Guardianship (Rules 92-97, Rules of Court; AM No.

03-02-05-SC 2003-05-01) {8} waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.
Hence, petitioner’s invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
1. Guy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163707 (2006)
Anent the issue on private respondents’ filiation, the Court agree with the Court of
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private
Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of respondents have yet to present evidence. As regards Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim,
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an
not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to
estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known
abandon a right.
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George
and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a In this case, the Supreme Court find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights.
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents’ plan for her minor daughters “by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any
petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping signed by their counsel, Atty. and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez. Susim.” Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents’
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
successional rights.
asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without
securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Article 1044 of the Civil
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. Code, provides:
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may
petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim had been paid, accept or repudiate an inheritance.
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios’ June 7, 1993
Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. wards only by judicial authorization.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their 2. Vda. De Bengson vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-17066 (2007)
filiation
Facts: As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson
No. In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted to P10,738 as of July 1,
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged 1957, and to a monthly death compensation for the rest of her life, all extended by the United
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that States Veterans Administration. Upon inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they incompetent, the Veterans Administration filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First
Instance of La Union, where in due course, an order was entered on August 8, 1957, adjudging
Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and appointing the Philippine National Bank convenient for the administration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the
(PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the said Veterans most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S. 65); otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.
Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank. On
March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a As to the alleged inconvenience of the guardian of the incompetent’s person having to come to
petition asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary Manila to obtain money for the ward’s sustenance, the same can be obviated by merely requiring
estate. the appellant Bank to keep part of the moneys in the San Fernando (La Union) branch, without
altering the guardianship.
Issue: Whether or not PNB can be removed as guardian.
3. G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003 PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner, vs. AMPARO
Held: No. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent. CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
the Rules.
FACTS:
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable
therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render The lower courts granted Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as guardian over the person and property of
an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, her sister Julieta Ledesma. Goyena appealed citing that she was a friend for than 60 years.
and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled
In respondent's application for guardianship, she mentioned that her sister suffered a stroke and
thereto….
needed outside assistance. Her sister also owns a real estate and in controlling such she needs an
Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian cannot be legally assistance of a guardian and the nearest kin was respondent.
removed from office except for the causes therein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno, 5 Phil. 172;
Petitioner filed an opposition citing that Julieta can take care of herself and that the siblings had
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed. p. 515). This is also the American law
antagonistic interests. Petitioner even gave other names the court may appoint if she was not
(39 C.J.S., p. 657). Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya, 74 Phil. 254; Gabriel vs.
herself appointed.
Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25) has been held sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that
antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the extent that a court The trial court ruled that indeed Julieta needed assistance; that Goyena even though she has a
uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is insuitable or incapable of discharging his special bond with Julieta, at 90, is not physically fit to do such chores; that Goyena's reason that
trust, that much it can be said that removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised Julieta dislikes her sister is not sufficient to make prevent her from being a guardian. The trial
within the law, and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian, court appointed Gustilo. Goyena filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. The
discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those grounds. trial court adds that the court found Amparo to be the most qualified after they considered Goyena
and the other names, given that the next of kin would not oppose.
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any
legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardian was founded.
Neither in Francisco Bengzon’s manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to
appear that the Philippine National Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was Goyena the appealed with the CA which they also denied. The CA cites that there are no
unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds for antagonistic interests between the siblings because they are co-owners. There is also no showing
removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout, the Philippine National that petitioner’s business decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta. There is no
Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. The it has received commissions allowed by law for enough proof of Amparo's hostile interests against Julieta as she was the one who petitioned for
its services is no ground to remove it, especially since the Bank’s commission averages no more the guardianship. The CA even pointed that Goyena initially concealed the deteriorating state of
than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest on the ward’s deposit and the sum that the son would mind of Julieta from the court. Lastly, that even if Goyena declared her disinterest as guardian, the
probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the names she mentioned have not acted, nor even indicated, their desire to act as such.
unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more
ISSUE: Whether petition has merit. . (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they . . . (were)
saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . . . (was) losing much money
RULING: No. as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within
one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
First of all, Rule 65 should have been applied as the case was a question of fact, not of law.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza’s
Second, the SC examined the letters that as per Goyena showed proof of antagonistic interest
house since the 1960’s; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by
between the sisters. The SC found the four letters presented to be insufficient to prove
Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4,
antagonistic interests. A mere disagreement is not proof of such.
1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Third, Goyena’s claim that Amparo's intent to be a guardian is for the control and use for her own
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza’s favor, the Estradas being
benefits of Julieta's properties is purely speculative and finds no support from the records. 
ordered to vacate the premises and pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees. But on
Finally, the SC noted two undisputed facts, that; Goyena opposed the petition for the appointment appeal, the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 96. By
of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, the RTC held that the "action by which the issue of
disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as defendants’ possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal
guardian, and concealment of the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, is situation . . . demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
reflective of a lack of good faith.  cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court." Cañiza sought to have the Court of
Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision
4. [G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997] The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court affirmed the RTC’s judgment in toto.
by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court’s
respondents. NARVASA, C.J.: judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she should have
pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a
FACTS: On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza was xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case."
declared incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court’s requirement, the Estradas insist that the
advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the context of the
1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court law." Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they
(MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Cañiza,
premises. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner
owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had Carmen Cañiza is admitted to probate."
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside
in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza’s legal guardian to oust
advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, them from the disputed premises.
maintenance and medical treatment.;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas
ISSUE: Whether Evangelista, as a guardian, has the right to obtain possession and manage the
verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the
properties of her ward. (YES)
defendants’ act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they . .
RULING: The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her 5. G.R. No. 119858. April 29, 2003 EDWARD C. ONG vs. THE CA AND THE PEOPLE OF
intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, THE PHILIPPINES CARPIO, J.:
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with
the ward’s will. FACTS: That on or about July 23, 1990, Benito Ong, representing ARMAGRI International
Corporation, conspiring and confederating together did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or feloniously defraud the SOLIDBANK Corporation represented by its Accountant, DEMETRIO
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed LAZARO, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused received in trust from said
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless SOLIDBANK Corporation, 10,000 bags of urea valued at P, 2,050,000 specified in a Trust
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner’s Receipt Agreement and covered by a Letter of Credit No. DOM GD 90-009 in favor of the
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not Fertiphil Corporation.
inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of Under the express obligation on the part of the said accused to account for said goods to
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical Solidbank Corporation and/or remit the proceeds of the sale thereof within the period specified in
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. the Agreement or return the goods, if unsold immediately or upon demand. 

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person However, Ong, once in possession of said goods, far from complying with the aforesaid
and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 obligation failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so despite repeated demands made
clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN upon him to that effect and with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
CAÑIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same or the value thereof to his own personal use
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Solidbank Corporation in the aforesaid
management of her properties . . ." By that appointment, it became Evangelista’s duty to care for amount of P2,050,000.00 Philippine Currency.
her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right Petitioner contends that in signing the trust receipts, he merely acted as an agent of ARMAGRI.
to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the trust receipts did he assume personal responsibility for the
get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza’s property, both real and personal, it being undertakings of ARMAGRI which was the entrustee.
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her
incompetency. That right to manage the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take possession ISSUE: Whether ARMAGRI Corp. violated the Trust Receipts Law
thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be
needful for this purpose. HELD: No, ARMGAGRI Corp. did not violate the Trust Receipts Law. The Supreme Court held
that the Trust Receipts Law recognizes the impossibility of imposing the penalty of imprisonment
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to
on a corporation. Hence, if the entrustee is a corporation, the law makes the officers or employees
attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by
or other persons responsible for the offense liable to suffer the penalty of imprisonment. The
Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
reason is obvious: corporations, partnerships, associations and other juridical entities cannot be
"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. — A put to jail. Hence, the criminal liability falls on the human agent responsible for the violation of
guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income the Trust Receipts Law.
and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the In the instant case, the Bank was the entruster while ARMAGRI was the entrustee. Being the
ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that entrustee, ARMAGRI was the one responsible to account for the goods or its proceeds in case of
purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to do sale. However, the criminal liability for violation of the Trust Receipts Law falls on the human
so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance." agent responsible for the violation. 
Petitioner, who admits being the agent of ARMAGRI, is the person responsible for the offense for ownership rights are imprescriptible. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the
two reasons. First, petitioner is the signatory to the trust receipts, the loan applications and the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held that,
letters of credit. Second, despite being the signatory to the trust receipts and the other documents, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
petitioner did not explain or show why he is not responsible for the failure to turn over the subject properties and as... such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit
proceeds of the sale or account for the goods covered by the trust receipts.  the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy's possession thereof for 17 years, and that
Eutropia and Victoria belatedly filed their action in 1997, or more than two years from knowledge
6. G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012 NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI- of their exclusion... as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the
MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-heirs. The CA declared the
D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and
Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, his children, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as
Respondents. PERLASBERNABE, J.: they consider necessary or fit. While recognizing
Facts: Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they
Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because
with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. of their inaction for a long period of time.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte. On Issues: petitioners impute to the CA the following errors:
September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate.
I.  WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF
and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF
of the Estate with Absolute Deed... of Sale[8] on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the THEIR INHERITANCE;
said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and
Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy) for a consideration of P80,000.00. On June 11, 1996, the II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARES OF
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96- ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within... the prohibited period. The
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having
been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage. Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place
beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion
denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria's exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and... from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently,
sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches. the are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares
RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others,the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique
of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year
acquired their respective inheritances,[9] entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole
prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia... and Victoria were deprived of their
estate
hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children,
Rosa and Douglas. Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co- in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas... were Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348);...
not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and and Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-
consequently, a total nullity. Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents
jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject Douglas in the total amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from
properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.
respondents is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot... be
denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from 7. G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012 NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO OROPESA,
the moment of her death[11] and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided Respondent. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
share in the estate.
FACTS: On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the
and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. In the said petition, it is alleged among
on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with... powers of others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his
mother, Anunciacion. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that
minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and
of majority,[15] is unenforceable. Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and
settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata,
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding his girlfriend. In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the
on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a
Rosa in the homestead properties have effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy. On the report thereon. Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her
issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker
so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see
CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and talk to the social worker.
reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August
estate. However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition. Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented
time the cause of action accrues,[22] which is from the time of actual notice in case of his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and
unregistered deed.[23] In this case, Eutropia, Victoria... and Douglas claimed to have knowledge the (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya. After presenting evidence, the (petitioner)
of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written
spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive formal offer of evidence.
period of 10 years. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri
NULL and VOID; Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop ISSUE: Whether respondent is considered as an incompetent person under the Rules of Court.
Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon (NO)
Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
RULING: After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be
Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the
without merit Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of
LAWFUL OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by
Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed
the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to the same and scheduled it
evidence presented by him showing respondent’s incompetence. for hearing. When the petition was called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody entered an
opposition and Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. After Abad formally offered his
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a Motion for Leave
following wise: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one to
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable
of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that Intervene, together with an Oppositionin- Intervention. Subsequently, on June 14, 2007, Leonardo
of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith
that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of
care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was
parentis as well. In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian. He
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent. vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform
his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties.
care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads: Sec. 2. Meaning On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, denying Abad’s petition and appointing
of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering Biason as Maura’s guardian. Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are decision but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated December 11, 2007.
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other Abad filed an appeal to the CA. On August 28, 2009, the CA issued a Decision, affirming the
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, decision of the RTC. On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. Court. Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11,
2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion, informing this Court that Biason passed away on
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, April 3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center, Marikina City due to multiple organ failure, septic shock,
positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must community acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with metastasis, and attached a copy of his
be applied in the case at bar. Death Certificate. Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the issues
raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be
8. G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012 EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,vs. LEONARDO terminated.
BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents. REYES, J.:
ISSUE: Whether the case should be dismissed due to the death of Biason. (YES)
FACTS: On March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship
over the person and properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), RULING: An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
Dagupan City. In support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such
Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which
who is single, more than ninety (90) years old, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
her and her business affairs.
In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and
Due to her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated September
and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation. Finding the 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was
challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as RULING: NONE. In ruling the case, the Supreme Court discussed the different kinds of trust
guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to since it is a rule that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription
proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship a property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. Further, it is a rule that if no trust
of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. relations existed, the possession of the property by the respondent, through her predecessor, which
The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s dates back to 1948, would already have given rise to acquisitive prescription in accordance with
appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure). Under Section 40 of Act No. 190, an action for recovery
petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any of real property, or of an interest therein, can be brought only within ten years after the cause of
substantial relief. action accrues.

