EN BANC

[ A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018 ]

RE: SHOW CAUSE ORDER IN THE DECISION DATED MAY 11, 2018 IN G.R. NO. 237428 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA V. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO)

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
The instant administrative matter is an offshoot of G.R. No. 237428 entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C.
Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, hereinafter referred to as the quo warranto case or proceedings against Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(respondent). A brief statement of the factual and procedural antecedents of the case is, thus, in order.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was lodged before the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives against respondent
for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. Having learned of respondent's disqualification as a
Chief Justice from the House Committee on Justice's hearings, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent, basically questioning her eligibility for the Chief Justice position.

The Court observed that since the filing of the impeachment complaint, during the pendency of the quo warranto case, and even after the
conclusion of the quo warranto proceedings, respondent continuously opted to defend herself in public through speaking engagements before
students and faculties in different universities, several public forums, interviews on national television, and public rallies. As the Court noted in its
decision in the quo warranto case, respondent initially refused to participate in the congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint. When
the petition for quo warranto was filed, respondent likewise continuously refused to recognize this Court's jurisdiction. Instead of participating in
the judicial process and answering the charges against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious resolution of the matter, respondent opted to
proceed to a nationwide campaign, conducting speeches and accepting interviews, discussing the merits of the case and making comments thereon
to vilify the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the impartiality of the Members of the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the
Judiciary, and falsely impute ill motives against the government that it is orchestrating the charges against her. In short, as the Court stated in the
[1]
said decision, respondent chose to litigate her case before the public and the media instead of the Court.
The Court was disquieted as doubts against the impartiality and dignity of the Court and its Members emerged, and the obfuscation of the issues in
the quo warranto proceedings resulted from such out-of-court discussions on the merits of the case. Worse, the Court was perturbed by the fact
that respondent, not only being a member of the Bar but one who was asserting her eligibility and right to the highest position in the Judiciary,
significantly participated in such detestable and blatant disregard of the sub judice rule.[2]

Consequently, having great regard of judicial independence and its duty to discipline member of the Bar to maintain the dignity of the profession
and the institution, the Court in its decision in the quo warranto case, ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be sanctioned for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (NCJC) for transgressing
the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of this Court.[3]

On June 13, 2018, respondent filed her Verified Compliance (To the Show Cause Order dated 11 May 2018) with Respectful Motion for Inhibition
(Of Hon. Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, Noel G. Tijam, Francis H. Jardeleza, Lucas P. Bersamin, and
Samuel R. Martires),[4] arguing that the acts imputed against her in the May 11, 2018 Decision do not amount to conduct unbecoming of a Justice
and a lawyer which would warrant her disbarment nor warrant any other disciplinary measure.

Respondent's Explanations/Arguments
(1) Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set forth in the CPR and the NCJC, emphasizing that her
[5]
participation in the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge but as a party-litigant.

(2) The imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant the Court's
[6]
exercise of its power of contempt in accordance with the "clear and present danger" rule. Respondent avers that she cannot be faulted for
the attention that the quo warranto case gained from the public considering that it is a controversial case, which involves issues of
[7]
transcendental importance.

(3) Assuming arguendo that the CPR and the NCJC apply, respondent argues that in addressing the matters of impeachment and quo
warranto to the public, she was in fact discharging her duty as a Justice and a lawyer to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the
[8]
law and legal processes pursuant to the said Codes.

(4) Assuming arguendo that respondent violated some provisions of the CPR and the NCJC in her public statements, the same does not
warrant the exercise of the Court's power to discipline in view of the attendant circumstances, to wit: (a) no less than the Solicitor General
repeatedly made personal attacks against her and publicly discussed the merits of the case, hence, she had to respond to such accusations
[9]
against her; and (b) she was not given her right to due process despite her repeated demand.

Issue
May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements as regards the quo warranto case against her during its
pendency?

Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the merits, We first resolve respondent's motion for inhibition. As respondent, herself, stated, the grounds for this motion are
the same as those discussed in her motion for inhibition in the quo warranto case. We find no cogent reason to belabor on this issue and deviate
from what has been discussed in the Court's decision in the quo warranto case. We reiterate that mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.[10]

Hence, this Court resolves to DENY the Motion for Inhibition of Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Diosdado M. Peralta, Noel Gimenez
Tijam, Francis H. Jardeleza, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Samuel R. Martires.

Proceeding now to the substantive issue of this administrative matter: May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public
statements as regards the quo warranto case against her during its pendency?

We answer in the affirmative.

First. This Court cannot subscribe to respondent's position that she was merely a party-litigant in the quo warranto case, not a counsel nor a judge,
hence, should not be judged on the exacting standards expected of a member of the Bar or of the Court.

Respondent argues that she had no obligation to be an impartial judge where she does not act as one. Also, she cannot be expected to be as
circumspect with her words or detached from her emotions as a usual legal counsel as she is directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings.
Respondent then remarked that just because she is a lawyer and a judge does not mean that she is less affected by the tribulations of a public trial
than an ordinary litigant.

