940; see P · 41.
also DGFP, X, p. 26, Schulenburg to 69. DGFP, X, pp. 19-20, Fabricius to
FM 26 June 1940.
, FM, 26 June 1940.
59. AVIJ RF, f.0125 op.24 p.118 d.3 70. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.319 d.2194
1.24-7, record of Molotov's meeting 1.89-90, Molotov to Lavrentev on
with Davidescu, 9 Apr.; and FO 371 meeting Davidescu, 27 June 1940.
24968 R4887 I 9/ 37, Ankara chan­ 71. DGFP, X, p. 32, Schulenburg to FM,
cellery to Southern Department of 27 June 1940.
FO, 13 Apr. 1940. 72. Ibid., pp. 34-5, Ribbentrop to Fabri­
60. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 l.106-7, cius, 27 June 1940.
Shkvartsev to FM, 28 May 1940. On 73. AVP RF, f.059 op. 1 p.318 d.2191
Italy see p. 29. 1.159, Lavrentev to FM, 28 June
61. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.318 d.2191 1940.
1. 104-7, Kukolev to Dekanozov, 74. FO 371 24968 R6648 /9/37, various
334 Notes to pages 34-8

telegrams and minutes related to 88. FO 371 24890 R6597/5 /67, Camp­
the annexation of Bessarabia, 1 July bell to FO, 18 June 1940.
1940. 89. LTI:s Arki'' 1920 ARS, HP / 1 548/
75. A\1P RF, f.059 op.1 p.319 d.2194 XXXIII, Assarasson to FM 14 June
,

1.9 1-2, �folotO\T to Le\"'I"ente'T on 1940.

meeting Da,ridescu, 28 June 1940. 90 . FO 371 24841 :>;3 840/5/38, Cripps
76. DGFP, X, pp. 33-4, German minis­ on meeting �foloto\T, 14 June 1940.
ter in Bucharest to E\1, 27 June 91. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.26 d.339 l.7-1 1,
1940. 14 June, and p.20 d.229 1. 1-6,
77. See for instance V. K. \'oil<o,", records of ?-vfoloto\r' s meetings V\ith
'So\·etsko-iugosla ,-skie otnosheniia Labonne and Rosso, 14 and 20 June
'T nachal'nyi period \'toroi mirO\"Oi 1940 respecti,Telyr.
\10in)' ,. kontekste mirO\'Vkh sob\·tii
- - ,,
92. Public Record Office, Prime Minis­
(193g-1941 gg.)', Sovetskoe sla- ter's Papers (hereafter PRE?-vf) 3,
via11ol.·edei1ie, 6 (1990). 395/ 1, pp. 16-17, Churchill to
78. Churchill, Seco11d World War, I, p. Cripps, 22 June 1940.
403, radio speech, 1 Oct 1941. 93. A\1P RF, f.06 op.2 p.10 d.100
79. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 167-g, 1.4-7, record of Yfoloto"r's meeting
:Yfaisk)1 to �' 7 Oct. 1939. \\ith Cripps, 26 June 19.+o; see pp.
80. \\Tebb papers, diM)r, pp. 688o-8, 20 23-g.
:...1a)· 1940. 94. FO 800 1 J22 pp. 353-60, Cripps to
81. A\1P RF, £.069 op.24 p.70 d.43 1.6-10 Halifax, 10 Oct. 1940.
and 1g-23, and FO 371 24840 95. CAB 79/6 COS(40)256(3) and CAB
�4625/ 5 38 \.\7P(40)106, records Bo/ 16 COS (40)649, 9 and 28 Aug.;
of Halifax's meeting \.\ith Yfaisky, FO 371 24852 �6458/283/38,
1 5 and 29 Apr.; and AVP RF, £.059 Cripps to Halifax and minutes b;·
op.1 p.326 d.2238 1.101-3, Yfoloto'T Sargent, 31 Aug. 1940.
to �faiskJ·, 21 :via)· 1940. 96. Significant!)'" this proposal is
82. A\-rp RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d.2235 missing in the Russian record of
1.28--3 3 and 55-8, :vfaisk)T to DA, 22 the con,·ersation, as ''"ell as in the
and 28 June 1940. leakage to the Germans; see FO
83. Ko111i11ter11 i t.Jtoraia 111iroz:aia z:oi1uz, 371 24844 �3937/30/38; Russian
I, p. 343, Dimitro,· to Stalin and \'ersion in Diplo11iaticl1eskii <Jestnik,
};foloto,,, 22 :...fa;· 1940. 21-3 (1993), record of Cripps's
84. FSB, Orga11y Gosildarsfc}eJ111oi meeting ''ith Stalin, 1 Jul)· 1940.
Be=opas11osti SSSR l' Velikoi Otecl1- 97. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op. i t pop.272
est0·en11oi Voi11e. Stor11ik dokilmentov, 1.151, Stameno,·, Bulgarian ambas­
2 ,·ols Cvfosco''� 1995), 1(1), pp. sador in lv-1osco\\'", to FM 14 July
,

187-g, a memorandum b)7 Osokin, 1940.

head of the Border �TITI, and 98. For a discussion on So,iet intelli­
Sa,·chenko, head of the 5th Dept of gence, see belO'\\'", pp. 52-6. Presi­
the �l<\TI, 16 �Ia)· 1940. dential Archi,·es, f.45 op.1 d.435
85. A\"'P RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5 1.64-8, l.3g-5 1, Proskuro,· to Stalin, 4 June,
Shk,·artse\· on meeting Gerde, 4 and A\"'P RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.5
:Yfa;· 1940. 1 . 1 1 2-14, record b)' ShlCT,.artse\· on
86. FO 371 24841 :\5812/ 5 38, and meeting Ritter, 1 June 1940.
24849 >: 5729 93 38, reports by 99. On the decision see pp. 48-52.
Butler on meeting :...·1 aislq·, and FO 100. Archi\'es of the Russian Securihr �

minutes, 16 and 29 :...fa;· 1940; and Senices counter-intelligence

FO 831 1 121, Dalton on meeting (hereafter TsA S\� RF), d.21616 t.1
�faisk)·, 25 :i\fa:· 1940. 1. 14-15, memo b)r Fitin, deput}·
87. FO 371 248iJ R6099 7 I4, Rendell director of the :\. l<\TI, 5th Dept,
to FO, / �Ia)· 1940. and GR'C GSh RF, op.2242.1 d.4
Notes to pages 38-41 335

1.261, 'Meteor', Berlin, to the 111. DGFP, X, pp. 195-6, Schulenburg

NKVD, 9 July; see also TsA SVR R F to FM 1 1 July, AVP RF, f.059 op. 1
,

d.21616 t.1 1.21-2, deputy director p.317 d.2180 1.140-1, Molotov to

of the Border NKVD to the Centre, Shkvartsev on meeting Schulen­
13 July 1941. burg, 13 July, and f.082 op.23 p.95
101. GRU GSh R F, op.918 d.3 1.159-63, d.5 1.139-41, Kobulov to FM 6 July ,

special report by the 5th Dept of 1940. On the alternative of the Con­
the RKKA, 13 June 1940. On the tinental bloc see G. T. Waddington,
tendency to suppress the threat 'Ribbentrop and the Soviet Union
see FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi 1937-1941', in J. Erickson and D.
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(1), pp. 236-7, Dilks (eds), Barbarossa: The Axis and
Savchenko, deputy director Border the Allies (Edinburgh, 1994).
NKVD to the Centre, 26 June 1 12. DGFP, X, pp. 207-8, Schulenburg to
1940. FM 13 July; see also HP I 5 16/
,

102. G. Gorodetsky, 'Filip Ivanovich LXVIII, Assarasson to Schulenburg,

Golikov', in H. Shukman (ed.), 5 Aug. 1940.
Stalin's Generals (London, 1993), pp. 113. B. A . Leach, German Strategy against
77-<JO. Russia, 1939-1941 (Oxford, 1973),
103. Central Archives of the Security pp. 60-1 and 70-1.
Services (hereafter TsA FSB RF), 1 14. AVP RF, f.059 op. 1 p.339 d.2267
f.3 op.7 pop.23 1.223-5, Golikov to l.211a-216, Gorelkin to Molotov
Timoshenko, 20 July 1940. on meeting Ciano, 26 June. DGFP,
104. Central Archives of the Security X, pp. 18-19, Mackensen to FM 26 ,

Services' Foreign Intelligence (here­ June 1940.

after TsA SVR RF), d . 21616 t . 1 115. DGFP, X, pp. 217-21 and 226 f.,
1.23-5 and 89-90, Beria to Stalin and Hitler's directive and letter to King
Molotov, 1 7 Aug. See also the Direc­ Carol, 1 5 and 16 July 1940.
torate of Ukrainian Frontier Guard, 1 16. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272
NKVD, 5 Aug. 1940, reproduced 1.127, Christov to FM 5 June,,

in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 ( 1990), pp. and AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.314
199-201. d.2161 1.290-4, Terentiev to FM
105. AVP R F, f.06 op.2 p.2 d . 1 2 1.173-4, on meeting Kirov, Bulgarian
record of Molotov's meeting with ambassador in Ankara, 20 June;
Le Rougetel, 3 1 May 1940. see also a detailed analysis in
106. DGFP, IX, pp. 470-1, Schulenburg Swedish Military Archives (here­
to FM 29 May 1940.
, after Krigsarkivet), Fo . . rsvarssta­
107. DGFP, X, pp. 79-85, record of a ben, Ser. E / II / 1 5 / 1 , report no. 54
meeting between Hitler, Alfieri by the military attache on conver­
and Keitel, 1 July 1940. On Hitler's sations with the Bulgarian military
decision to attack Russia see pp. attache, 1 Nov. 1940.
48-52. 1 17. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2175
108. M . van Creveld, The Balkan Clue: 1.275-7, Shkvartsev to FM 8 July ,

Hitler's Strategy, 1940-1941 (Cam­ 1 940.

bridge, 1973), p. 70. 1 18. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272,
109. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 516/ and op.1sh pop.272 1.181-3, Sta­
LXVII and LXVIII, Assarasson to menov to FM, 7 and 9 Sept. 1940.
FM 20 June and 10 July 1940.
, 1 19. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.1 1.14-15,
1 10. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.2 d.14 1.95-106, Savchenko, the deputy director
Molotov on meeting Togo, 2 July; of the Border NKVD, to the GRU,
see also DGFP, X, pp. 136-7, record 12 J uly; GRU GSh RF, op.817 d.4
of a meeting between Ribbentrop 1.119-20, report of the 5th Dept of
and Sato, 9 July 1940. On relations the RKKA, 9 Aug. 1940.
with Russia see chap. 9. 120. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi
 Notes to pages 41-5

Bezopasnosti SSSR, I(1), pp. 245-6, 132. Izvestiia, 2 Aug. See evaluations b.y
head of the Foreign Intelligence of Stamenov in AMVnR, d.40 p.34
the border NKVD to the Centre, 24 op.it pop.272 l.156-7, 2 and 3 Aug.,
Aug. 1940. and FO 371 24845 N6243/30/38,
121 . Bulgarian Central National Cripps to Halifax, 2 Aug. 1940.
Archives (hereafter TsDA MVR),
.
133. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.2 d.14 1.1 54-6,
f.176 op.8 a.e.906 l. i43-5, Antonov and DGFP, X, pp. 349 and 367,
(Stockholm) to FM 14 Sept. 1940.
, records of Molotov's meetings with
i22. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272 Schulenburg, 29 and 31 July 1940.
1.152, Stamenov to FM 16 July 1940;
, 134. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR
DGFP, X, p. 77, Ribbentrop to (Moscow, 1940), No. 31, and AVP
Fabricius, i July 1940. RF, f.059 op.1 p.336 d.2271 1.262,
i23. See the most authoritative book by Lavrishchev to FM 2 Aug. 1940.
,

M. L. Miller, Bulgaria during the 135. AVP RF, f.074 op.25 p.108 d.6 l.22-3,
Second World War (Stanford, i975), record of Lavrishchev' s meeting
pp. 13-i5 and 24-6, and see also with Popov, 15 Aug. 1940.
D. Sirkov, V'nshnata politika na 136. FO 37i 24877 R788/ 259/7, 26 Aug.
B'lgariia, 1938-1941 (Sofia, i979). It 1940.
is attested in DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 137. DGFP, XI, pp. 8-10, Ribbentrop to
263-70, Terentiev to Molotov, 6 Schulenburg, 3 Sept. 1940.
Nov. i939· 138. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2176
i24. AMVnR, d.40 pop.142 1.50--3, 1.185-7, Shkvartsev to Molotov, 2
Antonov, Bulgarian ambassador in Sept., and DGFP, XI, pp. 8-10 and
Moscow, to FM, 20 Sept. i939 · 44-6, exchange between Schulen­
125. DVP, 1939, XXII, 2, pp. 412-i3, burg and Ribbentrop, 2. and 3 Sept.
Dekanozov on meeting Antonov, i 5 1940. I

Dec. A highly informative account 139. DGFP, XI, pp. 22-5 and 28, 29-30,
of the events is in UD:s Arkiv i920 exchanges between Ribbentrop and
ARS, HP /516/LXVII, Assarasson Fabricius, 5 and 6 Sept. 1940; see
to FM, 2 Mar. i940. also Miller, Bulgaria during the
126. AVP RF, f.074 op.25 p.io9 d.22 l.1-4, Second World War, pp. 29-30.
Lavrentev to Dekanozov, 3 Jan. 140. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272
1940. 1.177-9, Stamenov to FM on meet­
127. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272 ing Dekanozov, 13 Sept. 1940.
1.48 and d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272 141. See a tremendous insight in G.
1.56-64, Christov to FM, 21 Feb. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Cam­
1940. Miller, Bulgaria during the paign (London, 1945), pp. 66-8, and
Second World War, pp. 21-3. his Misiune la Moscova, 1940-41:
128. DGFP, X, pp. 54-5, Richthofen to Culegere de dokumente (Bucharest,
FM 29 June 1940. On the Italian
, 1 995), pp. 67-8, Gafencu to the
episode see above, p. 23. FM, tel. 2305, 16 Sept., and AVP
129. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272 RF, f.0144 op.20 p.105 d.3 1.1 1-12,
1.122-3, Christov to FM, 7 June 1940. record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with
130. DGFP, X, pp. 37-8 and 47, memo­ Gavrilovic;, 5 Nov. 1940.
randum by Wortman on meetings 142. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Cam­
with Draganov on 26 and 27 June paign, pp. 67-8. DGFP, XI, pp. 73-4,
1940. On the Soviet expectations Schulenburg to FM, 14 Sept. 1940.
see UD:s Ark.iv 1920 ARS, HP I 516 I 143. FO 371 25229 W8797/ 183/96 and
LXVIII, Assarasson to FM, 26 June W6469/ 183/ 96, Campbell to FO, 8
1940. and 16 June 1940.
131. DGFP, X, pp. 332-41, record of a 144. AVP RF, f.0125 op.24 p.118 d.5
meeting between Filov and Hitler 1.41-5, record of Lavrentev's
and Ribbentrop, 27 July 1940. meeting with Tanriover, Turkish
Notes to pages 45-9 337

ambassador, 12 July, and FSB, Lavrentev to FM 1 Nov. See also

,

Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, p. 100,

SSSR, I(1), pp. 223-4, memorandum tel. 2791, 1 Nov., and FO 371 25231
by Savchenko, deputy director, W 1 1435/215 /96, Cripps to FO, 2
Border NKVD, 12 July 1940. Nov. 1940.
145. DGFP, XI, pp. 30-2, Ribbentrop to 1 54. Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, tel.
Schulenburg, 6 Sept., and Gafencu, 3042, pp. 102-3, Gafencu to FM, 1 3
Misiune la Moscova, pp. 64-7, tel. Nov. 1940, and UD:s Arkiv 1920
2302, Gafencu to FM, 16 Sept. 1940. ARS, HP I 517 /LXIX, Assarasson to
146. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.6 1.65-7, FM on conversations with Gafencu,
and. f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2176 1.232-3, 1 3 Jan. 1941.
p.317 d.2181 l.92-3 and 124, AVP RF 155. DGFP, XI, pp. 424-5, 458-9 and 461,
f.059 op . 1 p.317 d.2181 1.92-3 and Fabricius to FM on meetings with
124, exchanges between Molotov Sobolev, 29 Oct. and 3 Nov. 1940. See
and Shkvartsev, 6, 9, 12 and 16 similar impressions gained by the
Sept.; see also DGFP, XI, pp. 64-5, Soviet ambassador in Bucharest,
Schulenburg to FM 12 Sept. 1940.
, AVP RF, f.059 op . 1 p.319 d.21931.22,
147. AVP RF, f.0125 op.24 p.118 d.5 Lavrentev to FM, 1 Nov. 1940.
1.76-9, record of Lavrentev's
meeting with Hankey, 29 July 1940.
148. Izvestiia, 1 3 Sept.; see also Cripps's 3. On a Collision Course
evaluation in FO 371 25230
W10404/215/96. On the relevance 1. Quoted in T. Higgins, Hitler and
of the shooting incidents see Russia: The Third Reich in a Two­
Gafencu' s views in UD:s Arkiv Front War, 1937-1943 (New York,
1920 ARS, HP I 516/LXVIII, 1966), Introduction.
Assarasson to FM, 1 3 Sept., and 2. R. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade
AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272 Russia, 1941 (London, 1975), p. 167.
1.185, Stamenov to FM, 14 Sept. 3. J. Forster, 'Barbarossa Revisited:
1940. Strategy and Ideology in the East',
149. See AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.331 d.2275 Jewish Social Studies, 50/ 1-2 (1992),
1.47-8, Vyshinsky to La vrishchev, and W. Murray, 'Barbarossa',
18 Sept., and Gafencu, Misiune Quarterly Journal of Military History,
la Moscova, tel. 2309, pp. 68--9, 4/3 (1992), PP· 8-17.
Gafencu to the FM 17 Sept. 1940.
, 4. G. R. Ueberschaer, 'Hitlers
150. DGFP, XI, pp. 287-8, memorandum Entschluss zum ''Lebensraum'' -
by the director of the Economic Krieg im Osten. Programma tisches
Policy Department, 1 1 Oct., and FO Ziel oder militarisches Kalkiil?', UB,
371 25231 W10814 and W10543/ pp. 94-5, and B. R. Kroener, 'Der
215/96, Cripps and Campbell ''erfrorene Blitzkrieg''. Strategische
to FO, 19 and 27 Sept. 1940 Planungen der deutschen Fiihrung
respectively. gegen die Sowjetunion und die
151. DGFP, XI, pp. 287-8, memorandum Ursachen ihres Scheiterns', in B.
by the director of the Economic Wegner (ed.), Zwei Wege nach
Policy Department, 1 1 Oct., and FO Moskau vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis
371 25229 W 10967/ 1 83 /96, Camp­ zum 'Unternehmen Barbarossa'
bell to FO, 8 Oct. 1940. (Munich, 1991), pp. 137-8.
152. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.157 l.47-51 , 5. F. Halder, Kriegstagebuch (Stuttgart,
record of Molotov's meeting with 1963), II, pp. 46-50; see also Ueber­
Schulenburg, 17 Oct. 1 940. schaer, 'Hitlers Entschluss', p. 102,
153. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata, and E. Klink, 'Die militarische
pp. 52-67, and AVP RF, f.059 op.1 Konzeption des Krieges gegen die
p.319 d.21 931.22, telegram from Sowjetunion', DRuZW, p. 216.
 Notes to pages 49-53

6. DGFP, X, pp. 79-85, record of a 1941', in Wegner (ed.), From Peace to

meeting between Hitler, Alfieri and War, pp. 1 1 7-21.
Keitel, 1 July 1940. 17. Ueberschaer, 'Hitlers Entschluss',
7. See p. 37. p. 98.
8. DGFP, X, pp. 147-5, record of a 18. On the Continental bloc see pp.
meeting between Hitler, 48-9.
Ribbentrop and Ciano, 8 July 1940. 19. Deist, 'Die militarische Planung',
9. Kroener, 'Der ''erfrorene p. 1 13.
Blitzkrieg'' ', p. 138. 20. Ueberschaer, 'Hitlers Entschluss',
10. DGFP, X, p. 263, Wormann to the p. 102: Paulus's account is in Der
embassies in Ankara and Moscow, Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsver­
22 July 1940. brecher, VII, pp. 284-6.
11. General Armand de Caulaincourt, 21. DGFP, X, pp. 549-50, excerpts from
With Napoleon in Russia (New York, the War Diary of the Wehrmacht
1935), P· 23. Operations Staff, 26 Aug. 1940.
12. J. Tauber, 'Die Planung des ''Dnter­ 22. DGFP, XI, pp. 144-6, High
nehmen Barbarossa''. Bemer­ Command of the Weh.rmacht to
kungen zum Forschungsstand', in FM, 20 Sept. 1940.
H. H. Nolte (ed.), 'Der Mensch gegen 23. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsver­
den Menschen ': Uberlegungen und brecher, \'II, pp. 284-6 and 324-5;
. .

Forschungen zum deutschen iiberfall see also Cecil, Hitler's Decision to

aitf die Sowjetunion 1941 (Hanover, Invade Russia, p. 1 1 1 .
1992), pp. 160-91. Halder, Krieg­ W. Hubatsch (ed.), Hitlers Weisun­
stagebuch, II, pp. 49-50. gen fiir die Kriegsfiihrung, 1939-
13. On this point see J. Forster, ·Das 1945 (Munich, 1965), pp. 77-85 . See
Unternehmen ''Barbarossa'' als also the comments of Professor
Eroberungs und Vernichtung­ Hans-Adolf Jacobse11, the editor of
skrieg', DRitZW, p. 415. I--Ialder' s diary in Kriegstagebuch,
14. R. D. Miiller, 'Das ''Unternehmen P· 165.
Barbarossa'' als wirtschaftlicher Hitler's Directive No. 18, 12 Nov.
Raubkrieg', UB, p. 177, and Der 1940 in DGFP, XI, pp. 527-8.
Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsver­ 26. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, pp. 129-30
brecher vor dem Internationalen and 147-8, 8 and 23 Oct. 1940.
Milittirgerichtshoe (Nuremberg, M. Milstein, 'According to
1947), VII, pp. 278-80, and X, p. 589; Intelligence Reports . . . ' , New
see also Klink, 'Die militarische Times, 26 (1990).
Konzeption', p. 214. 28. On this see C. Andrew and 0.
15. J . Forster, 'Hitlers Entscheidung fur Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story
den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion', (London, 1991), pp. 253-4, and V.
DRuZW, pp. 14-16. Forster in most Berezhkov, History in the Making
•

of his work on the subject and W. (Moscow, 1983), pp. 100-3.

Deist, 'Die militarische Planung des 29. Both are mentioned by their code
''Unternehmens Barbarossa'' ', UB, names throughout the book.
pp. 1 10-11, present the decision as 30. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi
a symbiosis of power-oriented poli­ Bezopasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. ii and
cies and ideology. In the final judg­ 73, and FSB, Sekrety Git/era, ha stole
ment they may well be right but u Stalina: razvedka i kontrrazvedka o
while the pragmatic cons id era tions podgotovke germanskoi agressii protiv
ai·e easily detected the ideological SSSR, mart-iiun' 1941 g. (Moscow,
ones remain very much a matter of 1995), p. 218. See also unpublished
assumption. article by L. Bezymensky on 'The
16. J . Forster, 'Hitler Turns East - Soviet Security Forces and the
German War Policy in 1940 and German Attack on Russia'.
Notes to pages 53-9 339

31. F. I. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s . also AVP RF, op.23 n.104 d.57
Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva 1.202-3, Tikhomirov to FM, and TsA
(Moscow, 1991), pp. 31-2. SVR RF, d.21616 t.1 1.353-6, NKVD
32. F. I. Golikov, Krasnye orly (Iz Memorandum on German War
dnevnikov 1918-1920 gg.) (Moscow, Preparations, 5 Nov. 1940.
1959). 44. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 (1990), pp.
33. 'Marshal Sovetskogo Soiuza F. I. 203-5, report by the 5th Dept of the
Golikov (K 80-letiiu so dnia rozh­ NKVD on German intentions, 6
deniia)', VIZh, 7 (1980), pp. 86-8. I Nov. 1940.
am grateful for an informative 45. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.104 d.57
interview with the late General 1.202-3, Tikhomirov, first secretary
Milstein, who was Golikov's of the Berlin embassy, on 'The situ­
deputy in the GRU. ation in Germany after a year of
34. Dimitrov' s diary, 20 Feb. 1941. war', 4 Nov. 1940.
35. Ibid., 21 Jan. 1941. 46. GRU GSh RF, op.918 d.6 1.20-2,
36. Attested by V. A. Novobranets, special report by Golikov, No.
who was the head of the Informa­ 252610, 9 Nov. 1940.
tion Department of the R KKA , 47. GRU GSh RF, op.22424 d.4 1.402-4,
in Znamia, 6 (1990), and Zhukov, 29 Sept. 1 940.
'Iz neopublikovannykh vospomi­ 48. TsA SVR RF, d.21606 t.1 1.301-3,
nanii', Kommunist, 14 (1988), p. 98. Beria to Stalin, 24 Oct. 1940.
37. Volkogonov papers, Archival mate­ 49. Gafencu, Misiune La Moscova,
rial from the GRU prepared for the ra port 2 384, pp. 69-78, Gafencu
TsK. The unprecedented Russian to Sturdza, 21 Sept. 1 940. The only
release of material prepared by work focusing on the significance
Khrushchev but never released of the Turkish straits is T. V.
before is in 0. Gorchakov, Lavrova, Chernomorskie prolivy
'Nakanune, iii tragediia Kassandry: (Rostov, 1997).
povest' v dokumentakh', Nedelia, 50. COS(40)853 in FO 371 24892
42-4 (1988). R8227 I 5 I 67, 21 Oct. 1940.
38. See for instance Gf{U to Foreign 51. Attested by Chuev, Sto sorole besed s
Intelligence, 29 Mar. 1941, repro­ Molotovym.
duced in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 52. See a revealing talk between
(1990), p. 208. Vyshinsky and Cripps in FO 371
39. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.328 d.2253 24848 N7173/ 40/38, Cripps on
1.100-1, 144, 153, 163, 173 and meeting Vyshinsky, 1 1 Nov. 1940,
267--9, Ivanov to FM, 14 and 26 and Cl1uev, Sto sorok besed s
Sept., 7, 10 and 1 1 Oct. and 9 N'ov. Molotovym, pp. 101-3.
1940. 53. See pp. 63-6.
40. P. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The 54. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.326 d.2239
Me1noirs of an Unwanted Witness - a l. 50-2, Molotov to Maisky, 6 Oct.,
Soviet Spymaster (London, 1994), and AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1 sl1
pp. 1 1 6-17. pop.272 1.213-14, Stamenov to FM,
41. GRU GSh R F, f.37967 op.6 d.2551 7 Oct. 1940.
1.156; special intelligence review by 55. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.157 1.67-8,
the director of tl1e Western Front Maisky to FM, 3 Nov.; see also a
Intelligence to Golikov, 19 Sept. discussion of the appreciation of
1940. England's resilience, pp. 59, 89-90.
42. TSa SVR RF, d.21616 t.1 1.174-5, 56. Presidential Archive, copy of the
deputy director of the Ukrainian handwritten notes by MolotO\', 9
NKGB to Golikov, 26 Sept. 1940. Nov.; AVIJ RF, f.059 op.1 p.338
43. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvertnoi d.2314 1.2, Stalin to Molotov, 1 1
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(1), pp. 278-9; Nov. 1 940.
340 Notes to pages 59-63

57. AVP RF, f.084 op.22 p.132 d.5 Preparations for ''Barbarossa'' ', in·
1.18-25, Dekanozov to FM on , Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War, p.
meeting the Greek ambassador in 1 18.
Germany, 14 Jan. 1941 . 69. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272
58. CAB 65/ 10 288(40)3, 13 Nov.; AVP 1.207-8, Stamenov to FM 20 Oct.,
,

RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d.2237 l.117-19, and TsDA MVR, f.316 op.1 ae.273
Maisky to FM, 15 Nov. 1940. 1.77, Popov to Draganov, 17 and 21
59. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 834/Z/ Oct. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I
312/ 1, pp. 29-3 1, a memorandum 5 1 7 /LXIX, and HP I 516/ LXVIII,
by N emanov on meeting Assarasson to FM, 10 July and 21
Bogomolov, 4 Dec. 1940. Oct. 1940.
60. Gorodetsky, Cripps' Mission to 70. FO 371 25015 R7626 and 8117 I
Moscow,. pp. 24-3 1. FO 371 24841 242/ 37, Cripps to FO, 30 Oct. 1940.
N5808/30/38 and N5840/5/38, 71. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.314 d.2163
telegrams from Cripps, 14 and 17 1.1 26-8, Vinogradov to FM, 21 Nov.
June; Cripps papers, letter to 1940.
daughter Diane, 18 Sept. 1940. 72. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.315 d.2165
61. Cripps papers, letter to Knatchbull­ 1. 70-2, Vyshinsky to Vinogradov on
Hugessen, British ambassador in meeting Aktay, 4 Nov. 1940.
Ankara, 23 Oct. 1940. 73. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.315 d.2165
62. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.328 d.2253 1. 73-4, 75-6, Vyshinsky to
1.153, Ivanov (Paris) to FM, 7 Oct., Vinogradov, 4 Nov. 1940.
and op.1 p.319 d.2192 1.240-1, 74. DGFP, XI, pp. 482-3, Papen on
Lavrentev to FM on meeting Tanri­ meeting Gerde in Berlin, 6 Nov.
oera, Turkish minister in Bucharest, 1940.
10 Oct. 1940. See also a round table 75. AVP RF, f.0132 op.23 p.1232 d.6
reproduced in 'Mezhdunarodnye 1.74-7, record of Vinogradov's meet­
otnosheniia i strany tsentral'noi i ing with Aktay, 25 Sept., and f.059
Iugo-Vostochnoi evropy v nachale op.1 p.314 d.2163 1.51-4 and p.315
vtoroi mirovoi voiny: sentiabr' d.2165 1.62-3, exchange of tele­
1939-avgust 1940 gg.', Sovetskoe grams between Molotov and Vino­
slaviariovedenie, 1 (1991), pp. 3-27. gradov, 12 and 1 5 Oct.; see also UD:s
63. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.314 d.2162 Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 516 /LXVIII,
1.47-50, Terentiev to FM, 6 July; see Assarasson to FM 17 Oct. 1940.
,

also diplomatic efforts in this vein 76. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi

in f.0125 op.24 p.118 d.5 1.63-6, Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(1), pp. 270-8,
record of Lavrentev's meeting with memorandum by Beria on the situ­
Tanrier, 19 July 1940. ation in Turkey, 5 Nov. 1940.
64. Assarasson, I skuggan av Stalin, pp. 77. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.318 d.2189
37-8. 1.200-2, Sharonov to Molotov on
65. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.2 d.15 1.34-7, meeting Csaky, 28 Oct. 1940.
and f.059 op.1 p.315 d.2165 1.13-18, 78. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.it pop.272
records of Molotov's meetings with 1.1 57, Stamenov to FM 3 Aug. 1940.
,

Aktay, 9 and 13 Aug. 1940. 79. DGFP, X, pp. 410-11, Richthofen to

66. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.314 d.2162 FM 4 Aug. 1940.
,

1. 169-71, telegram from 80. TsDA MVR, f.316 op. 1 ae.273

Vinogradov to Molotov on meeting 1.149-50, Draganov to FM on
Saracoglu, 4 Sept. 1940. meeting Ribbentrop, 9 Sept. 1940.
67. AVP RF, f.0125 op.24 p.118 d.5 81. AVP RF, f.074 op.1 p.331 d.2272
1.131-8, record of Lavrentev's meet­ 1.17-18, Lavrishchev to Molotov on
ing with Fabricius, 13 Sept. 1940. meeting Popov, 26 Aug. 1940.
68. S. Wegner-Korfes, 'Ambassador 82. DGFP, XI, pp. 29-30, Ribbentrop to
Count Schulenburg and the Bucharest legation, 5 Sept. 1940.
Notes to pages 63-71 341

83. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.3 d.16 1.34, and 516 /LXVIll, Assarasson to FM, 10
AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272 Sept. 1940; Klink, 'Die militarische
1.174, Stamenov to FM on meeting Konzeption', p. 195-6; J. von
Molotov, 10 Sept. 1940. Herwarth, Against Two Evils:
84. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272 Memoirs of a Diplomat-Soldier during
1.213-14 and 207-12.r Stamenov to the Third Reich (London, 1981), pp.
FM, 7 and 20 Oct., and TsDA MVR, 182-4.
f.316 op.1 ae.273 1.77, Popov to 3. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.157 1.1-5;
Draganov, 17 Oct. 1940. DGFP, XI, p. 47, record of
85. DGFP, XI, pp. 364-6, King Boris to Molotov's meeting with Schulen­
Hitler, 22 Oct.; TsDA MVR, f.316 op. burg, 9 Sept. On Schulenburg's
1 ae.273 1. 71, Popov to Draganov, 20 concern see also Gafencu, Misiune
Oct. 1940. la Moscova, tel. 2287, pp. 63-4,
86. On this see pp. 83-6. Gafencu to FM 13 Sept. 1940.
,

