EN BANC

[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.]

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.

TATAD , petitioners, vs . SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN.
MARCELO B. FERNAN , respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW; IT IS WELL WITHIN THE POWER AND JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT TO INQUIRE WHETHER INDEED THE SENATE OR ITS OFFICIALS COMMITTED A
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS AND PREROGATIVES. — In the instant controversy, the
petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist — try to hew
closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They
also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
respondent. Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of
the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed
the Senate or its of cials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. cdasia

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE NO PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS OR EVEN
THE RULES OF THE SENATE HAS BEEN CLEARLY SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED,
DISREGARDED OR OVERLOOKED, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CANNOT BE IMPUTED
TO SENATE OFFICIALS FOR ACTS DONE WITHIN THEIR COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY.
— We hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was
recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent
Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides
were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. Under these circumstances, we
believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate of cials for acts done within their competence and authority.
CSEHIa

3. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; WHILE THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES THAT

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE MUST BE ELECTED BY A NUMBER CONSTITUTING
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 MORE THAN ONE HALF OF ALL THE MEMBERS THEREOF, IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT
THE MEMBERS WHO WILL NOT VOTE FOR HIM SHALL IPSO FACTO CONSTITUTE THE
"MINORITY," WHO COULD THEREBY ELECT THE MINORITY LEADER. — The term "majority"
has been judicially de ned a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total." The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean
that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the
"minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution
had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more
than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISION PRESCRIBED WHICH
OF THE MANY MINORITY GROUPS OR THE INDEPENDENTS OR A COMBINATION
THEREOF HAS THE RIGHT TO SELECT THE MINORITY LEADER. — Let us go back to the
de nitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the group,
party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This
is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with
a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the
majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two
unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority
parties, one of which has to be identi ed by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party"
for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional
or statutory provision prescribed which of the many minority groups or the independents
or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALL THAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS IS THAT "EACH HOUSE SHALL
CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY"; THE METHOD OF
CHOOSING SUCH OTHER OFFICERS IS MERELY A DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE
PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE SAID CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION; SUCH METHOD
MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY THE COURT. — While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker,
it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is the "[e]ach House shall choose such other of cers as
it may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other
of cers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court. The Rules of Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing speci cally for
such of ces and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. At any rate, such of ces, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or speci c rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.
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 On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SUPREME COURT WILL NEITHER BE A TYRANT NOR A WIMP;
RATHER, IT WILL REMAIN STEADFAST AND JUDICIOUS IN UPHOLDING THE RULE AND
MAJESTY OF THE LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL RESPECT AND A BECOMING REGARD FOR THE
SOVEREIGN ACTS OF A CO-EQUAL BRANCH PREVENTS THIS COURT FROM PRYING INTO
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SENATE. — Congress verily has the power and
prerogative to provide for such of cers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative.
This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold —
the very duty that justi ed the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it
will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law. To accede,
then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a
clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument
alone, the petition would easily fall.
DIESaC

7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; QUO WARRANTO; USURPATION OF

OFFICE; THE PERSON SUING MUST SHOW THAT HE OR SHE HAS A CLEAR RIGHT TO THE
OFFICE; IN CASE AT BAR, PETITIONERS PRESENT NO SUFFICIENT PROOF OF A CLEAR
AND INDUBITABLE FRANCHISE TO THE OFFICE OF THE SENATE MINORITY LEADER. —
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by
one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding
is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public of ce and
to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general
or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public of ce or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. The action shall be brought against the
person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such
of ce. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested of ce or to use or exercise the
functions of the of ce allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no suf cient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the of ce of
the Senate minority leader.

MENDOZA, J.: concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part:

POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW; COURTS HAVE NO POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
AND BUSINESS OF A HOUSE OF CONGRESS EXCEPT AS THE QUESTION AFFECTS THE
RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES OR A SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION IS INVOLVED.
— The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the minority in
the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is political. It respects the
internal affairs of a coequal department of the government and is thus addressed solely to
that august body. Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and
business of a house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties
or a speci c constitutional limitation is involved. For this reason this Court has declined to
take cognizance of cases involving the discipline of members of the legislature and the
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 application and interpretation of the rules of procedure of a house. For indeed, these
matters pertain to the internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive
jurisdiction.
ROMERO, J.: separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; POWER OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW; WHATEVER DIFFERENCES THE PARTIES MAY HAVE AGAINST EACH OTHER
MUST BE SETTLED IN THEIR OWN TURF AND THE COURT, CONSCIOUS AS IT IS OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONALLY-DELINEATED POWERS, WILL NOT TAKE A STEP TO OVERSTEP THE
SAME. — Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a
Senate "of ce" and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of internal
rules for the Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I previously invoked
may justify the Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of the Senate. There is to me no
constitutional breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to
uphold. The interpretation placed by petitioners on Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution clearly does not nd support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare
tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. The majority vote required
for the election of a Senate President and a speaker of the House of Representatives
speaks only of such number or quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully as such.
There is here no declaration that by so electing, each of the two Houses of Congress is
thereby divided into camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "of ces" of
Majority Floor Leader and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as
constitutional of ces. As pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, who penned the herein majority opinion, even on the theory that under
paragraph 2, Section 16 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution, each House shall choose such
other of cers as it may deem necessary, still "the method of choosing who will be such
of cers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision." With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed
upon the Senate, whatever differences the parties may have against each other must be
settled in their own turf and the Court, conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated
powers, will not take a perilous move to overstep the same. ITADaE

DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws of even the
Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate of cials for acts done within their
competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law. LLphil

The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an
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 original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the
ouster of Senator Teo sto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and
the solicitor general "to le COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fteen
(15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general
submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated
September 1, 1998, petitioners led their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998.
Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the
controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1
to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a ling of such
petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for
exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed
exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative of cers like the Senate President 4 and the
Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding of cer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the rst regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the
time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian
Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the

Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan

2 members Independent
––––——

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members

are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)

On the agenda for the day was the election of of cers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to
the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was
also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to
2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
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 allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
"majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
"minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering
seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the
question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On
the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter
signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad led before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

The Court's Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings 1 0 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro
a n d con, the Court nds that no constitutional or legal in rmity or grave abuse of
discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into of ce by Respondent
Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 1 1 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction
to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the
de nitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
speci cally Section 16(1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common
that the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining
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 exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no
constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide for the of ce of a
minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for
such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.

Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question
involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of
the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any
legislative practice to support the petitioner's theory that a senator who votes for the
winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the
various important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled
upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of
judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of
the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this
scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or
executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal " nds constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies." 1 2
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was
the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of
the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 1 3 and therein
elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this
Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this country the
judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the nal arbiter, to see that no one branch
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well." 1 4
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
"Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber
of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It
has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a
veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from
any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people
for an effective settlement are pinned." 1 5
". . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or
decide if this Court should refuse to decide them." 1 6
". . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered." 1 7

I n Tañada v . Cuenco, 1 8 this Court endeavored to de ne political question. And we said

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 that "it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure." 1 9
The Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not
depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations. 2 0 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty
to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 2 1 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote
that the Court "had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas
corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v.
Baker 2 2 and Montenegro v. Castañeda 2 3 that "the authority to decide whether the
exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege . . .) belongs to the President and
his 'decision is nal and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the
Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant —
the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of
his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary. 2 4
"The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar
character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal
bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers — characteristic of the presidential system of government —
the functions of which are classi ed or divided, by reason of their nature, into
three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are
allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting
the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with
the settlement of disputes, controversies or con icts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned
to courts of justice. Within its own sphere — but only within such sphere — each
department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers or led of action assigned to any
of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or
wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments — provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area
allocated thereto by the Constitution."
"Accordingly, when the grant of power is quali ed, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed quali cations or conditions
have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux
of the problem being one of legality of validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said quali cations, conditions or limitations — particularly
those prescribed by the Constitution — would be set at naught. What is more, the
judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions
of the courts of justice under the presidential form of government adopted in our
1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
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 predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to
decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation — made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the
highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution — to settle it.
This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held
that courts have a 'duty , rather than a power,' to determine whether another
branch of the government has 'kept within constitutional limits."

