Bochlll11Cr StliJil'n zur Phi losophic 17

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An introduction to
Plotinus Ennead 5.3 [49]

Henri Oosthout

B.R. GRUNER PUBLISHING COMPANY

 HENRI OOSTHOUT

Modes of Knowledge
and the Transcendental
An Introduction
to Plotinus Ennead 5.3 [49]
with a Commentary and Translation

B.R. GRUNER
AMSTERDAM· PHILADELPHIA
1991

;opynghted )1
Li brary of Congress Ca taloging-in-Publicatio n Data

OosthoUT, Henri.
Modes of knowledge and the transcendent al : an introduction to Plotinus Ennead 5.3 (49)
with a commentary and translation I Henri O osthout.
p. cm . -- (Bochumer St udien zur Phil osophie ; Bd. 17)
Includes b ibliograph ical references and index.
L Plot inus, Enneads. V , 3. 2. Knowledge, Theo ry o f -- H istory. L Plotinus, Enneads. V, 3.
E nglish, 1991. II . Title. III . Series.
B693 .E60S7 1991
186 ' A--dc20 91-23974
ISBN 90 6032 319 X CIP

No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any fo nn, by prin t, photoprint,
microfi lm, or any other means, without written pennission from the publisher.

© by B.R. Gruner, 1991

ISBN 90603 2 3 19 X
Printed in The Netherlands

B.R. Gruner is an impri nt of John Benjamin s Pu bl ishing Co,

P.O. Box 75577 - 1070 AN Amsterdam - The Netherlands

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 TABLE OF CON'l'EN'lS

PREFACE .......................... ,............................................................ ................... ........... vii

I INTRODUCIION .......................................................................................... ". 1

1 INTERPRETING PLOTINUS ................................................................ 1

Methods of Interpretation, 1; Plotinus and the History of Greek
Philosophy, 8; Preliminary Remarks, 13

2 THE TREATISE «MODES OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE

TRANSCENDENTAL> ......... ,.............. ,............................................ 15
Place Among the Other Works, 15; The Title, 17; Summary, 19;
Editions, Translations, Commentaries, 23; A Note on the Trans·
lation, 24

II ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE ......................................... 26

A Transcendental Method, 26; Self-knowledge and the Concept of
«We», 31; An Antithesis Between the Psychical and the Physical
Realm? , 42; Idealism or Realism?, 58; Unity as a Limiting Con-
cept,70

III MODES OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL ......... 75

1 MODES OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE .................. ................................... 75

1.1 A Philosophical Problem: Defining the Nature of That
which Thinks Itself (ch. 1) ....................................... ...................... 75
1.2 A Short Psychology of Perception (ch. 2) ........................................ 82
1.3 Self-Knowledge and Human Thought (chs. 3-4) ............................ 88
1.4 The Mind's Self-Knowledge (ch. 5) ................................................ 103
1.5 Logical necessity and persuasion (ch. 6, ll. 1-35) .......................... 110
1.6 The Inwardness of the Mind (ch. 6, ll. :;5 ff., and ch. 7) .............. 114
1.7 An Enlightening Metaphor (chs. 8-9) ............................................. 119

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 THE ULTIMATE LIMIT OF THOUGHT ..................................... 131

2.1 The Intrinsic Plurality of Thought (ch. la, 11. 1-39) ...................... 131
2.2 A Striving fo r Unity (ch. la, 1. 39 - ch. 11, 1. 16) ........................... 138
2.3 In What Sense is Unity the Origin of All Things?
(ch. 11, 1. 16 - ch. 12) .................................................................... 149
2.4 How Can We Speak About Wbat Goes Beyond
Thought? chs. 13-14) .................................................................... 158
2.5 How Can a Unity Provide What I t Does Not Have? (ch. 15) .... 164
2.6 An Ascent to the Absolutely One (ch. 16 and ch. 17, 11. 1-14) .... 174
2.7 Epilogue (ch. 17, 11.15 ff.) ................................................................ 180

INDEX OF CLASSICAL AUTHORS ................................................................... 184

INDEX OF GREEK WORDS ................................................................................. 190

GENERAL INDEX .......................................... ,................................................ ........ 193

•
V1

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 PREFACE

This book is what its subtitle indicates: an introduction to a central text in the
history of later Greek philosophy. It does not claim to give a complete survey of
Plotinian thought. Nor did I want to present yet another specimen of the histori-
cal approach which looks upon the Plotinian treatises as a conglomerate of tradi-
tional topics and conventional schemes, rather than as the coherent result of orig-
inal philosophical thinking. Indeed my intention has been no other than to return
to the Greek text of Ennead 5.3, and explain Plotinus's line of argument as clearly
as possible in modern language. In particular, I have so ught to replace the
esoteric and often cryptic terminology which is not uncommon among students of
Neoplatonism, with one that is more likely to convey the essence of Plotinus's
metaphysics to today's reader.
The major part of this book was written during the year 1987-1988, when I was
a fellow of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in th e Humanities and
•
Social Sciences. lowe to this institute for giving me the opportunity to ponder on
the Plotinian universe, «far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife». I further-
more want to express my gratitude towards those who, directly or indirectly. con-
tributed to this book. First, I should like to mention two of my former teachers at
the university of Nijrnegen: the late Prof. M. van Straaten, who introduce d me
into the study of Plotinus, and Prof. GJ.M. Bartelink, under whose supervision I
wrote my doctoral dissertat ion. A number of persons read the manuscript and
commented on it , either extensively, or in the form of brief remarks and
bibliographical suggestions. They are: Prof. AH. Armstrong; Prof. AP. Bas;
Mrs. J.H. Kmenta and D. Kmenta, M.A; Prof. P. Prini; Drs. G.A van Schilt; and
Prof. J.C.M. van Winden. None of them, however, should be held responsible for
any disputable assertion on Plotinian philosophy in this book, or for any
inaccuracies in the use of the English language. Finally, but not least, I thank my
father for his continuous and lively interest in my work, and Elle n for her
unremitting support.

"
Vtl

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Copyrigh!!:'d malenal
 I
INTRODUCTION

1 INTERPRE'llNG PLOTINUS

Methods of Interpretation, 1; Plotinus and the History of Greek Philo-

sophy, 8; Preliminary Remarks, 13

Methods of Interpretation

It seems inevitable that the interpretation of an ancient philosopher constantly

vacillates between a purely philological explanation of texts and of their historical
background, on the one hand, and a philosophical evaluation and discussion of
ideas and thoughts, on the other. In an ideal situation, both approaches would be
integrated into one comprehensive interpretation that combines philological
accuracy with philosophical depth. Such an approach would not only discuss the
meaning of terms, phrases, and metaphors, and place the texts in their historical
context, but it would also confront the ancient ideas with modern philosophical
views and developments. This situation, however, is se ld om, if ever, attained.
Although both approaches influence each other and profit from each other's
results in many ways, they tend to remain behind each other as far as the latest
and most specialized developments are concerned. While discussing the ideas of
his ancient predecessor, the modern philosopher rarely returns to the original
texts, and if he does, he may often find himself unable to grasp the exact meaning
of the material. The modern philosopher thus risks discussing and criticizing
what he thinks is the essence of ancient philosophy, without penetrating into the
real meaning of the texts themselves. On the other hand, the philologist rarely
attempts a critical discussion of the texts in th e light of the latest philosophical
and scientific developments. He may be an excellent student of ancient philo·
sophy, but this does not necessarily make him a specialist in modern thought.

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 INTRODUcrlON

Strangely enough, the discrepancy between a philological and a philosophical

approach has not always been viewed as an obstacle. In the eighteenth century,
for example, Immanuel Kant maintained that the Platonic Ideas represented
«archetypes of the things themselves, rather than just keys to possible experi-
ences, like the categories». He admitted, however, that he had not based this
statement on a close examination of the texts themselves.l Similarly, when the
twentieth-century philosopher, K. Popper, argued that Plato introduced a «third
world» of Forms or Ideas, differing both from the bodily world, and from the
world of the mind (the <<ideas in the mind»), he expressly added that he did not
want to «argue about Plato», or about the question whether he was justified in
attributing such a «pluralism» to Plato. 2 What Plato originally wrote appears
insignificant, as philosophers emphasize only what is commonly thought to be the
philosophy of Plato, and display little interest in putting these common opinions
to the test of the texts themselves. But philologists, on their part, are not always
willing to bridge the gap between a philological and a philosophical approach
either. In the late 1920's, for example, the eminent classicist H. Leisegang, was
sharply opposed to «philosophical interpretation and modernization» of Plato.
According to Leisegang, only philological research was worthy to be called rein
wissenschaftlich. 3 While Leisegang's point of view may be considered extreme,
in most cases the interpretation of ancient texts in the light of contemporary phi-
losophy is seen to lie beyond the scope of the specialist in classical philology.
Platonic thought in particular has become the victim of the discrepancy
between the philologist's attitude and that of the modern philosopher. Platonism
has had an enormous influence on the history of Western thought, to the extent
that Whitehead's aphorism terms the whole of Western philosophy as a mere
footnote to Plato. Especially after the Middle Ages, however, «Platonism», as it
existed in tbe minds of the philosophers, drifted further and further away from

1 I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vemunft (second ed., Riga, 1787), p. 370: «Ich will mich hier in keine
literarische Untersuchung einlassen, urn den Sinn auszumachen, den der erhabene Philosoph mit
seinem Ausdrucke verband.»

2 K. Popper, Objective Knowledge -An EvolutionaryApproach (Oxford, 1972), p. 154: «[....] even if
I and otbers should be mistaken in attributing tbis pluralism to Plato, even then could I appeal [0 a
well·known interpretation of Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas [....J».

3 H. Leisegang, Die Platondeutung der Gegenwart (Karlsruhe, 1929), p. 186. Cf. the critical discus·
sion of Leisegang's view in O. Wichmann, Platon - [deelle G esamtdarstellung und Studienwerk
(Darmstadt, 1966), pp. 1 ff.

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•

•
 INTERPRETING PLOTlNUS

the philosophical compendia of the Scholastic period. Yet Plotinus was not a
philosopher who, without any restriction, put his trust in the force of reason and
in logical arguments. The essence of his philosophy cannot be exclusively
explained and understood by means of a purely rational and intellectual analysis,
but must also be felt and experienced. In more than one passage Plotinus has
given testimony to this personal experience. As the prolific Plotinus scholar,
A.H. Armstrong, has pointed Qllt,l Plotinus even takes a pointed anti-
intellectual stance in those passages where he stresses the inadequacy and
deficiency of reason and intellectual speculation with respect to the ultimate goal
of philosophy, the intimate contact with Ihe final cause of all that exists.
However, to look upon Plotinus as a mystic rather than as a philosopher is to
misread him. Even less does Plotinus's thought present the tenets of a religioIf. 2
First of all, the exact meaning of terms such as «religion» and «mysticism» them-
selves is a problematic aspect in interpreting Plotinus. According to V. Cilento, a
twofold problem lies at the base of Plotinian thought, concerning both the destiny
of the individual human being, and the structure of th e whole of reality. For
Cilento, the first problem is a religious and mystical one, the second a philo-
sophical and rational one. 3 Yet Cilento's definitions are not the most appro-
priate ones with which to distinguish between Plotinian philosophy and Plotinian
mysticism. A more useful approach is to differentiate between the philosopher's
personal experience and his general statements about the world and its phenom-
ena. The personal experience can, to a certain extent, be communicated to the
reader but cannot be criticized on purely logical and rational grounds. The
description of the principles that determine the structure of the world, however,
can be subject to such a critical analysis. The former could perhaps be called

1 A.H. Armstrong, Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism
(Journal of Hellenistic Studies 93, 1973, pp. 13-22), especially pp. 20 ff. (This and other articles on
Plotinus by A.H. Armstrong have been collected in A.H. Armst rong, Plotinian and Christian
Studies, London, 1979.)

