International Labor and Working-Class, Inc.

Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar Europe, East and West

Author(s): Mark Mazower
Source: International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 58, Wartime Economies and
the Mobilization of Labor (Fall, 2000), pp. 275-282
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of International Labor and Working-
Class, Inc.
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 REVIEW ESSAYS

Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar

Europe, East and West

Mark Mazower
Princeton University

Abstract

This essay explores changing trends in the post-1989 historiography of both

eastern and western postwar Europe. It suggests that one major development is a
shift toward themes in social and cultural history that see the late 1940s in the con
text of wartime experience. Another is the wresting of issues such as the imposition
of communist power in eastern Europe from political science by historians. Short
comings visible in these new trends include a tendency to divorce the history of rep
resentations and images from older concerns with power and the state. On the
whole, however, common issues are emerging in the historiography of the two
halves of the continent that make it easier to envisage a more unified approach to
their joint postwar history.

Since 1989, the historiography of the postwar era in Europe has moved in new
directions. To generalize, one can say that the period as a whole is in the process
of being reclaimed for history from the social sciences. Insofar as historians had
already touched on events after the Second World War, it was largely within the
rubric of the Cold War and the historiographical concerns this generated?no
tably, the question of the origins of and responsibility for the Cold War itself and
the division of Europe. Originally interpreted in the light of international su
perpower diplomacy, the debate over Cold War origins broadened later to in
clude international economic policy as well, and has more recently encompassed
cultural politics and the impact of Americanization in particular on western Eu
ropean culture. In the process, mostly European scholars took issue with the
Washington-based focus of earlier scholarship, and pointed to the real autono
my enjoyed by European policymakers even in the late 1940s over issues such
as the implementation of the Marshall Plan, military policy in Greece, and so
forth.1 (There was an echo of this also in the historiography of communist rule
in eastern Europe, where some scholars even in the late 1980s were starting to
question the prevailing paradigm of an undifferentiated Soviet quest for domi
nation. I shall return to the impact of 1989 upon our understanding of commu
nist eastern Europe later in this essay.)2

International Labor and Working-Class History

No. 58, Fall 2000, pp. 275-282
? 2000 International Labor and Working-Class History, Inc.

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276 ILWCH, 58, Fall 2000

In the last ten years, these various approaches have come to look a little
limited. In the first place, they rarely offered any explanation of how the expe
rience of total war before 1945 impacted upon the postwar era. Stunde Null
seemed to be accepted by historians as completely as by the postwar German
public. Jan Gross was among the first to draw attention to the need to yoke
wartime and postwar experiences together, to see them as part of the same nar
rative. This is now increasingly accepted and the periodizations of modern Eu
ropean history are increasingly challenged as a result. The moment of liberation,
whenever it took place, starts to look like a stage in a continuum of social pro
cesses rather than the decisive break that was underscored in earlier work. As
Elizabeth Heineman has recently argued, for example, the German experience
of suffering follows a periodization that cuts right across the boundaries sepa
rating Nazism from the postwar era. The "crisis years" she has traced in the
memories of German women, in particular, began in 1942 or 1943, with the first
massive Allied bombing raids; continued through the chaos of defeat and the
mass rapes committed by Red Army soldiers; and end with the experience of
coping alone or bringing up children without a man's support, which for many
stretched through the decade.3 If Dean Acheson were to rewrite his memoirs of
the Cold War today, it is hard to believe that Present at the Creation (New York,
1969) would seem as apt a title as it did when he published it in 1969.
This, in turn, reflects the way historians are redefining the central signifi
cance of the war itself. Military and diplomatic aspects of the conflict no longer
hold center stage. Recent work on the Holocaust has underlined the impossi
bility of separating ideology from military behavior in understanding the
Wehrmacht; it has also focused attention on the war's impact upon civilians and
society in general. From Italy, Claudia Pavone's influential rereading of the war
as a "civil war" has opened up one entirely new avenue of enquiry: Whether this
civil war is identified in terms of class, ethnicity, or simply of rival factions fight
ing it out in the name of a bankrupt state, it redefines what was at stake in the
war in ways that make it nonsensical to assume a clear demarcation before and
after the war. The dopoliberazione (postliberation) emerges as an episode in the
transition from war to peace, a moment of social and political reconfiguration
that incorporates elements of continuity as well as change.4
Germany stands at the center of this new historiographical effort for the
late 1940s much as it has dominated discussion of the earlier part of the decade.
Where scholars once saw reconstruction as an issue of occupation military gov
ernment, or latterly of the Americanization of institutions and culture, they now
focus their attention upon that German society, whose basic structures and in
stitutions were largely destroyed in Nazism's collapse. The physical infrastruc
ture of urban life forms the centerpiece of Jeffery Diefendorf's concerns. Re
construction and rebuilding, he argues, relied heavily upon ideas and personnel
from the Nazi era and even earlier. Hence the new urban fabric?modernism
and all?looks less and less like the product of "Americanization" and more like
part of a longer-run story of German urbanism.5
An even more basic institution, the family, is also brought into question, af