Time and again, this Court has emphasized the high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing expected and required of members of the Bar.
Lawyers must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times,[11] whether they
are dealing with their clients or the public at large.[12] Lawyers may be disciplined for acts committed even in their private capacity for acts which
tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. There can be no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in lawyers' private lives or in their professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another.[13] As eloquently put by the Court in one case: "Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as
demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law."[14]
For the same reasons, judges or Justices are held to a higher standard for they should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence, hence, their conduct should be above reproach.[15]

The Court is, thus, reluctant to accept respondent's position that she should be treated as an ordinary litigant in judging her actions. The fact that
respondent was not the judge nor the counsel but a litigant in the subject case does not strip her off of her membership in the Bar, as well as her
being a Member and the head of the highest court of the land at that time. Her being a litigant does not mean that she was free to conduct herself in
less honorable manner than that expected of a lawyer or a judge.[16]

Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer and/or a judge, be it in their public or private activities, which tends to show said
lawyer/judge deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.[17] Respondent
should be reminded:
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, as he is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the
world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as well x x x.
[18]
That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Second. Respondent argues that the public statements attributed to her must have created a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice to warrant punishment.

According to respondent, the public utterances in question did not create such effect of a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice; did not, in any way, prevent or delay the Court from rendering its judgment; and criticism and public reaction remained within the bounds
of proper debate and despite widespread dissent, no violent protest erupted after the decision was promulgated. Further, respondent avers that
considering that the quo warranto case in itself was already controversial and of transcendental importance, her public statements and actions
cannot be blamed for the natural attention that it gained from the public.

Before proceeding to address these arguments, it is necessary, at this juncture, to discuss the concept of the sub judice rule for which respondent is
being charged of violating in this administrative case.

Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters under judicial consideration.[19] In essence, the sub
judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the
[20]
public in general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench.[20]

Historically, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to insulate members of the jury from being influenced by prejudicial publicity.[21] It was
aimed to prevent comment and debate from exerting any influence on juries and prejudicing the positions of parties and witnesses in court
proceedings.[22] Relatedly, in 2010, the late Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in filing Senate Bill No. 1852, also known as the Judicial Right to
Know Act, explained that sub judice is a foreign legal concept, which originated and is applicable to countries who have adopted a trial by jury
system. She emphasized the difference between a jury system and the Philippine court system, implying the inapplicability of the concept in our
jurisdiction.

Acknowledging the fact that sub judice is a foreign concept, Justice Arturo Brion noted in a Separate Opinion that in our jurisdiction, the Rules of
Court does not contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule.[23] He, however, opined that "the fact that the jury system is not adopted
in this jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from members of the jury,
they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media."[24] In fact, sub judice rule finds support in the provision on indirect contempt under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - x x x, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:

xxxx

c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;

d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

xxxx

As can be observed, discussions regarding sub judice often relates to contempt of court. In this regard, respondent correctly pointed out that the
"clear and present danger" rule should be applied in determining whether, in a particular situation, the court's contempt power should be exercised
to maintain the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-protected freedom of speech should be upheld. Indeed, in
P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al.,[25] the Court explained:
 The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue.
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under
Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxxx

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments
which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of
freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights.

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not
[26]
merely a likely, threat. (Citations omitted)

From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and present danger" to the administration of justice for
statements or utterances covered by the sub judice rule to be considered punishable under the rules of contempt.

The case at bar, however, is not a contempt proceeding. The Court, in this case is not geared towards protecting itself from such prejudicial
comments outside of court by the exercise of its inherent contempt power. Rather, in this administrative matter, the Court is discharging its
Constitutionally-mandated duty to discipline members of the Bar and judicial officers.
As We have stated in Our decision in the quo warranto case, actions in violation of the sub judice rule may be dealt with not only through contempt
proceedings but also through administrative actions. This is because a lawyer speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant reasons: one,
because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and two, the significant dangers that a lawyer's speech poses to the trial process.[27]
Hence, the Court En Banc resolved to treat this matter in this separate administrative action.[28] Indeed, this Court has the plenary power to
discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceeding, aimed to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the Bar and to preserve the
nobility and honor of the legal profession.[29]

Thus, contrary to respondent's argument, the "clear and present danger" rule does not find application in this case. What applies in this
administrative matter is the CPR and NCJC, which mandate the strict observance of the sub judice rule both upon members of the Bar and the
Bench, specifically:
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PIDLIPPINE JUDICIARY

CANON 1 - INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before any court or
administrative agency.

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which
is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

CANON 2 - INTEGRITY

Integrity is essentially not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done.

CANON 3 - IMPARTIALITY
 Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made.

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession, and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public
or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

CANON 4 - PROPRIETY

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity
of the judicial office.

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other Citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such
rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.

Besides, as We have stated in the quo warranto case decision, the Court takes judicial notice of the undeniably manifest detrimental effect of this
open and blatant disregard of the sub judice rule, which is a clear manifestation of the evil sought to be prevented by the said rule, i.e., "to avoid
[30]
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice." In the said decision, We cited the May 2, 2018 issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, wherein certain individuals from different sectors of the society, lawyers included, not only pre-judged the case but
worse, accused certain Members of the Court of being unable to act with justice, and threatening that the people will not accept any decision of such
Members of the Court as the same is tainted by gross injustice. To be sure, these statements do not only "tend to" but categorically force and
[31]
attempt to influence the deliberative and decision-making process of this Court.