2 Cf. M. Wundt's expression «Plotinian gospel» (in Plotin - Studien xur Geschichte des Neuplatonis·
mus, vol. 1, Leipzig, 1919, pp. 58 ff,), H. Schlette, Dos Eine und das Andere - Studien xur Problema-
tik des Negativen in der Metaphysik Plotins (Munich, 1966), pp. 25 f., although taking a less extreme
position, still views Plolinian thought as a kind of «doctrine of salvation», and he questions whether
it represents a religion or a philosophy.

3 Saggi su Plotino, p. 135.

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 INTRODUCTION

mysticaP (<<religious» seems to be a far less adequate expression2 ) to denote

its non-rational and pre-eminently individual character, while the latter could
then be referred to as Plotinus's philosophy in the strict sense.
Another important distinction is that between the two ways through which Plo-
tinus wants his reader to gain insight in the basic structure of reality and in the
deepest nature of man. One way Plotinus calls an «ascent» or <<way up», and the
other could accordingly be called a «descent» or «way down». H ere we are deal-
ing with two complementary aspects of one method, both of which deserve to be
called philosophical, rather than religious or mystical. The way down starts with
basic notions in their purest form (axioms, first principles), and derives the world
of human experience from these «with the force of logic», as Plotinus says. In
contrast, when following the way up, Plotinus wants to make this logical construct
plausible by taking as his starting-point what man can apprehend and know most
directly, that is, man himself. From this direct knowledge, Plotinus subsequently
induces the basic principles that govern the structure of the whole of reality,
thereby transcending the scope of man's individual and immediate world of expe-
rience. Yet as a speculative method which can be rationally analysed and com-
municated to others, this «way up » is expressly marked off from the unique
moments of inspiration, when «o ne leaves all learning behind» and «suddenly
catches sight without seeing how»}
The philosophy of Plotinus is not a practical philosophy. According to Ploti-
nus, true virtue is not to be found in action, but in contemplation. The Plotinlan
sage, instead of losing himself in the troubles of everyday life, concentrates on the
interior of his own mind. In his desire to get into close contact with the ultimate
ground of all things, he attempts to receive a glimpse of the ineffable, as he seeks
to go beyond the powers of the mind. The language in which Plotinus describes

1 On the nature of this «mysticism» CC. the elucidative remarks made by A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus
(in A.H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy,
Camb,;dge, 1970, pp. 193-268), pp. 258 ff.

2 In the same essay (p. 150), Cilento rightly remarks, «Noliamo quindi quanta distanza ci sia lra
Plotino e Filone, tra Plotin o e it Crislianesimo, tra Plotino e Ie religioni soteriologiche. [....1E' qui,
insomma, l'opposizione incontrata cos! spesso tra la devozione semitica e l'intelle ttualismo
ellenico.»

3 Enn. 6.7 [38], ch. 36, II. 3 ff. References are to Ennead and treatise, with number indicating
chronological order given in brackets. Chaplers (the division into chapters originates from the
Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino) and lines are those of H enry and Schwyzcr's edition (see page
23).

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 INTERPREnNG PLOTlNUS

his ideal of the spiritual, contemplative life often has what might be called a
religious or mystical colouring. The roots of Plotinian metaphysics (rather than
Plotinian mysticism), however, do not lie in a religious longing for a higher, better
world beyond the one in which we live. Plotinus's starting-point, Cilento says, is a
feeling of anxiety and discomfort about the human soul, which, after its fall into
the realm of the senses, is doomed to live a miserable life among evils of every
kind. But it is quite clear that Plotinus's vision of man and his place in the
cosmos has little to do with a Gnostic pessimism, according to which man is a
stranger in an alien and hostile world during his earthly life. Nor, it should be
added, is Plotinus adhering to any kind of dualism that distinguishes sharply
between a realm of the mind and a realm of the body, between a spiritual and a
material world, as if he were striving for the first as the true and only reality and
renounced the second as illusory and superficial. The picture of the world that
Plotinus depicts in his treatises is that of one universe only, of a reality that is one
and continuous despite its numerous aspects and dimensions. Moreover, Plotinus
depicts a harmonious and beautiful world, that should be admired, rather than
despised, because it has been realized in the best possible way.l
Some historians of philosophy have argued that for all of the assertions that
Plotinus makes, he adduces few or no arguments or proofs. F. Brentano
expressed this opinion some sixty-five years ago,2 and the idea lives on in a
recent textbook on the history of Western philoso phy,3 This prejudice, how-
ever, springs from a misunderstanding of the exact nature of metaphysics. In
covering the whole of reality, metaphysics necessarily moves around, so to speak,
in a closed system, and cannot hope to «prove» its vision of this reality by means
of any external criterion. By what arguments, it could also be asked, does Plato
actually prove the irrefutable and exclusive rightness of his philosophy of Ideas?

1 Cf., e.g., Enn. 2.9 l33] A gainst the Gnostics, ch. 4, U. 22 ff., where the thesis is maintained that the
cosmos is the best of all possible worlds; and Enn. 3.2 [47]. ch. 3, 11. 19 fL , where Plotinus has the
universe say: «It is god who has made me, and originating from bim I am perfect, composed out of
all living creatures, enough to myself, self-sufficient, and needing nothing, because all plants and all
animals are contained by me, the nature of all that bas been brought forth, many gods and hosts of
deities, good souls, and human beings, happy through their virtue.»

2 F. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Phj/osophje und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (Leipzig, 1926), p. 55:
.cErn Reichtum von Behauptungen ist in der Lehre: aber ein giinzlicber Mangel an Beweisen.»

3 Cf. D.W. Hamlyn, Greek Philosophy after Aristotle (pp. 62-78 of D. O'Connor, cd., A Critical His-
tory of Western Philosophy, New York/ London, 1964), p. 76, according LO whom the arguments that
Plotmus does use, «do not add to his credit as a philosopher».

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 INTRODUCI'ION

And does Aristotle, in book Lambda of his Metaphysics, give absolute proof of
the existence of a «prime mover»? Or, in relation to post-classical thought, what
kind of criterion would enable us to accept or reject definitively the way in which
Kant analyses the functioning of human thought and its relation to the world
which it takes as its object? Demanding such external evidence naturally leads
one into an impasse. Instead, every metaphysical system should be judged by its
inner consistency, the logic of its arguments, and the extent to which it fulfils its
claim to explain the basic structure of thought and reality. In this respect, Ploti-
nus does not yield to any of the great philosophers. In the Enneads, he presents a
picture of the world that, in its ambition to account for the whole of reality, no
doubt competes with the other great philosophical systems in the history of
Western thought.

Plotinus and the History of Greek Philosophy

Some sixty years ago, E. Br~hier, in his monograph on Plotinian philosophy,

depicted Plotinus as, in some respects, standing closer to certain strands of orien-
tal thought than to the Greek philosophical tradition'! Since then, however, a
great flow of literature on the sources of Plotinus has convincingly demonstrated
that the philosophy of this remarkable thinker exists as one firmly grounded in
the history of ancient Greek thought. 2 A glance over Modes of Knowledge and
the Transcendental corroborates this debt. We hear Plotinus speak about the
"pure mind » (voG~ iiKpaTo~), a term already used in the fifth century B.C. by
Anaxagoras. Plotinus qualifies this pure mind as «thinking itself» and as
«separable», which recalls both book Lambda of Aristotle's Metaphysics and the

1 E . Brehier, La philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1924), pp. 107 rr. (English translation of this work by
J. Thomas, The Philosophy of Plotinus, Ch.icago, 1958). The idea of oriental influence in tbe works
of Plotinus had been firmly rejected already a few years earlier in an article by H.F. Miiller, Orlen-
talisches bei Plorinos? (Hennes 49, 1914, pp. 70-89). In the French literature Brehier's views appear
to be long-lived; cf. the introduction to Plotinian tbought by R.-M. Mosse-Bastide, POUT connairre la
pensee philosophique de Plotin (Paris, 1972), pp. 13 r.

2 In spite of what ancient sources tell us about an Egyptian place of birth, we are still in tbe dark
about the ethnical origin of ptotmus. See H.-R . Schwyze r, P/otinos (Pau lys Rea/-Encyclopddje deT
klassischen Altettumswissenschaft, vol. 21.1, 1951, cols. 471-592), cols. 476 f. Severe doubt upon Plo~
tinus's alleged acquaintance with Egyptian religion is cast by E .R. D odds, The Greeks and the i"a-
tiona/ (Berkeley/ Los Angeles/London, 1951), p. 286.

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 INTERPRETING PLOTINUS

passage on the «separable mind» in Aristotle's treatise On the Soul'! Addi~

tionally, in a number of terms and expressions, one can easily detect a Stoic
origin.2 And above all, the treatise contains a host of quotations and reminis·
cenees of the Platonic dialogues. The philosophical discussions of Plotinus's own
time have equally left their traces in his Modes of Knowledge and the Tran-
scendental. The first chapter echoes ideas of the sceptical philosopher Sextus
Empiricus,3 and several researchers have related elements in Plotinus's descrip-
tion of the nature of the mind to ideas expressed in the commentaries on Aris-
totle written by Alexander of Aphrodisias. 4
Progress in scientific re search, however, tends to swing from one extreme to
the other, and research on the historical backgrounds of Plotinian thought is no
exception. In the present state of affairs, Plotinus, instead of being viewed as one
of the giants in the history of ancient philosophy, second perhaps only to Plato
and Aristotle, seems to be regarded as a rather traditional and somewhat eclectic
thinker whose writings merely reiterate and summarize the main tenets of a vari-

1 The index of proper names in Henry and Schwyzer's edition of {he Enneads lists only four occur-
rences of Aristotle's name, against morc than fifty of that of Plato. Yet especially in the late trea-
tises Aristotle is conspicuollsly presen t. The Enneads «contain Aristotle's Metaphysics in a con-
densed form_ , P orphyry writes in his Life of Plotinus (ch. 14).

2 The relation between Plotinus and the Swa has already been discussed some years ago by W.
Theiler, Die Vorbereitungdes Neuplaionismus (Berlin, 1934), pp. 61 ff. (on Plotious and Posidonius),
and in two articles by R.E. Witl, Plotinus and Posidonius, and T7le P/otiniall Logos alld its Stoic
Basis (Classical Quarterly 24,1930, pp. 198-207, and 25, 1931, pp. 103-111). Also d. Theiler's Plorin
zwischen Plato Wid Stoa (Entretiens Fondation Hardt sur l'antiquite cla.ssique, vol. 5, Les sources de
P/otin, Vandoeuvres/Geneve, 1960, pp. 393-413), pp. 63-86). A more recent inventory of Stoic
references in Plotinus can be found in A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoic.s - A Preliminary Study
(Leyden, 1972).

3 A recent survey of sceptical influence on (he Enneads is given by R.T. Wallis, Sceplicism and
Neoplatonism (in W. Haase & H. Temporini, eds.,Aujstieg und Niedergallg der Ronrischel1 Welc, voL
36.2, Berlin/ New York, 1987, pp" 911-954).

4 See, c.g., A.H. Armstrong, The Background of the Doctrine «That the Intellig(bles Are NOI Oulside
the Intellect» (Entretiens Fondation Hardt sur l'antiquite classique, voL 5, Les sources de Plotin, Van-
doeuvres/Geneve, 1960, pp. 393-413), pp. 405 ff.; P. Merlan, Mon opsychism, Myslicism, Metacon-
sciousness (The Hague, 1963), pp. 13 ff.; F.P. Hager, Die An"stotelesinterprelacion des Alexander von
Aphrodisias und die Aristoteleskn"tik Plotins (Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 46, 1964, pp. 174·
187); T A. Szlezak, Platon l!lId Aristore/es in der Nuslelrre Plorins (Basel/Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 135 ff.;
P.M. Scbroeder, Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus (Hemres 112, 1984, pp. 239-
248).