Unlike or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in de ning the scope of
judicial power. The present Constitution now forti es the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It
speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." 2 5

This express de nition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson, 2 6 Coseteng v. Mitra Jr. 2 7 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 2 8 similarly
resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in
apportioning among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the
Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, "even if the
question were political in nature," since it involve "the legality, not the wisdom, of the
manner of lling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI
of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Tañada v . Angara, 2 9 wherein the
petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's concurrence in the rati cation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously
stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political
departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such
action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or
illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 3 0 (HRET), the Court
refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal
had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled
that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
the returns, and the quali cations of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original
and exclusive. 3 1 The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only
if such "decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion." 3 2

Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 3 3 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill
doctrine and to look beyond the certi cation of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly
approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the
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 House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation of
the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned
the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated:
34

"It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department

for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
things the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can nd their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself
be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. . . In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body."

In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-
known constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They
claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial
power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 3 5 In light
of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the
petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed
the Senate or its of cials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their
discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its
officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the af rmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of
all its members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and
"minority", as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the
aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the
winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those
who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the
minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result,
petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he
voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the
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 minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners nds no clear support
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the
Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially de ned a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half
or more than half of any total." 3 6 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of
more than one half of allthe senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who
comprise the "majority", much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing
that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms. cdtai

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
"minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 3 7 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which
were not contested in petitioner's Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the rst to
convene after the rati cation of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R.
Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph
E. Estrada 3 8 . During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the
Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships
to all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 3 9 This practice continued during
the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 4 0
History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the
political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority"
normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the de nitions of the terms "majority" and "minority". Majority may also
refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," 4 1 not necessarily
more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a
group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority." 4 2
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there
are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled
to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party
system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could
be several minority parties, one of which has to be identi ed by the Comelec as the
"dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or
are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the
minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other of cers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other of cers as it may deem necessary." 4 3 To our mind, the method of choosing who will
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 be such other of cers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine
the rules of its proceedings." 4 4 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set
of rules to govern its internal affairs. 4 5 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II
thereof, which provide:
"Rule I

ELECTIVE OFFICERS

"SEC. 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a

President, a President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.

"These of cers shall take their oath of of ce before entering into the discharge of
their duties.
RULE II

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

"SEC. 2. The of cers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all
its Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same of ce, a
nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by
resolution."

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing speci cally for such of ces and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof . At any rate,
such of ces, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant . But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or speci c rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress
how to do its work. 4 6 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court
is of the opinion that where no speci c, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. 4 7

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to
revocation, modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 4 8 Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body 4 9 at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
of cers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority
to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold — the very duty that justi es
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 the Court's being . Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of
a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate.
To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp ; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial
legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the
Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may
still inquire whether an act of Congress or its of cials has been made with grave abuse of
discretion. 5 0 This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 5 1
". . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy[,
the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.
"Brie y stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
of ces of the government as well as those of its of cers. In other words, the
judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its of cials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
"This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question."

With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, rst, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 5 2
by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto 5 3 . A quo warranto
proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public of ce and to oust the holder from its enjoyment 5 4 . The action may be brought by
the solicitor general or a public prosecutor 5 7
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that
he or she has a clear right to the contested of ce or to use or exercise the functions of the
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 of ce allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 5 8 In this case, petitioners
present not suf cient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the of ce of the Senate
minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the
statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingona's assumption and exercise of the powers of the of ce of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his
specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the
definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility." 5 9

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the
minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a
caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate of cials for acts done
within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima
and Pardo, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J ., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part:
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 I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has jurisdiction over the
petition [in this case] to determine whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation
of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives." 1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the minority in
the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is political. It respects the
internal affairs of a coequal department of the government and is thus addressed solely to
that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a house of
Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a speci c
constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the discipline
of members 2 of the legislature and the application and interpretation of the rules of
procedure of a house. 3 For indeed, these matters pertain to the internal government of
Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate are not state of cers. They do not attain these positions by
popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They receive their mandate
as such not from the voters but from their peers in the house. While their of ces are a
constitutional creation, nevertheless they are only legislative of cers. It is their position as
members of Congress which gives them the status of state of cers. As presiding of cers
of their respective chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of
the majority of the members of the house to which they belong. 4 Thus, Art. VI, §16(1) of
the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

This is likewise true of the "other of cers" of each house whose election and removal
rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining to the
internal government of each house, infringements of speci c constitutional limitations
were alleged.

