PAACIKIN VIJAYA LIVES ! a TWIN CRITIQUES MANAGING CHAOS ZERO SUM CULTURES UN ile) DID JANASAVIVA FAIL?CURRENT ICES PUBLICATIONS BHUTAN NEPAL REFUGEE ISSUE A Report of @ Fact Finding Mission to Nepal May 1-7, 1995 by Niaz Naik and Bradman Weerakoon. 1995. 19pp. Rs. 50.00 THE BO-ATTE MASSACRE AND THE KEBETIGOLLAWA REFUGEE CAMP A Report on the attack on Bo-Atte village in the North-Central Province on October 21, 1995 and other atiacks in the Anuredhapura District. 1995. 32pp Rs. 50.00 CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS; DISPLACEMENT MIGRATION AND ACCOMMODATION. ‘A Report by Devendra Raj Panday and Jeevan Thiagarajah, September 1996. 26p DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, by Neelan Tiiucheivam (Tamil|. 1996. 296pp. Hard- cover: Rs, 300.00; Paperback Rs. 200.00 DEVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA, Edited by Sunil Bastian. 1994 232pp Rs. 350.00 ELECTORAL POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1993, Report of SAARC-NGO Observers. 1955. 136pp. Rs. 250 IDEOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUION: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRU- DENCE, by Radhika Coomaraswamy. 1996. pp178 Hardcover: Rs. 300,00; Paperback Rs. 200.00 LIVING WITH TORTURERS AND OTHER ESSAYS OF INTERVENTION; SRI LANKAN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE, by Sasanka Perera. 1995. 89pp. Rs. 150.00 THE LOST'LENORE; A TALE, by Regi Siriwardena. 1996. 100pp. Rs. 130.00 OCTET COLLECTED PLAYS, by Regi Siriwerdena, 1995. 172pp. Rs. 175.00 SRI LANKA: THE DEVOLUTION DEBATE, 1996, 255pp. Rs. 250.00 ‘TAMIL AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, by A. Theva Rajan. 1995. 126pp. Rs. 150.00 WRITING SOCIAL SCIENCES. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO WRITING TRADITION, by Sasanke Perera, (Sinhala). 1996. 74pp. Rs. 110.00 ALL ORDERS TO: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2, Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8.NEWS BACKGROUND. VIJAYA STor w Its a Woman's world. Sti Lanka was the fashion leader when it produced the world's first woman Prime Minister, Sirima Bandaranaika widow of Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike. assassinated by s demented monk neatly half a ‘century ago. Sheis Prime Minister right pow to, but with a difference, Her daughter, also 2 widew - of Vijaya Kumaratunga - President Chandrika Eandaranaike Kumeratunga, is boss, ‘And candidate Chandrika’s opponent at the Presidential polls, was Srima Dissanayeke, widew of the slain UNP minister, Garnini Dissanayake. —Flasg_ As we go to press, the local government polls campaign has got off to a bloody start with a gunfight in Kuruwita Town, Ratnapura, between PA and UNP supporters, in which PA M.P.Nalanda Ellawela has been shot dead. The Lanka Guardian deplores the violence and calls for the substantial presence of international observers at the polls campaign, the polling day and the immediate post-polls period. Mervyn de Silva President Kumaratunga’s Peoples Alliance (PA) cabinet has another widow, Transport Minister Srimani Athulathmudall, leader of the DUNLE The “*L" stends for Lalith (Athulathmudal) the founder of the party, Enter Dulanjalze Jeyakody, no widow this timo, but the daughter of Prosiciont Renasinahe Premedasa, slain by a Tamil Tiger suicide-bomber. She reads newspaper reports of whet President Chandrka Kumeratunga hac evidently told a press confarence atiended by local and foreign media personnel. “Presidont Reloaces Assassination Commission Report, Evidence implicates Premadase, Wijeratne in Vilaya’s kiling. say Report” was the five-column headiine right across the frent-page of the state-owned Daily News (1/2/97), Premadasa, Ranjan Wijeratne Directly Involved in Vijeya’s Killing read the Island front-page headline under President Tells Local and Foreicn Media (1/2/97). On 5/2/97 Dulanjalos vJayakody did such a stunning Gemolition job on the “Premadasa Wieratne dunit” thasis that the next contribution came NOT from the Fresidant's office or fram the PA but from the UNP. One of the more Intorasting points made by Dulsnjaloa Jayakody was “When Mr. Vijaya Kumaratunga was assassinated, President J.R.Jayewardene was the President and my lace father wes only the Prime Minister devoid of any executive powers. Mr. Premadasa was not oven thought of as the UNP candidate” A littie known fact involving meney clinches the claim ‘about a “sneciel relationship” between MeKumaratunga and MrPremedasa Ms Jayakody claims that “whan Vaya needed financial assistance to purchase his residence at Polhengode ft was President Premadasa he turnad to, President Premadasa auranged for Mr Kumaratunga to get the assistance he needed”. While the temptation to involve the UNP may be strong, the stark fact tha the Commission has explicitly Mentioned Lionel Ranasinghe, @ hard Core member of the JVP, shoule have Comet on page 4 KIN TAN Published fortuighly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co.Ltd. No.246, Union Place, Colombo 02, Tel/Fax 447584 E-mail guardian@sti lanka net Editor in Chief : Meryya de Silva Editor : Dayan Jayatlleka Cover Photography Ravi Prasad Herath Printed by United Publishing House (Pvt) ltd CONTENTS Mervyn de Silva a Tisaranee Gon SILA. Moluned yer yerAN OFFICER AND BUSINESSMAN KARU JAVASURIVA THE PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACH A Volunteer army officer, who was in active service in the 60's and 70's, ‘Karu Jayasuriya is a successiul export- erientod industrialist and has diplomatic experience serving as Ambassador to Germany, during which stint he excelled at investment promotion. Appointed Chatman of the UNP by Rani! Wickramasinghe, he is ‘the most high profile candidate on the UAP's list at the upcoming Municipal polls. He fielded questions posed by the editorial staffs of the Lanka Guardian and its Sinhala monthly counterpart, Vikalpa. @. Why dit you come imo poitics? You Wore ambassador to Garmeny. You are also a successful businessman. How ‘come you entered politics, first as the Chaitman of the United National Party and now as the UNP mayoral Cendivace for the city of Colorabo? A. | wes never keen on having a political carear. It was President Premadasa who first invited me to enter politics; that was sacn after the assassination of Minister Ranjan Wijeratne. | worked closely with President Premadasa in projects involving the private sector particularly in the efforts to set up a SAARC Chamber of Commerce He also wanted me to play a prominent cole in developing the export sector and specially organising the Expo ‘92 exhibition. | remember thet we were able to attract more than 3,500 participants for that fair and this success vias largely due to President Premadasa's afficiont way of working, ‘When | wes anpointed the ambassador +t Germany. | was entrusted with the task of attracting German investors to Srilanka This wae not an appointment | sought; | was the first non carear diplomet sont to Germany and | wes chosen because of my private sactor beck ground which enabled me to make a cortributtion towards furthering the development aims and objectives of the government. I dicn't knew the prosent leader of the UNP personally but | admired the way he functioned, particularly his decision, 10 vacate the Temple Trees after the 1994 election defest. That snowed that he is not graedy for power. When { decided to enter politics I didn’t think that | would be entrusted with se much respons bility, Ido not have any poitical ambitions but | also think that we should do whatever possible to help the party and the country, Thatis why. | dacided to accede to party's requost to contest the upcoming municinal clections, Q. Why do