87. TsDA MVR, f.316 op.1 ae.273 l.47-8, 4. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d . 1 57 l.16-27,
Draganov to Popov, 20 Oct. 1940. and DGFP, XI, pp. 137-43, records
88. Ibid., 1.65, Popov to Draganov, 30 of Molotov's meeting witl1
Oct. 1940. Schulenburg, 21 Sept. The Russian
89. Ibid., 1.38, Draganov to FM, 31 Oct., press presented Russia as 'a new
and AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh Danubian State', Gafencu, Misiune
pop.272 1.217, Stamenov to FM, 30 la Moscova, tel. 2273-4, pp. 59-3,
Oct. 1940. Gafencu to FM, 13 Sept. 1940.
90. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272 5. L. E. Hill (ed.), Die Weizsi:icker-
1.217 and 222, Stamenov to FM 30 , Papiere, 1933-1950 (Frankfurt,
Oct. and 5 Nov. 1940. 1974), p. 216.
91. DGFP, XI, pp. 479-80, Ritter to 6. DGFP, XI, pp. 221-3, memorandum
Bucharest legation, 6 Nov. 1 940. by Schnurre, 28 Sept. 1940.
92. On this see for example DGFP, XI, 7. Ibid., pp. 102-5, Hitler to Mussolini,
p. 408, Bismarck, charge d'affaires 1 7 Sept. 1940.
in Rome, to FM, 27 Oct., and TsDA 8. Wegner-Korfes, 'Ambassador
MVR, f.316 op. 1 ae.273 1.37, Count Schulenburg', pp. 1 18-19.
Draganov to FM, 4 Nov. 1940. 9. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272
93. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.31 5 d.2165 1.237, Stamenov to FM, 12 Nov.
1.70-2, Vyshinsky to Vinogradov on 1940.
meeting Aktay, 4 Nov. 1940. 10. Wegner-Korfes, 'Ambassador
94. See p. 81. Count Schulenburg', p. 195.
95. AVP RF, f.0100 op.24 p.196 d.8 11. Weizsiicker-Papiere, p. 226.
1.427-9, well expounded in 12. DGFP, XI, pp. 521-3, memorandum
Paniushkin's meeting with Bai by Weizsacker, 1 1 Nov. 1940.
Chzhunsi, Chinese Deputy Chief of 13. Ibid., pp. 1 1 3-23, memorandum on
Staff, 31 Oct.; and f.059 op.1 p.315 Ribbentrop's meeting with
d.2165 1.73-4, 75-6, Vyshinsky to Mussolini, 20 Sept. 1940.
Vinogradov, 4 Nov. 1940. 14. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.316 d .2177
96. TsDA MVR, f.316k op.1 ae.273 1.6-8. See also DGFP, XI, pp. 276-7
1.19, Popov to Draganov, 9 Nov. and 279, reports of Sl1kvartsev' s
1940. meeting with Ribbentrop, and a
circular to German missions in
the Balkans, 9 Oct.; DGFP, Xl,
4. The Road to 'Barbarossa' pp. 245-59, 297-301 and 41 1-22,
records of Hitler's meetings with
1. A typical approach is Cecil, Hitler's Mussolini, 4, 15 and 28 Oct. Halder,
Decision to Invade Russia, p. 1 10. Kriegstagebuch, II, pp. 135-9, 1 5 Oct.
2. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1940.
342 Notes to pages 71-5

15. TsDA MVI�, f.176 op.8 ae.17 l.67-70, on the war, Weinberg naturally .
Draganov to FM on meeting Papen, assumes that the Russians 'were
6 Nov., and a reconfirmation in always happy to assist the Germans
F. von Papen, Memoirs (London, in stirring up trouble for the British
1952), pp. 465-7, and see also in Asia', and that Molotov's visit
AMVnR, p.42 op.1sh pop.315 reflected the 'continued fruitful
1. 29-3 1, Draganov to FM, 11 Nov. cooperation between them against
1940. Great Britain'; but, as the Russian
16. DGFP, XI, pp. 150-2 and 164, documents demonstrate, this was
record of Ribbentrop meeting with not their main objective. He further
Mussolini, 22 Sept. Indeed clause V maintains that Molotov pressed
stipulated that the agreement in for 'real and immediate Soviet
no way 'affects the political status advances toward the Straits and
which exists at present as between thus to the Mediterranean'; while,
each of the three contracting parties as we have seen, the move to
and Soviet Russia'. See also ibid., the Straits was confined to the
pp. 187·-8, Ribbentrop to Molotov, Bosphorus, reflecting a concern for
26 Sept., and AVP RF, f.059 op.1 control of the Black Sea rather than
p.316 d.2176 l.31 1-12, Shkvartsev to interest in the Dardanelles, which
FM, 28 Sept. 1940. would have implied a southward
17. Weizsticker-Papiere, p. 219; AVP RF, ambition in the Mediterranean.
f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2176 1.311-12, 25. Berezhkov, History in the Making,
Shkvartsev to FM, 28 Sept. 1940. pp. 7-50.
18. DGFP, XI, pp. 187-8, Ribbentrop to 26. Presidential Archives, f.03 op.64
Molotov, 26 Sept. 1940. d.675 1.21-30, and DGFP, XI, pp.
19. Ibid., pp. 236-8, Ribbentrop to the 533-41, record of Molotov'$ meet­
Moscow embassy, 2 Oct. 1940. ing with Ribbentrop, 12 Nov. 1940.
20. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.316 d.2177 27. A\7P RF, f.059 op.1 p.338 d.2314
1.6-8, report by Shkvartsev of 1.1 1-18, Molotov to Stalin, 13 Nov.
meeting Ribbentrop; see also 1940.
DGFP, XI, pp. 276-7 and 279, a cir­ 28. G. Hilger and A. G. Meyer, The
cular letter by Ribbentrop, 9 Oct. Incompatible Allies: A Memoir­
1940. History of German-Soviet Relations,
21. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.157 l .47-5 1; 1918-1941 (New York, 1971), p. 323.
DGFP, XI, pp. 291-7 and 317, 29. AVP RF, f.059 . op.1 p.339 d.2 3 15
Ribbentrop to Stalin, 13 Oct., and 1.35-6, Stalin to Molotov, 13 Nov.
reports of Molotov's meeting with 1940.
Schulenburg, 1 7 Oct. 1941. On 30. AVP RF, f.3 op. 64 d.675 1.49-67,
Schulenburg' s continued optimism report of meeting between Molotov
see Gafenctt, Misiune la Moscova, and Hitler, 13 Nov., and f.059 op.1
raport 2714, pp. 91-9, report by p.339 d.2315 1.29-30, Stalin to
Gafencu to Sturdza, 21 Oct. 1940. Molotov, 13 Nov. 1940.
22. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.157 1.55-8 31. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64
and 61-2, and DGFP, XI, pp. 327-8 d.675 1.68-83, and DGFP, XI, pp.
and 334-7, records of Molotov 562-70, records of Molotov's meet­
meetings with Schulenburg, 19 and ing with Ribbentrop, 13 Nov. 1940.
21 Oct. 1940. 32. For this see Der Prozess gegen die
23. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64 Hauptkriegsverbrecher, IX, pp. 328-
d .675 1.1; DGFP, XI, pp. 353-4, 30 and 383-5.
Stalin's letter to Ribbentrop, 21 Oct. 33. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64
1940. d.675 l.31-41 and 49-67, and DGFP,
24. In his monumental A World at Arms, XI, pp. 541-9 and 55cr-62, records of
which set the standards for research Molotov's meetings with Hitler on
Notes to pages 75-80 343

12 and 13 Nov. 1940. See also Hilger 272 1.238, and AVP RF, f.059 op.1
and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, p. p.331 d.2275 1.105-13, records of
32 3· Molotov's meeting with Stamenov,
34. See for instance AMVnR, d.40 p. 34 18 Nov. 1940. On the Soviet
op.1sh pop.272 1.233-4, Stamenov policy see also P. P. Sevost' ianov,
to FM 13 Nov. 1940.
, 'Nakanune velikoi bitvy', Novaia i
35. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.338 d.2314 noveishaia istoriia, 4 (1981), pp.
1.36-8, Molotov to Stalin, 13 Nov. 99-128, and 0. N. Reshetnikova,
1940. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i strany
36. See the evidence of General Tsentral'noi i Iugo-Vostochnoi Evropy
Sousloparov, Soviet military v period fashistskoi agressii na
attache in Vichy, Quai d'Orsay Balkanakh i podgotovki napadeniia na
Archives, 834/Z/ 3 12/ 1 pp. 73-5. SSSR (Moscow, 1992).
37. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.326 d.2239 49. Filov, Dnevnik, p. 1 99, a1i.d DGFP,
1.1 12-14, Molotov to Maisky, 17 XI, pp. 652, n. 2, and 653-4, 18 Nov.
Nov. 1940. 1 940.
38. See p. 75. 50. DGFP, XI, pp. 654-70 and 680-4,
39. On this see AMVnR, p.42 op.1sl1 record of Antonescu' s talks with
pop.315 1.34, Stamenov to FM, 16 Hitler, Keitel and Ribbentrop in
Nov. 1 940. Berlin, 23 and 25 Nov.; the Russians
40. Weizsa·cker-Papiere, pp. 220 and 227, were well briefed about the talk,
and Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II, pp. see AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.3196 d.2193
182-3, 1 6 Nov. 1940. 1.131-5, Lavrentev to FM, 21 Nov.
41. DGFP, XI, pp. 598-609, memo­ 1 940. See a n earlier identification
randum on conversation between of the Balkans as the key to under­
Hitler and Ciano on 18 Nov. and standing the German-Soviet
with the Spanish Foreign Minister, clash in E. Presseisen, 'Prelude
Serrano Sufi.er, 19 Nov. 1940. to ''Barbarossa'': Germany and the
42. Ibid., pp. 637-43 and 654-70, Hitler Balkans, 1940-1941', Journal of
to Mussolini, and record of meeting Modern History, 4 (1960).
with Antonescu, 20 Nov. 1940. 51. DGFP, XI, pp. 651-3, Richthofen to
43. Ibid., XI, pp. 632-6, memorandum FM, 22 Nov. 1940.
on Hitler's meeting with the 52. Ibid., pp. 691-70, Richthofen to FM,
Hungarian Minister President, 24 Nov. 1940.
Count Teleki, and Count Csaky in 53. Ibid., pp. 672-8, report of Hitler's
Vienna, 20 Nov. 1940. meeting with Draganov, 23 Nov.
44. Ibid., p. 432, 1 7 Nov. 1940. 1940.
45. The Treaty of San Stefano, 3 March 54. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.331 d.2272
1878, established an independent 1.155-6, Lavrishchev to FM on
Bulgaria the borders of which meeting Popov, 20 Nov. 1940. On
comprised the territory lying the King's Hobson' s choice see
between the Danube, the Black Sea Rendell, British ambassador in
and the Aegean, including Rumelia Sofia, in his G. Rendell, The Sword
and Macedonia but excluding and the Olive: Recollections of
Saloniki. Diplomacy and the Foreign Service
46. AMVnR, p.42 op.1sh pop.315 (London, 1957), p. 183.
1.20-8, Draganov to FM, 14 Nov. 55. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272
See also p.34 op.1sh pop.272 1.237, 1.248, Stamenov to FM, 26 Nov.
Stamenov to FM, 1 7 Nov. 1940. 1940.
47. DGFP, XI, pp. 606-10 and 652, n. 2, 56. TsDA MVR, f. 176 op.8 a.e.17 1.104,
19 Nov. 1 940. B. Filov, Dnevnik and AMVnR, p.42 op.1sh pop.315
(Sofia, 1986), p. 199. 1.5, Antonov to FM, 24 and 29 Nov.
48. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop. 1940 respectively.
344 Notes to pages Bo-6

57. AMVnR, PRETI/ 1 / 3 pap.1 op.2sh 67. DGFP, XI, pp. 726-7, Richthofen to
pop.1 1.1, Stamenov to FM, 23 Nov. FM, 28 Nov. 1940.
1940. 68. AMVnR, PRETI/ 1 / 3 pap.1 op.2sh
58. AMVnR, d.40 p.34 op.1sh pop.272 pop.1 1.8--9 and 10, exchange of
1.246, Stamenov to FM, 26 Nov. telegrams between Popov and
See also Molotov's record of his Stamenov, 30 Nov. and 1 Dec.; AVP
meeting with Aktay on 10 Dec. 1940, RF, f.059 op.1 p.331 d.2272 1.192--9,
in AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.3 d . 19 1.10- Lavrishchev to Molotov, 30 Nov.
14. 1940. Richthofen's reports are in
59. A less likely explanation for the DGFP, XI, pp. 756-7.
oral delivery is that a written one 69. TsDA MVR, f.316 op.1 a.e.273 1.25,
would have constituted an abroga­ and DGFP, XI, pp. 767-73, records
tion of the 1925 agreement with of Hitler's meeting with Draganov,
Turkey on mutual consultations - 3 Dec. 1940.
at least this is the excuse used by 70. DGFP, XI, pp. 789-91, Hitler to
Molotov when reproached by the Mussolini, 5 Dec. 1940.
Turks, see Foreign Relations of the 71. See pp. 121-3.
United States (hereafter FRUS), I 72. Some historians suggest that it
(1941), pp. 287-9, MacMurray, US was customary for Hitler to gloss
ambassador in Ankara, to Secretary over this contentious issue with
of State, 22 Feb. 1941. the military; but there are no
60. AMVnR, PRETI/ 1 / 3 pap.1 op.2sh signs of a prior dispute between
pop.1 l.7, report by D. Shishmanov, Hitler and the army: see Klink,
general secretary of the Bulgarian 'Die militarische Konzeption', pp.
FM, 25 Nov. 1940. 236-7.
61. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.331 d .2272 73. Halder, Kriegstageb11ch, II, pp.
1.167-8, telegram from Sobolev to 213-14 and 227-8, 13 Dec. 1940.
Molotov, 25 Nov. 1940. 74. AMVnR, PREII / 1 / 3 pap.1 op.2sh
62. Dimitrov's diary, 1 1 Jan. 1941. pop.1 1.12, Shishmanov, minute on
63. Dimitrov's diary, and Komintern i meeting Lavrishchev, 6 Dec.; TsDA
vtoraia mirovaia voina, p. 454, MVR, f. 176 op.8 ae.17 l.42, Popov to
telegram from Dimitrov to the CC Stamenov, 9 Dec. 1940.
of the Bulgarian CP, 25 Nov. 1940; 75. TsDA MVR, f.176 op.8 a.e.17
AMVnR, PRETI / 1 /3 pap.1 op.2sh 1.41, Popov to Draganov, 8 Dec.
pop.1 1.19, anonymous pamphlet 1940.
distributed in Sofia, 27 Nov. On the 76. Ibid., 1. 106, and DGFP, XI, pp. 806-7
diplomatic setback in Sofia see and 833-5, Richthofen to FM, 7
AMVnR, PREII/ 1 / 3 pap.1 op.2sh and 10 Dec., and Draganov to FM
pop.1 1.11, Popov to Stamenov, 1 and record by Wormann, director
Dec. 1940. of the Political Department of the
64. Dimitrov' s diary, and Komintern i German FM, 10 Dec. 1940.
vtoraia 1nirovaia voina, pp. 461-2, 28 77. See above, pp. 44-7.
Nov. 1940. 78. DGFP, XI, pp. 838-9, 879-81 and
65. AVP RF, f.3 op.64 p. d.675 1. 108-16, 883-4, Fabricius to FM, 1 1 and 16
record of a meeting between Dec. 1940. See also Noviko�
Schnurre, Schulenburg and Vospominaniia diplomata, pp. 67-8.
Molotov, 25 Nov. 1940, and DGFP, 79. FO 371 25231 W12425 and
XI, pp. 714-15 and 716-17, notes W12738/215 /96, Campbell to FO, 6
by Molotov to Schulenburg and by Dec. 1940.
Schulenburg to FM . 80. DGFP, XI, pp. 841-2, Blucher
66. Filov, D11evnik, pp. 199-200, and (Helsinki) to FM, 1 1 Dec. 1940.
DGFP, XI, pp. 712-14, Richthofen to 81. Ibid., XI, pp. 899-902, 18 Dec. 1940.
FM, 26 Nov. 1940. 82. Ibid., XI, pp. 937-41, Ritter to
Notes to pages 86-92 34 5

FM (submitted personally to 5. The Curtain Falls

Ribbentrop and Hitler) and a on the Balkans
memorandum by General Jodl on
'German Military Preparations in 1. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.2 d.715 l.107-19,
the Balkans', 23 Dec. 1940. record of Molotov's meeting with
83. A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New Cripps, 24 Aug., and f.059 op.1
York, 1970), p. 173. A review of the p.326 d.2239 1.14-15, Molotov to
process of decision-making is in Maisky, 25 Aug. 1940.
E. M . Robertson, 'Hitler Turns from 2. AVP RF, f.059 op . 1 p.325 d.2236
the West to Russia, May-December 1.92-7 and 192-3, and f.069 op.24
1940', in R. Boys and E. M . p.70 d.43 l.91-3, Maisky to Molotov,
Robertson (eds), Paths to War: New 14 Sep., 1 and 7 Oct. 1940.
Essays on the Origins of the Second 3. AVP RF, f.069 op.24 p.70 d.43 l.95-9,
World War (New York, 1989). record of Maisky' s meeting with
84. 'Der operationsentwurf Ost' des Halifax, 17 Oct. 1940.
Generalmajors Marcks vom 5. 4. AVP RF, f.07 op.1 p.2 d.22 1.4-7,
August 1940', in F. Klein and I . and FO 418/86 N6594/2039/59,
Lachnit (eds), Wehrforschung, 4 reports of Cripps' s meeting with
(1972), p. 1 16. Vyshinsky, 14 Sept. 1940.
85. Quoted in Cecil, Hitler's Decision to 5. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d.2236
Invade Russia, p. 169. 1.163-7, Maisky to FM on meeting
86. FO 1093 I 2 fol. 14. Beaverbrook, 25 Sept. 1940.
87. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade 6. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.157 1.35-6,
Russia, p. 105. and DGFP, XI, pp. 244-5, records
88. See for instance the study of of Molotov's meeting with
Hitler's Chief of Staff F. Halder, Tippelskirch, 4 Oct. 1940.
Hitler as Warlord (London, 1950). 7. AVP RF, f.07 op.1 p.2 d.22 1.8-10,
89. Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade and FO 371 24841 N6681 /5 /38,
Russia, p. 171. records of Cripps' s meeting with
90. Ibid., p. 121 . Vyshinsky, 20 Sept.; see also FO 371
91. See Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 24848 N 7348 I 40 I 38, Halifax to
85. Cripps, 27 Nov. 1940.
92. Quoted in Forster, 'Hitler Turns 8. FO 371 24870 R7763/ 4/7, Rendell
East', p. 20. to FO, 28 Sept. 1940.
93. The following is based on a most 9. Cripps papers, and FO 371 24848
informative article by I. Tsukertort, N6838/ 40/ 38, official and private
'Gerrnanskii militarism i legenda letters to Halifax, 10 and 1 1
o ''preventivnoi voine'' gitlerovskoi Oct., and diary entry for 10 Oct.
Germanii protiv SSSR', VIZh, 5 1940.
(1991), pp. 16-24. 10. CAB 65/9 269(40)8, 10 Oct.; AVP
94. For more on this see pp. 1 15-17. See RF, f.059 op. 1 p.320 d.2202 1.13 1-4,
S. Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Vyshinsky to Umansky, 24 Dec.
Excellence: The Evolution of Opera­ 1940.
tional Theory (London, 1997). 11. See pp. 44-6.
95. Ueberschor, 'Hitlers Entschluss', 12. FO 371 25231 W12004/215 /96,
pp. 83-9· Hoare to FO, 21 Nov., and 25015
96. DGFP, XII, pp. 386-94, 405-9 and R8202/ 242/ 37, Cripps to FO and
41 3-20, Matsuoka' s conversations minutes, 3 Nov. 1940. A marvellous
with Hitler and Ribbentrop in and insightful examination of
Berlin, 31 Mar. 194 1 . Churchill's strategy and politics
97. Quoted in Forster, 'Hitler Turns in the Balkans is in S. Lawlor,
East', p. 22. Churchill and the Politics of War
98. DGFP, XII, p. 1069. (Cambridge, 1994).
 Notes to pages 92-5

13. FO 371 24852 N7163/ 22/ 38, Cripps 22. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.8 d.81 l.2-5, and
to FM, 10 Nov., and minutes by FO 371 29463 N402 and N41 1 / 3 / 38,
Cadogan and Halifax, 13 and 25 and 29473 N759122/ 38, exchange
Nov.; on the withdrawal of the of telegrams between Cripps and
offer see 24849 N7387 I 40/ 38, Eden, Cripps to Mikoyan, and FO
Cripps to Halifax, 8 Dec., CAB minutes, 1, 20 and 21 Feb. 1941.
65 / 1 0 295(40)3 and FO 837/1133, 23. CAB 69/2 DO (41 )7, 10 Feb. 1941.
Ministry of Economic Warfare 24. AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4
(hereafter MEW) minutes, 26 Dec. 1.105-6, Lavrentev to Molotov, 1 1
See also Maisky' s talk with Halifax Feb. 1941.
on the Berlin meeting in the same 25. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.158 l.18-22,
vein in FO 3 71 24848 N 7348 I 40 I and DGFP, XI, pp. 723-4, record of
38, Halifax to Cripps, 27 Nov. Molotov's meeting with Schulen­
1940. burg, 28 Nov., and pp. 746-8,
14. FO 371 24849 N7548/ 40/38, and Schnurre to Ritter, 29 Nov. 1940.
AVP RF, f.069 op.24 p.70 d.43 26. See above, pp. 80-2.
1.132-7, record of Maisky's meeting 27. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.317 d.2128
with Eden, 27 Dec., and a comment 1.188-90, and DGFP, XI, pp. 97g-80
by Cripps, 29 Dec.; Maisky gained and 1013-15, reports of meetings
a similar impression of Eden's inef­ between Molotov and Schulen­
fectiveness from Lloyd George, see burg, 29 Dec. 1940 and 3 Jan. 1941.
AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d.2237 See also Gafencu, Misiune la
1.323-7, Maisky to FM, 29 Dec. Moscova, tel. 3, pp. 127-8, Gafencu
1940. to FM, 2 Jan. 1941, and similar
15. FO 371 24849 N7500/ 40/ 38, Eden . detailed views by General Sous­
to Cripps. Also Cripps to Eden, loparov, military attache in Vichy,
•

19 Dec. 1940. Eden to Dalton, 3 Jan. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 834/ Z/

1941, and minute by Cadogan, 27 312/1, pp. 66-7, 3 Jan. 1941.
Dec. 1940. 28. DGFP, XI, pp. 1 137-8, mem­
16. FO 371 29463 N29/3 /38, Cripps to orandum by Wiehl, director of the
FO and minutes by Eden, 3 1 Dec. Economic Policy Department, 19
1940. Jan. See also AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9
17. See pp. 95-6. d.27 1.6-7 and 9, Vyshinsky on
18. FO 371 29497 N159/88/38, Cripps rr1eeting Pasikivii, 21 and 24 Jan.
to the FO, and minutes, 1 1 Jan. 1941.
1941. 29. On this episode see also J. Barros
19. FO 371 24849 N7484/ 40/ 38, FO and R. Gregor, Double Deception:
minutes, 22 Jan., and CAB 65/ 17 Stalin, Hitler, and the 1-nvasion of
5(41)2, 13 Jan. 1941. Russia (1995), pp. 48-51 . Double
20. Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, pp. 345, Deception gives a most persuasive
347, 372; See also W. P. Crozier, account of Stalin's politics in
Off the Record: Political Irzterviews, the spring of 1941. However, it
193 9-44 (London, 1973), p. 208. appeared before the opening of the
On the myth of Eden's staunch Russian archives and therefore
support of the Soviet Union see suffers inevitable lacunae and occa­
D. Carlto11, Anthony Eden: A Biogra­ sional inaccuracies.
phy (London, 1981), pp. 16, 63, 86-8 30. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 517 I
and 149, and on the Middle East, LXIX, Assarasson to FM, 25 Nov.,
170-2. Krigsarkivet, Fo ..rsvarsstaben, Ser.
21. FO 837I1098, Cripps to FM, 12 and E/II/15,1 1 , military attache's
20 Feb., and minutes. UD:s Arkiv report, no. 2, 25 Nov., AMVnR, p.42
1920 ARS, HP I 517 /LXIX, Assaras­ op.1sh pop.315 1.5, Antonov to FM ,

son to FM 9 Jan. 1940.

, 29 Nov., and FO 371 24853 N7347 I
Notes to pages 95-100 347

283/38, Cripps to Halifax, 29 Nov. 44. DGFP, XI, pp. 1018-27 (actual date
1940. of document 4 Jan.), memorandum
31. DGFP, XI, p. 854, Ribbentrop to on Hitler's meeting with Filov, 4
Schulenburg, 12 Dec. 1940. Jan., and Filov, Dnevnik, pp. 200-8,
32. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.319 d.2193 4 Jan. 1941. Even at the height of the
1.204, telegram from Dekanozov to 'ideologized' period of Bulgarian
FM 6 Dec. 1940.
, historiography it was recognized
33. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.6 that the drive for revisionism was
1. 285-90, and DGFP, XI, pp. 854-6 bound to lead Bulgaria towards the
and 864-5, records of Dekanozov' s German camp; see I. Dimitrov, 'Bul­
meeting with Ribbentrop, 12 Dec. garia in European Politics between
1940. the Two World Wars: Certai1l Pre­
34. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.6 liminary Inferences', Southeastern
1.268-72, record of Dekanozov' s Eitrope, 8/ 1-2 (1981).
meeting with Hitler, 19 Dec. 1940. 45. FRUS, I (1941), p. 278, Earle, US
35. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.15 d.158 l.48-52, ambassador in Sofia, to Secretary
and DGFP, XI, pp. 928-9, records of of State, 12 Jan. 1941.
Molotov's meeting with Schulen­ 46. Filov, Dnevnik, pp. 209-1 1, 7 Jan.
burg, 21 Dec. 1940. 1941.
36. DGFP, XI, pp. 943-4, Weizsacker 47. TsDA MVR, f. 1 76 op.15 ae.1 l.1 32-9,
to Schulenburg, 24 Dec. 1940. and DGFP, XI, pp. 1081-5, records
37. Ibid., pp. 1044-5, Weizsacker to of Weizsacker's meeting with
Ribbentrop, 7 Jan. 1 94 1 . Draganov, 13 Jan. 1941.
38. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 1. 48. Izvestiia, 1 1 Jan.; Dimitrov's diary,
1-6; DGF'P, XI, pp. 1000-1, records 12 and 13 Jan., and AMVnR, d.51
of Molotov's meeting with Schu­ p.45 op.1sh pop.333 1.10, Stamenov
lenburg, 2 Jan., and p. 1040, Schu­ to FM, 13 Jan. An analysis of tl1e
lenburg to Ribbentrop, 7 Jan. Russian position is also in FO 371
1941. 29500 N262,/ 122/ 38, Eden to
39. DGFP, XI, pp. 1066-<), Trade Agree­ Cripps on Butler's meeting with
ment between USSR and Germany, Maisky, 1 5 Jan. 1941.
10 Jan. 1941. 49. AMVnR, d . 5 1 p.45 op.1sh pop.3 .33
40. Ibid., XII, pp. 4-5 and 8, telegrams 1 . 1 1, Stamenov to FM 14 Jan. 1941.
,

to Schulenburg, 3 Feb., and minute 50. DGFP, XI, pp. 1 100-1, Scl1ulenburg
by him, 1 Feb., and AVP RF, f.07 to FM, 14 Jan. 1941.
op.2 p.9 d.22 1.19-20, record of 51. Ibid., pp. 1 104-5 and 1076,
Vyshinsky's meeting with Tippel­ Weizsacker to Ribbentrop, 1 5 Jan.,
skirch, 4 Feb. 1941. and head of Foreign Intelligence,
41. Herwarth, Against Two E-oils, pp. OKW, to FM 11 Jan. 1941.
,

188-9. 52. AVP R F, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 1.37-41,

42. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.331 d.2272 Molotov's meeting with Schulen­
1. 238-9, Lavrishchev to Molotov, 18 burg, 1 7 Jan. 1941 .
Dec.; AMVnR, PREII / 1 / 3 pap.1 53. DGFP, XI, pp. 1122-3.
op.2sh pop.1 1.14-16, report by 54. Ibid., pp. 1 1 22-3 and 1 155-6,
Popov on meeting Lavrishchev, 18 Weizsacker to Rib�entrop on meet­
Dec., and Dimitrov's diary, 20 Dec. ing Dekanozov, 17 Jan., and Ribben­
1940. trop to Weizsacker, 21 Jan. 1941.
43. TsDA MVR, f.176 op. 15 ae.1 1.55-9, 55. AVP R F, f.074 op.26 p.110 d.6 l. 26-7,
and op.8 ae.962 1.6, reports by record of Lavrishchev' s meeting
Petrov, the Bulgarian naval and air with Gurev, King Boris's adviser, 24
attache in Bucharest, on conversa­ Jan. 1941.
tions with Lavrentev and Lunin, 4 56. See p. 106.
and 1 1 Jan. 1941. 57. DGFP, XI, pp. 1210-12 and
 Notes to pages 100-104

1216-17, 1236-7, memorandum by 70. AVP RF, f. 017a, Maisky's diary1

Ambassador Ritter, Berlin; Field 1.41-6, 1 Mar. 1941.
Marshal Jodi to Ritter, 28 Jan. 71. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I
Directive of the High Command 517 /LXIX, Assarasson to FM on
of the Wehrmacht, 27 Jan. 1941. conversations with Aktay, 21 Nov.
58. AVP RF, f. 017a, Maisky's diary, 1940.
1.23, 1 1 Feb., and TsDA MVR, f.176 72. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.3 d.19 1.50-7,
op.8 ae.1016a 1.55, Moltchilov to Molotov on meeting Aktay, 14 Dec.;
FM 1 Mar. 1941.
, additional information in UD:s
59. TsDA MVR, f.176 op.8 ae.962 1.13, Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 517 /LXIX,
and DGFP, XII, pp. 73-4, reports Assarasson to FM, 14 Dec. 1940.
by Draganov and Ritter on their 73. FO 371 24871 R8945/ 4/7, Cripps
meeting, 9 Feb., and TsDA MVR, to FO, 14 Dec. 1940. Aktay was
f.176 op.8 ae.17 1.46-7, exchange a confidant of Cripps; they met
of telegrams between Popov and almost daily in what they termed
Draganov, 13, 17 and 18 Feb. 1941. the 'Club', together with the
60. FO 371 29724 R1562/ 36/7, minute Yugoslav and Greek ambassadors.
by Churchill on meeting Moltchilov, 74. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.314 d.2163
20 Feb. 1941. 1.182-5, Vinogradov to FM on
61. AVP RF, f.082 op.24 p.105 d.6 l.124- meeting Saracoglu, 17 Dec. 1940.
30, record of Dekanozov's meeting 75. FO 371 24871 R8909/ 4/ 7, Rendell
with Draganov, 18 Feb. 1941. to FO, 1 1 Dec. 1940.
62. Filov, Dnevnik, pp. 249-50; on Hitler 76. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.314 d.2163
and King Boris see Miller, Bulgaria 1.1 70-4, Vinogradov to FM, 13 Dec.,
during the Second World War, p. 46. and f.06 op.2 p.3 d.19 1.10-14,
63. AMVnR, d.51 p.45 op.1sh pop.333 Molotov report on meeting Aktay;
1.36 and 39-41, Stamenov to FM, 24 see also Steinhardt on meeting
Feb. 1941. Aktay in FRUS, I (1941), pp. 276-7,
64. Dimitrov's diary, 26 Feb. 1941. 10 Dec. 1940.
65. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 l.28-32, 77. DGFP, XI, pp. 54-6, Mackensen
and DGFP, XII, p. 195, records of to Ribbentrop, 10 Sept. Initially
Molotov's meeting with Schulen­ Molotov was happy enough to
burg, 28 Feb. 1941. resume trade negotiations; those
66. AVP RF, f.074 op.26 p . 1 10 d.6 1.45, could serve as a deterrent to the
Lavrishchev on meet.h"l.g Shish­ Germans and a vehicle for reopen­
manov, general director of Bulgar­ ing political discussions between
ian FM, 28 Feb. See also ibid., 1.47-8, Russia and the Axis, see AVP RF,
Lavrishchev on meeting Altinov, f.059 op.1 p.330 d.2269 1.182,
head of the Political Department of Molotov to Gorelkin, 14 Dec. 1940.
the Bulgarian FM, 1 Mar., and 78. AVP RF, f.0596 op.1 p.330 d.2268
1sDA MVR, f.176 op.8 ae.17 1.24, 1.160-1, Gorelkin to FM on meeting
Popov to Stamenov, 1 Mar. 1941. Ciano, 26 Dec. 1940. The Italian
67. DGFP, XII, pp. 191-4, Maritius to documents on the overture are in
FM, 28 Feb. 1941. Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, pp.
68. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 l.63-6, and 201-9.
DGFP, XII, pp. 213-16, records of 79. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.16 d.205 l.10-11,
Molotov's meeting with Schulen­ record of Gorelkin' s meeting Ciano,
burg, 1 Mar. 1941. 28 Dec. 1940.
69. AMVnR, d.51 p.45 op.1sh pop.333 80. See p. 27.
1.47, Stamenov to FM 4 Mar. He was
, 81. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.17 d.208 1. 1-7,
forced to resort to yet another inef­ and op.2 p.20 d.229 1.15-21, records
fective Tass communique, Izvestiia, of Molotov's meetings with Rosso,
4 Mar. 1941. 30 Dec. 1940, and 27 Jan.; UD:s
Notes to pages 104-8 349

Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 517 /LXX, Krigsarkivet, Fo .. rsvarsstaben, Ser.

