[G.R. No. 76648. February 26, 1988.

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND AFFIDAVITS
OF MERIT; REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 53 NOT COMPLIED WITH. — Said motion for new trial is not
in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a witness who was
already presented during the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the holding of new trial. The
alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty as to their appearance before the court
to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and when they are subpoenaed
by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the
testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts
and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. The affidavits are required to
avoid waste of the court’s time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial or of any
evidentiary weight. Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new
having been discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts
to locate the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down.
The trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses
who were admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present could
have been discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason
for concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to
discover said evidence.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR PURPOSE OF DELAYING PROCEEDINGS, PRO-FORMA. — It is very
patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of delaying the
proceedings. In fact, petitioner’s son in his manifestation admitted that he had to request a new law
firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and/or for new trial. This would explain the haphazard preparation of the motion,
thus failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 53, which was filed on the last day of the
reglementary period of appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon is questionable. The
appellate court correctly denied the motion for new trial.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RUNNING OF PERIOD OF APPEAL, NOT INTERRUPTED. — The motion for new
trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period for appeal. Since petitioner’s
motion was filed on September 24, 1986, the fifteenth or last day of the period to appeal, the
decision of the respondent court became final on the following day, September 25. And when the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October 30, 1986, it was obviously filed out of
time.

4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; FINALITY THEREOF RENDERED FINDINGS OF PROBATE

COURT CONCLUSIVE AND NO LONGER SUBJECT TO REVIEW. — Since the questioned decision has
already become final and executory, it is no longer within the province of this Court to review it. This
being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due execution of the will and the testamentary
capacity of testatrix are now conclusive.

5. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE PROBATE COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS,
CONCLUSIVE. — The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in
question was executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme
Court when supported by evidence. We have examined the records of this case and find no error in
the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in
accordance with law.

6. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; PRETERITION, JUSTIFIED. — Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from
the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason, being the only surviving sister of the
testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary
capacity of testatrix. In the case of Pecon v. Coronel, it was held — "The appellants emphasize the
fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from
one’s estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very
strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The
liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the
Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 . . ." Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one
who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed. It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister
who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the
latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner’s
son Francis was instituted as an heir in the contested will.

7. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO DISPOSE ALL PROPERTIES, NOT AN INDICATION OF UNSOUNDNESS OF

MIND. — Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose
of all of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind. We cannot subscribe to this
contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides — "A will shall be valid even though it should not
contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even
though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to
succeed. In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied
with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs." Thus, the fact that in her
holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the
will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate
undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.

8. ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF BLOOD RELATIVES AS HEIRS, NOT AN INDICATION OF UNDUE

INFLUENCE. — Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than
compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the
testator’s right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more favored than
others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate.

9. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ALLEGATION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE MUST BE

SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — The contention of the petitioner that the will was
obtained by undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be
sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise
undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure
and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.

10. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILL ITSELF, MOST AUTHENTIC PROOF OF TESTATOR’S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. — Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent
court — "There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the
most authentic proof that deceased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the
Will, is the Will itself.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated August
29, 1986 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXII 2 dated
March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the holographic will marked in evidence as
Exhibit "H" as one wholly written, dated, and signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola in
accordance with law while in possession of full testamentary capacity, and allowing and admitting the
same to probate.

"Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to the executor, Eduardo F.
Hernandez, as well as the certificate of probate prescribed under Section 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court.

SO ORDERED." 3

This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22,
1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of the
holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on January 28, 1980. 4 The testatrix, who
died single, parentless and childless on March 29, 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will
several of her real properties to specified persons.

On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for
appointment of special administrator. 5 With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the
testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5, 1981 6 appointed private respondent as
Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.

On June 29, 1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased
but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter alia:
that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same
was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to
make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the
testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to
the remainder of the estate.

After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the
petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will.

Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the decision. 8

On September 24, 1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new trial. 9 Attached
to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner’s son, alleging that
witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as
well as undue influence exerted on the latter.

The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, 10 denied the motion for new trial of
petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of Merit attached to the motion alleged that
efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court’s decision was handed down,
and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix
as well as the undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since
these facts were brought to light during the trial.