you wane t0 be the mayor of Colomba? ‘A. Bocause | think | should be able to solve the pressing problems of the citizens of Colombo through the adoption of what | would call the privete sector approach. What | mean by this is efficient decision making resulting inan efficient administration. . What's your vision for Colombo? if you ure clected the mayor what would you do for Colembe? A, \'m not telking about an individual effort buta team etfortin order to tind solutions tc the problome of tho Colombo city - we plan to harness the energies and the expertise of various segments such as the youth, the poor, the professionals. women’ etc. Our objective is to provide etficient services to the people of Colombo be it in ‘education, health, ensport or garbage. dieposal Q The UNP has held power in the Colombo municipality since 1979, Though it is undeniable that the city of Colombo changed from a sleopy backwater into what it is today, precisely under the UNF, itis also true that the quality of public services deteriorated drastically, particulerly in the last few yea's. The hest example ‘s the problem of garbage. Why do'you think that you would be able to do betier? And why should the voters of Colombo give the UNP another chance? ‘A. Ido not deny that there were many problems and inefficiencies in the previous administration. Having said that 1do not want to dwell on the past | would rathor lock to and plan for the future. And \'m confident that we will be able to solve many of the current problems because of our new ‘approach. We will attempt to deal with not only the major problems like gerbage disposal buta'so mnor issues like pavemonts, clean walls, . What ie your favourite city? What is the city thet you want Colombo 10 be fke? A. Lather like London the way it was swonty years ago. Certainly we should also look at the cities in the region like Kualalumpur But of course our first priority is to make the city cleaner and healthier by cleaning up the garbageand taking care of the mosquito 0. Over £0% of he people of Colombo are siuin and shanty dwellers. What do you have to offer to these people? Itmay be argued thet theres very litle that you have in common with these people. A. The wellbeing of the poor is one of the major concerns of the UNP. Efforts will be made to improve the quality of life of this segment through the provision of better faciities such as ‘water, canitation and avan housing. We can get aid and assistance from overseas to carry out some of these programmes. 0. You talked abour a private sector appioach. Though the private secror may be more efficient, it ie also profit ‘motivated, Therefore, often, only the well off people will benefit fram this efficiency. The poor people who cannot pey the price, will not benetit in anyway Hov do you ensure that your private sector approach does nor result in the merginalisation of the peor? A, | fully appreciete that profit is the bottom lina of the private secter, at the end of the day. What | meant by the private sector approach is utilising the resources of the CMG more efficiently in order to bring in more revenue which will in tum be used to provide better services to the poo’ and the havanote. What | have in mind is a partnership with the private sector which is aimed at helping all the citizens of Colombo inciuding the poor. 0. Colombo is a mutiethniccity What would you do 10 build bridges between the various othnic and religicus groups who live in Colombo? A. Ido not beliavein racial differences, We are al human beings. The future UNP edminictration will be commitiod 40 serving all tha citizens of Colombo irrespective of racial, celigious, class nd caste differences, Q. You talked about the need to clean the city. In many countries this has ‘meant the forced relocation of slum and shanty dwellers. We saw this hoopeniag in SriLanka in wre run up (0 the Non Allgned conference in 1976. How do yeu encure thae your attempts to clean up and beautify the Calembo ony da not adversely affect its slur and shanty dwellers? A. Whatever we do we will adopt a humane approach. We care about the People and wo are concomed about the poor. We will never try to beautify the city at the expense of its poorer inhabitants. In order to handle this problem as well as that of increased migration into the city in the future we will adopt the same policy as Mr.Pramadaas - that of building more houses and in this case. multi-storeyedi buildings. We will work out 2 programme to provide adequate housing facilities to the non privileged people of Colombo, mayhe with foreign assistance Q, What about the problerm of traffic congestion, which is getting increasingly worse? A. What ic noadod ie an efficient train OF Bus service within the city limits of Golornbo. This will make it possible for more people to use public transport instead of private vehicles within the Colombo city, This will reduce both the traffic problem and the problem of parking. Q. The employees of the CMC are not provided with adequate facilities to carry out thelr duties. For example the garbage collectors aro not provided with any kind of protective gear, not even a coke of soap. What would you do to alleviate this situation if you are elected mayor? A. The employees of an institution constituts the most important asset of that institution, Without their full cooperation no institution (be it the CMC or a private company) ean develop end prosper, Therefore tis our responsibility to lock efter these employees and ersura their well being | will discherge this responsibility 0 the bast of my ability if | am elected mayor. Q. Mormally the duties of the CMC are limited io the provision of services such as water electricity, and siilarfecilty 1 the people. Does the CMC have to be limited within these narrovr confines for can it go beyond this limits and provide extra services to the people? A. This is an area I'm paying attention to. We are making plans ta provide services such as day care contres and fecreation facilities to the Colombo tizena, This will elude the building of more parks and entertainment centres. We will also work towards providing mors facilties to our chicren, Q. In tho last couple of years the CMC was accused of imposing exorbitant toxcs on tox payers. What are you going to Go about this problem? AA, \We have na plans ta increase taxas in the immediate future, What is important is to upgrade the quality of the services provided by the CMC. Tax increases which are not preseded by improved services are unjust and should not be resorted to. Q. In your plans to develop the Colombo city whet are the major obstacles you foresee? A. The excessive politicisation of the ‘S:i Lankan society. Such societies are fare in today's world, | think thie polarisation based on politics is the main reason for the problems we ere faced with today. This politcisation has alfected every institution nour society bo it the work place, family, school, hospital or the police. If this polarisation continued we will never be able to develop our country. We will have to leam to put the country frst. The way | see it en clection is like @ clicker match; neither the victor nar the dofeated chould attack the other party, We must learn to accent the verdict of the people with a good grace. . You as the President of the UMP have to contest the man who wos your party treasurer for mary years. How will this affect you psychologically? A. [have known tMir.Ganeshalingem for many yeats. | do not have a pereonal problem with him. This is not 2 personal fight but 9 struggle based on principles, O. The UNP is today talking about creating anew poltical culture. We do —.]] Ssrot think that so far this has been extended to cover the erea of development policy. Take the CIC for ‘en example. Ask any former member of the CMC or any of the candidates whether they know the number of schoal aged children in tho Colombo ity who io not e0 to school. Or the number of garbage trucks currently available and the number that will be needed in the year 2000. There is (ot of talk about the year 2000 but are inere any plans or preparations for this? Ask any of the mayoral candidates whether they know what the annual income of the CMC is. Al’ they say fs that they will make all this plans, preperetions and celculations when they-eome in to office. The CMC is ‘not sensitive or responsive to the needs and concerns of tho citizens of Colombo and this is a mejor weakness. A. | agiee with what you ere saying. ‘We have looked into these problems and we will make our plans public in ‘the coming waeks during the election campaign. 