Trustees (Rule 98, Rules of Court) {3} 2. Advent Capital and Finance Corp vs Nicasio Alcantara and Editha Alcatara G.R. No.
183050 January 25, 2012 ABAD, J.
1. Cañezo vs. Rojas, G.R. No. 148788 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner Advent Capital filed a petition for rehabilitation. The RTC named Atty.
FACTS: The subject property is an unregistered land situated at Naval, Biliran. Petitioner Soledad Concepcion as rehabilitation receiver. Upon audit of Advent Capital’s books, Atty. Concepcion
Cañezo is the stepdaughter of respondent Concepcion Rojas. Petitioner Soledad – filed a found that respondents Nicasio and Editha Alcantara owed Advent Capital ₱27,398,026.59,
complaint in 1997 for the recovery of the subject real property. She alleged that she bought such representing trust fees that it supposedly earned for managing their several trust accounts.
parcel of land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was not reduced into writing.
Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the property. In 1948, she and her husband left for Atty. Concepcion requested Belson Securities, Inc. to deliver to him in cash dividends that Belson
Mindanao and entrusted the said land to her father, Crispulo Rojas, who took possession of, and held under the Alcantaras’ Trust Account, claiming that the dividends formed part of Advent
cultivated the property. In 1980, she found out that the respondent, Concepcion Rojas, her Capital’s assets. Belson refused, however, citing the Alcantaras’ objections as well as the absence
stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the same. She also discovered of an appropriate order from the rehabilitation court.
that the tax declaration over the property was already in the name of his father. Respondent
Concepcion- claimed that it was her husband who bought the property from Limpiado, which Thus, Atty. Concepcion filed a motion before the rehabilitation court to direct Belson to release
accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s name. MTC -rendered a decision in favor of the money to him, as rehabilitation receiver. The Alcantaras opposed Atty. Concepcion’s motion.
the petitioner Soledad, making her the real and lawful owner of thel and. RTC - reversed the MTC They claimed that under the circumstances, the rehabilitation court had no jurisdiction over the
decision on the ground that the action had already prescribed and acquisitive prescription had set subject dividends. The rehabilitation court granted Atty. Concepcion’s motion.
in. Motion for reconsideration: the RTC amended its original decision and held that the action had
The CA denied Atty. Concepcion and Advent Capital’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the
not yet prescribed considering that the petitioner merely entrusted the property to her father. The
filing of the present petition.
ten-year prescriptive period for the recovery of a property held intrust would commence to run
only from the time the trustee repudiates the trust. The RTC found no evidence on record ISSUE: Whether or not the rehabilitation court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the
showing that Crispulo Rojas ever ousted the petitioner from the property.CA - reversed the conflicting claims of the parties over the dividends that Belson held in trust for their owners.
amended decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review. The petitioner insists that her right
of action to recover the property cannot be barred by prescription or laches even with the RULING: Certainly, the rehabilitation court has not been given the power to resolve ownership
respondent’s uninterrupted possession of the property for 49 years because there existed between disputes between Advent Capital and third parties.  Advent Capital must file a separate action for
her and her father an express trust or a resulting trust. collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s authorization
if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs.  Rehabilitation
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an existence of trust over the property – express or implied – proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of
between the petitioner and her father. claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to
that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case. The
latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt
and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules “incorporate the concept of prohibited transaction penalized, the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return
pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower
traditional approach of receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
case, or any incident, on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.”
Adoption and Custody of Minors (Republic Act Nos. 8581 and 8043; AM No. 02-6-02) {7}
Here, Advent Capital’s claim is disputed and requires a full trial on the merits. It must be resolved
in a separate action where the Alcantaras’ claim and defenses may also be presented and heard. 1. Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)
Advent Capital cannot say that the filing of a separate action would defeat the purpose of
Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and
corporate rehabilitation. In the first place, the Interim Rules do not exempt a company under
settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who
rehabilitation from availing of proper legal procedure for collecting debt that may be due it.
died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the
Secondly, Court records show that Advent Capital had in fact sought to recover one of its assets
possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
by filing a separate action for replevin involving a car that was registered in its name.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of
3. G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only
LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C. KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO,
heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
and NAPOLEON O. GARCIA, Respondents. BRION, J.:
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of
 Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial institution and the
her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein
official depository of the Philippines. Respondents were officers of Asian Construction and
and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree
development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation engaged in the construction business. In several
was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
occasions, respondents executed in favor of Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) trust receipts to
secure the purchase of construction materials that they will need in their Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on
construction projects. When the trust receipts matured, Asian failed to return to LBP the proceeds  Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”
of the construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. After several
demands went unheeded, LBP filed a complaint for Estafa against the respondent officers of The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the
ACDC. petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse
since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
Issue:  Whether the disputed transactions is a trust receipt or a loan, cloud of doubt.”

Held: there are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction. -he first is covered by the provision Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it to the owner of the irregularities.
merchandisesold. the second is covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under 
the obligation to return it to the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law, intent to defraud is Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she
presumed when the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the had already presented before the trial court. An adoption decree is a public document required by
trust receipt to the entruster/ or when the entrustee fails to return the goods under trust, if they are law to be entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial
not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. In all trust receipt transactions, pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as
both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the alternative the return of the proceeds of the the court which rendered the judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed.  the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details
of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her husband
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children.
of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient
evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria
offered. Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too
meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
2. HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. parental authority over his beloved children."
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents. ROMERO, J.:
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the
Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed
her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
separation with alimonypendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of adoption in favor of the respondents. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the
Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing lower court erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were
that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted, among others, that
the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the because he did not have a written consent to the adoption and he never abandoned his children.
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that
also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation ISSUE: Whether the father has abandoned his minor children and thus, his consent for the
at all adoption of minors is no longer needed. (NO)

reasonable times and places" to petitioner. RULING: This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in the United States, petitioner
worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month a portion of which In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.
was remitted to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the
the name of his children. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In
Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she
would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute of Judge Moya's signature. A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea,
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant
the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and
for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters the "standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L.
and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.

3. G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999 TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented the
of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document
PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge
JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty.
Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within
FACTS: Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the allowable variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge
Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui
favor of Pedro Pilapil. declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic. Based on
the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, herein legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage
defendantappellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Contract as spurious and non-existent."
Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the ISSUE: Whether Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. (NO)
Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83)
questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. Appelant questioned, among others, RULING: In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature
whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob. of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special Proceedings also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the
No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "
Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo. Appellant
Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya. In an effort to We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect
disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the Order granting the by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
1990. applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he properly considered, will justify a different conclusion." Hence, the present case is an exception to
was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma". the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron
presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition
respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993
when he arrived at private respondents' residence.
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his. At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated
At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
counsel, he even read a document shown to him. Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya. proceedings. Trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents. Petitioner argues that a
petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
Bienvenido Albacea. It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree
been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by of adoption and an authority to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee, the respective
Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. Other considerations also cast doubt proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural
on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the
Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of
The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with
guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. ISSUE: Whether the petition for adoption can include a petition for change of name (NO)

Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as RULING: Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's
vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been for by petitioner.
adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption
of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
shows that the alleged adoption is a sham. relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
4. G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
ANDRADE, respondents. REGALADO, J.: adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

FACTS: On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a Petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal name and
cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing 5. G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO,
with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its respondents. MENDOZA, J.:
decree recording such change.
FACTS: The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years
old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed
with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined. a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first
that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the
name asked for.
child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a
An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be
Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry). According to the trial
changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil
court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of
registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
actions and inconvenience to the petitioners Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the RTC.
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its
adoption because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child.
own set of rules.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice
A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and her name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a "substantial
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system. The Solicitor defect in the petition and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was a question of identity
General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the involved in that case.
change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that
Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common
there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
experience would indicate.
deserve
ISSUE
I. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction (YES) persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding. The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He
II. Whether Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was
the not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry (YES)
party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint
RULING: including the judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as
required by Rule 108, §4 which reads:
I. The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child
sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" §4. Notice and publication. — Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was
publication of notice in this case. For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the
also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the
petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the
opportunity to be heard. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as
decision of the trial court, correctly did so.
an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was
II. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and
of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, §2 plainly states: §2. Entries subject to void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter
cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
6. EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S.
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation;
REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES vs. LIBRADA F.
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
PEREZ, J.:
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. This Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by
case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling Respondents (Librada Mauricio, and her alleged daughter Leonida) for annulment of contract
of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code — to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the between Librada and Eugenio parties.
Rules of Court in 1964 covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a
name that is clearly misspelled." Thus, in Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change "Sincio" to Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan.
"Sencio" which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel "i" in the first name into the Subject land herein.
vowel "e" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic it was
held that "the change of petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Respondentss alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who was the
Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate." lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land;
that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now §3 of this Rule provides: §3 Parties. — document to eject Respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized in Pasig;
When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents
of the said contract (Kasunduan) were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there
advantages of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother
in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent. as his middle name.

