*

G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner,  vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, Hon. MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Br. 1, Iligan City; SAMAHANG OPTOMETRIST SA PILIPINAS-
Iligan City Chapter, LEO T. CAHANAP, City Legal Officer, and Hon. CAMILO P. CABILI,
City Mayor of Iligan, respondents.

Police Power;  Municipal Corporations;  Local Government Code;  General Welfare Clause;  The
delegation of police power to local government units is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code.—Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of

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* EN BANC.

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the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared
objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the
Local Government Code.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Same;  Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue
licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within
the ambit of this power.—The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass
almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant
business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of
this power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Permits and Licenses; The power to issue licenses and permits necessarily
includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same, and the power to revoke or cancel,
likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions.—As aptly discussed by
the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the
corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise
includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of  Austin-
Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that the power to license carries with it the authority to
provide reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “License or Permit to Do Business” and “License to Engage in the
Practice of a Profession,” Distinguished.—Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or
permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession.
The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission
tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or
otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other
hand, is the grant of authority to a natu-

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ral person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct
of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a
profession, like that of optometry.—In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject
conditions on petitioner’s business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner’s
employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in
Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry.
Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by
law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of
Examiners in Optometry.
Optometry; Courts; Jurisdiction; Congress left the resolution of the issue on the matter of prohibition
of indirect practice of optometry by corporations for judicial determination, and it is therefore proper for
the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.—From the foregoing, it is thus evident that Congress has not
adopted a unanimous position on the matter of prohibition of indirect practice of optometry by
corporations, specifically on the hiring and employment of licensed optometrists by optical corporations.
It is clear that Congress left the resolution of such issue for judicial determination, and it is therefore
proper for this Court to resolve the issue.
Same; Equal Protection; There is no valid basis for treating corporations engaged in the business of
running optical shops differently from corporations running private hospitals.—In analogy, it is
noteworthy that private hospitals are maintained by corporations incorporated for the purpose of
furnishing medical and surgical treatment. In the course of providing such treatments, these
corporations employ physicians, surgeons and medical practitioners, in the same way that in the course
of manufacturing and selling eyeglasses, ye frames and optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed
optometrists to examine, prescribe and dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has ever charged that these
corporations are engaged in the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis for treating

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corporations engaged in the business of running optical shops differently.

Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; A party who has not appealed from the decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any,
whose decision is brought up on appeal.—It also bears stressing, as petitioner has pointed out, that the
public and private respondents did not appeal from the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the
holding by the Court of Appeals that the act of respondent City Mayor in imposing the questioned special
conditions on petitioner’s business permit is ultra vires cannot be put into issue here by the respondents.
It is well-settled that: “A party who has not appealed from the decision may not obtain any affirmative
relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtain from the lower court, if any, whose decision
is brought up on appeal xxx an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the
judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.”
Municipal Corporations;  Permits and Licenses;  Ultra Vires Acts;  Estoppel;  The fact that a party
acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not
preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of
the City Mayor—ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one’s authority are null and
void and cannot be given any effect.—It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the nature
of a contract but a special privilege, “xxx a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty
and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the
constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is
rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is
not in any way vested, permanent or absolute.” It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply
in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in
subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or
beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond
the scope of one’s authority are-null and void and cannot be

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given any deffect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise
null and void or ultra vires.
Same; Same; Police Power; The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature.—The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject business permit as
having been issued by respondent City Mayor in the performance of proprietary functions of Iligan City.
As hereinabove elaborated upon, the issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city
is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue
or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

KAPUNAN, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Optometry; Corporations; The rule is that corporate practice of any profession, including optometry,

must never be sanctioned, a policy based on the notion that the ethics of any profession is based upon
individual responsibility, personal accountability and independence, which are all lost where one verily
acts as a mere agent, or alter ego, of unlicensed persons or corporations.—The rule is that the corporate
practice of any profession, including optometry, must never be sanctioned. The public policy behind such
rulings is universal, and is based on the notion that the ethics of any profession is based upon individual
responsibility, personal accountability and independence, which are all lost where one verily acts as a
mere agent, or alter ego, of unlicensed persons or corporations.
Same;  Same;  In the absence of a statute specifically prohibiting a corporation from hiring duly
licensed optometrists, the employment by such corporation of said professionals is not tantamount to
practice of optometry by the corporation itself.—The second question provides no easy answer and
actually depends on the facts and circumstance surrounding a particular case. What is well-settled,
however, is that in the absence of a statute specifically prohibiting a corporation from hiring duly
licensed optometrists, the employment by such corporation of said professionals is not tantamount to
practice of optometry by the corporation itself.

