LEHMAN BROTHERS: TOO BIG TO FAIL?
CASE NARRATIVE
THE COMPANY
In the 1840's Henry Lehman started a business selling groceries, dry goods and utensils to cotton
farmers in Alabama. In 1850 his two brothers, Emanuel and Mayer, joined the small business
which was then named Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers soon moved away from the general
merchandising business into the more lucrative trade of buying and selling cotton.
The business expanded quite rapidly once the brothers built a large cotton warehouse. An office
was opened in New York in 1858 giving Lehman Brothers a footprint in the expanding
commodities trading business and a toehold in the financial community.
The business suffered greatly during the U.S. Civil War as the South's economy was
destroyed and its primary export crop, cotton, was lost. After the war the company largely moved
its operations to New York and continued to deal primarily in commodities. Lehman Brothers
organized the formation of the New York Cotton Exchange which was the first commodities
futures trading venture. The Company also helped to establish a Coffee Exchange and a
Petroleum Exchange.
The firm was asked to underwrite the first state bond issue for Alabama after the war and
become the fiscal agent for the state. Thus the firm began a long tradition of municipal finance.
In the latter part of the 19th century the formation and construction of railroads was a
booming business in need of financing. Traditional methods of financing at that time relied
largely on wealthy individuals but the massive need for financing pushed firms to structure
bonds in such a way as to draw in individual first-time investors. Lehman Brothers expanded its
commodity business to include selling and trading securities, joined the New York Stock
Exchange, and moved from commodity trading to merchant banking. The firm also became more
important in financial advisory services which set the stage for it to become a big player in the
underwriting business later in the 20th century. In the early 1900's Lehman was a leader and a
primary underwriter in the emerging retail sector which included many famous names like
Woolworth, Sears, Gimbel's and Macy's.
The firm grew rapidly underwriting emerging industries like airlines, the motion pictures and
entertainment industry, the oil sector including extraction, development, and production as well
as continuing its strong support of the retail sector.
Lehman Brothers remained a family-only partnership until 1924 when the first non-family
members were brought in.
During the Depression it was difficult for even strong companies to raise capital. Lehman was
one of the first firms to use private placements as a way to replace public financing with private
lending, a common method today but innovative in its day.
The 1950's began to see the dawning of the electronic and computer sectors and Lehman quickly
sought opportunities in these areas.
In the 1960's the firm expanded its capital markets and trading capabilities and became a leader
in commercial paper and a primary dealer in U.S. securities. As American companies began to
move to overseas markets, Lehman followed and increased its global presence by setting up
offices in Europe and Asia.
The last Lehman family member left the company in 1969. There was no clear line of
succession. The Company was also facing severe headwinds because of the poor economic
climate at that time.
In the 1980's much energy was focused on mergers and acquisitions both domestically and
internationally and Lehman was a key advisor for many of these transactions. There also were a
number of acquisitions aimed at rounding out the firm's business platform and moving it to the
fourth largest investment bank in the U.S. The firm enjoyed considerable success with one of the
highest returns on equity in the business.
Hostilities between the firm's investment bankers and equity and commodity traders caused
internal strife. An ex-Chairman of the firm's M&A committee recalls in an interview that
"Lehman Brothers had an extremely competitive environment which ultimately became
dysfunctional." The company suffered under the internal dissention and senior management was
pressured to sell the firm. From 1984 through 1994 Lehman Brothers was a part of the American
Express Companies and during this time was focused largely on brokerage rather than
investment banking.
In 1994 Lehman was spun out of American Express in an initial public offering and became
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.
Lehman's global headquarters were destroyed during the attack of the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001.
THE PROBLEMS
Richard J. Fuld, the Chairman of Lehman Brothers, spent his entire forty-two year career at the
company rising from the trading floor to the executive floor. Fuld was a classic Wall Street
personality noted for taking big risks and reaping large rewards with a great intensity and an
expectation of loyalty from the staff. Fuld ruled by intimidation and his brutality was legendary.
His motto was "never surrender". He neither sought nor accepted counsel from his senior
managers. His time was spent in his office on the 31st floor building the asset base that ended up
causing the firm's demise. Despite his fierce reputation Fuld was a much admired Wall Street
CEO but his experience and solo management style served him poorly when he, like many
others, miscalculated the severity of the market upheaval.