;opynghted )1
•

•
 INTRODUCTION

ing Plotinus for a «carelessness in the use of the word logos», a crucial term in
Plotinian metaphysics. Plotinus, Theiler claimed, would jump rather unsystemati-
cally from Posidonian to non-Posidonian meanings of this term, instead of devel-
oping and applying his own concept of logos, a concept which, from a philo-
sophical point of view, is not so incoherent and loose as Theiler thought. 1 Simi-
larly, in his voluminous work on the «origin of the metaphysics of the mind», H.
Kram er has tried to sh ow th a t Plotinus's philosophy of the mind is largely
determined by ideas developed by the immediate successors of Plato in the Old
Academy, and in (Neo-) Pythagorean circles. As impressive as the abundance of
historical material presented in Kramer's book may be, Plotinus's philosophy of
the mind inevitably appears in it in a rather fragmented fo rm, as a collection of
doxai, of opinions each to be connected with some of the rare testimonies that we
possess about the ideas of these early philosophers 2
From a philosophical point of view, therefore, a more balanced and fruitful
approach is to analyse the ideas advanced in the Enneads in relation to those ear-
lier thinkers whose works are for the greater part still extant, or of whose doc-
trines we at least have a more or less complete overview. Such a juxtaposition
offers us the opportunity to compare philosophical methods, attitudes, and argu-
ments, rather than mere terminologies and collections of statements on separate
subjects. Here again, however, it would be misleading to view the historical inter-
pretation of the Enneads as the chief key to understanding of Plotinian thought.
Plotinus often supports his views by referring to the great thinkers of the past,
and especially by quoting from the works of the «divine Plato». Yet he does so
less as an interpreter and commentator than as an independent and original
thinker. Statements such as, «We are to put forward what our views are, and try
to redu ce them to Plato's opiniom), and «We should attempt to show that the
opinions that we have received from the most excellent philosophers agree, or at
least do not di sagree, with the argument that we are now putting forward»3 are
often qu oted as indications for Plotinus's dependence on his forerunners. But

1 Cf. Die Voroereitung des Neup/atonismus (quoted above), pp. 62 and 66 f.

2 Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, quoted above. A weak point in Kramer's work is the Slrong
empbasis which he lays on the role that Pythagorean speculations on numbers play in the Enneads,
a role of which Kramer says himseU (p. 310) that it is a rather modest one in comparison with later
NeoplatonislS (cf. 1. Bertier et al.,P/olin: traite surles nombres, Paris, 1980, pp. 9 L).

3 Enn. 6.2 (43], ch. 1, U. 4 f. and Enn. 6.4 (22], ch. 16, 11. 4 ff.

12

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 INTRODUCfION

The danger, however, threatens from both sides. There is no guarantee that
the traditional and often oversimplified representation of Plotinian ontology as a
division of th e world into different classes or levels of being, or even into dif-
ferent «beings», will give today's reader a correct idea of the essence of Plotinus's
philosophy. It may also be remarked that the opposition between an objective,
unprejudiced explanation of the original texts, on the one hand, and a subjective
modernization and distortion of them, on the other, is in a certain sense a false
one. Every interpretation, even every translation that aims at making Plotinus
understandable to modern readers, uses a language that is not Plotinus's own and
therefore is of necessity subjective. As philosophy develops, its language and the
meaning of its notions inevitably change.
There can therefore be no serious objection against inquiring whether certain
traditional representations of Plotinian philosophy should in all cases be main-
tained. On the contrary, it is the duty of Plotinus's interpreters to portray his
thought as applicable and relevant to today's philosophy, while preventing it from
being judged on the basis of an interpretation that speaks neither Plotinus's lan-
guage nor that of his modern reader. If Plotinus is indeed to be deemed worthy
of a place among the gian ts of Western th ought, and if his philosophy is to be
valued as a truly living philosophy, then his arguments should be expected to
stand up to a continuous process of reformulation and adaptation in the light of
changing philosophical attitudes and interests.

14

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2 THE TREATISE «MODES OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE TRANS-
CENDENTAL>

Place Am ong the Other Works, 15; Th e Title, 17; Summary, 19;
Editions, Tran sla tions, Commentaries, 23; A Note on the Trans-
lation, 24

Place Among the Other Works

In his Life of Plotinus, Porphyry provides us with a chronological list of fifty-

four treatises written by his master, the forty-ninth of which is the treatise Modes
of Knowledge and the Transcendental. According to Porphyry, the work belongs to
a group of nine that Plotinlls wrote in Rome in the two years before his death in
270 AD. The subject of Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental seems to set
the work apart from most of the other treatises in this group. With titles such as
On Happiness, On Providence, On Love, 'What Are th e Evils and Wh erefrom Do
They Spring?, Do the Celestial Bodies Exert Any Influence?, and On the Highest
Good and the Other Goods 1 these treatises show a special inte rest in ethics and
in the influence of the cosmic order on the life and destiny of man. In contrast,
Modes of Knowledge and th e Transcendental might rightly be called Plotinus's last
great metaphysical work. In the treatise, the main themes of his philosophy
reoccur in a much denser and more abstract form. Which things can be said to
possess knowledge, and to what extent can they be said to know themselves?
What kinds, or modes, of thought are there, and what are their limits? What is
the relation between thinking and reality, and what should be the criterion for
determining to what extent a thing is real? M odes of Knowledge and the Tran-
scendental, however, does not exclusively treat these philosophical problems on a
highly theoretical and abstract level. It also displays its author's interest in
exploring the bearing that such abstract philosophical problems have on man, and
especially, on human psychology and on defining human kind itself. What are
we? What is the nature of human thinking, and in what sense are we human
beings capable of knowing ourselves? In this respect, Modes of Know/edge and
the Transcendental complements and broadens the perspective of the second last

1 Enn. 1.4 [46], Enn. 3.2-3 [47-48], Enn. 3.5 [50], Enn. 1.8 [51] , Enn. 2.3 [52J, and Enn. 1.7 [54]
respectively.

15

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 INTRODUCfION

treatise that Plotinus wrote: What Is a Living Creature and What Is Man? (Enn.
1.1 [53]).
In Porphyry's edition, the works of Plotinus have been divided into six groups,
or Enneads, of nine treatises each. The fifth Ennead, in which M odes of Knowl-
edge and the Transcendental appears third, comprises the treatises that, according
to Porphyry, have th e «mind» as their principal subject. Modes of Knowledge and
the Transcendental contains several passages that can be related to the other
works of the fifth Ennead. Yet, on the whole, there exists a fundamental differ-
ence in tone between the treatise and earlier ones which have the same subject.
Most noticeably, the language in Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental has
reached a high degree of abstraction. Plotinus develops his argument with almost
mathematical rigour, and there are comparatively few instances in which he
expresses his thoughts in picturesque descriptions inspired by mythology and cos-
mology. When we consider, for example, the way in which the treatise describes
the mind, we see that this notion is freed to a large extent from the cosmological
connotations which are present in some of the other treatises. In Modes of
Knowledge and the Transcendental, Plotinus is not evoking a captivating image of
a higher, intelligible world beyond the heavenly spheres,1 a realm of pure forms
together constituting the model or «archetype» of the world of perception. 2 He
is not depicting a pure mind that engenders the cosmic soul and the individual
souls, one that indirectly brings the material world into being. 3 Nor is he dis-
cussing the problem of whether this intelligible realm would, in every detail, have
to be the original of the material world copied after it. 4 Instead, «mind»
becomes a fundamental category in the description of the world as such. In
Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental, the concept of mind is the purest
expression of the idea that the primary constituents of the world are acts and
activities, rather than objects and material particles.
The qualities of M odes of Knowledge and the Transcendental have not always
been duly appreciated. Porphyry himself held the opinion that Plotinus wrote the

1 Cf.Enn. 5.9 [5), cb. 4, U.14 f.; Enn. 5.8 [31), ch. 3, U. 27 ff.

2 Cf. Enn. 5.1 [1 0), ch . 4, U. 1 ff.; Enn. 5.8 [31), ch. 7, U. 12 ff.

3 Cf. Enn. 5.1 [10), cb. 7, U. 35 ff.; Enn. 5.2 [11), cb. 1, 11. 13 ff.

4 cr. Enn. 5.9 15], chs. 11-14; Enn. 5.7 (18]. In Enn. 6.7[38], chs. 1·1 4, Plotinus elaborates on
related topics, such as the question whether each human being should have an intelligible counter-
part, and even whether perception, which in the fir st place seems to belong to the world of senses,
would in some way have to be prefigured in the intelligible world as well.

16

;opynghted )1
•

•
 THE TREATISE «MODES OF KNOWLEDGE ....»

arguments brought forward tend to beg the question.! In Plotinus's work, un6~
cr1:cxa~c; has, on the whole, a rather general and broad sense. It seems more

appropriate, therefore, to let its meaning in individual cases depend upon the
context in which it occurs. What Plotinus means exactly by «realness» and
«reality», and what he means by saying that a certain activity must with respect to
its source be regarded as an entity in itself, are important issues that need further
investigation. But for such an inquiry, the traditional formulation of a fixed set of
hypostases as the skeleton of Plotinian ontology does not seem of very much use.

Summary

M odes of Knowledge and the TrallScendental opens (ch. 1) by posing the ques-
tion whether or not something that is supposed to «think itself» or to «know
itself» would have to be compound. The idea of self-reflection seems to imply a
kind of simplicity. True self-knowledge, in any case, seems incompatible with the
idea of something compound in which the thinking element knows the other parts
but not itself (11. 1 ff.). Now, it may seem a rather absurd thought, Plotinus says,
that real self-knowledge would not exist at all. Nevertheless, it could well be
argued that all psychical activity engaged in the acquisition of knowledge (reaso n,
opinion, and sense-perception), is in the first place destined to gain information
about the outside world, and not about itself. On the other hand, what we are to
call «mi nd» thinks or knows what can be thought. The mind's objects, considered
on the level of pure thought, may thus be said to be internal objects of the mind,
rather than things outside of it. But does this mental process mean, that the mind
truly knows itself, or merely that it is divided into a knowing and a known ele-
ment (ll. 15 ff.)?
In the next three chapters of the treatise, this question remains unanswered.
In chapters 2 and 3, Plotinus is especially concerned with defining and delineating
the concepts of «mi nd » and «soul». Wh en we assume that the mind has self-
knowledge, at least in the sense that it has its objects inside itself, why could we

1 Cf. J .P. Anton, Some Logical A spects of the Concept of Hypostasis in Plotinus (Review of Meta-
physics 31, 1977, pp. 258-271), and th e literature given there (is «unity» in Plotinus a hypostasis?);
A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of P{otinus (Cam-
bridge, 1940), p. 86 (is «nature» a hypostasis?); M. Rist, Plotinus - The Road to Reality (Cambridge,
1967), pp. 90 ff. (vs. A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture .... , pp. 104 f.) (is the Plotinian logos a hypos-
. ?) .
taslS.

