MANU/SC/0355/2010

Equivalent Citation: AIR2010SC 1890, 2010(6)ALD119(SC ), 2010 (81) ALR 222, 2010(4)ALT59(SC ), 2010(2)ARC 293, 2010 (4) AWC 3427
(SC ), JT2010(4)SC 574, (2010)5MLJ311(SC ), 2010(3)RC R(C ivil)217, 2011(4)RC R(C ivil)824, 2010(1)RC R(Rent)532, 2010(5)SC ALE367,
(2010)6SC C 601

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4344 of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2689 of 2009)
Decided On: 07.05.2010
Appellants: Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd.
Vs.
Respondent: Jasbir Singh Chadha and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
G.S. Singhvi and A.K. Ganguly, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Shiv Kumar Suri, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: K.V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv., Arunima Dwivedi, Anil
Kaushik, Gopal Singh Chauhan, Neha S. Verma and Shiv Prakash Pandey, Advs.
Case Note:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII, Rule 6--Ejectment--High Court
recorded finding that case of ejectment was made out against appellant on
basis of administration a case of plaintiff-landlord in written statement--
High Court affirmed judgment and decree of dispossession passed by Addl.
District Judge against appellant--Whether calls for interference?--Held,
"yes"--No clear admission by appellant--Both judgments of courts below set
aside--Matter remitted to trial court.
In the instant case, it cannot be said that there is a clear admission of the
case of the respondents-plaintiffs about termination of tenancy by the
appellant in its written statement or in its reply to the petition of the
respondents-plaintiffs under Order XII, Rule 6.
The Supreme Court finds that in the pleadings of the appellant there is no
clear admission of the case of respondents-plaintiffs.
JUDGMENT
A.K. Ganguly, J.
1. Leave granted.
2 . This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 passed
by the High Court of Delhi in Regular First Appeal No. 465 of 2008. In the impugned
judgment upon admission the High Court came to a finding that a case of ejectment
was made out against the appellant on the basis of admission of the case of the
plaintiff-landlord in the written statement filed by appellant. In passing the said
judgment the High Court affirmed the judgment and decree of dispossession passed
by the Additional District Judge, Delhi on 23.09.2008 against the appellant.
3 . The material facts of the case are that the respondents-plaintiffs, claiming to be

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 the landlords/owners of the premises bearing Flat No. 205, (2nd Floor), Arunachal
Building, 19, Barakhambha Road, New Delhi-110001 having area of 581 sq. ft.,
(super area) (hereinafter, 'the suit premises') filed a suit against the appellant for
recovery of possession and mesne profit. The case of the plaintiff-landlord in the
plaint is that the appellant was inducted as a tenant vide lease deed dated
07.07.2003 at a monthly rent of Rs. 23,200/- for a period of three years with effect
from 07.07.2003. According to the respondents-plaintiffs the said lease dated
07.07.2003 was initially for a period of three years and which was to be renewed for
a further period of three years as per the mutual consent of both the parties with
20% increase in the monthly rent. The main case of the plaintiff- landlord is that the
said lease deed had expired by efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to
appellant which was enclosed with the plaint. In paragraph 6 of the plaint further
averment is that the appellant, despite determination of its tenancy of the suit
property, has failed to vacate the suit property, and handover the possession thereof
to the respondents-plaintiffs.
4 . The stand of the respondents-plaintiffs before the Civil Court and also the High
Court and before this Court also was that the case of termination of tenancy has been
admitted by the appellant in its written statement.
5 . In order to appreciate this controversy it will be proper to set out the relevant
averments in the plaint and written statement of the parties.
6 . Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint on which the respondents-plaintiffs rely are as
follows:
5 . That the tenancy has expired by efflux of time but for the precautionary
measure, the Plaintiffs vide notice dated July 15, 2006 terminated the
tenancy of the Defendant, which was sent via Regd. Ad. & UPC. The aforesaid
notice dated July 15, 2006 was duly served upon the defendant. The copy of
said notice is annexed herewith as Annexure A-3. The registration receipt,
UPC and acknowledgement card are annexed herewith as Annexure A-4 to A-
6 respectively.
6 . That the defendant, despite, the determination of its tenancy of the said
suit property has failed to vacate the suit property and handover the
possession thereof to the Plaintiffs.
7. In the written statement, which was filed by the appellant, paragraphs 5 and 6 of
the plaint have been dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the written statement
respectively. Those two paragraphs are set out below:
5 . That the contents of para 5 of the plaint are a matter of record. It is
submitted that tenancy has neither expired by efflux of time nor it has been
terminated.
6 . That in reply to the contents of para 6 of the plaint, it is submitted that
defendant is in possession of the premises. There has been no determination
of tenancy.
8. It is clear from a perusal of the aforesaid averments in the written statement that
the appellant has disputed (a) the fact of expiry of tenancy by efflux of time; (b) the
appellant has also disputed that there has been a determination of tenancy. So far as
receipt of notice referred to in paragraph 5 of the plaint is concerned, there has been
no denial by the appellant.

