VOL.
188, AUGUST 13, 1990 475
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. Nos. 52095-52116. August 13, 1990.
ANTOLIN JARIOL, JR., petitioner, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Commercial Law; Contracts; A person acting in the name of a
sole proprietorship must be held liable for his acts and
involvement in the fraudulent and simulated transactions.—
Petitioner, in his effort to clear himself of criminal liability,
contends that the criminal charges should have been brought
against Jariol Enterprises rather than against himself since he
had merely acted as agent of Jariol Enter-
_______________
* EN BANC.
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
prises. It is not disputed that Jariol Enterprises is a sole
proprietorship owned by petitioner's father and of which
petitioner was the manager. A sole proprietorship does not, of
course, possess any juridical personality separate and apart from
the personality of the owner of the enterprise and the personality
of the persons acting in the name of such proprietorship. It follows
that Jariol Enterprises was not a principal that petitioner Antolin
Jariol, Jr. merely represented as an agent. Petitioner must be
held directly liable for his acts and involvement in the fraudulent
and simulated transanctions which are the subject of the one
hundred twenty-six (126) cases before the Sandiganbayan.
Moreover, if it be assumed (though arguendo only) that Jariol
Enterprises possessed separate juridical personality, criminal
responsibility must still be borne by the officers actually
managing or operating the enterprise, in this case petitioner
Antolin Jariol, Jr. An artificial and juristic person can neither act
with the mens rea which is essential for criminal liability nor be
confined in a jail.
Same; Remedial Law; Witnesses; Legal deficiency that
attended the discharge of the witness from the information does
not impact upon admissibility of credibility of testimony.—We turn
to petitioner's contention that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in discharging the two (2) co-accused
Milagros Pisao and Dulcisimo Lucenas, who were utilized as state
witnesses. It appears to the Court that the requirements set out
in Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court for the
discharge of an accused for utilization as a state witness, were
sufficiently complied with. The existence of the five (5)
requirements there listed is for the trial court to determine and if
that court is satisfied that the discharge of one or more co-accused
so that they could testify for the prosecution is proper, that court
may issue the order of discharge. Once a co-accused is discharged
and the released witness actually testifies, any legal deficiency
that might have attended the discharge of the witness from the
information does not impact upon the admissibility and credibility
of the testimony given, provided such testimony is otherwise
admissible and credible.
Same; Same; Decision in Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan settled
issues in 1982 sustaining the statute as valid and constitutional.—
Finally, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the
Sandiganbayan in continuing with the hearing of the cases before
it despite pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the
Supreme Court by co-accused Rufino Nuñez. Although the Court
originally issued a temporary restraining order preventing the
Sandiganbayan from continuing with the proceedings against
Rufino Nuñez, by reason of which trial of the co-accused including
petitioner was suspended, that restraining order
477
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 477
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
was lifted on 11 July 1979. Upon the lifting of that restraining
order, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the trial of the one
hundred twenty-six (126) cases before it. This final claim of
petitioner was made in the hope that he could benefit from the
constitutional law issues which had been raised by Rufino Nuñez
before the Supreme Court: that the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan had violated the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution as well as the constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto legislation. This Court settled those
issues in 1982 when it promulgated its decision in Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, sustaining that statute as valid and
constitutional,
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the
Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Francis M, Zosa and Loreto N. Pono for petitioner,
FELICIANO, J.:
In this Petition for Review by certiorari, petitioner Antolin
Jariol, Jr. assails the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
29 November 1979 finding him, along with several others,
guilty on twenty-two (22) counts of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents and
sentencing him to the penalties specified in that Decision.
The background facts which are uncontested are set out
in the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in the following
terms:
"The Ministry of Public Highways is divided into thirteen (13)
regions and each region is in turn sub-divided into districts. One
of these regions Is Region VII based in Cebu City and covers the
Provinces of Cebu, Negros Oriental, Bohol, and Sub-province of
Siquijor and the cities In said provinces, namely: the Cities of
Cebu, Danao, Mandawe, Lapu-Lapu and Toledo in the Province of
Cebu, the Cities of Bais, Kanlaon and Dumaguete in the Province
of Negros Oriental and Tagbilaran City in the Province of Bohol.