Albeit advancing explanations of her actions, respondent undoubtedly violated the above-cited provisions of the CPR and the NCJC. The Court, in
[32]
the quo warranto case, enumerated some of the instances where respondent openly and blatantly violated the sub judice rule:
 Event Source Quotations
"Kung manalo ang
quo warranto,
mapupunta tayo
sa diktaturya, "
she said "Talagang
wawasakin
Video: completely ng quo
<https://web.facebook.com/juliusnleonen/videos/889291114607029/> warranto na ito
'Speak Truth to Power'
Article: ang judiciary. "
forum in UP Diliman,
<https://www.rappler.com/nation/201854-serenoquo-warranto-destroyjudicial-independence>
Quezon City on May 5,
"Pag itong quo
2018
warranto natuloy,
hindi na right and
reason, kundi will
- will na nu'ng
whoever is on top.
So kailangan natin
pigilan ito . . ." she
said.
Integrated Bar of theArticle: "Ano po ang tawag
Philippines (IBP) Central <https://businessmirror.com.ph/sereno-seesdictatorship-after-filingof-quo-warranto-petition- sa kondisyon na
Luzon Regional Conventionagainst-her/> ang citizen walang
and Mandatory Continuing kalabanlaban sa
Legal Education at the gobyerno" Chief
Quest Hotel here on May Justice Maria
2, 2018 Lourdes A. Sereno
asked. "Ang tawag
po doon
dictatorship, hindi
po constitutional
democracy ang
tawag doon, " she
said.
 "That is what is
going to happen if
the quo waranto
petition is granted,
" Sereno stated.

"The booming
voice of Justice
Vicente Mendoza
has reverberated
that if the quo
warranto petition
is granted, the
Judiciary will
destroy itself,"
Sereno said as she
also praised the
IBP's stand to
oppose and
dismiss the
petition.
Forum on upholdingVideo: "Of my colleagues,
Judicial Independence at <https://web.facebook.com/24OrasGMA/videos/10156438427991977/?t=16> I know that several
the Ateneo Law School inArticle: of them, have had
Rockwell, Makati City on<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/985460/defendjudicial-independence-cjsereno-tells-law-students> their
Wednesday, April 25, qualifications,
2018 their inability to
submit
documentary
requirements,
waived, several of
them. If the JBC
was correct in
saying that an
attempt to submit
requirements, that
good faith should
be accorded to the
14, including those
against me, why
am I the only one
being singled out?,
" she told law
students at the
Ateneo Law School
during a forum on
judicial
independence.

"The questions
propounded by
Supreme Court
itself, they wanted
to examine
everything I did in
the past in the
hope they would
find something
scandalous in my
life. I was just
preparing myself
for the question,
'ilang boyfriend
mo na?,'" Sereno
said, which elicited
laughter from the
crowd.

"Hindi ko naman
po minanipula ni
konti ang JBC...14
kaming pare-
 parehong
sitwasyon. Bakit
nagreklamo kung
kayo nalagay sa
listahan at ako
nalagay sa
listahan. Ang
masama ay hindi
kayo ang nalagay
at ako ang
nalagay, " she
added.
"The month of May
is a time that is
supposed to be
devoted to writing
decisions in the
many pending
cases before the
Court. Anyway the
session will resume
Speech at the on June 5, so
Commencement Exercises <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/04/23/1808492/sereno-camp-questions-sc-haste- what's with the
of the College of Law of thedecide-her-case> rush?"
University of San Agustin
(USA) in Iloilo City, on <https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/04/21/no-need-to-rush-quo-warranto-sereno/> "Wala namang
April 20, 2018 dahilan para
magmadali."

"Kung tatoo po,

indication po ito
na mayroon na po
silang conclusion
bago pa man
marinig ang lahat,
" Sereno said.
 "Even your very
livelihoods are
threatened; there
is no safety for any
of you...That is
how deadly this
quo warranto
petition is," she
added.

Sereno said if the

Supreme Court
would cooperate in
Fellowship of the Philippine
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/981806/sereno-ups-attack-vs-quo-warranto-in-speech-at-lawyers- the move of the
Bar Association (PBA) in
forum? Executive to oust
Makati City on April 11,
utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#link_time=1523450119> her sans
2018
impeachment trial,
"I will use directly
the words of Chief
Justice Davide that
it will be judicial
hara-kiri, if not a
judicial kamikaze
bringing it the
destruction of the
entire judiciary as
well as the entire
consitutional
framework."
 "I look at any
forum to try me
other than the
constitutionally
exclusive form of
impeachment as
an admission by
the complainant
and my other
detractors that
after 15 hearings,
they have failed to
come up with any
evidence which I
can be convicted in
30th Anniversary and 23rd
the Senate, " she
National Convention of the
asserted.
Philippine Women Judges<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/973692/sereno-delivers-most-powerfulspeech-yet-not-all-peers-
Association (PWJA) in happy>
"Sila ang
Manila Hotel on Thursday,
nagsimula bakit
March 8, 2018
ayaw nilang
tapusin?
Napakaaga
naman yata para
umamin sila na
wala silang napala
kundi matinding
kabiguan kaya 't
kung anu-ano na
lamang ang gimik
ang ginagawa nila
masunod lamang
ang kanilang
nais," Sereno
added.
CNN Philippines<https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=HIYKAQ4QPcY In this interview,
(March 9, 2018); One1. http://cnnphilippines.com/videos/2018/03/09/0ne-on-one-with-ChiefJustice-Maria-Lourdes-CJOL Sereno,
on One with the ChiefSereno.html> among others,
Justice with Pinky stated that her
Webb defense
preparation was
directed towards
the impeachment
proceedings as she
has not assessed
yet the quo
warranto petition
as of the interview.

