The Misuse of Expected Returns: Eric Hughson, Michael Stutzer, and Chris Yung
The Misuse of Expected Returns: Eric Hughson, Michael Stutzer, and Chris Yung
Volume 62 • Number 6
©2006, CFA Institute
Much textbook emphasis is placed on the mathematical notion of expected return and its historical
estimate via an arithmetic average of past returns. But those wanting to forecast a typical future
cumulative return should be more interested in estimating the median future cumulative return
than in estimating the mathematical expected cumulative return. For that purpose, continuous
compounding of the mathematical expected log gross return is more relevant than ordinary
compounding of the mathematical expected gross retum.
P
opular finance textbooks and other method- namely, compounding the arithmetic average to
ological treatises emphasize the relevance of produce cumulative retum forecasts at each future
a portfolio's expected retum and the use of horizon between 1 and 30 years. For example, the
time-averaged historical returns as an esti- forecasted cumulative retum after 1 year is 1.054^
mate of it. For example, Bodie, Kane, and Marcus = 1.054, and after 30 years, it is 1.054^0 = 4799. that
(2004) state: is, an initial investment of SI.00 is forecasted to
... if our focus is on future performance then grow to about $4.80. But this retum forecast is far
the arithmetic average is the statistic of interest higher than the 30-year historical cumulative
because it is an unbiased estimate of an asset's retum (3.005) shown at the bottom of the last col-
future returns, (p. 865) umn, which suggests that the arithmetic average-
A more detailed procedure for using this average based forecast in the fourth column may be too
is found in a respected researcher's survey article: high. We will now document that such overblown
forecasts are very likely to happen in practice.
When returns are serially uncorrelated—that
is, when one year's retum is unrelated to the The overoptimism inherent when the arith-
next year's retum—the arithmetic average metic average retum is used to forecast is illus-
represents the best forecast of future retum in trated in Table 2 and Figure 1, which report the
any randonUy selected year. For long holding results from a bootstrap simulation of one million
periods, the best return forecast is the arith- possible future cumulative retums derived from
metic average compounded up appropriately. the annual gross returns given in Table 1.^ Both
(Campbell 2001, p. 3)
Tabie 2 and Figure 1 clearly show that the mathe-
For an illustration of the quoted concepts, con- matical expected cumulative return is always
sider a hypothetical broad-based stock index with higher than the median cumulative retum (i.e., the
returns that are corxsistent with the ubiquitous ran- retum that has equal chances of being exceeded or
dom walk hypothesis. Annual gross (i.e., 1 plus net) not) and that the gap between the two increases as
retums for each of the past 30 years from the hypo- the time horizon lengthens and the cumulative
thetical index are given in the second column of retum distribution becomes more highly skewed to
Table 1. The arithmetic average gross retum is the right. For example, at the 10-year horizon, the
1.054 (i.e., the net retum averages 5.4 a year). The mathematical expected cumulative retum is 1.72,
last column provides the historical cumulative which is 18 percent bugher than the median cumu-
retums. The fourth column of Table 1 shows the lative return (1.46). At the 30-year horizon, the
cumulative retum forecasts calculated by follow- mathematical expected cumulative retum is 67 per-
ing the advice in the Campbell (2001) quotation— cent higher than the median cumulative retum. As
a result, the mathematical expected cumulative
return is less likely to be realized (i.e., met or
Eric Hughson and Chris Yung are professors of finance
exceeded by the future cumulative retum) in the
in the Leeds School of Business at the University of
future than the median retum, and this likelihood
Colorado, Boulder. Michael Stutzer is professor of
is more pronounced for the long horizons used by
finance and director oftheBurridge Center for Securities
Analysis and Valuation in the Leeds School of Business
retirement planners. For example, there is a 38 per-
at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
cent probability that the mathematical expected
40,000 80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
Cumulative Return Cumulative Return
cumulative retum will be exceeded at the 10-year Why Use the Arithmetic Average
horizon and only a 30 percent probability that it
will be exceeded at the 30-year horizon. Return In Forecasting?
The third column in Table 1 contains the loga- Two motives are put forth for using the arithmetic
rithms of the historical gross retums. The average of average retum, but neither is convincing. The first
these logarithms is lower than the arithmetic aver- motive is somewhat complex. Recall that the mathe-
age of the gross retums themselves. Table 2 con- matical expectation of something is the probability-
trasts forecasts that compound the arithmetic weighted average of its possible values. The
average gross retum with those that (continuously) quotations that began this article use this mathemat-
compound the average hg gross retum (3.7 percent ical definition of expectation. When portfolio gross
from Table 1). It is also common for analysts to call retums K, are independently (I) and identically dis-
the number e^-^^'^ - 1 == 0.038 percent the geometric tributed (ID), the mathematical expected cumula-
average net retum, in which case the last column of tive retum (denoted by E) is the compounded value
Table 2 is equivalently produced by ordinary com- of the expected gross retum per period—that is,
pounding of the geometric average gross retum (i.e.,
1.038'),^ Table 2 shows that the compounded aver- (0 ?• (ID)
age of the log gross retums is far closer to the simu- { ) Yt=] l { )
lated median future cumulative retum than is the
compounded arithmetic average (1.054^), which in where Wj denotes the (random) cumulative return
tum, is far closer to the simulated mathematical T periods in the future.