Region Vll is subdivided into fifteen (15) Highway Engineering
Districts, namely: Cebu First, Cebu 2nd, Danao City, Mandawe
City, Lapu-lapu City, Toledo City, Cebu City, Bohol 1st, Bohol
2nd, Tagbilaran City, Bais City, Kanlaon City, Dumaguete City,
Negros Oriental and Siquijor.
[B]ased on the standard operating procedure of the funding of
the different offices of the national government, the said regions
are funded in the following manner:
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
The Ministry of the Budget at the beginning of each quarter
releases to the Ministry of Public Highways the corresponding
Advices of Allotment (AAs), which is the authority to obligate, and
the Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC), which is the authority to
disburse. The Ministry or Central Office will now release Sub-
Advices of Allotment (SAAs) to the various regional offices, with
the Central Office retaining a portion of the allotment for its own
use. The Sub-Allotment Advice (SAA) released to the various
regional offices is addressed to the regional director and is
accompanied by an Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC).
Upon receipt thereof, the Chief Accountant of the region debits
the receivable accounts and credits the allotments in the Journal
Voucher. Thereafter, Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) based
on the program of work submitted by the district and Advices of
Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) are prepared by the region
for release to the different districts composing the region. The
LAAs and the ACDCs are signed by the Regional Director
addressed to the District Engineer but are usually received by an
authorized liaison officer of the district. With the receipt of the
LAAs and the ACDCs, the district is now equipped with authority
to incur obligations and authority to disburse. As a matter of
procedure, however, upon receipt of the LAA, a Requisition for
Supplies or Equipment (RSE) is prepared by the Property
Custodian wherein the District Accountant certifies as to the
availability of funds. The Project Engineer prepares a Request for
Obligation of Allotment (ROA) which is likewise certified as to
availability of funds by the District Accountant. The Requisition
for Supplies or Equipment, together with a copy of the program of
work, is transmitted to the Regional Director for approval and
returned to the district. If approved canvass bid forms are sent to
different contractors or suppliers for them to quote prices for the
materials or supplies called for in the approved Requisition for
Supplies or Equipment. After all the bid forms are submitted,
they are opened on specified dates and the determination of the
lowest quoted price is made. This is reflected in the Abstract of
Sealed Quotations. A Purchase Order is now prepared in favor of
the winning bidder or contractor. Deliveries then are made by the
contractor and, thereafter, General Vouchers, supported by
delivery receipts and tally sheets which are consolidated in the
Inspection Report and other supporting documents, are processed
for the payment of the deliveries. Finally, the corresponding check
is prepared and released to the contractor.
At the end of the month, the District Accountant prepares
several reports including the Report of Obligations Incurred (ROI)
and the Report of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer
(RCIDDO) which are submitted to the region. These reports form
the bases of the trial balance prepared by the regions for
submission to the Central
479
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 479
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
Office. The different regional trial balances are then consolidated
in a single trial balance prepared by the Central Office for the
entire Ministry of Public Highways which is then submitted to the
Commission on Audit.
x x x x x x x x x
It also appears undisputed that with the exception of Neis, who
claimed that he was then on leave from December 19, 1977 to
May 31, 1978, after he was re-assigned to the 2nd Highway
Engineering District of Bohol, all the accused government officials
actually discharged the functions pertaining to their office as
alleged in the informations during the period that the supposed
crimes were committed; that the Letters of Advice of Allotment
under which the disbursements in question were made are
Exhibits 'R', 'R-1' to 'R-118' with a total amount of P6,530,000.00
all addressed to the Danao City HED and signed and sent by
Assistant Regional Director Bagasao, acting for and in the
absence of the Regional Director, that the General Vouchers in
support of the disbursements are Exhibits 'LL', 'LL-1' to 'LL-125',
all charged against Project No. NC-0782, for the repair of the
Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf Road and/or its shoulders which is
about ten (10) kilometers long running from Km. 27.7 to Km. 38.6;
and that the checks, Exhibits 'W-1' to 'W-124', were actually 1
issued and cashed for the payment of the aforesaid vouchers."