Lehman was a global financial services firm serving corporations, local federal and state
governments, institutions, and high net worth customers. Its focus was largely in equities and
fixed income products, trading and research, investment banking and asset management.
Retail was not a major product line. Leman felt it was losing out on the huge profits other Wall
Street firms were enjoying from slicing and dicing America's home mortgages. Lehman began to
enter this business in earnest in 2005 ignoring warnings that the U.S. housing market had
become dangerously overheated and mortgage brokers were handing out money to individuals
who could never pay. Lehman started to exit the business in August 2007 right after the collapse
of two hedge funds sponsored by Bear Stearns that were invested in complex derivatives backed
by home mortgages. The collapse of the two hedge funds focused the market's attention on the
value of subprime mortgages. Lehman closed its subprime lender, BNC Mortgage, but retained
an outsized position in subprime debt especially the lower quality lower rated mortgage tranches
at the bottom of the securitization chain. It is uncertain whether Lehman did this because it was
simply unable to sell the low rated bonds or senior management made a conscientious decision to
hold on to them hoping the impairment in value was only temporary.
Lehman Brothers took false comfort in the fact that their balance sheet was heavily
weighted in commercial real estate which management thought was immune from the
growing problems in the residential housing sector and far away from the toxic brew of
collateralized debt obligations polluting other investment banks’ books. Lehman had the
largest commercial real estate portfolio on Wall Street. The firm considered itself an expert in
financing commercial real estate. Lehman paid high prices at the top of the market and
management maintained an optimistic view of the portfolio's worth despite growing evidence
that this sector was also in trouble. Lehman's commercial property book was out of control, an
$80 billion accumulation of fantasy real estate projects. Lehman was a ticking time bomb.
The Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States had net capital rules in place
since 1925 which, among other requirements, held securities firms to a leverage ceiling of 12 to
1. Firms were required to notify the SEC and the public if they were coming close to the limit
and cease trading if they exceeded the limit. In 2004 the EU passed new rules allowing
computerized models and doing away with the discounts and haircuts historically used in
computing net capital. The new EU rules also allowed significantly larger leverage in the
consolidated firm - up to 40 to 1.
Financial firms operating in the EU have to be subject to consolidated supervision. Lehman
Brothers and the four other U.S. investment banks had no consolidated supervisor as the U.S.
law was silent on this point. The SEC instituted a voluntary program called the Consolidated
Supervision Entities (CSE) program which was designed to meet the requirements for
consolidated supervision. There were significant flaws in this program which rendered it
ineffective. (See Appendix). Regardless of the voluntary nature of the program and the suspect
ability of the SEC to enforce any rules the SEC justified allowing the firms in the program more
generous leverage and reduced capital rules because the CSE program allowed the firm to better
manage risk on a consolidated basis. In reality Investment Bank Holding Companies, including
Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., had no formal regulatory oversight, no liquidity requirements,
no leverage constraints, and no capital rules.
To enhance returns Lehman Brothers became addicted to debt which put the bank at even more
risk. Lehman's assets to real tangible common equity reached 44 to 1. If asset value were to fall
only 1% it would reduce real tangible common equity by half, which would increase leverage to
80 to 1, at which point confidence in the firm would be irretrievably lost.
Lehman's Board of Directors was inexperienced at overseeing a diversified investment bank
holding company. Only one outside member had any background in the financial sector. The
Board failed to put any brakes on an expanding portfolio of commercial real estate and
increasingly toxic securities. Between 2000 and 2007 the so-called risk committee met only
twice a year yet the Board awarded total remuneration of close to $500 million to Chairman
Fuld. Four days before its collapse and following an announcement that the firm lost almost $4
billion in the third quarter, Fuld told the media that "the Board's been wonderfully supportive."
Lehman had been looking at taking on a strategic partner to buy 10% to 15% for some time. The
firm approached AIG in 2006 and Sovereign Funds and other institutional investors in the
Middle and Far East in 2007. Secretary of the Treasury, Hank Paulson, was encouraging the firm
to find a buyer. Fuld, however, thought the company should be selling at a premium and not a
discount. Early in 2008 the stock was getting hammered despite reasonable results. Management
took the opportunity to dole out shares to staff in the belief the price would soon rebound and
yield large payouts.