19

;opvn 11
 INTRODUCTION

then not simply say that the thing which has this kind of self-knowledge is a part
of the human psyche, the function that we call reason and that Aristotle called
«the soul's mind »? Because, as Plotinlls explains, we distinguish between a level
on which information from outside is being processed (reason), and a level on
which pure thoughts are thought (mind). We should maintain this distinction,
and let the notion of «soul» comprise only those levels of knowledge that have
external objects (ch. 2, 11. 20 ff.; ch. 3, 11. 15 ff. ). Similarly, the notion of «mind ..
shou ld , by definition, be associated only with the thinking of thoughts, that is, of
internal objects. Reason, which is defined as a thinking abou t external objects,
consequently does not belong to the concept of mind, but rather to that of soul
(ch. 3, 11. 21 ff.).
The remaining part of chapter 3 and chapter 4 relate this distinction between
«soul» and «mind» mo re specifically to human knowledge, and to the question of
what «we» actually are. The mind , Plotinus says, is both ours and not ours. We
make use of it, but we do not do so continuously. The mind, he adds, again bor-
rowing an Aristotelian expression, «stands apart» fr om reason, which is man's
most characteristic psychical function (ch. 3, 11. 26 ff.). As human beings, we
employ a mode of knowledge which, essentially, acquires information from out-
side (ch. 4, 11. 7 ff.).
In chapter 5, P lo tinu s again addresse s himself to the problem of self-
knowledge in the pure mind's thinking. Plotinus argues that we should not con-
ceive of such a mind as something compound, as a centre of thinking, on the one
hand, and around it a number of elements tha t are being thought about, on the
other hand. In thi s conception, strictly speaking, the objects of thought could not
be called internal objects. It could be suggested that the compound mind is in
fact composed of similar parts, that a centre of thinking observes other centres
similar to itself. Even then, however, the thinking agent would still not «see)), not
fully know its own nature. It would see these other elements as objects of its own
thought, rather than truly grasping their nature as thinking agents (11. 1 ff.).
Subsequently, Plotinus discusses the possibility that the centre of thought
could turn towards itself, and reflect on its own act of thinking. In this case, Ploti-
nus argues, the centre evidently reflects, not on a void act of thinking, not on a
thought without any content, but on a thinking of something. In the act of think-
ing, the object of thought is given, and the mind's reflection on its own thinking
must therefore necessarily be a reflection on its thinking some thing. Thus the
mind , Plotinus asserts, can know itse lf only when th e act of thinking and the
object of thought are identical, when the act of thinking app rehends its object

20

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 THE TREATISE "MODES OF KNOWLEDGE .... "

directly and fully. In this case, the mind reflects upon itself, upon its own act of
thinking, and becomes nothing but a thinking of truth, of (<what really is» (Il. 15
ff.). But Plotinus does not equate this process with sheer objectivity, in the sense
that the mind contains nothing but bare and immediately graspable truths, with-
out there being something that actually thinks these truths. There can be no
actuality, no actual truth, no actualized object of thought, without an activity of
the living mind that thinks this truth and grasps this object of thought (11. 28 ff.).
In the four chapters that follow (chs. 6-9), Plotinu s seeks to corroborate his
analysis of the concept of mind by, as he says, addi ng "persuasion» to the logical
force of the argument. Although it seems to lie beyond the reach of human
reason to penetrate the nature of a thought which directly a nd fully grasps «what
is», it might be possible to extrapolate the concept of such a mind from the
modes of knowledge with which we are familiar. Plotinus then shows that in the
world of human experience there are different modes or levels of thought, which
together seem to point towards the existence of the concept of mind described in
chapter 5, and which can all be considered as derivatives of this mind.
In this manner, Plotinus goes on to describe and define the different modes of
thought. As he states, <<All things are traces of thoughts and of mind, proceeding
in accordance with the original, the ones near it imitating it more closely, the
most distant ones guarding a faint image of it» (end of ch. 7). The qualities that
we ascribe to concrete things, to the objects in the world around us, are in fact
«thoughts that are carried out», ultimate reflections of the mind. These percep-
tible forms and qualities are the result of a «creative thinking», a thinking that is
«involved in action». Unlike the thinking activity that purely and fully concen-
trates on itself, this «creative» thinking is directed outwards and is primarily con-
cerned with th e world around the thinking subject (ch. 7, 11. 25 ff., and the begin-
ning of ch. 8). This creative thinking is a function of the soul, but it is the soul's
lowest level, and its external di rect ion stands in sharp contrast to the sheer intro-
spective quality of the mind. Between these extremes, Plotinus situates the other
psychical functions, which include reason (which is closest to mind) and pe rcep-
tion.
The tenth chapter, in which Plotinus again examines the concept of mind,
provides a transition to the second part of the treatise. At first sight. the conclu-
sions reached here may appear rather startling. The simplicity of the mind and
the identity between the thinking subject and its object, so carefully worked out in
the fifth chapter, are now called into question. Such an identity appears
incompatible with the fact that thought essentially, and on all levels, establis hes a

21

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 INTRODUCTION

relation between the thinking subject and what in the act of thinking is perceived
as something different. Even in the case of self-reflection a discrepancy results.
In stating, «I am this», the copula both connects and marks the distinction
between the mind as subject and the object of thought. Therefore, the mind's
thought cannot be based on id entity alone. There must be so me kind of di ffe ren-
tiation as well (ll. 21 ff.).
This argument leads us to the paradoxical conclusion that the perfect unity
which seemed to be required in order to assure real and complete self-
knowle dge, cannot be found on the level of that which is supposed to know itself.
In order to possess real se lf-knowledge, the mind has to be simple, it has to be
one with its own act of thinking, and with its own objects of thought. Yet this per-
fect unity is not to be found in the mind itself, but rather goes beyond any mode
of knowledge. Plo tinus draws thi s conclusion in detail in chapters 11-14. The
perfect unity that seems to be required for true self-knowledge, is a «from which»
in its relation to the mind, rather than an «out of which». It is the basic principle
on which the mind's thinking rests, but it is itself not a constituent of the mind
(ch. 11, II. 16 ff.). Therefore it cannot even fu nction as an object of thought; it is
«truly ineffable» (ch. 13, 11. 1 ff.), and there can be no knowledge or thought of it
(ch. 14, II. 1 ff.) .
With this argument, however, the ques tion immediately arises how th ought is
to be explained from a principle which is itself u tterly different from thought.
How, Plotinus asks (ch. 15, II. 1 ff.), ca n this unity «p rovide what it does not
have»? H ow can the mind's intrinsic plurality and differentiation spring from a
principle that is perfectly one and undifferent iated? Plotinus tries to so lve this
problem in various ways, but he does not succeed in finding a fully satisfactory
and co nclusive answer. What follows from a principle apparently lacks and
requires the qualities of that principle. So what comes from a perfect unity will to
a certain extent lack unity itself, and can only be a «one-many», a unified plurality
(11. 7 ff.) . Yet why should there be any plurality and diffe rentiation in the first
place? A possible answer might be th at the principle of unity contains in itself
the elements which constitute the plurality of the mind, but in such a way that
they cannot be distinguished one from the other, as they can be on th e level of
mind. T hen, the principle of unity could be called a power, one that creates the
actual differentiation within the mind (II. 26 ff.). Being a power, it must necessa-
rily unfold itself, and because, in a process of generation, there is no possibility of
«moving upwards», but only of «moving downwards», this unfold ing must by
nature be a development towards plurality (ch. 16, 11. 1 ff.). In this case, however,

22

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 THE TREATISE «MODES OF KNOWLEDGE .. ..f>

it can no longer be maintained that the mind's origin is absolutely one and
undifferentiated.
Plotinus ends the discussion therefore with a non liquet, and the question
remains: why did thought come from what is not thought? Why did a perfect
unity generate a deficient unity, and why did it generate precisely this particular
plurality of aspects which characterizes both thought and the reality apprehended
by though t? There seems to be no logical argument by means of which the con-
cept of mind can be forcibly deduced from the concept of a perfect and undiffer-
entiated unity (ch. 16, II. 16 ft.). This impasse suggests an alternative approach.
Perhaps the initial mistake was made by trying to deduce the derivative from its
principle, in attempting to descend from this principle, rather than ascending to
it. By such an ascent, it would become clear that the structure of the mind, being
essentially plural and differentiated, points towards the existence of a unity
beyond mind. In the same manner, human reason, which is essentially directed to
an outside world, points towards the existence of a higher mode of thought that
fundamentally concentrates on itself. That thinking stems from something essen-
tially different from thinking, is a paradox that ca nnot be solved by any kin d of
logical argument. Yet jf human reason could transcend itself, Plotinus posits, and
if we could leave human thought and its facul ties behind, then we might for one
short moment be struck by the light of the perfect unity th at shines upon the mind
(end of ch. 17).

Editions, Translations, Commentaries

The standard edition of the wo rks of Plo tinus is that of P. H enry and H.-R.
Schwyzer, Plotini Opera (3 va Is., Paris/Brussels, 1951-1973). The text of this edi-
tion has also been published, with a number of modifications, in the series of
Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford, 1964-1 982). Unless the Oxford edition is
specified, «Henry and Schwyzef» in the commen tary refers to the text of the
Paris/Brussels edition (including the corrections proposed at the end of the thi rd
volume). Line numbers at the beginnings of the translated passages also refer to
this edition.
Apart from Henry and Schwyzer's text, I have made frequ ent use of the follow-
ing editions, commentaries and translations:

M. Fieino. Plotini Opera. Latin trans lation. Florence, 1492.

23

;opynghted )1
•

•
 II
ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE

A Transcendental Method, 26; Self-knowledge and the Concept of

«We», 31; An Antithesis Between the Psychical and th e Physical
Realm?, 42; Idealism or Realism?, 58,. Unity as a Limiting Con-
cept, 70

A Transcendental Method

The Plotinian treatises often take their point of departure from what to the
modern reader might appear to be a technicality that can be fully appreciated
only in the context of the philosophical debates of Plotinus's own time. Yet in the
Enneads, there is no philosophical problem, no technical detail, that is not raised
far above the level of a school debate and given a universal scope. The treatise
Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental is no exception. It opens with a prob-
lem that may seem somewhat academic: Can th ere be a «thinking oneself» in the
strict sense, or is «to think oneself» simply a short way of saying that something
thinks of, or reflects on, or has some knowledge about certain aspects o r parts of
itself? According to Aristotle, a true «thinking oneself» can be found in a mind
that is in no way connected with or directed towards a body or something mate·
rial. A purely immaterial mind, Aristotle argued, is indivisible and therefore able
to think itself fully and immediately. Some five hundred years later, however, the
sceptic Sextus Empiricus held a quite different opinion. In a polemic style, he
refuted the idea of there being such a thing as true self-knowledge. The so-called
sel£·apprehension, Sextus argued, must of necess ity always be an operation in
which a thinking element apprehends some other element that, however close it
may be to the thinking element, can never be identical with the thinking element
itself.
In a first rough delineation of his subj ect, Plotinus hints at the positions of
both Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus. Yet rather than simply choosing one
extreme and rejecting the other, he uses both id eas as an introduction to a more
fundamental analysis of th e notion of self-knowledge or self-apprehension. Ploti-
26

;op 11
 A TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

nus does not merely want to discuss self-knowledge in the ordinary se nse of the
word, the insight that we human beings can acquire into our own thoughts,
motives, and behaviour. Ins tead, Plotinus ge ner alizes the notion of «self-
knowledge» in such a way that it can be applied to the overall structure of the
world. At the same time, however, he defines the noti on in such a strict se nse,
that it appears to be present in the world of human experience only in an
imperfect and derivative form. Both procedures, the search for a very strict defi-
nition of a given notion, on the one hand, and the broad application of that same
notion, on the other, may seem incompatible. Apparently, if pushed to the
extreme, these methods must lead to contradictions, for how can one maintain
that no mode of thought is capable of self-knowledge in the true sense of the
word, and at the same time declare that all thought is in fact a kind of self-
knowledge? Yet it is the combination of such apparently contradictory ideas that
characterizes what we may call Plotinus's transcendental method, and that, in
Plotinus's view, provides a suitable tool with which to analyse the fundamental
laws that govern the relation between thought and reality.
The transcendental method is narrowly connected to what Plotinus refers to as
the two ways in which he wants to develop his argument. The first way consists of
the logical derivation of specific phenomena in the world of human experience
from higher principles that lie outside the range of that experience. The second
way, however, which Plotinus terms the ascent or way of «persuasion»,l starts
from the world of human experience and induc es th e higher principles that
determine the structure of this world fro m the phenomena in wh ich they are
reflected.
Yet the relation between the transcendental method and the two «ways» is a
rather complex and delicate one. First, there is the problem of how to construct a
philosophical language through which the limits of our experience can be suitably
described. The «way down", the deduction of the world of human experience
from higher principles that, in their purest form, go beyond human experience,
requires a terminology that is capable of describing these higher principles. Yet
the notions and concepts th at we have at our disposal are primarily suited to
describe what lies within, rather than outside, the range of our experience.
Plotinus seeks to overcome this difficulty by taking terms and ideas use d in
everyday language to distinguish certain phenomena or states or events from