From 1) January 1978 to 25 August 1978, a team from the
Commission on Audit led by Maria Athena C. Flores,
Manager, Performance Audit Office, audited the operations
of Regional Office No. 7 of the Ministry of Public Highways
and the Danao City Highways Engineering District
("HED") and found many irregularities. These
irregularities consisted, among other things, of: (a) fake
allotments for payment of fake obligations, and fake Cash
Disbursement Ceilings (CDCs) for fake authorities to
disburse; (b) conversion of the fake allotments and fake
CDCs to actual payments for fake payrolls, overpaid
payrolls, fictitious deliveries, double payments, overpricing
and underdeliveries; and (c) manipulations of the actual
payments, manipulations by Journal Vouchers,
manipulations of accounting records to conceal payments,
fake allotment obligations under fake Cash Disbursement
Ceilings as represented by Journal Vouchers.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 68-71.
480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr, vs. Sandiganbayan
As a result of such auditing and investigation, one hundred
twenty-six (126) uniformly worked informations—
uniformly worded, that is, except with respect to the
amounts involved, the names of the persons charged and
the dates of the commission—were filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan, against certain named
government officials of Regional Office No. 7, Ministry of
Public Highways and the Danao City HED and certain
named private persons, including petitioner herein Antolin
Jariol, Jr., who had been private suppliers of materials in
respect of the questioned transactions. The total amount
involved in these one hundred twenty-six (126) cases was
P6,237,018.00. Petitioner was charged in twenty-two (22) of
the one hundred twenty-six (126) informations. The
twenty-two (22) informations were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 118, 122, 123, 127, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136,
137, 140, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152, 156, 170 and
172. The informations were typically set forth in the
following terms:
"That in, about and during the period from May 2, 1978 up to and
including June 11, 1978 in Danao City and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused Jose Bagasao and Rolando
Mangubat, Assistant Director and Chief Accountant of Region
VII, Ministry of Public Highways, respectively conniving with
each other with the deliberate intent of defrauding the Philippine
Government, and with the indispensable cooperation, assistance
and connivance of the accused Angelina Escano, Finance Officer
of the same office; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief Accountant of
the same office; Gualberto Toledo, District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) assigned to Danao City HED;
Milagros Pisao, Chief Accountant of the same office; Romeo
Andrino, Senior Civil Engineer of the Danao City HED; Adolfo
Sucalit, Assistant District Engineer of the same HED; Antolin
Jariol, Jr. a supplier; Florencio Masecampo, Administrative
Officer of the Danao City HED; Juan Doe, Pedro Doe Jesus Doe,
Juana Doe, whose identities are still unknown all taking
advantage of their official positions committed in relation to their
respective offices, with the exception of Antolin Jariol, Jr., and
mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully and
feloniously falsify the following documents, to wit:
1. Letter of advice and allotment (LAA #107-07824 93A-78
dated May 16, 1978
2. Request for obligation of allotment (ROA) #101-4-202-77
481
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 481
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
3. Abstract of Sealed Quotations dated May 2, 1978
4. Purchase Orders dated May 29, 1978
5. Delivery Receipts (15)
6. Report of Inspection undated
7. General Voucher No. 780618'
by making it appear that Region No. VII of the Ministry of Public
Highways regularly issued a letter of advice of allotment to the
Davao City HED to purchase 147 m.t. of the bituminous concrete
surface course for use in the repair of Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf
road by making it appear further: That the proper request for
obligation of allotment was prepared and approved; that the
proper bidding among the suppliers was conducted; that the
corresponding purchase order was prepared in favor of the lowest
bidder; and that the ordered construction materials were duly
delivered and inspected when, in truth and in fact, as all the
respondents knew, the foregoing were false and incorrect and that
because of these falsifications, the said accused were able to
collect from the Danao City HED the amount of FORTY-NINE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P49,980.00)
Philippine Currency in payment of the non-existent deliveries
and, once in possession of the same amount, the accused
misappropriated, converted and misapplied the said amount for
their own personal needs to the damage and prejudice of the
Philippine Government in the total amount of FORTY-NINE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED 2
EIGHTY PESOS (P49,980.00)
Philippine Currency,"
All one hundred twenty-six (126) cases were tried jointly by
agreement of the parties. On 29 November
3
1979, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting accused
Rosilo Neis, Rafael Alberio and Ernesterio Sabare on
grounds of reasonable doubt. All the other accused,
including petitioner, were found guilty. Thus, petitioner
was sentenced, in each of the twenty-two (22) cases in
which he was included as an accused, to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum, to pay a fine of P3,500.00 and jointly
and severally to indemnify the Republic of the Philippines
the amount of P49,980.00 representing the amount of
which it was defrauded.