Assarasson to FM 5 Feb. 1941.
, E/II/15/1, military attache's
82. DGFP, XI, pp. 990-4, 996-<J and report, no. 4, 5 Feb. 1941.
1011, Hitler to Mussolini, 31 Dec. 94. DGFP, XII, p. 120, Papen to Ribben­
1940, and Mackensen to Ribben­ trop, 20 Feb. 1941.
trop, 1 and 3 Jan.; on Rosso see 95. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 517 I
AMVnR, d.51 p.45 op.1sh pop. LXX, Assarasson to FM, 30 Jan. 1941.
333 1.20, Stamenov to FM, 1 Feb. 96. TsDA MVR, f.176 op.8 ae.1016a
1941. l.40-3a, Draganov to FM on
83. See p. 46. DGFP, XI, pp. 1030-3, meeting Dekanozov, 21 and 22
record of Ribbentrop's meeting Feb. See also AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9
with Alfieri in Berlin, 7 Jan. 1941, d.24 1.1-2, record of Vyshinsky's
and the Italian version of the nego­ meeting with Aktay, 20 Feb., and
tiations in Toscano, Designs in UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/517/
Diplomacy, pp. 201-35. LXX, Assarasson to FM on conver­
84. DGFP, XI, pp. 1 127-33, Hitler's sations with Aktay, 19 Feb. 1941.
meeting with Mussolini at Bercht­ 97· FO 371 29497 N159 /88/38,
esgaden, 21 Jan., DGFP, XI, pp. telegram from Cripps, 1 1 Jan.;
1 1 63-7, and XII, pp. 45-6, unsigned Cripps papers, letter to daughter
n1emorandum, probably from Diane, 10 Jan., and letter to wife
Ribbentrop to Ciano, 22 Jan., and Isobel, 1 Feb. 1941.
note by Weizsacker, 6 Feb. 1941. 98. FO 371 29777 R616 / 1 13 / 67, Cripps
85. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 1.55-7, to the FO and minutes, 27 Jan. 1941.
record of Molotov's meeting with 99. See for example FO 371 29500
Rosso, 24 Feb. 1941. See also N262 / 1 22/38, Eden to Cripps,
Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, pp. 21 Jan., and 29463 N29/ 3 / 38,
241-4. telegram from Mallet, 16 Jan.; State
86. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.4 d.35 1.48-50, Dept. 740.0011 EW 39/ 79809,
Lozovsky on meeting Rosso, 19 telegram from Sterling (Sweden),
Mar. 1941. 25 Jan. 1941.
87. See pp. 91-2. 100. See below, pp. 155-8.
88. AVP R F, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4 101. FO 371 29778 R1476/113 /67,
1.68-71, report on Lavrentev' s Cripps to Eden on meeting the
meeting with Kokatiirk, Turkish Turkish ambassador and Vyshin­
military attache in Bucharest, 6 Jan.; sky, 21 Feb., and minute by Sargent,
and AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.10 d.25 25 Feb. 1941.
1.2-4, Dekanozov on meeting with 102. FO 371 29463 N675 and N733 /3/38,
Alkend, the Turkish charge d' af­ exchange of telegrams between
faires in Berlin, 1 3 Jan. 1941. Cripps and the FO, and minutes, 24
89. FO 371 29463 N382/3/38 and 29777 Feb. 1941.
R/700 / 1 1 3 /67, Eden to Cripps, 29 103. PREM 3 / 395/ 16, 22 Feb., and
Jan. 1941. Cripps papers, diary, 8 Mar. 1941.
90. DGFP, XI, pp. 1 1 24-5 and 1 172, and 104. Gorodetsky, Cripps' Mission to
AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 1.37-41 Moscow, chs 6-8.
and 42-7, records of Molotov's 105. FO 371 24891 R7849 /5/67, FO note
meetings with Schulenburg, 17 and for Cabinet, 9 Dec. 1940.
23 Jan. 1941. 106. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, 1.37,
91. See below, pp. 127-8. 25 Feb. 1941; AVP I�, f.07 op.2 p.9
92. AVP R F, f. 017a, Maisky's diary, d.20 1. 1-2, record of Vyshinsky' s
1.15, 21, 29-30, 27 Jan., 10 and 19 meeting with Cripps, 24 Feb.,
Feb. 1941. and Politburo Archives, f.3 op.64
93. See revelations by the Turkish d.341 1.108-9, records of meetings
military attache in Moscow, in between Vyshinsky and Cripps, 24
350 Notes to pages 108-16

and 25 Feb. See also UD:s Arkiv 1 19. FO 371 29500 Ni164/122/38, and
1920 ARS, HP I 517 I LXX, Assaras­ AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.20 1.13-14,
son to FM, 28 Feb. 1941. records of Vyshinsky' s meeting
107. The only detailed account is in with Cripps, 9 Mar., and FO
Cripps papers, entries in his diary minutes, 1 3 Mar. 1941.
of 26 and 27 Feb. and travel diary, 8 120. FO 371 30067 R2248 / 112/ 44,
Mar., and letters to his daughter minute by Cadogan, 1 3 Mar. 1941.
Diane, 26 Feb. and 8 Mar. There 121. DGFP, XII, pp. 201-2, 246 and
is also a summary of the talks in 285-6, exchange of letters between
FO 371 29500 N1 164/ 122/ 38, 9 Mar. Hitler and Inonu, 1 and 12 Mar.,
1941. Eden gives only a passing and Papen to FM, 8 Mar. 1941.
and perfunctory reference to the 122. AVP RF, f.0132 op.242 p.236 d.7
episode in The Eden Memoirs: The 1.199-201, and FO 371 29780
Reckoning (London, 1965), p. 208. R2459/ 1 13 /67, reports of Vino­
108. See, for instance, B. Rubin, Istanbul gradov' s meeting with Knatchbull­
Intrigues (New York, 1989). Hugessen, 14 Mar. 1941.
109. AVP Rf, f.0132 op.24a p.236 d.7 123. FO 371 30067 R2s87/1 12/44,
1.165-73, Vinogradov on meeting Knatchbull-Hugessen to FM, 17
Eden; see also DGFP, XII, pp. Mar. 1941.
211-12, Papen to Ribbentrop, 28 124. DGFP, XII, pp. 308-12 and 384,
Feb. 1941. memorandum on Hitler's meeting
1 10. See Cl1apter 8, 'Churchill's Warning with Gerde, 18 Mar. Krigsarkivet,
to Stalin'. Fo .. rsvarsstaben, Ser. E / I I / 1 5 / 1 ,
111. AVP RF, f.0132 op.24 p.236 d . 3 military attache' s report, no. 27, 24
1.19-24, Vinogradov on meeting Mar. 1941.
Cripps, 2 Mar., and FO 371 125. FO 371 30124 R2836/ 1,934/ 44,
30067 R1897I 112/ 44, Knatcllbull­ Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 21
Hugessen to FO, 2 Mar. 1941. Mar. 1941.
1 12. AVP RF, f.069 op.25 p.71 d.6 1.41-6, 126. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­
Maisky on meeting Butler, 5 Mar. pasnosti SSSR, 1(2), pp. 60-1, report
1941. by Merkulov, head of the NKGB, 22
113. AVP RF, f. 017a, Maisky's diary, Mar. 1941.
1.56-7, 6 Mar. 1941. 127. lzvestiia, 25 Mar. 1941.
1 14. M. Gilbert, Finest Hour: Winston 128. See pp. 1 37-9·
S. Churchill, 1939-1941 (London, 129. AMVnR, d.51 p.45 op.1sh po p .333
1983), chs 52-4. 1.61, Stamenov to FM, 26 lvfar. 1941.
115. FO 371 29779 R2117/ 1 1 3 /67,
Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 5
Mar., and CAB 69/ 2 DO (41)9, 5 6. The Red Army on Alert
Mar. 1941.
1 16. FO 371 30067 R2129/ 1 1 2/ 44, and 1. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and
AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.20 1.5-12, Tragedy, p. 368.
record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with 2. By far the best and most original
Cripps, 6 Mar., and FO minutes and description of the novelty of the
reply to Cripps, 7 and 1 1 Mar. See doctrine is in Naveh, In Pursuit
also UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I of Military Excellence; on the forging
517 I LXX, Assarasson to FM, 7 Mar. of the doctrine see D. Glantz, The
1941. Soviet Conduct of Tactical Manoeuvre:
1 17. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1554/ Spea1·head of the Offensive (London,
XLIX, Assarasson to FM, Mar. 1941. 1991), pp. 76-7.
1 18. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.24 1.3-5, 3. Glantz, Soviet Conduct of Tactical
Vyshinsky on meeting Aktay, 9 Manoeuvre, pp. 80-1.
Mar. 1941. 4. See V. K. Triandafillov, Kharakter
Notes to pages 116-20 35 1

operatsii sovremennykh armii 13. See H. Hanak, 'The Implications

(Moscow, 1929), pp. 125-37, and G. of the Soviet-German Pacts for the
S. Isserson, Evoliutsiia operativnogo Western European Democracies'
iskusstva (Moscow, 1937), pp. 1 1-18. (unpublished paper, 1989), pp.
Y. M . Zhigur's work Budushchaia 13-17.
voina i zadach oborony SSSR 14. National Archives, Department
(Moscow, 1938) was devoted of State, 740.0011 EW 1939/ 3446,
entirely to defence. The most 1 June 1940.

authoritative account of the theoret­ 15. See pp. 23-4. On the strategic con­
ical revolution is in J. Schneider, The straints see for example Leach,
Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total German Strategy against Russia, chs
War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare 3 and 4; V. A. Anfilov, Bessmertny
State (Novato, Calif., 1994). podvig (Moscow, 1971), pp. 149-60;
5. The doctrine was clearly M . V. Zakharov, 'Stranitsy istorii
expounded in Narodnyi Komis­ sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil
sariat Oborony, Vremennyi polevoi nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi
ustav RI<.KA 1936 (Moscow, 1937). voiny 1 939-1941 gg', Voprosy istorii,
On the legacy of Tukhachevsky' s 5 (1970).
contribution to this strategy see 16. DGFP, IX, p. 566; Churchill, Second
R. Savushkin, 'K voprosu o zarozh­ World War, II, pp. 1 18-19.
denii teorii posledovael'nykh 17. On the defensive nature of the
nastupatel'nykh operatsii', VIZh, 5 deployment before the war see
(1983), pp. 78-82, and Shimon Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voirty
Naveh, 'Tukhachevsky', in Shuk­ Sovetskogv Soiuza, 1 941-1945
man (ed.), Stalin's Ge11erals. (Moscow, 1961), I, pp. 477-8, and G.
6. Glantz, Soviet Conduct of Tactical K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
Manoeuvre, pp. 80-2. See a discus­ leniia (Moscow, 1995), I, pp. 1 12-14.
sion of the supposedly aggressive See a remarkable analysis of the
disposition of these forces below, issue in C. A. Roberts, 'Planning
pp. 209, 238-40. for War: The Red Army and the
7. On this aspect see below, p. 237f. Catastrophe of 1941', Europe-Asia
8. V. A. Anfilov, Proval 'blitskriga' Studies, 47 /8 (1995) I n 'Tragediia
(Moscow, 1974), pp. 162 and krasnoi armii', Moskovsky Novosti,
1 78-89, and A. G. Khor'kov, 'Neko­ 7 May 1989, Lieutenant-General
torye voprosy strategicheskogo Nikolai Pavlenko, a leading Soviet
razvertyvaniia sovetskikh vooru­ military historian, presented a
zhennykh sil v nachale Velikoi revealing and frank review of the
Otechestvennoi voir1y', VIZh, 1 performance of the Red Army in
(1986), pp. 9-1 1 . the opening stages of the war. An
9. Dimitrov' s diary, 28 Mar. 1940. iJ.1sigl1tful discussion of the
10. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 1 (1990), pp. shortcomings is in B. M. Gerard,
193-6. See also Timoshenko's 'Mistakes in Force Structure and
'Smena rukovodstva Narkomata Strategy on the Eve of the Great
oborony SSSR v sviazi s urokami Patriotic War', Journal of Soviet Mil­
sovetsko-finliandskoi voiny 1939- itary Studies, 4/ 3 (1991).
1940 gg.', in ibid., pp. 210-15. 18. D. Glantz, Soviet Military Strategy
11. Reproduced in VIZh, 3 (1991), pp. in the 1990s: Alternative Futures
5-8. (Carlisle, Pa., 1991), p. 75. See
12. N . S. Khrushche"'' Khrushchev below, pp. 241-2.
'
Remembers (Boston, 1970), pp. 176- 19. See on this a fair judgment by
7, and E. Harrison Salisbury, The Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and
Siege of Leningrad (London, 1969), Tragedy, pp. 362-3.
pp. 67-81. 20. 'Komitet Oborony pri SNK SSSR:
352 Notes to pages 120-7

''Ob organizatsii i chislennosti 36. Leach, German Strategy against

Krasnoi Armii'' '. SNK SSSR i TsK Russia, p. 163.
VKP(b), 'O proizvodstve tankov 37. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
T-34 v 1940 godu', Izvestiia TsK leniia, I, pp. 332-3. See also B.
KPSS, 2 (1990), pp. 181-3. See also Gugate, Operation Barbarossa
'Postanovleniia SNK i TsK, 5 June (Novato, Calif., 1984), challenged
1940' in ibid., pp. 180-1. by L. Rotundo, 'War Plans and the
'
21. Timoshenko's speech produced in 1941 Kremlin War Games', Journal
VIZh, 3 (1991), p. 38. of Strategic Studies, 10/ 1 (1987), pp.
22. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 84-97.
20-4. 38. Dekanozov to Molotov, 7 Dec. 1940,
23. M. V. Zakharov, General'nyi shtab v reproduced in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 3
predvoennye gody (Moscow, 1989), p. (1990).
125. See also Glantz, Soviet Military 39. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.325 d.2237
Strategy, pp. 69-74. 1.272-4, Maisky to FM on infor­
24. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 2 (1990), p. mation received from Colonel
182. Moravec of the Czech mission in
25. GRU GSh RF, f.16a op.2951 d.239 London, 18 Dec. 1940.
1. 1-37, 19 Aug. 1940. See also 40. The speech is in DGFP, XI, pp.
'Vpered byla voina', VIZh, 5 (1991), 980-1, and Stalin's acquaintance
p. 6, and 'Pribaltiiskii voennyi with its content is attested by
okrug', in VIZh, 6 ( 1989), pp. 17-22. Anfilov.
26. See pp. 52-7. 41. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.3 l.7, 4 Jan.
27. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsver­ 1941.
brecher, I, p. 163, statement by 42. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi
General Jodl in Nuremberg, 6 Sept. Bezopasnosti SSSR, I(2), p. 286, 'Cor­
1940. sicanets', 7 Jan. 1941.
28. Volkogonov papers, Special 43. Ibid., pp. 5-7 and 19-21, 16 and 20
'Razvedyvatel'naia svodka po Jan. 1941.
zapadu', No. 6, 25 Aug. 1940. 44. Ibid., p. 280, 20 Jan. 1941.
29. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.1 1.89-90, a 45. Ibid., I(1), pp. 287-97, memo­
report by the 5th Dept of the randum by Timoshenko and
Ukrainian NKGD, 15 Aug. 1940. Voroshilov, 7 Dec. 1940, and I(2),
30. GRU GSh RF, op.24 1 19 d.4 1.65-6, pp. 3-4, report by Merkulov to
'Sophocles' in Belgrade to GRU, 27 Zhukov, 2 Jan. 1941.
Jan., and AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 46. p. 126.
d.5 1.50-3, record of Mikhailov's 47. See on this Zhukov, Vospominaniia i
meeting with Spitsmuller, the razmyshleniia, I, pp. 304-6. See alsc
French charge d' affaires in D. Glantz' s insightful book, The
Bucharest, 1 Feb. 1941. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army in
31. The directive is AGSh RF, f.16 June 1941 (1998).
op.2951 d.237 1.138-56, 18 Aug. 48. The verbatim proceedings of the
1940. See also Zakharov, General'nyi conference were published by the
shtab, pp. 219-20. Russian Institute of Military History
32. See pp. 310-11. under the title Nakanune Voiny:
33 · See pp. 39-43. Materialy soveshchaniia vysshego
34. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.242 l.84-90, rukovodiashchego sostava RKKA, 2 3-
Timoshenko and Meretskov to 3 1 dekabria 1940 g. (Moscow, 1993).
Stalin, not later than 5 Oct. 1941. 49. On this see also Zakharov,
35. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.239 General'rzyi shtab, pp. 195-21 1 .
1.245-77, report by Pukaev, head of 50. See also a still very remarkable
the Kiev Military District, on the analysis of the conference in Erick­
deployment plan, Dec. 1940. son, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 40-6.
Notes to pages 127-34 353

51. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ NKGB to the CC of the CPSU, 9

leniia, I, pp. 306-7. Mar. 1941.
52. Interview with Anfilov, May 1994. 69. TsA SVR RF, d .23078 t.1 1.202-4,
53. The following is based mostly on Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and
Zakharov, General'nyi shtab, pp. Beria, 6 Mar. 1941.
239-5 1, which is the most revealing 70. Volkogonov papers, 'Razvedy­
and authoritative description of the vatel'naia svodka po zapadu, No.
games. 1', report for the period from 1 5
54 · Ibid., p. 240. Nov. 1940 to 1 Feb. 1941.
55. E. Ziemke, 'Stalin as a Strategist, 71. GRU GSh RF, op.7237 d.2 1.15-20,
194cr-1941', Military Affairs, 47 I 4 special intelligence report by
(1983), pp. 174-80. Golikov, 14 Feb. See also op.24122
56. Zakharov, General'nyi shtab, pp. d . 1 1.49, a corroborating report from
247-54. 'Dora', Zurich, 21 Feb. 1941.
57. Ibid., p. 247. 72. Ibid., op.24119 d.4 l.213-14, military
58. Presidential Archives, 'Special Col­ attache, Budapest, to Golikov, 1 5
lection', 'Postanovlenie Politburo Mar.; d.3, 1. 127, deputy military
TsK VKP(b )', 14 Jan. 1941; see also attache, Paris, to Golikov, 15 Mar.
Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ 1941.
leniia, I, pp. 308-1 1 . 73. Ibid., op.7237 d.2 1.21-50, special
59. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. report by Golikov on the expansion
53-4. and deployment of the German
60. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh- armed forces, 1 1 Mar. 1941.
leniia, I, p. 323. Glantz suggests that 74. On this see Chapter.
from the psychological point of 75. Reproduced in full in lzvestiia TsK
view the legacy of the offensive KPSS, 4 (1990), pp. 205-6.
strategy stifled discussion and 76. A report of 7 Feb. 1941 reproduced
implementation of the defensive in ibid.
measures, in Military Strategy of the 77. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.2 1.405-6,
Soviet Union, pp. 6cr-1 . 'Sophocles' in Belgrade to Golikov,
61. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, 9 Mar. 1941.
p. 31. 78. Ibid., 1.407-8, military attache,
62. Ts A SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.199-201, Bucharest, to Golikov (transmitted
Beria to Stalin and Molotov, 21 Jan. to Stalin), 1 5 Mar., and 1.195-6,
1941. Sorge to Golikov, 10 Mar. 1941.
63. Presidential Archives, t.8 1 1 5 op.8 79. NKGB to TsK and SNK in Izvestiia
d.44 1. 3, Stalin and Molotov to SNK TsK KPSS, 4 (1990), p. 207.
and the CC of the CPSU, 21 Jan. 80. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.4 l.213-14,
1941. military attache, Budapest, to
64. See pp. 52-6. Golikov, 14 Mar. 1941.
65. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi 81. NKGB to the CC of the CPSU and
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2), pp. 24-5, the government, reproduced in
resolution of the Central Commit­ Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 (1990), p. 206,
tee, 3 Feb. 1941. 9 and 14 Mar. 1941.
66. TsA SVR RF, d.23078, t.1, 1.205-9, 82. GRU GSh R F, op.24119 d.3 1.127,
report by Merkulov to Stalin and deputy military attache, Paris, to
Molotov, 8 Feb. 1941. Golikov, 15 Mar. 1941 .
67. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d . 1 1.394-5, 83. Ibid., op.2421 d.3 1.138, military
'Eshchenko', milita1·y attache in attache, Paris, to Goli kov, 22 Mar.
Bucharest, to Golikov (transmitted 1941.
to Stalin), 1 3 Mar. 1941. 84. Ibid., op.24119 d . 1 1.452-5, military
68. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi attache, Bucharest, to Golikov, 24
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2), pp. 45-6, Mar. 1941 .
354 Notes to pages 135-9

85. A report by 'Marsa'_, the GRU resi­ 6. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.317 d.2183
dent in Budapest, in GRU GSh RF, 1.199, Plotnikov to FM, 17 Dec. 1940.
op.241 19 d.4 l. 160, and TsA SVR RF, 7. AVP RF, f.0132 op.23 p. 232 d.6
d.23078 t.1 1.194_, 'Lauren' from 1.67-70, record of Vinogradov' s
Berlin to the NKVD, 15 Jan. See also meeting with Shumenkovic;,
UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1554/L, Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara, 19
Swedish ambassador in Berlin to Sept. 1940. A supportive account,
FM, 4 Mar. 1941. based to a large degree on the
86. DGFP, XII, pp. 41-4, Hitler's 'Direc­ papers of the Regent Paul at the
tive 23', 6 Feb. 1941. Hoover Institute, is in Barros and
87. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.4 1.210, Gregor, Double Deception, pp. 62-78.
military attache in Budapest to 8. DGFP, XI, pp. 728-35, record of the
Golikov, 13 Mar. 1941. meeting, 28 Nov. 1940.
88. On this see pp. 18o-6. 9. Ibid., pp. 525 and 532-3, IP.emoran­
89. See pp. 1 57-8. dum by the political division, 1 1
90. GRU GSh RF, op.14750 d.1 1. 12-21, No\r. 1940.
Golikov' s report to the Soviet gov­ 10. Ibid., pp. 927-8, Ribbentrop to lega­
ernment and the CC of the CPSU, tion in Belgrade, 21 Dec. 1940.
20 Mar. 1941. Zhukov confirms the 11. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.317 d.2183
shattering impact of such evalua­ 1.63-4 and 2184 1.177-8, exchange
tion in Vcspominaniia i razmysh­ of telegrams between Molotov and
leniia, I, pp. 380-2. Plotnikov (Belgrade), 17 Oct. and
29 Nov. 1940.
12. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.10 d.32 1.1-3,
Vyshinsky on meeting Gavrilovic;,
7. At the Crossroads: 4 Jan. 1941.
The Yugoslav Coup d'Etat 13. DGFP, XII, pp. 79-96, record of
Hitler's and Ribbentrop's meetii1.gs
1. DGFP, XII, pp. 1 1 1, Ribbentrop to with Cvetkovic; and Cincar­
legation in Belgrade, 16 Feb. 1941, Markovic;, 1 5 Feb., and pp. 230-3
and vcm Creveld, Hitler's Strategy, and 247, exchanges between Herren
p. 65; and see his 'The German and Ribbentrop, 4 and 7 Mar. 1941.
Attack on the USSR: The Destruc­ 14. FO 371 29777 Rs65 / 1 13/67, Eden
tion of a Legend', European. Stitdies to Knatchbull-Hugessen on meet­
Review, 2/ 1 (1972). ing Maisky, 22 Jan. 1941; AVP RF,
2. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p. 1 19. f.017a, Maisky's diary, p. 52, 2 Mar.
3. AVP RF, f.0144 op.20 p. 105 d.3 l.1-3 1941. On the fear of embroilment
and 10, records of meetings of see pp. 85--g4.
Lozovsky and Vyshinsky, both 15. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.24 1.1-2,
Deputy Foreign Ministers, with record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with
Gavrilovic;, 9 JuJy and 25 Oct. 1940. Aktay, 20 Feb., and f.059 op.1 p.342
4. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.328 d.2253 d.2341 1.39, Lebedev, Soviet ambas­
l.102oa-1026, Ivanov, first secretary, sador in Belgrade, to FM, 1 Mar.
Soviet embassy, Paris, to Molotov, 1941.
13 Sept. 1940. 16. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 d.32 l.4-6, Vyshin­
5. Based also on an enlightening sky on meeting Gavrilovic;, 8 Feb.,
unpublished paper on the coup by and f.077 op.21 p . 1 1 1 d.5 1.17-19,
Gibiansky. See also A. L. Naro­ Sharonov on meeting Yanic;, former
chnits� 'Sovetsko-iugoslavskii Miiuster and head of the Belgrade
dogovor 5 aprelia 1941 g. o druzhbe Radio Station, 10 Mar.; UD:s Arkiv
i nenapadenii (po arkhivnym mate­ 1920 A RS, HP I 517 /LXX_, Assaras­
rialam)', Novaia i 11oveisl1aia istoriia, son to FM on meeting Schulenburg,
1 ( 1989), PP· 3-19. 19 Feb. 1941.
Notes to pages 13 9-44 355

17. Tupanjanin proved to be only of a R2879/ 394/ 92, Cripps to FO, 23

partial value to the Russians as Mar. 1941.
his party was also 'in receipt of 32. ATvP R F, f.0132 op.24a p.236 d.7
a subsidy from His Majesty's 1.223-6, record of Vinogradov' s
Government', PREM 3 / 5 10,/ 1 1 p. meeting with Papen, 25 Mar. 1941.
448, minute, 2 Mar. 1941. 33. Such a claim is made by Sudopla­
18. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.4 1 . 1 99, tov, Special Tasks, p. 119. There is a
report by 'Sophocles' in Belgrade, 9 more informative observation by
Mar. 1941. Gafencu in Misiune la Moscova, tel.
19. FO 371 29779 R2357/ 1 13/67, 1 1 1 135, pp. 164-5, Gafenc11 to FM ,

and 12 Mar. 1941. 3 Apr. 1941. On the coup see E.

20. DGFP, XII, pp. 269-73, Herren to Barker, British Policy in South-East
FM, 1 1 Mar. 1941. Europe in the Second World War
21. Archives of the Yugoslav Foreign (London, 1976), pp. 78-108. On the
Ministry (hereafter AJ), CK KPJ, British involvment see D. A. T.,
1941I9, resolution of the CC of Stafford, 'SOE and British Involve­
the Yugoslav CP 'Against Capitula­ ment in the Belgrade Coup d'Etat
tion - In Favour of a Pact of of March 1941', Slavic Review, 36/3
Mutual Assistance with the Soviet ( 1 977).
Union', 1 5 Mar. 1941. See also 34. DGFP, XII, pp. 372-5, minutes con­
Vestnik MID SSSR, 1 5 (49) (1989), p. cerning the situation in Yugoslavia,
57· 27 Mar., and pp. 369-71, record of
22. Kominterri i vtoraia mirovaia voina, I, Hitler's meeting with Szt6ja y, 28
p. 43, 22 Mar. 1941. Mar. 1941.
23. AJ, MIP, Politichko odeljenje, 35. Lebedev to MID, 28 Mar. 1941,
Gavrilovi<; to Cincar-Markovic;, 14 is quoted in Sovetsko-iugoslavskie
Mar. 1941. otnosheniia, 1 9 1 7-1941 gg. (Moscow,
24. FO 371 29780 R2446 / 1 1 3 / 67, 1992), P · 363.
Campbell to FO and minutes by 36. AVP RF, f.144 op.23 p.107 d.1
Sargent, 1 2 and 1 5 Mar. 1941. 1.14-15, Lebedev to FM (Political
25. AJ, MIP, Politichko odeljenje, news from Yugoslavia), 31 Mar.
Cincar-Markovic; to Gavrilovic;, 1 3 1941.
Mar. 1941. 37. GRU GSh RF, op. 7237 d.2 1.79-81,
26. AVP RF, f. 017a, Maisky's diary, p. special report by Golikov on the
70, 1 Apr. 1941. coup d'etat in Yugoslavia, 28 Mar.
27. AVP RF, f.0132 op.24 p.236 d.3 1941.
1.19-24, Vinogradov on meeting 38. King Peter, King's Heritage: The
Cripps, 2 Mar. 1941. Memoirs of King Peter II of Yugoslavia
28. FO 371 29779 R2360/ 1 1 3 / 67, (London, 1955), p. 71; DGFP, XII,
Cripps to Eden, 1 1 Mar. 1941. pp. 383-5 and 398-9, Herren to FM ,

29. FO 371 30228 R2878 I 394/ 92, 27 and 28 Mar. 1941.

Cripps to FO, 22 Mar. 1941. 39. Dimitrov's diary, 29 Mar., and
30. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.20 1.15-24, Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina,
record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with I, p. 5 1 8-20, the Yugoslav CP to
Cripps, 22 Mar. The nature of the Dimitrov, 29 Mar. 1941.
meeting is also confirmed in 40. AJ, CK KPJ 1941/ 10, resolution of
Cripps's talk with Steinhardt, see the Yugoslav CP, 30 Mar. 1941.
FRUS, I (1941), pp. 298-9, Stein­ 41. FO 371 30228 R3254/ 394/ 92, Cripps
hardt to the Secretary of State, 24 to FO, 29 Mar. 1941, and Novikov,
Mar. 1941. Vospominaniia diplomata, p. 75.
31. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.10 d.32 1.7-8, 42. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.342 d.2341
Vyshinsky on meeting Gavrilovic;, 1.80-1, 85 and 88-9, Lebedev to
22 Mar.; see also FO 371 30228 Molotov, 30 Mar. 1941.
 Notes to pages 144-50

43. See pp. 135-6. 57. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I

44. Simovic;'s diary, Archiv Vojeno­ 1 5 5 5 /LIII, Assarasson to FM, 4
istorijskog instituta, R-16, II, Apr.; see also FO 371 30228 R3405 /
reg.no.2/ 1, pp. 268-9. 394/ 92, Cripps to FO, 4 Apr. 1941.
45 . AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.342 d.2341 58. Vestnik MID SSSR, 1 5 / 49 (1989),
1.88-9, Lebedev to Molotov, 30-31 pp. 5 5-6, and AVP RF, f.017a,
Mar.; f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4 1. 182- Maisky' s diary, pp. 79-80, 6 Apr.
4, record of Lavrentev's meeting 1941.
with Avakumovic;, Yugoslav ambas­ 59. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.66
sador in Bucharest, 31 Mar. 1941. d.905 1.71-5, Vyshinsky on meeting
46. Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina, I, Gavrilovic;, 4 Apr. 1941; see also
pp. 45-6, 5 Apr. 1941. FRUS, I (1941), p. 300.
47. FRUS, I (1941), pp. 31 1-14, 60. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.342 d.2342 l.80,
Steinhardt and Kelly (first secretary Molotov to Lebedev, 4 Apr.; f.06 op.3
in Ankara) to Hull on Gavrilovic;' s p.27 d.375 1.21, note by Molotov to
talks with Stalin, 18 May 1941. the Politburo, 4 Apr. 1941.
48. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.27 d.375 1.3, 61. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata,
Vyshinsky on meeting Gavrilovic;, 1 PP· 76-9.
Apr. 1941; ibid., f.059 op.1 p.342 62. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.27 d.375 1.25-7,
d.2342 1.72-4, instructions by Vyshinsky on meeting Simic;, 5 Apr.
Molotov to Lebedev, 1 Apr. 1941. 1941.
49. Sobolev to Lebedev and Lebedev to 63. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.342 d.2341
Molotov, 1 Apr. 1940, reproduced in 1.102, Lebedev to Molotov, 5 Apr.
Vestnik MID SSSR, 1 5 / 49 (1989), p. 1941.
60. 64. DGFP, XII, p. 463, the German
50. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.27 d.375 1.7-10, charge d' affaires in Belgrade to FM,
record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with 5 Apr. 1941.
the Yugoslav delegation, 3 Apr. 65 . On this see UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS,
1941. 011 the proposals see S. HP / 1 5 5 5 / Lill, Assarasson to FM
Cvetkovic;, 'Sovjetska Prisutnost on conversations with Gavrilovic;, 6
u Jugoslovenskoj Politici Na Apr. 1941.
Pochetku Drugog Svetskog Ra ta', 66. Gafencu, Misii£ne la Moscova, tel.
Istorija 20. Veka, 1 (1995), pp. 32-41. 1 1 78, pp. 169-70, Gafencu to the
51. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.342 d.2341 l.97, FM, 7 Apr. 1941.
Lebedev to Molotov, 3 Apr. 1941. 67. The following account of the events
52. TsA SVR RF, d.2 3078 t.1 1.240-1, of the night of 5-6 April is based on
Kobulov ('Zakhar') to Merkulov, AVP RF, f.144 op.3a p.4 d.4 1.3-6,
and FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi report by Novikov, 6 Apr., and
Bezopasrzosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 289- his Vospominaniia diplomata, pp.
90. 76-9; FRUS, I (1941), pp. 300-1,
53. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.74 Steinhardt to Hull 011 meeting
1.279-82, 4 Apr. 1941. Gavrilovic;, and FO 371 29544
54. DGFP, XII, pp. 426-7, Schulenburg N1392 / 1 392/38, Cripps to FO, 6
to FM, 4 Apr. 1941. Apr. 1941.
55. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 1.75-81, 68. The transcription of the call is in N.
Molotov on meeting Schulenburg, B. Popovich, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski
and DGFP, XII, pp. 45 1-2, Schulen­ odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu
burg to FM, 4 Apr. AMVnR, d.51 (1941-1945) (Belgrade, 1988), pp.
p.45 op.1sh pop.333 1.67, Stamenov 26-7. See also Simovic;'s diary,
to FM, 6 Apr. 1941. Archiv Vojeno-istorijskog instituta,
56. On the Soviet theory of a split R-16, II, reg.no.2/ 1, pp. 268-9, and
between the armed forces and J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis,
Hitler see below, pp. 179-89. 1 934-1941 (New York, 1962).
Notes to pages 150-7 35 7

69. On this see Simovic;' s diary, Archiv attitude in V. K. Volkov, 'Sovetsko­

Vojeno-istorijskog instituta, R-16, iugoslavskie otnosheniia v
II, reg.no.2/ 1, pp. 268-g. nachal'nyi period Vtoroi mirovoi
70. Krigsarkivet, Fo .. rsvarsstaben, Ser. voiny v kontekste mirovykh sobytii
E / II / 1 5 / 1, military attache's ( 1939-1941 gg)', Sovetskoe sla­
report, no. 59, 5 Apr. 1941. vianovedenier, 6 (1990), pp. 3-17.
71. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p. 1 19.
72. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata,
PP · 79-82. 8. Churchill's Warning to Stalin
73. Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, tel.
1 161, pp. 165-6, Gafencu to FM, 6 1. The present work is saturated with
Apr. 1941. such reports.
74. Pravda and lzvestiia, 6 Apr. 1941. 2. Cl1urchill, Seco11d World War, III, pp.
75. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, 316, 319-23.
HP I 5 1 8 / LXXll, Assarasson to FM, 3. See pp. 10-18. A more detailed dis­
5 Apr. 1941. cussion of controversy between
76. AJ, f. MIP, Poslanstvo Moskva, Shu­ Churchill and Cripps in Gorodet­
menkovic; to Simovic;, 6 Apr. 1941. sky, Cripps' Mission to Moscow, chs
77. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.342 d.2342 l.83, 8-10.
Vyshinsky to Lebedev, 6 Apr. 4. FO 371 29464 N1526/3 /38 and FO
1941. 837I 1 098, telegrams from Cripps,
78. DGFP, XII, pp. 479-80 and 484, 23 and 29 Mar. 1941.
exchange of telegrams between 5. CPlB 65/18 33(41)7, 3 1 Mar. 1941.
Schulenburg and FM 6 Apr. 1941.
, 6. FO 371 29479 N1360 /3 /38, 2 Apr.
79. By far the best account of the cam­ 1941.
paign is in van Creveld, Hitler's 7. See Chapter 1, pp. 21-2ff for the
Strategy, pp. 160-5. role Orme Sargent played in devel­
80. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. 25-8, a note oping the Foreign Office's political
by Merkulov to the CC of the concept.
CPSU, 10 Apr. 1941. 8. FO 371 26518-9 and 29479 are
81. AVP RF, f. 017a, Maisky's diary, packed with such intelligence and
1.81-2, 7 Apr.; DGFP, XII, pp. 490-1, appraisals.
Weizsacker on meeting Dekanozov, 9. J. Herndon, 'British Perceptions of
8 Apr. 1941. Soviet Military Capability, 1935-g',
82. AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4 an unpublished paper.
1.199-201, record of Lavrentev's 10. See the most revealing and author­
(Soviet ambassador in Bucharest) itative study of F. H. Hinsley et al.,
meeting with the Greek ambas­ British Intelligence in the Second
sador Kolias, 10 Apr. 1941. World War: Its Influence on Strategy
83. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.10 d.32 1.10-12, and Operations (London, 1979-go),
Vyshinsky on meeting Gavrilovic;, I, PP · 237-41; FO 371 29479 N107,
and f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4 1.206-9, N255 and N286/78/38, minutes by
Lavrentev on meeting Avaku­ Maclean, Collier, Cadogan and
movic;, 1 1 and 12 Apr. 1941 Eden, 10 and 18 Jan. 1941.
respectively. 11. FO 371 29528 N648/648 / 38 20 Jan.,
84. lzvestiia, 12 Apr. 1941. and minutes by Maclean and
85. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 5 1 8 / Collier, 22 and 23 Feb. 1941.
LXXII, Assarasson to FM 27 May
, 12. FO 371 26518 C2222/ 19/ 18,
1941 . telegrams from O'Malley, Halifax
86. Vestnik MID SSSR, 49 (1989), p. 5 5 · and Mallet, 6 and 7 Mar., and
See I. V. Bukharkin, 'No tut vme­ minutes by Cavendish-Bentinck,
shalas' Iugoslaviia', Pravda, 1 June Strang, Cadogan and Collier, 9, 10,
1991. A similar but far more critical 1 1 and 12 Mar. 1941.
 Notes to pages 157-65