0. What are you gaing t0 do about the transport problem? After 8 p.m. there is no bus service worth talking about in Colombo. This is extremely inconvenient particularly for people (including women) vito have to work il lato. |A. We ate looking into the possibility of commencing a new inner cty aublic transpart service, covering verious areas of Colombo, rather lke the old ice Lins’ Q. The PA is using the various presidential commissions extensively In its propaganda campaign against your party. The UNP is accused of various crimes including murder anc torture. How do you plan to respond to these accusations? ‘A. Our Secretary has already issued ¢ statement countering the report of the presidential commission on the assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga ‘We will mactthe other chargas during the election campaign. People co not believe those storias anymore. As for human rights, they know thet there was an insurgency end certain excesses may have been committed In the attempt to meet this challenge. Peaple don't believe in these lies anymore, Contd foam page 1 stopped the over enthusiastic PA leadership from trying to implicate its traditional enemy. Amona Lionel Ranasinghe’s victims were UNP sraiwarts like Harsha Abeywardene and Nandelal Femando. Another target was Prof, Stanley Wijesundara, 2 disciplinarian that campus egitato: intencely disliked. Besides, tho Government analyst testitled tha’ bullets found in these investigations matched the bullets used in Viiaya Kumaratunga’s killing. UNP MOVE, Hore wae a wide open “window of ‘opportunity*. No political party would have neglected such a crucial fact, unless, of course, it decided to ianore any (ecorded information that did not suit its purposa. To ba charitable, tha Pas most glaring weakness se=ns 2 crude, amstourish approach to propaganda. It is no surprise then to find Sri Kotha using the word “absurdity” in its press communiqué (ISLAND 7/2/97)". “The absurdity of this observation by the Commission is esiaplisned by the fact that the late Prosident Promadasa was not nominated by the UNP as its Presidential cendidate s No woniler the UNP dismisses the PA ‘agit-prop contemptuously. "Cheap propaganda” Sri Kotha sneers. NDI LY REBUFF. Explaining why the NDUNLF (Lalith Front) decided after many “aiscussions”, NOT to participate in the local government polls, the party spokesman, Mr.Ravi Karunanayake told the orees that the main reacon was rnot disappointrrent over the number Cf seats allocated to the NDUNLF but the question of unkept polls pledges: tem No, | jn the Lalth Fronts agenda ie “the abolition of the Executive Presidency”. While one appreciates the Lath Front’e principled etanco on this Vitalissue it is useful to remind readers the wise wards of the architect of the Presidential system, JR. Jayewardene. He told this correspondent - end enybedy who was “foolish” enough to raise the issue - “who is the fool who will give up sll that powor .." In JRU'e book, Ms Chancrika Kumaratunga wes no fool, WG - LITE The CWE boss Mr.S.Thondaman is tara avie, « rare or qucer bird, He has yet to ebregate his pact with the UNF. which gave hima pleco in tho UNP ‘cebinat. Daspite this, he is Livestock Development Minister in Ms Kumaratunga’s Peoples Alliance Cabinet, He doe not submit his resignation nor is it demandes. And the PA does nat presa the point despite Mr.Thondamans persistent demand that the PA should re-open negotiations with the ITE. Last week, MrThondaman told the Sunday Leader that the “other Tamil political parties are nothing but nameboards!” Nemeboards they may well ba, but at the division bel in Perlament they do give tha 8 party Peoples Alliance a comfortable majority. Has the UNP lost Tamil support in the city of Colombo by NOT nominating the former Mayor K.Ganeshalingam? The UNP hes fielded party Chairman (former Ambassador to Germany) Karu Jayasuriya, He heads the party’s clty list. But party leader Ranil Wickremasinghe hee made it clear that this is no antiTamil or anti-minority The pressures on the 7-8-9 party Peoples Alliance aro such that the unraveling of the PA ora sucden crack: up may come sconer then we think. Rising living costs make the trade unions restive Perhaps the PA watcher «will have to keop an alert eye after the election, on the likes of Mr.Batty Woarakson, rather than on his leader Mr. Bernard Soysa, es NNaS BALES CIEE ee FORUM ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (SRI LANKA) ON ISSUES IN RELATION TO GATT AGREEMENT & WTO. The Frum of Paamentaran on talc Property and National Werking Group en Ptrt Laws Now Oat) conaneden ltemetond Cofeence on tel Petet Systenand inesiment Regme ang eneoenyissues in elation GATT gtsament tnd WID on November {4h aed 15th, 1996 i the Paimertary ames s New Dah Te convenors otis Crfeterce were veteran Ices fom nia ie YER ihe yes, DrAshos Miva M., DaMicti Manohar Jesh A, and NGeorge Fernandes, MP The Sf Lanian Denson consisted of Honble Kh. Doupas Devnanda, 12, 1McS.Troih ef FPOP and MESureshPrenuchanden ol EPRLF and vas led by How'ble Vasudeva Nanayatara, Membe: of Parianent. Large number of Parlanentarin,Acadomcs, Scr, Iduntrlat and Lega Exper ro lo the watt patvpatd nis Conference. ‘A CounryReperton ‘Code of lecual Pony was eeentd bythe SriLankan Dekgiton, The te days’ seminar was convened in onde enightn the Thi Wotd Counties ayant fe baclarount ol tha Mista esting ofthe 70 that was held in ingore Desemoe: 1966. A jslemase onal f the background of the GATT agoeren was reser by ives Krishna ys anc alnest alte syste qrssed the va shat i the Indien ish ations that vould benefit aut ofthe GATT atest and WTO nd that po ralons of te South would Eacone mare ind row denendet on focign compares for thc supe of irputs, The sesons wee conlied wth Pin cecaation. Sone tthe main eats of he docatn ar as flows 1. The deeloned courtris wer seking te elage oper, pees ard ‘egsties of ther bsiess curation expe the mara and ntl rescues brig the ers and expt sap labour ofthe deen 2 The TFS auesmert whichis part of GATT) seek strike ae ts of Human Fights esecily in theses of Heath Ca, Employment ooortintes and of rina ler of ving in the dering cuties whch a esse ira 1 Call pon the Gooruerts ofthe deveprg word to omnes any mows 0 crlag® the scope of WTO theugh the induction o now aus in the ferthcarng instal meetg at Sraepoe. i Larkn Dect irs cnsened iniiinls and omniston tena the ntrestinsetng up rd rg n sila Foun Si Lanka a Deore 2681 Febuary 1997: Forum on lntelecta Propet (Si Laka ‘on ues in ean o GATT Aareorent& WI, No.108C. Sunni Fits ‘eppitpla Mavatia Colon 05 aside Naraplor WF KNDougls Derababds NP Such Pamsehandran Thai SUNIL ON MANIK J write to cotrect sevefal inaccuracies appearing in articlesin the Lanka Guardian of 15 January 1997, under ‘the title “The Making of