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of Respondents. On ISSUE: Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
appeal with the CA, Petitioner assailed the status of Leonida as a legal heir and her capacity to natural mother as her middle name (YES)
substitute Librada who died during the pendency of the case. Petitioner averred that Leonida is
merely a ward of Librada. RULING: As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
Issue: Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally? known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent
as to what middle name a child may use.
Decision: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
Citing Dr. Tolentino’s book, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Dr. case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case,
Tolentino explained thus: the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the
another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also,
the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint matter.
before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
and within the periods fixed in the present articles.” THE SAME RULE IS APPLIED TO of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code
ADOPTION: It also cannot be made subject to collateral attack. and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
7. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. D E In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
C I S I O N SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: adopters." Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as
a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
FACTS: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt issuance of the decree of adoption. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.,It is a
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the
"Catindig," his surname. Trial court granted the adoption. Petitioner filed a motion for Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these rights and privileges for Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the
the adopted. conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna
subsequently.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons
of RA 8552. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including care.
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA
immediately precede the surname of the father. 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas
corpus filed by respondent.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling,
189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover, records show that
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.
Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa".
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals
as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
custody of minors.
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are
of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. Hence, since there is cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of
no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:
middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
 Section 20.   Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
Habeas Corpus (Rule 102, Rules of Court; AM No. 03-04-04 – Re: Rule on Custody of Minors involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors; AM No. 08-1-16-SC Rule on the within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
Writ of Habeas Data; AM No. 07-9-12-SC Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
 x x x          x x x          x x x
1. Madriñan vs. Madriñan, G.R. No. 159374 (2007)
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

2. Camara vs. Pagayatan, c (2007)

Facts: Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)  was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBP’s failure to deposit the preliminary withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to
compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the trial courts order. LBP was directed enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of P71,634,027.30 person of his own free will. (Egardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and
with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, and to notify the Court of Angelita Diamante, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001)
compliance within such period.
4. G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in cash under CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs.
its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial court’s clerk of court. However the ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and
JANE DOES, respondents.
respondent  judge found LBP’s compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to place the deposit in
x---------------------------------------------------------x
the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily withdrawable. G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001 POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER
and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA
Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order. K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTS: Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband
Issue: WON a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of
excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara from detention despite LBP’s
her husband in consortium. On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
compliance.
dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano
Held: Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie if Ilusorio. Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. One reason
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process. why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were
Petitioner does not question the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the Order citing petitioner in illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure
contempt. What petitioner assails is respondent judge’s refusal to release Camara from detention greed. She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away
despite LBP’s compliance of the full amount of the preliminary compensation. Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that
since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
This is grave abuse of respondent judge’s contempt powers, amounting to lack or excess of his Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia
jurisdiction. were the ones controlling the corporations.

3. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125901 (2001) ISSUE: Whether the habeas corpus petition shall prosper (NO)

Facts: Spouses Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their lost son from RULING: The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of
Angelita Diamante. They presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Diamante, on the other Appeals on March 23, 1999. Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his
hand, claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children
Tijing and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the whom he loved.
ruling. CA expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to
Issue: Whether or not the action for support is barred by res judicata see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that
maybe threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, (1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent
respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781
for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed
by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino. All the foregoing petitions assail the
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem"
declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both infact and in law.
sublime social institution. On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty,
his Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration
prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono. of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered
moot and academic
5. G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001 PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and
CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR
ISSUE: Whether the aforestated petitions are proper (NO)
LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
RULING: In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents. arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
---------------------------------------- Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001 RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion”
HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR
LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents. Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001 THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is
petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a "state of
MENDOZA, respondents. MELO, J.:
rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what
armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception
assaulting and attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers. President shall be the
there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged rebellion…"
leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of
arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been
to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court – lifted
6. G.R. No. 175864 June 8, 2007 ANISAH IMPAL SANGCA, petitioner, vs. THE CITY singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of
PROSECUTOR OF CEBU CITY and THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, physical liberty. In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the
Branch 58, Cebu City, respondents. trial judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition has become moot.

FACTS: In the first week of July 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), 7. G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE HERIBERTO
Regional Office VII, received information that Adam was engaged in illegal drug trafficking M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and
activities in Cebu City and neighboring cities and municipalities. PDEA then planned an NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO),
entrapment operation which led to the arrest of Adam. Respondents.

Adam denied the charge against her. She claimed that she is a trader of ready to wear clothing. As Facts: Charging Anita Mangil... syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
such, she frequently travels to different Asian countries to buy goods for sale in Cebu and in Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Mindanao. She supplies various boutiques in Cebu City, including Salad Dressing at SM, D. Cities in Puerto Princesa City. Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila... and
Blaz., Beauty Land and Lovely's Closet. She also operates a beauty parlor in Talamban. The her cohorts without bail.
inquest prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City
Prosecutor. Consequently, an information charging Adam with violation of Section 5, Article 2 of As a consequence, Mangila was arrested... and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue,
R.A. No. 9165 was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58. Manila... laiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he
On Petition for Review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient...
probable cause to hold Adam liable for the offense charged stating that based on records, it was justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals
revealed that no payment was ever made by the police officers for the supposed object of the buy (CA)a petition for habeas corpus. CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of meri
bust operations and no buy-bust money was ever presented. According to the DOJ, of the essential
elements to be established in the prosecution of the drug "buy-bust" cases, that is, "the delivery of As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could
the thing sold and the payment therefore" was wanting. With this, the Justice Secretary directed have been procured by resort to another general remedy.
the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to withdraw the information. PDEA filed a motion for
Issues: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the
reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary. Finding that Adam could not be held
release of Mangila from detention?
liable for the crime charged, the RTC issued an Order on January 26, 2007 granting the Motion to
Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for another Ruling: petition for review lacks merit. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to
valid ground. the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.
The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides... for other remedies in the regular
However, before the the order of the RTC, on January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances
filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the release of
Lovely Impal Adam who was detained in the Cebu City Jail for alleged violation of Section 5, Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial
Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where...
exceptional circumstances are extant.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for writ of habeas corpus is proper. (NO)
It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities,
RULING: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in
which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for... relief by habeas corpus because
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is
in such cases, the restraint is not illegal... here is no question that when the criminal complaints
withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all
were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts... residing Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to
manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The
conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in... their
respective territorial jurisdictions."... the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to
the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil
examination in writing and under oath of the... complainant and the witnesses in the form of Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.In the reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record
context of this rule, Judge of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of
properly denied Mangila's petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial... officer undeniably
possessing the legal authority to do so. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
With Mangila's arrestand ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
restraint on her liberty.  This is because the restraint, being lawful and... pursuant to a court public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.
2. Republic vs. Bolante, G.R. No. 160597 (2006)
Change of Name (Rule 103, Rules of Court; Republic Act Nos. 9048 and 9255)
FACTS: A petition for change of name was commenced by Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also
1. Dantes Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689 (2007) known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. In her petition before the RTC, she alleged, among other
things, the following:
Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that
is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified 1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B.
himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate 2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered
changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use
a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate. records; and

