1. Honasan, II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, G.R. No.

159747, June
15, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner filed a motion to cite respondent in contempt alleging that the issuance of the
assailed order was in direct contravention and flagrant violation of the agreement of the
parties – which was to remain the status quo before filing of certiorari. Petitioner
argued that he still have 15 days from receipt of the Court’s decision which was on April
22 2004 (May 7 2004 will be the 15 th day) to file for a motion for reconsideration and
therefore the decision dated April 13 2004 is not yet final and executory.
Issue: Did respondent commit contempt of court?
Ruling:
No. The court found no contemptuous intent on the part of respondent to impede the
administration of justice. Responded had explained that the charges against petitioner
was filed with the DOJ in August 2003 and since then, the preliminary investigation has
been pending and petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition was taken into account.
Further, it was found that petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration 30 days late, on
July 8 2004.
Motion to cite respondent in contempt of court was denied.
2. Local Government Code; Hagonoy v. Municipality, G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002
Facts:
On October 1 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy Bulacan enacted ordinance
Kautusan Blg. 28 which increased the market stall rentals. Said ordinance should take
effect upon approval and was posted from November 4-25 1996.
On November 1997, market vendors were given copies of the ordinance and were
informed that it should be enforced on January 1998. On December 8 1997, petitioners
filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice questioning the constitutionality of the
ordinance and also claiming that they were not aware of posting of the ordinance.
Respondent contended that the ordinance had taken effect on October 1996 and was
posted. Also, responded contended that petitioner’s appeal was already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time,
i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as
prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Was the Appeal to the Secretary of Justice time barred?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under Section 187 of the Local Government Code, it
requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the
Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even
during its pendency; the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended.
Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
3. Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committee on Public Information, and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology
and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Garcillano implored from the Court the issuance of an injunctive writ to
prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report without duly published rules of procedure.
Respondents admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers
of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. Respondents reasoned that the reason
for non-publication is that the rules have never been amended since 1995. Further, the
rules were published in the webpage of the Senate.
Issue:
Is publication through the internet valid and substantial in complying the constitutional
requirement of publication?
Ruling:
No. R.A. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act, considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for
evidentiary purposes. It does not make the internet a valid medium for publication of
laws, rules, and regulations.
The Court ordered for a writ of prohibition be issued ordering the Senate of the Republic
of the Philippines from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
tapes.

4. Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner married Rubylus Gaa on July 28 1975. In 1996, he met private complainant
Tina B. Gandalera and eventually also married her. After some time, the marriage of
petitioner with Gandalera started to fail as he only went home twice or thrice a year and
he would slap Gandalera whenever she asked for money. Gandelara made inquiries at
the National Statistics Office and found out that petitioner was already married before.
Petitioner stated that he declared he was single in his marriage with Gandelara because
he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid, that he did not know that he
had to go to the court to seek nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Gandelara. The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner's
first wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the
Family Code?
Ruling:
No. The Family Code amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. The requirements for a
subsequent bigamous marriage to be considered valid, are: (1) the prior spouse have
been absent for four consecutive years, (2) the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead, and (3) a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse. The third rule was designed to harmonize with Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code which defines and penalizes bigamy.
5. Miaque v. Judge Pamonag, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1412, March 28, 2003
Facts:
On August 27 1998, complainants Bernie Miaque, Noel Cabobos, Rodolfo Divinagracia
and Peter Jimenea, were charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pototan-
Mina, Iloilo, presided by respondent Judge Nilo P. Pamonag, with the crime of libel. The
respondent Judge conducted a preliminary investigation and issued warrants for the
arrest of the complainants.
Complainants filed an administrative case against the respondent Judge for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of judicial functions and authority and issuing patently
illegal orders. Complainants contended that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, the respondent Judge neither has the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation nor to issue warrants for their arrest
Respondent admitted his mistake and explained that the same was his first libel case
and that he issued the challenged warrants in good faith. He said that he erroneously
relied on a pamphlet of the Revises Penal Code quoting Article 360 which consisted only
of four (4) paragraphs, without any word on the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Issue:
Was respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of judicial
functions and authority and issuing patently illegal orders?
Ruling:
Yes. The court held that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4363, which took effect on June 19, 1965, the jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation in libel cases is lodged with the provincial or city prosecutor of
the province or city or with the municipal court of the city or capital of the province.