Sirimavo Bandaranaike" by Manik Sandrasogra and the Film Review by Historicus. | should fike to stete that lam the producer and direotor of the documentary “Sirimava Bandaranaike” and had full artistic control of the emire production, The cameramen were MD Mshindapala and Channe Deshapriye. {1am also the Managing Director af the Asia Information Channel, the company that produced the documentary, and wish to state further that all partige involvad in the: production have been paid in full. This is on recorc, {trust you will publish this letter in your next eaiticn Yours faithfully, Sod. SUNIL SITUNAYAKE Managing Director MANIK ON SUNIL At long last the oracle has spoken. Sunil Situnayake has come aut of the closet. Let the memory af Sol Banders be praised! Producer, Director, Menaging Director and. Accountant with total artistic and financial control 10 disburse Rs.3 milllon which was the cost of the documentary programme “Sirimavo Bandarancike!” According 10 Sunil ‘all parties Involved in the production have been paid in ful’. Suppose he ts refering to himself since he claims to be Producer, director and Managing Director. Besides myself being denied a credit as well as my foo, a 5 star hotel Business Buroau is yet to be pala Rs. 6,700/- for transcubing the taped interviews with Prosident Chandrika and prime Minister Bendaranaike, What is on record Is that the Producer received ig.200,000/., the Director R's.200,0001-, AlC production fee Rs.226.575)- General Expenses/Overhead fis 229,233/- Living Expenses Rs.375,000/- lam sure this has bean paid The above itistrates my experence wth the city Monik Sandrasagra PS. Having worked with the likes of Lester James Pieris ‘and Gamini Fonseka, among others, I have great respect for the credit title “Director”, An organiser is not a Director. | cannot buy the modern interpretationNO OF COMA LOCAL POLLS AND THE BIG LIE “lathe big li there ie a cortain force of credibility’s because the broad maseae of a nation are always mere easily corupted in the deeper strata of ‘their emotional nature than consciously Of voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fal victims to the big lie than the small lis, since they themselves often tall smal lies in little matiers but would be ashamed to resort to large scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal luntruths and they would not heliave that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously .... The grossly impudent lic always leeves traces behind it. even after it has bean nailed down” Adolf Hitler (Mein Karnpt) When President Chendrika Bendaranaike Kumaratunga claimed at a recent conference, that Ranasinghe Premadase and Ranjan Wijeratne have been implicated In the assassination of Vaya Kumeratunga, she was firing the first selvo in the politice propagarda batile for the local government institutions. There is no other explanation for her ining - efter all the Report of the Commission of Inquiry inte the Assassination of Mr Vijaya Kumaratunga was presented to the President several months ago. and copies were avaliable to the public at least from jate November. (This enabled the Lenka Guardian 10 publish 2 comprehensive analysis of the Report ‘nts December 01st issue). Contrary te the genersl expectations, the President keot mum about the Report, the only exception being an interview given to the nternaticnal Hera Ttibune during hor trip to France, This lence so uitexpected that there was even Tisaranee Gunasekara speculation that this was because the President was actually unhappy with the Report for rot making a strongor and a more unequivocal indictment of Ranasinghe Premadaca end Ranjan Wietaine. With hindsight itis easy to Understand the since of tha Prosident, She was bicing her tme, waiting to hurl hor ‘thundorbo't' in such a way 08 to cause maximum political camage to her rival, the UNP, Whoo the Ropert was presented to the President in the frst half of 1996, these segments cf the Report which made Teferences to Messrs Premadasa and Wijratne were mace available to the [ress, [The state ovined press published ‘this a6 the lsed story with beaner head lines, the next day). This caused an immediate reaction in the form of a stronaly worded press statement issued by Sirisena Cooray in his capac the Chairman of the Premadasa Centre Neither the government nor the President replied this statement. ‘When she made the decision to use the Vijaya Commission Report as the launching pad of the PA's local government election campaign, the President may have thought that she will be able to co so with impurity because Cooray, who defended President Premadasa and Minste! Wiieratne from the charges levelled lageinst them by one Commission, has himself today become the victim of yet another Presidential Commission. However, things warked out rather, differently. President Chandrike’s ‘nuntlet was picked up by both the UN and President Premadase’s daughtar, Dulanjales and the UNP itself. The all eis back inthe President's court and whether she will resort to tactics ‘of evasion once again or whether she will charge back into the fray remains to be seen. Minister Dhermasiri Senanayake's lame performance on 7.V. ‘Monday (Fab. 10%h) night was hardly a substitute A credible Presidential counter attack can be @ somewhat difficutt task - particularly considering the flimay foundation on which the findings of the Roport rests. According to the Report the evidence against President Pramadasa and Minister Ranjan Wieratre consists of the testimonies of three people: 2 JUP cuspect who Claims that he was arrested by the CID in connection with the aesaesination of SP Terence Fetere and the Digene Pooplos Bank robbery; @ junior police officer involved in the investigetion into the assaccination of Viaya Kumaratungs and 2 PA parliamentarian from the Gempahe district, The evidence by the first two consist sclely of statements made to thom by two dead people the main accomplice of Viaya’s assassin and another police officer involved in ‘the Viaya investigation: the evidence of the third witness consists of th disclosure that the Rupavahini carried 2 false nows item concerning Vaya and the JVP the day before the essessination - But even according to the Report the paper containing the order to the TY crew was missing and “therefore we do nct know the source of the order* (P.64) The other evidence included the testimonies of the sister and a family friend of Tarzan Weeresinghe (the main accomplice of Vifaya's assassin) and ‘two suspected criminals detained by the CID pius an anonymeus letter sent to one of the witnesses. It was based on this conclusive evidence that the Report mede its non specific findings against President Premadasa and Mr\Nijeraine Like an individual, an institution or 2 publication toc can be judged both by what it believes in and what * doesn’t The evidence the Report refused 10 believe in makes as much interesting reading as the evidence the Report dia believe in. The list of witnasses tho Report didn’t believe in include the Director CID, and the Additional Government Analyst as well asa former Director of CID and a former IGP.a I DT] The Report followed a sinilar logic in discovering the motives for tho assassination. Not only cogs it qiors ail the evidence of Vijaya'c etruggle ‘against the JVP since 1987 and the JVP's hatred and enmity towards Vijaya; it elso bends over backwarcs to the JVP 2 clean bill of health, hes, according to the Report there was a ‘conspiracy’ te undermine the investigation into the Vijaya’s assassination. The participants in this ‘conspitacy which was the result of a guiding hand included” all the police officers Involved in the investigation in general and