Brent School, Inc. v.
Zamora
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
Facts:
1. Doroteo R. Alegre is an athletic director at Brent School, Inc. with a
yearly compensation of P20,000.00. 4 His conract with the school
hasa specific term of five (5) years, from July 18, 1971 to July 17,
1976.
2. On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent
School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his
services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the
termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite
period of employment." A month or so later, on May 26, 1976, Alegre
accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor
containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May
16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
3. Alegre protested that although his contract did stipulate that it would
end July 17, 1976, he cannot be terminated because he had earned
the status of a regular employee.
4. Brent School Inc., was ordered by the Regional Direcrtor to reinstate
Alegre as a “permanent employee, to his former position without loss
of seniority rights and with full back wages.
5. Brent filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have
anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
Ruling:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School
having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the
agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to
reinstatement.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of
probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED
PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of
Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for
which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite
period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a
fixed period" in the following manner: …where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where
the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a
definite period" and "regular" employment were amended by
Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment,"
was altered by eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a
fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).
Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment
contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but
would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right
of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of
his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation
should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable
interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the
whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the
principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using
it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of
tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly,
curing a headache by lopping off the head.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a
meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.
Since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly
appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention
of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said
article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral
agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as
defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil
that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into
precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no
application to instances where a fixed period of employment was
agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any
force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent,
or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.
Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to
purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus
becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead
to absurd and unintended consequences.