THE DOWNFALL
In the beginning of 2008 Chief Financial Officer, Erin Callan, was asked at a regular
investor update conference call why Lehman Brothers was not in need of a capital
restoration program. Ms. Callan responded with a number of points:
_ Lehman did not need more money
_ the company had not yet posted a loss during the credit crisis
_ the firm had industry veterans in the executive suite who have perfected the science
of risk management
_ the bank's real estate investments were top notch
_ we know when we need capital and we do not, and right now there is no way
While she later tempered these remarks it served to focus analysts’ attention on Lehman.
As the credit crisis grew, investors began to get nervous about Lehman and the stock fell 45% in
two days in March after the Federal Reserve's assisted bailout of Bear Stearns. With Bear out of
the picture Lehman was the smallest investment bank on Wall Street.
At the end of the first quarter the bank announced a small profit of just under $500 million
coupled with write-offs of $1.8 billion. The firm sold $4 billion in capital.
As the property market cratered Lehman reacted by selling assets but not as aggressively as it
needed. The selling of assets crystallized losses. In June Lehman had to announce 2nd quarter
results earlier than usual. It announced an unexpected loss of $2.8 billion. The President, Joe
Gregory, was replaced. Mr. Gregory had been a close ally of Chairman Fuld and his chief
supporter. The CFO, Erin Callan, was demoted. There was severe discord within the firm; many
of the senior managers were troubled about the lack of an aggressive plan to address the
company's problems - especially with respect to dealing with the overvalued commercial real
estate. Very experienced staff began to leave.
Lehman raised another $6 billion in capital and explored selling parts of the business. Neither the
management changes nor the promises of a turnaround arrested the company's downward spiral
and the stock continued to fall.
In early August Lehman thought it had a deal to sell a 25% stake in the company to the Korean
Development Bank at $22 a share. But Fuld was pushing the Korean Bank to also take some of
its underperforming assets. The Koreans balked and were becoming spooked by the ballooning
toxic property losses. The stock continued to slide to under $10 a share and the expected deal
cratered.
On September 7th the U.S. government seizes control of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the two
big mortgage companies, because of large losses.
On September 10th Lehman announces losses of $3.9 billion and the market expects a concrete
plan to deal with the downward spiraling property values and resuscitate the company. They are
disappointed as Fuld's plan is to spin off $60 billion of toxic rubbish into a bad bank leaving
$600 billion in a good bank with solid assets. The Head of Equity trading in Lehman reflects the
mood of the market as he says "if this is all we have as a plan we are toast."
The next day, JP Morgan asks for additional $5 billion in collateral to secure Lehman's trading
and settlement account. Credit rating agencies warn Lehman if it cannot raise additional funds
over the weekend it would face a downgrade. Such an action would be a death blow to the
company. Fuld believes that Lehman's access to the Federal Reserve's extended facility program
to provide liquidity to investment banks which was set up after Bear Stearn’s failure means the
firm can't fail.
On Friday, September 12th there is massive withdrawal by clients, and other firms wanted
similar trading guarantees as JP Morgan had received. Lehman was running out of cash. On
Friday evening the Federal Reserve Bank of New York asks the CEOs of the four other
investment banks to come to a meeting at 6 o'clock. Present in the room is Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Tim
Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and SEC Chairman Christopher Cox.
Secretary Paulson tells the assembled group that "there will be no public bailout." They are asked
to think about the consequences that a Lehman failure might have on the market and their
respective firms and meet back at the New York Fed at 8:00AM on Saturday.
Late Friday evening the Head of Investment management for Lehman Brothers called his cousin,
President George W. Bush. The White House operator told him she was "deeply sorry but the
President was not able to take his call." Lehman Brothers was out of options and it was now clear
that no government support was likely.
Bank of America had been looking over the books of Lehman Brothers in anticipation of a
possible acquisition. By early Friday the Bank of America due diligence team concluded that
Lehman's real estate portfolio was worse than it expected and that liabilities considerably
exceeded assets. No deal could be done without some sort of government assistance. They left
New York to return home to Charlotte, North Carolina.