Respondent was fined and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
6. Estate of Boo v. Gee, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922
Facts:
Cheong Boo allegedly married Tan Dit in China in 1895 and had a son, Cheong Seng Gee.
When Cheong Boo went to the Philippines, he contacted another marriage, through
Mohammedan rites, with Mora Adong and had two children, Payang and Rosalia.
Cheong Boo died intestate. Cheong Seng Gee and his family in the Philippines were
fighting over his property. The order of the trial judge was to divide his property among
his natural children.
Issue:
a. Was the Chinese marriage valid?
b. Was the Mohammedan marriage valid?
Ruling:
a. No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All
marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the
country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." However,
there was no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of
Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. Cheong Seng Gee had only rights of a
natural child.
b. Yes. The Court found the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of
the Mohammedan marriage and the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as
validating marriages performed in Mohammedan rites.
7. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.P. Eusebio
Construction, Inc. Et Al, G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004
Facts:
The State Organization of Buildings (SOB) of Iraq awarded the construction of the
Institute of Physical Therapy – Medical Rehabilitation in Baghdad, Iraq to Ajyal Trading
and Contracting Company (Ajyal), a firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of
Commerce. 3-Plex International, Inc (3-Plex) entered into a joint venture with Ajyal.
Since 3-Plex was not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction, it awarded its
rights to V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. (VP). For compliance with the bond requirement
of SOB, 3-Plex and VP applied for a guarantee with Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee). SOB wanted another foreign bank to provide
the counter guarantee to Rafidain Bank of Iraq and Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen.
VP, Ajyal, and SOB entered into a contract where VP and Ajyal would supply manpower
and materials, and SOB would refund to the former 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar
and the 75% in US dollars at the exchange rate of 1 Dinar to 3.37777 US Dollars .The
project was to be completed within 18 months, as agreed upon in a contract between
SOB and VP. However, there was a delay in construction and the joint venture
contractor worked for the renewal of the Performance Bond up to December 1986. As
of March 1986, the status of the Project was 51% accomplished, meaning the structures
were already finished. The remaining 47% consisted in electro-mechanical works and
the 2%, sanitary works, which both required importation of equipment and materials.
On October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its
performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VP requested Iraq Trade and
Economic Development to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual
agreement that the penalty would be held in abeyance until completion of the project.
VP also protested to SOB for the noncompliance of the 75% refund in US Dollars.
Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain
Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli Bank representing the full
payment of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq.
Philguarantee demanded respondents to pay for the surety bond. A case for collection
for sum of money was filed but was dismissed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the respondent contractor has defaulted in its obligations that would justify
resort to the guaranty.
Ruling:
No. Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides that in reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. The non-completion of the project was partly
because of the SOB’s non-performance of duties. SOB failed to pay 75% of the project
cost in US Dollars which was to be used in purchasing materials from foreign sources.
8. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and C.F. Sharp & Company Inc.,
G.R. No. 112573, February 9, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines and respondent C.F. Sharp & Company Inc. entered
into an agreement where the former authorizes the latter to sell its plane tickets.
Petitioner then sued respondent in Japan for not remitting sales. A writ of summons was
to be served to respondent by Tokyo District Court but the summons was not served
after two attempts. The Tokyo District Court then decided to serve the summons in
Manila, where the head office of respondent was located. Petitioner filed a suit of
enforcement of judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Respondent then
filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese Court sought to be enforced
is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due
and proper notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear
mistake of law and fact. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals decided in
favor of the respondent.
Issue:
Whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing
business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine
corporation.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that a foreign judgment presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. The extraterritorial service of
summons by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption
but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
The Court ordered respondent to pay what the latter owed petitioner.
9. Moy Ya Lim Yao “Alias” Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim And Lau Yuen Yeung v.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
Facts:
Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese living in Hong Kong, applied for a visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. She had her visa repeatedly extended and while she was in the
Philippines, she married Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Does marriage with a Filipino citizen automatically confer Philippine citizenship?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 15 of Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January
1962.
10. Mercado v. Manzano & COMELEC, G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
Facts:
A petition for disqualification was filed against Eduardo Manzano to hold vice mayor
position on the grounds that he was a dual citizen of the United States and the
Philippines. The COMELEC disqualified Manzano pursuant to the Local Government
Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public
position.
Issue:
Is dual citizenship a ground for disqualification to hold any public position?