PC Sangara Rajendian and Senior police officers Sheriffdeen and Thuraisingham in partiouler. Going by the Report, the assassination was committed by two JVP activists but the JUP was net involved in i’ The 2reassin had the support of several hundred police officers who, acting according to the order of this ‘guiding hand’, allowed the assassins to get away after the murder. What we aro left with ie a seanario in which several hundred police officers (hig and small) ware informed by the “guiding hand” before or immediately after tho assassination that they must not act ditgently in cetching the assassins of Vijaya Kumaratunga. & mind bogging scenario indeed! One wonders how it was done? Through woid of mouth? Or through Circulars? What wae the chai of command? And all this without 2 word of it getting out! Not a mean feat especially in Sri Lanka, Even now, with @ diferant government in office, hot « single officer has come forward 10 confess as to how this wholesale ‘otrancy’ was orchestrated. Now we come to the all important uestion of tho “guiding hand”. Whess was It? According to the inan specitic) findings of tha Commission, tho “guiding hand” would have been either MrPremadasa's ar MrWijoratne's. fut McPremadasa was only the Prime Minister at that time, (a Prime Minister ‘without any executive powers); he was Rot even the Presidential candidate. Therefore, the police department could not and did net teke orders from hin. It 1s impossible that he could have deliborately misguided the entire Investigation (a process requiring the complicity of hundreds of police officers from top to bottom) under the very noses of the President cum defence Minister J.R.Jayewardene and the State Minister for Defence Mr.talith Athulathmudali- without them knowing enything about #. As for MiWijeratna, hhe was not even a Cabinet Minister and the possiblity that his would hyave been the ‘guiding hand is even moro for fetched, ‘The Report gives rise 10 a number of questions. Why was the avidenes which proved beyond aeasonable doubt thet the relationship te:wesn Vijaya and tho JVP was a hostile, one not taken into account? The Report cays that on actificial attempt was mace (ostensibly by MrPremadasa) to “eroste a publi impression that Vjaya was on a collsion course with the JVP” (P64), The truth was thet Vijaya was on a collision fepurse with tho JVP. During the lest few months of his life Vijaya took an increasingly stridant ant: JVP-stend; in fact he was probably the only Left leader ‘who dared to eriticiaa the UWP and often ‘by nama, in public. Some cases in point 8) Viaya's final public speech (88.1.28 = Campball Park) b) Speech made at an educational camp 2t Dereweruwa, Kurunegela lan. 1988). ©) Speech made at the meeting ornanised by the Independent Students Union of Colombo University to commemorate tha first doath anniversary of i's leader, Daya Pathirana - Jan.1$88 New Town Hall Speech made at the funeral of Nendena Maresinghe, killed by the AVP (Nov.1988 Anuradhapura cometery} 4 The question cannot but arise why steps were not taken to listen to tapes, of Vijeya's last few speeches or obtain ‘copies of naws papar reports. The VP also issued 9 pumber of leaflets and tapes in which thay threatened Vijaya before bis assessination and condoned his filing afterwards, Foremost among, this wes @ tape of the JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera in which he heaped invective on Vijaya, as. Mr DEW Gunasekara former MP end currently. Chairman Rupavabini seia in Parliament coon aftar Vijaya's death : “Listen (0 the last cassette of the JVP. Rohane Wijewaora. The name is ‘mentioned 1 the last cassette ft says thet Vioya Kumaratunga, Colvin de Silva, Vasudeva Nanayakkera and K.PSiNa ore waiters who should be DUNShed, [told Mr Vilaya Kumaratunga and Mrz. Chendiika Kumeratunga about the situation 9 manths ago Why ‘was this person Kiled? Because his face Was beautiful and the cther person's face is ualy? Or was it because ne was 4 prominent youth leader? No. Because of the accord which was going to be signed on the 21st* («the formation of the USA) Ie is an cpen secret that Mr.Kumaratungs received a number of death threets from te JVP. This wes steted by his mother, Mrs.Clara Beatrice Kuraratunga in her first letter to the Vijaya Commission. Mrs, Kumaratunga sad “| know full well that there were VP death threats against my ean when he was alive. He also gat letters threatening t0 kell him”. (It should bs boine in mind thet Viaya wes extremaly close to his mother snd that hie mother ‘sometinies used to opan letters seat to Vijaya). The fact that Vijaya hed received death thesis was revealed im the investigation inte the aseassinetion (under the Presidency of MrJayewardene): (Policel "Sources edded that the late Mr. Kumeretunga had been reoaiving a series of threatening letters, The Counter ‘Subvorsive Unit too was aware of these letter, sources added’. (The island 18.288), One canact but wender why this angle ‘was ignored, Why were all the above Mentioned pieces of evidence implicating the JVP in the Vijaya assassination ignored - pa/ticulatly various anti JVP statements by Viaya and anti Vijays etotements by the JVP? Why was the leaflet issued by tho JVP*s military wing, the DJY, proudly clelming responsibility for Viaya’s assassination and justifying ft. ignored? If the President continues 10 use the \Viaya Commission Report as ¢ weapon against the UNP in the upcoming local government election campaign, the country wil expect her to give reasons. for these many sins of omission and Commission.POLITICISING POVERTY ALLEVIATION, ‘STAMPING’ OUT POVERTY “We will ensure that the Janseaviya recipients willimmediately receive the ‘entire sum of Rs, 2500/- which the ‘government claims to have daposited in banks on behalf of each Janasaviya beneficiary”. Source - Flection Manifesio of the Feoples Alliance August 1994. Paga 19. Poverty hes played en importent cole in the Lankan elections since 1943, However the understanding of poverty was a fecile one. When one political parly thought a free messure of rice will roct out the causes of poverty, the fathers hoped that either two measures Ot rice or some free ration system wil do tho neadtul. But nothing happaned, except for the rich becoming richer anc the poor becoming poorer. Thoce incorrect calculations, approaches and Jeptions were to have seria political, social and economic repercussions, In the lete 80's it was revealed that fone half of the population still vad below the poverty line No constructive ifort has been taken either to study the roat cause of this cycle of povarty 7 to implement a vieble programme to uplift ha living standards of the poor and to enable them to stand on thalr own feet instead of depending on others. The various development programmes of successive ‘govatements rarely catered fo the basic feeds of the poor. Concepts and projects, misro credit programmes and Social empowerment of the poor did hot occupy significant positions in the country’s development strategies. ‘The Janasaviya Programme (ISP) was aunched in this context. It was programme designed to address the Foct causes of poverty. The JSP contained @ compulsoly saving ‘component of Rs. 1042/- each making up a total of Rs.25,000)- over the two ‘year grant period. Instead of paying this lump sum the then government decided to convert the Rs, 25,000/- into @ saving which cannot be withdrawn. The beneficiaries were given savings books to tho value of Rs.25,000/- legally issued by the National Savings Bank and the JSP families were te be -and in fact were - paid a monthly interest of Rs. 250/- pormenth, The participants wore civen the option of using the savings book fas a