- "From the very

beginning, we
were looking
really at the
impeachment
provisions of the
Constitution so
that has been the
preparation all
along. Well, I
haven't yet
assessed this latest
quo warranto
petition. Not yet
time maybe"

- CJOL Sereno
refused to talk
about the quo
warranto petition,
but interpreted the
SC's resolution
which directed her
to comment on
said petition
without taking due
course to the
petition. CJOL said
that such action of
the SC does not
mean anything and
affirmed Webb's
interpretation that
such action does
not mean that the
SC assumes
jurisdiction over
the quo warranto
case.

- ''Yan naman
talaga ang hindi
ko pwede
pagusapan, ano."

- On jurisdiction:
"Normal yan,
marami kaming
ganyan petition.
Wala naman
talagang ibig
sabihin yan. In
most cases,
walang ibig
sabihin yun kasi
hindi pa
prejudged. Pero
hayaan niyo po
muna yung
 lawyers ko ang
magsabi kasi
mahirap naman
pong pangunahan
ko sila eh
ginagawa pa po
nila yung sagot
eh".

- "Marami ho
kaming laging
ginagamit na
without due course
at marami kaming
dinidismiss na
nanggaling sa
without giving due
course pero
pinagkocomment...
It doesn't mean...
Ang usual
tradition po namin
ay walang ibig
sabihin poyun"
Speech of CJOL Sereno <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iN511W9bpk> Directed towards
at politicians
thePanpacificUniversity supposedly
North Philippines regarding the
(March 9, 2018) (Posted ongoing
by CNN Philippines) impeachment
proceedings, CJOL
Sereno said, "''Wag
na 'wag niyo kami
gigipitin" and
further stated that
such what judicial
 independence
means.

- I know that our

women judges, for
example, are
always eager to
make a stand for
judicial
independence.
Kayong mga
pulitiko, wag
nyong pakialaman
ang aming mga
gustong gawin
kung palagay nyo
kayo ay tama at
andyan ang
ebidensya, lalabas
naman yan eh.
Pero huwag na
huwag nyo
kaming gigipitin.
Yan ang ibig
sabihin ng judicial
independence"
Speech on "The <http://newsinfo.inquirer. net/987807/live-chief-justice-sereno-at-updiliman-forum> - CJOL Sereno
Mumshie on Fire: emphasized that
Speak Truth to Power" AJ Leonardo-De
held at the University of Castro's inhibition
the Philippines (May 5, would prove that
2018) she is unbiased.

*Forum was organized by - Hindi sila

youth groups, Ako Ay Isang tumigil, hangga't
naisip ng isa, yung
Sereno and Youth for nagaakusa sa
Miriam akin, "ay yung
SALN niya, yung
SALN nya na
sinabi nya sa JBC
na nahihirapan
niyang humanap
(sic). Yun, dun
tugisin. At sinabi
nya na dapat ako
ay idisqualify dahil
unjust daw na aka
ang naappoint.
May injustice na
nangyari. So alam
na natin ang isa sa
pinagsisimulan
nito".

- CJOL Sereno said

that "Even when
they thought they
have won, in the
end, they will
never win. The
country is already
woke. The youth
would not listen to
lies. The people
own the judiciary
They are not
owned by the
judiciary, the
justices, the
judges" and that
the "good will
always prevail
over evil".

- CJOL Sereno said

that two of her
accusers, who she
considers as her
rival also, will be
one of those who
will decide the quo
warranto petition
filed against her,
thereby against the
basic rules of fair
play.

- "Eh bakit biglang

umatras sila
(pertaining to her
accusers in the
impeachment
proceedings) at
ginawa itong kaso
na quo warranto
kung saan ang
dalawa sa
nagsabing hindi
ako dapat
naappoint eh sila
rin ang
maghuhusga sa
akin. Saan kayo
nakakita ng
sitwasyon na yung
karibal niyo sa
posisyon ang may
kapangyarihan
sabihin kayong
dapat ka
matanggal sa
posisyon, hindi
ikaw dapat. Paano
nangyari? Under
what rules of
fairness, what
rules of
Constitution or
legal system can
an accuser who
acted also as my
prosecutor during
the oral arguments
now sit as judge?
This violates the
most basic norms
of
fairplay...Ngayon
talaga, nakita na,
na hindi ho aka
bibigyan talaga ng
ilang ito ng kahit
anong modicum of
fairness"

- She discussed
that one of the
effects of an invalid
appointment is the
forfeiture of
retirement
benefits.
- "At alam nyo ho,
pag sinabi na
invalid yung
appointment, pati
yung retirement
benefits ho
tatanggalin"

- The granting of a
quo warranto
would result into
dictatorship and
would destroy the
judiciary.