In Avelino v. Cuenco, 5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present there was a
quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of the 24 members, one
was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The case called for an interpretation of
Art. VI, §10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which provided that "A majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business. . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction,
this Court nally took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate
opinion in support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which
persuaded the Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a
quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that calls for the
interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and speci c provision of the
Constitution." 6 In his view, "The word quorum is a mathematical word. it has, as such, a
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 precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (½)." 7
In Tañada v . Cuenco, 8 the question was whether the majority could ll the seats intended
for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are not enough minority
members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed by a speci c provision (Art. VI,
§11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the Electoral Tribunals of each house should
be composed of "nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . .
and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the
party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a speci c constitutional provision to be
applied.
The cases 9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments likewise
involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, speci cally Art. VI, §18 of the
present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall be composed of "twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the
Court had jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties and
organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction over the
choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco, 1 0 it declined to take cognizance of a quo
warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the Senate representation in the
Commission and to reinstate a particular senator after satisfying itself that such
recomposition of the Senate representation was not a "departure from the constitution
mandate requiring proportional representative of the political organizations in the
Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan 1 1 this Court took cognizance of the case which involved
the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of political forces in
the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary alliance. But the Court's
decision was justi ed because the case actually involved the right of a third party whose
nomination by the President had been rejected by the reorganized Commission. As held in
Pacete v. The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 1 2 where the construction to
be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the speci c constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing cases,
beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall elect a president
and Speaker, respectively, and such other of cers as each house shall determine "by a
majority vote of all [their] respective Members." the Constitution leaves everything else to
each house of Congress. Such matters are political and are left solely to the judgment of
the legislative department of the government.
This case involves neither an infringement of speci c constitutional limitations nor a
violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has jurisdiction
over this case only in the sense that determining whether the question involved is reserved
to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in the same way that a court which
dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow sense have jurisdiction since it
cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The determination of whether the question
involved is justiciable or not is in itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the
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 great lesson of Marbury v. Madison 1 3 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while af rming its
power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act
of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional. In other words, a court
doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without jurisdiction
over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.

ROMERO, J .:

"Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul."

These words vividly inscribed just beneath Mark Twain's bust at the Hall of Fame veritably
speaks about the creativity and dynamism which ought to characterize our perspective of
things. It instructs us to broaden our horizon that we may not be held captive by ignorance.
Free and robust thinking is the imperative.
But there are times when one has to render fealty to certain fundamental precepts and I
believe that this occasion presents an opportunity to do so. Thus, as I join the majority and
case my vote today for the denial of the instant petition, may I just be allowed to reiterate
jurisprudential postulates which I have long embraced, not for the sake of "loyalty to
petri ed opinion" but to stress consistency in doctrine in the hope that all future disputes
of this nature may be similarly resolved in this manner.
This is not actually the rst time that the Court has been invited to resolve a matter
originating from the internal processes undertaken by a co-equal branch of government,
more particularly the Senate in this case. Earlier, in the landmark case of Tolentino v .
Secretary of Finance, et al. , 1 we were confronted, among other things, by the issue of
whether a signi cant tax measure namely, Republic Act. No. 7716 (Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law), went through the legislative mill in keeping with the constitutionally-mandated
procedure for the passage of bills. Speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the
majority upheld the tax measure's validity, relying on the enrolled bill theory and the view
that the Court is not the appropriate forum to enforce internal legislative rules supposedly
violated when the bill was being passed by Congress. I took a different view, however,
from the majority because of what I felt was sweeping reliance on said doctrines without
giving due regard to the peculiar facts of the case. I underscored that these principles may
not be applied where the internal legislative rules would breach the Constitution which this
Court has a solemn duty to uphold. It was my position then that the introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Committee Report violated the constitutional proscription
against any amendment to a bill upon the last reading thereof and which this Court, in the
exercise of its judicial power, can properly inquire into without running afoul of the principle
of separation of powers.
Last year, 2 Arroyo, et al. v. de Venecia, et al. 3 presented an opportunity for me to clarify
my position further. In that case, Congressman Joker Arroyo led a petition before the
Court complaining that during a session by the House of Representatives, he was
effectively prevented from raising the question of quorum which to him tainted the validity
of Republic Act No. 8240 or the so-called "sin taxes" law. The Court, speaking again
through Justice Mendoza, dismissed Mr. Arroyo's petition, arguing in the main that courts
are denied the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. Concurring with
the majority opinion, I discerned a need to explain my position then because of possible
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 misinterpretation. I was very emphatic that I did not abandon my position in Tolentino, the
facts as presented in Arroyo being radically different from the former. In keeping with my
view that judicial review is permissible only to uphold the Constitution, I pointed out that
the legislative rules allegedly violated were purely internal and had no direct or reasonable
nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill
which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention.
In the instant case, at the risk of being repetitious, I again take a similar stand as the ones I
made in the two cited cases.
Although this case involves the question of who is the rightful occupant of a Senate "office"
and does not deal with the passage of a bill or the observance of internal rules for the
Senate's conduct of its business, the same ground as I previously invoked may justify the
Court's refusal to pry into the procedures of the Senate. There is to me no constitutional
breach which has been made and, ergo, there is nothing for this Court to uphold. The
interpretation placed by petitioners on Section 16(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
clearly does not nd support in the text thereof. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. The majority voted required for the election
of a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives speaks only of such
number of quantity of votes for an aspirant to be lawfully elected as such. There is here no
declaration that by so electing, each of the two Houses of Congress is thereby divided into
camps called the "majority" and the "minority." In fact, the "of ces" of Majority Floor Leader
and Minority Floor Leader are not explicitly provided for as constitutional of ces. As
pointed out by my esteemed colleague, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who penned the
herein majority opinion, even on the theory that under paragraph 2, Section 16(1) of Article
VI of the Constitution, each House shall choose such other of cers as it may deem
necessary, still "the method of choosing who will be such of cers is merely a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision."
With the prerogative being, therefore, bestowed upon the Senate, whatever differences the
parties may have against each other must be settled in their own turf and the Court,
conscious as it is of its constitutionally-delineated powers, will not take a perilous move to
overstep the same. LLjur