1 See ch. 6 of Modes of Knowledge and the Tran scendental.

27

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 ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE

others, and transposing them into transcendental concepts. These transcendental

concepts no longer refer to a specific subset of all possible phenomena and
events. Neither, however, do they denote things that simply transcend human
knowledge and human experience. Instead, they pretend to express an essential
feature of the world as a whole (which is precisely why they should be called
«transcendentah>, rather than «transcendenb)l). The phenomena that consti-
tute the world of our experience are then measured by the degree to which this
essential feature becomes realized in them. Consequently, the transcendental
notion acquires the character of a limiting concept. It refers to the perfect and
full realization of a quality that man can experience only in an imperfect and par-
tially realized form.
Thus, in the treatise Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental, Plotinus tries
to demonstrate that the concept of «thinking oneself» or self-knowledge is essen-
tial to a proper description of the world. Yet he also develops the idea that the
modes of self-knowledge, as well as the modes of apprehension in general, with
which we are acquainted through an introspection into our own nature, are all
imperfect forms of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge, therefore, becomes a limit-
ing concept. It functions as a fundamental category in the description of the
world of human experience, but its full realization falls outside the range of
human experience.
When following the «way up», on the other hand, Plotinus wants to convince
his reader of the legitimacy of his deductive method by pointing to the great vari-
ety of instances in which the central notion in question is, in a derived form,
applicable to the world of our experience. If one assumes that the basic structure
of the world may be suitably described in terms of self-knowledge, then it is
essential to the argument that as many phenomena in the wqrld around us as pos-
sible may be described by this concept. Plotinus thereby gives a meaning to terms
such as «thought» and «self-knowledge» that extends their applicability far
beyond the limits of what we would normally call «(human) thinking» and
«(human) self-knowledge». As Plotinus states in the seventh chapter of the trea-
tise, all things are «traces of thought and of the mind».
The world view summarized in this statement, as well as the transcendental
method itself, ultimately rest on two axioms. The first of these axioms assumes

1 Cf. I. Kant's deflnition of transzendental. in Kritik der Reinen VemunJt (second ed .. Riga. 1787). p.
297.

28

;opynghted )1
 A TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

that the world is not a random conglomerate of phenomena and events that bear
no relation to each other, but is rather a well-ordered and structured whole. The
world is not only built on multiplicity and diversity, but also on identity and unity.
The second axiom state s, in its most general form, that a congruence exists
between reality and thought, between the modes of being and the modes of
thought, between the structure of the totality of what can in any way be said to
exist or to be real, and the structure of any possible thinking about reality.
According to Plotinus, thought can only exist if some parallel structure, some con-
nection, or some kind of identity exists between what thinks and what is being
thought. Conversely, it is meaningless to speak of «real things » and «reality», if
this reality cannot in any way be considered an object of thought.
The transcendental method and the axioms on which it is founded enable Plo-
tinus to describe both the functioning and the structure of thought (and related
functions, such as perception), and the structure of the reality that forms the
object of thought, with a single set of terms and concepts. However, these terms
do not all have the same status. In the treatise Modes of Know/edge and the Tran-
scendental, one is first of all required to distinguish between a number of tran·
scendental notions in the strict sense, and a number of additional, less abstract
notions that appear to be more or less illustrations of the first type. The terms in
the second group make it somewhat easier to grasp their more abstract counter-
parts. They usually also express a certain positive or negative appreciation of
their abstract counterparts. For example, Plotinus associates the notions of
«thinking» and «activity» with notions such as «light» and «life»; and the concept
of a perfect unity is, although with so me hesitation, referred to as «the Good»,
Secondly, there is what one might call a difference in the dimension of certain
concepts. For instance, the notion of «mind» primarily describes a special type of
relation between the act of thinking and the reality that is being thought. On the
other hand, the concept of «sou b) comprises rather different modes or levels of
apprehension.
Most of the aforementioned concepts already had a long history before Ploti-
nus incorporated them into his philosophical vocabulary. This may be obvious in
the case of general terms such as «being» and <<unity)}, but it is also true for the
more specific and less abstract ones such as «lighb>, «life», «the Good), Espe·
cially in the case of the latter se t of notions, a tension can sometimes be felt
between the philosophical tradition, which more or less imposed the use of a
certain term, and the actual function of that term in the argument in which it
plays a role. AH. Armstrong puts it perhaps too strongly, when he states that the

29

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 ASPECfS OF THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE

philosophical tradition was, for Plotinus, sometimes «too rich and complex [.... ] to
handle».1 Yet one could say that Plotinus was eager to absorb as much of the
traditional philosophical vocabulary as he could, and that he did not always real-
ize that the introduction of certain concepts tended to complicate his argument,
rather than to clarify it. For example, in the final chapters of Modes of Know/edge
and the Transcendental, Plotinus does not quite succeed in making clear what the
(Platonic) notion of «the Good») actually contributes to a better understanding of
the notion of a perfect unity (which is why he hesitates in using «the Good» as a
synonym for the perfect unity), or why the ter m should be connected precisely
with this concept and no other. During the last two or three decades, much of the
scholarly research on Plotinus has concentrated on these additional or illustrative
notions, which contribute much to the special flavour of the language of the
Enneads. Yet it is important to realize that they are meant to illustrate the more
abstract notions and make them somewhat more tangible, rather than to replace
them.
If one draws up a list of the transcendental notions that build up Plotinus's
argument in Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental, it will contain a far
greater number of items beyond those that the traditional interpretative litera-
ture acknowledges as the basic principles of Plotinian metaphysics. A se rious
objection to attempts to derive a restricted number of basic principles from Plo-
tinian metaphysics is that such attempts fail to appreciate the flexibility of Ploti-
nus's philosophical method, and put his metaphysics under the constraints of
more or less conventional models of interpretation. For example, traditional Plo-
tinian hypostases include the «mind » and the «soul», but not the noti on of
«reality», nor that of «activity». Yet the idea of «reality» is, in Plotinus's phi-
losophy, of no less importance than that of «mind», nor is it logically posterior to
this latter concept. Similarly, the idea of «soul» is not decidedly more fundamen-
tal to or more clarifying of Plotinus's argument than that of «act» or «activity».
Moreover, the meanings and ranges of the different concepts are not always
fixedly demarcated. Thus, in the second part of Modes of Know/edge and the
Transcendental, it is not always precisely clear to what extent unity, which accord-
ing to Plotinus must underlie all thought, has a status of its own, one separate
from the pure mode of thinking that comes closest to the absolute identity of the
act of thinking and the object of thought. The same holds true for the question

1 A.H. Armstrong, {(Emanation» in Plotinus (Mind, n.S. 46, 1937, pp. 61-66), p. 63.

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 SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONCEPT OF «WE»

denote what man really and essentially is,l more than a century before
Augustine, in the tenth book of his Confessions, described the memory as the fac-
ulty where man meets with his most intimate self. Modern in terp re ters have
readily pointed to the Plotin ian «we» as the germ from which later th e idea of a
conscious «h, or «subject», or «ego» evolved. The Plotinian «we», E. Bn!hier
wrote,2 is not a «th ing», not, like the soul, a hypostasis, but a subjective activity.
It is an entity to which the soul, with its various psychical functions, extends itself
as an object. Similarly, E .R. D odds,3 and in his footsteps, H.J. Blumenthal,'
take the Plotinian «we» as a fluctuating centre of conscious activity. It fluctuates,
because it is not always th e same psychical function, not always the same «psychic
level», as Blumenthal calls it, that dominates human consciousness at different
• • •
pomts In time .
It is doubtful, however, whe ther the Plotinian «we» may be compared to the
idea of a conscious ego, if we take this in the Cartesian and post-Cartesian sense
of an independent and distinct faculty within the human mind that guarantees th e
unity of perception and thought, and that in some way or other is immediately
present to itself. Plotinu s has enriched the history of psychology with va luable
observations and insights, but the discovery of an ego is not likely to be one of
these. First of all, the Plotinian «we» cannot be identified with a separate entity
or a particular element within the psycho-corporeal system, or within the human
mind. In fact, Plotinus merges the notion of «we» with the much broader concept
of a coherent information processing system in which both the psychical func ti ons
and the biological organs t hroug h which they operate, take their part. And
secondly, the notion of co nsciousness, and the distinction between conscious
psychical activities and unconscious ones, play only a minor role in Plotinus's
definition of man.
In this context, the use of the term «consciousness» may already appear con-
fusing. The general term with whi ch Plotinus usually refers to the pure acquisi-

- -- -
1 The use of the term fl/J.E:'i'~ may be induced by th e spuri ous Platonic di alogue Al:iochus (365e) .
There, however, flJ..le:'lf; is simply identified with the soul.

2 E. Bremer, La philosophie de Plorin (Paris, 1928), p. 68.

3 In Entretiens Fondation Hardt sur l'antiquite c/assique, vol. 5, Les sources de Plotin (Vandoeu-
VTcs/Geneve, 1960) pp. 385 f.

4 HJ. Blumenthal, Plotinus' Psychology - His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul (The H ague, 1971),
pp. 109 fl.

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 ASPECfS OF TH E PLOTINlAN UNIVERSE

tion of informati on is iwdA'1<1n~ (<<apprehension»). When informatio n is

acqu ired about some activity of the psycho-corporeal system itself, then Plotinus
often, bu t not exclusively, speaks of «consciousness», or better, «awareness»
(napaKoAOv8nol<;;).1 Thus, Plotinus says th at we «are aware» of something
occurring in the body, or that we «are aware» of the fact that we are reading, or
thinking. But in cases such as these, he also uses the term appre hension, for
example, when he says that we «ap prehend» the fact th at we are thinking.
«Apprehension» is th e more general term; it also re fe rs to the perception
(a'(aa'1al~) of things exte rnal to the system as a whole, thal is, outside of the
body. «Awareness» and the apprehension, through se nse-perception, of externa l
objects are thus closely related to each other. In fact, Plotinus ten ds to see in
both awareness and perception the transfer of a piece of information from one
element to another. The difference is that in the case of perception of external
objects, only the receiving element forms part of the system, while in the case of
«awareness)>, both the receiving element and the source of information belong to
the same information processing system.2
What does Plotinus re fe r to, then, when he asks himself what «we» essentially
a re? It is quite clear that Plotinus, in li ne with others befo re him, regards the
power of reaso n as the distingu ishing feature of the human being,3 and he
according ly states t ha t the essence of what «we» are -- or what «man »
(av8pwnoc;) is - lies firs t and foremost in the reasoning power. But «we» or
«man» may also be taken in a broader sense. We do not only think, but we also
perceive; and we are also «living creatures», in which the psychical functions ope-

1 For a historical survey of the vocabulary that Plotinus an d earl ier writers use to express the
notions of «awareness» and «consciousness», see H .-R . Schwyzer, «Bewusst»« und «unbewusst» bei
Plotin (Enrreriens Fondation Hardt sur I'anriquite classique, vol. 5, Les sources de Plorin , Vandoeu-
vres/ Geneve, 1960, pp. 341-378).

2 The tendency to read into Plotinus the discovery of the notion of «consciousness» as something
essentially different fr om other kinds of apprehension, brings some authors to far-fe tched conclu-
sions about the meaning of such words as «apprehension» and «perception» in Plotinus. «The use
of a~alC; to designate, not only sensation, but also consciousness, results in some ambiguities and
awkward constructions», P. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness (The H ague,
1963), p. 7 says. In reality, such ambiguities seem to arise only when an interpretation of the texts
clings to the artificial distinction between norm al apprehension/ perception and a special kind of
•
«conSCIOusness».