- At ano ho ang
mangyayari kung
ang buong sangay,
ang lahat ng
kawani ng
gobyerno ay
kayang takutin at
hindi na pwedeng
maging
independent?.. Ano
hong mangyayari
kung ang
COMELEC ho ay
sinabihan ng
Presidente at
Solicitor General
na "yung partido
lang namin ang
pwedeng manalo,
kung hindi i-quo
warranto ka
namin?" Ano po
yun? Ano yung
tawag sa ganoong
sitwasyon na may
matinding
pananakot sa
buong bayan? Ang
tawag po dun,
diktaturya.. Kung
manalo po ang quo
warranto, yan po
ang magiging
resulta"

- "Saang korte
kayo pupunta?
Sino ang
magtatapang na
huwes kung
madali na sila
mapatanggal?...
Hindi na ho kayo
makakatakbo, kasi
lahat ho ng judges
tatakutin ng
Solicitor
General...Saan ho
kayo pupunta sa
isang arbiter na
impartial?.. wala
na po. Wawasakin
nitong quo
warranto petition
nito, completely
ang judiciary"
 - "Ano na ho ang
mangyayari sa
bayan natin kung
wala na hong
security of tenure
sa government
service? Kasi kung
may kaunting
kulang lang sa
file... kulang ang
file na nabigay sa
JBC.. eh
naglalabasan na
ho ang SALN ko...
pero eta
tatanggalin at
gagawa sila ng
prinsipyo at
ikawawasak ng
buong bayan para
lang sa kanilang
personal na
interes.
Nakakalagim po
ang pangyayari
ito"
Speech on Ateneo Law<https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=oh35V4BMiww> CJOL Sereno
School for the forum discussed the
Tindig: A forum on contents of the quo
upholding judicial warranto petition.
independence as a
pillar of democracy - On the
(April 25, 2018) prescriptive period,
CJOL Sereno said
that jobs of the
justices, judges and
government
employees are
jeopardized
because of the
assertion of the
OSG that a petition
for quo warranto
does not prescribe
against the
government. CJOL
Sereno said that
such assertion
makes the action
imprescriptible.

- "According to the
Solicitor General,
the one year
prescriptive period
can never apply
against
government. It
must be personal
knowledge of the
Solicitor General
himself. And so if
you change the
person of the
Solicitor General,
the period
continues to
always be fresh.
It's a never
prescriptible, a
completely
imprescriptible
action. So you
jeopardize the jobs
of the justices, the
judges and all
gov't employees.
You allow selected
targeting against
the Chief Justice
for reasons that
are very obvious
now and you
destroy the legal
profession"

- On the effect of
the quo warranto
petition, CJOL
Sereno said that all
incumbent judges
and justices would
be prejudiced
because their
qualifications may
suddenly be
reviewed.

- "The SC itself
really wanted to
examine every
little thing I did in
the past in the
hope that they
would find
something
scandalous about
my life..."

- "It also prejudices

more than 2000
judges and justices
that are already
sitting now
because all of their
qualifications may
suddenly be
reviewed. The JBC
was wrong to
waive this
qualification for
this position. I can
tell you as a matter
of record that of
my colleagues, I
know that several
of them have had
their
qualifications,
their inability to
submit
documentary
requirements,
waived. Several of
them. So if the JBC
was correct in
saying that an
attempt to submit
the requirements,
the good faith
accorded to those
who had missing
requirements,
 should be accorded
to 14 of us,
including those
who have
complained loudly
against me among
my colleagues,
why am I the only
one being singled
out? The rules of
inability to submit
all the SALNs were
waived in favor of
14 out of 20
applicants, 6 out of
the 8 were
shortlisted. Why is
the rule being
invoked only
against me? And
so it would appear
that this is selected
targeting"

These public utterances did not only tend to arouse public opinion on the matter but as can be clearly gleaned from the tenor of the statements,
such comments, speeches, and interviews given by the respondent in different forums indisputably tend to tarnish the Court's integrity and unfairly
attributed false motives against its Members. Particularly, in several occasions, respondent insinuated the following: (i) that the grant of the quo
warranto petition will result to dictatorship; (ii) in filing the quo warranto petition, the livelihood and safety of others are likewise in danger; (iii)
that the people could no longer rely on the Court's impartiality; and (iv) that she could not expect fairness from the Court in resolving the quo
warranto petition against her.

Thus, while it may be true that the quo warranto case was controversial and naturally invited public attention to itself without necessity of
respondent's statements, the fact remains that respondent, who is a lawyer and who was then asserting right to the highest position in the Judiciary,
succumbed to and participated in the affray that diverted the quo warranto proceeding from its primary purpose and created a great deal of
antipathy from the public to the Court and its Members.
In yet another attempt to evade sanctions for her public utterances concerning the quo warranto petition, respondent claims that she merely
echoed her arguments in her pleadings submitted before this Court and that the same could not have influenced the outcome of the case nor caused
obfuscation of the issues therein since the issues to which the utterances relate are the very same issues raised by the parties in their pleadings,
invoking P/Supt. Marantan,[33] wherein the Court ruled that therein respondents' statement of their opinion were mere reiterations of their
position in a related case, which according to the Court was not malicious and does not even tend to influence the court.

