Political Law

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3820             July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director
of Prisons, respondents.

J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.

OZAETA, J.:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in
the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the
Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:

Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now,
therefore, be it.

Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further
order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8,
such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to
the Senate or to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.

FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve
was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates
that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before.
The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government.

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Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one
of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount
of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest
Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter
filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.

ISSUE:

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

RULING:

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1.    Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed.

            xxx                              xxx                              xxx

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The Court finds that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot
be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,
requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to
whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination —
it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is
impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body
to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2.    YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to
the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that
body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative
to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but
logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3.    NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

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Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we
find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to
the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of
the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact
that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not
sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such
violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the
case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is
for the trial judge to decide that question.

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