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G.R. No. 194538. November 27, 2013.*

MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights

and interests under him, petitioner, vs. CARMEL
DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; An

action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully
withholds possession of any land or building against or from a
lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied.—An action for unlawful detainer
exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land
or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other
persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Here,
possession by a party was originally legal, as it was permitted by
the other party on account of an express or implied contract
between them. However, the possession became illegal when the
other party demanded that the possessor vacate the

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

31

subject property because of the expiration or termination of the

right to possess under the contract, and the possessor refused to
heed the demand.
Statutes; As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional
produces no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any person.
—As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional produces
no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any person. It
matters not whether the person is a party to the original case,
because “[n]ot only the parties but all persons are bound by the
declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.” Thus,
petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae
nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt cannot be countenanced. We

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have categorically stated that the doctrine does not apply when
the party concerned is a “successor in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is
in rem, the judgment in which is binding against him.” While
petitioner may not have been a party to Tuason, still, the
judgment is binding on him because the declaration of P.D. 293 as
a nullity partakes of the nature of an in rem proceeding.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine
recognizes the interim effects of a law prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality.—Neither may petitioner avail himself of the
operative fact doctrine, which recognizes the interim effects of a
law prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality. The operative
fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an
exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration
of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law, but it can never be invoked to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act.
Civil Law; Builders in Good Faith; A builder in good faith is
“one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is
his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.”—Upon perusal of the
records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in good
faith. A builder in good faith is “one who builds with the belief
that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has
the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in
his title.” Since

32

petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995

(when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his
favor), or about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he
should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since
all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence
should be “[o]n one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial
notice; on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat.” He thus loses
whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity,
in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Ebencio M. Gandia for petitioner.
  Rhoan Purugganan for respondent.
  Rita Marie B. Cubangban collaborating counsel for
respondent.

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SERENO, CJ.:
This is an appeal by way of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 dated 6 December 2010 assailing the Decision2
and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 105190, which reversed the Decision4 and Order5 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City
in Civil Case No. C-22018. The RTC had reversed the
Decision6 of the

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 28-55.
2 Id., at pp. 7-19; CA Decision dated 25 May 2010, penned by Associate
Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio
L. Villamor and Florito S. Macalino.
3 Id., at p. 20; CA Resolution dated 15 October 2010.
4  Id., at pp. 112-114; RTC Decision dated 30 April 2008, penned by
Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
5 Id., at p. 115; RTC Order dated 11 August 2008.
6 Id., at pp. 187-190; MeTC Order dated 9 November 2007, penned by
Acting Presiding Judge Josephine M. Advento-Vito Cruz.

33

Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan

City in Civil Case No. 03-27114, ordering petitioner to
vacate the subject property in this case for ejectment.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the
registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the
Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan
City.7 The property has a total land area of 156 hectares
and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name
of Carmel Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and (64007)
15807.8 The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No.
32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles above-mentioned.9 On
14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D. 293),10 which invalidated
the titles of respondent and declared them open for
disposition to the members of the Malacañang
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI), to wit:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President

of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081, dated
September 21, 1972 and

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7  Id., at p. 8.
8  Id.
9  Id.
10 See Presidential Decree No. 293 otherwise known as “Cancelling the Sale
Certificates and/or Transfer Certificates of Title Numbers 62603, 62604, and
62605, covering Lots 1, 2, and 3, respectively, Pcs-4383, all in the name of Carmel
Farms, Inc., which is a consolidation and subdivision of Lots 979, 981, 982, 985,
988, 989, 990, 991-New, 1226, 1230, and 980-C-2 (Lrc Psd-1730), All of Tala
Estate, Caloocan City, and Declaring the same open for disposition to the
Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present occupants, pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Number 32, as amended.” 

34

General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972 do hereby order

and decree that any and all sales contracts between the
Government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled,
and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and
any and all transfers thereafter, covering lots 979, 981, 982, 985,
988, 989, 990, 991-new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 (LRC PSD-
1730), all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City are hereby declared
invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government;
that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 6204, 6205,
covering lots 1, 2, and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel
Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and subdivision
survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared
invalid and considered cancelled as against the
Government; and that said lots are declared open for
disposition and sale to the members of the Malacañang
Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide
occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32,
as amended. (Emphasis supplied)

By virtue of P.D. 293, a Memorandum11 was inscribed on

the last page of respondent’s title, as follows:

Memorandum — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this

Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio
and considered cancelled as against the government and the
property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale
to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc.