13. FO 371 29479 N 1 390/78/ 38, Mallet 26. In December 1993 the British
to FO and minutes, 4 Apr. 1941. government opened the archives
14. FO 371 29135 W2860/53 /50, WIP, containing the raw intelligence
12 Mar., and W3205 / 53/ 50, 19 Mar. prepared for Churchill. The present
See also FO 371 29479 N 1132/ account is based on this material in
78/38, Butler on conversation with PRO HW 1 /3, 28 Mar. 1941.
Greek minister and FO minutes, 18 27. PREM 3/ 510/ 1 1 pp. 363-4,
Mar. 1941. Churchill to Eden, 30 Mar. 1941.
15. See pp. 108-10. 28. Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, p. 367.
16. FO 371 26518 C2924/ 19/ 18, Cripps 29. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I,
to FO, 24 Mar. 1941. P· 451.
17. For Cripps's views see State 30. FO 371 29479 N1354/78/ 38,
Department, 740.001 1 EW /39/ Halifax to FO, 2 Apr. 1941.
8919, telegram from Steinhardt, 7 31. FO 371 29479 N1316, N1324/78/
Mar. 1941; Assarasson, I skuggan 38 Cripps, Campbell and Halifax
av Stalin, p. 56; Gafencu, Prelitde to to FO, and minutes, 2 and 3 Apr.
the Russian Campaign, pp. 1 34-6. 1941.
On the press conference see W. 32. WO 190/983; FO 371 29135
DuraP.ty, The Kremlin and the People W3859/ 53/ 50.
(New York, 1942), pp. 1 51-2; A. 33. See for example his opposition to
Werth, Moscow 1941 (London, Eden's visit to Russia, PREM
1942), p. 133; H. Elvin, A Cockney in 3 /395 /16, telegram to Eden, 22
Moscow (London, 1958), p. 54· Feb. 1941.
18. On the accuracy of the information 34· Ibid.
see B. Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa 35. Churchill, Second World War, III, pp.
(Carrtbridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 50-1. 320-1; PREM 3 / 403/7.
·

As long as the Soviet archives 36. Churchill papers, 20/37, Churchill

remained closed, Whaley' s work to Cripps, 30 Mar. 1941.
was considered to be the most 37· FO 371 29479 N366/78/38,
authoritative and exhaustive work telegram to Cripps and minute by
on the subject. It still is valuable, Cadogan, 4 Apr. 1941.
especially as far as the disinforma­ 38. Churchill, Second World War, III, p.
tion dimension is concerned. The 321.
Russians had obtained the same 39. See Chapter 7.
inforn1ation from a t least four inde­ 40. FO 37 1 29479 N1397/78/38, Cripps
pendent sources, see note 43 belovv. to Churchill, 5 Apr. 1941.
19. FO 371 26518 C2919/ 19/ 18, Cripps 41. FO 371 29479 Ni429/78/38 and
to FO and minutes, 24-28 Mar. 29479 N1429/78/38, Cripps to
1941. Churchill, 5 Apr. 1941.
20. FO 371 29479 N1367/78/38, mili­ 42. FO 371 29479 Ni364/78/38 and
tary attache, Bern, 24 Mar., and 29465 Ni713 / 3 / 38, 12, 15 and 19
minutes by Major Templin, the Apr. 1941.
expert on Russian affairs in MI2 43. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.27 d.375 1.4-6,
(Military Intelligence), 3 1 Mar. 1941. record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with
21. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, l, Gavrilovic;, 2 Apr., and intercepted
pp. 446-50. telegram of Aktay reproduced in
22. See below, p. 22. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 (1990), pp.
23. Churchill, Second World War, III, p. 207-9, 26 Mar. and 7 Apr. See in
319. particular a report which tallied
24. On this see pp. 102--14. with Churchill's own warning in
25. Churchill, Second World War, Ill, GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.3 1.138,
p. 319, and Dilks (ed.), Cadogan military attache, Vichy, to Golikov,
Diaries, p. 367. 22 Mar. 1941.
Notes to pages 1 65-74 3 59

44 · FO 371 29479 N 1 5 10/78/38, 60. Churchill papers, 20/ 37, Churchill

exchange of telegrams between to Dominion Prime Ministers, 1 5
Churchill and Cripps, 8 Apr. 1941. Apr. 1941.
45. FO 371 29479 N i 5 1 0/78/38 and 61. Ibid., 20/ 36, Churchill's minute to
N 1 5 34/78/38. Ismay, for COS, 20 Apr., and 20/
46. FO 371 29464 N1386 / 3 / 38, Cripps 38, Wavell to Churchill, 22 Apr.
to Eden (in Athens), Eden to Cripps 1941.
and minutes, 4-16 Apr. 1941. 62. Ibid., Churchill's directive, 28 Apr.
47. FO 371 29479 N 1 5 10/78/ 38, 1 1 Apr. 1941.
1941. 63. See for instance AVP RF, f.017a,
48. Eden, The Reckoning, p. 262. Maisky's diary, pp. 1-3, 62-5 and
49. Monckton papers, Box 4, p. 201, 17 69, 1 Jan. and 3 1 Mar. 1941.
Apr.; Cripps papers, Isobel's diary, 64. Dimitrov' s diary, 20 Feb. 1941.
16 and 20-4 Apr.; ibid., Weaver 65. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp.
papers, letter from Cripps, 18 Apr. 79-80, 4 Apr. 1941.
1941. 66. Reported in AVP RF, f.059 op.1
50. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.20 1.25-9, p.351 d.2401 1.130, Maisky to FM,
record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with and in Maisky's diary, pp. 83-4, 9
Cripps (not reported by Cripps to Apr. 1941.
the FO), 10 Apr. 1941, and UD:s 67. AVP R F, f.069 op.25 p.71 d.6 1.58-g,
Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 5 1 7 / LXXI, Maisky to FM on meeting Brendan
Assarasson to FM 9 Apr. 1941.
, Bracken, 30 Apr.; f.017a, Maisky's
51. FO 371 29480 N1848/78/38, and diary, pp. 1 1 1-15, 30 Apr. 1941.
AVP RF, f.06 op.3 d.89 p.8 1.1-6, 68. AVP RF, f.059 op. 1 p.361 d.2401
Cripps to Vyshinsky, 1 1 Apr. 1941. 1.133-4, Maisky to FM, 10 Apr.;
52. FO 371 29479 N1 573/78/38, Cripps f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp. 41-5 and
to FO and minutes by Eden and 85-7, 1 Mar. and 10 Apr. 1941.
Churchill, 12-15 Apr. 1941. See also 69. Ibid., pp. 121-2, 5 May 1941.
Churchill's quotations in Second 70. See below, pp. 213-17.
World War, III, pp. 1 1 1 and 321, with 71. FO 371 29465 N 1999/ 3 / 38, Halifax
the obvious omissions. to Eden, 5 May 1941. On the delib­
53. FO 371 29465 N1667/ 3 / 38, and erate manifestation of confidence
29473 N1889/22/38, FO minutes, see below, pp. 207-8.
12 and 18 Apr. 1941. 72. I ain grateful to I. McDonald for
54. CAB 65/ 18 42(41)3, 21 Apr. 1941. this piece of information.
55. PREM 3 / 395/ 16 p. 433, Churchill 73. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp.
to Eden, 22 Apr. 1941. 1 52-3.
56. Churchill Papers, 20/37, Churchill 74. See pp. 202-4 below.
to Eden, 3 Apr. 1941. Much the best 75. FO 371 29465 N1667/3/38,
work on Churchill's strategy as far exchange of telegrams between
as the Balkan war is concerned and Cripps and Eden, 17 and 19 Apr.
especially the decision to help See also Cripps papers, Isobel's
Greece is Lawlor, Churchill and the diary, 28 Apr. 1941.
Politics of War, ch. 10. 76. The following meetings are based
57. Churchill papers, 20/ 37, Churchill on FO 371/29480 N1762/78/38,
to Wavell, 4 Apr. 1941. telegrams from Cripps, 23 Apr., and
58. Ibid., exchanges between Churchill, minutes by Sargent and Eden, 25
Eden and Wavell, 7 and 9 Apr.; see Apr. 1941.
also Eden papers, diary, 11 April 77. FO 371 29465 N1828 and
1941. N1692 / 3 / 38, Cripps to FO, 18 Apr.
59. Reported in The Times, 10 Apr., and AVP RF, f.06 op.3 d.75 p.7 1.1 1-16,
commentary in The Times, 20 Apr. Cripps to Vyshinsky, 18 Apr. See
1941. also State Department, 740.0011
 Notes to pages 174-82

EW39/8919, telegram from Stein­ 94. CAB 69/ 2 D0(41)69, 27 Oct.; CAB
hardt, 7 Mar. 1941, on similar insin­ 79/ 55 COS(41)34 and minute by
uations made earlier by Cripps Churchill, 28 Oct. 1941.
to the American ambassador and 95. PREM 3 / 403/7, Churchill to
which may well have reached the Beaverbrook, 14 Oct. 1941.
ears of the Soviet authorities. 96. PREM 3/395/2, fol. 30, Eden to
78. On this see FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. Churchill, 14 Oct. 1941; Werth,
25-81 Merkulov to the CC of the Russia at War, p. 270.
CPSU, SNK and NKVD, 10 Apr. 97. FRUS, I (1941), pp. 702, 712-13, 715.
1941. See also Vyshinsky's conver­
sations with Gavrilovi<;, on the
same day in AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p. 10 9. Japan: The Avenue to Germany
d.32 1. 10-12.
79. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos' op.8 d.55 1.288- 1. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.36-41,
91, memorandum by Merkulov to Merkulov to Timoshenko, 31 Mar
Stalin on Cripps' s secret press con­ 1941.
ference, 1 1 Mar. 1941. 2. Ibid., 1.1 1-12, Merkulov to Stalin, 31
80. State Department 740.0011 EW I Mar 1941.
39/8919, 7 Mar. 1941. 3. Foreign Intelligence, NKVD, to
81. I am thankful to Sir Maurice Shock GRU, reproduced in Izvestiia TsK
for his enlightening comments on KPSS, 4 (1990), p. 21 1 .
Cripps and the Blitzkrieg. 4. GRU AGSh RF, op. 7237, report by
82. PREM 3/395 /2 fol. 29. Golikov, 16 Apr., and Volkogonov
83. DGFP, XII, pp. 604-5, FM to Schu­ papers, 'Razvedyvatel'noi svodki
lenburg, 22 Apr. 1941. po zapadu', No. 4, 20 Apr. 1941.
84. FO 371 29465 N1806/3 /38. 5. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p. 1 18.
85. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp. 6. On the hard military information
102-3, 22 and 23 Apr. 1941. which intrigued the armed forces in
86. FO 371 29465 N1667/3/38, FO the first place see pp. 13o-6.
minutes, 17 and 19 Apr. 1941. 7. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.315 d.2174
87. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.1 1.452-5, 1.104, Shkvartsev to FM, 12 Feb.
military attache, Bucharest, to 1940.
Golikov, 24 Mar. 1941. 8. See Chapter 8, 'Churchill's Warning
88. FO 371 29480 Ni725 /78/38, to Stalin'.
telegram from Cripps, 22 Apr. 1941; 9. Umansky to Molotov, 1 Mar. 1941,
P. A. Zhilin, Kak fashistskaia Ger­ reproduced in Vestnik MID SSSR,
maniya gotovila napadenie na Sovet­ 8/66, (1990), p. 78.
skii Soyuz (Moscow, 1966), p. 219; 10. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvenrzoi
Zhu kov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ Bezopasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 26-7,
le11iia, I, pp. 368, 371 and 373. report from the 2nd Dept of the
89. The meeting of 25 Apr. is covered NKGB, 7 Feb. 1941.
in FO 371 29465 N1801 /3/38 and in 11. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.210-14,
AVP RF, f.069 op.25 d.6 p.71 1.66-9 Merkulov to Stalin and Molotov, 8
(and see also 1.62-5 for earlier Mar. 1941.
meeting on the 18th). 12. GRU GSh RF, op.24127 d.2 1.1 95-6,
90. See p. 227. Sorge to Golikov, 1 1 Mar. 1941. For
91. Van Creveld, 'The German Attack a Soviet and a Western account of
on the USSR'. Sorge' s activities see A. Egorov,
92. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy, pp. 'Rikhard Zorge (K 90-letiiu so dnia
149 and 151. rozhdeniia)', VIZh, 10 (1985), pp.
93. Beaverbrook papers, D 93, 90-2, and G. W. Prange, Target
Churchill to Eden and Beaver­ Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ri11g
brook, I Nov. 1941. (New York, 1984).
Notes to pages 1 82-8

13. GRU GSh RF, op.24127 d.2 1.340-1, 27. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 l.331-2, and
Sorge to Golikov, 6 May 1941. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezop­
14. Ibid., 1.381, Sorge to Golikov, 21 asnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 290-1, report
May 1941. on Kobulov's ('Zakhar') meeting
15. Ibid., 1.422, two telegrams from with 'Corsicanets' and 'Starshina',
Sorge to Golikov, 1 June 1941. 2 and 1 1 Apr., and Merkulov to
16. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos' op.8 d.55 Stalin, Beria and Molotov, 14 Apr.
1.288-91, Merkulov to Stalin and 1941; see L. Bezymensky, 'The
Molotov, 1 1 March 1941. Great Game', an unpublished
17. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1554/L paper.
and LVI, Swedish ambassador in 28. Rosso quoted by Cripps in FO 371
Berlin to FM, 13 Mar. and 1 5 May; 29480 N1819/78/38, 26 Apr. 1941.
AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.25 d.335 1. 1-6, 29. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi
and Quai d'Orsay Archives, tele­ Bezopasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 292-3,
grams from Moscow, tel. 428-31, Berlin residency to NKGB, 1 May
reports of Bogomolov' s meeting 194 1 , passed on to Stalin and
with Bergery, 1 5 May. See also Molotov on 5 May; see FSB, Sekrety
Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, raport Gitlera, pp. 65-7.
1627, pp. 200-10, Gafencu to FM, 1 5 30. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.236-46,
May 1941. information transmitted through
18. FO 371 29481 N2388/78/38, 'Zakhar' from 'Litseist', 16 Apr.
Halifax to FO, 23 May 1941. 194 1 .
19. See p. 135. 31. AVP RF, f.082 op.24 p.106 d.8
20. GRU GSh RF, op. 14750 d . 1 1.12-21, 1.370-2, Bogdanov, first secretary in
Golikov' s report to the Soviet gov­ Berlin, 14 Apr. 1941.
ernment and the CC of the CPSU, 32. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos' op.8 d.56
20 Mar. 1941. 1.792-5, Merkulov to the CC of the
21. TsA SVR RF, d .23078 t.1 1.269-74, CPSU, SNK and NKVD, 22 Apr.
report by 'Stepanov' on informa­ 1 941, and TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1
tion from 'Starshina', 17 Apr. 1.285-7, Merkulov to Molotov, 1 6
Already in his report of mid-Mar. Apr. 1941.
'Corsicanets' pinpointed Goring 33. See pp. 202-4
as the leading spirit in the drive 34. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. 31-2, a
towards war, FSB, Organy Gosu­ report from Berlin transmitted by
darstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR, I(2), Merkulov to the CC of the CPSU, 22
pp. 287-8, 'Corsicanets' to the Apr. 1941.
Centre, 1 5 Mar. 1941. 35. 'fsA SVR RF, d .23078 t.1 1.388-90,
22. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.291-5, report by 'Starshina', 9 May, and
Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov, Beria 1. 369-72, report by 'Zakhar' from
and Tirnoshenko, 24 Apr. 1941. Berlin, 10 May 194 1 .
23. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, p. 1 16, 36. AV P RF, f.0134 op.24a p.236 d.9
Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and 1.96-7, record of Zhegalov's (first
Beria, 19 May 1941; the original is secretary) meeting with Gruic;
in FO 371 29135 W5835/35/50, (Yugoslav), 5 May 194 1 .
Soviet Union, 14 May 1941. 37. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos' op.8 d.56
24. Ibid., pp. 1 1 7-18, Merkulov to Stalin, 1.1160-3,. Merkulov transmits
Molotov and Beria, 19 May 194 1 . Cripps's telegrams 412 and 413 to
25. Hitler's instructions of 12 May Eden, of 30 Apr. and 5 May 1 941.
1941, in 50 Let Velikoi Otechestvennoi 38. AVP RF, f.094 op.26 p.331 d.5 1.5-8,
vozny, pp. 21-2. record of Filomonov' s (Soviet
•

26. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos', op.8 d.57 ambassador in Iran) meeting witl1
1.1500-4, Merkulov to StaJin, Ishikava, Japanese ambassador
Molotov and Beria, 25 May 1941. in Iran, 21 Apr. , AVP RF, f.0125 op.27
 Notes to pages 188-91

p.122 d.4 1.23 1-2, record of 16, report of Lozovsky's meeting

Lavrentev' s meeting with Lon with Togo, Japanese ambassador m
Liang, 6 May, d.5 1. 108-110, record Moscow, 21 Jan. 1940. J. Haslam's
of Mikhailov's meeting with Nurel­ The Soviet Union and the Threat from
dzhim, 7 May. See also GRU GSh RF, the East, 1 933-1941 (London, 1992)
op.24119 d . 1 1.762-3, 'Zevsa', Sofia, should be considered the most
to Golikov, 9 May 1941. exhaustive st1rvey of Soviet policies
39. Ibid., op.24122 d.1 1.272, 'Dora', in the Far East. However, Haslam
Zurich, to Golikov, 19 May 1941. overlooks Stalin's search for accom­
40. AVP RF, f.077 op.2 p . 1 1 1 d . 5 1.56-7, modation with Germany through
record of Sharonov' s meetL.1.g with the Japanese. He shows the fluctu­
Unaidin, 21 May 1941. ations and strange fusion of
41. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.349-51, Soviet Russia's imperial policies,
Berlin residency to NKGB, 30 Apr. Realpolitik and ideology in her
1941. foreign policy in the East.
42. Ibid., 1.352-5, Merkulov to Stalin, 51. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p. 2 d.12 l.144-51,
Molotov and Beria, 30 Apr. 194 1 . record of Molotov's meeting with
4 3. See an enlightening insight in Togo, 23 May 1940. The Japanese
AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp. archives do attest to the correctness
106-7, 26 Apr. 1941. of that evaluation, see H. Chihiro,
44. Most of the works on intelligence, 'The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality
Whaley' s Codeword Barbarossa ii1 Pact', in J. Morley (ed.), The Fateful
particular, dwell on the disinforma­ Choice: Japan's Advance into South­
tion aspects of the episode. east Asia, 1 939-1941 (New York,
45. DGFP, XII, pp. 490-1. 1980), pp. 28-31 .
46. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 834/Z/ 52. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p. 2 d.13 1.3-9,
312/ i pp. 127-8, report of conver­ 13-16 and 39-43, records of
satio11s with Bogomolov, 9 Apr. Molotov's meetings with Togo, 1, 3
1941. and 7 June 1 940.
47. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.1 d.1 1.13-15, 53. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.2 d . 1 3 1.68-71,
record of Molotov's meeting with record of Molotov's meeting with
Yan Tse, Chinese ambassador in Chao Litse, Chinese ambassador, 9
Moscow, 8 Jan., and f.059 op.1 p.338 June, and f.0100 op.24 p.196 d.6
d.2312 1.8-9, Paniushkin, Soviet 1.54-5, record of Rezanov's (direc­
ambassador in China, to Molotov, 9 tor of the Far Eastern Department
Jan. 1940. of MID) meeting with Dzan
48. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.2 d . 1 1 1.64-7, Detinem, Chinese charge d' affaires,
record of Molotov's meeting with 10 June 1940.
General Xe Iaotsu, 28 Apr. 1940. On 54. AVP RF, f.0146 op.23 p.206 d . 14
the impact of the Soviet-Japanese l.6g--75, Malik (Soviet embassy in
war at Khalkin-Gol on the Soviet Tokyo) to FM, 12 June. See a similar
policy see A. D. Coox, Nomonhan: German appreciation of the change
Japan against Russia, 1 93 9 (Stanford, in DGFP, XI, pp. 1g--20, FM minute,
1986). 4 Sept. 1940. See also Chihiro, 'The
49. On his suspicions in 1940, see pp. Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact',
94-5. AVP RF, f.0100 op.24 p.196 d.8 pp. 41-3.
1.6-10, Paniushkin on meeting 55. DGFP, XI, pp. 206-7, Ott to Mat­
Chinese Deputy Prime Minister suoka, 27 Sept. 1940. Chihiro, 'The
and Minister of Finance Kun Siansi, Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact',
War Minister Xe Intsin and Minis­ pp. 47 and 50.
ter of Economics Ven Venkhao, 29 56. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.3 d.17 1.1-3,
Feb. 1940. record of Molotov's meeting with
50. AVP RF, f.0146 9p.23 p.205 d.9 l.10-- Togo, 1 Oct. The Swedish ambas-
Notes to pages 1 9 1-6

sador, in close touch with the Axis LXX, Assarasson to FM 15 Mar.

,

powers, believed the way was 1941.

paved for Russia's access to the 68. DGFP, XII, pp. 139-51, memoran­
pact, see UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, dum on Ribbentrop's conversa­
HP /516/LXVIII, Assarasson to FM, tions with Oshima, 23 Feb. 1941.
12 Oct. 1940. 69. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.4 1.67--g,
57. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64 Molotov on meeting Tatekawa, 18
d.675 ll.13-15, Beria to Stalin, 24 Mar. 1941.
Oct. 1940. 70. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.28 d.383 1.1-5,
58. AVP RF, f.06 op.2 p.3 d . 1 7 1.50-5, report on Molotov's meeting with
record of Molotov's meeting with Matsuoka, 24 Mar., and f.06 op.3
Togo, 1 7 Oct. 1940. p.30 d.413 1.1, memorandum by
59. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/ 5 1 7 / Lozovsky, 22 Feb. See also UD:s
LXIX, Assarasson to FM 1 1 Nov.
, Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP / 517/ LXX,
1940. Assarasson to FM 24 Mar. 1941.
,

60. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.335 d.2294 71. Presidential Archives, f.45 op.1
1.55-7, Molotov to Smetena, p.404 1.83-8, record of Stalin's
Russian ambassador in Tokyo, on meeting with Matsuoka, 24 Mar.
conversations with Tatekawa, 1 Matsuoka was greatly impressed
Nov. 1940. by Stalin's hostility towards
61. DGFP, XI, pp. 644-6, Ott to FM 21 , England, see AMVnR, d.51 p.45
Nov., and AVP RF, f.0146 op.23 op.1sh pop.333 1.76, Stamenov to
p.205 d.9 1.120-7, Lozovsky on FM 15 Apr. 1941.
,

meeting Tatekawa, 24 Dec, f.06 72. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/517/
op.2 p.3 d.19 1. 106-19, Molotov on LXX, Assarasson to FM 25 Mar.
,

meeting Tatekawa, 26 and 28 Dec., 1941.

f.0146 op.23 p.205 d.9 1.131-49, 73. AVP RF, f.069, op.25 d.6 p.71
record of Lozovsky' s meeting 1.47-52, Maisky to FM on meeting
with Tatekawa, 27 Dec. 1940, Butler, 26 Mar. 1941.
and f.06 op.3 p.1 d.3 1.2-8, Molotov 74. DGFP, XII, pp. 386--g4, 405-9 and
on meeting Tatekawa, 17 Jan. 41 3-20, reports of Matsuoka's
1941. meetings in Berlin, 27-29 Mar. 1941.
62. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.3 1.9-16 75. DGFP, XII, pp. 386--g4, record of
and 23-4, record of Molotov's Hitler's meeting with Matsuoka, 1
meeting with Tatekawa, 27 and 29 Apr. 1941.
Jan. 1941. 76. TsDA MVR, f.176 op.8 a.e.995 1.2-4,
63. AVP RF, f.0146 op.24 p.224 d.7 Karadjov, Bulgarian ambassador in
1. 1 1 1-13, Smeta11in to Molotov, 1 1 Rome, to FM 4 Apr. 1941.
,

Feb. 1940. 77. See pp. 152-3.

64. Chihiro, 'The Japanese-Soviet Neu­ 78. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/ 517 /
trality Pact', p. 71. LXXI, Assarasson to FM 7 Apr. ,

65. DGFP, XII, pp. 100-1, Ott to F M on 1941.

meeting Matsuoka, 1 5 Feb. The 79. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.28 d.383 1.6-20,
British recognized right away the report of Molotov's meeting with
priority attached to the Russian trip Matsuoka, 7 Apr. 1941. See also
and the intention to sign a non­ G. Krebs, 'Japan and the
aggression pact, see FO 371 27956 German-Soviet War, 1941', in
F1 125/ 421/23, Craigie to FO, 19 Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War, pp.
Feb. 1941. 545-6.
66. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.3 1.37-40, 80. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.28 d.383 l.19-35,
record of Molotov's meeting with report of Matsuoka's meeting with
Tatekawa, 18 Feb. 1941. Molotov, 9 Apr. 1941.
67. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/517/ 81. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.28 d.383 l.36-46,
 Notes to pages 196-204

report by Molotov on meeting 96. Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina, .I,

Matsuoka, 1 1 Apr. 1941; Zl1ukov, pp. 525-6.
Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia, I, pp. 97. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 834/Z/
356-7, 13 Apr. 1941. 312/ 1 pp. 132-3, report on conver­
82. AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4 sation with Bogomolov, 11 Apr.
1.199-201, record of Lavrentev's 1941.
meeting with �ollas, Greek ambas­ 98. On the event see Cripps papers,
sador in Bucharest, 10 Apr. 1941. Isobel's diary, 21 Apr. 1941.
83. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi 99. Dimitrov's diary, 20 Apr. 1941.
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2), pp. 93-4, 100. Ibid., 21 Apr. 1941.
Berlin residency to NKGB, 10 Apr. 101. Firsov, 'Arkhivy Kominterna', pp.
1941. 34-5.
84. Presidential Archives, f.45 op.1 102. Dimitrov's diary, 12 May 1941.
d.404 1.91-101, record of Stalin's 103. Ibid., 22 June 1941.
meeting with Matsuoka, 12 Apr.
•

1941.
85. The following description is based 10. 'Appeasement': A New
mostly on a detailed and lively German-Soviet Pact?
report by Jack Scott, correspondent
of the Nezos Chronicle, in FO 1. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian
37129480 N1829/78/38, corrobo­ Campaign, pp. 160-1, and AMVnR,
rated by other reports quoted p. 17 op.1b pop.13 l.50, Stamenov to
below. FM, 14 Apr. 1941.
86. FO 371 27956 F2960/ 421 / 23, 2. E. H. von Weizsacker, Menioirs
Cripps to FO, 14 Apr. 1941. (London, 1951), p. 252.
87. A remarkable exception, recogniz­ 3· Ibid., P · 246. I

ing the historiographical problem, 4. Waddington, 'Ribbentrop and the

is B. N. Slavinsky, Pakt o neitralitete Soviet Union', p. 22.
mezhdit SSSR i Iaponiei: diplomatich­ 5. DGFP, XII, p. 802.
eskaia istoriia, 1941-1945 (Moscow, 6. Weizsacker, Memoirs, p. 248.
1995), PP· 98-9. 7. Hill (ed.), Weizsiicker-Papiere, pp.
88. Krigsarkivet, Fo .. rsvarsstaben, Ser. 565-6, n. 126.
E/Il/ 15/ 1, military attache's report 8. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/517/
on conversations with Krebs, no. L:XX, Assarasson to FM 4 Apr. ,

41, 13 Apr. 1941. 1941. •

89. AMVnR, d.51 p.45 op.1sh pop.333 9. The essence of the memorandum,
1.74, Stamenov to FM, 13 Apr. 1941 . which has never been recovered
90. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian (see DGFP, XII, p. 661, n. 2), is con­
Campaign, pp. 158-9. veyed in Hilger and Meyer, Incom­
91. Slavinsky, Pakt o neitralitete, pp. patible Allies, p. 328, and UD:s Arkiv
105-6 and 108. 1920 ARS, HP / 1554/L and LXX,
92. A telegram by Aktay intercepted by Assarasson to FM, 25 Feb., 17 and
the Germans in DGFP, XII, pp. 29 Mar. 1941.
873-6, 1 May 1941. 10. Author's italics. DGFP, XII, pp.
93. Ibid., pp. 723-4, Ott to FM, 12 Apr. 536-7, Schulenburg to FM, 13 Apr.
1941. 1941. That he achieved this impact
94· Ibid., pp. 546-7, Boltze, German is attested by Hitler's interpreter
charge d' affaires in Tokyo, to FM , P. Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter
14 Apr. See similar observation by (London, 1952) p. 232. The con­
Craigie, Tokyo, to FO, in FO 371 versation between Stalin and
27956 F3042 and F3046/ 421/23, 14 Schulenburg is confirmed also by
and 15 Apr. 1941. Assarasson in UD:s Arkiv 1920
95. See below, pp. 202-4. ARS, Assarasson to FM, HP I 517 I
Notes to pages 204-8

LXXI, 21 Apr. 1941, and in his I 27. Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible
skuggan av Stalin, p. 57. Allies, p. 328.
11. Telegram from Tippelskirch, 1 5 28. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1556/
Apr., in DGFP, XII, pp. 560-1; AVP LV, Assarasson to FM on meeting
RF, f.082 op.24 p.105 d.3 1.95-6, Hilger, on 30 Apr., Schulenburg on
Sobolev on meeting Tippelskirch, 3 May, and Walter on 6 May. This
1 5 Apr., and a second meeting on 24 was confirmed by Gafencu in
Apr. 1941, in AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.4 Misiune la Moscova, raport 1405, pp.
d.38 1.85-9. 183-94, 30 Apr., and by Cripps
12. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.10 d.31 1.32-3, in FO 371 29481 N2172/78/38, 14
Vyshinsky on meeting Gafencu, 1 5 May 1941.
Apr. 1941. 29. Dimitrov's diary, 9 Apr. 1941.
13. DGFP, XII, 15 Apr. 1941, pp. 563-5. 30. Sudopla tov, Special Tasks, p. 1 1 7.
14. Ibid., 25 Apr. 1941, pp. 623-4. 31. AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4
15. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 517 I 1.224-6, 22 Apr. 1941.
LXXI, Assarasson to FM 19 Apr.,
, 32. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 5 1 7 I
and AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.10 d.32 LXXI, minute by the Swedish FM ,

1.13-14, record of Vyshinsky's 24 Apr., and Assarasson to FM 5 ,

meeting with Gavrilovic;, 20 Apr. May 194 1 .

