G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992 Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr.

were sweethearts, but

two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a
quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at
vs. the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents. Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she
believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
 
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside
REGALADO, J.: the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right
side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat
Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff
May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and protested, but which the duo ignored and instead
Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at threatened her not to make any noise as they were
Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying ready to die and would bump the car against the post if
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled
its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they
reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the
from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and
factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the
appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:
joint strength of the two male combatants because of
her natural weakness being a woman and her small
Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel
indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel
sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in down and embraced her, his companion held her two
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr.
and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, threatened her that he would ask his companion to
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on
of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application how blood came out of her private parts after her vagina
for a marriage license. was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr.
(t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag,
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Jr. once more to allow her to go home but the latter
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, would not consent and stated that he would only let her
which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as go after they were married as he intended to marry her,
follows: so much so that she promised not to make any scandal
and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already gone, and
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
she testified, single and had finished a college course in grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila
Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n.,
September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same
afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of
Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following
Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, day which was a Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go
Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion. to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they
 did. They filed their applications for marriage license Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home,
(Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant
defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos,
Leon and lived there as husband and wife from Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and
September 8, 1973 to September 29, 1973. Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They
finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered
using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, the
On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon
never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until September 19, 1873.
go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-
ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him to break
eat because of the deception done against her by off their plan to get married.
defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the
The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda,
September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-
at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of
mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts
efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff of his son. He came to know about his son's whereabouts when he was told
might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his
March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and
day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3
Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili
of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and
Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag,
and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August
Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent,
Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent
already. Let us settle the matter and have them P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of
married." temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit.
Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her
honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag,
promised they would be married. Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants,
assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized
by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-
Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding
1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5
eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their
relationship.
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for
Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff- reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review,
appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for
known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on
made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement
Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6
the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the)
aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising
was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good
witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court. customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant
and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence
presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on
analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of
the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent court. the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every
constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise
of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action
subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law. does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it
findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and the extinction of the civil action.
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature
falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a review of the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between
records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of private respondent. the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that
there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal
and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff
erred in awarding damages. to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise
to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those SO ORDERED.
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to
paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.
moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave
so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and Nocon, J., took no part.
moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10