On the basis of P.D. 293, petitioner’s predecessor-in-

interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied
Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there.12 On the
other hand, respondent was constrained to allow the
members of MHAI to also occupy the rest of Pangarap
Village.13

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11 Rollo, p. 8.
12 Id.
13 Id., at pp. 8-9.

35

On 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated

Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact,
Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,
Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer14 (Tuason),
which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab
initio in all its parts. The dispositive portion is herein
quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be

unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public
respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles
of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the
memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring
the property therein respectively described open for disposition
and sale to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners
Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles
to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and
desist from implementing any provision or part of said
Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs.

On 17 February 1988, the Register of Deeds then

cancelled the Memorandum inscripted on respondent’s
title,15 eventually restoring respondent’s ownership of the
entire property.
Meanwhile, sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot
No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Pelagio M.
Juan in his favor.16
As a consequence of Tuason, respondent made several
oral demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to
no avail.17 A written demand letter which was sent
sometime in April 2002 also went unheeded.18

_______________
14 241 Phil. 650, 663; 157 SCRA 613, 623 (1988).
15 Rollo, p. 9.
16 Id., at p. 408.
17 Id., at p. 10.
18 Id., at pp. 9-10.

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On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for

Unlawful Detainer19 before the MeTC. After due hearing
on 9 November 2007, the trial court rendered a Decision20
in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, in the
following manner:
1. Ordering the defendant to vacate the subject property
located at Lot No. 32, Block 73, Gregorio Araneta Ave.,
Makatipo, Caloocan City, together with all persons claiming
right under her;
2. To pay the sum of P10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees;
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

In so ruling, the trial court stated that respondent was

the registered owner of the property until its title was
voided by P.D. 293.21 It had no alternative but to allow
petitioner’s occupancy of the premises.22 Since the latter’s
occupation was only by mere tolerance of respondent,
petitioner was necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he would vacate the property upon demand.23 Failure
to do so would render him liable for unlawful detainer.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC. On 30 April
2008, it rendered a Decision24 reversing the findings of the
MTC, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision

appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET

_______________
19 Id., at pp. 117-120.
20 Supra note 6.
21 Id., at p. 188.
22 Id.
23 Id., at p. 189.
24 Supra note 4. 

37

ASIDE and the complaint is accordingly DISMISSED.

With costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

In the opinion of the RTC, respondent’s Complaint did

not make out a case for unlawful detainer.25 It maintained
that respondent’s supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of petitioner’s
possession.26 Since the possession was sanctioned by the
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issuance of P.D. 293, and respondent’s tolerance only came

after the law was declared unconstitutional, petitioner thus
exercised possession under color of title.27 This fact
necessarily placed the Complaint outside the category of
unlawful detainer.28
On 24 September 2008, respondent appealed to the
CA.29 The appellate court rendered a Decision30 on 25 May
2010, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

GRANTED. The assailed decision dated April 30, 2008 of
the RTC (Branch 121) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-
22018 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision
dated November 9, 2007 of the MTC (Branch 52) of
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. 03-27114 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

In disposing of the issues, the CA observed that

petitioner’s arguments could not be upheld.31 The question
of whether tolerance had been exercised before or after the
effectivity of P.D. 293 would only matter if what was at
issue was the time-

_______________
25 Id., at p. 114.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id., at pp. 56-108.
30 Supra note 2.
31 Id., at p. 15.

38

liness of the Complaint or whether the Complaint was one

for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.32 Since the
Complaint specifically alleged that the possession of
respondent was by petitioner’s tolerance, and that
respondent’s dispossession had not lasted for more than
one year, it then follows that the MeTC rightly acquired
jurisdiction over the Complaint.33
Moreover, with the determination of who was the lawful
and registered owner of the property in question, the owner
necessarily enjoyed or had a better right to the possession
and enjoyment there.34 Hence, petitioner had no right to
the continued possession of the property.35 Neither could he
be considered a builder in good faith who could avail

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himself of the benefits under Article 448 of the Civil

Code.36 From the moment P.D. 293 was declared
unconstitutional and the title to the property restored to
respondent, petitioner could no longer claim good faith.37
Thus, as provided under Article 449, petitioner loses what
he would be building, planting, or sowing without right of
indemnity from that time.38
On 25 May 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution39 issued
by the CA on 15 October 2010.
Hence, the instant Petition.
On 2 May 2011, respondent filed a Comment40 on the
Petition for Review; and on 17 May 2011, petitioner filed a
Reply.41

_______________
32 Id.
33 Id., at pp. 15-16.
34 Id., at p. 17.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id., at p. 18.
39 Supra note 3.
40 Id., at pp. 395-414.
41 Id., at pp. 451-463.

