SECOND DIVISION

February 3, 2016

G.R. No. 198994

IRIS MORALES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO
OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ and FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA
OLONDRIZ, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Iris Morales from the May 27, 2011 decision and
October 12, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.  The CA
1

denied Morales' petition for certiorari from the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) July 12, 2007 and
October 30, 2007 orders in SP. Proc. No. 03-0060 and SP. Proc. No. 03-0069. 2

Antecedents

Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow,
Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O.
Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas
RTC for the partition of the decedent’s estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July
4, 2003. The case was raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060.

On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the
decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for her
appointment as special administratrix. Her petition was also raffled to Branch 254 and docketed
as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.

The pertinent portions of the decedent’s will reads:

1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and administrator of my
estate until its distribution in accordance herewith. x x x
2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and between (1)
IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3) ALEJANDRO
OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6) MARIA
ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR. 3

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the
decedent.

On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and moved
to suspend the intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc.
Case No. SP-03-0069. The respondent heirs opposed Morales’ motion for suspension and her
petition for allowance of the will.

On November 27, 2003, the RTC consolidated Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 with Sp. Proc.
Case No. SP-03-0069.

On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because
Francisco was preterited from the will.

On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of
preterition. Thus, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate
the existence of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.

After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of evidence for the evidentiary
hearing was scheduled on May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving her
right to present evidence on the issue of preterition.

On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub, suspended the intestate
proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned
that probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order but the RTC denied the
motion on September 1, 2006. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration
previously issued to Alfonso Jr.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary revocation of the Letters of
Administration. They also moved for the inhibition of Judge Aglugub of Branch 254.

On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for inhibition. The case was transferred
to Branch 253 presided by Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.

On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs’ motion for reconsideration of the
revocation of the Letters of Administration and (2) Morales’ motion to be appointed Special
Administratrix of the estate. The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will
not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might become
an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that
based on the evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30, 2007, for lack of merit.
On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC. Morales
alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding intestate despite the
existence of the will. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.

On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales’ petition for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while
probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into
intestate succession.  Thus, the continuation of the probate proceedings would be superfluous and
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impractical because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12, 2011. Hence, she filed the
present petition for review on certiorari on December 5, 2011.

The Petition

Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the case to
proceed intestate because: (1) the probate of a decedent’s will is mandatory; (2) the RTC Branch
254 already ordered the case to proceed into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate
already attained finality; (3) the probate court cannot touch on the intrinsic validity of the will; and (4)
there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on
his legitime.

The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC’s jurisdiction to reverse or modify an
interlocutory order setting the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention that she did
not appear in any of the evidentiary hearings to disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the
RTC and the CA both found that Francisco was preterited from the will; and (4) that Francisco’s
preterition annulled the institution of heirs and opened the case into intestacy. They conclude that
the RTC did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as the administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed intestate.

Our Ruling

We join the ruling of the CA.

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not
named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor
assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.  Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any
5

legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. 6

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s
inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation. (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution
of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired.
Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory
heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.
7

In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless
Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his
preterition.

During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco
received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales
did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the
issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

We will not entertain the petitioner’s factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited because this
Court is not a trier of facts.  Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC’s conclusion. We see no
1âwphi1

cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.

The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will during probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of
preterition.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will’s formal
validity and due execution.  However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.  It is not beyond the
8 9

probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by
exceptional circumstances.  When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
10

will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue. 11

The decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s preterition
annulled the institution of heirs.  The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will,
1avvphi1

resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance.  The decedent’s will, no matter how valid it may appear
12

extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity
of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error – much less
grave abuse of discretion – on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.

Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the previous order setting the case for
probate barred the RTC from ordering the case to proceed intestate. The disputed order is merely
interlocutory and can never become final and executory in the same manner that a final judgment
does.  An interlocutory order does not result in res judicata.  It remains under the control of the court
13 14

and can be modified or rescinded at any time before final judgment. 15

Certiorari is a limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one
where the officer or tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  As discussed, it is well within the jurisdiction
16

of the probate court to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will if probate proceedings might become
an idle ceremony due to the nullity of the will.

On the other hand, grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the
law.  It is present when power is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion
17

and hostility. Morales failed to show that the R TC acted in such a capricious and despotic manner
that would have warranted the CA's grant of her petition for certiorari. On the contrary, the RTC
acted appropriately in accordance with the law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

(On Leave)
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN *

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Footnotes

*
 On Leave.

 Both penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser and concurred in by Associate

Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario. Rollo, pp. 23-33.

 RTC, Las Pifias City, Branch 253 through Presiding Judge Salvador V. Timbang,
2

Jr. Rollo, pp. 130-134.
3
 Rollo, p. 34.

4
 Id. at 28.

 Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966, 17 SCRA 449, 454, citing VI
5

Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 7th Ed. (1951), p. 424; Aznar v.

 Nuguid, id. at 454; see also Aznar, supra note 5, citing Sanchez Roman – Tomo VI, Vol. 2,
6

p. 1133.

7
 Nuguid, id. at 459.

8
 Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 223 Phil. 418, 423 (1985).

9
 Id. at 424.

 See Nuguid, supra note 5; Nepomuceno, supra; Balanay v. Hon. Martinez, 159-A Phil.

718, 723 (1975).

11
 Balanay, supra note 10, at 723, citing Nuguid, supra note 5.

12
 Nuguid, supra note, at 455-459.

 Montilla v. Court of Appeals, 244 Phil. 166, 171 (1998); Denso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate
13

Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 256, 263-264 (1989).

14
 Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 804 (2000).

15
 Manila Electric Co. v. Artiaga, 50 Phil. 144, 147 (1929).

16
 Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 52-54.

 Commission on Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119322, June 4, 1996, 257
17

SCRA 200-201; Salma v. Hon. Miro, 541 Phil. 685, 686 (2007); Ligeralde v. Patalinghug,