_______________
2 Petition for certiorari, Rollo, pp. 7-8.
3 Rollo, pp. 50-148.
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a separate motion
for reconsideration. Without waiting, however, for
resolution of his motion, petitioner filed the present
Petition. The issues raised by petitioner were summarized
by him in the following terms:
"I. Did the prosecution prove the essential elements of
the complex crime of estafa through the falsification
of public and commercial documents as charged in
the 22 informations against herein petitioner?
II. Did not respondent court fail to consider the laws
on contract of sale and contract of agency which are
the applicable laws in the twenty two (22)
transactions subject of these criminal cases, and
therefore, should have acquitted the accused?
III. Did not respondent court commit grave abuse of
discretion in not complying with Rule 119, Section 9
of the Rules of Court in discharging two (2) co-
accused, Milagros Pisao and Dulcisimo Lucenas and
who were utilized as state witnesses? and
IV. Has not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in continuing with the
hearings of the above entitled cases knowing fully
well that a petition for certiorari in the case of
Rufino V. Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan and the People
of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 50581-617 is still
pending decision with this Honorable Court seeking
relief under the 'equal protection' ex post facto
4
law
and 'due process' clauses of the Constitution?"
In his issues 1) and 2, petitioner basically disputes the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
during the trial and upon which the Sandiganbayan relied
in rendering its Decision. He insists that he did not
participate, connive or assist and conspire in the
preparation of the fake public and commercial documents
utilized in the defrauding of the Republic of the
Philippines. Petitioner claims that he made actual
deliveries of the ready-mixed asphalt and cites affidavits
and testimonies of witnesses, both of the prosecution and of
the defense, in his Petition.
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No.
1606, which created the Sandiganbayan, specified that
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
subject to review on
_______________
4 Petition, Rollo, pp. 3-4.
483
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 483
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
certiorari by this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides, in Section 2, that only questions of law may be
raised in the Petition for Review and these must be
distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are not to be reviewed by this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari. There are, 5
of course,
certain exceptions to this general principle. Here, reading
petitioner's Petition for Review and Memorandum in the
most favorable possible light, petitioner may be seen to be
in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan
misapprehended certain acts in arriving at its factual
conclusions.
We have examined the assertions of petitioner on this
score and found, first of all, that the arguments he makes
before this Court and the allegedly favorable testimony
pointed to by him were already made and adduced by him
before the Sandiganbayan and considered and rejected by
that court. Referring in particular to the question of
whether deliveries of asphalt and other materi als had been
made by petitioner and his co-accused suppliers, the
Sandiganbayan held:
"On the second issue, whether or not there were deliveries of
materials made and for which General Vouchers, Exhibits 'LL',
'LL-1 to 'LL-125', were approved and checks, Exhibits W-1 to 'W-
124', were drawn in payment thereof and actually cashed, this
Court is of the firm belief that except for negligible deliveries to
show semblance of deliveries, there were no deliveries made to
justify payments as stated in the different vouchers and checks in
question.
State witness Lucenas, who, as Property Custodian of the
Danao City HED, requisitions materials and supplies and
oversees the properties of the government entrusted to him,
recommends approval of all the Requisitions for Supplies or
Equipment and signs the Report of Inspection of materials
delivered as having received the same, spontaneously and
categorically declared with marked fluency and ease, that in all
the one hundred twenty six (126) General Vouchers and Reports of
lnspection signed by him, he has not received any material in the
Wharf Road, and that it was only upon instruction of Masecampo
that he signed the General Vouchers and supporting documents,
some in
_______________
5 Palma Gil v. People, G.R. No. 73642, 1 September 1989; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 (1986); Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA 105
(1985).
484
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
their office already filled up and the rest in the house of In
asecampo in blank (TSN, pp. 215 to 234, August 7, 1979 hearing).