39

Issues
From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the
following:
1. Whether or not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the
case;
2. Whether or not Tuason may be applied here, despite
petitioner not being a party to the case; and
3. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith.
The Court’s Ruling
We shall discuss the issues seriatim.
The MeTC rightly exercised
jurisdiction, this case being
one of unlawful detainer.
Petitioner alleges that the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, because respondent had filed the
Complaint beyond the one-year prescriptive period for
ejectment cases. Despite losing ownership and possession
of the property as early as 14 September 1973 when P.D.

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293 took effect, respondent allegedly still failed to take the

necessary action to recover it.42
Petitioner also insists that tolerance had not been
present from the start of his possession of the property, as
respondent extended its tolerance only after P.D. 293 was
declared unconstitutional.43 This situation necessarily
placed respondent’s cause of action outside the category of
unlawful detainer.44 Consequently, the presence of an
ownership dispute should have made this case either an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.45

_______________
42 Id., at p. 37.
43 Id., at pp. 45-46.
44 Id.
45 Id., at p. 37.

40

Unfortunately, petitioner’s contentions are without merit.

The MeTC rightly exercised jurisdiction, this case being
one of unlawful detainer.
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person
unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building
against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons,
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.46
Here, possession by a party was originally legal, as it was
permitted by the other party on account of an express or
implied contract between them.47 However, the possession
became illegal when the other party demanded that the
possessor vacate the subject property because of the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under the
contract, and the possessor refused to heed the demand.48
The importance of making a demand cannot be
overemphasized, as it is jurisdictional in nature.49 The one-
year prescriptive period for filing a case for unlawful
detainer is tacked from the date of the last demand, the
reason being that the other party has the right to waive the
right of action based on previous demands and to let the
possessor remain on the premises for the meantime.50

_______________
46 Samelo v. Manotok Services, Inc., G.R. No. 170509, 27 June 2012,
675 SCRA 132, citing Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694, 707; 490 SCRA 302,
312 (2006).

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47 Jose v. Alfuerte, G.R. No. 169380, 26 November 2012, 686 SCRA 323,
citing Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, 7 April
2009, 584 SCRA 81, 89-90.
48 Id.
49  Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, 517 Phil. 648; 482 SCRA 461 (2006),
citing Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, 23 September 1992,
214 SCRA 216.
50  Leonin v. Court of Appeals, 534 Phil. 544; 503 SCRA 423 (2006),
citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107, 1117; 268 SCRA 640,
652 (1997); Penas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112734, 7 July 1994,
233 SCRA 744, 747.

41

In this case, it is clear from the facts that what was once a
legal possession of petitioner, emanating from P.D. 293,
later became illegal by the pronouncement in Tuason that
the law was unconstitutional. While it is established that
tolerance must be present at the start of the possession,51 it
must have been properly tacked after P.D. 293 was
invalidated. At the time the decree was promulgated,
respondent had no option but to allow petitioner and his
predecessor-in-interest to enter the property. This is not
the “tolerance” envisioned by the law. As explained in
Tuason, the decree “was not as claimed a licit instance of
the application of social justice principles or the exercise of
police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem
deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous
and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was in
reality a taking of private property without due
process and without compensation whatever, from
persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles
in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by
law.”52
When respondent sent petitioner a demand letter in
April 2002 and subsequently filed the Complaint in
January 2003, it did so still within the one-year
prescriptive period imposed by the rules. It matters not
whether there is an ownership issue that needs to be
resolved, for as we have previously held, a determination of
the matter would only be provisional. In Heirs of Ampil v.
Manahan,53 we said:

In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material

possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties, is the sole issue for resolution.
But where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass
upon said issue in order to determine who has the right to possess

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the property. This adjudication, however, is only an initial

determination of

_______________
51 Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365, 372; 22 SCRA 1257, 1265 (1968).
52 Supra note 14, at pp. 662-663; p. 623.
53 G.R. No. 175990, 11 October 2012, 684 SCRA 130, 139. 