valid guarantee to obtain loans through all ecognised government lending institutions. The PA whieh was then in the opposition cried foul over this and pledged that they will grant this Rs. 26,000) as @ lump sum to ell entitled families. This pledge was contained in the official PA election manifesto, Whet is the PA doing today? How is t enouring its election pledge to mors than 400,000 JSP families? By ceciding to terminate the Rs, 250)- monthly interest oaymont os of Ot st of January 1997, This implementation hhas been postponed till May -i-o. until the lacal government elections are over ~ obviously becouse the numercus gamanstrations and meetings S.H.A.Mohamed organised by Janasaviya families clearly indicate how extremely unpopular this decision is. RATION STAMPS ‘Ag a racult the PA rogimo has etartod issuing a ration stamp valid for five monthsin place of the monthly interest payments, until the heat of the polls are over. The JSP recipients were chosen through @ process in which there was very little political intervention. The 250/- monthly Interest payments were made through government post offices, But today in ‘obtaining the ration stamp thoso JSP families are at the mercy of the Samurdhi Niyamakas : henchman appointed by the local ruling party member of Pasliament. Earlier the savings book issued by the National Savings Bank was an acceptable and valid piece of document which could be used as a guarantee in order to, obtain loans. The present system of ration stemps issued for the first five months of the year has no such value, This Clearly proves thet the ‘entire exorcise of the government is an outright farce. The government which has imposed no festrictions on importing fuxury vehicles for ministers and parliamentarians, is out to get the Fs. 260/- monthly peyment of more then Rs, 400,000 JSP families. It is very clear a5 to which people's interest the ‘Peoples Alliance Government’ is representing. DeelCONEL (The author, who is Senior Research ‘Scholar at the Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad, is Visiting Professor, Dept of Defence and Strategic Stucles, Cusié-EAzam University: He has also been a Vishiing Fellow at the Henry 1 Stimson centre, Washington D.C.) Aveattempts towards Conflict Rescl [CR| in South Asia like chasing shadows? Ava techniques and mechanisms leat from Western exoeriences and some other successful cases mera alien transplant? Do conflict resolution meesiiras hold any relevance at all for South Asis or they are an exercise in Sheer cosmetics? Today, some of these guestions agitate the minds of many concerned and well-meaning South Asians. Conflict resolution, asa concept, arrived rather late in South Asia. While the former superpowers and Western European rations started practising itn the ently 1970s, in the case of Seuth Asia t was only in the mic-to-late 1980s that the gravity of the idea was realised. Part of the reason were the two military crisge (1987-88 and oorly 1990} which India and Pakisten as two arch rivals hac te face Fortunetely, these crises were defused due to the timely conilict prevention mecouras, Thase entailed essentially Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) and later como Confidence Bullding Measures (CBMs). Taken together and if pursued to their logical end, In good eamast, they coule meshingfully contribute teviarés conflict settlement/resoluticn in South Asia Following the end of the Cold War and the traditional super power rivairy, there Is aneed to reconceptualise the concept of security and development. Presently, Inter-state conflicts over resource, avironment, hums rights and ethno. lingustic issues are becoming more pressing concams, Vet it would be too piemature to the celebrate the demise Of the national state in the international sysiem ~ an institution that still exists. CEN ANSI ENES ANUS ONCMU HU Dr. Magsudul Hasan Nuri Hence, it needs solution of the above problems cr else they could escalate into shooting wars if sufficient prophylacsie ‘measures are nat taken wel in time, Prior experience fiom other nations’ searcn for conflict mitigation and conflictresolution serves as dintled wisdom, Preliminary efforts tewards centliet resolution during 1995-96 in such areas of the globe as the Midele Eest, the Korean Peninsula, Gontial America and some countties in Asia-Pacific have brought home certain leascns. Admittedly, these have cot received much attention in South Asia but it could gain momentum as South ‘Asia moves ahead with economic and political moderri Paradoxically, both India and Pakistai today provide nearly hal! of the size of international poacokaoping forsee in Gifferent parts of the world, trying to douso the fires af intamational contiiot. Burt itis an irony that they are sil visceral foos and remain locked in historical hatreds end paranoias. The winds of chenge that hava blown aerose some countries in Asia (Southeast Asia and Midadlo East) have barely touched tho Subcontinent. Whet to talk of conflict resolution when oven attempts at conflict containment/management are at boost fitful and half-hearted, PAST ATTEMPTS AF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Realistically speaking, since their independence, both India and Fakistan, dosptte their outstanding conflits, have ‘entered into some embryonic forms of confidence generation measures that may act es a prelude towards conflict resolution. These included the Liaqat- Nehru Pact (1951); Indus Water Treaty (1960); Tashkent Agrooment (1966); Rann of Kutch Agregment (1968); Sima Accors (1973): Sallal Dam Agresment (1878) end the formation of the Indo- Pak Joint Commission (7983), Yet any progress towards resolution of some disputes has remeined stalled. ‘These inslde the core issue of Keshmic Cher issues that nesd final settlement fare Siachen, tha nuclear issue Woller batrage and demarcation of Sir Cresk, In fact, according to most observers tho ‘main stumbling biock is Kashmir and when and if recolvad it could pave the Way for the resatuion of other disputes too. As part of this desire for conflict resolution both countries have taken some initiatives sinco independance by proposing No-Wer Pacts/Feace Treatios/ No War Deslarations with each ather While india wes the frst to propose the No-War Pact, Pakistan's stand was that its signing would be meaningless unless the bone of contention, namely the Kashmir issue wes first resplved, Moreover it was thought that by signing the No-War Fact Pakiston would foriet its right on Kashmir and lll Pakistan into 2 false sense of security. In truth, both counties wanted to build peace with theirnsighbour on their own terms India wanting normalisation by putting the Kashmir digpute on the back burner while Pakistan was uraing India to first talk bout Keshmir and aette the issue before ‘aking up other things. This ultimately oduced the offers and counter-offers of No-Wer Pacts to almost a “ritual” and ping pong diplomacy”? {ths late 1980s, both Indi ane Pakistan Started serious'y considering soma confidence buililing measuresin erder to Teduce the threat of war, espacially nuclesr. Consequontly, measures euch a9 hot Ing, notification on military exere'se, onattack on each other's nuclear facilities and border security were signed. “To dats, both countrae have proposed a ‘number of measures in the nuclear felc, Ary agreement ie difficult to como by because of the diverging perspectives between the twe countries - with India sspiting for ¢ global power status and Pakistan ralying on its nucloar ehiold for ecurty and survival. “Mutual security” fr “common securty” is stil not on the ‘agenda of the two feuding pincipals in South Asia. Hera each wants to imposeite own vorsion