1941. 33. AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.4 l.230,
16. Pravda, 19 Apr. 1941. record of Lavrentev's meeting with
17. DGFP, XII, p. 602. Avakumovic;, 1 May 1941; almost
18. Fleischhauer, Diplomatischer Wider­ a verbatim statement in Vino­
stand gegen 'Unternehmen Bar­ gradov' s meeting with Knatchbull­
barossa', p. 305. Hugessen, on 3 May, in AVP RF,
19. Weizsacker, Memoirs, p. 253, and f.0134 op.24a p.236 d.7 l.288-92. See
Hill (ed.), Weizsiicker-Papiere, 21 also the tone assumed by Maisky in
Apr. 1941, p. 248. At his trial all his conversations with Eden
Weizsacker stated: 'I know that I during May and June: below, p. 302.
11ad been considered to be a 34 · FO 371 29465 N1999/3/38, Halifax
defeatist for a long time with out­ to Eden, 5 May 1941.
dated views to whom no one lis­ 35. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.21 1.6-11,
tened. But I wanted, probably for record by Vyshinsky on meeting
the last time in my career, to convey Steinhardt, 24 May 1941.
my explicitly differing views to the 36. V. A. Nevezhin, 'Vystuplenie
knowledge of the leadership of the Stalina 5 maia 1941g. i povorot v
State' : ibid., p. 570, n. 156. propagande', in V. A. N evezhin
20. J. von Ribbentrop, The Ribbentrop and G. A. Bordiugova (eds), Gotovil
Memoirs (London, 1954), p. 152. li Stalin nastupatel'nuiu voinu protiv
21. DGFP, XII, p. 666, n. 1 . Gitlera? (Moscow, 1995), pp. 147 ff.,
22. His full memorandum is repro­ drives home effectively the
duced in ibid., pp. 661-2. See also message that the propaganda in the
Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 247 and army was now geared towards
253, and Hill (ed.), Weizsiicker­ preparing tl1e soldiers for an 'offen­
Papiere, 28 and 29 Apr. 1941, pp. sive war'; it is a classic case
249-50. however of an analysis overlooking
23. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, pp. the wider political, international
1 90-1, 25 Apr. 1941. and military context. Likewise J.
24. Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Hoffman brings a similarly tenden­
Allies, p. 328. tious version in his 'The Soviet
25. Weizsacker, Memoirs, p. 257. Union's Offensive Preparations in
26. DGFP, XII, pp. 666-9. Hilger and 1941', in Wegner (ed .), From Peace to
Meyer, Incompatible Allies, p. 328. War, PP · 365-9.
 Notes to pages 208-14

37. See for instance FO 371 29481 son to FM 22 May 1941. Earlier pre­
,

N2130/78/38, Cripps to FO, 5 May; sentation of the appeasement is

Quai d'Orsay Archives, telegrams in M . Lisann, 'Stalin the Appeaser:
from Moscow, tels 409-13, Bergery Before 22 June, 1941', Survey, 76
to FM 5 May; DGFP, XII, pp. 964-5,
, (1970).
5 May 1941; Erickson, Road to Stal­ 50. See a long report on the changes in
ingrad, p. 82, and Hilger and Meyer, Krigsarkivet, Fo .. rsvarsstaben, Ser.
Incompatible Allies, p. 330. E / I / 1 5 I 3, military attache' s report,
38. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d . 1 1.452-5, no. 30, 16 June i941.
'Eshchenko' to Golikov, 24 Mar. 51. RTsKhIDIN, op.1 d.1a 1. 1-4, Proto­
1941. col of the Plenum of the CC, 5 May,
39. Reproduced in Izvestiia CC CPSU, 5 and Dimitrov's diary, 5 May 1941.
(1990), pp. 191-6, head of indoc­ 52. DGFP, XII, pp. 691-2. There are
trination of the Red Army to various indicators that Schulen­
Zhdanov, Jan. 1941. burg had raised with Weizsacker
40. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym,. the possibility of exploiting
p. 45· Dekanozov' s presence in Moscow
41. The Russian Centre for the Preser- to make an approach to the gov­
vation and Study of Contemporary ernment. Weizsacker had formed a
History (hereafter RTsKhIDIN), f.88 positive impression of Dekanozov
op.1 d.898 1.14-22, directive by after his appointment in December
Shcherbakov, 5 May 1941. 1940, as a 'man one could talk with
42. Bezymensky papers, memo by in an objective way'. Weizsacker,
General N. Liashchenko, 1954. I am Memoirs, p. 246.
grateful to Lev Bezymensky for this 53. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 517 I
document. LXXI, Assarasson to FMJ, 7 May
43. RTsKhIDIN, f.558 op.1 d.3808 i941.
1. 1-12, 5 May 1941. 54. Quoted in G. Kumanev, '22 June',
44. Pravda, Timoshenko' s speech, 1 Pravda, 22 June 1989. See for
May 1941. instance V. V. Sokolov' s in trod uc­
45. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi tion of the document in Vestnik
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2), pp. 128-g, Ministerstva innostranykh del SSSR,
Berlin residency to NKGB, Apr. 20 (1990), p. 58. This is borne out
1941. neither by the text nor by the next
46. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.26 1.1, report two meetings: See a critical review
by Vyshinsky on meeting Labonne, in S. Gorlov and V. Voyushin,
5 Apr., and UD:s Arkiv 1920 A.RS, 'Warnings Came Not Only from the
HP I 517 /LXXI, Assarasson to FM, German Ambassador', New Times,
25 Apr. 1941. 2 (1991).
47. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 834/Z/ 55 . Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible
312/ 1 pp. 13 1-3, Nemanov on con­ Allies, p. 331.
versation with Bogomolov, 1 1 Apr. 56. Ch11ev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym,
1941. P· 39·
48. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.26 l.2-5, and 57. See V. A. Voiushin and S. A. Gorlov,
Quai d'Orsay Archives, Moscow 'Fashistskaia agressia: o chem soob­
tels 369-75, reports of Vyshinsky' s shchali diplomaty', VIZh, 6 (1991),
meetings with Bergery, 28 Apr. pp. 22-3.
1941. 58. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64
49. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.25 d.335 1.1-6, d.675 1.1 57-61, Dekanozov's report
and Quai d'Orsay Archives, tele­ of a meeting with Schulenburg, 5
grams from Moscow, tel. 428-3 1, May 1941.
Bergery to FM 1 5 May; UD:s Arkiv
, 59. DGFP, XII, p. 446, Commander in
1920 ARS, HP I 5 17 /LXXI, Assaras- Chief of the Wehrmacht to FM 3 ,
Notes to pages 2 1 4-21

Apr., and pp. 698-<J, Military Intel­ and Hill (ed.), Weizsticker-Papiere, 1
ligence to military attache in May 1941, p. 252.
Moscow, 4 May 1941. Even before 73. See below in this chapter.
his return to Moscow, the German 74. With a view to securing the rear
naval attache informed the High prior to the Russian campaign
Command of the Navy tl1at he was Hitler was in the midst of crucial
'endeavouring to counteract the negotiations with Marshal Petain
rumours, which are manifestly and Admiral Darlan about future
absurd', ibid., 24 Apr. 1941, p. 632. relations between Vichy and
See also 0. V. Vishlev, 'Pochemu Germany.
zhe medlil I . V. Stalin v 1941 gg. 75. Hill (ed.), Weizsticker-Papiere, 16
(iz Germanskikh arkhivov)', Novaia Feb. 1941, p. 238.
i noveishaia istoriia, 2 (1992), pp. 76. DGFP, XI I, 7 M ay 19 41 , pp . 734-5 .
93-4. 77. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64
60. DGFP, xn, 4 May 1941, pp. 698-9. d.675 1.174, note by Dekanozov on
61. FO 371 29481 N2418/78/ 38, Cripps meeting Stalin and Molotov, 12
to FO, 1 5 May 1941. May 194 1 .
62. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/517/ 78. Trtey were sent on 10 May but
LXXI, Assarasson to FM 12 May
, arrived by courier, as Schulenburg
1941. told Dekanozov without display­
63. DGFP, XII, pp. 730 and 734-5, Schu­ ing their content, on the day of their
lenburg to FM 7 May 1941; Rosso' s
, meeting.
similar evaluation in AMVnR, d.51 79. DGFP, XII, pp. 750-1.
p.45 op.1sh pop.333 1.89-90, Sta­ Bo. Presidential Archives, f.3 op.64
menov to FM 8 May 1941.
, d.675 1.169-73, record of
64. Pravda, 9 May, and DGFP, XII, p. Dekanozov's meeting with Schu­
792, Schulenburg to FM 12 May
, lenburg, 12 May 1941. Weizsacker' s
1941. short telegram to Schulenburg
65. On this see p. 287f. included a cryptic reference which
66. A memorandum by Dekanozov on may have led Schulenburg to this
his meeting with Schulenburg conclusion but it is unlikely to have
addressed personally to Molotov in referred to Hess. Weizsacker wrote:
only two copies is in Presidential 'The near future will again bring
Arc11ives, f.3 op.64 d.675 1.162-8, some meetings of important per­
record of Dekanozov' s meeting sonalities which, however, will
with Schulenburg, 9 May 1941. scarcely affect your particular
67. Presidential Arcl1ives, f.3 op.66 province.' He was most probably
d.906 1.1-4, record of Vyshinsky' s referring to Ribbentrop's meeting
meeting with Gavrilovi�, 8 May with Mussolini t°"No days later,
1941. See also R. Douglas, New DGFP, XTI, p. 750. But the fact that
Alliances 1940-41 (London, 1982), p. both Schulenburg and Cripps had
60. been alluding to the possibility
68. DGFP, XTI, p. 66, n. 1 . of a separate peace surely alerted
69. Ribbentrop Memoirs, p. 152. Stalin.
70. Hill (ed.), Weizsiicker-Papiere, 1 May 81. See p. 265.
1941, pp. 252-3. 82. See Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible
71. G. Ciano, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers Allies, p. 3 5 1 .
(London, 1948), 15 June 1941, p. 83. Hill (ed.), Weizsticker-Papiere, 2 May
358. Berezhkov formed a similar 1941, p. 253.
impression in his memoirs History 84. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, pp.
in the Making (Moscow, 1982), pp. 192-3.
70 ff. 85. DGFP, XII, pp. 791-3.
72. Weizsacker, Memoirs, pp. 253-4, 86. Ibid., 22 May 1941, p. 870.
 Notes to pages 221-8

87. Ibid., 4 June 1941, pp. 964-5. right or wrong, does not detract
88. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.361 d.2401 from their main argument about
l.133-4, Maisky to FM, 10 Apr.; Stalin's self-deception, which is
f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp. 41-5 and accepted by the present author.
85-7, 1 Mar. and 10 Apr.; and pp. 95. See below, p. 303.
121-2, 5 May 1941. 96. AVP RF, f.0132 op.24a p.236 d.8 l.42,
89. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p. 123. report by Vinogradov of meeting
90. AMVnR, d.51 p.45 op.1sh pop.333 Koskinen, 24 May 1941.
1.98, Stamenov to FM, 25 May 1941. 97. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. 131-2,
91. Bezymensky was told so by Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and
Zhukov in the 1960s. Beria, 26 May 1941.
92. Berezhkov, History in the Making, p. 98. GRU GSh RF, op.24 1 19 d.1 l.86474,
59· 'Eshchenko', Bucharest, to Golikov,
93. AVP RF, f.082 op.23 p.95 d.6
· 28 May 1941.
ll.141-2, report by Semenov, 19 99. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.389-<)7,
Nov. 1940. deputy director of the NKVD to
94. Barros and Gregor, Double Dec­ Merkulov, 30 May 1941.
eption, pp. 150-9. Due to the 100. AVP RF, f.082 op.24 p. 106 d.7
unavailability of the Soviet records 1.140-1, report by Dekanozov, 30
at the time of writing their book, May; see also ibid., 1.142-3, record
the authors were unaware of the of Dekanozov' s meeting with
three crucial meetings held by Gerde, 7 June 1941.
Dekanozov and Schulenburg in 101. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.12 d.138
the first half of May. Relying on 1.99-107, Dekanozov to Molotov, 4
Hilger' s misleading account, they June 1941.
refer to only one meeting and 102. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
wrongly date it to 19 May. They leniia, I, pp. 346-7 and 373 ·
therefore attach undue significance 103. GRU GSh RF, op.7237 d.2 1.1 14-19,
to the meetings with Meisner, special report by Golikov, 31 May
which aimed at reviving the 1941.
talks. As they concede, Meisner 104. TsA FSB RF, f.6894 1.238-<J, 3 June
never admitted to those meetings 1941.
in his debriefings after the war;
Cripps' s report, which they rely on,
spoke in general about rumours of 11. 'The Special Threatening
talks. None of the reports are to be
Military Period '
found either in the Presidential
Archives or in the archives of the 1. Van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy, p.
Security Services. The evidence 150.
therefore rests on the then 2. See 'The Gathering Clouds' section
extremely young Berezhkov, who above in Chapter 6, and below, p.
had been serving in the embassy 237f.
as an interpreter. However, as 3. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
Meisner spoke fluent Russian leniia, I, pp. 362-3, an admission not
Berezhkov' s services would not printed before; the reference to the
have been needed at those parti­ intelligence is debatable.
cular meetings. The significance of 4. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 81;
the talks, therefore, is conjectural Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 2 (1990), pp.
only; they were certai11ly secondary 202-3.
to those between Schulenburg 5. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
and Dekanozov. And yet Barros leniia, I, pp. 341-3 and 345. On
and Gregor's intuition is certainly Stalin's dacha and social life see
correct and therefore the episode, Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym.
Notes to pages 228-36

6. AGSh RF, f.8 op.2729 d.28 1.61-82, 24. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 84.
214-26 and 262-3, Sokolovsky (CS) L. S. Skvirski, 'V predvoennye
to the Commanders of the Western gody', Voprosy istorii, 9 ( 1989), pp.
District, the Far East and the air 55-68.
force, 2-7 Mar. 1941. 25. See pp. 1 1 5-18.
7. See pp. 123-4. 26. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.237
8. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.241 1.1-15, 1.48-64, directive by Timoshenko
Zhukov and Timoshenko to Stalin and Zhukov to Pavlov, 30 Apr.
and Molotov, 1 1 Mar. 1941. 1941.
9. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ 27. See pp. 202-4.
leniia, I, pp. 322-5. 28. Presidential Archives, Stalin's
10. See pp. 1 79-84. appointment diary, 23 Apr., and
11. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.302-6, f.93, special collection, Stalin and
report by 'Sidrov', 24 Mar. 1941. Molotov to CC of the CPSU and the
12. Ibid., d.21616 t.4 1.1-10, director of government, 23 Apr. 1941.
the Baltics NKGB to Merkulov, 27 29. GRU GSh RF, op.38 d.1 1.161-6,
Mar. 1941. directive by Timoshenko and
13. Ibid., d.23078 t.1 d.21616 t.3 Zhukov to the Western Military
1 . 1 15-20, Savchenko, deputy­ District, 29 Apr. 1941.
director Ukrainian NKGB, to 30. Ibid., op.7277 d . 1 1.140-52, Tupikov,
Merkulov, 29 Apr. 1941. Soviet military attache in Berlin, to
14. GRU GSh RF, op.241 19 d.4 1.346-7, Golikov, 25 Apr. The following day
'Mars', Budapest, to Golikov, 30 Golikov transmitted to Stalin the
Apr. 1941. gist of the report in a watered­
15. See pp. 180-6. down version. GRU GSh RF,
16. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­ op.7237 d.2 1.92-6, report by
pasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 61-2 and Golikov on the German deploy­
289, Berlin residency to NKGB, 24 ment, 26 Apr. 1941. That the danger
Mar. 1941. of war was well perceived can also
17. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.236-41, be deduced from the hasty mobi­
'Zakhar' to NKGB, 2 Apr. 1941. lization of the NKGB, placing
18. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.242 the organization on a war alert.
1.236-40, Merkulov to Timoshenko, FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­
4 Apr. 1941. pasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 1 1 7-18,
19. GRU GSh RF, op.24119 d.1 1.468-g Kobulov' s instructions on mobi­
and 4 72-3, 'Eshchenko' to Golikov lization of NKGB, 26 Apr. 1941, and
from Bucharest, 26 Mar. 1941. Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p. 1 19.
20. Ibid., op.7237 d.2 1.84-6, special 31. AVP RF, f.0125 op.27 p.122 d.2 1.8,
report by Golikov, 4 Apr. Corrobo­ FM memorandum by Novikov on
rated a week later by Meshnik, German intentions in Rumania,
head of the NKGB in the Ukraine, 29 Apr. See also GRU GSh RF,
in TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.3 1.53-g, 12 op.24119 d.1 1.737-45, 'Eshchenko'
Apr. 194 1 . to Golikov, 5 May 1941.
21. AVP RF, f.082 op.24 p.105 d.3 1.103; 32. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.39 1-2,
DGFP, XII, pp. 602-3, records by report from Bucharest, 17 May 1941.
Sobolev and Tippelskirch on their 33. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. 40-5,
meetings, 21 Apr. 1941. Strokacha, Deputy Interior Minis­
22. GRU GSh RF, op.7237 d.2 l.8g-g1, ter, departmental mernorandum, 30
special periodical report by Apr. 1941.
Golikov, 16 Apr. 1941. 34. GRU GSh RF, op.7237 d.2 1.97-102,
23. Ibid., op.24119 d.4 1. 335-6, 'Mars', special report by Golikov, 5 May
Budapest, to Golikov, 24 Apr. 1941. See also Zhukov, Vospomi­
1941. naniia i razmyshleniia, I, pp. 344-5.
370 Notes to pages 23 6-42

35. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.269-71, 41. Presidential Archives, Stalinrs
Merkulov to Stalin, Molotov and appointment diary.
Beria, 5 May. See a similar report in 42. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym,
TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.265-8, p. 31.
Fitin, director of the 1st Dept of the 43. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.237 l.1-15.
Ukrainian NKGB, to Golikov, 5 44. Iu. A. Gor'kov, 'Nakanune 22 iiunia
May 1941. 1941', Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 6
36. Ibid., d.21616 t.3 1.156-60, Meshnik, (1992), p. 4. Presidential Archives,
commissar of the Ukrainian Stalin's appointment diary.
NKGB, to Merkulov, 1 5 May. 45. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
See also intercepted telegram of leniia, I, p. 342; V. Karpov, 'Zhukov',
the Japanese consul in Konigsberg Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, 5
to Tokyo via Moscow, reproduced (1990), pp. 62-8, and interview with
in FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Anfilov, May 1995.
Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2), p. 171 (inter­ 46. 'Neopublikovannoe interv'iu mar­
cepted telegram), 31 May 1941. shala sovestskogo soiuza A. M.
37. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ Vasilevskogo', Novaia i noveishaia
leniia, I, pp. 346-9, and in I. istoriia, 6 (1992). See also Chuev, Sto
Bargamian, 'Zapiski nachal'nika sorok besed s Molotovym, p. 33.
operativnogo otdela', VIZh, 1 47. Reproduced in an enlightening
(1967). volume of documents on the prepa­
38. See pp. 231-3. rations for war, Skrytaia pravda
39. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.259 1.1-17 voiny: 1941 god. Neizvestnye doku­
and d.237 1. 33-47 and 65-81, f. 131 menty (Moscow, 1992), pp. 23-4, 25,
op.12507 d . 1 1.71-5 and d.258 29 and 30-3.
1.1-1 1, Zhukov and Timoshenko to 48. Volkogonov papers, instructions
the Commanders of the Odessa, by Timoshenko, Zhdanov and
Baltics, Kiev and Western Regions, Zhukov, to the Commanders of the
13 May 1941; Zakharov, General'nyi Military Districts.
shtab, pp. 266-9. See also J . W. 49. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
Kipp, 'Military Theory: Barbarossa, leniia, I, pp. 348-5 1 . See also A. G.
Soviet Covering Forces and the Khor' kov, 'Ukreplennie raiony na
Initial Period of War: Military zapadnykh granitsakh SSSR', VIZh,
History and Airland Battle', foitrnal 12 (1987), pp. 47-54.
of Soviet Military Studies, 1 / 2 (1988), 50. Glantz, Milita.ry Strategy of the Soviet
pp. 198-9. On the shortcomings Union, p. 75.
of the deployment see Lieutenant­ 51. RTsKhIDIN, f.17 op.3 d.273 1.27-8,
General N. Pavlenko, 'Tragediia Politburo decree of 8 Mar. 1941.
krasnoi armii', Moskovskii novosti, 7 52. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­
May 1989. M . M. Kiriia, 'Nchal'nyi leniia, I, pp. 349-52, and R. E. Tar­
period Velikoi Otechestvennoi leton, 'What Really Happened to
voiny', VIZh, 6 ( 1988), G. P. Pas­ the Stalin Line?', fournal of Soviet
tukhovsky, 'Razvertyvanie opera­ Military Studies, 2 (1992), pp.
tivnogo tyla v nachal'nyi period 187-219.
voiny', and Iu. G. Perechnev, 'O 53. Quoted in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 2
nekotorykh problemakh podgo­ (1990), p. 207. On the intensive
tovki strany i Vooruzhennyx Sil k efforts invested in the construction
otrazhneniia fashistskoi agressii', of the URs see also V. I. Beliaev,
VIZh, 4 (1988). 'Usilenie okhrany zapadnoi gran­
40. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.248 itsy SSSR nakanune Vekiloi Otech­
1.36-54, directive by Pavlov to the estvennoi voiny', VIZh, 5 (1988),
Commander of the 3rd Army, 14 pp. 51-5, and A. D. Borshchev,
May 1941. 'Otrazhenie fashistskoi agressii:
Notes to pages 242-50 371

uroki i vyvody', Voennaia mysl', 3 example in L. Schwartzchild,

( 1990), p. 19. 'Neozhidanyi zakhvat Gessa v
54. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ lovushku, podstroenuiu angliiskoi
leniia, I, p. 333. ''Sikret servis'' ', VIZh, 5 (1991), pp.
55 · Ibid., pp. 336-7. 37-4 1, and V. I. Chukreev, 'Zagadka
56. Presidential Archives, f.93, special 22 iunia 1941 goda', V!Zh, 6 (1989),
collection, Molotov and Stalin to p. 39. Tl1e Americans formed a
the SNK and Politburo, 1 5 Mar. and similar impression: see National
12 Apr., and instructions by the Archives, Washington, RG 319, Box
government and the CC, 5 May 83, B8026020, report on Hess by
1941. See also D. T. Iazov, 'Vperedi Raymond Lee, US military attache
byla voina', VIZh, 5 (1991), p. 13. in London, 10 May 1941.
57. RTsKhIDIN, f. 17 op.3 d.1037 l.33-4, 4. H. Thomas, The Murder of Rudolf
protocol of the Politburo meeting, 9 Hess (London, 1979). C. Andrew
Apr. 1941. presented and dismissed tl1e
58. AGSh RF, f.8044 op.1 d.652 1.89-92, various conspiracy theories in
Zhigarev, Commander of the Air 'Hess: An Edge of Conspiracy', in
Force, to Stalin, 27 May 1941. Timewatch, BBC2, 17 Jan. 1990.
59. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmy­ 5. One of the rare cases when
shleniia, I, p. 346, previously Churchill's account is essentially
unpublished. accurate tl1ough not full, Second
60. Ibid. World War, III, pp. 43-9.
61. Ibid., pp. 368-g. 6. G. Gorodetsky, 'Tl1e Hess Mission
62. GRU GSh RF, op.7237 d.2 1.109-13, and Anglo-Soviet Relations on the
special report by Golikov, 1 5 May Eve of ''Barbarossa'' ', English His­
1941. See corroborating informa­ torical Review, 101 /399 (1986).
tion in ibid., op.24119 d . 1 1.814-15, 7. P. Padfield, Rudolf Hess: The Fiil1rer's
'Kos ta', Sofia, to Golikov, 19 May Disciple (London, 1993), p. 353. See
1941. below, pp. 250, 253-4. See Cripps's
63. Ibid., op. 7237 d.2 1 . 1 14-15, 31 May report summing up the affair in FO
1941. 371 30920 C10635/61 / 18, 2 Nov.
64. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1557 I 1942.
LVII, Assarasson to FM, 28 May. 8. This was admitted by Padfield in
See also AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.4 d.36 Rudolf Hess, pp. 334-5 and 355-6,
1. 36-49, report by Lozovsky on after inspecting the relevant files
meeting Steinhardt, 5 June 1941. in depth. See also J. Douglas­
Hamilton, The Truth about Rudolf
Hess (London, 1993), pp. 140-1, and
12. The Flight of Rudolf introduction by Roy Conyers
Hess to England Nesbit, who had carried out a tl1or­
ough research into the RAF records.
1. Stalin to Maisky, 19 October 1942, 9. For this see WO 199/ 3288, Scottish
MID, Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia Command: The Capture of Hess, 13
vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvenrioi May 194 1 .
voiny, 1 941-1 945 (Moscow, 1983), 1, 10. WO 199/3288/ A, report by the
p. 294. Officer in Charge of the 3rd Battal­
2. FO 371 30920 C10635/61 / 1 8, 2 ion Renfrewshire Home Guard,
Nov. 1942. 1 1 May 1941, and FO 1093/ 1 1 fols
3. PREM 3 / 434/7, notes on 1 52-5, interrogation of Hess by
Churchill's conference with Stalin, Battaglia, and comments by 'C',
October 1944, 10 May 1945, and FO 10 May 1941.
Boo/ 414 fol. 21, 18 Oct. 1944. On the 11. Douglas-Hamilton, The Trutlz abozJt
persisting views see the most recent Hess, pp. 142-3. Padfield, Ritdolf

•
372 Notes to pages 250-8

Hess, still raises some doubts at p. Hamilton's interview with Hess, 11

354· May 1941.
12. WO 199/ 3288, intelligence report, 33. FO 1093 / 8 pp. 221-2, 22 May 1941.
10 May 1941. 34. FO 1093/8 p. 206, Hess to his wife,
13. See FO 371 30920 C10635/61 /18 3 June 1941.
DEFE 1 / 134, collation of letters on 35. FO 1093/ 2 p. 8, 14 Sept. 1941.
Hess by the Postal Censorship, 23 36. Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, 11 May
May 1941. 1941. J. Costello, Ten Days to
14. FO 1093/9 p.15, FO minutes on Destiny: The Secret Story of the Hess
Hamilton libel case against the Peace Initiative and British Efforts to
CPGB, 17 June 1941. Strike a Deal with Hitler (London,
15. FO 1093/7, fol. 26, memorandum 1991), pp. 415-16, concocts on the
by S01. basis of this paragraph a whole
16. FO 1093 / 1 pp.18-20, Duke of story in an attempt to prove that
Hamilton's interview with Hess, 1 1 Churchill was eager to fetch
May 1941. Hamilton because he already knew
17. See interviews with Hess described that he was carrying with him
below. the German proposals.
18. I. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet 37. Cadogan papers, diary, 1 / 10, 15
Ambassador: The War, 1 93 9-43 May 1941.
(London, 1967), p. 147. 38. Douglas-Hamilton, The Tritth about
19. Padfield, Rudolf Hess. Hess, pp. 149-150.
20. The newspaper articles and 39. PREM 3/219/7 p. 167, Churchill to
Foreign Office minutes which Eden, 13 May 1941.
dismiss its essence are in FO 371 40. Cadogan papers, diary, 1 I 10, 14
46780 C4725/ 44/18. May 1941. 1

21. Padfield, Rudolf Hess, pp. 368-71. 41. PREM 3/219/7 pp. 146 and 165,
22. See below, p. 261. minute by Churchill, 16 May 1941.
23. WO 3288 I A f.4. 42. FO 1093/ 10 fols 54-5, Churchill to
24. Padfield, Rudolf Hess, p. 364. Roosevelt, 17 May 1941.
25. FO 371 26945 C4038, C4140, C4147, 43. FO 1093/ 1 fols 20-30, Kirkpatrick
C4613/306/ 41, C4245/306, 20 and interview, 12 May 1941.
25 April 1941. Padfield's comment 44. FO 1093/ 1 1 fol. 93.
that 'from a diplomat of Hoare' s 45. In The Tritth about Hess, pp. 185-92,
subtlety, this was hardly a dis­ Douglas-Ha�ilton cites sufficient
claimer' is by no means convincirtg. evidence to prove Hitler 's tremen­
26. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1555/ dous shock when the news of
LIV, Swedish ambassador in Berlin Hess's flight was brought to hi1n.
to FM, 23 Apr. 1941. 46. Eden papers, diary, 12 May 1941.
27. FO 371 1093/ 14 fol. 101, 10 May 47. FO 1093/ 1 1 fol. 149, 13 May 1941.
1942. 48. PREM 3 I 219/ 4 fol. 18, Churchill's
28. FO 1093/ 3 p. 92, letter to Professor undelivered statement, 12 May
Haushofer, 20 June 1942. 1941.
29. News Chronicle, 26 July 1945. 49. PREM 3 / 219/ 4 fols 14-19, 1 1 May
30. FO 1093/ 3 pp. 33 and 142-3, Hess 1941.
to his mother, 28 Mar. and 9 Sept. 50. Minute by Morton, FO 1093/ 10 fols
1942. 82-3.
31. DGFP, XII, pp. 783-7, Albrecht 51. Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, pp.
Haushofer to Hitler, 12 May 1941. 175-80. Making a hero of Hess,
See a thorough discussion of this in which Bevin indeed complained
Douglas-Hamilton, Tl1e Truth about was happening, only increased
Hess. Russian suspicions, see Eden
32. FO 1093/ 1 pp. 18-20, Duke of papers, diary, 1 5 May 1941.
Notes to pages 258-67 373

52. FO 371 26565 C5301/ 5188/ 18, 7J. FO 1093/7 fols 19-29 and 33-7,
Halifax to FO, 1 7 May, and PREM memorandum on the publicity of
3/219/7 p. 147, Roosevelt to the affair by S01, and FO minutes,
Churchill, 15 May 1941. 23 June 1941.
53. Eden papers, diary, 14 May 1941. 74. FO 1093/ 10 fols 58-63 and 82, 13
54. FO 1093 / 1 1 fols 132 and 140-1, June 1941.
minutes of FO, 14 May 1941. 75. PREM 3 / 219/5 p. 3, Churchill to
55. Eden papers, diary, 19 May 1941. Eden, 14 June 194 1 .
56. PREM 3 /219/7, Duff Cooper to 76. FO 1093 / 1 0 fols 157-60, report by
Churchill, 1 5 May 1941, and Colonel J. R. Rees, Consultant in
Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about Psychological Medicine to the
Hess, p. 161. Army at Home, 30 June 1941.
57. FO 1093/ 1 1 fols 1 10-15, Churchill 77. PREM 3 / 219/6 pp. 32-6, Clark
to Roosevelt, 16 May 1941. Kerr to Churchill, 25 Oct. 1942.
58. FO 1093 / 1 1 fol. 121, Churchill to 78. FO 371 30941 C9971 and C10433/
Cadogan, 16 May 1941. 1299/ 18, 33036 C5566/ 5272/ 38 and
59. FO 1093/ 1 1 fol. 123, Butler to Eden, PREM 3/219/6 fols 32-3.
16 May 1 94 1 . 79. Cripps papers, diary, 13 May; FO
60. FO 1093 / 1 fols 20-30, Kirkpatrick 371 29481 N2171 /78 / 38, FO
interview, 12 May 1941. minutes, 14 May; FO 371 26565
61. FO 1093 / 10 fols 139-41, Major D. C5301 / 5 188/ 18, Halifax to FO, 1 7
Morton to 'C' and report by May 1941.
Cadogan on Hess, 6 June 1941. 80. FO 371 26565 C525 1 /5188/ 18,
62. FO 1093 / 1 1 fols 5 1-4, Simon to minute by Sargent, 14 May. On
Eden, 27 May; Dilks (ed.), Cadogan the earlier decision to adopt that
Diaries, p. 380, 19 May 1941. method see PREM 3/219/7, Duff
63. PREM 3/219/7 pp. 1 13-15, Major Cooper to Churchill, 1 5 May 1941.
Morton to Churchill, 9 June 1941. 81. Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, p . 382.
64. Ibid., pp. 1 1 7-18, Cadogan to 82. Ibid., p. 387.
Churchill, 6 June 1941. 83. FO 1093/ 1 1 fols 125-6, FO minutes
65. FO 1093 / 1 0 fols 91-4, note by Kirk­ on Russia and propaganda, 16 May
patrick, 29 May 1941. 1941.
66. FO 1093/ 10 fol. 170, statement by 84. FO 1093/ 1 1 fols 90 and 93, FO
Hess, and 11 fol. 85, SIS report no. minutes on information re Russia,
1 6 by phone, 30 May 194 1 . 22 May 194 1 .
67. FO 1093/ 10 fol. 129 and 146, 'C' to 85. FO 1093/6 pp. 2-10, SIS instruc­
Foreign Office, 4 June, and report tions. FO Directive to Stockholm,
by SIS officer, 6 June 1941. New York and Istanbul. Minutes by
68. PREM 3/ 219/7 pp. 144-5, com­ Cadogan, 23 May 1941.
ments by Major Sheppard, MI6, 21 86. FO 1093 / 1 1 fols 24-35, 27 May 1941.
May 1941. 87. The Times, 27 May 1941.
69. The written proposals are in FO 88. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.352 d.2402
1093/ 1 pp. 154-6, 10 June 1941. 1.174·
70. FO 1093 / 1 0 fols 95-6, preliminary 89. FO 371. 29481 N2466/78/ 38, Cripps
report by 'C' to Eden, FO 1093 I 1 to FO and minutes, 27 May 1941 .
•

fols 1-13, Simon's own report on 90. FO 371 29482 N2787/78/38, FO to

his interview with Hess, 9 June, Cripps, 9 June 1941.
and fols 70-147, verbatim report of 91. FO 1093 / 1 0 fols 142-5, minutes of
the meeting, 10 June 1941. FO committee on German propa­
71. Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about ganda, 5 June 1941, and fols 133-4,
Hess, p. 135. FO instructions to Military Intelli­
72. FO 1093/ 10 fols 86--910, Cadogan to gence, 6 June 1941.
Eden, 12 June 1941. 92. FO 1093/ 10 fol. 132, MI to FO, and
374 Notes to pages 267-76

fols 106-8, Major D. Morton to FO, 108. AVP RF, f.069, op.25 d.6 p.71 l.72-4,
7 June 1941. Maisky to Molotov, 14 May 1941.
93. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 109. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 d.352 p.2402
P· 137. 1.12-14.
94. On the 'negotiations' see pp. 1 10. AVP RF, f.069 op.25 d .6 p.71 1.75-7,
215-27. Maisky to Molotov, 16 and 21 May
95. TsA FSB RF, f.338 d.20566 1.71, Bo 1941.
and 82-3, press summaries with 111. TsA FSB RF, f.376 d.28889 t.1 1.47,
departmental markings, 13 May 'Va dim', pseudonym of Ivan
1941. Chicha iev, NKVD residency in
96. On this see pp . 67-75. London, to the Centre, 14 May
97. TsA FSB RF, f.338 d .20566 1.232-4, 1941.
NKVD memorandum on Hess, 12 11 2. Ibid., f.338 d.20566 1.67-8., 'Vadim'
Dec. 1940. to NKVD, 22 May 1941.
98. Ibid., 1.101-2, information from 1 13. Ibid., 1.163, minute of the 1st Dept of
'Litseist', 14 May 1941. the NKVD, 3 June; see also 1.169-70,
99. Ibid., 1.60 and 65, 'Zakhar' to Schiller from Shanghai, 1 1 June
NKVD, 16 May 1941. 1941.
100. TsA FSB RF, f.338 d.20566 1.62-4 114. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambas­
and 66, report from 'Zakhar', 16 sador, p. 145.
May 1941. 115. Webb papers, diary, pp. 7079-80.
101. FO 371 24844 N6072/ 30/ 38, 30 July See also AVP RF, f .017a, Maisky' s
1940. diary, pp. 130--3, 22 May 1941.
102. NKVD to GRU, 9 July 1940 in 1 16. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp.
Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 (1990), p. 199. 138-40.
103. Monckton papers, Box 5, p. 49. 1 17. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.3_5;2 d.2402
104. FO 371 /29465 N1801 /3/38; Webb 1. 149-52, Maisky to FM, 5 June
papers, diary, p. 7079; Monckton 1941.
papers, Box 5, p. 49, memorandum, 1 18. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp.
28 May 1941. A11 insightful inter­ 146-7, 10 June 1941 (handwritten
pretation of these events is in entry).
Kitchen, British Policy towards tlie 1 19. Webb papers, diary, pp. 7103-7, 14
Soviet Union during the Second World June 1941; FRUS I (1941), p. 173.
War, pp. 52-5. See also S. M. Miner, 120. AVP RF, f.059 op.415 d.3727 1.319,
Between Churchill and Stalin: The Maisky to Molotov, 27 June 1941.
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the See also AVP RF, f.048 'z' op.1'b'
Origins of the Grand Alliance (Chapel d . 1 p . 1 1 1.8, 'Sovetsko-Angliiskie
Hill, NC, 1988), pp. 130--7 . otnosheniia v 1941-1945 gg.'.
105. Maisky in conversation with the
Webbs in their unpublished diary,
pp. 6921-2, of 3 July; for similar 13. On the Eve of War
views see his conversations with
A. V. Alexander, the First Lord 1. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos', op.8 por.9
of the Admiralty, in his papers, 1.52-3, Beria to Stalin, 2 June 1941.
AVAR 5 / 4/31, of 28 June; Halifax 2. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­
papers, A.7.8.4, diary, 10 July; pasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 224-7, report
and Dalton papers, diary, 26 July by Major Tkachenko, head of the
1940. L vov District of tl1e Ukrainian
106. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, NKGB, 12 June 1941.
1.118-19 and 123-7, 2 and 10 May 3. Ibid., pp. 206-7, Golikov to Beria, 3
1941. June 1941.
107. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.351 d.2401 4. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.4 1.184-98,
1.283, Maisky to FM, 13 May 1941. director of the Baltic Region to
Notes to pages 2 76-82 375