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Same; Words and Phrases; “Ophthalmologist,” “Optometrist,” and “Optician,” Explained.—The words

“ophthalmologist,” “optometrist” and “optician,” though closely related, should be distinguished.
An ophthalmologist is a duly licensed physician who specializes in the care of eyes. Optometrists merely
examine the eyes for refractive error, recognize (but does not treat) diseases of the eye, and fill
prescriptions for eyeglasses. Optometrists also adapt frames and lenses to overcome errors of refraction
and restores, as nearly as possible with these mechanical appliances, normal human vision.
The optician is engaged in the business of furnishing lenses to customers on the prescriptions of licensed
optometrists or qualified physicians, putting the lenses into frames selected by the customer, and fitting
the frames to the face.
Same; Same; Optometry is distinguished from other professions by the nature of relationships created
between the optometrist and the client—it has been held that the traditional relationship between
physician and patient does not exist in the practice of optometry, since such practice involves no
relationship of trust and confidence as exists between a physician and a patient, or as between an attorney
and client.—Optometry is distinguished from other professions by the nature of relationships created
between the optometrist and the client. It has been held that the traditional relationship between
physician and patient does not exist in the practice of optometry, since such practice involves no
relationship of trust and confidence as exists between a physician and a patient, or as between an
attorney and client. The argument is that, considering the nature and scope of the optometrist’s
functions, no such trust relationship exists and, consequently, there is no public policy to be subserved by
prohibiting optometrists to practice their profession as employees of corporations.
Same; Police Power; The scope of regulations of trades and occupation is determined by the principle
that an exercise of the police power must confer public benefit commensurate with the burden imposed
upon private rights and property, and the means adapted must be suitable to the end in view, impartial in
operation, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.—A justification for a licensing requirement and
other forms of restrictions generally requires a showing that the measures at least tend to promote
public health, morals, safety or welfare. Whenever a business is affected with public interest it may be
subject to regulation to protect the public

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against danger and injustice. However, the scope of regulations of trades and occupation is
determined by the principle that an exercise of the police power must confer public benefit commensurate
with the burden imposed upon private rights and property, and the means adapted must be suitable to
the end in view, impartial in operation, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The burden imposed
must not interfere with rights of private property and freedom of contract beyond the necessity of the
situation. The test, thus, is the classic  reasonableness  and  propriety  of the measures or means in the
promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Same;  Same;  Types of Commercial Restrictions in the Practice of Optometry.—There are generally
four types of commercial restrictions in the practice of optometry. These are: 1)  Employment
Restrictions  which usually provide that it is unprofessional conduct or an illegal practice for an
optometrist to accept employment from unlicensed person or  non-professional
Corporations; 2) Restrictions on Location prohibit optometrist to work in an office not devoted exclusively
to the practice of optometry or in which materials are displayed pertaining to a commercial undertaking
not related to the practice of optometry; 3) Branch Office Restrictions usually set a maximum number of
branch Offices an optometrist may operate or require the optometrist to be on personal attendance a
certain proportion of time the office is open to the public; 4) Trade Name Restrictionsdeclare illegal or
unethical for an optometrist to practice under a name other than his or her name or under a false or
assumed name. This last type of restriction has a distinct discriminatory impact on non-professional
corporations.
Same;  Optometrists, like any other professionals are, nonetheless, bound by the same standards of
professional conduct, care, skill and diligence, whether they practice as independent optometrists or as
employees of unlicensed persons or corporations.—The primary purpose of the Optometry Law is to
ensure that the service would be rendered by competent and licensed persons and thereby protect the
public from inexpertness. Despite the public respondent’s assertions that the conditions in the business
permit were made for the purpose of “safeguarding the general public and especially the poor who are
easily gulled by misleading advertisements,” hence, falling within the ambit of police powers granted to
local officials under the Local Government Code, this Court sees no cogent reason why such purpose
cannot be attained even if the persons rendering the service

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are employed by a corporation. Optometrists, like any other professionals are, nonetheless, bound by
the same standards of professional conduct, care, skill and diligence, whether they practice as
independent optometrists or as employees of unlicensed persons or corporations.