Ruling:
No. The Court differentiated dual citizenship from dual allegiance and held that the dual
citizenship as referred to by the Local Government code was in fact dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is not a
ground for disqualification.
11. Bengson v. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001
Facts:
The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the House of Representatives, was
questioned as to he was not a natural born Philippine citizen. Cruz was born in the
Philippines but he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen
in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative.
Issue:
Was Cruz a natural born Philippine citizen?
Ruling:
Yes. Upon reacquiring his Philippine citizenship under RA 2630, he had taken an oath of
allegiance to the Republic and this act of repatriation allowed him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
12. Agapito Aquino V. COMELEC, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and Juanito Icaro, G.R.
No. 120265, September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for Makati City Second
District Representative. Respondents filed a petition for disqualification on the grounds
of lack of residence qualification of petitioner.
Issue:
Did the petitioner lack the residence qualification as required by Section 6 Article VI of
the Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes. The COMELEC found that petitioner was a resident of Tarlac before moving to
Makati. The Court held that transferring of petitioner’s domicile from Tarlac to Makati
was a bare assertion which was hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench.
Petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. There was an absence of clear and
positive proof that would prove that petitioner intended to move to Makati.
13. Luis Asistio v. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27,
2010
Facts:
A Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City was
filed by private respondent Enrico Echiverri against Luis Asistio on the grounds that
Asistio was not a resident of Caloocan City, at 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15.
The Metropolitan Trial Court issued a Notice of Hearing notifying Asistio, through his
counsel of the scheduled hearings of the case. Asistio filed his Answer alleging that he
was a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of
Precinct No. 1811A. Asistio said that he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the
contract of lease with Angelina Tengco which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay
15, Caloocan City. Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision removing the name of Asistio
from the list of voters. Asistio appealed but Echiverri filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal with the argument that the Regional Trical Court did not have jurisdiction for
failure to file appeal fees.
Issue:
Should Asistio be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Precinct 1811A of
Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law as evidenced by a
false or non existent address?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter,
should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. Asistio had always been a
resident of Caloocan City, belonging to a prominent family in Caloocan, and served as a
public official on numerous occasions. There was no proof showing that he abandoned
his domicile in Caloocan City.
The Court ruled in favor of Asistio, making him still a registered voter of Caloocan City.
14.  Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L- 14628, September 30, 1960
Facts:
Soledad Cagigas met Francisco Hermosisima, 10 years her junior. They had sexual
intercourse and she got pregnant. Francisco promised to marry her. Their child was then
born on June 17 1954 but on July 24 1954, Francisco married someone else. Soledad
then filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize their daughter and for
damages for breach of promise to marry. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of
Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Is moral damages recoverable under breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:
No. The Court held that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
The lower courts based their decision on awards for damages under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. However, in this case, there was no seduction in the part of Francisco.
Soledad, being 10 years older, wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement
before having benefit of the clergy.
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision with the elimination for moral
damages.
15. Locsin v. Mekeni Food Corporation, G.R. No. 192105, 09 December 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Locsin worked for respondent Mekeni as Regional Sales Manager on . As a
part of his compensation and benefit package, a car was offered to him. Petitioner
would shoulder half the cost of the car through monthly salary deductions. The car was
valued at P280,000.00.
Petitioner then resigned and a total of P112,500.00 had been already deducted from his
salary for the payment of the car. Petitioner made personal and written follow-ups
regarding his unpaid salaries, commissions, benefits, and offer to purchase his service
vehicle. Mekeni replied that the company car plan benefit applied only to employees
who have been with the company for five years; for this reason, the balance that
petitioner should pay on his service vehicle stood at P116,380.00 if he opts to purchase
the same.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Mekeni for the recovery of monetary claims
consisting of unpaid salaries, commissions, sick/vacation leave benefits, and recovery of
monthly salary deductions which were earmarked for his cost-sharing in the car plan.
Issue:
Was petitioner entitled to a full refund of the deducted monthly salaries for payment of
the car?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that there was no evidence to suggest that if petitioner failed to
completely cover one-half of the cost of the vehicle, then all the deductions from his
salary going to the cost of the vehicle would be treated as rentals for his use thereof
while working with Mekeni, and shall not be refunded. A quasi-contractual relation was
created between petitioner and respondent. An unjust enrichment would occur, in favor
of Mekeni, if Mekeni would not refund petitioner’s payments.
Respondent was ordered to refund petitioner the total amount of P112,500.00.