Respondent's reliance thereon, however, was misplaced and finds no application in the present case. In P/Supt. Marantan,[34] the subject public
statements were indeed a reiteration of therein respondent's position in the related criminal case. A reading of the questioned public utterances in
the said case would show that they were merely expressions of the victims' families and their counsel's opinion and position in the criminal case that
P/Supt. Marantan perpetrated the murder of the victims.

In the case at hand, as can be clearly seen from respondent's aforequoted statements, respondent unquestionably directed her statements to the
merits of the quo warranto case, to influence the public and the Members of the Court, and to attack the dignity and authority of the institution.
Perhaps, to an unwilling mind, it may be argued that the public statements expressed by respondent were without the intention of prejudging the
matters or issues that are before the Court. However, a scrutiny thereof clearly demonstrates that her statements went beyond the supposed
arguments and contentions contained in her pleadings. To cite an example, respondent never alleged or argued in her pleadings nor during the Oral
Argument, as she knows the ethical issues that would entail if she did, that the grant of the quo warranto petition would result into dictatorship and
would destroy the judiciary, but she did during one of her public speeches as cited above.

Third. Respondent then proceeded to advance the argument that her public statements were actually aimed to discharge her duty as a Justice and a
lawyer to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the law and legal processes pursuant to the CPR and the NCJC. This is a desperate and
convoluted, if not an absurd, argument to elude liability. Respondent's actions and statements are far from being an innocent discharge of duty of
upholding the Constitution, the laws, rules, and legal processes. On the contrary, they were direct and loaded attacks to the Court and its Members,
which constitute a blatant disrespect to the institution. Respondent cannot justify her attacks against the Court under the guise of merely
discharging her duties as a Justice and a member of the Bar. No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his cause or what he believes
in, he must not forget to display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper
and utmost respect due to the courts.[35] As the nation's then highest-ranking judicial official, it is with more reason that respondent is expected to
have exercised extreme caution in giving her opinions and observed genuine confidence to the Court's processes.

As aptly and eloquently concluded by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in his Dissenting Opinion in the quo warranto case, respondent, not only as a
member of the Bar, but more importantly, as Chief Justice of the Court, must exemplify the highest degree of leadership, and must refrain from
activities that will tend to cause unwarranted attacks against the Court. Relevant portions thereof read:
This dissent, however, should not be read as a shield for the respondent to be accountable for her actions.

xxxx

Unfortunately, in her efforts to save her tenure of public office she held as a privilege, this nuance relating to this Court's role in the
constitutional democracy may have been lost on the respondent. She may have created too much of a political narrative which elided her own
accountability and backgrounded her responsibilities as a member of this Court.

Ideally, a justice must be slow to make public statements, always careful that the facts before her may not be the entire reality. The conclusion
that the initial effort to hold her to account for her acts was an attack on the entire judiciary itself should have been a judgment that should
have been carefully weighed.

It was unfortunate that this seemed to have created the impression that she rallied those in political movements with their
own agenda, tolerating attacks on her colleagues in social and traditional media. She may have broken the expectations we
have had on parties to cases by speaking sub judice on the merits of the Quo Warranto Petition and her predictions on its
outcome. She may not have met the reasonable expectation of a magistrate and a Chief Justice that, whatever the reasons
and even at the cost of her own personal discomfort, she-as the leader of the Court-should not be the first to cause public
shame and humiliation of her colleagues and the institution she represents.

xxxx

This Court has its faults, and I have on many occasions written impassioned dissents against my esteemed colleagues. But, there have
always been just, legal, and right ways to do the right thing. As a Member of this Court, it should be reason that prevails.
We should maintain the highest levels of ethics and professional courtesy even as we remain authentic to our convictions
as to the right way of reading the law. Despite our most solid belief that we are right, we should still have the humility to be
open to the possibility that others may not see it our way. As mature magistrates, we should be aware that many of the reforms we
envision will take time.

False narratives designed to simplify and demonize an entire institution and the attribution of false motives is not the
mark of responsible citizenship. Certainly, it is not what this country expects from any justice. Courts are sanctuaries of all
rights. There are many cases pending in this Court where those who have much less grandeur than the respondent seek succor. Every
judicial institution, every Justice of this Court, will have weaknesses as well as strengths. We should address the
weaknesses tirelessly but with respect. We should likewise acknowledge the strengths which we intend to preserve. No court is perfect.
All courts need reform.
 It is reasonable to expect that the Chief Justice should have the broadest equanimity, to have an open mind, and to show
leadership by being the first to defend her Court against underserved, speculative, callous, ad hominem, and irrelevant
attacks on their personal reputation. She should be at the forefront to defend the Court against unfounded speculation and
attacks. Unfortunately, in her campaign for victory in this case, her speeches may have goaded the public to do so and
without remorse.

To succeed in discrediting the entire institution for some of its controversial decisions may contribute to weakening the
legitimacy of its other opinions to grant succor to those oppressed and to those who suffer injustice.[36] (Emphasis ours)

Truth be told, respondent miserably failed to discharge her duty as a member of the Bar to observe and maintain the respect due to the court and its
officers. Specifically, respondent violated CANON 11 of the CPR, which states that:
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

[37]
In Montencillo v. Gica, the Court emphasized the importance of observing and maintaining the respect due to the Courts and to its judicial
officers, to wit:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity
and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[38] (Citations omitted)

Fourth. Respondent points out certain circumstances to justify her violative actions and statements.