expected future cumulative return. At the relatively In addition, with the same IID assumption, the
long horizons that characterize retirement planning, arithmetic average of historical gross retums is a
the unwarranted optimism inherent in the arith- commonly used estimate of the (unknown) con-
metic average-based forecasts will probably lead to stant mathematical expected gross retum E{Ri) per
excessively high investment in stocks. period, which becomes a more accurate estimate as
To confirm that these problems also occur the calendar history of gross retums lengthens.
when actual monthly historical returns are used, we This argument is the typical motivation (as used in
applied the same bootstrap simulation technique to the opening quotation) for substituting the arith-
the widely used 1926-2004 large-capitalization metic average gross retum (i.e., 1.054 percent) for
stock monthly retums produced by CRSP. The the unobserved expected gross retum per period,
results, depicted in Figure 2 and Table 3, confirm EiRx).^ But as Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 2 and 3
the previous problems. Moreover, a proof in show, the mathematical expected cumulative
Appendix A shows that these phenomena are return, E{Wj), for a stock index is less likely to be
generic, not simply the result of the specific data or equaled or exceeded than the median cumulative
accuracy of the simulations.
retum is. The situation becomes extreme in the long
These findings are important because some
run because, as proven in Appendix A,
investors do use the overly optimistic forecast pro-
cedure based on the historical arithmetic average.
For example, in 2001, the chief actuary of the U.S. pwb[Wj->E{Wj-)] = 0.
Social Security Admirustration described forecast So, perhaps some long-term investors want to
procedures used in the organization's study of indi- forecast the expected cumulative retum because
vidual retirement account options that had been they use the word "expected" in its dictionary
proposed but notyet enacted. The actuary noted that sense, rather than its mathematical sense. Accord-
for individual account proposals, analysis of ing to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
expected benefit levels and money's worth "expect" means "to anticipate or look forward to
was aiso provided using a higher annual
equity yield assumption of about 9.6 percent. the coming or occtirrence of" or "to consider prob-
This higher average yield reflected the arith- able or certain." Long-term investors using this
metic mean, rather than the geometric mean sense of the word will want to forecast the median
(which was 7 percent), of historical data for cumulative retum rather tlian the mathematical
annual yields. (Campbell 2001, pp. 55-56) expected cumulative return because the unknown
In other words, the actuary made separate forecasts future cumulative retum is more likely to equal or
by compounding equity accounts at both the 9.6 exceed the median. Tables 2 and 3 suggest that such
percent historical arithmetic average retum and the investors should continuously compound the aver-
7 percent geometric average retum. We now exam- age log gross retum (or, equivalently, simply com-
ine possible reasons for compounding at the histor- pound the geometric average retum) when making
ical arithmetic average retum rate. forecasts based solely on historical data.
8,000
7,000
r 16,000
14,000
6,000
5,000
-\ \
A
12,000
10,000
\
\
4,000 8,000
]\
3,000 6,000
\ \
2,000 4,000
Jj .
1,000 2,000
0 0
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
Cumulative Return Cumulative Retum
35,000 r i\
1 100,000
30,000 l\
\
25,000 •I I 75,000
20,000 -I \
50,000
15,000 > \
10,000 W
25,000
5,000 vi \ ^
0 1 0
30.0 40.0 50.0 0 25.0 .JO.O 75.0 lro.O 125.0 150.0
e Retum Cumulative Retum
A
A
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
\
40,000 •
\
20,000 -
^ _
0 1. 1 .1. ^ ^ ^ ^
A second possible motive for interest in fore- Hence, they act "as if" the forecast loss is the fore-
casting the mathematical expected cumulative cast error itself, rather than the squared error.