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 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant also argued before us that the lease deed cannot
be terminated in view of certain clauses contained in the lease. The said argument
was opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs. But in the facts of
this case and in view of the nature of the judgment we propose to pass we need not
decide those contentions at all.
10. It may be noted herein that to the written statement filed by the appellant, the
respondents-plaintiffs did not file any rejoinder. They filed an application under
Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure for passing a judgment on admission.
In the said petition in paragraph 4, the respondents-plaintiffs also averred as follows:
4. That in view of the admission (i) On existence of relationship of landlord
and tenant and there after (ii) service of the termination notice, the only
question left for adjudication for the purpose of possession is "whether the
termination of the tenancy has been validly terminated?"
11. To that application the appellant had given a reply. In paragraph 2 of the reply it
was again denied by the appellant that there was any admission by them about
termination or determination of tenancy. In the said reply it has been stated that in
the suit issues are still to be framed and the case be tried in accordance with the Civil
Procedure Code as there is no admission by the appellant and the respondents-
plaintiffs have to prove its case with legally admissible evidence. As such prayer was
made to dismiss the application of the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6.
12. Learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied on a judgment of this Court
i n Karam Kapahi and Ors. v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and Anr.
reported in MANU/SC/0240/2010 : 2010 (3) SCALE 569 and contended that in view
of the principles laid down in that case, this Court may affirm the judgment of the
High Court in the instant case. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid
contention. In Karam Kapahi (supra) a Bench of this Court analyzed the principles
of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code and held that in the facts of that case there was clear
admission on the part of the lessee about non- payment of lease rent. The said
admission was made by the lessee in several proceedings apart from its pleading in
the suit. In view of such clear admission, the Court applied the principles of Order 12
Rule 6 in the case of Karam Kapahi (supra). The principles of law laid down in
Karam Kapahi (supra) can be followed in this case only if there is a clear and
unequivocal admission of the case of the plaintiff by the appellant.
13. Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by one party of the case
of the other party is essentially a question of fact and the decision of this question
depends on the facts of the case. This question, namely, whether there is a clear
admission or not cannot be decided on the basis of a judicial precedent. Therefore,
even though the principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be unexceptionable they
cannot be applied in the instant case in view of totally different fact situation.
1 4 . I n Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India and Ors.
reported in MANU/SC/0485/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 120 the provision of Order 12 Rule
6 came up for consideration before this Court. This Court on a detailed consideration
of the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 made it clear "wherever there is a clear
admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such
admission to succeed" the principle will apply. In the instant case it cannot be said
that there is a clear admission of the case of the respondents-plaintiffs about
termination of tenancy by the appellant in its written statement or in its reply to the
petition of the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6.
1 5 . It may be noted here that in this case parties have confined their case of

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 admission to their pleading only. The learned Counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs
fairly stated before this Court that he is not invoking the case of admission 'otherwise
than on pleading'. That being the position this Court finds that in the pleadings of the
appellant there is no clear admission of the case of respondents-plaintiffs.
16. In this connection reference may be made to an old decision of the Court of
Appeal between Gilbert v. Smith reported in 1875-76 (2) CD 686. Dealing with the
principles of Order XL, Rule 11, which was a similar provision in English Law, Lord
Justice James held, "if there was anything clearly admitted upon which something
ought to be done, the plaintiff might come to the Court at once to have that thing
done, without any further delay or expense" (see page 687). Lord Justice Mellish
expressing the same opinion made the position further clear by saying, "it must,
however, be such an admission of facts as would shew that the plaintiff is clearly
entitled to the order asked for". The learned Judge made it further clear by holding,
"the rule was not meant to apply when there is any serious question of law to be
argued. But if there is an admission on the pleading which clearly entitles the plaintiff
to an order, then the intention was that he should not have to wait but might at once
obtain any order" (see page 689).
17. In another old decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hughes v. London,
Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Company (Limited) reported in 1891-92 8
TLR 81, similar principles were laid down by Lord Justice Lopes, wherein His
Lordship held "judgment ought not to be signed upon admissions in a pleading or an
affidavit, unless the admissions were clear and unequivocal". Both Lord Justice Esher
and Lord Justice Fry concurred with the opinion of Lord Justice Lopes.
18. In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in Landergan v. Feast reported
in 1886-87 85 ltr 42, in an appeal from Chancery Division, Lord Justice Lindley and
Lord Justice Lopes held that party is not entitled to apply under the aforesaid rule
unless there is a clear admission that the money is due and recoverable in the action
in which the admission is made.
1 9 . The decision in Landergan (supra) was followed by the Division Bench of
Calcutta High Court in Koramall Ramballav v. Mongilal Dalimchand reported in
23 CWN (1918-19) 1017. Chief Justice Sanderson, speaking for the Bench, accepted
the formulation of Lord Justice Lopes and held that admission in Order 12, Rule 6
must be a "clear admission".
20. In the case of J.C. Galstaun v. E.D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd. reported in 27 CWN
(1922-23) 783, a Bench of Calcutta High Court presided over by Hon'ble Justice Sir
Asutosh Mookerjee sitting with Justice Rankin while construing the provisions of
Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code followed the aforesaid decision in Hughes (supra) and
also the view of Lord Justice Lopes in Landergan (supra) and held that these
provisions are attracted "where the other party has made a plain admission entitling
the former to succeed. This rule applies where there is a clear admission of the facts
on the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed". In saying so
His Lordship quoted the observation of Justice Sargent in Ellis v. Allen (1914) 1 Ch.
D. 904 {See page 787}.
21. Similar view has been expressed by Chief Justice Broadway in the case of Abdul
Rahman and brothers v. Parbati Devi reported in AIR 1933 Lahore 403. The
learned Chief Justice held that before a Court can act under Order 12, Rule 6, the
admission must be clear and unambiguous.
22. For the reasons discussed above and in view of the facts of this case this Court
cannot uphold the judgment of the High Court as well as of the Additional District

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 Judge. Both the judgments of the High Court and of the Additional District Judge are
set aside.
23. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for expeditious disposal of the suit as
early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of service of
this order on the learned trial Court. It is made clear that this Court has not made any
observation on the merits of the case.
24. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

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