It is respondent's position that her act of speaking in public was justified since there was a series of onslaught on her integrity over the media
coming from no less than the Solicitor General himself. Further, respondent insists that newsman, Jomar Canlas, publicized information to
condition the minds of the public that she should be removed from office.

We do not agree.

The tenor of the statements made by the Solicitor General, as well as the newsman, was never made to challenge the Court's authority or to
undermine its ability to pass judgment with impartiality. Neither were those statements aimed at criticizing the professional competence and
responsibility of the magistrates as well as the Court as a collegial body. Put differently, those statements had nothing to do with assailing the
capacity of this Court to render justice according to law, which is what the respondent has been doing through her public speeches.

At most, the Solicitor General's statements are the harmless statements contemplated in the case of P/Supt. Marantan, i.e., mere reiterations of the
Republic's position in the quo warranto case.

On the other hand, the newsman's questioned statements are nothing but a publication of reports on the status of the case, whether true or not,
which on its face notably comes within the purview of the freedom of the press. Besides, as We have been emphasizing, an ordinary citizen's action
cannot be judged with the same standard on this matter as that of a member of the Bar and Bench. Also, whether or not the Solicitor General or any
newsman attacked respondent finds no relevance to her liability for her violative actions and statements. At the risk of being repetitive, it bears
stressing that lawyers, as first and foremost officers of the court, must never behave in such a way that would diminish the sanctity and dignity of
the courts even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.[39]

We also give short shrift to respondent's contention that she was denied due process despite her repeated demands to be heard, hence, she resorted
to bringing her case to the public. Recall that this matter has already been squarely addressed by this Court in its decision in the quo warranto case.
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[40]

Suffice it to say, in this case, respondent has been given several opportunities to explain her side. Records show that the Congress invited her to
shed light on the accusations hurled against her but she never heeded the invitation. Likewise, the Court gave her the opportunity to comment on
the petition and file several motions in the quo warranto case. A special hearing for her requested oral argument was even conducted during the
Court's Baguio session last April of this year. During the hearing, she was given the chance to answer several questions from her colleagues. In fact,
she even freely raised questions on some of the magistrates present during the hearing. Undeniably, she was accorded due process not only through
her written pleadings, but also during the special hearing wherein she voluntarily participated. These facts militate against her claim of denial of
due process.

At this point, this Court leaves an essential reminder to members of the Bar and the Bench alike: all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed
officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and the integrity of the judicial institution to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly in all circumstances.[41] It is one thing to
show courage and another to display arrogance; it is one thing to demonstrate passion and another to exude heedless overzealousness. To be clear,
this Court is not undermining the right of lawyers, as officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize the acts of courts and judges, as well as discuss
issues of transcendental importance. However, they should be circumspect of their actions and statements, thus such criticisms and discussions
should only be done in a proper and legally-accepted manner. The use of unnecessary language and means is proscribed if we are to promote high
esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.[42]

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent's reckless behavior of imputing ill motives and malice to the Court's process is plainly
evident in the present case. Her public statements covered by different media organizations incontrovertibly brings the Court in a position of
disrepute and disrespect, a patent transgression of the very ethics that members of the Bar are sworn to uphold. This, the Court cannot
countenance.
Respondent's liability having been established, We come now to the proper sanction to be imposed considering the gravity of her offense, as well as
the circumstances surrounding this case.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo,[43] this Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year for therein
respondent's act of resorting to the press instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies in airing out his grievances. The Court ruled:
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
[he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the
proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against
the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated
Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his
disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers. x x x

xxxx

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for
[44]
doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintaiiled. (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
[4 ]
In Judge Pantanosas v. Atty. Pamatong,[45] respondent was suspended for two years for stating slanderous remarks in public against the judge
and for resorting to the press for his grievances against the said judge while the case that he filed against the latter was already pending. The Court
concluded its ruling with the following statements:
In closing, we find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition
that criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's
success is wholly subordinate to the administration of justice.

True, lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the law. However, the purification of our justice system from venal
[46]
elements must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting of the very system that it seeks to protect. (Citations
omitted)

In exercising its disciplinary authority in administrative matters, however, this Court has always kept in mind that lawyers should not be hastily
disciplined or penalized. In administrative proceedings against lawyers, this Court is always guided by this principle, that is:
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and
only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while
those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature
and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well
as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
[47]
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. (Citation omitted)

In Advincula v. Atty. Macabata,[48] the Court further explained:

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a
number of factors. When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other
lawyers from similar misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry
out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary
and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the
purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in
[49]
the profession and to the public. (Citations omitted)

[ 0]
Indeed, "lawyer discipline x x x is not meant to punish; rather, its purpose is to protect clients, the public, the courts, and the legal profession."[50]
Conviction, punishment, retribution, much less, denigration have no place in administrative proceedings against lawyers.