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Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar Europe, East and West 277

fected as it had to be by the absence of millions of German prisoners of war

(POWs) in Soviet captivity. The striking gender imbalance of the 1940s has al
lowed us to interrogate the situation of German women during and after the war
and changing perceptions of marital status and gender roles. Heineman sees sub
stantial continuities across regimes?Nazi, democratic, and communist?in the
status, experiences, and treatment of German single women. Indispensable at
the start in both East and West Germany, and increasingly in the 1950s in East
Germany, single women?whether unmarried, widowed, or divorced?were
used by a society that felt highly ambivalent about their existence and exerted
sufficient normative pressure upon them to ensure a high rate of remarriage af
ter the war. Another kind of woman?the "consuming woman"?is the subject
of Erica Carter's How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and
the Consuming Woman (Ann Arbor, 1997). Just as Heineman argues for the im
portance of gender politics in the era of reconstruction, so Carter suggests that
in the 1950s the new consumer culture allowed, or actually required, a new mod
el of "national duty," this time based upon the housewife's duty to consume. Sup
port of new retailing methods, on the one hand, and exposure to advertising and
magazines for housewives, on the other hand, mark the emergence of this new
kind of consumption politics. But Carter makes wider claims than Heineman;
Carter tries to link the new gender history to older preoccupations with refor
mulations of German nationalism. A similar line of argument is proposed by
Frank Biess in a recent article on East German citizenship and the returning
POWs. However, the precise links between representations of gender?whether
of consuming housewives or emasculated veterans?and national politics re
mains in need of further elucidation.6
Finally, in connection with these new approaches to the social conse
quences of the war in Germany, one must mention the indications that the long
scholarly silence over the issue of German expellees from eastern Europe and
former Reich territories is coming to an end. This subject, which suffered a kind
of scholarly taboo for many decades, is back on the agenda with a vengeance, as
events of the 1990s draw our interest back to the longer-term history of ethnic
cleansing and forced population transfer. A recent debate in Slavic Review has
opened up the problems of moral equivalence that continue to bedevil compar
ative discussion of this subject. But the new openness is evident in a willingness
to bring the discussion of the expulsion of Germans back into a consideration of
the founding of communist regimes in postwar eastern Europe. Perhaps the
most important aspect of this vast subject is the question of how Konrad Ade
nauer handled the potentially volatile political consequences of the presence of
millions of expellees in West Germany. A recent article by Pertti Ahonen, based
on his doctoral dissertation, sheds light on this issue, arguing that the price for
the domestic stabilization of a group that was feared at one stage as a focus for
revanchist sentiment was a nationalist armlock on West German foreign policy
towards eastern Europe that lasted for several decades. The political issue of
how and on what terms refugees, expellees, and deportees are incorporated into
the nation-state that has received them remains in need of comparative analy