3 Man, Plato says, is essentially the soul (First Alcibiades 130c), and the chief part of the human
soul is reason (Republic IV, 441e) . Similarly, Aristotle states that each of us is essentially the most
important and best part of the human being, which is the power to reason (e.g., Nicomachean
Ethics X, 1178a).

34

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 SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONCEPT OF .WE.

rate through biological organs.! In this respect, Plotinus distinguishes between

what «we» ourselves are and what, in a broader sense, is «ours». We are
endowed with reason; we always think, Plotinus says, even when we are not
always aware of it. However, we do not always perceive. We do not always let
incoming information from the sense-organs immediately determine the function-
ing of our thought. Thus, perception is «ours» because we can make use of it, but
we do not always do so. Likewise. Piotinus says that we make use of what he calls
the «pure» or «upper» mind, or simply «mind», which contains all general notions
and concepts that we use when analysing, classifying, and recombining the pieces
of information that we acquire through perception. However, we do not always
make use of these notions either; we do not always «apprehend» them in a
proper way. Thus, the «pure» mind is «ours», but it is not «we» ourselves. 2
The distinction that Plotinus makes, therefore, is not that between an «ego», a
centre of consciousness that alternately focuses its attention on different psychi-
cal functions (is «aware» of these) and the «soul», which consists of all psychical
functions (thinking, perception, etc.), and which stretches itself out, so to speak,
before the ego as an object. «We » are the whole of our psychical activi ties.
Among these, reason is the most definitive function. It is the power to reason
that distinguishes us from other living creatures. To Plotinus, however, «we»
cannot be identified exclusively with the power of reasoning. The concept of
«we» also includes the functions that man shares with other living creatures, such
as perception and the vegetative functions.
According to Plotinus, one does not need to be aware of a function to exercise
it properly. Much though Plotinus's concept of «awareness» may seem to resem-
ble John Locke's idea of an «internal sense»,3 it has little in common with the
consciousness that, according to Locke, «is inseparable from thinking and essen-

1 Cf. Enn. 4.4 [28], ch. 18, 11. 10 ff. In Enn. 1.1 [53], ch. 7, 11. 14 ff. Plotinus writes, «But how is it we
who perceive? - Well, in the sense tbat we are not loosened of such a living creature, although we
have other, higher aspects which enter into the totality of what a human being is, a totality com-
posed of many elements.»
2 Cf. ch. 3 of Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental, and Enn. 1.1 [53], ch. 11, II. 4 ff,: «But
are we then not also that higher function? - Yes, we are, but there has to be apprehension; for
we do not always use all tbe functions that we possess; it depends on whether we direct the middle
towards the upper part or towards the opposite; in other words, whether we turn certain functions
from power, or disposition, into activity.»

3 The parallel has been drawn by AC. Lloyd, Nosce teipsum and conscientia (Archiv fUr Geschichte
der Philosophie, 46, 1964, pp. 188-200).

35

;opynghted )1
 ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN UmVERSE

tial to it») In Plotinian terms, a function can be active without our apprehend~
ing its operation. «Thinking is one thing, and the apprehension of the thinking is
another thing», Plotinus argues. «We always think, but we do not always appre-
hend this, because the receiving element does not only receive thoughts, but also
perceptions, from the o tber side. »2 «Awareness» is basically a form of
apprehension, and requ ires a certain amount of attention. Consequently, it must
compete with other forms of apprehension, especially with those that gather
information from the external world. Plotinus even suggests that the apprehen-
sion of the psychical functions themselves must, to a certain extent, follow along
the same path as information acquired from outside. Information about the
psychical activities is passed on to the reasoning power through a kind of internal
perception, a perception which, as Plotinus puts it, «bends to the inside»,3
Therefore, this awareness is more likely to hi nder rather than stimulate the ope-
ration of the function towards which it is directed, because it leaves less room for
a full concentration on the information that the function provides to the reason-
ing power.4

I J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. II, ch. 27.

2 Enn. 4.3 [27], ch. 30, II. 13 ff.

3 Cf. Enn. 5.1 [10], cb. 12, n. 5 ff. , and the comm entary at 2.7 ff. See also E .K. Em ilsson, Plotinus
and Sense-Perception -A Philosophical Study (Cambridge/New York/ Melbourne, 1988), pp. 107 ff.
Rather tban concluding, as Blumenthal does (on p. 42 of the above quoted work), that Plotinus thus
uses .:perception» in a way which brings it very close to «o ur idea of consciousness», one should
view passages like these as an indication that Plolinus's idea of «consciousness» differs in important
aspects from later connotations of that word.

4 For example, when we are reading, or when someone is making a sculpture, as Plotinus says in
Enn. 1.4 [46], ch. 10, ll . 24 ff. In the same chapter (11. 17 ff.) , the distinction between thinking and
being aware of one's thinking is illustrated by the case o f a bod ily dist urbance which affects the
awareness of the thinking without interrupting tbe thought itself. The whole argument of Enn. 1.4,
ch. 10 serves to underscore the Stoic idea that true happiness and true wisdom do not cease to exist
when a loss of consciousness occurs thro ugh some illness. As Brehier remarks in his introduction
to Enn. 1.4 [46], Plotinus diverges from the Stoics in that he does not regard unconscious (i.e., not
appr ehended) psychical activities as inferior to conscious (i.e., apprehended) ones. E.W, Warren,
Consciousness in Plotinus (Phronesis 9, 1964, pp. 83-97), obscures PlOlinus's point, when he states
that Plotinus distinguishes between a reason that «is always conscious», and a «we» that is not
always conscious. When an awareness of an activity occurs in which reason is involved (such as
reading or making a sculpture), this awareness (i.e., apprehension) is likely to occur by means of
reason itself. Therefore, to say that «we» are not aware of the act of readi ng, simply means that
reason apprehends the written information, but does not apprehend its own activity. On the other
hand, when reason does apprehend its own activity, the informatio n about this activity has gone
through a kind of internal perception. The «consciousness» of the act of reasoning cannot therefore
be exclusively ascribed to reason alone.

36

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 SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONCEPT OF «WE»

Plotinus thus introduces the concept of the «we» as a whole that integrates all
the psychical functions, and in which reason acts so to speak as the central pro-
cessing unit. «We» are not a part of the soul, Plotinus states, but «we» are the
entire soul, the entire system of psychical functions. Consequently, statements
such as, <<we think» or «we perceive» apply, in the most proper sense, to cases
when a thought or a piece of information from the sense-organs has gone through
the whole psychical system, rather than only being processed by some part of it. 1
On the other hand, there can be concepts in our mind which are not made
explicit by any kind of discursive reasoning. Similarly, there can be hidden
recollections of things we seem to have forgotten, or perceptions of which we
remain unaware, or emotions that are active without our being fully aware of
their nature. Such recollections, concepts, perceptions, or emotions do not per-
vade the psychical system in its entirety; in this sense, Plotinus can say that it is
not «we» who remember, or perceive, and so aD. Yet the psychical activities of
which we have no knowledge - that is, which do not become objects of our dis-
cursive reasoning - should still be regarded as belonging to the whole of what
«we» are. Sometimes these psychical activities are even more powerful when we
are not aware of them (although often, because of their faintness, they do not
produce any effect whatsoever).2
Plotinus's treatment of recollections that we are not aware of but which can
nevertheless be very powerful is especially interesting. When the «soul» does
know of these recollections, Plotinus says, then it knows them to be something
different from itself, something which it has but which it is not. When, on the
other hand, such recollections are active without the soul's knowledge, then the
soul simply seems to be, rather than to have (as a part of itself) the function that
dominates it without its being aware of that function. In other words, the aware-
ness of a function externalizes this function, so to speak, by perceiving it and
sending a kind of sense-image of it to the reasoning agent. The act of apprehen-
sion thus creates an apparent contrast between the «we» and the perceived psych-
ical function. In reality, this contrast only arises from the opposition between the

1 Cf. Enn. 4.8 [6], ch. 8, U. 6 ff. and Enn. 5.1 [10], ch. 12, 11. 8 f. respectively.

2 Cf. notably the passages Enn. 4.8 [6] , ch. 8, U. 6 ff. on concepts in the mind and emotions that are
there without our «apprehending» them; Enn. 4.4 (28], ch. 4, ll. 7 ff. on memories that we are not
aware of and which can nevertheless be more powerful than those of which we do have knowledge;
and ch. 8, II. 1 ff. of the same tr ealise, on per cepti ons thal , because of the ir fa intness, pa ss
unnoticed.

37

;opynghted )1
•

•
 ASPECfS OF THE PLQTINlAN UNIVERSE

which we apprehend our own psychical functions essentially differs from the way
in which we acquire knowledge of the external world. His psychology does not,
therefore, require the existence of a special centre of consciousness, an «I» that is
distinguished from the functions that it is aware of, and that possesses the
capability to grasp itself fully and immediately. The Plotinian «we» is not a unify-
ing centre somewhere within the psycho-corporeal system, disti nct fro m the other
elements that constitute the sys tem, but it is precisely the tota li ty of psycho-
corporeal activities and qualities that characterize the human person.
In the light of the foregoing, it appears more appropriate to compare Plotinian
psychology to certain strands in modern th ought, than to interpret it in terms of
Cartesian philosophy, and of the eighteenth- and nine teenth-century psychology
that gave birth to the division of the psychical system into a conscious and uncon-
scious part.! Of course, one sho uld be equally carefu l not to project twentieth-
century psychological views too rapidly onto a third-century thinker. Yet it may
be remarked that the distinction between a consciolls and an unconscious part of
the psychical system is no longer taken for granted by all of today's philosophers
and psychologists. The dichotomy has been fi rmly rej ected by Anglo-Saxo n philo-
sophers such as G. Ryle and P.F. Strawson, and it is equally under discussion in
modern psychology.
Ryle and Straws on's severe criticism of the idea of a self-conscious ego or a
self-conscious mind proves that the absence of such an idea in th e Enneads need
not necessarily undercut Plotinus's validity as a psychologist. Some of the ideas
of these twentieth-century thinkers indeed refl ect the basic tenets of Plotinus's
concept of the human person, of the «we». Man, P.F. Strawson argues, is not
divided into a pure, self-conscious ego and corporeal and physical attributes; he is
simply a human person, to which both certain conscious and physical charac-
teristics should be ascribed. 2 Likewise, the Plotinian «we» is precisely an entire
psycho-corporeal system, to which various kinds of psychical functions and bodily
characteristics can be assigned. G. Ryle similarly states that there is no essential
difference between the way we come to know things about other people and the

1 Cf. the distinction made by D escartes, in Les passions de ['lime, between two syste ms within the
mind, one consisting of a network of tubes and wires in the brain connected to sense-organs and
muscles, which is to be held responsible for all «unconscious» acts that are perfor med by human
beings and animals alike, and another, referr ed to by D escartes as the soul, which controls all
voluntary and conscious actions, characteristic of the human being.