The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986 11 was likewise
denied by the appellate court in its resolution of November 20, 1986 12 on the ground that the
affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence and the
motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.

In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE.

II

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
RESOLUTION DENYING THE AFORESAID MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

III

AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION
WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN, DATED AND SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA.

IV

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL WAS FRAUDULENTLY
ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE OF EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE
DISPUTES AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE
TIME OF ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION.

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA WAS NOT SUBJECTED
TO UNDUE PRESSURE AND IMPROPER IMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART OF THOSE STANDING TO
BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED WILL.

VI

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION TO PROBATE." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3, 1986, was substituted by her heirs.

In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in denying
the motion for new trial insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented is not merely
corroborative or cumulative.

On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial was a pro-
forma motion because it was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We find
merit in this contention.

Section 1, Rule 53 provides —

"Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals becomes executory, a motion for
new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the Court below by the exercise of the diligence and which is of such a
character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits
showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence." cralaw virtua1aw library

The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson alleged the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x           x

"3. That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted efforts to locate witnesses whose
whereabouts were not known to us during the trial in the lower court, but I have finally succeeded in
tracking them down;

"4. That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case, law convinced that they would testify
under proper subpoena for purposes of shedding light on the fact that the testatrix was gravely ill at
or about the time that the questioned will was allegedly executed;

"5. That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances under which the purported will
was executed; and that they know for a fact that there was `undue influence’ exerted by petitioner
and other relatives to procure improper favors from the testatrix;

x       x       x" 13

Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone
affidavit of a witness who was already presented during the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the
holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty as to their
appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and
when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue
influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite
affidavits must state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. 14 The
affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court’s time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to
be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.

Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having been
discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the
witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down. The trial
lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were
admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present could have been
discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for
concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to
discover said evidenced. 15

In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as well as
the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial, and new
evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a ground for
new trial. 16 Accordingly, such evidence even if presented will not carry much probative weight which
can alter the judgment. 17

It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of delaying
the proceedings. In fact, petitioner’s son in his manifestation admitted that he had to request a new
law firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and/or for new trial. 18 This would explain the haphazard preparation of the motion,
thus failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 53, which was filed on the last day of the
reglementary period of appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon is questionable. The
appellate court correctly denied the motion for new trial.

The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period for appeal.
19 Since petitioner’s motion was filed on September 24, 1986, the fifteenth or last day of the period
to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the following day, September 25. And
when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October 30, 1986, it was obviously
filed out of time.

Since the questioned decision has already become final and executory, it is no longer within the
province of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due
execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now conclusive. 20

At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its merits, the petition will also have
to fail.

During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix
presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are in
the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of
the Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court, 22 or the probate
of holographic wills.

As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to present competent proof that the will
was actually executed sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously ill and dying
of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion
Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which upon careful examination did not prove
such claim of antedating.

The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question was
executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when
supported by evidence. 23 We have examined the records of this case and find no error in the
conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in
accordance with law.

Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason,
being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus
demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.

In the case of Pecon v. Coronel, 24 it was held —

"The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the
exclusion of a relative from one’s estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship
in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the
inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs
is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all
his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her
will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry
worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner’s son Francis was instituted as an heir in
the contested will.

Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of
her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind.

We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides —
"A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution
should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept
the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.

In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and
the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs." cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real
properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of
unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the
deceased in intestate successor.

Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have
been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator’s right to disregard
non-compulsory heirs. 25 The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither
fraud or undue influence. 26 Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament,
otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. 27

The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure
exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is
not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have
been exercised. 28 The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. 29

Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent court —

"There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the most
authentic proof that deceased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is
the Will itself which according to a report of one of the two expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3)
reveals the existence of significant handwriting characteristics such as: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing.

x          x           x

‘3. good line quality.

‘4. presence of natural variation. . . .’ (Exhibit X).

The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be achieved by the
testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind/or under undue influence or improper
pressure when she executed the Will." cralaw virtua1aw library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs
against petitioner. The decision of respondent court dated August 29, 1986 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21, 1985 is hereby declared to be
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.