VITUG, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Optometry;  The exercise of the profession of optometry is no different from the practice of other
regulated professions which can only be undertaken by individuals duly licensed therefor.—The
questioned conditionalities imposed on the business permit of Acebedo are activities that cannot be
performed by a corporation without such engagement being translated into an unauthorized practice of
optometry. The exercise of this profession is no different from the practice of other regulated professions
which can only be undertaken by individuals duly licensed therefor.
Municipal Corporations;  Licenses and Permits;  A license or permit is not a contract between the
sovereign and the grantee—for a permit to be impressed with a contractual character, it must be clearly
demonstrated that the very administrative agency, which is the source of the permit, can place that burden
on itself as such.—A license or permit is not a contract between the sovereign and the grantee; rather, it
is a special privilege, a permission or authority to do what would be within its terms; it is neither vested
nor permanent that can at no time be withdrawn or taken back by the grantor. The Solicitor General has
posited correctly in disagreeing with the appellate court which has mistaken the conditions imposed by
respondent City Mayor as being binding on both the city government and petitioner upon the thesis that
the permit issued by him partakes the nature of a private agreement or contract. For a permit to be
impressed with a contractual character, it must be clearly demonstrated that the very administrative
agency, which is the source of the permit, can place that burden on itself as such.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Puruganan, Chato, Tan & Geronimo for petitioner.
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Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

     Magsalin Law Offices for respondent Samahang Optometrista sa Pilipinas.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed by the herein petitioner against the City Mayor and City Legal Officer of
Iligan and the Samahang Optometrist sa Pilipinas-Iligan Chapter (SOPI, for brevity).
The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are as follows:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner’s application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following
conditions:

1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial
store;
2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for
patients, because these are functions of optical clinics;
3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first
been made by an independent optometrist  (not its employee)  or independent optical
clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-
Ban and similar eyeglasses;
4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and
similar glasses and frames;
5. Acebedo is allowed
1
to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.

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1 Annex A to Memorandum of Respondent City Mayor and City Legal Officer of Iligan, Rollo, pp. 231-232.

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On December 5, 1998, private respondent Samahan ng Op tometrist sa Pilipinas

(SOPI),  Iligan Chapter, through its Acting President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, lodged a
complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had
violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or
revocation of such permit.
Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor Camilo P. Cabili designated City Legal Officer
Leo T. Cahanap to conduct an investigation on the matter. On July 12, 1989, respondent City
Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of
violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of
petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City. The report further advised that no new
permit shall be granted to petitioner for the year 1989 and should only be given time to wind
up its affairs.
 On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of
Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its
affairs.
On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor,
City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-Iligan City Chapter
(SOPI),docketed as Civil Case No. 1497 before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch
I. Petitioner alleged that (1) it was denied due process because it was not given an opportunity
to present its evidence during the investigation conducted by the City Legal Officer; (2) it was
denied equal protection of the laws as the limitations imposed on its business permit were not
imposed on similar businesses in Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor had no authority to impose
the special conditions on its business permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to
conduct the investigation as the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.
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Respondent SOPI interposed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies but on November 24, 1989, Presiding Judge Mamindiara P.
Mangotara deferred resolution of such Motion to Dismiss until after trial of the case on the
merits. However, the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Thereafter,
respondent SOPI filed its answer.
On May 30, 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied by an Order dated June 28, 1990.
On October 3, 1990, instead of taking an appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the questioned
Order of Dismissal, branding the same as tainted with grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court. 2
On January 24,-1991, the Ninth Division  of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion reconsideration was also denied in the Resolution dated May
15, 1991.
Undaunted, petitioner has come before this court via the present petition, theorizing that:
A.

THE RESPONDENT COURT, WHILE CORRECTLY HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT CITY
MAYOR ACTED BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN THE
PERMIT AS THEY HAD NO BASIS IN ANY LAW OR ORDINANCE, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SAID SPECIAL CONDITIONS NEVERTHELESS BECAME BINDING ON PETITIONER UPON
ITS ACCEPTANCE THEREOF AS A PRIVATE AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT.