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname 4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally Thus, to prevent confusion, Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the
change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason name she has always carried and used.
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
ISSUES: A. Whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the petition. (YES)
and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that B. Whether the desired change of name should be granted. (YES)
no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth
RULING: (A) Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and Changing one’s name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. Non-compliance with these requirements would change his name appearing in his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of
be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change of name. reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within 4 prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, the Republic submits that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction. This must fail. As gleaned from the records, the petition was Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among
filed on October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and pronounce; (b)
December 7, 2000
when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname
issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
the order, the initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the 4-month fraudulent
prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. Realizing the error purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.
committed, the lower court already rectified its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all In the case at bar, Bolante’s submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable
concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001, a date reason.
outside the prohibition. She has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa.
Her
The Republic’s counter argument that the resetting, in any case, did not cure the jurisdictional records in government offices including that of her driver's license and professional license all
defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished, still must fail. While it is attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. As such,
the
true that the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all
imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted.
the jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction, during the initial hearing, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection 3. [G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002] MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in
as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the behalf of her minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL
jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, the Republic fully and CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON,
knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in respondents.
this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the subject
FACTS:
proceedings.
Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the RTC seeking to correct the following entries in
the
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may
birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: (a) the surname "Borbon" to "Eleosida"; (b) the date
appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. On behalf of the Government, the Solicitor General of
or his deputy shall appear. The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and, the parents' wedding to be left blank; and (c) the informant's name as "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida,"
therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively represents instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave
the public. In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the birth
purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was to her son out of wedlock and that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married.
fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a The
petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.
republication of the initial notice of the hearing.
The trial court issued a notice of hearing directing the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon
(B)The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification.
City and the Solicitor General to file their opposition thereto, if any, within 15 days from notice of
the petition or from the last date of publication of such notice. After the expiration of the said
period, it issued another order setting the date for the presentation of evidence on the part of the 4. G.R No. 170340 JUNE 29, 2007 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO I.
petitioner to show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements considering that there is no KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-
opposition filed despite notice. However, the Court eventually dismissed the petition for lack of SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor)
merit, stating that only the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature may be CARPIO MORALES, J.:
allowed and not those that may affect the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the persons
involved. FACTS:
Carlito Kho and his siblings filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction
ISSUE: Whether corrections of entry in the certificate of live birth may be allowed under Rule of
108 even if the errors to be corrected are substantial. (YES) entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. In
the case of Carlito, he petitioned the (1) change of the citizenship of their parents from “Chinese”
RULING: Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or to
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under the said rule may either be “Filipino”; (2) deletion of “John” from his name; and (3) deletion of the word “married” opposite
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, the
the procedure to be adopted is summary. On the other hand, if the rectification is deemed date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was prayed to be effected likewise in the birth
substantial as if it affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, the procedure to be certificates of his siblings.
adopted is adversary. In addition thereto, Carlito asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted order
proceedings the correction of the date of his and his wife’s marriage from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000,
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been the prayed that the name of the children’s mother be changed from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent. Moreover, as required,
thoroughly weighed and considered. Under Rule 108, in order to make the proceedings adversary, the
it is required that the following be made parties to the proceeding: (a) the civil registrar and (b) all petition was published for 3 consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Moreover, upon the of
filing of the petition, the Court should: (a) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing general circulation, after which it was set for hearing. Eventually, documentary evidence were
of the petition, and (b) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for 3 consecutive presented showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition.
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. If all these procedural requirements The trial court granted the petition. The Republic appealed, faulting the trial court in granting the
have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth petition despite the failure to implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be to
described as summary. offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned "married" status
In the case at bar, the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and the latter’s citizenship. Since the changes sought were
errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which
Carlos Borbon as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. As the procedural indispensable parties should have been notified or impleaded. The trial court was also faulted for
requirements stated above were complied with, the Court is not correct in dismissing the ordering the change of the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with
petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition. It jurisdictional requirements. The petition failed to allege Carlito’s prior 3-year bona fide residence
must be noted that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the in
hearing and ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three 3 consecutive weeks in a Butuan City. The title of the petition did not also state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as
newspaper of general circulation as well as its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The "Carlito
notice John I. Kho."
stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during the said hearing and all other persons
having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the ISSUES:
petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of (A) Whether Kho‘s request for change requires an adversarial proceeding. (YES)
Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing (B) Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial short of the
together with a copy of the petition. required adversary proceeding. (NO)
RULING: FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna
(A) It cannot be gainsaid that the petition involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not married to each other. When his parents
harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their
amendments. For the change involving the nationality of Carlito‘s mother as reflected in his birth son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and Wang.
nationality not only of the parents but also of the offspring. On the other hand, the deletion of the The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time. Since middle
entry that Carlito‘s and his siblings‘ parents were “married” alters their filiation from “legitimate” names are not carried in a person’s name in Singapore, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan
to Wang will be discriminated there. Moreover, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin
“illegitimate” with significant implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these
changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. When all the procedural reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin
requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to Wang.
effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition, finding that the reason given for the change of
(B) The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. Since the State has an interest in the
the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section name
3, of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. The OSG, on the
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which states that when cancellation or correction of an entry in the other hand, added that there is no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which the best interest of the petitioner.
would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. ISSUE: Whether dropping the middle name should be allowed. (NO)
Such requirement, however, may be cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108 which requires RULING: Legitimate and legitimated children are given the right to bear the surnames of their
notice by publication. The purpose precisely of Section 4 is to bind the whole world to the father and their mother. Illegitimate children, on the other hand, are required to use the surname of
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who their mother unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case, they may bear the latter’s
should have been impleaded under Section 3 but were inadvertently left out. It must be noted that surname. Applying the laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The bears only a given name and his mother’s surname. He does not have a middle name. It is only
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. As such, it is when he is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is
Considering so, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or the respondents’ parents convenience. How such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention that easier
during the hearing, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding. confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
Moreover, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of the foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change
trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the children. of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of his name. Granting of the same
5. G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005 IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be 6. G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009 MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners, vs. THE CITY CIVIL
mother ANNA LISA WANG, Petitioners, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK
represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents. ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and
LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Ma. Cristina Torres Braza and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. were married on January 4, 1978. marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
The union bore 3 children. After some time, Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. filiation
During Pablo’s wake in the Philippines, Lucille Titular began introducing minor Patrick Alvin in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. As
Titular such,
Braza as her and Pablo's son. Consequently, Ma. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which the petition must fail because in a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the
she trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. These are
obtained Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 17118 of the Family Code
Occidental. Such birth certificate stated, among others, that Patrick was acknowledged by Pablo which provides that the corresponding petition should be filed in a Family Court. Moreover, it is
and well- accepted principle that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22, 1998. Ma. questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
Cristina attack such as the petition filed in the present case.
likewise obtained a copy of the marriage contract between Pablo and Lucille. Considering the
foregoing, Ma. Cristina filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the 7. G.R. No.174689 October 22, 2007 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
Local vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. CORONA, J.:
Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that
Lucille is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
use changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered
of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for
paternity certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.
The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry,
the court, which is not acting as a Family Court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not
to a DNA test. The controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally
change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, in this case, may rule upon the validity of marriage between Pablo justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and Lucille and answer questions regarding Patrick’s legitimacy. (NO) and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that
RULING: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil
other innocuous errors. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
understanding that is made by a clerk or a transcriber in copying or writing resulting in a harmless by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record
occupation of the parent. In contrast thereto, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
only in adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded and due process is visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
properly observed. infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of
In the case at bar, the allegations of the petition clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the abovementioned ruling.
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied. respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the
8. G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER Rules of Court.
B. CAGANDAHAN QUISUMBING, J
RULING: NO. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction issue and the court must look to the statutes. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
of Entries in Birth Certificatebefore the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
in Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance
the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics of
and male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen,
was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where a
persons male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1)
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was swollen
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
development. deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has 18,000 children are born with CAH.
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. of
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that
the there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’." The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled
that by mere
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change
condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female in
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, scientific
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in thesubject’s birth
The RTC granted respondent’s petition.The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily certificate entry is in order. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed for. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
and male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
identified as a male. His name was change from Jennifer to Jeff and his gender from female to inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
male. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a The RTC then issued an order in favor of respondent and directed the City Civil Registrar of
male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong Gingoog
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to City to effect the correction or change of the entries. The CA affirmed the same, finding that the
do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the
his male characteristics. order.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual ISSUE: Whether the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. (YES)
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital RULING: The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court mandates 2 sets of notices to different potential
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply
and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name with the requirements of fair play and due process in order to afford the person concerned the
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. In the case at bar, respondent seeks the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her
merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Considering the foregoing, she should have impleaded
his birth certificate from female to male. and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as they have
interest in and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
9. G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, It must be noted that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
vs.DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT. PERALTA, J.: involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation and legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
FACTS: 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all
with parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other
only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City impleaded as respondent. Her Certificate of Live mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
Birth
shows that her full name is “Anita Sy” when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and 10. G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013 MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ
friends GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
as “Norma S. Lugsanay.” Her school records, PRC Board of Medicine Certificate and passport QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
show so. She also claimed that she had to follow the surname of her mother since she is an OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS. CARPIO, J.:
illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married. Furthermore, she contended
that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese. In connection therewith, she allegedly filed earlier a FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
effect the mentioned corrections. This was supposedly granted. However, the National Statistics well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
The RTC issued an order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and set the
case In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
for hearing with the directive that the said order be published in a newspaper of general being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
circulation Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for 3 abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
consecutive
weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished to the OSG and Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
the City Prosecutor’s Office. Respondent complied with the publication requirement. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to
RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition. marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki as a Code
"third person” in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by
the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized. 11. G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent. PERALTA, J.:
The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.
FACTS: Merlina Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
ISSUES: one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof,
she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of 24, 2002, at the Office of the MTCC. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. that she did not know the allegedhusband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and,
that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
the ground of bigamy. before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
3. Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
RULING: Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport. She also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable MTCC, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office,
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged. The RTC granted the petition. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
2. YES. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Fujiki has the personality to file innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108; and (2)
a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
married to Marinay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of the entry of marriage was proper.
3. YES. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts RULING: YES.
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. However, the Philippine the
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical,
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or Certiorari... the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. execution sale of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil statutory limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160,... according to the
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value;
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. therefore, the trial court's order was contrary to law.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered Issues: whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the
into Family Code.
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a Ruling: Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of Code.
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and 153 of the Family Code. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous,
all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. inalienable and free from attachment. ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, execution, forced sale or attachment except:
but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
marriage to speak of. (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
Constitution of Family Home (Rule 106, Rules of Court) rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
1. G.R. No. 186322 July 8, 2015 ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155
Petitioners, vs.PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL, PATERNO obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court...
FERDINAND BELL III, and PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL IV, Respondents. which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The
court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum
Facts: (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value... exceeds
Rogelia Calingasan-Bell... sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the
obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed. property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum.CA... affirmed constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred
Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners in the thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by... law.
amount of P1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed... their Petition for failure to Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its
show any reversible error committed by the CA. owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property... was levied on provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at... the time of its
execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31August 2004, ordered the lifting of constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or
the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family home. Petitioners filed a enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.[45]
Motion... of the lifting of the writ of execution. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a... forced sale, and any amount above the
Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed
commercial... area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million. to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
The RTC... set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family home... and voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting... the family
directed the commissioners to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot. Respondents home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the
filed a Petition... before the CA... the CA rendered its Decision granting respondents' Petition for maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already defendants, hence a petition.
determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an...
equitable mortgage. Issue: W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid?

Absentees (Rule 107, Rules of Court) Held: NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null