Merkulov, 6 June; FSB, Organy 1960), pp. 14-20; N . M . Kharlamov,

Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR, Trudnaia missiia (Moscow, 1983),
I(2), pp. 209-1 1, Strokach, deputy ch. 3; N. B. Kuznetsov, Nakanune
commissar for interior affairs of the (Moscow, 1989), pp. 324-40; Iu. A.
Ukraine, to NKGB, 6 June 1941. Panteleiev, Morskoi front (Moscow,
5. GRU GSh RF, op.24210 d.3 l.319-20, 1965), pp. 31-42; B. Vainer, Severnyi
'Ostwald', Helsinki, to Golikov, 15 fiot v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine
June 1941. (Moscow, 1964), pp. 21-5.
6. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.372-5, 19. Volkogonov papers, 'The plan for
Kobulov to Timoshenko, 9 June the covering of the Baltic Special
1941. Military District during mobiliza­
7. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­ tion, transfer and deployment of
pasnosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 221-4, the troops'.
NKGB report to the CC on German 20. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.256 1.2-3,
warlike measures, 1 2 June 1941. Timoshenko and Zhukov to Pavlov,
8. TsA FSB R F, f.'ZOS', op.8 por.9 12 June 1941.
1.87-g, Beria to Stalin and Molotov, 21. AGSh RF, f. 16 op.2951 d.261
12 June 1941. 1.37-40, Timoshenko and Zhukov
9. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­ to Kirponos, 12 June 1941.
pasnosti SSSR, 1(2), p. 217, inter­ 22. Ibid., 1.20-1, Zhukov and Timo­
cepted telegram from the Japanese shenko to the KOVO Military
consul in Konigsberg to Tekawawa, Council, 1 3 June 1941.
10 June 1 94 1 . 23. AGSh RF, f.140 op.68oo86c d.7
10. GRU GSh RF, op. 24119 d.4 1.497, 1.128, Sokolovsky to the com­
military attache, Budapest, to mander of the Baltic District, 14
Golikov, 14 June 1941. J11ne 1941.
11. GRU GSh R F, op.7237 d.2 1.120-1, 24. Presidential Archives, f.93, 'special
report by Golikov, 7 June 1941. collection of documents', directive
12. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.421-6, by Zhukov and Timoshenko, 19
'Zakhar' to the Centre, 10 June June 1941.
1 94 1 . 25. WO 193 /644, note by Military
13. AGSh R F, f.48 op.3408 d.14 1.425 Intelligence on 'The Possible Effect
and 432, Zhukov to Kirponos, 10 of a German-Soviet War', 1 1 June
and 1 1 June 1941. 1941. See also the illuminating
14. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.261 1.22-3, work of W. K. Wark, 'British Intelli­
Kirponos to Timoshenko, 1 1 June gence and Operation Barbarossa,
1941. 1941: The Failure of Foes', in
15. AGSh RF, f.16 op.2951 d.265 H . B. Peake and S. Halpern (eds),
1.26-30, Kirponos to the comman­ The Name of Intelligence: Essays
ders of the 5th, 6th, 12th and 26th in Honour of Walter Pforzheimer
Armies, 1 1 June 1941. (Washington, DC, 1994).
16. AGSh RF, f.164 op.2951 d.236 26. See pp. 157-8.
1.65-g, report by Vatutin, 1 3 June 27. FO 371 26518 C2919/ 19/ 18, Cripps
1941. to FO and minutes, 24 Mar. 1941.
17. See below, p. 287f. See also the debate concerning the
18. Zl1ukov, Vospominaniia i razmy­ information obtained from Hess,
shleniia, pp. 383-4. Similar evidence
is provided by N. S. Khrushchev, 28.
PP· 262-4.
FO 371 26520 C479 1 / 19/ 18, Kelly
'Vospominaniia', Voprosy istorii, 2/8 (Berne) to FO, 6 May; 29480 N 1957,
(1990), p. 59. On the abortive N2200/78/38 and 2260N /78/38,
attempts of the navy to bring Craigie to FO, 1, 16 and 19 May
about the mobilization see A. G. 1941 respectively.
Golovko, Vmeste s fiotom (Moscow, 29. FO 371 29481 N2234 and N2466/
 Notes to pages 282-7

78/38, memoranda by Brigadier Papen, 16-29 May, and 1 and 6 June

Skaife and Professor Postan of the 1941. See also H. Knatchbull­
MEW, 12 May, and minute by Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and
Warner, 29 May; WO 190/893, War (London, 1949), pp. 168-9.
report by MI14, 12 May 1941. See 43. FO 371 30068 R606 1 / 1 12/ 44,
also similar analysis in FO 3 71 Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 9 June
29481 N2392/78/38, Mallet to FO, 1941.
23 May 1941, and minutes by 44. DGFP, XII, pp. 1036-40, exchanges
Sargent,, Cadogan and Eden, 25 and between Ribbentrop and Papen, 16
26 May. and 18 June; AVP RF, f.0134 op.24a
30. FO 371 29481 N2500/78/38, 2 June p.236 d.9 1.125-6, memorandum
1941. by Zhegalov (first secretary Soviet
31. Note by the Secretary, 3 June, embassy in Ankara), 20 June 1941.
Churchill papers, 20/ 38, Churchill 45. DGFP, XII, p. 1080, Papen to Hitler,
to Smuts, 16 May; 20/36, 22 June 1941.
Churchill's minute to Ismay, 3 June; 46. AVP RF, f.069 op. 25 d.6 p.71 l.72-4,
and CAB 80/ 28 COS(41)350, 3 June Maisky to Molotov, 14 May 1941.
1941. 47. Ibid., 1.79-82, and FO 371 29501
32. FO 371 29482 N2673 and N2678/ N2471/ 122/ 38, reports of Eden's
78/38, Mallet to FO, and Cripps to meeting with Maisky, 27 May 1941.
FO, 7 June, 30 May 1941. 48. FO 371 29481 N2466/78/38, Cripps
33. FO 954/ 24 Su/ 41/ 13, Sargent on to FO, 27 May. See also similar
intelligence and German inten­ views in Krigsarkivet, Fo.. rsvar­
tions, 1 June 1941. sstaben, Ser. E / I I / 1 5 / 1, military
34. FO 371 30068 R4882/ 1 12 / 44 and attache's report, no. 57, 2 June
29480 N1978/78/ 38, Cripps to FO, 1941. I

1 and 3 May respectively, and UD:s 49· FO 954/ 24 fols 304-9, Cripps' s
Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/1557/LVII, private letter to Eden, 27 May 1941.
Assarasson to FM, 2 May; FO 371 50. WO 208/ 1761, JIC(41 )234 (1st
29135 W5536/53/ 50, 8 May 1941, draft), 31 May 1941, and comment
weekly intelligence reports. by MI14. WO 193/644, note by
35. FO 371 29480 N2020/78/38, Cripps Military Intelligence on 'The Pos­
to FO, 5 May 1941. sible Effect of a German-Soviet
36. FO 371 30068 R4.832/ 1 12/ 44, War', 1 1 June 1941.
Cripps to FO, 3 May, and 29480 51. Eden papers1 diary, 5 June 1941.
N1989/78/38, Halifax to FO, 4 May 52. FO 954/24 Su/41 / 1 2 and 13,
1941. minutes by Warner, Sargent and
37. FO 371 30125 R2366, R5368 Cadogan on intelligence and
and R5369/ 1934/ 44, Knatchbull­ German intentions, 31 May
Hugessen, 18 and 20 May 1941. and 1 June. CAB 79/86 COS(41)197,
38. FO 371 29481 N2380/78/38, Cripps including War Office to C-in-C ME
to FO, 22 May 1941. and India, 31 May 1941.
39. WO 208/1761, JIC(41)218, German 53. Gilbert, Finest Hour: Winston S.
intentions, 23 May 1941. Churchill, 1 939-1941, cl1. 57, and M.
40. WO 190/893, report by MI14, 26 Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy
May 1941. in the Second World War (London,
41. FO 371 30068 R5558 / 1 12/ 44, 1968), ch. 2.
Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 23 54. The meeting of 2 June 1941 is
May 1941. reported in AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.352
42. DGFP, XII, pp. 828-9, 836-7, d. 2402 1.120-2, and FO 371 29465
839-40, 849-50, 866-7, 910-15, N2570/2/38.
937-40 and 985-7, exchange of 55. CAB 65I18 56(41), 2 June 1941. See
telegrams between Ribbentrop and also Eden, The Reckorzing, p. 266.
Notes to pages 287-93 377

56. FO 800/279 Su/ 4 1 / 1, minutes of is his attempt to show that he had

26, 29 and 30 Apr. 1941. been warning Moscow constantly
57. FO 371 29466 N2674/3 /38, the before the war.
press reaction to Cripps' s recall, 9 66. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambas­
June 1941. sador, pp. 150 ff.
58. On the Moscow meeting see 67. AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.20 1.37-8,
AVP RF, f.07 op.2 p.9 d.20 1.35- record of Vyshinsky' s meeting with
6, record of Vyshinsky' s meeting Baggallay, 1 6 June 1941.
with Cripps, 4 June 1941; see also 68. 'Cripps Visit Sets Berlin Wonder­
Quai d'Orsay Archives, 835 / Z / ing', News Chronicle, 9 June 1941.
312/ 2, pp. 264-5, Nemanov on 69. 9 and 8 June 1941.
meeting General Sousloparov, 5 70. FO 371 29483 N2862/78/38. On the
June 1941. attitude of the paper see also I .
59. AVP RF, f.059 op. 1 p.352 d. 2402 McDonald (ed.), The History of the
1.149-52, and FO 371 29466 N2628/ Times, V: Struggle in War and Peace:
3 I 38, reports of Eden's meeting 1939-1966 (London, 1984), p. 84. I
with Maisky, 5 June 1941. See also profited much from numerous con­
FO 371 29483 N2982/78/38, Bag­ versations with Iverach McDonald
gallay to FO, 20 June 1941. on this and other aspects of Bri­
60. Monckton papers, Box 5, p. 96. tish policy at the time during my
61. J. G. Winant, A Letter from Grosvenor stay at St Antony's and he made
Square: An Accoitnt of a Stewardship some detailed and useful com­
(London, 1 947), pp. 143-4. ments on an earlier version of this
62. J. P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, manuscript.
1939-1941: The Partnership that 71. FO 371 29483 N2992/78/38,
Saved the West (New York, 1976). Maisky to Eden, 13 June 1941.
Harper papers, H22.f.21, Harper to 72. AVP RF, f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp.
Henderson, 22 June 1941. See also 1 50-3, 12 June 1941.
R. H. Dawson, The Decision to Aid 73. AVP RF, f.069 op.24 p.68 d.7 l.88-94,
Russia, 1 94 1 : Foreign Policy and FM memorandum, 2 June 1941.
Domestic Politics (Chapel Hill, NC, 74. FO 371 N2887/78/38, Warner's
1959), pp. 60-1. minute, 13 June 1941.
63. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambas­ 75. FO 418/87, Eden to Baggallay, 13
sador, pp. 148-50, 165. A hint of June 1941.
a connection between Cripps' s 76. FO 371 29483 N2887/78/38,
threats, the Hess episode a11d minutes by Cadogan and Sargent,
the communique is in F. D. 13 and 14 June; 29315 W7499/ 53/
Volkov, SSSR-Angliia 1929-1945gg. 501 PIS, 18 June 1941.
(Moscow, 1964), pp. 343-4. FO 371 77. Dilks (ed.), Cadogan Diaries, p. 382.
29466 N2628 / 3 / 38, Eden to Cripps 78. WO 208/ 1761, JIC(41)234 (1st
on meeting Maisky, 5 June, and draft), and comment by MI14;
N2674 / 3 / 38, FO minute, 9 June final draft in FO 371 29483 N I
1941. 2906/78/38, and comment by
64. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, Cavendish-Bentinck, 15 June, in
p. 43. N3047/78/38, see also JIC(41)218,
65. Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambas­ 23 May, in FO 371 29483 N I
sador, p. 149. This episode, so central 2893 /78/ 38, 31 May. For the waver­
to the understanding of the events ing nature of MI appreciation see
on the eve of the Soviet-German WO 190/893, 2 June 1941.
war, has been omitted from his later 79. FO 371 29482 N2832/78/38, Mallet
Russian version, I. M. Maisky, to FO, 14 June 1941.
Vospominaniia sovetskogo diplomata 80. Izvestiia, 14 June 1941.
(Moscow, 1987). Just as misleading 81. 50 Let Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,

•
 Notes to pages 293-300

p. 26, 'Starshina' to NKGB, 16 June Kobulov to Stalin, Molotov and

1941. Beria, 19 June 1941.
82. AVP RF, f.082 op.24 p.105 d.3 17. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos', op.8 d.58
1.1 77-82, record of Vyshinsky's 1 . 1978-80, Kobulov to Stalin,
meeting with Schulenburg, 14 June Molotov and Beria, 20 June 1941 .
1941. See also Herwarth, Against 18. Reproduced in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4
Two Evils, pp. 194-5. (1990), p. 217, 19 June 1941, and
83. FO 371 29483 N2891 /78/38, Eden confirmed by the NKVD resident
to Maisky, 14 June 1941. in Rome, in FSB, Organy Gosu­
darstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2),
p. 269, 19 June 1941.
14. Calamity 19. GRU GSh RF, op.24127 d.2 1.454,
Sorge to Golikov, 1 5 June 1941.
1. Reproduced in Vestnik MID SSSR, 8 20. Ibid., 1.463, Sorge to GRU, 20 June
66 (1990), p. 76. 1941.
2. Reproduced in Vishlev, 'Pochemu 21. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi
Medlil Stalin v 1941', p. 82. Bezopasnosti SSSR, 1(2), pp. 254-64,
3· Ibid., pp. 94-5. special report by the NKGB, 19
4. Ibid., p. 96. June 1941.
5. Ibid., pp. 82-3, 1 1 June 1941. 22. I am indebted to Dr Lev Bezymen­
6. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. 148-50, sky for a signed statement by
Kob11lov to Stalin, Molotov and General N . Liashchenko, to whom
Beria, 9 June 1941. Tirnoshenko volunteered the
7. TsA SVR RF, d.23078 t.1 1.430-1, information.
'Starshina' to NKGB, 1 1 June 23. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.3 1.68-73,
1941. special report by the deputy direc­
8. Ibid., 1.432-3, Kobulov to Stalin, tor of the Ukrainian NKGB, 16 Apr.
Molotov and Beria, 12 June 1941. 1941.
9. Merkulov to Stalin reproduced in 24. Ibid., l. 569-72, special report by the
Izvestiia TsK KPSS, 4 (1990), p. 221, deputy director of the Ukrainian
16 June 1941. See also Sudoplatov, NKVD, 27 Feb. 1941, and also FSB,
Special Tasks, pp. 120-1. Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopas­
10. G. Kumanev, '22-go' na rassvete', nosti SSSR, I(2), pp. 82-5, report by
Pravda, 22 June 1989. Pavel Meshik, the head of the
1 1 . Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, p. 122. Ukrainian NKGB, 9 Apr. 1941.
12. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ 25. TsA FSB RF, f.3 op.8 por.373 1.367-9,
leniia, p. 324. Meshnik, head of the NKVD in
13. Ibid., pp. 362-3. the Ukraine, to Merkulov, 20 Apr.
14. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­ 1941.
pasnosti SSSR, 1(2), p. 212, inter­ 26. TsA SVR RF, d.21616 t.2 1.366, 29
cepted telegram from Tatekawa to May 1941.
the Japanese ambassador in Sofia, 9 27. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezo­
June 1941. pasnosti SSSR, I / 2, pp. 240-7, report
15. TsA FSB RF, f.'Zos', op.8 d.58 by the 3rd Dept of the NKGB,
1.1945-8, Merkulov to Stalin, 16 June 1941.
Molotov and Beria, 18 June; see 28. See pp. 213-17.
also Krigsarkivet, Fo . . rsvarsstaben, 29. FSB, Organy Gosudarstvennoi
Ser. E/II/15/1, military attache's Bezopasnosti SSSR, I / 2, pp. 142-50,
report, no. 58, 19 June, and UD:s instructions by Merkulov to the
Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/ 1 557/LVII, Ukrainian and Baltic NKGB, 16 and
Assarasson to FM, 20 June 1941. 17 May 1941.
16. FSB, Sekrety Gitlera, pp. 168-9, 30. Ibid., pp. 152-3, 154-6, 162-3, 165-6,
Notes to pages 300-8 379

directive of the 3rd Dept of the and 29483 N289 1 / 78/38, telegram
NKV D and reports by Merkulov to from Baggallay and minute by
the CC of the CPSU as well as Cadogan, 1 4 and 1 5 June 1941.
reports by the heads of the local 44. FO 371 29482 N2680/78/38, Mallet
NKGB, 22 May 1941. to FO, 8 June, and CAB 65/ 22
31. Ibid., pp. 172-87, rnemorandum 59(41 )2, 12 June 1941; Boheman, Pd
by the deputy director of the 31·d Vakt, pp. 154-5.
Dept of the NKGB, 3 1 May 1941. 45. Eden papers, diary, 16 June 1941.
32. Ibid., pp. 218-19, report by Bor­ 46. FO 371 30126 R6170/ 1934/ 44,
shchev, deputy director of the 2nd minutes by Sargent and Cadogan,
Dept of the NKGB, 1 1 June, and pp. 16 June 1941.
247-8, Merkulov to the CC of the 47. Churchill papers, 20/ 40, Churchill
CPSU, 17 June 1941; Sudaplatov, to Smuts, 18 June 1941.
Special Tasks, p. 122. 48. AVP RF, f.059 op. 1 p.352 d.2402
33· FO 954/24 Su/ 4 1 / 15, 9 June; CAB 1.246-7, Maisky to Molotov, 20 June
65 / 22 58(41)2, 9 June 1941. 1941.
34. FO 371 29482 N2744/78/38, Mallet 49. Ibid., 1.235-6, Maisky to Molotov,
to FO, 1 1 June 1941. aftcl f.017a, Maisky's diary, pp.
35. FO 371 29482 C6668 I 19/ 18, 1 53-7, 18 June 1941.
minutes, 9-11 June 1941. 50. FO 371 29466 N3099/3/38, memo­
36. FO 954/24 Su/41 / 16, Eden to randum by Cripps, 19 June 1941.
Baggallay (Moscow) on meeting 51. The Times archives, Dawson to
Maisky, 10 June 1941. Halifax, 22 June 1941. On 24 June
37. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.352 d.2402 Gallacher, Communist Member of
1. 203-6, and FO 371 29482 N2793/ Parliament, revealed that a change
78/ 38, reports of the meeting in appreciation had occurred on 19
between Eden and Maisky. June, Parl. Deb. HC, vol. 372, col.
38. FO 371 29483 N3047 /78/38, minute 986.
by Cadogan and Cavendish­ 52. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I
Bentinck on intelligence transmit­ 1 5 57 /LVIII, Swedish ambassador
ted to Maisky, 1 5 June 1941. in Berlin, 21 June 1941.
39. FO 371 /29466 N3047/78/38, 53. Khrushchev, 'Vosporninaniia', pp.
minute by Cadogan; Dilks (ed.), 59 and 71-3.
Cadogan Diaries, p. 388; Maisky, 54. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP/1557/
Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador, pp. LVIII, Boheman minute, 21 June
149, 165-71. As a central piece of 1941.
evidence on the warnings to the 55. Ibid., Assarasson to FM 21 June
,

Russians, Maisky' s version has led 1941.

most historians to a faulty and con­ 56. Gafencu, Misiune la Moscova, tel.
demnatory interpretation of the 45698, pp. 225, Gafencu to FM 16
,

Tass communique, among them Ju11e 1941.

Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, pp. 57. UD:s Arkiv 1920 ARS, HP I 1557 I
107-8 and 1 14. LVII, Assarasson to FM, 16 June
40. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.352 d .2402 1941.
1.214-15, Maisky to Molotov, 16 58. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 834/Z/
June 1941. 312/ 1 pp. 145-g, Nemanov to FM
41. FO 371 29483 N2898 /78/38, Bag­ on meeting Bogomolov, 5 June 1941.
gallay to FO, 16 June 1941. 59. Quai d'Orsay Archives, 835 /Z 312/
42. FO 371 29483 N2898/78/38. 2, pp. 261-4, Nemanov on meeting
43. FO 371 29466 NJ099/3/38. For a General Sousloparov, 18 June 1941.
similar erroneous British inter­ 60. AVP RF, f.059 op.1 p.352 d .2402
pretation see FO 371 29482 N2842 1.254-7, Maisky to Molotov, 21 June
 Notes to pages 308-15

1 941, and a report by Cripps in FO 73. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­

371 29484 N3047/78/38. leniia, II, pp. 7-9; the full new
61. Dimitrov's diary, 21 June 1941. version of the memoirs is vital for
62. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.5 1.6-7, this episode as the older one was
report by Molotov on meeting heavily censored.
Aktay, 19 June 1941. 74. Timoshenko, Zhukov and
63. AVP RF, f.082 op.24 p. 106 d.7 l.94-7, Malenkov to the Military Councils
report by Dekanozov on meeting of the various fronts, 22 June 1941,
Weizsacker, 18 June 1941. in 50 Let Velikoi Otechestvennoi
64. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.5 l.8-1 1, and vozrzy, p. 30.
•

DGFP, XII, pp. 1070-1, records of 75. FO 371 29466 N3232/ 3 / 38.
Molotov's meeting with Schulen­ 76. Dimitrov's diary, 22 June 1941.
burg, 21 June 1941. 77. FO 371 /29466 N3018 /3/38;
65. Ibid., pp. 1061-2, Weizsacker on Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambas-
meeting Dekanozov, 21 June 1941. sador, pp. 156-7.
66. AGSh RF, f.208 op.2513 d.71 1.69, 78. Ibid.
Timoshenko and Zhukov, 22 June 79. Churchill papers, 20/ 40, Churchill
1941; see also Zhukov, Vospomi­ to Roosevelt, 20 June 1941.
naniia i razmyshleniia, p. 387. 80. Ibid., 20/ 36, Churchill minute to
67. Presidential Archives, f. 3 op.50 Ismay for COS, 21 June 1941.
d. 125 1. 75-6, handwritten Politburo 81. FO 371 29484 N3212/78/38.
resolutions by Malenkov on the 82. AVP RF, f.17a, Maisky's diary, pp.
organization of the southern front, 160-6, 23 June 1941.
21 June 1941. 83. Daily Express, 23 June 1941.
68. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmysh­ 84. FO 371 /29466 NJ180 and N3489/
leniia, I, pp. 386-9; Presidential 3 / 38, minutes 23 and ' 28 June
Archives, Stalin's appointment 1941.
diary. See also a confirmation in 85. Cripps papers, diary, 9 July. For
Zakharov, General'nyi shtab, pp. Molotov's obsession see the Soviet
276-7. records of his first meeting with
69. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, Cripps on 27 June 1941 in MID,
p. 47· Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia, I, pp.
70. DGFP, XII, pp. 1063-5, Ribbentrop 47-50.
to Schulenburg, 21 June 1941. 86. The Library of Congress, Ambas­
71. Berezhkov, Gady diplomaticheskoi sador Davies Papers, Box 1 1 . See
sluzhby, pp. 60-4; R. J. Sontag and also Halifax papers, A.7.8.9, diary,
J. S. Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1 1 December 1941. Gromyko
1 939-1 94 1 :Documents from the witnessed later on in New York a
Archives of the German Foreign Office fierce row between Molotov and
(Washington, DC, 1975), pp. 353-6. Litvinov in the back of a car he
Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible was driving, when Molotov
Allies, pp. 336 and 339. DGFP, XII, continued to maintain that Britain
pp. 1071-5, Schulenburg to FM, and France had pushed Hitler
and memorandum of tl1e FM, 21 into attacking the Soviet Union in
June 1941. 1941. See A. Gromyko, Pamiatnoe
72. AVP RF, f.06 op.3 p.1 d.5 1.12-15, (Moscow, 1990), II, p. 423. In
record of Molotov's meeting with negotiating with the British in
Schulenburg, 22 June 1941. See the early stages of the war,
also Hilger and Meyer, Incompat­ Stalin did not seek a second front
ible Allies, pp. 334-6, and Gafencu, but singlemindedly sought an
Misiune la Moscova, pp. 228-33, agreement which would pledge
report by Gafencu to Antonescu, 1 both sides not to negotiate a
Aug. 1941. separate peace.
Notes to pages 3 1 6-23

Conclusion acute judgments that 'Stalin was

indeed a monster; but in the
1. Cripps papers, diary, 9 Mar. 1941. conduct of international relations,
A most convincing argument in he was the supreme realist -
this direction is advanced by patient, shrewd, and implacable,
G. Roberts, 'Military Disaster as a the Richelieu of his period' (p. 333),
Function of Rational Political Cal­ or 'common geopolitical interest
culation: Stalin and 22 June 1941', is a powerful bond, and it was
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4 / 2 (1993). pushing the old enemies, Hitler
See also R. Suny, 'Making Sense and Stalin, inexorably together' (p.
of Stalin - Some Recent and Not­ 332). A similar conclusion is drawn
So-Recent Biographies', Russian in Paul Kennedy's classic study, The
History/Histoire Russe, 16/ 2-4 Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(1989). (London, 1988).
2. H. Kissinger, Diplo1nacy (London, 3. See p. 309.
1995), pp. 335 and 103-4. One 4. Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym,
cannot but approve Kissinger's p. 3 1 .
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 ..
Index

Aegean Sea, 41, 44, 99, 103 Baltic fleet (Soviet), 1 1 9

Afghanistan, 286 Baltic Sea: Soviet access to, 3 1 7
Aktay, Haydar, 17, 60-1, 102, 107, 1 12, 165, Baltic States: agreement on future of, 5; lJSSR
245 occupies and annexes, 25, 37, 43, 90-2, 94,
Albania, 79 1 19-20, 209; indemnities to German citizens
Alfieri, Dino, 104, 203 in, 72; British refusal to recognize Soviet
Ali, Rashid, 217, 285-6 control of, 92-4; Soviet troops in, :1i18; and
Allenstein, Prussia, 231 Soviet defence strategy, 1 1 9-20; British
Anfilov, V. A., 127 recognition of Soviet occupation of, 165-6;
Antonescu, General Ion, 44, 63, 78, 134, 231, USSR asked to cede as guarantees, 186, 204;
235 anti-Soviet subversives suppressed, 301
Antonov, 42, 80 'Barbarossa', Operation: early Russian defeats
Aras, Tevfik Rti�tii, 106 in, 23; and German-Soviet trade, 24;
Assarasson, Vilhelm, 158, 306 planning, 39, 48, 52, 83, 88, 96, 124, 125, 202;
Astor, Nancy, Viscountess, 21 Hitler discusses details, 83; decision on
Attlee, Clement, 156 implementation of, 85-6; justified as
Axis see Tripartite Pact (1940) preventive act, 86-7;, and capture of
Yugoslavia, 137, 1 77; postponed, 142
Baghdad, 2 1 7 Barrie, Captain James, 252
Baku: Allied plans to bomb, 17-18, 49, 60, 62, Battaglia, Roman, 249
65, 72, 92, 108, 286, 318; security Battle of Britain (1940), 39, 45, 58, 60, 76
arrangements, 71; German threat to, 105, 'Battleaxe', Operation, 286, 314
124, 131, 133, 140 Batum, 49, 62, 71-2
Balkans: early British plans for, 15, 17-19; Beaverbrook, William Maxwell Aitken, 1st
relations with USSR, 24; Allied guarantees Baron, 90, 177-8, 246, 258-5), 263, 272-3
in, 24-5, 28, 36; Italian interests in, 25, 27-8; Beck, Colonel Jozef, 125
Soviet policy in, 29, 35, 38; and defence of Beck, Field Marshal Ludwig, 146
British possessions, 35; German-Soviet Bekker, General, 133
clash over, 48-51, 56-5), 63-4, 67, 69-71, Belgium, 217
73-5, 77-83, 89-5)0, 93-4, 97, 1 21-4, 179, 194, Belgrade: pro-Soviet demonstrations in, 142,
207, 318-19; British threat to, 79, 86; Soviet 146; Germans attack (1941), 152, 195; see also
fear of involvement in, 95; British Yugoslavia
intervention in, 101, 319; British ejection Bendera, Stephan, 300
from, 1 1 1 ; fall to Germans, 130, 134-5, 323; Benghazi, 94
Churchill believes to be main German Berchtesgaden, 49-50, 77, 98, 105, 138, 262
objective, 160 Berezhkov, V, 222

394
Index 395

Bergery, Gaston, 210-11, 216, 218, 245 Turkish Straits, 13-15, 104, 106-7, 1 1 0;
Beria, Lavrenti: and German plans to invade relations with Tu rkey, 14-15, 59-60; and
USSR, 38, 57, 275; trusts Kobulov, 52; sees Balkans, 15, 17-19, 79, 85-6, 144, 281; access
Intelligence reports on Germany, 54, 230; to Black Sea, 16-18, 27, 30-1, 35-7, 74, 93,
and Turkish threat i n Caucasus, 62; 188; Italian expectations of early surrender,
manipulates intelligence reports, 186; and 28; Germany plans attack on, 33, 41, 59, 69,
Japan-USSR pact, 191; suppresses 76, 135, 225, 245; attempts to divide
subversive elements, 300; Stalin meets Germany and USSR, 39, 43, 91, 1 76;
before German attack, 3 1 1 prepares for long war, 39; and control of
Berlin: Molotov-Hitler conference i n ( 1940), Danube, 45; discussed at 1940 Berlin
46-7, 5 1 , 55-61, 65, 67, 69-77, 91-3, 95, conference, 58-9; German bombing
102-3, 106, 113, 125, 138, 319; bombed by campaign against, 59, 69, 135; bombs Berlin,
British, 75 75; offers trade agreement to USSR, 89, 92,
Berlin Congress (1878), 44 94; attempts to draw USSR into vv-ar, 90,
Berlings, 0. see 'Litseist' 94-5, 105, 1 1 0, 1 13, 170, 171-2, 173-4, 181,
Bessarabia: agreement on future of, 5; 215, 302, 321; military intervention in
Rumania and, 25, 235; Soviet annexation of, Greece, 101, 139, 167-70, 196; and Soviet
28-31, 33-4, 36, 40-3, 45, 95, 209, 3 1 8 interest in Turkey, 103; and prospective
Bevin, Ernest, 21, 259 Turkish involvement in war, 106; scepticism
Bismarck (German battleship), 259 over German-Soviet war, 107, 281-3; USSR
Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 14, 316 overestimates military power, 118; German
Black Sea: British access to, 16-18, 27, 30-1, attack postponed, 133-4; and Yugoslav­
35-7, 74, 93, 188; Italian interest in, 27, 29; Soviet agreement (1941), 135)-41, 143, 148,
Soviet i nterest in, 27, 29, 61, 74, 97, 3 1 7-19; 15 1-2; evacuates Greece and Crete, 152;
German threat to, 30, 97; Turkish fear of Military Intelligence, 156-62; military
Soviet-German collusion in, 30; and Soviet setbacks (1941), 168-70, 215; USSR suspects
occupation of Bessarabia, 41; Germans of seeking separate peace with Germany,
reach, 57; fears of German power in, 60; 169-70, 174-6, 226, 276, 288, 295, 321-3;
Rumanian desire for access to, 63; Hitler threatened by German strategic aims, 188-9;
disclaims interest in, 83; see also Turkish Atlantic sl1ipping losses, 215; Hitler's belief
Straits in defeat of, 218; and Stalin's foreign policy,
Bletchley Park, England, 159; see also Enigma 317; near-war with USSR, 318; and German
machine build-up on Eastern front, 321; see also
Blunt, Anthony, 185 Churchill, Winston S.
Bock, General Fedor von, 158, 233 British Empire: German-Soviet collusion to
Bogomolov, Alexander E., 210-11, 307 d ismember, 73, 75
Bolshevism: German crusade against, 48, 88, Bukovina, Northern, 29, 33
186, 245, 274 Bulgaria: Italian-Soviet agreement on, 23;
Boris, King of Bulgaria, 36, 42-3, 46, 62-4, 66, claims on Rumania, 34; early neutrality, 41-
74, 77-80, 84, 97-8, 100-1 3, 66; strategic position, 41, 58, 63, 100-1;
Bosphorus, 30, 58, 70, 97 German agreement with, 44, 60, 62-3;
Bracken, Brendan, 171, 305 German-Soviet dispute over, 5 1 , 63-6, 74-5,
Braila, 46 77-85; and Turkish Straits, 61, 63, 65, 103-4;
Brauchitsch, Field Marshal Walter von, 40, and Tripartite Pact, 62-3, 65, 79-81, 84-5,
224, 272 98, 107; Soviet guarantees to and demands
Brest-Litovsk: in military strategy, 123 on, 65-6, 74, 97, 103; and German interests
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 1 1 in Turkey, 701 103; leans towards Germany,
Britain: guarantees to Poland, 4-6; USSR fears 78-83; and Black Sea, 97-8; forced
anti-Soviet alliance with Germany, 5-6, 14, association with Germany, 98-100, 102; non­
264, 272, 276, 288, 292, 295, 315; and Soviet aggression declaration with Turkey, 100,
hopes for mutual security treaty, 6-7; 106; German troops in, 101; Molotov's
economic blockade of Germany, 10, 89; demands to Hitler on, 1 1 3; defensive
fears German-Soviet partnership, 10, 12; measures during German attack on USSR,
Russophobia, 1 1-12, 91; naval dominance, 189; and Vienna Agreement, 319
13, 36, 58-9, 69, 188-9, 318; Soviet Bulgarian Communist Party, 81, 99, 200
suspicions and mistrust of, 13-14, 36- 7, 105, Burgas, Bulgaria, 63, 100, 157
1 10, 1 1 2-13, 139, 141, 1 5 1, 167, 176, 181, 190, Burgess, Guy, 271
194, 232, 269, 313-14, 317, 321-3; and Butler, Richard Austen, 10, 21, 1 10, 176, 270-1
 Index