Guided by the foregoing, despite the severity of the offenses committed by respondent, We are constrained to suspend the application of the full
force of the law and impose a lighter penalty. Mindful of the fact that respondent was removed and disqualified as Chief Justice as a result of quo
warranto proceedings, suspending her further from law practice would be too severe to ruin the career and future of respondent. We are also not
inclined to merely disregard respondent's length of service in the government, specifically, when she was teaching in the University of the
Philippines, as well as during her incumbency in this Court. Further, the fact that, per available record, respondent has not been previously found
administratively liable is significant in determining the imposable penalty. These factors have always been considered by the Court in the
determination of proper sanctions in such administrative cases.[51] This Court is not merciless and opts to dispense judicial clemency even if not
sought by respondent.

To be clear, however, this accommodation is not a condonation of respondent's wrongdoings but a second chance for respondent to mend her ways,
express remorse for her disgraceful conduct, and be forthright to set an example for all law-abiding members of the legal profession. The legal
profession is a noble profession: as a former Member of this Court, it is incumbent upon respondent to exemplify respect, obedience, and adherence
to this institution. This judicial temperance is not unprecedented as this Court has in several cases reduced the imposable penalties so that erring
lawyers are encouraged to repent, reform, and be rehabilitated.

Henceforth, respondent is expected to be more circumspect, discerning, and respectful to the Court in all her utterances and actions. Respondent is
reminded that the practice of law is neither a natural right nor a Constitutional right demandable or enforceable by law. It is a mere privilege
granted by this Court premised on continuing good behavior and ethical conduct, which privilege can be revoked or cancelled by this Court for just
cause.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is found guilty of violating CANON 13, Rule 13.02, and CANON 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of CANON 1, Sections 1 and 2 of CANON 2, Sections 2 and 4 of CANON 3, and
Sections 2 and 6 of CANON 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Thereby, after deep reflection and deliberation, in
lieu of suspension, respondent is meted the penalty of REPRIMAND with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense or any
offense violative of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility shall merit a heavier penalty of a fine and/or suspension or
disbarment.

This judgment is final and executory. No further motions for reconsideration or any further pleadings shall hereafter be entertained.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Senior Associate Justice), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Martires, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo,
JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part (prior action in related case)
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official business.
Caguioa, J., I certify that J. Caguioa left his vote to concur in the result.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on July 17, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on July 17, 2018 at 12:20 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court

[1] Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Rollo, pp. 7-42.

[5] Id. at 8.

[6] Id. at 9-10.

[ ]
[7] Id. at 28.

[8] Id. at 25.

[9] Id. at 29-36.

[10] Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018.

[11] Mendoza v. Atty. Deciembre, 599 Phil. 182, 191 (2009).

[12] Manuel L. Valin and Honoria L. Valin v. Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz, A.C. No. 10564, November 7, 2017.

[13] Mendoza v. Atty. Deciembre, supra at 191-192.

[14] Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17 (2000).

[15] Barrios v. Atty. Martinez, 485 Phil. 1, 14 (2004).

[16] Id.

[17] Ventura v. Atty. Samson, 699 Phil. 404, 415 (2012).

[18] Valencia v. Atty. Antiniw, 579 Phil. 1, 13 (2008).

[19] Black's Law Dictionary.

[20] Separate Opinion of Justice Arturo Brion in Lejano v. People, 652 Phil. 512, 652 (2010).

[21] Id.

[22] <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/la/proceduralpublications/Pages/factsheetno22.aspx> (visited June 30, 2018).

[23] Supra note 20.

[24] Id.

[2 ]
[25] 726 Phil. 642 (2014).

[26] Id. at 648-649.

[27] Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018,
citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).

[28] Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018.

[29] Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada, 755 Phil. 349, 356 (2015).

[30] Romero II, et al. v. Senator Estrada, et. al., 602 Phil. 312, 319 (2009).

[31] Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018,
supra note 1.

[32] Id.

[33] Supra note 25.

[34] Id.

[35] Ret. Judge Virgilio Alpajora v. Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018.

[36] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018.

[37] 158 Phil. 443 (1974).

[38] Id. at 453.

[39] Bajar v. Baterisna, 531 Phil. 229, 236 (2006).

[40] Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes, 674 Phil. 416, 432 (2011), citing F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 731, 740 (2007).

[41] Atty. Barandon, Jr. v. Atty. Ferrer, Sr., 630 Phil. 524, 532 (2010).
[42] Judge Pantanosas v. Atty. Pamatong, 787 Phil. 86, 98 (2016).

[43] 561 Phil. 325 (2007).

[44] Id. at 339-341.

[45] 787 Phil. 86 (2016).

[46] Id. at 99-100.

[47] Advincula v. Atty. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431, 447-448 (2007).

[48] 546 Phil. 431 (2007).

[49] Id. at 446-447.

[50] Fred C. Zacharias, THE PURPOSE OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.675 (2003) citing James Duke Cameron, STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS-A LONG OVERDUE DOCUMENT, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91 (1987) (discussing the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, at 97.

[51] See Andres, et al. v. Atty. Nambi, 755 Phil. 225 (2015); Castro-Justo v. Atty. Galing, 676 Phil. 139 (2011 ); Plus Builders, Inc., et al. v. Atty.
Revilla, Jr., 598 Phil. 255 (2009); Pena v. Atty. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512 (2007); Spouses Williams v. Atty. Enriquez, 518 Phil. 372 (2006); Civil
Service Commission v. Cortez, 474 Phil. 670 (2004).