1. Armas vs. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467 (2000) and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil
status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a
FACTS: Teodorico Calistero died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. He was survived by relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or
his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married to absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary Jane ,
William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the
years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico got married without putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative
Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving 2. Vda. De Biascan vs. Biascan, G.R. No. 138731 (2000)
heir of the latter and that the marriage between Marietta and her brother, being allegedly
bigamous is by itself null and void. She prayed that her son be appointed as administrator of the FACTS: Private respondent Rosalina J. Biascan filed a petition at the CFI of Manila praying for
estate of the decedent and inheritance be adjudicated to her. her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea
Zulueta. She was then appointed as regular administratrix of the estates. However,Maria Manuel
ISSUE: WON Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of Florencio Biascan entered her appearance as Oppositor-
of presumptive death Movant. She filed a pleading containing several motions including a 1) motion for intervention, 2)
motion for the setting aside of private respondent’s appointment as special administratrix and
RULING: No. The marriage between the respondent and decedent was solemnized in 1958 where administratrix, and 3) motion for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Florencio
the law in force at the time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code. Article 256 of the Family Biascan. Judge Serafin Cuevas granted Maria’s intervention and set for trial the motion to set
Code limits its retroactive effect only to cases where it would not prejudice or impair vested or aside the Orders appointing respondent as administratrix. On April 2, 1981, the trial court issued
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws. Since the Civil Code provides an Order resolving that: (1) Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio; (2) respondent and herbrother
that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 are the acknowledged natural children of Florencio; (3) all three are the legal heirs of Florencio
consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry, then Marietta’s marriage with who are entitled to participate inthe settlement proceedings; (4) the motion to set aside the order
Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right to claim a portion of Teodorico’s estate. appointing private respondent as administratrix is denied; and (5) themotion to approve inventory
and appraisal of private respondent be deferred. 58 days after he receipt of the April 2, 1981
Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108, Rules of Court) Order, Mariafiled her motion for reconsideration which private respondent opposed.
1. Rivero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273 (2005)
On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was caught on fire. The
Facts: In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against records of the settlement proceedings were lost. On January 2, 1985, private respondent filed a
defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During Petition forReconstitution of the said records.Due to the delay caused by the fire and the
trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement reconstitution of the records, it was only on April 30, 1985 that an Order has been issue denying
with plaintiff whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and Maria’s Motion for Reconsideration. Maria died and her testate estate also became the subject of
pay petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC Granted settlement proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed as interim special administrator.
the compromised agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed On August 21, 1996, the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given notice of the April 30,
for annulment 1985 Order when its associate to inquired about the status of the case. The associate checked the
of  judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed records if there was proof of service of the April 30,1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria,
Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he discovered that there was none.  A Notice of Appeal dated
question assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the April 22, 1996 was filed by petitioner from the Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30,
subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not 1985 of the trial court. While the said notice of appeal was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp of the
recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were trial court on the first page of thenotice clearly indicated that the same was received by the trial
court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September20, 1996 was also filed by
petitioner. On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioner’s appeal on the Additional Cases
ground that the appeal was filed out of time. The trial court ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order 1. [G.R. NO. 128781. August 6, 2002] TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS
which was the subject of the appeal already became final as the Motion for Reconsideration and the HEIRS OF ANTONIO NICOLAS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
thereof was filed sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the court HON. PABLO P. INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS, respondents.
ruled that the notice of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the same was filed more than 11 AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.:
years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985 Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. FACTS: Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of
The Motion for Reconsideration dated November 13, 1996 of petitioner was likewise denied Rafael C. Nicolas. Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner
by the trial court in an Order dated February 12, 1997.Not satisfied with this decision, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari  with Prayer for Mandatory Injunction with the Court of  Appeals Zenaida Nicolas and
questioning the October 12, 1996 and February 12, 1997 Orders of the Regional Trial Court. The predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas.
First Division of the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari of petitioner and On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositor–applicant in the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. intestate proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that
ISSUE: administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the
WON the CA HAS SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE TRIAL COURT FROM THE decedent.
USUAL COURSE On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon "to submit pertinent
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED 16 FEBRUARY 1999 DECISION  documents
AND THE 18 MAY 1999RESOLUTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ERRONEOUS FINDING relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE ORDER determination of the court if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing with notice
DATED APRIL 2, 1981 BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY DESPITE THE FACT THAT N to
O OPPOSITION ON ITS TIMELINESS WAS FILED AND MOREOVER NO RULING AS the present registered owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the
REGARDS ITS TIMELINESS WAS MADE. collation of properties."