VITUG, J .:

The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has continued to
be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of
the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — proper
acknowledgment and respect for each other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding
neither the "purse" (held by Congress) nor the "sword" (held by Congress) nor the "sword"
(held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State governance, functions
both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional Court of the nation. 1 Peculiar,
however, to the present Constitution, specifically under Article VIII, Section 1, thereof, is the
extended jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of
"whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. " 2 This
expanded concept of judicial power seems to have been dictated by the martial law
experience and to be an immediate reaction to the abuse in the frequent recourse to the
political question doctrine that in no small measure has emasculated the Court. The term
"political question," in this context, refers to matters which, under the Constitution, are to
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 be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been tasked with the
awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I nd it here opportune to
reiterate what I have stated in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 3 viz:
"I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly provocative as it might
be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court may now at good liberty intrude, in
the guise of the people's imprimatur, into every affair of government. What
signi cance can still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed
principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows itself to pass
upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch in
our system of government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties that such
an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our
jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of stability
rather than quiescence."

Pervasive and limitless, such as it may seem to be, judicial power still succumbs to the
paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is the branch of government,
composed of the representatives of the people, that lays down the policies of
government and provides the direction that the nation must take. The Executive carries
out that mandate. Certainly, the Court will not negate that which is done by these co-
equal and coordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of
discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel against
misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse becomes all too
clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial tyranny, is what has been
envisioned by an institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution.
There is no hornbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be determined. The
provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging millieu. In its normal concept,
the term has been said to imply capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner such as by reason of passion or personal hostility. When the question, however,
pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to
the dictum, somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 4 that
unless an infringement of any speci c Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the
Court will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches
of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear disregard of a speci c
constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. cda

In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the above rule.
Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.

Footnotes

1. § 21 (1), BP 129; § 5 (1), Art. VIII, Constitution.

2. S ee Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, 138-139, September 1, 1994; citing People v.
Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, 423-24, April 18, 1989, and Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez,
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 217 SCRA 633, 651-652, January 27, 1993.

3. Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167, September 26, 1994; Vergara Sr. v. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753,
December 21, 1987.
4. Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, October
20, 1992.

5. Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997.