of peace snd security ‘on the other - that is often tantamount to striving for ona! own security at the cost of the other, ‘The time bas come whan both India an Fakistan cannot afford to remain at tho preliminary stage of CA's and CBM: ‘hers isa need to go beyond the conflict resolution attempts, with courage, will and imagination. One fact howavar is inescapable and a harsh reality: like it or not, both countries will ore day have to be sit down to resolve their mutuel Conflicts either through compulsion of fenother war or secioecenoinic reasons. Instead of being weylaid by time end History itis timely and prudent that they should put behind their deadly animatitios and foster reconciliation end compromise. Forces of sanity, vision and statcemarship have to prevail over the inertia of fanaticism, rigicity and myopic, Talking about ard praparing for war takes allot physical and mental energy that could be put to batter uso in tho task of national development. Both countries, despite their many felling and foibles in their system, ere functioning demacracies. As such, thoy should ba ‘mature enough to Sor out thei problems. through debate, dialogue and deliberations - keeping in view of course their enlightened national interests, Wile dialogue and debate are essential, itis very iinportent that both countries ‘should draw proper lessons from earlier conflict resolution attempts made fn other parts of the werld. These lessons ‘may be of a generic type but they could +b tailored to the South Asian conditions. Following ar2 some of the cardinal lessons derived fram other cases: UESSON 1: TIME FACTOR As an institutional process, conflict resolution requires patience, perseverance and persistence In the case (f the European Union, the once-aich enemies, France and Germary, had to trayoreo a pariod of nearly 50 years to airive at the present lovel of harmony and trust-whieh only preves thet sworn enemies are not destined to remain at loggarhoace with each for cterrity. Today, boih these nations are thriving damecracias and form the core of the European Union’ after having ‘transcended thoirittorand bleody past Ittook 35 nations of the CSCE as many as eloven yoare for agreomant on discretionary measures to crysiallise into robust CBMs aid another four years for tho antagonists to carry out force eduction. In the Middle East, it tock nearly 26 years for Egypt and Israel to arrive at an agreement; in ceniral ‘America the 1986 Contadora Act or the recent Honduran treaty lal the basis for ‘agreement. In Latin Amerca, Argentina and Brazil, with a century-old rivalry, signed e historic agreement in November 1085 to chara nuctoar technclagios and expertise; * and the step-by-step normalisation precose between India and China came about in September 1983, |r may ba mantioned hare that langthy and interminable nature of negotiations is neither endemic to the Micdlo East or a yaldstick by which t9 measure the potential success of nagatiations TESSON 2: TRANSPARENCY AND. coytestexrions, Teensparency and easy flow of communications are a sine qua non for building trustand actas a stepping store, to conflict resolution. However, the flow of information hae to bo voluntary and mutual soas not t give any party undue advantago. Lack of information end needless accent on security leads to dietortion of tha cosnition process leading to misperceptions and risky bbehsviours. Sacurity ascosement should tbe based on healthy and praventive ‘spect of throat while over security ean {ead to over-reaction ard morbidty - thus Creating worst case ecararios. While the Western) experience nas brought out soma lessont leg. SALT) where tron dispositions and movements, induction of ney weapons and balance in forces ellayed mutual fears by sharing of information, in South Asia extrema secrecy and misinformation breed insecurity All these act a cisineent for creating conditions for conflict reduction and then conflict resolution, Of course, asymmetric evel In geographic size, resources and the armed foreas of India and Pakistan act as creat disincentives in fostering any ‘transparency measures.’ For the latter, this is often seen as giving an added ‘adventage to its bigger adversary, Whereas the East-West normalisation process was catalysed by the Dedicated ‘Communication Links (OCLs) suchas the hot line between Washington and Mescow, in case of India and Pakistan the hot line needs to be modernised through fax or satelite communications, especially on the Line of Control in Kasim Further, there is the need for another hot line between tho political leaderships of both countries, Likewise, defence and forsign secrotanes need be in touch to exchange views, information and seek clarifications if and when required. Only when these communication procedures ate routinised/institutionalised thet proper transparency can result. This will impart predictability to cach other's behaviour, act as preventives against any surprise attack and prove conducive towerds taking further steps in conflict resolution. [As Western experience has shown, mera setting up of hot lines is not enough. Strong backup efforts like encouragement of transparancy such as ‘opening up for scrutiny, hicden detence budgets (infrastructure, arme acquisition, ew raising of troops, research and development and publicly declaring their stiategic docttines) are also important. This is to prevant in both countries nat only the milliary commanders from overreacting in acvsis situation but also to prevent certain polticians end press ‘rom cynically exploiting the insecurity syndrome. Conflict resolution, therefore needs conducive CBMsin place - or also the whole process may get subverted or boaged down LESSON 3: INCREMENTAL PROGRESS The East'West experience demonstrates that conflict resolution does not come into effect by 8 quantum jump aramere leap of faith. They fellow a step by step, brick by brick and block by block approach, Mutual confidence has te be Generated in stages with negotiations tachling simplo problems followed by ‘more complicated ones. In Eurane. it tock the CBM process nearly fifteen years of fhegotiations. The Stockholm Accords (1975) and the Stockholm Agreements (1.986) set te tone end tempo for further agreements to be negotiated, Needless to say that the process of negotiations leading to compromise of settlement involves timo end patience While recourse to contlict or vislenca is anly a shortcut to pszce. Besides, ‘mankind's experience through the ages hes baon that conflict rosclution techniques/mechanisms/skills have lagged far behind than war-making techniques and technologies, In other ‘words while man has learnt to ight more cfficienily end lethally he remains stil a novice on how to negotiate and settle Contd on page 23 ——<———— a ee' ‘The anilein he Lanka Guardan ‘of December 15, 1996, titled "From’77 ‘to the Last Political Thoughts" by KM de Silva, merits a responss; if only 19 expose some of its more fanciful inteipretation of past events, and presantaltemativainierpretations The tile of this response is adapted from a saying “God can do anything axcopt the past - but a historian can ‘do that’ Your readers may jucgs for temselves whether this thie i well ‘choten or ofvorwis. ‘The autor of the article under teview, the distinguished historian Professor KM de Silvais the biogrepher “of JR Jayawardena, together with Professor Howard Wilgains. As such, ‘altornative interpretations of some events discussed by him in his article under reference must be undartaxen by ‘others lke this author, who however cannot lay claim to be a historian and annot therefore attempt to do what God himeelf cannot do. Some statements made by Ptotessor KM de Sjlva to describe