Lucenas became more convincing in the thorough cross
examination to which he was subjected wherein he ramained firm
and unshaken in his claim of non-delivery of construction
materials in the Wharf Road. The aforesaid testimony of Lucenas
was corroborated by Salengua, Danao City Public Works
Supervisor, who testified that he did not notice asphalting in the
Wharf Road (TSN, p. 30, May 30, 1979 hearing); by Abdulia
Rondina, Secretary-Treasurer of Barangay Maslog, one of the
barangays traversed by the Wharf Road, that there was no repair
or deliver of construction materials noted by her from January to
June 1978 (TSN, p. 199-120, May 30, 1979 hearing); and finally
by NBI Agent Nereo Joaquin that in November 1978, in the course
of his investigation of these anomalies, he inspected the items of
deliveries stated in the General Vouchers and 'found out that
there were no deliveries made as alleged in the vouchers' and that
although 'in the voucher it was made to appear that materials
were needed in those places, we found out that there is no need to
put those materials in this portion of the highway because that
highway is in a very good condition' made of 'concrete and asphalt
and that the shoulders of the highway were also in good condition'
(TSN, pp. 65 to 68, July 25, 1979 hearing). The testimony of
Joaquin becomes more convincing by his detailed report (Exhibits
'CCC', 'CCC-1' to 'CCC-9') showing the date of the supposed
deliveries, the vouchers covering them, the kilometer posts where
the supposed deliveries were made, the quantity of the supposed
deliveries and the contractors who supposedly made them.
The ocular inspection likewise indubitably demonstrated that
there was no need to deliver to the Wharf Road 123,683 cubic
meters of gravel surface for the highway is partly asphalted and
concreted and in good condition and if said volume of materials
had been applied on the shoulders of the road, then in the works
of Engr. Abesamis, the shoulders of the road, both sides, will be
about two meters higher than the surface of the road (TSN, p.
294, July 25, 1979 hearing). The truth, however, as the ocular
inspection showed, the shoulder of the Wharf Road, except a few
meters which seem to have just been repaired, is in good condition
for a long time judging from the age of vegetation which may have
been in existence long before 1978; that some portions of the
Wharf Road have no shoulder, either the road immediately
adjoins the private lot like in the city proper of Danao or no
shoulder at all because it is already the sea. And with respect to
the 8,232 metric tons of bituminous concrete surface course, that
no delivery at all was made is shown by the lack of necessity for
such volume of materials for more than five (5) km. of the Wharf
Road is concreted and in good condition; and the fact that during
the ocular inspection there was no overlaying
485
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 485
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
of premix of the Wharf Road including the concrete portion which
started last April 1979 shows that actually there was no
application of bituminous concrete surface course, for had it been
so, there would have been no need of the overlaying again of
asphalt. Said overlaying of premix in April 1979 is even quite
intriguing as it
6
ends to conceal the true condition of the Wharf
Road in 1978." (Italics supplied)
Petitioner next claims that "simple contracts of sale" were
entered into by supplier Jariol Enterprises with the
government, after having won the bid therefor, to deliver
one hundred forty-seven (147) tons of ready-mixed asphalt
at the Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf Road at the price
P340.00 per metric ton. Petitioner then contends that the
ready-mixed asphalt was in fact delivered and spread at
"several places within the jurisdiction of Danao City" and
"not at the Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf Road at the
instance and on the orders of the officials and/or employees7
of the Danao City Highways Engineering District."
Petitioner claims those officials or employees instructed
Jariol Enterprises to deliver the asphalt instead to certain
barangay roads and selected spots such as a basketball
court, and pleads that petitioner cannot be held liable as he
simply complied with the instructions of the vendee.
The above argument of petitioner was met squarely by
the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, by pointing out, among
other things, that no public bidding had in fact taken place,
and that had actual deliveries of asphalt and other
materials been in fact made, there would have been
absolutely no reason to engage in and fabricate the series of
irregularities
8
and forgeries which had been independently
shown. The Sandiganbayan said:
"x x x. If there was really an honest-to-goodness requisition of
supplies and their eventual deliveries there would have been no
need to commit the string of irregularities consisting of:
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 80-83.
7 Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo, p. 358.
8 In Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 478 (1987) and Gabison,
et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 61 (1987), the Court in effect affirmed
the finding of the Sandiganbayan concerning the existence of these
irregularities.