6. The solicitor general, in his Comment dated August 21, 1998, attributed to the 23
members of the Senate the following party affiliations:

"Senate President Marcelo B. Fernan Laban ng Masang Pilipino

(LAMP)
Sen. Raul S. Roco Aksyon Demokratiko

Sen. Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. Lakas-National Union of

Christian Democrats-United

Muslim Democrats of the

Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP)

Sen. Franklin M. Drilon LAMP

Sen. Juan M. Flavier Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago People's Reform Party

(PRP)
Sen. Sergio R. Osmeña III Liberal Party (LP)

Sen. Francisco S. Tatad PRP

Sen. Gregorio B. Honasan LP (Independent)

Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile LP (Independent)

Sen. Anna Dominique M. L. Coseteng LAMP

Sen. Loren Legarda-Leviste Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Sen. Renato L. Cayetano Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III LAMP

Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. LAMP

Sen. Robert Z. Barbers Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Sen. Rodolfo G. Biazon LAMP

Sen. Blas F. Ople LAMP

Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña LAMP

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 Sen. Robert S. Jaworski LAMP
Sen. Ramon B. Revilla Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Sen. Tessie Aquino-Oreta LAMP"

(Rollo, pp. 63-64, See also Comment of Respondent Guingona, Jr., Rollo, p. 41.)

7. One position was vacant, because of the election of the incumbent, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, as the Vice President of the Philippines.
8. Senator Fernan abstained from voting. (Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 6. Comment of the
solicitor general, p. 2; Rollo, p. 63.)

9. Senators Robert Z. Barbers, Renato L. Cayetano; Juan M. Flavier, Teo sto T. Guingona
Jr., Loren Legarda-Leviste, Ramon B. Magsaysay Jr., and Ramon B. Revilla.
10. The Petition was signed by both petitioners; the Comment of Senate President Fernan,
by Senator Fernan himself and Attys. Mary Jane L. Zantua and Lani Grace R. Songco;
the Comment of Senator Guingona, by Atty. Ricardo G. Nepomuceno Jr.; the Comment of
the OSG, by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega and Associate
Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag; while the Consolidated Reply, by Sen. Miriam
Defensor Santiago.
11. 83 Phil 17 (1949).

12. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary , Vol. II, 1988
ed., p. 282.
13. § 10 (2), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution, reads:

"(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but

a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
provide."

14. Supra, p. 72.

15. At p. 76.
16. At p. 78.

17. At p. 79.
18. 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957), per Concepcion, J .

19. Ibid., p. 1067, citing 16 CJS 413.

20. § 11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution.
21. 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971.
22. 5 Phil 87 (1905).

23. 91 Phil 882 (1952).

24. 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973.
25. Art. VIII, § 1, par. 2
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 26. 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989, per Cruz, J .
27. 187 SCRA 377, July 12, 1990, per Griño-Aquino, J .

28. 214 SCRA 789, October 20, 1992, per Campos Jr., J .
29. 272 SCRA 18, 47, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J .
30. 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991, per Gutierrez Jr., J .

31. Citing Lazatin v. HRET , 168 SCRA 391, 1988.

32. Citing Robles v. HRET , 181 SCRA 780, 1990.
33. 277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997, per Mendoza, J .

34. At p. 299.
35. Alleje v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 495, January 25, 1995; Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals, 250 SCRA 108, November 16, 1995; Times Broadcasting Network v. Court of
Appeals, 274 SCRA 366, June 19, 1997; Chico v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127704,
January 5, 1998.
36. Perez v. De la Cruz, 27 SCRA 587, 603 (1969), citing Webster's International Dictionary,
Unabridged; Concurring Opinion of J . Perfecto in Avelino v. Cuenco, supra, p. 80, See
also Petition, rollo, p. 12, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1990.
37. P. 15; rollo, p. 55.
38. Citing Record of the Senate, 8th Congress, Vol. I, No. 14, p. 9.
39. Citing Record of the Senate, 9th Congress, Vol. III, No. 47-A, pp. 88-94.
40. Then Minority Leader Ernesto C. Maceda chaired the Committees on Constitutional
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws; and on Foreign Relations. Senator Honasan
chaired the Committees on Agrarian Reform; on Peace, Uni cation and Reconciliation;
and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement. Senator Coseteng was the chair of
the Committees on Civil Service and Government Reorganization; and on Labor,
Employment and Human Resources. (See footnote 40 of Respondent Guingona's
Comment, supra.)
41. Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd college ed., 1972.
42. Ibid.
43. § 16 (1), second par., Art. VI of the Constitution.

44. § 16 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution.

45. Rules of the Senate (see Appendix "A," Guide to the Senate by Reginald M. Pastrana
and Demaree J.B. Raval).

46. New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 353 NE2d 558.
47. Concurring Opinion in Oposa v. Factoran Jr., 224 SCRA 792, 818, July 30, 1993.
48. Osmeña Jr. v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 870-871 (1960), citing 76 CJS 870. See also
Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra.
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 49. Ibid. See also Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1977, pp.
188-189.

50. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656, 681, September 5, 1997.
51. I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436.
52. 91 CJS 551, citing State ex rel Danielson v. Village of Mound, 48 NW2d 855, 863.
53. 67 CJS 317, citing Wheat v. Smith, 7 SW 161.

54. Lota v. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 715, 718, June 30, 1961.
55. § 2, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
56. § 5, ibid. See also Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez Sr., 239 SCRA 11, 18,
December 6, 1994; Tarrosa v. Singson, 232 SCRA 553, 557, May 25, 1994.

In this regard, the Court notes that Petitioner Santiago has no standing to bring
the instant petition for quo warranto, for she does not claim to be rightfully entitled to
the position of Senate minority leader. We have ruled in the past:

"Nothing is better settled than that a petitioner, in a quo warranto

proceeding to try title to a public of ce, must be able to show that he is entitled
to said of ce. Absent such an element, the petition must be dismissed. This is a
principle that goes back to Acosta v. Flor [5 Phil 18, 22], a 1905 decision. There,
the doctrine has been laid down that: 'No individual can bring a civil action
relating to usurpation of a public of ce without averring that he has a right to
the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that such
individual has no right, the action may be dismissed because there is no legal
ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action
is destroyed.' This has been the exacting rule, since then, followed with stricter
rmness in Cuyegkeng v. Cruz [108 Phil 1147], where this Court held that one
who does not claim to be entitled to the of ce allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by another, but who 'merely asserts a right to be appointed'
thereto, cannot question the latter's title to the same by quo warranto. In other
words, one whose claim is predicated solely upon a more or less remote
possibility, that he may be the recipient of the appointment, has no cause of
action against the of ce holder."( Garcia v. Perez, 99 SCRA 628, 633-34,
September 11, 1980, per De Castro, J .)
However, any question on standing has been rendered moot by the inclusion of
Petitioner Tatad, who claims to have the right to the contested office.
57. § 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court. In relation to this rule, Respondent Fernan claims that he is
not a proper party to the case, because he did not usurp nor is he unlawfully holding or
exercising the of ce of minority leader. While the action commenced by petitioners was
denominated a quo warranto petition under Rule 66, the Court notes that among the
principal averments made was that Respondent Fernan committed grave abuse of
discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader. Such
averment brings the petition within the purview of a certiorari proceeding under rule 65. A
basic principle in remedial law states that it is not the title given by the parties to the
action which determines its nature, but the averments made in the pleadings. The case
may, thus, be treated as a joint certiorari and quo warranto action and, as such,
Respondent Fernan is a proper, if not necessary, party thereto.

58. Batario Jr. v. Parentela Jr., 9 SCRA 601, November 29, 1963; Caraon-Medina v. Quizon,
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 18 SCRA 562, October 29, 1966.

59. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200, 209, June 4,
1996, per Kapunan, J.; citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10,
1994, and other cases. See also Imutan v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 286, 292, January
27, 1981.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part:
1. Majority Opinion, p. 18.
2. Alejandro v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924) (suspension of senator for disorderly conduct for
assaulting a fellow senator): Osmeña v. Pendatun , 109 Phil. 863 (1960) (suspension of
senator for disorderly behavior for imputing bribery to President Garcia)

3. Arroyo v. De Venecia , 277 SCRA 268 (1997) (power of each house to determine its rules
of proceedings).
4. VICENTE G. SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 171-172 (11th ed. 1962).
5. 83 Phil. 17 (1949)
6. Id., at 50.
7. Id., at 79.
8. 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
9. Daza v. Singson , 180 SCRA 496 (1989); Coseteng v. Mitra Jr ., 187 SCRA 377 (1990);
Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
10. 88 Phil. 654 (1951).
11. 115 Phil. vii (1962).
12. 40 SCRA 58 (1971).

13. Cranch 137, 2L. Ed. 60 (1803).

ROMERO, J.:
1. 235 SCRA 630.
2. August 14, 1997.

3. G.R. No. 127255; 277 SCRA 268 (1997).

VITUG, J.:
1. Justice Jose C. Vitug, The Court and its Ways, The Court Systems Journal, June 1998,
Volume 3 No. 2

2. Sec. 1, Article VIII.

3. 235 SCRA 630, 720.
4. 277 SCRA 268, 289.

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