2 P.F. Strawson, Individuals -An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London, 1959), pp. 102 ff.

40

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 SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONCEPT OF .WE.

manner in which we come to know ourselves, and that the powers by which minds
apprehend their own states and operations do not differ from the ones they use to
apprehend the external world. 1 Again, this sounds much like Plotinus's defini-
tion of human self-knowledge. All knowledge we possess, Plotinus holds, is
knowledge of something outside the knowing element itself, and there is no essen-
tial difference between the «awareness» which the psycho-corporeal system has
of its own operations, and the more general «apprehension» of external informa-
tion.
But, as previously noted, we should not ourselves fall into the error of simply
incorporating Plotinus into twentieth-century philosophy. There are, with respect
to the concept of the human person, some important points where Plotinus
diverges from modern philosophy, or at least where he places a different empha-
sis. One of these areas concerns the unity of the human person, what Kant called
the Einheit der Appeneption, and that is to account for the fact that a variety of
apprehensions, perceptions, and thoughts, taking place at different moments and
operating through different parts of the psycho-corporeal system, can all be felt
as aspects of one and the same person, or «1». Strawson maintains that the unity
of the «b is a purely formal one; in fact, he denies the need for such a concept,
just as he denies the need for a pure, self-conscious ego. In Strawson's view, the
unity of the human person is simply a suggestion th at arises from the way in
which we talk about human perception and our own perceptions. We simply
must use the same pronoun «1» as the subject of sen tences in order to express
that some thought or perception occurs in us: «l think, I perceive, etc.».
In the philosophy of Plo tinus, the unity which underlies all modes of thought is
not a purely formal unity. Yet the Plotinian unity of thought does not coincide
with the notion of an «1» or self. On the contrary, it is precisely a lack of unity
that, in the case of human thinking, gives rise to such a notion. All thought, Ploti-
nus argues, must be considered a deficient form of self-knowledge. Each mode of
thought, or more generally, of apprehension, can only operate in a proper way by
virtue of a higher mode, where there is less need to externalize the object of
apprehension in order to make the apprehension possible. Thus, the act of think-
ing that leads to the statement, «I think about thi s object (which is not myself)>>
or <<1 have this thought (again without my being identical with the thought)>>, is,
according to Plotinus, made possible by a higber and more concentrated act of

1 G. Ryle, The COllcept of Mir. ·' ] (London, 1949), pp. 148 ff.

41

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 ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE

thinking which can say, «1 am this th ough t» and even, «I am this object». And in
its turn, this mode of thinking points towards a mode of existence where no more
needs to be said than «1 b , which is equivalent to «am am», since the personal
pronoun «I» loses its meaning when it no longer functions to distinguish between
the apprehending subject and the apprehended object. l Consequently, Plotinus
regards the kind of thinking in which an «I» is able to distinguish itself from its
object as a deficient mode of thinking, a deficient form of self-knowledge. In
contrast, the unity of apprehension, although it is only partially realized in the
case of ordinary human thinking, specifically counteracts the disintegration of the
human person into an apprehending agent - an <d » - and a world of possible
objects of apprehension that are all external to, and separated from, this appre-
hending agent.

An Antithesis Between the Psychical and the Physical Realm?

An other point of comparison between P lotinian philosophy and modern

thou ght involves the intricate problem of the relation between body and mind.
G. Ryle maintained that the way in which our minds discover facts about them-
selves does not essentially differ from the ways in which we discover facts about
the physical world, simply because a separation does not exist between the mind
and the physical world. This view appears incompatible with Plotinus's portrayal
of the mind and the reality of the mind. Indeed, to say that there exists no realm
of the mind would sou nd rather un-Plotinian. On the other hand, the idea that
our minds and our bodies do not constitute separate worlds, and that what goes
on in the mind is subject to laws essentially similar to the ones that govern the
body, comes close to the views held by Plotinus.
In order to form a clearer picture of Plotinus's thought in this respect, we must
.turn to the discussion of a crucial concept that reoccurs throughout the treatise
Modes of Kn owledge and the Transcendental, and places Plotinian psychology in
the much broader context of Plotinian metaphysics. For that concept, Plotinus
uses the Greek word EVE:PYElCX, which can be translated in various ways; as
«operation», «ac tivity)), «act)), or «energy)), but also, in a mo re Aristotelian
fashion, as «actualization» or «realization». The things that we ordinarily call

1 ce. chapter 10 of Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendemal.

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 AN ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THE PSYCHICAL AND THE PHYSICAL REALM?

psychical functions or psychical phenomena are described as €V€PYEtal (<<acts»,

«activities») by Plotinus. Thus, reason is an EV€PYE1.CX, and so is the function of
representation, as well as the perceptive function or whatever function could be
subsumed under the «soul» or the «psyche).
The description of human psychology presented in the first chapters of Modes
of Knowledge and the Transcendental , a description which we find amply elabo-
rated upon in the treatise What Is a Living Creature and What Is Man (Enn. 1.1
[53]), has given rise to some dispute among scholars. There has been much
debate over the question how sharply Plotinus wants to separate a pure, universal
mind from the individual human reason, and what distance his psychology creates
between the soul, as the cause and agent of psychical functions, and the body, in
and through which these functions become manifest. 1 The dispu te has been
especially provoked by Plotinus's use of the word xwpw't6<; (<<separable»,
«separated», «s tanding apart») with respect to mind in its relation to the soul,
and likewise, with respect to the soul in its relation to the body.
The use of )(WPlU-r&; as a technical term recalls, of course, the psychology of
Aristotle. In the third book of the treatise On the Soul (430a), Aristotle makes
his famous distinction between the active and the passive mind. The latter is
defined as a dispOSition of the soul which enables it to think. The passive mind,
Aristotle says, is in fact no more than a potentiality, just as colours in the dark are
potential colours, waiting for light to make them visible and hence actual. Simi-
larly, it is the active mind that must stir the passive mind in order to change it
from potential into actual thought. Aristotle conceives of this active mind as a
universal and continuous activity which stirs different indivi dual minds to dif-
ferent thoughts, in accordance with their individual dispositions, just as the same
undifferentiated light makes different objects and materials exhibit different col-
ours. From this it follows, Aristotle argues, that the active mind stands apart
from the passive individual minds. However, when Aristotle discusses the posi-
tion of the «mind of the soul» (reason, or the mind of the individ ual thinking

1 The discussion is usually carried on within the framework of the interpretation in terms of hypos·
tases. cr., e.g., A.H. Armstrong, The A rchitecture of the In telligible Universe in the Thought of Ploti·
nus (Cambridge, 1940), p. 69 and T .A. Szleti.k, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plorins
(Basel/ Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 1% ff., versus A.H. Armstrong, Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at
Variance with Classical Intellectualism (Journal of Hellenistic Studies 93, 1973, pp. 13-22), pp. 18 fr.
and H.I. Blumenthal, Nous and Soul in Plotillus - Some Problems of Demarcation (Alii del Con·
vegno internazionale sui tema: Plotino e if Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente. R a ma, 1970, pp.
203-219).

43

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 ASPECTS OF THE PLOTINlAN UNIVERSE

creature), he comes to the conclusion that this too «stands apart», apart, that is,
from the body and from other psychical functions, such as perception. First, Aris-
totle argues, reason does not operate through any bodily organ as perception
does. Secondly, its operation cannot be negatively affected by an excessive influ-
ence of its object: an excess of light or sound can damage the eye or ear, but
there is no such thing as an excess of thinkability which would prevent something
from actually being thought.
In Modes of Knowledge and the Transcendental, Plotinus is clearly influenced by
this piece of Aristotelian psychology. He too declares the «pure mind» to «stand
apart» from individual human souls, and, like Aristotle, he argues that the power
of reason, being a function of the soul, stands apart from the body. In fact,
according to Plotinus, all psychical functions, although some of them may operate
through bodily organs, are themselves «impassible» with respect to bodily influ-
ences. In the treatise What is a Living Creature and What is Man? (Enn. 1.1 [53]),
which, according to Porphyry, was written in the same period as Modes of Knowl-
edge and the Transcendental, Plotinus even unfolds the idea that the soul as such
is «separable» from the body. Plotinus states that it is not the soul itself, but a
«reflection» of it that is fused with the body and m ake s it perform the functions
of a living organism. With this statement, Plotinus seems to go much further than
Aristotle, to whom the soul is just the whole of properties and qualities of a body
that make it live and perform certain biological and psychical functions. Here,
we are hitting upon a crucial point. Does Plotinus indeed b elieve that the soul
stands apart from the body, that it is a separate entity of a different order? The
problem becomes even more complicated when, instead of «soul» and «body»,
we substitute «mind» and «body», or «the immaterial» and «matter».
Thus, the more general question may b e rais ed whether Plotinus was a
«dualis1». By introducing this rather vague term we may easily become entangled
in a fruitless discussion on different types of dualism and different interpretations
of the word. Therefore, a more precise definition appears necessary. From an
epistemological point of view, we may take an extreme dualism to imply that
essentially different models of analysis and essentially different types of descrip-
tion are needed to acquire knowledge about different classes of phenomena.
One class would then comprise the «material» phenomena that constitute the
realm of physics, while the «immaterial» phenomena of the second class would be
the object of psychology, or perhaps of metaphysics.
Now, a glance at the history of Greek philosophy makes it clear that such a
plain dualism, in the sense of a sharp divisi on of r eality into a material and

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another, more specific distinction between mind and body. There exists, Aris-
totle states, a mind that stands apart from the body and from all those psychical
functions whose operations require bodily organs. This mind is «wi thout matter»
and as such it is sheer actuality (EvEpyna). When we read that this mind is
defined as «thinking of thinking», and that it stirs the potential minds of individ-
ualliving creatures to form actual thoughts, we may conclude th at €V€pye:ta has,
in this case, the connotation of «act», «activity», in addition to «actuality),
In his description of the nature of true self-knowledge, Plotinus adopts Aristo-
telian terminology. At the same time, however, he adheres to the Platonic con-
cept of a permanent and universal pattern or structure in which the constantly
changing stream of physical phenomena and events in the world around us is, as
it were, embedded. From the terminology that he uses, the impression might
arise that Plotinus, perhaps more strongly so than others before him, tend s to
think in dichotomies (mind - matter, soul- body, "pure» mind - ensouled body).
Yet behind the surface of this terminology, a world view emerges with surpris-
ingly strong monistic traits. To Plotinus, what mind, soul, and body have in
common is that they are all types, modes, or levels of what Plotinus calls EVEP-
yna. As Plotinus u ses the term, it is not quite possible to distinguish sharply
between EVEPYElcx, meaning «actualization», «realizatioID>, and EVEPY€1.a in the
sense of «act», «activity». Rather, it is the way in which these two meanings are
blended that enables Plotinu s to make EVEPYEux one of the central notions of his
metaphysics.
Let us consider the consequences which this blending of the concepts of
«activity» and of «actuality» has for Plotinian psychology. Plotinus, with more
emphasis than Aristotle, regards all psychical functions first and foremost as EVEP-
YEUXL It is not only the mind that is defined as pure activity. As the treatise
What Is a Living Creature and What Is Man? (Enn. 1.1 [53]) shows, all functions
and qualities of the living body should in fact be ascribed to powers! which the
soul, as Plotinus says, bestows upon the body. Now Plotinus, quite in agreement
with modern everyday language, speaks of the «body» when he refers to the thing

1 In this context, «power» (Mva}.w;) does not have the (Aristotelian) connotation of a potentiality
that must be stirred to actual operation by some external influence. Aristotle too uses the word
ouvcq.llI;, in the sense of «power» , «function» (e.g., in an enumeration of the soul's BUVCt}..LE:l<; in On
the Soul lII, 433b), but the usual view of «power» in Aristot le is that of a «potential» (ouvO:}..Lel)
thinking and a «potential» perception that become «actualized» (evepyeU;t. eV'tE:AEXE:iQ) when they
are stirred to activity by their respective objects (d., e.g., On the Soul 429a and 431a). Plotinus's use
of the OUVQjll<;-terminology is discussed in H. Buchner, Plorins M6g/ichkeits/ehre (Munich, 1970).