42

ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the

issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. As such, the
lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.

Tuason may be applied despite

petitioner not being a party to that
case, because an unconstitutional
law produces no effect and confers
no right upon any person.
Petitioner argues that respondent has no cause of action
against him, because under the doctrine of operative fact
and the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis
praejudicium faciunt, petitioner should not be prejudiced
by Tuason; the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
P.D. 293 should not affect the rights of other persons not
party to the case.54
Again, petitioner’s argument deserves scant
consideration. In declaring a law null and void, the real
issue is whether the nullity should have prospective, not
retroactive, application.55 Republic v. Court of Appeals56 is
instructive on the matter:

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is

declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and
purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed.
x x x.
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not
necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act
occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the
moratorium laws, we have been constrained to recognize the
interim effects of said laws prior to their declaration of
unconstitutionality,

_______________
54 Rollo, pp. 46-48.
55 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79732, 8 November
1993, 227 SCRA 509.

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56 Id., at p. 512.

43

but there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong

considerations of equity and fair play. x x x.

As a general rule, a law declared as unconstitutional

produces no effect whatsoever and confers no right on any
person. It matters not whether the person is a party to the
original case, because “[n]ot only the parties but all persons
are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which
means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the
courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in
other words, a total nullity.”57 Thus, petitioner’s invocation
of the doctrine of res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis
praejudicium faciunt cannot be countenanced. We have
categorically stated that the doctrine does not apply when
the party concerned is a “successor in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action, or the
action or proceeding is in rem, the judgment in which is
binding against him.”58 While petitioner may not have been
a party to Tuason, still, the judgment is binding on him
because the declaration of P.D. 293 as a nullity partakes of
the nature of an in rem proceeding.
Neither may petitioner avail himself of the operative
fact doctrine, which recognizes the interim effects of a law
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality.59 The
operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must
be applied as an exception to the general rule that an
unconstitutional law produces no effects.60 The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on

_______________
57 Id., at p. 511.
58 Dar Adventure Farm Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161122, 24
September 2012, 681 SCRA 580, 583.
59 Supra note 55, at p. 512.
60 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951,
24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 819.

44

those who have relied on the invalid law,61 but it can never
be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act.62

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In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been

unduly burdened by reliance on an invalid law. Petitioner
merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit
allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the
MHIA, authorizing petitioner to occupy the same.63
However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime in
1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case
was promulgated.64 At the time petitioner built the
structures on the premises, he ought to have been aware of
the binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent
unconstitutionality of P.D. 293. These circumstances
necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operative fact
doctrine.
Petitioner may not be deemed to
be a builder in good faith.
Petitioner also argues that he is a builder in good faith
for want of knowledge of any infirmity in the promulgation
of P.D. 293.65 Being a builder in good faith, he believes that
he is entitled to the reimbursement of his useful expenses
and that he has a right to retain possession of the
premises, pending reimbursement of the value of his
improvements to be proven during trial, in accordance with
Article 545 of the Civil Code.66
Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that
petitioner is not a builder in good faith. A builder in good
faith is “one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to
build thereon,

_______________
61 Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676 SCRA 579, citing
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, 14
March 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 516-517.
62 Supra note 61.
63 Rollo, pp. 408-409.
64 Id.
65 Id., at p. 460.
66 Id.

45

and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.”67 Since

petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in
1995 (when his predecessor-in-interest executed an
Affidavit in his favor), or about seven years after Tuason
was promulgated, he should have been aware of the
binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial decisions
form part of the law of the land, its existence should be
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8/11/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 711

“[o]n one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice;

on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat.”68 He thus loses
whatever he has built on the property, without right to
indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil
Code.69
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105190 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and

Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition affirmed, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—The operative fact doctrine must be applied as

an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional
law produces no effects — it can never be invoked to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. (League
of Cities of the Philippines [LCP] vs. Commission on
Elections, 628 SCRA 819 [2010])
——o0o——

_______________
 
67 Rosales v. Castelltort, 509 Phil. 137, 147; 472 SCRA 144, 155 (2005),
citing Macasaet v. Macasaet, 482 Phil. 853, 871; 439 SCRA 625, 644 (2004)
(citation omitted).
68 Lapid v. Laurea, 439 Phil. 887, 896-897; 391 SCRA 277, 285 (2002).
69 Civil Code, Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity.

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