Cadogan, (Sir) Alexander: on anxieties over and Eden in Balkans and Middle East, 160-
war with USSR, 1 5; on Eden's attitude to 1; and setbacks in Middle East and
USSR, 93; a11d Cl1urchill' s view of Turkey, Greece, 169; dependence on Soviet alliance,
1 1 2; and German intimidation of USSR, 157, 171-2; Prytz believes lacking in grand
163; opposes Cripps's warning to USSR, strategy, 172; authority as leader, 175; public
161-2, 165; and Hess's mission to Britain, criticism of, 215; and Hess's mission to
253-4, 258-61, 265, 267; and Turkish Britain, 246-7, 252, 254-9, 261-3, 267, 273;
mistrust of USSR, 28Lf; and Cripps's recall, Maisky on popularity of, 270; speech (22
287; and Maisky's warning to Stalin, 289, June 1941 ) promising aid to USSR, 274; and
291; hopes for German involvement in German build-up on Soviet front, 282, 286;
USSR, 292; and Hitler's decision to attack badgers Wavell, 286; and renewed German
USSR, 301, 303; informs Maisky of peace overtures, 288; and Cripps' s recall to
imminent German attack, 303-5, 308 London, 291, 302; on inevitability of
Cairo, 2 1 5 German war with USSR, 292; Soviet
'Cambridge Five' (British spies), 52, 185; see suspicion of as obstacle to German-Soviet
also Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy; Maclean, understanding, 292; sanctions passing
Donald; Philby, Kim Enigma evidence to USSR, 303; doubts on
Campbell, Sir Ronald Hugh, 36 outcome of German attack on USSR, 305;
Carol, King of Rumania, 3 1 , 33-4, 4 1 , 43-5 assures Maisky of refu.sal of British peace
Caucasus: oilfields, 57; Turkish threat to deal with Germany, 314; interest in Russian
Russians in.1 62; Turkish plans to make war, 314; preoccupation with Libyan
autonomous region, 1 14; Soviet troops in, campaign, 314; differences with Cripps, 318;
118; in German strategic plans, 1 3 1 , 282, US pressure on to seek separate peace, 322-
286; proposed British troop deployment in, 3; see also Britain
1 77; see also Baku Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 25, 27, 76, 104, 195,
Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor Frederick William, 199, 218
156-8, 165, 265, 282 Cincar-Markovic;, Aleksandr, 138, 1 39-40
Chamberlain, Neville, 4-6, 10, 12, 14-15, 19, Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald J olu1 Kerr (later
140, 321 Baron lnverchapel), 262
I
Chiang Kai-shek, 190 Collier, Laurence, 161
Cl1icherin, Georgi, 2 Comintern: decline, 2; ideological principles,
China: relations with USSR, 1 90, 192-3 2; Stalin manipulates, 4, 8 1 , 201; and Nazi-
Christov, Todor, 42 Soviet Pact, 8; accuses Britain and France of
Chuikov, Lieut.-General Vasili, 120 initiating war, 16; and pro-Soviet
Churcl1ill, Winston S.: and secret demonstrations in Belgrade, 143; and world
Soviet-German military alliance, 1 6; communism, 200-1; dissolved, 320
Balkans policy, 18, 35, 1 10-11; assumes Communist Party of Great Britain, 3 1 4
premiersl1ip (1940), 19, 3 1 7; and Cripps's Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 18th
mission to Moscow, 1 9-20; a11d war aims, Congress (1 939), 4
20; early BritisJ1 policy on USSR, 22; and Compiegne, Peace of (1 940), 1 1 8
Soviet a11nexation of Bessarabia, 34; Constanza, 3 1 , 57, 1 00, 147
attempts to bring USSR into war, 35, 221, Continental bloc (economic), 39-40, 57, 69, 71,
321; on enigma of USSR, 35; Stalin fears 76, 82, 96, 193, 202, 204
seeking peace with Germany, 36, 269; Cooper, Alfred Duff, 258, 265, 267-8, 292
appeals to Stalin for support, 37; resists 'Corsicanets', 53, 232, 145, 181, 230, 297
Germans, 39; rejects Hitler's 1940 peace Costello, John: Ten Days to Destit1y, 247-8, 2 5 1
offer, 49; on London Blitz, 59; Christmas Crete, 152, 215, 259, 275, 284-5, 301
1 940 Cabinet reshuffle, 92; and defence of Creveld, Martin L. van, 177
Greece, 94; and Bulgarian alliance with Cripps, Isobel, Lady, 288, 305
Germany, i oo; vetoes Eden's meeting with Cripps, Sir Stafford: on Stalin's ambiguous
Molotov, 107; and Soviet declaration of policy, 5; mediates for USSR over Finland,
support for Turkey, 1 12; warns Stalin of 16; as Ambassador to Moscow, 19-22, 36-9,
German invasion plans agai11st USSR, 133, 90-1, 1 66, 3 1 8; post-war vision, 20; meets
1 55-6, 159, 161-6, 168, 1 7 1 , 176-8, 221, 246, Molotov/ 36, 94; and Stalin's Balkan
270, 321; describes Stalin as simpleton, 134; hegemony, 49; and British trade offer to
history of Second World War, 1 55 ; and USSR, 89, 93-4; warns Molotov of Balkan
Intelligence reports, 1 59-60; believes danger, 89; encourages Russian control of
Balkans to be main German objective, 160; Danube, 92; attempts to mediate between
Index 3 97

USSR and Turkey, 105; believes German­ i11vasion of Yugoslavia, 149; negotiates with
Soviet war inevitable, 106-7, 157-8, 161, Weizsacker, 190; meetings with
175, 183, 291, 305-6; and moves to draw Schulenburg, 211-14, 216-17, 219-22; fails
USSR close to Allies, 107-8, 1 1 1 , 137, 141, to meet Ribbentrop, 222; reports on German
158, 1 73-4, 1 76, 197, 270, 321 ; proposes opposition to war with USSR, 223-4, 268;
Eden meeting with Molotov, 107-8; visits secret meeting with Hitler, 225; discussions
Eden in Turkey, 1 08-10, 156; denies with Stalin, 237; ambiguous reports to
Turkey's joining Axis, 1 1 1; favours Balkan Stalin from Berlin, 294-5; fails to establish
bloc, 1 1 1 ; and Soviet declaration of support contact in Berlin, 309-10; meets Ribbentrop
for Turkey, 11 2; and German strategic plans after German assault on USSR, 3 1 2
against USSR, 133; passes on information Denmark: Germans invade, 18, 241, 118, 318
from Sweden, 135, 245; and Yugoslav Dill, General Sir John, 133, 140, 159
situation, 141, 147; rivalry with Churchill, Dimitrov, Georgi, 8, 81-2, 143, 200-1, 309
155-6, 177, 318; reports to Foreign Office on Directive 18 (German), 5 1
German intentions, 157-8, 160-1; and Dobrudja, 41-4, 60, 62-3, 100
warnings to Stalin of impendll 1g German Donald, Group-Captain Graham, 249
attack, 161-7, 177, 272-3; and Prince Paul's 'Dora' (Zurich agent), 188
meeting with Hitler, 165; negotiates with Douglas-Hamilto11, Lord James, 254
Vyshinsky, 167, 173-4; hints at separate Draganov, Parvan, 42, 63-4, 77, 79, 83-5, 98,
British peace, 174-6, 246, 321; Churchill 1 00-1, 106
criticizes, 177-8; reports supposed rift i n Drax, Admiral see Plunkett-Ernie-Erle-Drax,
German leadership, 183; telegrams to Eden Admiral Sir Reginald
intercepted, 188; on date of German Dupree, Tom, 271-2
invasion, 245; report on Hess affair, 250;
and effect of Hess's flight in USSR, 263, 265, Eden, Anthony: Monckton on, 2 1 ; meets
266; and Britain's response to German Maisky as Foreign Secretary, 92-3, 172-3;
peace overtures, 269; informs Eden of policy towards Soviet Union, 93-4; and
German invasion plans, 281; aims to defence of Greece, 94, 1 1 1 ; and Maisky' s
obstruct German-Soviet agreement, 283, hopes for neutrality of Balkans, 105; in
288; and Stalin's Middle Eastern policies, Turkey, 107-10, 133, 156; and Soviet
285; recalled from Moscow, 287-9, 291, 302, declaration of support for Turkey, 1 12; on
304, 322; and Stalin's Tass comrrlunique, Yugoslav drift to Germany, 139; refused
293; suspects secret Soviet-German ''isit to Belgrade, 140; and Balkan bloc, 141;
agreement, 304; informs Maisky of attempts to bar German advances into
imminent German attack, 305-6, 307; on Balkans and Middle East, 1 59-61; and
Red Army weakness, 305; and Molotov's recognitio11 of Soviet annexation of Baltic
surprise at lack of ultimatum for war, 313 states, 1 65; and Churchill's warning to
Cvetkovic;, Dragisa, 138-9 Stalin of German invasion, 166-8, 178;
Cyrenaica, 169 claims credit for Grand Alliance with USSR,
Czechoslovakia, 5-6 166; and Cripps's independent actions in
Moscow, 167-8, 1 78; Maisky complains of
Daladier, Edouard, 4 effects of Cripps's memoranda, 176;
Dalton, Hugh, 94 dissatisfaction with Churchill's policy on
Danube: Russian interest in, 3 1 , 33, 41, 44-7, USSR, 1 77; and Hess's mission to Britain,
78, 85, 92, 95, 318; German control of, 35, 255-6, 258-9, 263, 265-7, 272, 274; and
45, 57, 101, 3 1 9 rumoured Soviet-German negotiatio11s, 273;
Danubian Commission, 44-6, 66, 72, 91, 96, denies separate British peace deal witl1
104 Germany, 274, 314; Cripps informs of
Dardanelles, 17, 36, 83, 97, 107, 113; see also German invasion plans, 281; scepticism
Turkish Straits over date of German invasion of USSR, 282;
Darlan, Admiral Jean, 2 1 1 aims to obstruct German-Soviet agreement,
Dawson, Geoffrey, 306 283, 286; misjudges Turkish suspicion of
Dekanozov, Vladimir: appointed Soviet USSR, 284-5; and evacuatio11 of Crete, 285;
special ambassador to Berlin, 52, 93, 95-6; a11d Cripps's recall, 287, 302, 304; Maisky
and Bulgarian agreement, 78, 99-1 00; and assures of Soviet 1nili tary preparedness,
threat to Baku through Turkey, 1 05-6; sees 287; informs USSR of German military
letter on Hitler's intention to invade USSR, concentrations, 301; and Hitler's decisio11 to
124; informs Stalin of imminent German attack USSR, 302, 305; welcomes war on
 Index

Eastern front, 314; and US pressure to seek successes (1940), 25, 1 1 8-20, 239, 318, 323;
separate peace, 322-3 occupies Low Countries, 29-30; plans attack
Egypt: Germany plans operations against, 69, on Britain, 33, 41, 69, 76, 134-6, 225, 245;
76, 105, 107; and defe1lce of Greece, 94; plans to invade USSR, 33, 39, 41, 48-50, 52,
German threat to (1941), 169, 187, 188, 215 64-7, 59, 68-70, 83-6, 125-6, 130-4, 146,
England see Britain 157-8, 161, 180-2, 235-6; as protector of
Enigma machine, 159-61, 168, 303, 308 Rumania, 34; military deployment on
Estonia, 49 eastern front, 38, 40-1, 55-7, 65, 71, 122,
European Commission (1856), 44 125-6, 134, 157, 160, 162, 177, 179-81, 187,
208, 214-15, 222, 225-'J, 229-32, 234-7, 244-
Fedotov, 1 37 5, 264, 275-'J, 286, 295, 298, 303, 319-21; and
'Felix', Operation, 51 Continental bloc, 39-40, 57, 69, 71, 76, 82,
Filitov, I. F., 295 96, 193, 202, 204; Balkan policy, 40-4, 46,
Filov, Bogdan, 42, 43, 63, 80-2, 98--9, 101 63-4, 77, 97; and control of Danube, 44-5,
Finland: winter war with USSR (1939-40), 8, 47; Soviet Intelligence activities in, 52-5, 62,
12, 15, 17, 23, 30, 1 1 7-18, 3 1 7; British 131-5, 180-·1, 277-8; Blitz on Britain, 59, 89-
support for, 16, 318; Soviet peace terms 90; military strength, 77, 1 32-3, 229, 232-3,
with, 16, 41; spheres of interest in, 58; 244; invades Greece, 84-5, 137-8, 152, 177;
supplies for Germany, 69; German activities Soviet claims on borders, 97; forces
in, 71; USSR demands German troop Bulgarian alliance, 98-100; as threat to
withdrawal from, 82; Soviet control of, 85; Turkey and Straits, 105-7, 110-13; expected
nickel deposits, 95, 204; reservists recruited strategy i n invasion of USSR, 121-4, 127-8,
by Germans, 276; military preparations in, 229, 233, 277; border incidents with USSR,
307 125; industrial stre1lgth, 132; disinformation
Fitin, 297, 301 campaigns, 135, 185-6, 212-13, 219, 295-6,
France: hostility to USSR, 1 1 , 14, 37; plans to 322; attacks Yugoslavia, 136, 137, 145, 150-2,
attack Baku oilfields, 17-18; collapse (1940), 177, 186, 195-6, 199; Belgrade
22, 24-5, 33, 36-f', 1 18-19, 318, 323; Soviet demonstrations against, 142, 146; and
overtures to Vichy, 210-11; Hitler and Vichy Yugoslav-Soviet agreement, 144-50, 154;
government of, 211, 218 codes broken, 159; overflies Scviet air
Franco, General Francisco, 77, 252 space, 179, 225, 231, 243, 277, 309; supposed
'Frankfurter' (Soviet agent), 269 rift in leadership, 180-1, 183-6, 188;
Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia: shortage of resources, 187, 189, 235;
L'Antimachiavel, 87 demands to USSR, 188; strategic aims,
Fumimaro, Koiloe, 40 1 88--9; relations with Japan, 190-1; and
Funk, Walther, 189 Japanese-Soviet pact, 192, 194; rumoured
agreement with USSR ( May-June 1941),
Gabrovsky, Peter, 98 283, 301-2, 304; withdraws missions from
Gafencu, Grigore, 33, 245, 307 USSR, 297-8; opens attack on USSR, 3 1 1-13;
Galatz, 45-6 see also Hitler, Adolf; Ribbentrop-MolotO\'
Galler, Admiral L. M., 120 Pact
Gavrilovic;, Milan: Cripps employs, 137, 141, Geyer, General, 218
165; in Moscow to negotiate Yugoslav coup, Gibraltar, 5 1 , 69, 76, 188, 252
137-g, 143-4; as So\1iet agent, 137; requests Goebbels, Joseph, 49, 295
alliance with USSR, 145; and Soviet­ Golikov, General Filip I.: appointed head of
German agreen1ent over Yugoslavia, 147-5 1, GRU, 38; career, 53; Stalin's assessment of,
153; praises Stalin, 1 5 1 ; evacuates Yugoslav 54; informs Kremlin of German deployment
officers from Moscow, 204; USSR withdraws against Saloniki, 56; reports on German
recognition of, 217 industrial and military strength, 132; edits
Gelfarld, 27 Intelligence reports to Stalin, 135, 245, 294;
Gerde, 224 on pro-Soviet Belgrade demonstrations, 143;
German Communist Party, 4, 180-1 warns of war in Yugoslavia, 144; reports on
Germany: USSR fears anti-Soviet alliance with German military deployment against USSR,
Britain, 5-6, 14, 264, 272, 276, 288, 295; 179, 231-2, 235-6, 276-7, 32o; on rumoured
USSR exports war material to, 10, 14; German leadership split, 183; assesses
invades Denmark and Norn1ay, 18, 24, 118; German strategic priorities, 225, 244-5;
trade traffic and agreement with USSR, 23- Sorge informs of German invasion plans,
4, 35, 69, 93, 95-7, 187, 205, 308; military 298
Index 399

Goring, Hermann: promises military aid to Haushofer, Albrecht, 248, 250, 253-4, 256
USSR, 23; testimony at Nuremberg, 75; and Haushofer, Karl, 248
potential Rumanian participation in attack Heimann, Lieut.-Colonel Reinhard von, 296
on USSR, 134; advocates war with USSR Henderson, Sir Nevile, 5, 11
and peace with Britain, 184; and superior Herwarth, Hans, 67-8, 220
Soviet aircraft, 210; confirms intention to Hess, Rudolf: and Hitler's Soviet invasion, 87,
attack USSR, 231, 282; and German 226, 255, 260-1; flight to Britain, 220, 246,
economic needs, 235; and Hess, 263, 268-9, 248--9; conspiracy theories and speculations
272; supposed peace overtures to Britain, on, 247, 251-2, 259-60, 273, 276, 314;
268; attends naval manoeuvres in Baltic, questioned an.d interviewed, 249-50, 254-6,
275; HQ transferred to Rumania, 296 260-2, 266, 274, 288; supposed trip to Spain,
Gorske, Anatole, 271 252-3; Churchill and, 254-5; in custody, 255;
Greece: Italian war on, 46, 60-1, 77, 79, 103; propaganda value of flight, 256--9, 262-3,
Germany plans to attack, 56, 78; Germany 265-7, 272; effect of flight on Russians,
invades and occupies, 84-5, 137-8, 152-3, 262-72, 314, 321-2; character, 268; Butler's
177, 188, 284, 301; British defence strategy interpretation of, 271; and supposed British
for, 94; British intervention in, 101, 139, separate peace with Germany, 288
167--9, 188, 196; British evacuate, 1 1 1, 152, Hilger, Gustav, 203, 206, 212, 220, 312
16�70 Himmler, Heinrich, 185, 266, 272
GRU: warns Stalin of German invasion plans, Hitler, Adolf: rise to power, 2; aggression
38, 54-5; in Berlin, 52; on German military appeased, 3; and British guarantees to
build-up, 1 22, 1 3 1 ; suggests avoidance of Poland, 4; and Munich Agreement, 4; long­
war, 180 term military aims, 7; and Nazi-Soviet Pact,
Guderian, General Heinz, 87, 233 7, 22, 69; d.ivision of spheres of interest with
Guerber, Andre, 25 1 USSR, 23; and ltalian relations with Allies,
25; fears Italian-Soviet collusion, 27; plans
Halder, General Franz: and Soviet-German attack on Britain, 33, 41, 59, 69, 76, 134-5,
interests in Balkans, 40; plan for attack in 231; and Soviet annexation of Bessarabia,
East, 48-50, 68, 87, 131; assured of Soviet 33-4; and British plans to divide Germany
friendliness, 52; receives Schulenburg' s and USSR, 39; plans to invade USSR, 39,
document on German attack on USSR, 70; 48 -50, 52, 64, 68, 70, 83-4, 86, 122-5, 133-5,
on invasion of Greece, 84; and Soviet 146, 157, 161, 186, 202-3, 217-18, 223, 233,
weakening of Germany, 84; optimism over 235, 242, 301; misjudges Soviet interest in
invasion plans, 133; attends naval Balkans, 40; Balkan policy and actions, 41,
manoeuvres in Baltic, 275 64, 69, 83, 125, 179; in Vienna, 42; promises
Halifax, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st protection to Bulgaria, 43; control of
Earl of: advice to USSR, 6; Maisky reports Rumania, 44; and control of Danube, 45-6,
to on German conquest of Poland, 16; visits 85; Molotov confers with i11 Berlin, 46-7, 51,
Turkey, 18; proposes Cripps for Moscow 55-6, 67, 69-77, 91-3, 95, 1 13, 125, 319;
embassy, 19, 21; praises Sargent's memo on peace overtures to Britain, 49, 90; protects
Soviet-German pact, 22; and Soviet­ oilfields in Rumania, 51, 78, 105; ideological
German trade agreement, 36; Maisky's aims, 52, 88, 186, 245, 274; letter from King
relations with, 59, 90; threatens severance of Boris, 64; threatens Turkey, 65, 79, 98;
relations witl1 USSR, 59; aims to divert proposed meeting with Stalin (May-June
Germany to Balkans, 90; Cripps warns 1941), 67, 215-16, 268, 307; strategic plans,
of Soviet hostility, 91; and Molotov's 69; disillusioned by Continental bloc, 76;
meeting with l litler, 92; proposes warning promises help to Mussolini, 77; world
USSR of German invasion plans, 161; vision, 77; impatience with Bulgaria, 7�83,
Umansky complains to of British 85; and Soviet participation in Continental
Russophobia, 172; on Soviet concessions to bloc, 82; war with Greece, 84-5; justifies
Germany in Ukraine and Baku, 183; and US invasion of USSR, 86-8; 'Lebensrau1n im
interest in Hess flight, 258; favours Osten' policy, 88; meets Dekanozov, 96;
exploiting Hess story as showing German Schnurre meets, 97; Filov meets, 98; forces
split, 263 alliance with Bulgaria, 99, 102; blocks Soviet
Hamilton, Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, 14th foothold in Turkey, 102; hides Soviet
Duke of, 247-51, 254-5, 260, 271 invasion plans from Mussolini, 104; meets
Hansen, General, 5 1 Mussolini in Berchtesgaden (Jant.1ary 1941),
Harnack, Arvid see 'Corsicanets' 105; British Foreign Office believes in
400 Index

bargain with Stalin, 107; disclaims German Ironside, General Sir Edmund, 15 •

threat to Turkey, 1 12-13; and Soviet-Turkish Irving, David, 261

non-aggression pact, 114; and 'new Isakov, Admiral I. S., 120
European order', 125; disinformation Ismay, General Hastings, 11
campaign, 135, 295-6; and Yugoslav Isserson, General, 1 1 6
negotiations and coup, 138-9, 142, 144-5, Italy: and Balkans, 25, 27, 58, 60; relations
147-8, 213, 320; success in Yugoslavia and with USSR, 25, 27-9, 36, 318; and Turkish
Greece, 153; meets Prince Paul, 165; Straits, 29, 103-5; and Soviet annexation of
supposed preference for understa nding Bessarabia, 34; war with Greece, 46, 60-1,
with USSR, 183, 185-7; uncertain war aims, 77, 79, 103; as counter to British naval
i84; fears Japanese attack on USSR, 187; dominance in Mediterranean, 69; military
postpones war against USSR, 187; meets failure in Balkans, 85; see also Tripartite Pact
Matsuoka, 194; Schulenburg visits in Berlin, Ivanov, Major-General V. D., 46
202-6, 215, 219; and Soviet conciliatory Izvestiia, 42, 60, 63, 151
overtures, 205; and Vichy France, 211, 218;
Schulenburg proposes meeting with Stalin, Japan: expansionist policy, 40, 191-2;
215-17, 222; Stalin's personal letter to, 217, Germany proposes pact with USSR, 57, 71;
219, 222; Dekanozov meets secretly, 225; and engagement with USA, 69; in Tripartite
and Hess's mission to Britain, 251-3, 255-6, Pact with Germany and Italy, 71, 182, 187,
259-61, 268-9, 271-2, 274; supposed 191, 195; defeat at Khalkin-Gol (1939), 127;
agreement witl1 Stalin, 264; and Lloyd Hitler fears premature attack on USSR by,
George's peace compromises, 274; attends 187; neutrality pact with USSR (1941), 190-
naval manoeuvres i11 Baltic, 275; Stalin 7, 199, 204, 211, 32o; and impending
disbelieves intention to attack USSR, 279, German attack on USSR, 194, 298; Zhukov
323; and German military build-up on anticipates eastern war with, 229
Soviet border, 283; seeks non-aggression Jews: German extermination plans for, 48-52;
pact with Turkey, 284; and Stalin's Tass used as forced labour, 236; seen as
communique, 293; visit to Danzig, 294; subversives in USSR, 301
Stalin seeks late agreement with, 305; Jodl, General Alfried, 50, 122 1

Cripps believes will attack without prior Joint Intelligence Committee (British), 164,
ultin1atum to USSR, 306; and German 264, 281, 283, 303
assault on USSR, 312; Stalin fears military
dominance in Europe, 318; July plot against Kaganovich, Lazar M., 3 1 3
(1944), 320; Mein Karnpf, 40, 48, 157, 282, Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm: and German
296; see also Germany invasion of USSR, 50, 86, 124-5; welcomes
Hoare, Sir Samuel, 252 Molotov to Berlin, 73; and Balkan situation,
Hood, HMS, 259 78; and Hitler's reaction to Hess's flight,
Hoover, Herbert, 288 256, 272; visit to Danzig, 294
Howell, John, 251 Khalkin-Gol, Battle of ( 1 939), 127, 129, 172,
Hull, Cordell, 178 1 96, 239
Hungary: and Balkans, 25; claims on Khrushchev, Nikita S., 267, 307
Rumania, 29, 34, 43; Italian-Soviet Kiev, 123, 230
agreement on, 29; discussed at 1 940 Berlin Kipling, Rudyard: 'The Truce of the Bear',
conference, 58; German relations with, 62; J l-12
and Tripartite Pact, 77; military support for Kirkpatrick, (Sir) Ivone, 25 1 , 255, 258-61
Germany, 123; defensive measures duri11g Kirponos, General Mikl1ail Petrovich, 240, 278,
German attack on USSR, 189; army put on 280, 3 1 1
alert ( 1 941), 230; and Vienna Agreement, Kissinger, Henry, 316
319 Kleist, General Paul von, 152
Kleist, Colonel Peter, 57
Iliushin-18 aircraft, 2 1 0 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe
India, 64, 71, 76 Montgomery, 108-10
Ingelbart, General von, 56 Kobulov, Amiak ( 'Zakhar'), 52-3, 132, 188,
Inonu, Ismet, 15, 113, 222 222, 268-9, 295-6
International Advisory Committee of tl1e Kollo11tai, Alexa11dra, 41, 64, Bo, 207, 282, 293,
Danube, 101 307
Iran, 188-9, 284-6 Koniev, Lieut.-General Ivan, 120
Iraq, 189, 217, 236, 285-6, 288 Konoe, Prince Fumimaro, 190, 193
Index 401

Kosh, Franz, 187 fro1n Moscow, 158; and Br1tisl1 attempts to

Kostring, Lieut.-General Ernst, 33, 68, 70, 87, draw USSR into war, 1 70, 1 72, 302, 305; status
203 and reputation in London, 170; and British
Krebs, Colonel Hans, 198, 204 warning to USSR of German invasion, 1 71,
Krutikov, Alexei, 205 178, 222, 303; disbelieves separate British
Kulik, General G. I., 54, 228, 234 peace, 171, i 75, 269-70; monitored by NKGB,
Kursk, Battle of ( 1 943), 126 1 72-3; reports sense of hopelessness in
Kuznetsov, Admiral Nikolay G., 54, 120, 240 Britain, 176; denies Japanese agreement with
KV3 tanks, 243 Britain, 194; and Hess's flight to Britain, 251,
266-7, 270--4; and Stalin's fear of Anglo­
Labonne, Erik, 36 German anti-Soviet crusade, 269; denies
Latvia, 49 Soviet-German negotiations, 273, 302; Eden
Lavrishchev, 91 denies separate British peace with Germany
League of Nations: Soviet membership, 44 to, 274, 314; and Stalin's intentions on Turkey,
Lebedev, 140, 142, 144-5, 148 285; and British Middle East strategy, 286;
Leeb, Field Marshal Wilhelm von, 233 reports Soviet military readiness to Eden,
Leitgen, Alfred, 256 286-7; and Cripps' s recall from Moscow,
Leman, Willy ('Breitenbach'), 52 287-8, 302; and Stalin's Tass communique,
Lend-Lease (US s11pply programme to 289, 291; and British coverage of i1nminent
Britain), 91 German invasion of USSR, 292; Cadogan
Lenin, Vladimir I.: on revolutionary war, 4; informs of German invasion intentions,
and imperialist war, 8, 209; Cripps on, 21; 303-5, 307; doubts on German invasion,
forms Comintern, 200; influence on Stalin, 305-7; and expected German ultimatum to
317; 'Imperialism as the Highest Form of USSR, 305; Cripps convinces of German
Capitalism', 1 intentions, 306-7; learns of German attack on
Leningrad: and Soviet-Finnish war, 16, 41; in USSR, 314
Soviet defence strategy, 1 1 9 Malenkov, Georgii, 3 1 3
Leningrad Opposition, 53 Malta, 215
Libya: British setbacks in, 169, 171, 314 Mru1stein, Field Marshal Erich von, 87
List, Field Marshal Siegmund, 86, 146, 158 Marcks, General-Major Erich, 50, 86
Lithuania, 25, 49 'Marita', Operation, 85-6, 134, 137, 152, 1 77
Lithuanian strip, 97 Marx, Karl, 3 1 6
'Litseist' (agent), 53, 185, 187, 268 Mascia, Luciano, 27
Litvi11ov, Maxim, 2, 7, 3 1 5 Matsuoka, Yosuke, 88, 161, 1 90--9, 202-3, 206,
Lloyd George, David, 1st Earl, 28, 171, 273-4 209, 217
Locarno Treaty (1925), 5 'Mazut' (informant), 187
London: German Blitz on, 59, 89, 1 69 Mediterranea11: British naval dominance in,
Low Countries: German invasion a11d 13, 58-9, 69, 318; Italy-Soviet spheres of
occupation of, 29-30 interest in, 28; German operations against
Lunin (GRU resident i n Rumania), 97-8 British in, 51, 69, 85; German air superiority
.
Lutsev (cruiser), 23 1n, 215
Meissner, Otto, 222
McDonald, I., 291 Mekhlis, General Lev, 54, 228, 3 1 1
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 3 1 7 Me11zies, Major-General Sir Stewart, 160
Mackensen, Hans Georg von, 27, 68 Meretskov, General Kiril A., 1 20, 122, 129, 138,
Maclean, Donald, 271 234, 311
Maisky, Ivan: and British pact with Turkey, 15; Merkulov, V selov: Stali11' s assessment of, 54;
on speed of German conquest of Poland, 16; on Turkish anti-Soviet I11tellige11ce, 1 1 3; on
and Cripps's mission to Moscow, 1 9-20, 89; Red Army's unpreparedness, 126; warns
and British access to Black Sea, 35; meets Stalin of Germa11 war plans, 1 30, 144, 296-7;
Halifax, 36, 90; on Britain's survival, 59, 89- 011 rumoured split in German leadership,
90; and Eden's reappointment as Foreign 180, 184; and tailoring of reports for Stalin,
Secreta ry, 92-3; on Soviet foreign policy, 92- 186; on morale of German troops, 223;
3; on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, 102; and summarizes Intelligence inforrnation for
Turkish position, i o5-6; and British moves Stalin, 297; organizes purges of subversives,
for Soviet alliance, 108; and proposed 300--1
Soviet-Turkish alliance, 1 10; and Yugoslav Metternicl1, Clemens Wenzel LotJ1ar, Prince,
drift to Germany, 139; and Cripps's report 316
402 Index