fectual historical ‘events wil be quoted in this ericia, ancl altemative interpretations of the facts wil given with some comments in aspect of each of them. ‘Dunng the wholepericd when he wes head of government, JA did not have any rivals within his party, no “challengers 10 his authority within his arament and, tll the fatet: ; chal what is not mentioned in this: statementisthe removal fromthe party, atthe very beginning ofthenew regime, of Rukman Senanayake and his {ellowing, thus eliminating the possible potential challenge within his party, from that source. Similarly, Suspension of Mrs Bandaranalke’s tivia rights fora poriod of seven years, effecively emovedithe ralyingpointot the Sinhala electoral opposition, the SLFP. Further details ofhow the SLEP was reduced to disarray, by carefully thought out steps to "recognize" rival fections within that party, cannot be dealt with in this brief account of events, Seven govemments thatwerein power in this couniry after the demise of DS Senanayiake in 1952, had held fea and fair general elections; the later six of these seven governments, staring mith Sir Johm Koielawala's in 1956, and ‘ending with Mrs, Bandaranaike's in 1977 had all been defeated at the polis. This was wel known, and that was probably what JR wanted to prevent happening to his party when general elections would become de inn 1982 alter five years. Many of his subsequent actions may be tunclerstcod when Seen in this light “The institutional framework essential for the success or failure of ppresidentalism-a powerful presidential eres for instarice, was never ‘head of government - should lose ‘majority, the kind of political defeat ‘had arenged for Mrs Bandaranaite 1968," ‘This statement glosses over z umber of things, and is misleading regard t0 the workings cf the nel executive Presidential systei government set up by JR, using ‘ivessixths mejorty of seats ofthe UI in parliamont. Tho Prosident was ansviereble to parliament, end to. all intents and purposes howas above t law of the land. He himself ha anncunced that he could ¢ anythin except “make a man a women ora women a man’, In-utter contrast, Mi Bandranaike's poltical defeat in 196 (nich Professor KM de Siva sa was “arrangec" by JR), involved | ‘crossing over to the UNP of a hare of SLEP MPs in seriament, electoral defeat of th ‘goverimen! by ustene vete. these two siftiations, the SLEP’ precaiicus situation in pa'liamet December 1964, and the UI colossal majority in 1 compared ?@ nephew was appointed 4s Inspector General In the army ta, a nephew wes appointed Commander, and he in tum re-oppoinied serveral friends and old schoolmates, with back pey and seniority, who hed left the army orhad been telired for various reasons under the provious regime, Another of theca ‘close reatives whohad been avayirom the army for thres years was re- ‘appointed without loss of seniority, and jater also became amy commander. ‘On the other hand, some service personnel who were not in favour with the new high command, ware also retired prematurely. The effect cf all theso appointments by an all powerful President, as could be sean in thellight. ef future events, makes the non: establishment of a "powerful Presidential secrsiaria” quite irrelevant ‘His viciory in 1977 brought to an end the cuopoly in political leadership that the two family compacts of the Senanayakes and Benderaraikes had esiablistied since jndependenca, a change thai gave him ‘feat satisfaction, He believed that Si Lanka's. multi-party democracy deserved something better than that and he set about opening the doors fo the jeadership of his own pany, quite aliborately, tomon whe did not belong tp founding ‘amily or to elite families in generél. In doing s0 he believed that the example he set would have jis influence and repercussions on the holdof the Bandaranaike family on the SLFP. Bul he reckoned without the tenacity of Mrs Bandaranaike in her single - minded determination to Keep the family in control of that party despite the succession of electoral defeats she suiteredin 1877 andafter* Of those “who aid not belong to founding family or to olite families’ Renasinghe Premadasa had proved fimsclfas a Minister for a short period in the later stages of the 1965 Dudiey Senanayake government, and he had @ strong following within the UNP. There was no way JR could have Kept him out of the Premiership, afier he himself became President, without causing serious disruptions ‘within the UNF. But, JR had seen to it that the Prime Minister's executive power was Circumscribed under the new Consitution. Total power was with the President, and he himself mada no bones about it on several occasions For example, as President he made 2 famous pronouncement from the historic. paifirippuwa in the Dalada Waligawa, as the kings of yore usec to do ; and during an official visit to Washington, he ennounced that he Was in the direct line of cuccassion from the encient Kings in Sri Lanka, The reference to ‘the tenacity of Mrs Bandaranalke in her singleminded determination to keep the family in control” of the SLFP, sounds very much like a ory of frustration from JR's biographer. Objective analysis would show thal many attempts to cistupt the SLFP, both within the electoral process, and oultside it, were supported if not actually masterminded by JR Disontranchisoment of | Mre Bandarenalke was the most glaring ‘example, but it was her “tenacity” that utimately saved her late husband's party from dsintegration. Even without such ¢ collapse, JR's government, without an effective opposition in Parliament, was able to impose many difficulties on its opponents outside parliament, ‘Indeed by the eatly 1980s the UNP had consolidated its hold on the electorate and had defeated its ‘opponenis on four consecutive elections held on a national level botwoon July 1977 and October 1982. the oppestion SLFP was reeling in the face of selFinfloted wounds stemming from iniernal division, and others contrived for it by him.’ These refrences to “suovessive electoral defeats che eutforad in 1977 and after’ and to “our consecutive eleations held between July 1977 and Ociober 1982 at a national level” are extiemsly misteading, (or tworeasons. Firsily, Mrs Bandararanaike was deprived of her civic rights for a7 year period starting ip 1978, and kept out of politics til that restriction was Unexpectadly removed in 1984, piobabiy under pressure rom the Prime Wirister of Incl, when Indo-Sri Lanka relations had sunk to an all time low. Secondly, general elections as well as severaly elections were not held after 1977, by resorting to various devices including a Raferendim to pesipane general elections in 1982, causing a Great deal of jrustration, especially amoung milions of disoruntled youth who had never had a chanes to exercise theitfianchise intheirifetime: ‘The Kelawana fiasco merits. special mention since it showed up the authoritarian nature of the new constitution in no uncertain terms. The President re-appcinted to Parliament ‘2 member who had been discualfies by the Supreme court on an election pelllim, and a by-election had been ‘won by an opposition member. For a shoit period there seemed to be iwc members representing a single eleciorate, The farce was only resolved \whon tho disqualified member agreed to “tesign*. This incident too will go down in the constitutional history books to the etemal srame of JR and his government, despite all the efforts of his historians to prevent it The four oleotions referred te were held under emergency regulations, and ware boycotted by opposition peries, or were threatened with boyest, making a mockery of the whole electoral process The mosi slering example perhaps were the