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278 ILWCH, 58, Fall 2000

sis, even though its relevance to the refounding of nation-states in Europe in the
late 1940s is evident.7
For western Europe, perhaps the major topic remains the nature of recon
struction under a regime of what might be called conservative modernization.
The prevailing view tends to see a moment in the immediate dopoliberazione
(1944-1945) when more radical political options emerged, only to be suppressed
by local and foreign forces. Patrick Major's recent study of the decline of the
Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD) stresses the power of occupation
forces, gripped by fear of communism?the KPD polled fourteen percent in lo
cal elections in North Rhein/Westfalia in 1947, and did better in the Ruhr than
it had in 1932. But a combination of repressive measures by the occupation gov
erments, the opposition of the Social-Democratic party (SPD), and home-grown
anticommunism successfully drove the KPD to the margins even before it was
banned in 1956. (The same argument can, incidentally, be made for Europe un
der Russian control, too, where the initial antifascist committees ["antifas"] and
other expressions of home-grown radicalism were suppressed in favor of foreign
backed proxies who took over, or who continued to dominate, the state appara
tus.) Others have told a similar story for countries from Greece?where parlia
mentary moderation was undercut by late 1946 by the burgeoning civil war?to
Belgium and France.8
The "continuity of the state" in western Europe meant the persistence of
authoritarian impulses?even after the defeat of fascism?that manifested
themselves in various ways. Purges of collaborators were partial and incomplete;
judicial mechanisms for trying traitors and criminals for wartime violence were
wound down or turned against the Left, notably in Italy and Greece. Where the
Left was tempted to retaliate, it was smashed by police action, as in Italy, or de
feated in full-scale civil war, as in Greece.9
Notable in this historiography?even as the focus switches from interna
tional to internal determinants of postwar state rebuilding?is a typically oppo
sitional stance to the state itself and those running it that seems to undervalue
aspects of the overall mood and perception of the political problems of the time.
Hence, the argument that postwar purges were incomplete or biased runs
counter to the evidence from public opinion polls that popular desire for a con
tinued settling of accounts with the past dropped sharply after late 1945, as peo
ple opted for stability and economic reconstruction instead. This does not mean
people wanted persecution of the Left, but it suggests that Christian Democrats
who preached "the strength to forget" were not out of tune with their elec
torates, and not only in Germany. As before the war, the revolutionary impulse
did not really run very deep in European society. Christian Democrats and oth
er conservatives were able to tap a potential quietism better than their rivals.
In contrast, the transformation this implied in political Catholic attitudes is
often taken for granted or ignored. Socialism appeals to scholars far more than
conservatism, and too often the latter is analyzed in terms of its role as a vehi
cle for scarcely reformed fascists rather than as the successful expression of a
mainstream longing for a parliamentary alternative to social democracy. Lately,

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Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar Europe, East and West 279

however, studies have emerged that chart the distance traveled by the latter in
the course of their rapid journey from interwar authoritarianism to a rap
prochement with post-1945 democratic institutions. Martin Conway's writings
on political Catholicism represent the first, and long overdue, serious historical
enquiries into this subject. By documenting the extent of the authoritarian im
pulse in interwar Catholic thought, Conway underscores the novelty of this force
for democracy after 1945. The transition required ideological readjustment and
an embrace of materialism and, to some extent, individualism in politics; but the
new ties were cemented rather quickly by the new interests generated for these
parties through the expansion of patronage and the consolidation of welfare
state capitalism.10
Memories of prewar instability also explain attitudes towards the econom
ics of reconstruction. There was widespread fear of a return to prewar capitalist
crisis and mass unemployment that clashed in unpredictable ways with orga
nized labor's postwar radicalization. The strike wave of the late 1940s and early
1950s awaits comparative historical treatment. However, the history of industri
al relations cannot be divorced from the flight to the cities, which for various rea
sons took place in both eastern and western Europe. One possibility, hinted at
in some of the literature, is that the rapid urbanization that was so important a
feature of the economic development of southern Europe in particular in the
1950s and 1960s was connected with the political repression of villagers in the
late 1940s. Thus, Catia Sonetti shows how the anonymity of the northern cities
welcomed peasants who had suffered for their participation in the sit-ins on
landed estates at the end of the war. Similarly, in Greece, cities offered anonymi
ty to leftist villagers who wanted protection from the surveillance of village
agents and gendarmes.11
Perhaps the biggest historiographical changes since 1989 have not occurred
in relation to western Europe at all. For the East, it is not only that conceptual
categories and scholarly priorities have changed; access to archives is for the first
time allowing historians to take over a task previously controlled by political sci
entists, that of analyzing the character of the imposition of communist power. A
landmark in this development was Norman Naimark's study of the Russian oc
cupation of Germany, which analyzed the emergence of a new regime that bal
anced the Soviet desire to micromanage the administration of German society
with opportunities that communist ideology made available?in a way that
Nazism never had?for local collaboration in politics, culture, and economic
life.12
Elsewhere, perhaps because Russian influence worked in different and less
obtrusive ways than it did in Germany, the focus has been less on Soviet power
and more on local communists. The challenges to communist predominance?
despite the backing of the Soviet Union?are emerging more and more clearly
in this work. Padraic Kenney has charted the enormous difficulties communists
faced in Poland in winning over workers. Despite the latter's evident desire for
radical social change, they remained suspicious of the Communist party, espe
cially in towns and cities where prewar traditions of labor organization had sur

