Gonzales III vs.
Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
Facts:
1. In 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the
PNP-NCR against Rolando Mendoza and four others.
2. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon
the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
3. On February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio
Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman.
4. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
5. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of
the case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft
Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released
a draft Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and
forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27,
2010.
6. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010,
petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final
approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it
remained pending for final review and action when Mendoza hijacked
a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in
a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
7. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against
the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
8. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
9. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to
participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of
the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.
10. IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among
those in whom culpability must lie. It recommended that its findings
with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the
President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative
offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative
proceedings. On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal
Charge against petitioner.
11. Petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman
to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and
that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein,
necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the President, acting through individual
respondents, has constitutional or valid statutory authority to subject
petitioner to an administrative investigation and to thereafter order his
removal as Deputy Ombudsman.
Ruling:
Yes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively
is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive
or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on
the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a
statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not
as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as
parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both
provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act
was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such
legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance"
intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from
administrative liabilities.