rehim arises from the statistical theory of best fore-
casts. This theory requires that the forecaster
choose a loss function that quantifies the loss Limitations of Historical Returns
incurred by missing the forecast. Of course, the Unfortunately, using a historical average to estimate
forecast error is random, so the best forecast is the either the unknown expected gross return per year
one that minimizes a misforecasting "cost," or expected log gross return per year requires, even
defined to be the mathematical expected loss. under the ideal statistical circumstances embodied
When the loss is proportional to the squared forecast in the IID assumption, a very long calendar history
error, it is well known (see, for example, Zellner of returns. Under the IID assumption, the estimate
1990) that the best forecast, m this sense ofthe word becomes progressively more accurate as the number
"best," is the mathematical expected cumulative of available past years' returns gets larger. But the
return, despite the fact that it will be higher than convergence to the unknown true number is typi-
the median cumulative return. To understand why, cally slow. Measuring returns more frequently (e.g.,
consider the loss associated with underforecasting monthly or daily instead of annually) does abso-
an unusually high cumulative return. The loss is lutely no good."*
extremely high because it is found by squaring the For an illustration of this point, note that the
error between the high cumulative return and the hypothetical annual stock returns in Table 1 (and
(lower) forecast. For example, suppose the forecast used to produce Figure 1 and Table 2) were ran-
error is +3. Then, the loss is 9, which is three times domly sampled from a lognormal distribution
the size of the forecast error itself. Now, because with a volatility of 15 percent. Suppose we would
cumulative returns are inherently positively like to be 95 percent confident that the historical
skewed, the chance of underforecasting by an average log gross annual return is within 400 bps
unusually large amount is greater than the chance of the (unknown) expected log gross return per
of overforecasting. As a result, to minimize the year. Appendix A shows that we would need more
chance of underforecasting by an unusually large than 54 years of past log gross returns to ensure this
amount, the forecast that minimizes the mathemat- confidence level. And ±400 bps per year is probably
ical expected squared forecast error will be higher too wide an uncertainty band for many financial
than the median. But this mathematical result is planning purposes.
merely an alternative way of characterizing the Moreover, even if we did have a long calendar
behavior of someone who uses the expected cumu- history of returns, how likely is it that those returns
lative return as a forecast. It is not a recommenda- would continue being generated by the same IID
tion that investors use the squared forecast error to process? If the probability distribution of the mea-
measure the loss from misforecasting. In fact, stat- sured returns changes over time, the compounding
isticians have also shown that if investors use the of historical averages will be very misleading, espe-
forecast error itself to measure the loss from mis- cially for short- or medium-term forecasts. Asness
forecasting, the median is the statistically best fore- (2005) noted:
cast. After seeing the results in this article, we
believe that most long-term investors would con- When it comes to forecasting the future,
sider the median cumulative return to be a better especially when valuations (and thus histori-
cai returns) are at extremes, the answers we
forecast than the expected cumulative return. get from looking at simple historical averages
are bunk. (p. 37)
so raising either side of Equation A20 to the power measure log retums I/At times per year {e.g.. At =
T produces the same T-period cumulative retum 1/12 when retums are measured monthly). Then,
forecast—a "plug-in" estimator of Equation A17. If the log gross retum per measurement period has an
R, is used to denote a generic random historical expected value of (^ - a^/2)Af, so a historical aver-
gross retum, a desirable property of this plug-in age of N s T/At log gross retums (i.e., T years of
estimator is that history) will also be normally distributed with an
expected value equal to (fj - o^/2)A(. Hence, an
Median (A21) unbiased estimator of ^ -CT^/2is the historical aver-
Median = e
age log gross retum divided by Af. Because the log
which we dub "median unbiasedness." A more gross retum per measurement period has a variance
complex procedure might provide a better estimator of a^Af, the variance of the unbiased estimator is
of the median cumulative retum, but simplicity of <y^{Atf/T divided by {AO^ which equals a^/T and
implementation and motivation are practitioners' is hence independent of the retum measurement
desiderata that would be implicitly ignored by those interval, Af. A 95 percent confidence interval for
(if any) who advocated a more complex procedure.
the historical average will then have a width of
Unfortunately, historical arithmetic or geomet-
± 1.96o/ Jf. For that width to be +0.(K, T would have
ric averages are inherently imprecise estimators—a
fact that is easily illustrated under lognormality. to be 0^(1.96/0.04)2 ^^^^.^ SubsHtutingCT= 0.15
The log of the one-year cumulative retum distribu- yields 54 years, no matter how frequently retums are
tion has an expected value oi\i- cr/2. Suppose we measured, as claimed near the end of the text.
Notes
T random draws from the annual gross retums in Table 1 ematical expected cumulative return, They added tbe
were multiplied to produce a possible T-year cumulative assumption that returns are lognormally distributed and
retum. Tbe procedure was repeated one million times to proposed better estimators of the unknown mathematical
produce eacb of the smootbed histograms in Figure 1, expected cumulative retum. Our goal is different, however,
whose means and medians are reported in Table 2. for we are highlighting flaws in the arguments used to justify
See Appendix A for a derivation of this equivalence and the the relevance of estimating tbe mathematical expected
other mathematical claims made later in the text. cumulative retum in the first place. We argue that estimat-
Even this typical motivation is flawed. An interesting article ing the median cumulative retum is a much more relevant
by Jacquier, Kane, and Marcus (2003) highlighted problems objective, regardless of whether the returns are lognormal.
resulting from compounding the historical arithmetic aver- See Luenberger (1998) for a simple exposition of this prob-
age to produce a data-based estimate of tbe unknown math- lem and Appendix A for a specific calculation.
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