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
(1) The issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotment
as previously discussed from which the
disbursements were taken.
(2) The issuance of Requests for Obligation of
Allotments in support of the General Vouchers
when the Letters of Advice of Allotment to which
they refer are fake, hence, they must necessarily be
also fake.
(3) The Inspection Reports supporting the vouchers and
signed by Lucenas as having received the materials
supposedly delivered therein were signed by
Lucenas in the office already filled up or in the
house of Masecampo in blanks, as stated before,
when actually there were no such deliveries.
(4) The absence or lack of actual bidding as testified to
by Lucenas (TSN, p. 239, August 7, 1979 hearing;
TSN, p. 23, August 8, 1979 hearing) when according
to COA Regional Director, Region VII, Sofronio
Flores, the mode of procurement adopted was by
public bidding (TSN, p. 54, July 23, 1979 hearing).
The Abstract of Sealed Quotations attached to the
General Voucher was one of the supporting
documents of the voucher that Masecampo told him
to sign in the office or in his (Masecampo's) house.
Contractors who appeared in the Abstract of Sealed
Quotations to have bidded like Adlawan, Nadela
and Chavez testified that they did not participate or
submit any bid to the Danao City HED (TSN, p, 33,
July 25, 1979 hearing; TSN, pp. 273, 286, July 17,
1979 hearing). The claim of the defense that they
dispensed with the bidding, except in eight
instances, as it will favor the government in the
light of the continuing increase of prices is without
merit, for the other contractors may submit bids
lower than the existing lowest bid as they may be
satisfied with a profit lower than that realized by
the winning bidder.
(5) The signing in one day by Pisao of several General
Vouchers and the Requisition for Supplies or
Equipment, the Requests for Obligation of
Allotments and the Purchase Orders in support
thereof wherein she certified to the availability of
funds with all the other signatures appearing
therein already there and the duplicate of the
corresponding checks already cashed attached
pursuant to the instructions of Masecampo. And
when Pisao called the attention of Masecampo to
the irregularity, the latter replied 'No, no do not be
afraid because this is kept in secret, nobody knows
what is going on' (TSN, pp. 52 to 55, August 7, 1979
hearing).
(6) The giving of money on different occasions by
Masecampo to Lucenas in the total amount of from
P90,000.00 to P100,000.00 (TSN, p. 157, August 8,
1979 hearing) and P100,000.00 plus to Pisao (TSN,
p. 80, August 6, 1979 hearing)
487
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 487
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
for having signed the vouchers and supporting
documents, and to the other accused like Andrino
and other personnel of the district like Carmen
Mata, Adereta Labador, Magdalena Landero,
Teofilo Cencio and Arturo Pepito at P1,800.00 per
voucher (TSN, pp. 82-83, August 6, 1979 hearing).
This giving of money is unusual in ordinary
transactions for it would indeed be contrary to
human nature for a businessman dealing with the
government to throw away his hard earned profits
like in these cases to the government officials or
employees who helped him as if they were his
partners in the transaction. For obvious reasons, it
is but natural for the persons so implicated to deny
having received the amount claimed to have been
given them. But the fact remains that Pisao
appears not to be a very 9disreputable person to
make baseless accusations." (Italics supplied)
In addressing the claim that the asphalt and other
materials had been delivered and used for barangay roads
instead of the specified project, i.e., the Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf Road, the Sandiganbayan held:
"We credit, however, the accused with 20 truckload deliveries of
gravel and sand for prosecution witnesses Barangay Captain
Lauro claimed that he saw 10 truckloads of gravel and sand along
the highway in Barangay Sabang and Barangay Captain Olimpio
Nuñez of Looc, testified that he saw the same quantity in
Barangay Looc. Other than that, the accused cannot be credited
for any delivery. The deliveries claimed to have been made by them
in the different barangays or near the City Hall of Danao cannot
be favorably considered as deliveries covered by the transactions in
question, for had they really been so, then why should they be
brought to the said barangays when it is crystal-clear in all of the
Requisitions for Supplies or Equipment that they are for the use
in the repair of the Wharf Road with its very kilometer numbers
where to be used clearly indicated. The claim of the accused,
therefore, that the phrase Cebu North Hagnaya Wharf Road
includes even barangay and city road as long as they are within
the territorial limits of Danao City has no leg to stand on. A
typical example is requisition Exhibit 'LL-1' where it is there
stated: For use in the repair of road shoulders along Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf Road, Km. 29.0 to Km. 33.0 with exceptions. This
is in accordance with the approved program of work/ The claim,
like that of Nuñez that
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 83-86.