HELD: No. On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, to wit:
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and judgments in special "Acting on the Amended Motion for Collation filed by oppositor-applicant Ramon G. Nicolas and
proceedings which may be thesubject of an appeal. the
“Section 1. comment thereto filed by petitioner-administratrix, the Court finds the following properties to be
Orders or  judgments from which appeals may be taken. collated to the estate properties under present administration, to wit:
 – An interested person may appeal in a special proceeding from an order orjudgment rendered by "Accordingly, the Administratrix is hereby ordered to include the foregoing properties which were
a Regional Trial Court or a Juvenile and domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: received from the decedent for collation in the instant probate proceedings. On November 18,
(a) Allows or disallows a will; 1994, petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive shares of the esta that the properties subject of the Order "were already titled in their names years ago"8 and that
te to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. On February 23, 1995, the RTC
claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to
offset to a claim against it; determine whether titled properties should be collated. Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;(e) Constitutes, in procee Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated February 23, 199510 which respondent
dings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a opposed.11
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, On November 4, 1996, the RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on ground
except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; of
and(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the p conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the subject
erson appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for new trial or
for reconsideration.”
properties acquired by her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not be A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
included in the collation;13 and, ordered the hearing on the collation of properties covered by provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded
TCT No. T-V- 1211 and T-V-1210 only.14 in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals: "The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and
On November 28, 1996, acting on the impression that the collation of the real properties the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
enumerated in the Order dated November 11, 1994 is maintained by the RTC, petitioner Teresita inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.
N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as administratrix be "All that the said court could do as regards said properties are determined whether they should or
maintained; and that the properties be declared and decreed as the exclusive properties of the should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
registered owners mentioned therein and not subject to collation. administrator.
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996. Petitioners Teresita N. de If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to
Leon, resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
Zenaida Nicolas (the surviving spouse of Antonio Nicolas) and the Heirs of Antonio Nicolas filed probate court cannot do so."
with Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction claiming that: third
After private respondent Ramon had filed his comment, and petitioners, their reply, and after persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased
hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a third person
found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the Order dated November 11, 1994 directing the for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims.
inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had What seems to be a conflict between the above-quoted Rule and the afore–discussed
already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation; that the appeal jurisprudence
of the petitioner from the Orders dated November 4, 1996 and December 3, 1996 removing that the Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This
petitioner as is
administratrix is timely appealed; and, observing that the notice of appeal and record on appeal because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC
appear to be unacted upon by the RTC. and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the
subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court can pass upon the question of title? The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals26 that the order of exclusion (or
inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for
RULING: The court finds the petition partly meritorious. Contrary to the finding of the Court of all
Appeals that the Order of November 11, 1994 had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
therefrom in due time, we hold that said Order is interlocutory in nature. Our pronouncement in certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass
Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling: upon
"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
of separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the In the Rodriguez case, the Court distinguished between an order of collation and an order of
said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator exclusion from or inclusion in the estate’s inventory, thus:
appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the "In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs.
administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent Rustia’s titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the
power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be
excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased determined."
person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an Order
left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations, with power to of Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we
determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein have already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the
belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to probate
the ownership of the said properties."
court at the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
case and we found no indication that the debts of the decedent’s spouses have been paid and the that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
net remainder of the conjugal estate has already been determined, and the estates of the deceased because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death.
spouses at the time filing of the motion for collation were ready for partition and distribution. In
other words, the issue on collation is still premature. ISSUE: Whether the venue was properly laid. (YES)
And even if we consider, en arguendo, that said assailed Order is a collation order and a final RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
order, of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he
still, the same would have no force and effect upon the parties. It is a hornbook doctrine that a resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the
final doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
order is appealable. As such, the Order should have expressed therein clearly and distinctly the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
facts The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
and the laws on which it is based as mandated by Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution residence
of or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should
the Republic of the Philippines be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
2. Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis-G.R No. 133743 Feb 6, 2007 Rodolfo San Luis vs. application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
Felicidad San Luis-G.R. No. 134029 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: such
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
(Felicisimo). During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, term
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
Divorce meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
which term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis. He had no children with requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership than temporary.
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the say,
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
and purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
administration be issued to her. of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
to place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to... receive and enter into
the possession those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Muntinlupa." Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia's death in April
Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties.  They... said that their
deceased’s residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong's
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business... partner.  They
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not
of possess the desire to earn.  They claimed that the best... interests of the estate dictate that Joseph
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of be appointed as special or regular administrator.
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, of Joaquin's estate.  Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective proposed
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads--
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The
3. G.R. No. 177099. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner, versus SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED
JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, Respondents. Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF
Facts: On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM
Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER
Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE
in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), [5] and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad).  Lucia THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM
died on April 24, 1924.  Joaquin and Lucia had three children--Jesus (died without issue), FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED
Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, [6] Joseph, and Teresa [7]).  AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND
Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926.  They also had three children--Eduardo, Sebastian, COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE
and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile).  At the time of his death, Joaquin left two REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL
parcels of land with improvements Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA
improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING
April 1994. CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP,
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA.
to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of
a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a)... confirming and Ruling:
declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the As to Sebastian's and Eduardo's common issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we
estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the Court of
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions... of ownership that arise en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second... marriage of Joaquin to
during the proceedings. [15]  The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises Caridad.  It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of Caridad's name in TCT
special and limited jurisdiction. [16]  As held in several cases, [17] a... probate court or one in No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to TCT No. 32184. Lucia's share in the  property... covered by the said TCT was carried over to the
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not properties covered by the certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the... deceased but by title adverse to that of the and 38255.  And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory
deceased and his estate.  All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine heirs - Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death
administrator. of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the... deceased
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice intestate proceedings of either.  Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. [18]  Second, if the interested parties properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership... to determine the estate of
are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not estate of Lucia, the same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being
impaired, then the... probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. [19]  Verily, its Lucia's spouse. [24] 
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the properties
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the... property in the covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory heirs.
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. [20] Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that the
heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration
ownership issue.  More importantly, the determination of whether the subject... properties are in... the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant
conjugal is but collateral to the probate court's jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin. consideration.  This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said TCTs.  Indeed, simple
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement of possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a holder's... true ownership of
Joaquin's estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since property.
the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married... to Caridad Thus, the fact that the properties were... registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Garcia.  He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses'
contracted a first marriage with Lucia.  Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, coverture. [27]  The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the
were able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254... and 38255 were derived from a civil... status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties
mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR are their conjugal properties.
BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Neither can Sebastian's claim that Joaquin's estate could have already been settled in 1965 after
Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the... first the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld.  Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not
married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta). [21]  When TCT settle the estate of a deceased person.  As provided in Section 1,... Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the debts of the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was... issued for a parcel of land, estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. 
identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965
Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square meters.  This same lot was covered by As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say
TCT No. 5577 (32184) [22] issued on that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose.  The RTC found
April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta. that Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his... averments in his
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative allegations.
on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. Also, Sebastian's insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to the estate
of Joaquin cannot be sustained.
Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco
May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the... proceedings below by her husband Walter de against Emilio I.  Emilio I was eventually... acquitted.
Santos.  Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos.  The RTC In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among
likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to others with infidelity.  The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of
intervene, alleging that he is the... surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren,
Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention.  The RTC later granted the motion, thereby Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II,
admitting his answer on October 18, 1995. and Isabel in the same special lower court.  The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that both City (JDRC-QC)... granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was
courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel's
participated in the estate of Joaquin.  It was incumbent upon Sebastian to... present competent testimony in court that her grandparents' visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.
evidence to refute his and Eduardo's admissions that Joseph and Teresa were heirs of Jose, and On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina's death, Federico adopted his
thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so.  On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina's estate Federico,
representation of the Joaquin's compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively. opposed the petition Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel's petition for letters of
This Court also differs from Eduardo's asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together with administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she
Joaquin's estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria.  A perusal of being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel's parents' marriage being declared
the November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of... the properties null... and void.  However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel
related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on
of Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I,... who can all
lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after... the payment of the obligations of represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
the estate, as enumerated in the said provision.  The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent's estate on
Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico.
Joaquin's estate, they being his legal... heirs. On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
However, we agree with Eduardo's position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin's estate Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing
pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros.  Eduardo was able to show that a separate Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina's intestate estate
proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros... before the On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City. [34]  While there has been no showing that the alleged will of Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin's estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been subject estate As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the
probated and approved, prudence dictates that this ruling of the appellate court.  We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina's
estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico's estate.
4. G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012 EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article
992 of the Civil Code must be followed.  Isabel further asserts that Emilio
Facts: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.  Cristina III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three become a co-administrator thereof.
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate...
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and Cristina's only child, Emilio Issues:
A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no
spouses Federico and Cristina.  Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita interest in the estate to justify his appointment as... administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III's
and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation... of Isabel's actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically
parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.  Isabel's parents, along with her paternal grandparents, demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint... administration as there are no "opposing parties or administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the...
factions to be represented." office.[18]
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura[21] where we
Ruling: allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is administrators.  However, we drew a distinction between the... heirs categorized as next of kin,
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent's estate.  We did not choose.  Considering the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute... of
Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co- distribution to the decedent's property [citations omitted]. It is generally said that "the nearest of
administrator.  In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
decision of 16 June 2010. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the... amount or preponderance
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.'"
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III's demonstrable interest in the
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules.  We gave weight to Emilio
an administrator.  This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, III's demonstrable interest in Cristina's estate and without a closer scrutiny of... the attendant facts
the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has... been reinforced in and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof.
jurisprudence. The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof.  Neither does squabbling
is the prospective administrator's interest in the estate. among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the... order of preference set
The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and forth in Section 6, Rule 78.  Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,... deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to to be appointed as administrator.[31]  Given Isabel's unassailable interest in the estate as one of
administer the estate correctly.[10]  In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the the decedent's legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of
person to be appointed administrator of a decedent's estate... must demonstrate not only an interest Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right.  It is a... matter
in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court[32] and depends on the facts and the attendant
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of circumstances of the case.[33]
administrator of a decedent's estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
but as an exception.  We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court... which Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.  They compel that a choice be made of one over the
specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the other.
next of kin.  In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio
which say that "x x x [w]hen an executor or administrator dies,... resigns, or is removed, the III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x." characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
benefit of the estate and those interested therein.[13]  We recognized that the appointment of 2.  Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the... determination of a person's suitability for the co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent's estate, ultimately delaying settlement
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court thereof; and
exercising the power of appointment. 3.  Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina's estate, has not
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American looked after the estate's welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III's demonstrable interest in the
their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;[15] (2) where estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.  Respondent Isabel... points out that
the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and after Emilio III's appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked
perplexing one to settle;[16] (4) to... have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof
work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;[17] and when a person entitled to the as evidenced by the following:
1.  Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully
the partial inventories[34] he filed therewith properties of the estate[35] including several parcels discharge the duties of settling the decedent's estate with the end in view of distribution to the
of land, cash, bank deposits,... jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio
properties, contrary to Section 1,[36] paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. III's omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
2.  Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico's settlement of the decedent's administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate
estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said estate of the decedent, Cristina.
(whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the... decedent did not leave In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is
any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.[37] the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.  To
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to... work as co-
following imputations of Isabel that: administrators of their grandmother's estate.  The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of
[Emilio III] did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002; Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were
[T]he inventory [Emilio III] submitted did not include several properties of the decedent; estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
[T]hat properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent's estate to appoint a co-
persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those,
[W]hile some properties have found their way to [Emilio III], by reason of falsified documents; such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested... in the said estate.
[38]
Emilio III refutes Isabel's imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the 5. [G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004]. JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their
functions of administrator of Cristina's estate: capacities as President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines Internationl
From the time of the RTC's Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners, vs.
before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III's assumption of that office, arguing that "[t]he REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE
decision of the [RTC] dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments... authorized by the PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY
Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;" SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial
The delay in Emilio III's filing of an inventory was due to Isabel's vociferous objections to Emilio Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special
III's attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their behalf,
Appeals; respondents. CORONA, J.
The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one of the
first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent's estate, such that it cannot constitute FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance
a complete and total listing of the decedent's properties; and Company, Inc. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent
The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private complainant, has (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife
been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu... propio dismissal of illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes
the cases. and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).
While we can subscribe to Emilio III's counsel's explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course City
of the settlement of a decedent's estate, we do not find any clarification on a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez,.
Isabel's accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about. for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in appoint a special administrator. Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85,
his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special administrators of their father’s estate.
when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his... inaction on two As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an
occasions of Federico's exclusion of Cristina's other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,029 shares of
siblings, from the list of heirs. stock
in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing
50.725%
of the company’s outstanding capital stock. RULING: An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,014 under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right to transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However,
repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of
its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of stock the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall
within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an
name. On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In
and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and
share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do
FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner pending the finaladjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it
FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Ortañez failed to repurchase the same. Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings is
at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City), Juliana Ortañez and her two children, Special well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s
Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property
4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the of
estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to
number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortañez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
Ortañez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. It must be emphasized that the questioned properties fishpond were included in the inventory of
Herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as properties of the estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November
private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of 14,
Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez. 1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3, 1976 in lieu of
The intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed private Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was
respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. Special executed between petitioner and private respondent without notice and approval of the probate
Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of court. Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three fishponds as
agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial among
nullity the real properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated
of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate. These motions were opposed by Special by same were part of the estate under administration.
Administrator Jose Ortañez. The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which according to
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale our settled jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under
of administration. More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes where We
Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose stated that when the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
Ortañez. proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval
Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife of the probate court.
shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, We held that the sale of an
Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to immovable
administer. property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special proceedings, needs court approval. . .
The intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez for the This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs. Agustin Cancio
approval of the deeds of sale. wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs can sell a part of the estate during the pendency of the probate It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before it
proceedings can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. As
without approval from the court. (NO)
early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano, We laid down the rule that a sale by an distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will.
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court is null and For
void and title does not pass to the purchaser. unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the father's holographic will.
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate
sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void and
for as approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,
long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s contention that Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue
the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power influence.
pertaining to the said court. Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755. On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator Street,
or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a Maria
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
sale? Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to
to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words, prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul unauthorized Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property
or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication. and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed by the On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of
subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the
the decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of judgments on February 23, titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent
1999. Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed by Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
the appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent
thereafter move for a writ of execution and for the intestate court to grant it. Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider.
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of
6. G.R. No. 118671January 29, 1996 THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
RUIZ, Executor vs. CA, MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance
JUDGE OF THE RTC OF PASIG, BRANCH 156. PUNO, J.: the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his ISSUES
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, 1. Whether the probate court has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the
private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren. (NO)
Edmond 2. Whether the probate court should order the release of the titles to certain heirs. (NO)
Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named 3. Whether the probate court should grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. executor of the will. (NO)
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate
was RULING
1.On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
the court, such allowance as are provided by law. distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children and decided as in ordinary cases.
of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
gainfully In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate
the tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of
latter's grandchildren. them
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within
"minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died
education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
extend obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order
it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
therefore, It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate. extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic
2.Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to raised even after the will has been authenticated.
creditors. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate probate
which is allowed only under the following conditions: court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his motion for
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. Therein, petitioner assailed the
or distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of
appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be provide
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules. shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
And Rule 90 provides that: cases.
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to 3. Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a
explicitly provides: Continuing
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not Guaranty Agreement for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March
the 1981,
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one
debts and expenses for administration. When petitioner moved for further release of the funds of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the
deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide
real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
favor. On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its among
succeeding others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds. Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summons were issued against
the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
and justness signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void;
7. [G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005] UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.: ISSUES
1. Whether the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid. (NO)
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. 2. Whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid. (NO)
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended
for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel RULING
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the 1.At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
the In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of will
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard has been probated:
Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
the probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property 2.The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
such heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or abovedescribed
solemnities chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as
which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of liability
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced was
in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic will which conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows: their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition,
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to
demise, receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of such
Edmund and Florence, my children. tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
embracing creditor
all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
making accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All
tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The claims
joint for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is due,
invalid, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
probate otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors. that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead
the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot of
allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
any amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we
of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. … This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
When executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. the
Ariola rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
other disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased. soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its at the time of his death:
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further. Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in
8. G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON which he had estate.
and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON PEREZ, J.: jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
having been residence
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of be
Eliseo’s interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to such
the nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
Certificate cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
real "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
administratrix of her late father’s estate. actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant the
to Section1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be Everlasting
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate. Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
In a Decision dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to estate
Eliseo upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was may be laid in the said city.
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled.
ISSUE: Whether the venue was properly laid. (YES)
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma".
time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness
the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as of Judge Moya's signature.
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner.
the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being the
bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in
of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the "standard" signature"
with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the and concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT
lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual written by one and the same person.
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature, appellee presented the
binding upon this Court. comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former NBI Chief Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge
9. G.R. No. 150175 February 5, 2007 ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA Moya
ORTIZ BRIONES, namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui
SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable
RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA, Petitioners, vs. variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting
BRIONES, the
petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
FACTS: Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his claim
support as
of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed
Moya, Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."
CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil. During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, herein ISSUE: Whether Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. (NO)
defendantappellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as RULING: In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature
Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the
damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. Appelant credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "
questioned, among others, whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect
Jacob. Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo. applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya. heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the Order found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 properly considered, will justify a different conclusion." Hence, the present case is an exception to
October 1990. the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned
proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were
was
presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on possession in his favor. The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually issued. Thereafter, a
respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to him
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More on installment for the total purchase price. Thus, a new certificate of title in the name of Solas’
importantly, was issued. Later, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee,
when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his. Solas cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
At
the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense ISSUE: Whether or not an estate proceeding may be considered a pending litigation in relation to
counsel, he even read a document shown to him. Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent the property included is such estate which disallows a court official from purchasing the same on
has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya. the ground of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner
Bienvenido Albacea. HELD: YES. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after
any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. A
expert thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
purportedly probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is
made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an
which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show that the
contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his Special Proceeding in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated at the
own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage, Lot 11 is still deemed to be “in
thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted litigation” subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. This notwithstanding, it
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local was held that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of Solas did not violate the rule on disqualification to
Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro purchase property because the special proceedings was then pending before another court (RTC)
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
1. Secretary Leila De Lima vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528
10. A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013 RODOLFO C. SABIDONG vs. NICOLASITO S. Facts: on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of
SOLAS (Clerk of Court IV) VILLARAMA, JR., J.: a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is Lot No. 11 which is part of the Hodges Estate which is Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
subject of a pending intestate proceedings. Rodolfo Sabidong is the son of Trinidad Sabidong, one Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and
of the longtime occupants of Lot 11. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the desist... from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges
Hodges Estate, docketed at the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered in said case of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."[3]
ordering the occupants to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered
plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time, respondent Nicolasito Solas De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.[4] He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The
was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City. He submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary... protection order may be issued.
11. Under the Order issued by the probate court, Solas’ Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a
Then, the probate court issued another Order granting Solas’ motion for issuance of a writ of
Issues: Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.[5]
Ruling: WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed FACTS: Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme. He was last seen in
Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to: Jolo, Sulu. Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo; Station.
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this More than a month later , the Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife, filed a Petition for
Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the Court of Appeals (CA).The petition was directed against
its attached affidavits. certain
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP):
2. Spouses Nerio vs. Brgy. Capt. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460 Lt.
Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
 Spouses Nerio vs. Brgy. Capt. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460 Facts Petitioners alleged that in PNP; Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr.
February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet
Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. [collectively referred to as petitioners].
After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from
respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who The petition went on to state: Soon after the Tagitis left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the
advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to
the latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him. When Kunnong could not locate Engr.
a receipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local
the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter- reply – as police agency. Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to
well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possible violence from locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities
respondents – gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by
issuance of a writ of amparo. After examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits the Abu Sayyaf group.
attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed respondents to make a verified return.
Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the Information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified stated that Engr. Tagitis
assailed Resolution finding that petitioners’ claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, is
surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficiently explained the reason behind the in the hands of the uniformed men; and according to reliable information received by Tagitis,
issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of the subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the
writ of amparo. CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or seeking
threatened by an unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a their help to find her husband, but Tagitis's request and pleadings failed to produce any positive
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to results. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to Tagitis's request for help
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in
is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely physical possession and custody of Engr. Tagitis.
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain Tagitis has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
grounds. circumstances, Tagitis has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their
3. Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of thesubject’s human and the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;”
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. iii. “(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo. The basis whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
for threat, act or omission; and”
the issuance by the Court of the Writ is as follows:
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the Tagitis from the military, Lt. Gen The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) of the Rule to be complete in every
Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory
military, pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
that was involved. omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in
Thereafter, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis of the PNP did not light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty;
appear to hence the one filing the petition may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance. disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is
ISSUES detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused
1. WON the petition for writ of amparo filed is sufficent in form and substance. (YES) the disappearance.
2. WON an enforced disappearance is a proper ground for issuance of a writ of amparo. (YES)
3. WON there was an enforced disappearance in this case. (YES) To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
4. WON the PNP may be held accountable. (YES) situation,
RULING the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details
1. In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the available to the one filing the petition under the circumstances, WHILE presenting a cause of
petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or
SPECIFICALLY, the petitioners allege that Tagitis failed to A) allege: 1) any ACT or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, to determine if the
OMISSION the required
petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to LIFE, LIBERTY, and SECURITY; 2) in a elements-–-namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
complete violations of the rights to life, liberty or security-–- are present.
manner HOW Tagitis was ABDUCTED, the persons RESPONSIBLE for his
DISAPPEARANCE, and the Applying these rules in the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the
respondent’s SOURCE of INFORMATION; 3) the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal
instructions or with their consent; and 4) any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in activities,
the and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too,
performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; B) implead the under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information,
members police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights
of PNP-CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband; C) attach to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor
the vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken
affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations; and D) specify what legally available efforts "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007,
she specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt
took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband. of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."
The petitioners state that a petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall
allege, among others, as stated in Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as
i. “(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. This requirement, however, should not be read as an
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
affidavits;” submitting
ii. “(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as statement
that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. The Court also states that certain evidentiary difficulties are present in the Amparo
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance proceeding: First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
must perpetrators. Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the
have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. The Court rejected the military or police forces. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
petitioners’ argument that the Tagitis's petition did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements disappearance; The central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance-–-i.e., the corpus
of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his delicti or the victim’s body-–-is usually concealed to effectively thwart any investigation. The
companions problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence.
immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they Third is the element of denial; In many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the
were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
2. The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights.
Amparo in an ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE situation.
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced The characteristics an amparo proceeding of being summary and of the use of substantial
disappearances or threats thereof." However, while the Rule covers "enforced disappearances" evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or
this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveals the clear intent of the framers
The Court clarifies that it does not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial of the Amparo Rule to have it become similar to an administrative proceeding.
killing Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
based on existing penal laws. Its intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance allegations by substantial evidence.
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address it. To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, the Court refers this case back to the CA for appropriate
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions,
of and
Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less
than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the 4. Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010
life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.
The absence of a specific penal law in the Philippines, however, is not a stumbling block for Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December 3,
action from this Court through the issuance of a writ of amparo. Because UNDERLYING every 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in
enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable6
that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held that Col. Kasim was
powers. accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced
Furthermore, the Court has surveyed international law and states that enforced disappearance as a disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded
State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital information that
generally accepted principle of international law, which should be considered a part of the law of Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim
the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the carries. However, before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead.
international conventions that bind us. This should serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ
of Issue Whether or not Col. Kasim’s death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic.
Amparo.
Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as Ruling: The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has
evidenced been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny the petitioners’
primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced disappearance," the some material, motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can no longer be
among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening
Rule, the Court can provide remedies. death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left
behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence disappearances. The trial erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility
gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However,
informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military. It is the Court agreed with the trial in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are very
not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on limited, superficial and one-sided. In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly
the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim failed to discharge their burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of James’s
received from his "asset" or network of assets during his lifetime. 4 |Case Digests in Special abduction. Such ineffective investigation extant in the records of this case prevents us from
Proceeding completely exonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James’
disappearance. The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio
5. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795 City Police Station do not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the
Facts: The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have been investigation made. In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the
deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our constitutional rights to liberty and security of James who remains missing to date, the Court
Constitution, as the result of the nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for further investigation by the PNP
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City. and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the standard of
Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to diligence required by the Amparo Rule. 6 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding
be demolished pursuant to a court judgment which was affirmed with finality in four other cases.
7. Edgardo Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467
Issue: Whether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners. Facts: This petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision6 of the RTC of Malolos which
granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent against the petitioners. The
Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened petition was filed due to the mysterious disappearance of respondent’s husband after he was
demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among thee arrested by the security of Asian Land. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
numeration of rights covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding no legal basis for the issuance complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new remedy of writ of amparo which is agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or persons
effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also
not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. 5 |Case Digests in Issue: Whether or not allegation and proof that the persons subject of the petition for Writ of
Special Proceeding Amparo are missing are enough for such writ to issue.