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280 ILWCH, 58, Fall 2000

vived the war. By contrast, cities like Wroslaw, which were, in effect, new soci
eties composed of newcomers filling the gap left by the departed Germans,
proved much more susceptible to the Communist party's message; again, the
linkage between population displacements and political outcomes has become
a major theme. Both Kenney and Eric Weitz have also brought gender into the
discussion of early communist rule, stressing the way a gendered representation
of productive labor came into conflict with the reality of a labor force in which
women played a major role.13
Numerically, of course, the crucial sector of the labor force everywhere in
eastern Europe was the peasantry. In Yugoslavia, the war itself had brought the
Communist party and the peasantry together through the partisan struggle. The
war also forced urban communists to find ways of overcoming rural suspicions
of armed radicals and to wean peasants away from their longstanding affiliations
with the prewar Peasant party. A new study suggests that peasants were able to
succeed where Josef Stalin and the Allies had failed: in forcing domestic policy
changes on Marshal Tito's regime by their resistance to the Communist party's
efforts at collectivization. There was similar resistance elsewhere, although not
always so successful. David Kideckel, in his study of Romanian villagers, illu
minates the way the Communist party tried to impose collectivization upon the
countryside, and suggests that what transformed agrarian relations was less gov
ernmental policy or doctrine than sustained labor-intensive industrialization. In
Bulgaria, the villagers were no happier with imposed change from above; yet
some welcomed the founding of cooperatives and could even recognize that
communist dogma offered one solution to the land shortage and fragmentation
that had driven the countryside to hunger by the time the Second World War be
gan. All the above studies emphasize the limits to the communist ability to force
change on the countryside, and suggest that villager responses often had the ef
fect of forcing modification, change, or even abandonment of the Communist
party's original ideas. Whether there may be other, less obviously political fac
tors at work as well is a possibility raised below.14
Perhaps the most intellectually exciting and demanding effect of 1989 is the
challenge it poses to historians to search out commonalities in the postwar de
velopment of the two halves of the continent. The difficulty is obvious: how to
do this without overlooking major differences between East and West, whether
of prior experience, ideology, or the differing concrete impact of communist and
capitalist state forms. How, too, can one do this without appearing to equate two
basically unequal experiences? Nevertheless, certain fundamental symmetries
exist that it may be worth pointing out. Politically, both East and West saw broad,
national coalition governments give way between 1945 and 1948 to single party
administrations or narrower and more politically focused coalitions. To what ex
tent then?and this must at present be left an open question?should the so
called "salami tactics" adopted by communists in eastern Europe be explained
in tactical or structural terms? Economically, both halves of Europe saw high
savings and investment ratios, austerity programs, and heavy investment in cap
ital goods industries as means of moving from immediate postwar reconstruc

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Changing Trends in the Historiography of Postwar Europe, East and West 281

tion to longer-term development in ways that?despite international transfers

through Marshall Plan aid?were fundamentally based upon internally gener
ated sources of funds organized by national governments in closed economies.
Both, therefore, automatically faced economic and political tensions in their
handling of the peasantry, on the one hand, and the industrial working class, on
the other hand. Industrial unrest hit both halves of the continent before the post
war economic miracle took hold in the mid-1950s. But what threatened the rul
ing system in eastern Europe?and would eventually bring it crashing down thir
ty or so years later?only threatened the governing party in western Europe.
If we are still some distance from a genuinely unified history of the divided
continent, we are getting closer as historians increasingly give Europe's history
back to the Europeans. The postwar era no longer looks like the "end of the Eu
ropean era." Rather, it looks like the second half of the century's central decade.
This shook the nation-state to its foundations, exposing deep-seated dilemmas
and tensions within national societies that ran across class, gender, ethnic, and
regional lines. The effort to overcome these took place in a world dominated by
two superpowers, but it was largely an effort managed by the Europeans them
selves, and as such it forms part of a longer-run history of nation-state formation
in the modern era.