488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs, Sandiganbayan
deliveries to the barangays were made despite the contract to
deliver only in the Wharf Road because of the directive of Engr.
Sucalit (TSN, p. 92, September 18, 1979 hearing) i s flimsy for
there was no modification of the contract to deliver to that effect
before or subsequent to the delivery. The testimony of Sucalit that
he ordered deliveries of the materials to several barangay roads
because of persistent demands of the barangay residents through
resolution, personal request from the City Mayor, resolution of
the City Council and the Memorandum of the Director of the
Bureau of Construction and Maintenance, MPH (TSN, p. 378,
Sept. 17, 1979 hearing) is devoid of merit for there were then funds
for these barangay roads as testified to by accused Alberio (TSN,
pp. 19-21, Sept. 3, 1979 hearing) and NBI Agent Nereo Joaquin
(TSN, p. 76, July 25, 1979 hearing). And in the valid Letters of
Advice of Allotment issues for the Danao City HED, there was
actually P30,000.00 alloted for repair, reconstruction, restoration
of Barangay roads and bridges (Exhibit 'KK'). Their testimonies
are also supported by Section 6 of P.D, No. 702, which clearly
states as follows:
'SECTION 5. Appropriations—All national funds appropriated and
programmed by the Department of Public Highways for the construction,
rehabilitation, betterment, improvement and maintenance of barangay
roads and bridges including the shares of provinces, cities, municipalities
and the allocation for the maintenance of farm-to-market or feeder roads
and bridges within a barangay area, from the Highway Special Fund,
shall be released to the Department of Public Highways which shall then
sub-allot them to the barangay but construction and maintenance shall
be under the supervision of the Department of Public Highways through
the Bureau of Barangay Road.'
Moreover, the various requests of the different barangay
councils to improve or repair their barangay roads (Exhibits '121-
A-Sucalit', '122-A-Sucalit', '123-A-Sucalit', '124-A-Sucalit') and the
request of Mayor Ramon D. Durano, Jr. for the repair of the
barangay road of Tuburan Sur were all made in 1977. If Sucalit,
therefore, desires to favorably respond to those requests then he
should have made the documents pertaining thereto like the
Requisition for Supplies or Equip-ment, Report of lnspection and
the General Voucher reflect such fact, if there is nothing wrong
about it. Why will he resort to falsification of public documents by
making it appear that the materials are for the Wharf Road when
his intention was for the repair or improvement of the barangay
roads? Queer, indeed! Besides, the telegram-memorandum relied
upon by Sucalit (Exhibit '49-Sucalit') was clearly only for 1977.
The truth of the matter, however, is that said telegram-
memorandum is immaterial as there is no appropriation or funds
alloted to
489
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 489
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
consider in these cases because the Letters of Advice of Allotment
are all fake.
The delivery receipts and tally sheets presented by De los
Angeles (Exhibits '3-A-De los Angeles' to '21-A-De Los Angeles').