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2 Associate
Justice Luis Javellana, ponente; Associate Justice Alfredo Marigomen and Associate Justice Artemon
Luna, members.

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 B.

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT

BETWEEN PETITIONER AND THE CITY OF ILIGAN WAS ENTERED INTO BY THE LATTER IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Although petitioner agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent City
Mayor acted beyond the scope of his authority in imposing the assailed conditions in subject
business permit, it has excepted to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the said conditions
nonetheless became binding on petitioner, once accepted, as a private agreement or contract.
Petitioner maintains that the said special conditions are null and void for being ultra viresand
cannot be given effect; and therefore, the principle of estoppel cannot apply against it.
On the other hand, the public respondents, City Mayor and City Legal Officer, private
respondent SOPI and the Office of the Solicitor General contend that as a valid exercise of
police power, respondent City Mayor has the authority to impose, as he did, special conditions
in the grant of business permits.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote3
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.  The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the
4
State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation.  This delegation of police power is embodied in the general
welfare clause of the Local Government Code which provides:
Sec. 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essen-

_________________
3 Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508.
4 Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157.

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tial to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
cuiture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all
matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, 5if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within
the ambit of this power.
The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil.
It is provided for by law.
Section 171, paragraph 2 (n) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1983, reads:
Sec. 171. The City Mayor shall:
xxx
 n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city licenses or permits, and revoke the same for violation
of law or ordinance or the conditions upon which they are granted.

However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and
equal protection of the law.

_______________
5 Procter and Gamble Phils, vs. The Municipality of Jagna, 94 SCRA 894.

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Succinct and in point is the ruling of this Court, that:

“x x x While a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be within the bounds of
reason,  i.e.,  the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the
exercise of police power, x x x
x x x      x x x      x x x
x x x The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against 6 public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.”

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the
Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such
special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public
respondents and private respondent SOPI, on the other hand, are one in saying that the
imposition of said special conditions on petitioner’s business permit is well within the
authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.
As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and
permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And
the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through 7the imposition of
certain conditions. In the case of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,  it was held that
the power to license carries with it the authority to provide reasonable terms and conditions
under which the licensed business shall be conducted. As the Solicitor General puts it:

_______________
6 Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182.
7 69 SCRA 564.

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“If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader power, it stands
to reason that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express
power, i.e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain conditions, especially so that there is no
positive prohibition to the exercise of such8 prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any particular
official or body vested with such authority.”

However, the present inquiry does not stop there, as the Solicitor General believes. The power
or authority of the City Mayor to impose conditions or restrictions in the business permit is
indisputable. What petitioner assails are the conditions imposed in its particular case which, it
complains, amount to a confiscation of the business in which petitioner is engaged.
Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually
granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to
regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or
otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license,
on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or
exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to
engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its
employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.
The case of  Samahan 9ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas vs. Acebedo International
Corporation, G.R. No. 117097, promulgated by this Court on March 21, 1997, is in point. The
factual

_______________
8 Comment by the Solicitor General, p. 8; Rollo, p. 78.
9 270 SCRA 298.

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antecedents of that case are similar to those of the case under consideration and the issue
ultimately resolved therein is exactly the same issue posed for resolution by this Court  en
banc.
In the said case, the Acebedo International Corporation filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor an application for a business permit for the operation of a branch of Acebedo
Optical in Candon, Ilocos Sur. The application was opposed by the Samahan ng Optometrists
sa Pilipinas-Ilocos Sur Chapter, theorizing that Acebedo is a juridical entity not qualified to
practice optometry. A committee was created by the Office of the Mayor to study private
respondent’s application. Upon recommendation of the said committee, Acebedo’s application
for a business permit was denied. Acebedo filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court but
the same was dismissed. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
disposition, prompting the Samahan ng Optometrists to elevate the matter to this Court.
The First Division of this Court, then composed of Honorable Justice Teodoro Padilla, Josue
Bellosillo, Jose Vitug and Santiago Kapunan, with Honorable Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr.
as  ponente,  denied the petition and ruled in favor of respondent Acebedo International
Corporation, holding that “the fact that private respondent hires optometrists who practice
their profession in the course of their employment in private respondent’s 10
optical shops, does
not translate into a practice of optometry by private respondent itself.”   The Court further
elucidated that in both the old and new Optometry Law, R.A. No. 1998, superseded by R.A.
No. 8050, it is significant to note that there is no prohibition against the hiring by corporations
of optometrists. The Court concluded thus:
“All told, there is no law that prohibits the hiring by corporations of optometrists or considers the hiring
by corporations of op-

________________
10 Ibid., p. 306.

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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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tometrists as a practice by the corporation itself of the profession of optometry.”