NOTES
1. A. Milward's The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (London, 1984), offers
a very different view to M. Hogan 's The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruc
tion of Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge, 1987). This debate is usefully summarized by D. Ell
wood's Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London,
1992). On new views of Greece, see D. Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War (London,
1995), emphasizing the indigenous Greek rightwing roots of civil war violence rather than
British or American diplomacy.
2. M. Myant's Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1948 (Cambridge,
1981), and C. Gati's Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, 1986) exemplify the trend.
3. J. Gross, "Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of Imposition of
Communist Regimes in East Central Europe," East European Politics and Society 3 (1989):
198-214; E. Heineman, "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and
West German National Identity," American Historical Review 1996 (101):354-395.
4. O. Bartov, Hitler's Army (Oxford, 1993); H. Heer and K. Naumann, eds., Vernich
tungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941-1944 (Hamburg, 1995), 157-90; War Crimes of the
Wehrmacht (New York, 2000); and C. Pavone, Una Guerra Civile: Saggio sulla Moralita nella
Resistenza (Turin, 1995). An important study in this spirit, which sees the violence of the
dopoliberazione as part of a longer story of agrarian relations dating back to the nineteenth
century, is G. Crainz, Padania: il mondo dei braccianti dall'Ottocento alia fuga dalle campagne
(Rome, 1994).
5. J. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War
II (New York, 1993). Also see Krieg-Zerstoerung-Aufbau. Architektur und Stadtplaung, 1940
1960 (Berlin, 1995).
6. E. D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status
in Nazi and Postwar Germany (California, 1999); E. Carter, How German is She? Postwar West
German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman (Ann Arbor, 1997); and F. Biess, "'Pio
neers of a New Germany': Returning POWs from the Soviet Union and the Making of East
German Citizens, 1945-1950," Central European History 32 (1999):143-180. See also
R. Moeller, ed., West Germany Under Construction: Politics, Society and Culture in the Ade
nauer Era (Ann Arbor, 1997).

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 282 ILWCH, 58, Fall 2000

7. R. Hayden, "Schindlern Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Population Transfers,"

Slavic Review 55 (1996):727-48; J. Chuminski and E. Kaszuba, "The Breslau Germans Under
Polish Rule, 1945-46: Conditions of Life, Political Attitudes," Studia Historiae Oeconomicae
22 (1997): 87-101; P. Ahonen, "Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of
the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era," Central European History 31 (1998):31-64.
8. P. Major, Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany,
1945-1956 (Oxford, 1998).
9. C. Pavone, "The General Problem of the Continuity of the State and the Legacy of Fas
cism," in After the War: Violence, Justice, Continuity and Renewal in Italian Society, ed. J. Dun
nage (Hull, 1999), 5-21. On failed purges, see R. Palmer Domenico, Italian Fascists on Trial,
1943-1948 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991); J. Dunnage, "Policing and Politics in the Southern Italian
Community, 1943-1948," in After the War, 32-48; and G. Neppi Modona, "Postwar Trials
Against Fascist Collaborationists and Partisans: The Piedmont Experience," in After the War,
48-59.
10. T. Buchanan and M. Conway, eds., Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965 (Ox
ford, 1996); M. Mitchell, "Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Social
ism, 1945-1949," Journal of Modern History 67 (1995):278-308; K. van Kersbergen, Social
Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (London, 1995); and
F. Traniello, "Political Catholicism, Catholic Organisation and Catholic Laity in the Recon
struction Years," in The Formation of the Italian Republic, ed. F Coppa and M. Repetto-Alaia
(Frankfurt, 1993), 27-55.
11. C. Sonetti,"The Family in Tuscany Between Fascism and the Cold War," in After the
War, 75-89; M. Dalianis, "Children in the Greek Civil War, Today's Adults," in After the War
was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Society and the Nation in Greece, 1944-1960, ed. M. Ma
zower (Princeton, 2000 forthcoming).
12. N. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
13. P. Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, NY,
1997); P. Kenney, "The Gender of Resistance in Communist Poland," American Historical Re
view 104 (1999):399-426; and E. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Pop
ular Protests to Socialist State (Princeton, 1997).
14. M. Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists: Politics and Ideology in the Yugoslav Coun
tryside, 1941-1953 (Pittsburgh, 1998); D. Kideckel, The Solitude of Collectivism: Romanian Vil
lagers to the Revolution and Beyond (Ithaca, NY, 1993); and G. Creed, Domesticating Revolu
tion: From Socialist Reform to Ambivalent Transition in a Bulgarian Village (University Park,
PA, 1998).

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