Gabison (Exhibits '5-A-Gabison' to '4-A-Gabison'), Nuñez (Exhibits
'3-Nuñez', '3-A-Nuñez' to '3-Q-Nuñez', '3-A-1-Nuñez' to '3-A-17-
Nuñez' thru '40-Nuñez, '40-A-Nuñez' to '40-P-Nuñez' to '40-A-1-
Nuñez' to '40-A-16-Nuñez') and Jariol (Exhibits 12', '12-A', to '12-
Z', '12-AA' to '12-ZZ', '12-AAA' to '12-ZZZ', '12-AAAA' to '12-
DDDD') are feeble to prove the deliveries in question for said
receipts do not reflect that they were actually delivered in the
Wharf Road. The integrity of said receipts is even destroyed by the
foregoing discussion especially the testimony of Lucenas, Salengua
and NBI Agent Joaquin that there was actually no delivery in the
Wharf Road. They may be last attempts to make regular what
was apparently irregular, to make existing, what has not existed
at all considering that there was no showing that they 10produced
during the preliminary investigation of these cases." (Italics
supplied)
Thus, it appears to the Court that petitioner has failed to
show any misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner, in his effort to clear himself of criminal
liability, contends that the criminal charges should have
been brought against Jariol Enterprises rather than
against himself since he had merely acted as agent of Jariol
Enterprises. It is not disputed that Jariol Enterprises is a
sole proprietorship owned by petitioner's father and of
which petitioner was the manager. A sole proprietorship
does not, of course, possess any juridical personality
separate and apart from the personality of the owner of the
enterprise and the personality of the persons acting in the
name of such proprietorship. It follows that Jariol
Enterprises was not a principal that petitioner Antolin
Jariol, Jr. merely represented as an agent. Petitioner must
be held directly liable for his acts and involvement in the -
fraudulent and simulated transactions which are the
subject of the one hundred twenty-six (126) cases before the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, if it be assumed (though
arguendo only) that Jariol Enterprises possessed separate
juridical personality, criminal
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 86-89.
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
responsibility must still be borne by the officers actually
managing or operating the11 enterprise, in this case
petitioner Antolin Jariol, Jr. An artificial and juristic
person can neither act with the mens rea which is essential
for criminal liability nor be confined in a jail.
We turn to petitioner's contention that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
discharging the two (2) co-accused Milagros Pisao and
Dulcisimo Lucenas, who were utilized as state witnesses. It
appears to the Court that the requirements set out in
Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court for the
discharge of an accused for utilization
12
as a state witness,
were sufficiently complied with. The existence of the five
(5) requirements there listed is for the trial court to
determine and if that court is satisfied that the discharge
of one or more co-accused so that they could testify for the
prosecution is proper, that court may issue the order of
discharge. Once a coaccused is discharged and the released
witness actually testifies, any legal deficiency that might
have attended the discharge of the witness from the
information does not impact upon the admissibility and
credibility of the testimony given, provided
13
such testimony
is otherwise admissible and credible.
_______________
11 West Coast Life Insurance, Co. v. Hurd, 27 Phil. 401 (1914).
12 Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be witnesses for the
prosecution.—When two or more persons are charged with the commission
of a certain offense, the competent court, at any time before they have
entered upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to be
discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may be witnesses for
the government when in the judgment of the court:
'(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant
whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
defendant;
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated
in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.'"
13 People v. de Leon, 108 Phil. 800 (1960); People v. Bautista, etc.,
491
VOL. 188, AUGUST 13, 1990 491
Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
Finally, petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the
Sandiganbayan in continuing with the hearing of the cases
before it despite pendency of a petition for certiorari filed
before the Supreme Court by co-accused Rufino Nuñez.
Although the Court originally issued a temporary
restraining order preventing the Sandiganbayan from
continuing with the proceedings against Rufino Nuñez, by
reason of which trial of the co-accused including petitioner
was suspended, that restraining order was lifted on 11 July
1979. Upon the lifting of that restraining order, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with the trial of the one hundred
twenty-six (126) cases before it. This final claim of
petitioner was made in the hope that he could benefit from
the constitutional law issues which had been raised by
Rufino Nuñez before the Supreme Court: that the statute
creating the Sandiganbayan had violated the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as
well as the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto
legislation. This Court settled those issues in 1982 when it
14
14
promulgated its decision in Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan,
sustaining that statute as valid and constitutional.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for
Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
Decision of the Sandiganbayan appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with respect to petitioner Antolin Jariol, Jr.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., On leave.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.
Notes.—A mere opinion of a witness regarding a
particular
_______________
et al., 106 Phil. 39 (1959); United States v. Alabat, 38 Phil. 698 (1918).
14 111 SCRA 433. This ruling was reiterated in Calubaquib v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 SCRA 493 (1982); De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA
337 (1982); Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659 (1983); Alviar v.
Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63 (1985); and Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan,
supra.
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Embassy Farms, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
matter is not admissible. (People vs. Tolentino, 166 SCRA
469.)
The contract was null and void since it was onerous and
prejudicial to the creditors of the respondent corporation.
(Figueroa vs. SEC, 162 SCRA 689.)
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