6. Arthur Balao vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050 Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative. The Court pointed out that “in an amparo petition, proof
Facts: On the early morning of September 17, 2008, James Balao was abducted by unidentified of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance
armed men. With no idea where he is, the siblings asked the assistance of the organization was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) and other NGOs to locate James. One of the teams also went government.” The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of the Military Intelligence thereof. "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or
Group in Camp Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in said offices denied any abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
knowledge on James’s whereabouts. Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
for them to protect James’s life, liberty and security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose where James is detained or confined, to release protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. From the statutory definition of enforced
James, and to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. The RTC granted the disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it: (a) that there be an
petition. arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it
Issue: Whether or not the order of the court granting the petition for writ of amparo was correct. be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for
Ruling: The Supreme Court partially granted the petitions and modified the judgment of the RTC. such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
Writ of Amparo was formulated amidst rising incidents of extralegal killings and enforced time.
 Facts: Spouses Gregorio and Mar Lourdes Samson filed a complaint for forcible entry and
8. Lourdes Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871 damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against herein petitioner
Facts: On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, Daniel Masangkay Tapuz et al, for entering without permission and against their objection the
was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron disputed land in Aklan registered under the name of the spouses armed with bolos and carrying
(AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was suspected firearms and unidentified persons numbering 120 and for building a nipa and bamboo
brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless structure. The Municipal Trial Court decided in favor of the spouses, herein private respondent.
interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset. Despite her The herein petitioners appealed the ruling to Regional Trial Court which affirmed the decision and
release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with the Office of granted the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and subsequently, ruled positively on the
the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave motion of the spouses to demolished the structure built by Masangkay Tapuz et. al. While their
misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She petition for review of the permanent mandatory injunction and order of demolition at the Court of
likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite Appeals is pending, the sheriff issued notice to vacate and for demolition. Petitioners now seek
provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation. Meanwhile, the the succor of the Supreme Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that men belonging to of Court and issuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo.
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such
information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October Issue: Whether or not writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is the proper remedy.
2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act against
the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for Ruling: No, the Supreme Court found the petition for certiorari and issuance of writ of habeas
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico data and writ of amparo as fatally defective in this case. The writ of amparo does not issue to
also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
the case of Lourdes. amorphous and uncertain grounds. It was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an Amparo petition. and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations
of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
Ruling: No. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
proceedings Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under On the other hand, the writ on habeas data on the other hand, is intended to address the
international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. There is no Philippine law unjustified/unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty and
that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there security, which was not concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of the writ. 9 |Case
are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides Digests in Special Proceeding
for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command
responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra- legal killings, 10. Fr. Robert Reyes vs. Raul Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161
enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30,
the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary 2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of
inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes,
seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion. Upon the
Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order
crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. Reluctance of the (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold
amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49
pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. 8 |Case Digests in others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
Special Proceeding After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ
Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City. RTC
9. Daniel Masangkay vs. Judge Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484 issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of
probable cause. Petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Every time petitioner would leave and protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner the privilege of the
return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a ytemporary protection order independently of the
minutes because of the existing HDO. former. 11 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Issue: Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. 12. So vs. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108 (2010)
Facts: Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on
Ruling: No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights that behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the
fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings
the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The restriction on before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati
petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by
was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan.
security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Additionally, Acting on the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to Refer Accused’s Illness to a Government Hospital,
petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of
deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he Guisande’s mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial
has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of for Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused
amparo. The new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by the Supreme Court is Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of
life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s determination that she was
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and ready for trial. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which
effort on matters not covered by the writ. 10 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding ultimately led to the incident before this Court, The Criminal Case for Qualified Theft was
dismissed.
11. Noriel Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011
Facts: On September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was forced to Issues:
confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he was repeatedly 1. Is issuance of writ of amparo and habeas corpus a proper remedy based on the facts at hand?
threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess the whereabouts of NPA camp 2. Does the dismissal of the criminal case for qualified theft warrants the dismissal of the petition
and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring that he had surrendered to the military for writ of habeas corpus and amparo?
and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset. On his last day of
incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a Ruling:
surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper On the first issue, The Court ruled in the negative.The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and
and was warned not to report anything to the media. On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of -
Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life,
Protection Order, Inspection of Place and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful. In this case , the
Supreme Court granted the respective writs on December 15, 2009, after finding that the petition confinement and custody of Accused Guisande is proper. The most basic criterion for the issuance
sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by the members of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom
of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted
via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify
Issue: Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after the writs the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal
of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor. and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of On the second issue, The court completely agreed with the OSG, that with the dismissal of the
temporary protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist the court non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail
before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any
can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful
underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and
academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as "one that ceases to 14. Burgos vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon Facts: On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas
would be of no practical use or value." 12 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person
abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO verification, it was
13. Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165 (2009) discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a
Facts: Respondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The poloce was able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the
leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August 29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG
property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA CARLO, and Melissa
intended to utilize it for local projects. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements of the New People’s
property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their investigation as “rather shallow” and “conducted haphazardly.” The CA took note that P/Supt.
indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a Estomo’s investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt. Col. Clement, Lt. Col.
motion for writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56th IB, and failed to consider them as suspects in the
abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the PNP-CIDG’s investigation should focus on the
Issues: criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, which
1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights. mandates the PNP to “investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.
already filed.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
Ruling: investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is fatal to
On the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that, “Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the
omissions. Secretary of National Defense v Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct
to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuz vs. an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to
Del Rosario also teaches: What is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. To thus ofAmparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until
be covered by the privilege of the writs, reposndents must meet the threshold requirement that a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.” It was further
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. noted that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire
Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property dispute between the Provincial into the veracity of Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The case was referred to
its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty, and security, the Court will not delve on the the CHR as the Court’s directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the
propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property. It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report
not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. its factual findings and recommendations to the Court. 14 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding
Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of
amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to 15. Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010)
post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest. Facts: In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the failure of
On the second issue, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibility anent her abduction
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence on the part of existing
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the police and military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, this
Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may time, to be spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. investigating agency for purposes of this petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report
13 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding of its investigations as well as a recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime,
retained jurisdiction of this case. Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the
investigations and submit to the Court its own report and recommendation, for its consideration 1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to prove that the
and, ideally, final disposition. public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty is ground for the
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Issue: Can the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal appearance of 2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is proper in
confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath? cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of the alleged victim.

Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHR Ruling: As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required in Amparo
investigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any of the petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in
public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized. CHR the performance of their duty the requirement for a government official or employee to observe
Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected to
investigations were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone in particular be taken in safeguarding every citizen’s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of
for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither did the ocular cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the public
inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conducted by the CHR, official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the
definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.” The Court agreed that bringing the automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III confidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the
investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before the Court of Appeals will serve as a public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant
huge step towards identifying the persons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. certain interim reliefs.
Certainly, it may aid an on-going investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisional remedies
direction. Before disposing of this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
possible lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned. 15 |Case Digests in judicious determination of the amparo petition – Section 14 of theAmparo Rule provides for
Special Proceeding interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses
and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, These provisional reliefs are
16. Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010) intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. 16
Facts: Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of |Case Digests in Special Proceeding
Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to issue a 17. Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)
Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before the Court Facts: Marynette Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, filed a petition for the issuance of
of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include Marciana Medina ) and writ of habeas data before the Regional Trial Court alleging that her right to privacy was violated
to implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional by her supposed inclusion in the enumeration of indiiduals maintaining a private army group in
respondents. In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons the report of the Philippine National Police, made pursuant to the administrative order no. 275 by
Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. She also prayed for destruction of the report which she
Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the “wives” of claimed was unverified and to restrain the PNP from forwarding it. The RTC denied her petition
Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw for failure to establish the source of the information.
armed men in soldiers’ uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day,
Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, Issue: Whether or not the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.
slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged that
Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp of the Ruling: No, it is not proper. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court cited the ruling of the
Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo, European Commission on Human Rights in Leander vs Sweden which it says, illustrates how the
the production of the victims’ bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an
military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of overriding legitimate state interest. While the Court held that petitioner established that the PNP
judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. was indeed the source of the report, she nevertheless failed to impute that the leakage came to
Issues: third parties on the PNP and such made her and her supporters more susceptible to harassment
and increased police surveillance. The Court ruled, taking cognizance of the Constitutional fiat of
dismantling private armed groups, the state interest outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa as the collection of forwarding of the report was pursuant to a lawful mandate. In there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
this case, the Court also cautioned investigating entities that information sharing must observe unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security.
strict confidentiality and the intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. 18 |Case Digests in Special
empowered to receive the relevant information. It must be emphasized the in order for the Proceeding
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand and the right to life , liberty or security on the other. 17 |Case Digests in Special 19. G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008 DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-
Proceeding MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY
TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS,
18. Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010) petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Facts: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.
LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents. BRION, J.:
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…. Copies of the letter Facts Spouses Gregorio and Mar Lourdes Samson filed a complaint for forcible entry and
were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against herein petitioner
the matter to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum, petitioner Daniel Masangkay Tapuz et al, for entering without permission and against their objection the
Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of disputed land in Aklan registered under the name of the spouses armed with bolos and carrying
respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” effective July suspected firearms and unidentified persons numbering 120 and for building a nipa and bamboo
18, 2008 in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and threats directed structure. The Municipal Trial Court decided in favor of the spouses, herein private respondent.
against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and The herein petitioners appealed the ruling to Regional Trial Court which affirmed the decision and
security.” Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President, granted the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and subsequently, ruled positively on the
appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings motion of the spouses to demolished the structure built by Masangkay Tapuz et. al. While their
on the matter, claiming that the “punitive” nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due petition for review of the permanent mandatory injunction and order of demolition at the Court of
process. Citing the gruelling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, Appeals is pending, the sheriff issued notice to vacate and for demolition. Petitioners now seek
and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). the succor of the Supreme Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer. No response to of Court and issuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo.
her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Issue Whether or not writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is the proper remedy.

Issue Whether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the Rule on the Writ of Ruling No, the Supreme Court found the petition for certiorari and issuance of writ of habeas data
Habeas Data. and writ of amparo as fatally defective in this case. The writ of amparo does not issue to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
Ruling The Court ruled in the negative. Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying amorphous and uncertain grounds. It was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary
with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available
guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations
the province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process On the other hand, the writ on habeas data on the other hand, is intended to address the
clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her unjustified/unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty and
transfer  a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment  are security, which was not concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of the writ. 9 |Case
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such Digests in Special Proceeding
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein,
20. G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008 ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, Ruling: On the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of
MARRIETA PIA, petitioners, vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I – XIII, INC., ET Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
AL., respondents rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful
acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense v Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was
Facts The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have been intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Tapuz vs. Del Rosario also teaches: What is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
Constitution, as the result of the nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City. grounds. To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, reposndents must meet the threshold
Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
be demolished pursuant to a court judgment which was affirmed with finality in four other cases. act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
Issue Whether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners. complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty, and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property. It bears emphasis that respondents’
Ruling No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among thee security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the
numeration of rights covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding no legal basis for the issuance writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even
of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new remedy of writ of amparo which is able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any On the second issue, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the
not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. 5 |Case Digests in Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
Special Proceeding be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
13 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding
21. BERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO
BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and 22. G.R. No. 182498 June 22, 2010 GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A.
and JOHN DOES, Petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; and GEN. JOEL R.
FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents. CARPIO MORALES, J. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS,
herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,Respondent.
Facts Respondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz),
leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the Facts This is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December 3,
property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in
intended to utilize it for local projects. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully accountable6
property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held that Col. Kasim was
from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced
indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded
motion for writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for the suppression of vital information that
Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim
Issues: carries. However, before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead.
1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights.
2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case Issue Whether or not Col. Kasim’s death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic.
already filed.
Ruling: The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case has persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III confidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field
been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny the petitioners’ investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before the Court of Appeals will serve as a
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can no longer be huge step towards identifying the persons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner.
enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening Certainly, it may aid an on-going investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right
death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left direction. Before disposing of this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every
behind, particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence possible lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned. 15 |Case Digests in
gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of Special Proceeding
informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military. It is
not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on 24. G.R. No. 199199 August 27, 2013 MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE
the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYANSORSOGON, PETITIONER vs. HON. RAMON
received from his "asset" or network of assets during his lifetime. 4 |Case Digests in Special PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
Proceeding ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE,
23. G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A.
WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES
ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE,
GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME RESPONDENTS. REYES, J.:
VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ,
MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND Facts: petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus
CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents. Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
PEREZ, J.: continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the RTC of Sorsogon,... The petition
contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore
 Facts In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the failure of mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibility anent her abduction Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of
and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence on the part of existing Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to
police and military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, this protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is
time, to be spearheaded by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood
investigating agency for purposes of this petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after
of its investigations as well as a recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required... permit to operate;
retained jurisdiction of this case. Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-
investigations and submit to the Court its own report and recommendation, for its consideration scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
and, ideally, final disposition. Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog;
Issue Can the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal appearance of [5] and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath? Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local
Government Code.
Ruling The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHR Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents
investigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any of the to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of... a
public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized. CHR temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to
Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron
investigations were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone in particular ore, among others.[7]... referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being
for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither did the ocular the designated environmental court.
inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conducted by the CHR, case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.” The Court agreed that bringing the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC[11] further ruled that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always
that: (1) there was... no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section
case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their... administrative 1:
remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.[12] performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law. or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an... environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such
Issues: whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction... whether the petition is dismissible on the right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the... proper court, alleging the facts with
allegedly... failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency. respondent to do an act or series of acts until the... judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
Ruling: The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn
confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action certification of non-forum... shopping.
filed by the petitioners. On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one
that of improper venue. who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or... its officer
special civil action for continuing mandamus... shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising concerned
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x." .S
In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive
of Matnog... and as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.[24] But even allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the
then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance... of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality
waived. of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes
Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners... is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government
element of jurisdiction. agency, instrumentality or its... officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases    results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners' motion for environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible adequate remedy... in the course of law.
on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet that the... public the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes
officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust But the petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the
administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining... operation being conducted by
of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency. concept of continuing mandamus was Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in the
first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in
Bay. favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and... local government
he writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a... distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions officials over the issue.
for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and expertise of the members
Procedure) of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function.
Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial
certiorari, prohibition... and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition affidavits.
filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, Principles:
the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the...
determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion
writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law."[33] The petition should mainly involve an
environmental and other related law, rule or regulation... or a right therein.
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency
or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed
by final judgment which shall remain effective until... judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)