Meanwhile, John Thain, CEO of Merrill Lynch, another severely distressed investment bank,
realizes that if Lehman Brothers fails his company will likely be next. He calls the CEO of Bank
of America, Kenneth Lewis, to see if there is interest. The due diligence team is told to turn
around and head back to New York. Kenneth Lewis joins them on the flight North. At the Lewis
home in Charlotte, after repeated calls from Fuld, his wife Donna Lewis finally tells Fuld that if
Mr. Lewis wanted to talk with him he would have called back by now. If Bank of America is to
make an acquisition this weekend it will be Merrill Lynch and not Lehman Brothers.
On Saturday, September 13th, the investment bank participants reassemble at the New York Fed
and are divided into three groups to address a number of public policy and market concerns.
They are asked to advise on:
a) the potential fall out of a Lehman failure
b) the value of Lehman's toxic real estate investments
c) the possibility of an industry-led bailout for Lehman's.
No one on Wall Street doubted that failing to do a deal to save Lehman would be catastrophic.
Investors would continue to suck out money from whichever bank looked to be the next in
danger of failing. The Government needed to be part of the solution but yet Treasury Secretary
Paulson was adamant that market discipline needed to be restored. He personally believed that
the market had had a sufficiently long time to prepare for Lehman's collapse. He also believed
that the U.S. banking system was safe and sound. He was wrong on both counts.
The only possible deal on the table was one that involved Barclay's Bank buying Lehman sans
the soured real estate assets. A bank syndicate might be arranged to support a separate company
containing the bad real estate assets. Two problems were evident. One, the bank syndicate would
want some participation from the government to absorb part or all of the losses. New York Fed
President Geithner reiterated that the Government’s position was not a negotiating ploy and any
official assistance was out of the question. The banking sector was not in a position to absorb
losses of this magnitude or make a long term funding commitment to hold the spoiled assets until
the market turned. Secondly, Barclays would need a waiver from the Financial Services
Authority in the U.K. to permit the purchase without prior shareholder approval which
the FSA was not likely to grant. By Sunday evening time was quickly running out.
At 8:00PM Sunday night SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, at the urging of Secretary Paulson,
placed a call to the assembled members of Lehman Brothers Board of Directors. He told them
that they had a serious and grave matter before them. One of the Directors asked if the SEC was
directing Lehman to file for bankruptcy. After a few moments of dead air Mr. Cox repeated his
comment that the Board had a serious matter to attend to. With all options exhausted the Board
agreed to file for bankruptcy.
Federal Reserve President Tim Geithner informed the CEOs of the major commercial and
investment banks "it is time to spray foam on the runway. Lehman Brothers has failed.”
APPENDIX
THE REGULATORS
The United States has a quilt work of supervisors combining both State and Federal Agencies.
Additionally, there was a bias toward self-regulation especially in the securities area.
Investment banks are subject to supervision by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
the State of New York, and Self-Regulatory Organizations. There is no clear evidence of
coordinated supervision and with the number of supervisors active in overseeing the activities of
Bear Stearns it was surprising there were no alarm bells raised on a number of critical issues –
most importantly – capital adequacy.
The SEC lacks the authority to force large investment banks, including Bear Stearns, to report
their capital, maintain liquidity, or submit to leverage requirements. Since they lack reporting
requirements it is highly conjectural whether they could enforce any prudential rules.
Since all of the large investment banks, including Bear Stearns, had major operations in EC
countries they needed, under EC rules, to have a consolidated supervisor. That was absent in the
United States since the SEC lacked specific authority to act as the regulator of investment banks.
The State of New York had authority to regulate and supervise activities of the chartered bank
but had limited or no authority over non-bank subsidiaries, the holding company or subsidiaries
of the holding company. In order to continue operations in the EC the investment banks
submitted to a voluntary program called the Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) program
which was inaugurated to fill the regulatory gap as to investment bank holding companies
created in the wake of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Since the collapse of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy and liquidation of Lehman Brothers, the
other major investment banks have converted to Bank Holding Companies supervised by the
Federal Reserve. The CSE program is no longer in effect.
Problem Statement:
"What were the factors that led to the downfall of Lehman Brothers and how can
companies avoid them?”