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aspects of man that one would be inclined to regard as fi rst and foremost corpo-
real, such as the body's shape and colour.
Yet the question remains how we are to treat the expression xwp~a"t6<;
(<<standing aparb>, «separable»). which Plotinus borrows from Aristotle and which
he applies, as it seems, even more broadly than Aristotle. No t only is there the
«pure» or «uppen} mind which, in chapter 3 of Modes of Knowledge and the Tran -
scendental, is said to stand apart from human re ason, but, as it appears in other
texts, psychical functions such as reason and perception are equally considered to
be «separable». In fact, the soul as such is, in a typically Plotinian phrase, said to
be «separable, even when it is not separated».
A rough indication for how to account for this «separable» nature can already
be found in Ari stotle. The ac tive mind, Aristotle states, is no t stirred to activity
by something else. On the contrary, being itself a pure activity, the active mind
exercises its influence on those souls that have the capacity to reason, and it stirs
their potential reason to actual th ough t. Reason, in its turn, stands apart from
the body, Aristotle continues, because it is not affected by the body, nor by the
objects towards which it directs its attention. Yet again, for a full appreciatio n of
the Plotinian use of the word and its Aristote lian connotati on of the «separable
mind» we must add the Platonic idea that the permanent structure in which the
fleeting physical phenomena partake, and from which they borrow their determi-
nation and their determinability, does not itself depend on these phenomena. In
the Platonic sense, this permanent structure is, in a sense, more «reab> and more
of a «being>) than the perceived physical phenomena. Similarly, to Plotinus a
higher form of activity does not arise out of the combination of lower ones, nor
does Plotinu s regard activity in general as an accompanying property of matter.
The activity exists in its own ri ght; it is the activity that structures matter, and the
higber kind of activity that structures, and is reflected in, the lower one.
However, this definition presents a problem. The function of reason, for
example, processes information which perception provides to it. Reason seems
thus to be dependent on perception, and it is difficult to see how, in this case, the
higher function of reason could exist without the lowe r functi on of perception
being there first. Likewise, it seems odd that there would be an impassible func-
tion of perception that does not have its raison d'etre in a capability to undergo
the influences exercised on it by the objects of perception. Yet this appears to be
what the Plotinian theory of psychical activities implies. We could also pose the
question in another form: If there is no information to process from the sense-

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organs, then could we still say that the perceptive function and even the power of
reason are active, that they are more than mere potentialities?
The way in which the problem is raised is co ntingen t upon how one views the
relation between human thinking and perception on the one hand, and the world
that is the object of this activity, on the other. One could say, for example, that
the information about the world and its structure is not in our brains, but only in
the world itself. Given this view, there can be little if any information in the
brain which has not come from the outside world and through the sense-organs.
Alternatively, it could be argu ed that our minds impose a structure upon the
world, that in our thinking, we select pieces of information that fit into a coherent
picture, and that we leave out the multitude of facts that obscu re this picture or
disturb its structur e a nd regularity. But then one would still have to conclude
that the infinity of phenomena an d events in the world around us are primary,
and that the stru ctured and organized picture we have of this world is secondary
or even imaginary, and therefore less «real » than the world which it describes.
Neither of these ways, however, are chosen by Plotinus. To Plo tinu s, the world
is a structured whole, and it is the structure that he refe rs to as «reality» (or
«being»), rather than the embedded phenomena that only bear the stamp of this
structure to a limited extent and for a limited amount of time. The same applies
to a living creature. Its «reality» is me asu red by the degree to which it is
organized and structured. Thus, an organism that thinks is more «real» than an
organism that perceives but does not think, because thinking on the basis of per-
ception represents a higher kind of organization than mere perception.
Therefore, the psychological description that is applied to the living organism
in the philosophy of Plotinus matches to a high extent his physi cal description of
the world as a whole. Actuality (realization, «real ness», determinacy) in the
physical world corresponds with the act (activity, operation, function) in the
psychology of the living organism. The parallel argument even goes so far as to
imply that «knowledge» in the living creature does not refer to anything essen-
tially different from what could be called the «structure» or «organization» of the
physical world. This is the deeper meaning of Plotinus's state ment that «all
things are traces of thought and of the mind». The degree to which an organism
can be said to «have (self-) knowledge» parallels what, in physical terms, would
be the organization or structure of a thing.
As noted before, it is impossible here to draw a sharp distinction between
«actualization» and «activity», which are both meanings of the same word, €V€P-
YEW. In the Plotinian universe, th e scales of th e balance between activity and

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 AN ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THE PSYCHICAL AND TH E PHYSICAL REALM?

corporeality are turned in favou r of the former. «Matter» is, strictly speaking, a
limiting concept. Wh en the radiation of light is taken as an example of pure
activity (<<energy)). then one could conceive of matter as a kind of horizon, a bar·
derline, where the light, which becomes fainter as the distance from its source
increases, finally turns into complete darkne ss .1 Matter itself is sheer indeter-
minacy. Therefore, matter cannot confer realness or actualization on objects. It
is the activity that things possess, which makes them real and determinate, rather
than their «corporeality» or «materiality» .
The analogy between «activity» (<<energy») in the area of physics, and «act»
(<<function») as a psychological concept is pushed even further. It is typical of all
kinds of activity, Plotinus asserts, that they are directed primarily towards the
inside, and only second arily towards th e outside. In physical terms, this means
that there has to be a certain amount of energy concentrated within a given body
or within given spatial limits, in order fo r there to be an external emission and
manifestation of that activity. The same applies to activities performed by the
living creature th at are commonly described as psychical acts. In th is case too,
Plotinus argues, the inwardly directed activity is primary. All psychical functions
that are in any way directed towards an external object must be regarded as the
depl oyment or external «radiation» of a highe r and more concentrated level of
• •
aCtiVIty.
Consequently, the overall picture that emerges centres around two basic prin-
ciples. First, Plotinus does not distinguish between «psychical» and «physical»
phenomena, not at least in the se nse that separate sets of concepts and terms
would be exclusively applicable to either one of these classes of phenomena.2

1 See, e.g., Enn. 2.4 [12], cb. 5, and Enn. 1.8 [51], ch. 4, 11. 28 ff. In Enn. 2.4 Plotinus tends to a
more r elative interpretation of the notion of matter, each level of activity being considered as
«matter» witb respect to a higber level. In later treatises, however, this idea seems to have fallen
into tbe background, and matter is usually rep resented as the absolutely indeterm inate. Aristotle
uses UATl in a similar sense in Metaphysics, bk. Zeta (1029a), where he defines it, more strictly than
in bk. Eta, as «tbe ultim ate» of which nothing can be predicated.

2 It therefore appears rather inappropriate to regard Plot in us as the «father of the mind-body
problem», in the sense thal his psychology would create an «ontological gap» between the human
soul and the body (thus Emilsson, in the above quoted work, pp. 145 ff.). The distinction between
«soul» and «body», or between psychological and physiological ph enomena, presents a problem
only when psychology and physics are considered to apply to separate and mutually exclusive sets of
phenomena. Plotinus indeed criticizes materialistic and mechanistic explanations in tbe realm of
psychology, but he does not maintain a rigid materialism in the fi eld of physics. On the contrary,
rather than constituting separate worlds, psychical and bodily phenomena are both described as
«acts.. or «actualities».

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the idea of an «emanation» or outflow of energy in his philosophical system.!

Armstrong is particularly intrigued by the remarkable variant of the light meta-
phor in Enn. 6.4 [22], ch. 7, II. 22 ff., where the idea of a radiation from a centre is
replaced by the image of a spherical space filled up with light, without there
being a centre from which this light can be said to proceed.
There are indeed indications that Plotinus had his doubts about the light meta-
phor, and in particular, about the comparison of universal activity to the sun and
its radiance. In chapter 9 of Modes of Kn owledge and the Transcendental, for
example, he considers the image of the lower psychical functions radiating as it
were from higher ones like light from the sun. Yet here Ploti nus appears to be
chiefly concerned with pointing out in what respects the analogy does not hold.
Contrary to what Armstrong suggests, however, it is not the Stoic background of
the metaphor that causes the greatest problem, not at any rate in the sense that
Plotinus, in taking over the metaphor, would bring his own system into conflict
with a strongly monistic world view. According to Armstrong, the Stoic orig.in of
the light metaphor,2 with its predominantly materialistic emphasis, is hardly
compatible with a system of a thinker like Plotinus's, who, as Armstrong puts it,
«is very clear about the distinction between material and spiri tual»,3 But the
Plotinian universe does not in any way break down into a material and a spiritual
realm, with light as a kind of glue to hold the two togethe r. Instead, Plotinus dif-
fers with the Stoics in terms of the key position that the concept of energy (activ-
ity, actuality) takes in the Plotinian universe at the expense of matter. Therefore,
if only the immaterial and energetic character of light were sufficiently brought
out, there would, in principle, be no objection against transplanting the light
metaphor from a material universe to one that is described in terms of energy
and activity.4

1 A.H. Armstrong, «Emanation» in Plotinus (Mind, n.s. 46,1937, pp. 61-66).

2 For this d. also R.E. Witt, Plotinus and Posidonius (Classical Quarterly 24, 1930, pp. 198-207), pp.
205 rr,
3 This seems to be a common view; cf. J .M . Rist, The Problem of «Otherness» in the Enneads (in Le
neopiaronisme - Co/loque International du Centre National de fa Recherche Scientijique, Royaumont,
1969, Paris, 1971, pp. 77-87), p. 87: «By using the analogy of the sun, P IOlinus is led to explain the
acts of an incorporeal substance in terms of an erroneous explanation of the operations of a physi-
cal body.»

4 Tbe fact tbat tbe sun metaphor was not previously limited to a strictly materialistic context is
demonst rated by its frequent use in various kinds of solar theologies. In fact, as noted by Arm-
strong and Witt, the idea of an outflow or emanation of light out of the divine mind is common to a
diversity of sources: the "Wisdom of Solomon, Seneca, the H ermetic writings, Christian authors, etc.

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 AN ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THE PSYCHICAL AND TH E PHYSICAL REALM?

Now, there can be no doubt that Plotinus conceives of light as an activity or

energy, rather than a s a flow of particles. In thi s respect, Armstrong's remark
that Plotinus agrees with Aristotle on the incorporeality of light, bu t that he gives
light a more august status than Aristotl e does, may be somewhat misleadi ng.
Rather than defending (in Enn. 4.5 [29], ch. 6) a special status of ligh t against
Aristotle, who, according to Armst rong, «regarded it as simp ly a physical
phenomenon», Plotinus is defending the light's energetic character as such. In
On the Soul II, 418b, the passage to which Plotinus is apparently alluding, Aris-
totle defines light first as the fac t of a certain medium actually being transparent,
and subsequently as the presence of a fire or a similar agent in the transparent
medium. But in spite of his use of the word EVEpY€Lcx, Aristotle's definition of
light lacks, or at least does not clearly bring to the fore the notion of an energy in
the modern sense of the word. And it is precisely this connotation that Plotinus
wants to add in to Enn. 4.5, where he says th a t light is not just a quality of a
certain medium (namely, the fact that the medium is transparent), bu t «an activ·
ity springing from some thing luminous». On th e other hand, P lotinus, in the
same passage, remains rather unclear with respect to the question whether light
can propagate through a void. T his brings us back to chapter 9 of M odes of
Knowledge and the Transcendental, where Plotinus remarks that «one is to situate
it all in something else, including the light that is around the su n, so as to avoid
the assumption that the space beyond the sun's surface is a void without matter».
The incongruities that arise here go beyond the particular instance of the light
metaphor and touch upon the notion of «energy» or «activity» in general. Appar·
ently. Plotinus has diffi culty in imagining the propagation of an activity without
there being some kind of medium (the word actually used in chapter 9 is not VAT'),
completely indeterminate matter in the strict sense, but a@,ucx, a «body» or mate·
rial that already has certain qualities and properties) in which the propagation
takes place. Yet it is said that the soul, «being a kind of ligh t from the mind, is
not in something else, but around the mi nd without having a place». Now why

Apart from these examples, Plotinus had, of course, the model of Plato, who had compared the spe·
cia! status of the highest Idea of (he Good among the pure objects of thought with that of the sun
with respect to all the things that it makes visible (in R epublic VI, 508a fL, a central text in Ploti-
nus's Plato-interpretation).

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