Middle East: military campaign in, 16970; negotiations with Germany, 190; and
German forces in, 225; and British stra tegy, relations with Japan, 191-2; Matsuoka
281, 286; in German strategy, 284-5; Stalin's meets, 194-J; at Matsuoka's departure, 198;
policies in, 285; see also Egypt; North Africa; on military doctrine, 209; and Japanese
Turkey pact, 21 1; and Schulenburg' s meetings with
Mikoyan, Anastas, 24, 212 Dekanozov, 212, 220; Schulenburg reports
Miliukov, Pavel N., 58 on, 216, 221; Schulenburg meets, 221,
Milstein, General Solomon, 142 309-13; and German violation of Soviet air
Minsk, 119 space, 225; attends Stalin's meetings with
Moldavia, 31, 208, 235, 300 Zhukov and Timoshenko, 228, 237; on
'Molotov Line', 241 Stalin's pessimism over resisting Germany,
Molotov, Viacheslav M . : concludes 1939 Pact 239; meets Hess in Berlin, 268; proposes
with Ribbentrop, 3; opposes Litvinov, 7; agreement witl-L Germany on Turkey, 284;
denies Soviet-German military alliance, 16; instructions to Maisky, 286; and Cripps's
and rumoured Allied attacks on Baku, 17; recall, 288; and Tass communique, 289; in
and Soviet war with Finland, 23; meets pre-invasion Moscow, 309; and German
Hitler in Berlin, 24, 46-7, 5 1 , 55-6, 58-<), 62, assault on USSR, 3 1 1 ; Stalin meets before
65, 67, 72-5, 77, 91-3, 95, 102-3, 106, 1 13, German attack, 3 1 1 ; announces outbreak of
125, 138, 284, 319; compliments war on radio, 313; expects discussion or
Schulenburg on German 1940 successes, 25, ultimatum before war, 313; on Stalin's
1 19; and occupation of Baltic States, 25; and estimate of military equality with Germans,
Soviet relations with Italy, 27, 29; and Soviet 323; see also Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact ( 1939)
Balkan policy, 29-30, 36; and annexation of Moltke, Helmuth, Count von, 87
Bessarabia, 33-4, 95; and Allied attempts to Momtchilov, Nikolas, 100
draw USSR into war, 36-7; Cripps meets, Monckton, Sir Walter, 20, 270
36, 94; and Turkish Straits, 37, 102-6; on Montreux Agreement (1923), 14, 17, 31, 44,
Cripps's appointment to Moscow, 39; and 73-4, 76-7, 79, 105-6
Bulgarian neutrality, 42-3; presents survey Morton, Major Desmond, 159, 257, 262
of foreign policy, 43; and control of Danube, Moscow: conditions before Germani invasion,
44, 46; and Russian representation on 309
European Commission, 44; sees Intelligence Munich conference ( 1 938), 4-5, 7
reports on Germany, 54; and Turkish Mussolini, Benito: relations with USSR, 25,
knowledge of plans to bomb Baku, 60; and 27-8; and Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, 25; and
Bulgarian claiIP.s to Dobrudja, 63; Balkarts, 27-<;; and Soviet annexation of
guarantees to Bulgaria, 65-6; accuses Bessarabia, 33; and formation of Axis, 68;
Germans of breaching Ribbentrop Pact, 68; Hitler promises help to, 77; Hitler informs
and tripartite Balkan agreement, 68; and of entente with Russia, 84; and Hitler's
formation of Axis, 71; and Bulgaria's decision to invade USSR, 88, 104; proposes
German sympathies, 78-80, 82, 84; and Four talks with USSR on Turkish Straits, 103, 105;
Power Pact, 82; suspicion of Cripps' s meets Hitler in Berchtesgaden (January
warning, 89; on British neglect of Soviet 1941), 105; and Yugoslav coup, 147; favours
interests, 94; and trade agreement with co-operation with USSR, 203; Schulenburg
Germany, 96; Schulenburg advises on proposes Stalin write to, 217; Stalin's
Bulgarian actions, 99; and German relations with, 318
incursion into Bulgaria, 101-2; and
Bulgaria's joining Tripartite Pact, 107; and Napoleon I (Bonaparte), 197, 218
German threat to Turkey, 107; and Soviet Narvik, Norway, 1 18
defence strategy, 127; warned of German Nazi-Soviet Pact see Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
intentions by NKVD, 133; and Yugoslav Neuilly, Treaty of (1919), 3 1
agreement, 138-<), 144, 146-8, 150-1; and Neurath, Baron Konstantin von, 38
German attack on Yugoslavia, 152, 320; New Economic Policy, 1
Cripps gives warning of German intentions Nicholas I I , Tsar, 28
to, 163-4; praises Maisky, 170; and Cripps's Nincic;, Momcilo, 144
attempts to involve USSR in war, 173, 176; NKGB: Merkulov heads, 54; as source of
and Cripps's hint of separate British peace, Intelligence, 54-5; in Berlin, 56; reports on
174-5; and agreement with Japan, 190, 193; German military build-up, 125, 179, 230,
and German invitation to USSR to join 235, 275-6, 298; conceri.trates on external
Axis, 190; orders Dekanozov to renew issues, 130; monitors Maisky, 172; reports
Index

on Cripps, 175; believes 'ultimatum theory', Pripet l\1arshes, 122-3

186; on Hess's flight, 267-8, 271; on German Proskurov, General Ivan I., 38
violation of Soviet air space, 277; and Soviet Prytz, Bjorn, 171-2
military deployment, 278; on evacuation of Purkaev, Lieut.-General Maxim Alexeevich,
German Moscow embassy staff, 297; on 240
Ukrainian nationalists, 299; purges
subversives, 300-1 Racconigi Agreement (1909), 28
NKVD: warns Stalin of German invasion Raeder, Admiral Erich, 203
plans, 38, 41, 54-5, 129, 133; in Berlin, 52; in Rapallo Treaty (1922), 4, 7, 1 1
Turkey, 62; on German military build-up in Red Army: inter-war weakness, 3; in Finland
East, 122; on failure of railway construction (1939), 8, 12, 15-16, 23, 30, 1 15; British
and administration, 130; reformed, 130; and assessment of, 16, 156-7; discipline, 21;
Yugoslav agreement, 150; on Hitler's setbacks i n Operation 'Barbarossa', 23;
meeting with Prince Paul, 165; and Hess's Germans perceive as weak, 76, 86-7, 131,
flight to Britain, 272 133-4, 182, 186, 207-8; mobilization and
North Africa: military campaigns in, 168, 184, deployment (1941), 86-7, 127, 165, 183,
215, 236, 281 227-g, 237-8, 240-1, 275, 278-80, 322;
Norway: Germans iI1vade, 18, 24, 30, 318; inadequacies and unpreparedness, 115, 128,
diplomatic representation i11 Iv1oscow, 217; 229, 241, 305, 319-20, 323; military doctrine,
German forces in, 244 1 1 5-20, 126, 129, 209; Stalin purges, 115,
Novikov (head of Soviet Near East i26, 209; demobilization plan, 118;
department), 46, 150 reorganized after fall of France, 1 1 8-21; and
Novikov, K. V., 172-3, 285 German strategy, 123; January 1941 war
Nuremberg trials, 75, 87 games, 127-9, 135, 157, 239-40, 319; Stalin
boosts reputation and morale, 207-10; old
Odessa, 3 1 , 33, 41 forms reinstated, 211; military I ntelligence
'Omeri' (Soviet agent), 62 withheld from, 227; strength (1941), 229;
Osltima, Hiroshi, 193 receives Intelligence from Germany, 231;
Ott, General Eugen, 181-2, 199, 203 and Zhukov's war plans, 234, 237, 239-40;
defensive strongholds, 241-2; supply
Padfield, Peter, 251 problems, 241; Military Council, 242; air
Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount, force, 243, 278; Stalin's instructions to, 310-
316 1 1 ; see also Soviet Union
Papen, Franz von, 61, 79, 102, 141, 222-3, 284 Rendel, (Sir) George William, 90-1
Paris Agreement (1856), 14, 44 Reynaud, Paul, 18-19
Paul, Prince, Regent of Yugoslavia, 137, 139, Ribbentrop, Joachim von: visits Moscow
141-2, 145, 161, 165 (October 1939), 13; assures Soviets of
Paulus, Field Marshal Friedrich von, 50-1, 87 German support, 23; presses for Italy and
Pavlov, General D. G., 126-g, 212, 232, 234, USSR to maintain relations, 25, 27; and
238, 240 German invasions in West, 30; and
Persian Gulf, 71, 73, 76, 196 Bessarabia, 31; attacks King Carol, 34;
Petain, Marshal Philippe, 36, 48, 270 favours Continental bloc with Eastern
Peter, King of Yugoslavia, 1 42 states, 39-40, 57, 193, 202, 254; and
Petsamo, Finland, 95, 204 Bulgarian neutrality, 42; forbids
Philby, Kim, 271 Schulenburg's co11sultations on Rumania,
Pintsch, Karlheir1z, 256 43; and agent 'Litseist', 53; proposed visit to
Plunkett-Ernie-Erle-Drax, Admiral Sir Moscow (1940), 58, 75; and formation of
Reginald, 14, 106 Axis, 68, 70-2; and Berlin conference ( 1 940),
Poland: Germany occl1pies, 3, 16, 125; British 69, 73-5; proposals to isolate Britain, 70;
guarantees to, 4--6; Red Army campaign in, letter to Stalin and Molotov, 72-3; testimony
1 1 5, 1 18; divided, 209; railway system and at Nuremberg, 75; and Bulgarian relations
German military build-up, 230, 236, 276-7; with USSR, 7/, 79; and Dekanozov in
and Ukrain.ian nationalism, 300-1 Berlin, 95-6; denies leave to Schulenburg,
Pollitt, Harry, 2 50 97; Dekanozov warns on Bulgaria, 99; and
Popov, Ivan, 65, 77-8, 82-4, 101 Italian negotiations with USSR, 104; and
Portsmouth Agreement (1 905), 192, 195 Yugoslav resistance to joining Axis, 139;
Postan, Michael, 282 advocates economic agreement with USSR,
Pravda, 151, 1 75, 211, 215 181, 183, 185; opposes Goring's ad vocacy of
 Index

war witl1 USSR, 184-5; supports attack on Tri partite Pact, 77, 78; USSR refuses Germpn
USSR, 189; and Japanese alliance, 191, 194; predominance, 85; German military forces
and new world order, 1 9 1 ; urges Japanese in, 97, 102, 105, 107-8, 122; Italians claim
to military action, 193; attempts to dissuade right to oil, 103; military support for
Hitler from invading USSR, 202, 205, 207, Germany, 123, 134, 303, 307; and German
217; and Schulenburg's visit to Berlin, 202; military strategy, 124; and German
Schulenburg despises, 203; Weizsacker' s preparations for war with USSR, 188, 276,
relations with, 205; Schulenburg' s proposals 296; defensive measures d uring German
withheld from, 219; Dekanozov fails to attack on USSR, 189; border disputes with
meet, 222, 309; and Hess, 263, 266, 272; and USSR, 204; Germans reinforce borders, 235;
German violation of Soviet air space, 309; and Vienna Agreement, 319
Dekanozov meets after German assault on Rundstedt, Field Marshal Gerd von, 146, 233
USSR, 312; disclaims respo11Sibility for war, Russia see Soviet Union
3 1 2; invites USSR to join Axis, 320; Stalin Rychagov, General P. V., 243
believes opposed to war with USSR, 323
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (1939): concluded, Sakhalin, 1 92, 195-7
3; and Britisl1 guarantees to Poland, 4; Saloniki, 55-6, 62, 74, 78, 85, 99, 125, 1 37,
unexpectedness, 5; antagonizes Britain, 13; 1 51-2
and new world order, 40; and Turkey, 60; Saracoglu, Shukru: meets Stalin, 1 3-14; pro­
Kollontai opposes, 80; secret protocol, 1 2 1 ; British views, 1 3 ; and access to Black Sea,
and Soviet agreement with Yugoslavia, 146; 30; and Allied plans to bomb Baku, 60; and
USSR adheres to, 190; Tupikov' s belief in, German-Italian threat to Turkey, 62; and
235; effect on Soviet military methods, 241; Hitler's policy for Turkish independence,
Stalin's view of, 317-18 102; protests at Soviet-Bulgarian agreement,
Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis de, 103; and proposed Soviet mutual assistance
Cardinal, 3 1 6 pact, 106; and Cripps-Eden visit to Turkey,
Richthofen, Herbert, Freiherr von, 82-3 109; and German troops in Bulgaria, 1 1 2;
Roberts, Frank, 252 fears Soviet-German agreement, 283-4
Rokosovsky, Marshal Ko11stantin K., 120 Sargent, Sir Orme, 1 1 , 20, 22, 263-5; 305
Romanenko, General Prokofii Logvinovich, Schlieffen, Alfred, Count von, 87
126 Schmidt, Paul-Otto, 255
Rommel, General Erwin, 168, 215, 286 Schnurre, Karl, 82, 95, 97, 205-6
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 91, 255, 258-9 Scholl, Lieut.-Colonel, 182
Rosenberg, Alfred, 272, 296 Schulenburg, Count Werner von: on Soviet
Rosso, Augusto: returns to Moscow, 27; and wish for neutrality, 1 1; and Baku oilfields,
Italian policy i11 Mediterranean, 28, 103; 17; on Red Army success in Finnish war, 23;
renounces claims against Turkey, 29; on and potential clash over Balkans, 24;
German threat in Balkans, 57, 1 1 4; and Molotov compliments on German 1940
Soviet exclusion from Tripartite Pact, 65; successes, 25, 1 19; and Soviet occupation of
entertains Molotov, 76; and Turkish Straits, Baltic States, 25; conceals Soviet strategic
103-4; and Yugoslav crisis, 147; excluded i11te11tio11s, 33, 68; and Soviet annexation of
from dinner for Japanese ambassador, 193; Bessarabia, 33-4; informs Hitler of British
believes in Hitler's intention to attack plans to divide Germany and USSR, 39;
USSR, 203; on negotiations for German supports Continental bloc, 40, 57, 71, 76;
transit rigl1ts i11 Ukraine, 245; on imminence and German Balkan policy, 43; and
of German attack on USSR, 298 banishment of USSR from Danube, 45;
Rumania: British designs on oilfields, 15, 71 ; relations with Rosso, 57; di fferences with
British guarantees to, 25, 30; Italy and, 25, German policy, 61; and Turkish Straits, 61;
27, 29; Hungarian claims on, 29; and Soviet a11d exclusion of USSR from Tripartite Pact,
threat, 30, 50; a11d Soviet annexation of 65; initiates H itler-Molotov meeting ( 1940),
Bessarabia, 3 1 , 33-4; German need for oil 67-8, 70, 71, 73, 91; learns of German
from, 41-2, 69; annexes soutl1ern Dobrudja, invasion plans, 68; document on German
42, 63; Iron Guard suppressed, 44; and attack on USSR, 70; submits Ribbentrop's
control of Danube, 45-7; Soviet inspection letter to Molotov, 72; reports to Berlin, 73;
of, 46; Hitler protects oilfields, 5 1 , 78, 105, and German trade agreement with USSR,
235; German occupation of, 56-7, 63-4; 82, 95; leave request denied, 97; and
discussed at 1940 Berlin conference, 58; Schnurre' s mission to H itler, 97; and Soviet
German guarantees to, 65, 74, 138; and reaction to German moves in Bulgaria, 99;
Index

reports Bulgaria's joining Tripartite Pact, Sousloparov, Ivan, 307

101; told of Italian negotiations with USSR, Soviet Union (USSR): pre-war foreign policy,
104; and Balkan threat, 105; dismisses 1-9i rise as superpower, 2; seeks treaty of
Soviet-Turkish non-aggression pact, 1 14; mutual assistance, 6-7; trade traffic and
and Soviet agreement with Yugoslavia, agreement with Germany, 10, 14, 23-4, 35,
146-7, 153; and German attack on 69, 93, 95-7, 187, 205, 308; expelled from
Yugoslavia, 152; Cripps fears return from League of Nations, 1 1 ; and Turkisl1 Straits,
Berlin with new German agreement, 173-4; 13-15, 29, 36, 58, 60-1, 63, 65, 68, 71, 73, 75,
consults with H i tler i n Berlin, 187, 1 89, 199, 102-5, 110-12, 318-19; occupies Baltic
202-7, 211, 213, 215, 219; negotiations with States, 25, 37, 43, 90-4; relations with Italy,
Stalin, 1 88-9, 231, 234, 289, 300; excluded 25, 27-9, 36; annexes Bessarabia, 28-31 , 33-
from dinners with Japanese ambassador, 4, 36, 40-3, 45, 95, 209, 218; Balkan policy,
193; disbelieves German intention to invade 29, 63-4, 67, 74, 77-84, 97; reluctance to
USSR, 203, 307; reports on Japanese-Soviet support Britain, 35, 91; Germa11y deploys
pact, 203-4; unofficial meetings with against, 38, 40-1, 55-7, 65, 71, 122, 125-6,
Dekanozov, 21 2-22; misled over German 134, 157, 1 60, 1 62, 1 77, 1 79-81, 187, 208,
invasion intentions, 214; encourages 214-15, 222, 295, 298, 225-7, 229-32, 234-7,
Hi tler-Stalin meeting, 21 5-16; plans for war 244-5, 264, 275-7, 286, 303, 319-21;
precautions, 218-19; reprimanded, 220; Germany plans to invade, 38-9, 48-50, 52,
believes Stalin's wish to negotiate, 221; asks 54-7, 68, 70, 83-6, 125-6, 1 30-4, i46, 157-8,
permission for Germans to search for First 161, 167; and control of Danube, 44-7, 85;
War graves, 225, 243; hints at Hitler's Intelligence activities in Germany, 52-5, 62,
intentions, 237; dissembles over German 1 3 1-5, 180-1, 277-8; and Black Sea, 60;
threat to USSR, 245, 264; and Hess's flight mobilization and military deployment
to Britain, 246; supposed agreement plan (1941), 86-7, 127, 165, 227-9, 237-8, 275,
with USSR, 283; silence on Stalin's Tass 278-80, 319; British trade offer to, 89, 92, 94;
communique, 293; under surveillance, 297; overtures to Britain, 89-90; Britain attempts
pessimism before German attack, 298; to involve in war, 90, 94-5, 105, 1 1 0, 1 1 3,
summ oned to Kremlin (18 June 1941), 309- 167, 170-2, 173-6, 181, 302; i n Maisky's
10; meets Molotov after German assault, account of foreign policy, 92-3; claims on
311-13; explanation for German attack, 313; German borders, 97; and Bulgaria's
conciliation attempts in Moscow, 320-1; accession to Germany, 100-2; and German
hopes for USSR joining Axis, 320; in plot threat to Turkey, 100, 106, 1 1 2; suspicion of
against Hitler (1944), 320 hegemonial powers, 1 00-1; non-aggression
Schulze-Boysen, Harro see 'Starshlna' pact witl1 Turkey, 112, 114; and Hitler's
'Sea-Lion', Operation, 41, 76 assurances to Turkey, 1 1 3; military
Sebastopol, 31 principles and defence strategy, 1 1 6-24,
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS; Britisl1), 126-9, 238, 278; military districts, 121;
248-50, 261-2 railway system, 130; wartime industrial
Seeds, Sir William, 5 weakness, i 30; and Yugoslav negotiations
Shaposhnikov, Marshal V. M., 54, 1 21 , 242 and agreement (1941), 137-8, 140-5 1 , 1 53,
Shcherbakov, Alexander Sergeevich, 209 163, 206, 213; air space violated by
Shkvartsev, Alexander A., 41, 45, 95 Germa11s, 1 79, 225, 231, 243, 277, 309;
'Sidrov' (agent), 230 military i11telligence, 180, 229, 276-7;
Simi, Lieut.-Colonel Boshina, i 38-41, 1 5 1 neutrality pact with Japan, 190-7, 1 99, 204,
Simon, John Allsebrook, 1st Viscount, 246, 211, 320; prepares alternative capital, 218;
252, 260-1, 266, 273-4, 288 disbelieves German invasion warnings,
Simovic;, General Sushan, 1 42-5, 148-50 222-3; defensive strongl1olds established,
Sinaia Conference (1938), 44 241-2; air force weaknesses, 243; war
Singapore, 1 93-4 economy and production, 243; and
Skopje, 1 5 2-3 significance of Hess's fligl1t, 262-72;
Slovakia, 77 rumoured agreement with Germany
Sobolev, Arkady, 46, 80-3, 95, 98, 103 (May-June 1941), 283, 301-2, 304;
Sokolovsky, Lieut.-General Vassili Danilovich, subversive elements suppressed, 300-1;
1 20 Germans open attack on, 311-13; see also
'Sophocles' (Soviet military attache in Red Ar1ny; Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact;
Belgrade), 139-40, 145 Stalin, Josef V.
Sorge, Richard, 181-2, 229, 296, 298 Spain, 69, 76-7, 1 88, 252-3
 Index

Speer, Albert, 256 with Schulenburg, 187-8; autocratic

Stalin, Josef V.: principles of foreign policy, methods, 189, 298--5), 316; Schulenburg
1--5); collaboration with Nazi Germany, 4-8, misleads, 189; and Japanese-Soviet pact,
22; and British Russophobia, 12; concern for 191-3, 211; Matsuoko meets, 194, 196-?;
Turkish Straits, 13-14; hostility to and concern for eastern frontiers, 197; behaviour
suspicion of Britain, 13-14, 36-7, 105, 1 10, at Matsuoka' s departure, 198--9, 202-4; on
1 12-13, 139, 141, 151,..167, 176, 181, 190, 194, world communism, 200; seeks new
232, 269, 313-14, 317, 321-3; and Cripps, agreement with Germany, 204, 305; and
20--1 , 38-9, 174; and Winter War with study of military theory, 20<)-10; assumes
Finland, 23; suspends delivery of raw premiership (May -r941), 211-12, 215, 217,
materials to Germany, 24; relations with 221, 294; and Schulenburg's meetings with
Italy, 25, 27-8, 37; and German occupation Dekanozov, 212, 215-16, 220; resists military
of Low Countries, 29; and annexation of mobilization, 214-15, 23<)-40, 244, 275, 277,
Bessarabia, 31, 33-4; blamed for ineffective 27<)-80, 297--5), 321-2, 323; Schulenburg
resistance to Germans, 35; Churchill appeals proposes meeting with Hitler, 215-16;
to for support, 37; warned of German personal letter to Hitler, 217, 219, 222;
invasion plans, 38, 54-6, 124-5, 130, 1 32-3, recognizes governments in German­
146; and Balkan situation, 43, 48-51 , 95, 179; occupied territories, 217, 224; disbelieves
and control of Danube, 44-5; purges, 52, German invasion warnings, 222-3, 277, 279,
1 15, �-26; puzzled by Hitler's aims, 52; and 296-7, 304, 307, 310; and German request to
Soviet Intelligence in Germany, 52, 230; locate First War graves, 225, 243; keeps
interpretation of Intelligence and military uninformed, 227; consults with
information, 53-4, 180, 185-7, 189, 231, 233, military commanders, 228, 237, 240, 243;
296-7, 321-2; European defensive strategy, and Zhukov's war plans, 229, 232-4, 237--5);
58; and Molotov's Berlin conference with and German overflying of Soviet air
Hitler, 58--5), 71-5; Turkish policy, 61-2, 65, territory, 231; agrees to creation of new
106, 1 10--1 2, 285; proposed meeting with mechanized corps, 242-3; and Hess's flight
Hitler (May-June 1941), 67, 215-16, 268, to Britain, 246-7, 264-5, 267, 269, 272, 273-4,
307; and Bulgaria, 75, 79, 81-2, 99, 107; 314, 322; supposed agreement with Hitler,
demands for extended sphere of influence, 264; and Cripps' s recall, 288; issues Tass
82; rejects Hitler's Continental bloc communique, 289, 291, 293; actions against
proposals, 82; and Hitler's claims of subversive elements, 300--1 ; pre-invasion
preventive war against USSR, 86; and behaviour, 307, 30<)-11; instructions to Red
British resistance to Germany, 89; and trade Army, 310-11; and German assault on
agreement with Germany, 97; British USSR, 3 1 1, 323; delays Zhukov's
Foreign Office believes in bargain with deployment plans on German attack,
Hitler, 107; and Red Army inadequacies 3 1 2-13; first deployment directives, 313;
and reorga11ization, 118-19; defence suspects separate British peace deal with
strategy, 1 1<)-20, 124, 127, 129, 131, 233, 237; Germany, 315; poliey and statesmanship,
and Ger1nan disinformation campaign, 122; 316-23; neutralist stance, 317; see also Soviet
and 'new European order', 125; convenes Union
conference of High Command (December Stamenov (Bulgarian ambassador i n Moscow),
1940), 126-7; Churchill warns of German 62-3, 78, 80, 102
invasion plans, 133, 1 5 5-6, 1 59, 161-6, 168, 'Starshina' (Soviet agent in Berlin), 5, 131, 180,
176-8, 221, 270, 322; and German 184, 186, 188--5), 210, 229, 231, 269, 277, 295-
involvement in Balka11s, 134; and Yugoslav 7
agreement (1941), 13<)-45, 147-8, 1 50--1 , Steinhardt, Laurence, 60, 175, 178, 208
1 53, 1 86, 196; and German campaign in Stern, General Grigori Mikhailovich, 126
Yugoslavia and Greece, 149, 1 52-3; Straits Convention, 99
conciliation poliC)' towards Germany1 175, Straits (Turkish) see Turkish Straits
180, 182, 185, 189--5)0, 207, 211-13, 217, 219, Sudoplatov, General P., 137, 180, 301
221-2, 227, 232, 234, 239, 276, 293, 306, Suez Canal, 169, 188, 215
3 1 <)-22; and German build-up on Soviet Sulina, 31, 44, 46-7
borders, 180, 289, 320; speech to war Sunday Times, 291
academy graduates, 182, 208-10, 221; and Sufi.er, Serrano, 77
supposed split in German leadersllip, 183; Supreme Allied Command, 49
Merkulov reports to, 184; reads secret Suvorov (i.e. V. Rezun), 3-5, 8
Foreign Office papers, 185; negotiations Svechin, Alexander Andreevich, 122
Index

Svveden, 135, 157, 165, 245, 301 assistance treaty with Britain and France,
Syria, 105, 188, 286, 288 14-15, 17-18, 25, 29-30, 60, 104, 1 1 3 ; and
British access to Black Sea, 16-18, 27, 30-1,
T-34 tanks, 120, 243 35-7, 74, 93, 188; and Allied plans to bomb
Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 197 Baku oilfields, 18-19, 60, 62, 65; Stalin fears
Tallinn, 1 19 Allied attack through, 24, 318; Italy
Tass (news agency): Stalin's communique in, renounces claims against, 29; and Soviet
289, 291-3, 302, 309 annexation of Bessarabia, 30; and Soviet
Tatekawa, Lieut.-General Yoshitsugu, 191-2, Balkan policy, 38; and Soviet strategic
198--9, 222 thinking, 58, 60; discussed at 1940 Berlin
Thrace, 63, 77-8, 80 conference, 59-61, 73, 75-6; USSR fears
Tirnes, The, 21, 291 German attack on, 65; exclusion from new
Timoshenko, Marshal Semyon K.: military European order, 70; German threat to, 79,
planning, 54, 65, 118, 120-1, 124, 1 26-7, 238, 98, 105-7, 1 10-12, 188, 236, 283-4; Stalin
241; and Yugoslavia, 138, 144, 1 5 1 , 153; seeks naval bases in, 81; Bulgarian non­
warned of German intentions, 179; aggression declaration with, loo, 106; resists
Merkulov reports to, 184; and Stalin's major power dominance in Balkans, 102;
speech to military graduates, 209; May Day non-intervention policy, 106, 1 1 1; Eden
speech (1941), 210; and Soviet war visits, 107-10; Cripps visits, 108-10; and
preparations, 225; kept uninformed by Soviet support, 111; and Tripartite Pact, 1 1 1 ;
Stalin, 227; meets Stalin with Zhukov, 228, Hitler assures of non-interference, 113; non­
237, 240, 243; and military Intelligence, 230, aggression pact with USSR, 1 1 3-14; anti­
278, 296; and German overflying of Soviet Soviet Intelligence, 114; and position of
territory, 231, 243; and German build-up on Yugoslavia, 1 5 1 ; Eden and Dill attempt to
Soviet borders, 237; and Soviet air force, divert German attack on, 159; USSR
243; mobilization and deployment plans, disclaims countermeasures in event of
275, 279, 298--9, 310-11; reminiscences, 275; German attack on, 207-8; Hitler seeks non­
and imminence of German attack, 310; and aggression pact with, 284
German assault, 3 1 1 Turkish Straits: Stalin fears British designs on,
Tippelskirch, \'Verner von, 203-4 13-15, 36, 81, 1 10; Stalin demands transit
Tito, Josip Broz, 140, 143 rights through, 14; Turkish control of,
Tobruk, 169, 215, 314 14-15, 37, 102, 1 1 1; USSR negotiates with
Todt, Fritz, 236 Italy over, 29, 103-5, 318; German threat to,
Togo, Shigenori, 65, 190-1 55, 57-8, 65, 105-7, 1 1 1-13; Soviet concern
Tokyo: as source of intelligence, 181-3 over control of, 58, 60-1, 63, 65, 68, 71, 73,
Triandafilov, General Vladimir K., 1 1 6 75, 81, 102-5, 112, 3 1 8-19; Molotov's
Tripartite Pact (1940; 'Axis'): France and, 57; demands on, 102-4; British access to, 106;
Spain and, 57, 76; Bulgaria pressed to join, British-Turkish-Soviet understandi11g on
62-5, 79-81, 84-5, 100-1, 107; expansion, 64; (1941), 106-7, 1 10; Hitler and Stalin's
Japan expects Soviet exclusion from, 65; designs on, 107; see also Black Sea;
established and signed ( 1940), 68--9, 71, 191; Dardanelles; Turkey
Japan joins, 71, 182, 187, 191, 195-6;
invitations to USSR to join, 74-5, 186, 190, Ukraine: German plans to attack and
193, 197, 199, 204, 320; Balkan countries appropriate, 41, 51, 1 22-4, 131, i40, 186-7,
join, 77-81, 83-5; Hungary and, 77; 224, 229, 231, 233, 282, 296; German lack of
Vyshinsky fears Turkey's joining, 1 1 1 ; policy on, 49; nationalism and subversion
Yugoslavia joins, 138-9, 141, 143, 147, 159, in, 299-301
•

213; and Japanese-Soviet Pact, 193, 197, Uldricks, Teddy, 9

199 Ultra (deciphering system), 159, 222
Trotsky, Leon, 1, 62 Umansky, Konstantin A., 172, 208
Tucker, Robert, 3 United States of America: support for Britain,
Tu khachevsky, Marshal Mikhail, 1 16, 122, 126, 39, 57, 94, 305; Japanese threat to, 69; Lend­
234, 319 Lease programme, 91; and Soviet
Tupanjanin, Willos, 139-40 involvement in war, 175; withholds
Tupikov, General (Soviet military attache in warning of German invasion from USSR,
Berlin), 52, 125, 235 1 78; and Soviet-Japanese pact, 191-2; and
Turkey: neutrality in war, 8, 13, 60, 285; Stalin supposed British separate peace with
appeals to for support, 13-14; rnutual Germany, 288, 322
 Index

Urals: in German strategic plans, 1 3 1 Yeremenko, Lieut.-General Andrei Ivanovich,

USSR see Soviet Union 120
Yugoslav Communist Party, 199-200
Vansittart, Sir Robert, 170 Yugoslavia: Stalin establishes relations with,
Varna, Bulgaria, 43, 63, 100 28; discussed at 1940 Berlin conference, 58;
Vassilevsky, General Alexander M., 121, 234 and German moves in Bulgaria, 100;
Vatutin, Lieut.-General_Nikolai F., 120, 123, resistance to Germany, 1 10; Germany
238, 240, 278 attacks and occupies (April 1941), 1 36-7,
Versailles Treaty ( 1 9 1 9), 9, 44, 317 145, 1 50--3 , 1 77, 186, 1 95-6, i99; negotiates
Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, 28 for Soviet agreement, 1 37-8, 1 40--5 1 , 1 5 3-4,
Vienna: Hitler in, 42 163, 206, 213; German influence in, 138-42;
Vienna Award, 44, 60, 62-3, 68, 70, 72, 95, 319 joins Axis, 1 38-9, 1 4 1 , 143, 147, 159; British
Vinogradov, Sergei, 62, 109-10, 1 13, 1 4 1 , 207, interest in, 1 4 1 -2; coup (March 1941), 1 42-3,
222 1 59-60, 320; strategic position, 1 5 1 ; USSR
Voroshilov, Marshal Kliment E., 54, 1 1 7-18, disclaims obligation to, 1 90; Soviet
1 20, 228, 3 1 1 , 3 1 3 Friendship Agreement with (April 1941),
Voznesensky, Nikolay A., 242 320
Vysl1insky, Andrei: and Stalin's dual policy,
59; friendliness to Cripps, 90, 1 1 1; warns
Bulgarian ambassador, 99, 101-2, 175; and Zakharov, General M.V, 128
Turkish Straits, 1 1 1-12; and Yugoslav Zakopane, Poland, 231
situation and negotiations, 141, 145, 147-50; 'Zateya' (Intelligence file), 55
and Cripps's attempts to draw USSR into Zhdanov, Andrei: and impending war, 7-8,
war, 167, 1 74-5; dismisses Steinhard's 207, 225; on effect of Balkan events, 144;
warning on Soviet-German agreements, warns Dimitrov of Stalin's views on
208; and Cripps's departure from Moscow, world communism, 201; and morale of Red
288; on Cripps's rumour-mongering in Army, 208; Stalin consults on military
London, 291, 304; meets Schulenburg, 293 matters, 228; report on army shortcomings,
241 I

Walther, Gebhardt von, 70, 207, 307 Zhukov, Marshal Georgi: relations with Stalin,
Warsaw: and German war preparatio11s 54, 232, 235, 299; and Bulgarian army, 101;
against USSR, 236 devises military strategy, 120, 124, 126;
Wavell, Field Marshal Archibald, 1st Earl, criticizes Defence Ministry, 127; in January
168-9, 286 1941 war games, 127-8, 239-40; appointed
Webb, Beatrice, 270, 272, 274 Chief of Staff, 129; Stalin dismisses
Webb, Sidney, 272 Churchill's warning to, 176; Matsuoka
Weizsacker, Ernst von: congratulates Red meets, 1 96; sees Stalin's letter to Hitler, 222;
Army on Finnish victory, 23; and Bulgarian war preparations and deployments, 225,
situation, 64; favours Continental bloc, 69, 228-9, 232-4, 237-4 1 , 275, 279-80, 298-9, •

76, 96; on possible war with USSR, 69, 76; 3 1 0, 319, 322; kept uninformed by Stalin,
dismisses USSR as threat, 70--1 ; and 227; meets Stalin witl1 Timoshenko, 228,
Danubian conference, 96; Dekanozov 237, 240, 243; and military Intelligence, 230,
negotiates with, 99, 1 90; attempts to deter 278, 296; and German military build-up,
Hitler from war with USSR, 202-3, 218; 232, 237; proposes pre-emptive strike
warns Ribbentrop of war danger, 205, 218; against Germany, 238-9, 241, 322; warned
Schulenburg communicates with, 218-20; of logistical problems, 241; on Stalin's
and Dekanozov' s protests at German desire to avoid war, 244; memoirs, 275; told
violation of Soviet air space, 309-10 of German reconnaissance flights, 277;
Welles, Sumner, 23, 1 6 1 , 261 e11courages local defence preparations, 278;
Weygand, General Maxime, 1 7 and imminence of German attack, 310; and
White Russia, 50 Stalin's instructions to army, 3 10--1 1 ;
Winant, John G., 288 commands south-western and sottthern
Windsor, Edward, Duke of, 38, 269 fronts, 3 1 1 ; and German assault, 3 1 1 , 323;
Windsor, Wallis, Duchess of (formerly Stalin declines pleas to activate deployment
Simpson), 269 plans, 312-13
Wbrmann, Ernst, 21 9-20 Zionists, 301