In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner’s
business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner’s employ to
produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in
Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the
City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession,
like that of optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative
agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
It is significant to note that during the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee
of the Senate and the House of Representatives on R.A. 8050 (Senate Bill No. 1998 and House
Bill No. 14100), the committee failed to reach a consensus as to the prohibition on indirect
practice of optometry by corporations. The proponent of the bill, former Senator Freddie Webb,
admitted thus:
“Senator Webb: x x x      x x x      x x x

The focus of contention remains to be the proposal of prohibiting the indirect practice of optometry by
corporations. We took a second11look and even a third look at the issue in the bicameral conference, but a
compromise remained elusive.”

Former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani likewise voted her reservation in casting her vote:

________________
11 Saturday, June 3, 1995, “Approval of the Conference Committee Report on S. No. 1998 and H. No. 14100, Record

of the Senate, p. 847.

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“Senator Shahani: Mr. President

The optometry bills have evoked controversial views from the members of the panel. While we realize the
need to uplift the standards of optometry as a profession, the consensus of both Houses was to avoid
touching sensitive issues which properly belong to judicial determination. Thus, the bicameral conference
committee decided to leave the issue of indirect practice of optometry and the use of trade12 names open to
the wisdom of the Courts which are vested with the prerogative of interpreting the laws.”

From the foregoing, it is thus evident that Congress has not adopted a unanimous position on
the matter of prohibition of indirect practice of optometry by corporations, specifically on the
hiring and employment of licensed optometrists by optical corporations. It is clear that
Congress left the resolution of such issue for judicial determination, and it is therefore proper
for this Court to resolve the issue.
Even in the United States, jurisprudence varies and there is a conflict of opinions among
the federal courts as to the right
13
of a corporation or individual not himself licensed, to hire and
employ licensed optometrists.
Courts have distinguished between optometry as a learned profession in the category of law
and medicine, and optometry as a mechanical art. And, insofar as the courts regard optometry
as merely a mechanical art, they have tended to find nothing objectionable in the making and
selling of eyeglasses, spectacles and lenses by corporations
14
so long as the patient is actually
examined and prescribed for by a qualified practitioner.
The primary purpose of the statute regulating the practice of optometry is to insure that
optometrical services are to be rendered by competent and licensed persons in order to pro-

_______________
12 Ibid.
13 128ALR 586.
14 House of $8.50 Eyeglasses, Inc. vs. State Board of Optometry, 288 Ala 349, 261 So 2d 27; State ex rel. Board of
Optometry vs. Sears Roebuck and Co., 102 Ariz 175, 427 Pd 126.

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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

tect the health and physical welfare of the people from the dangers engendered by unlicensed
practice. Such purpose may15 be fully accomplished although the person rendering the service is
employed by a corporation.
Furthermore, it was ruled that16
the employment of a qualified optometrist by a corporation
is not against public policy.   Unless prohibited
17
by statutes, a corporation has all the
contractual rights that an individual has  and it does not become 18
the practice of medicine or
optometry because of the presence of a physician or optometrist.  The manufacturing, selling,
trading and bartering of eyeglasses
19
and spectacles as articles of merchandise do not constitute
the practice of optometry. 20
In the case of  Dvorine vs. Castelberg Jewelry Corporation,   defendant corporation
conducted as part of its business, a department for the sale of eyeglasses and the furnishing of
optometrical services to its clients. It employed a registered optometrist who was compensated
at a regular salary and commission and who was furnished instruments and appliances
needed for the work, as well as an office. In holding that the corporation was not engaged in
the practice of optometry, the court ruled that there is no public policy forbidding the
commercialization of optometry, as in law and medicine, and recognized the general practice of
making it a commercial business by advertising and selling eyeglasses.

__________________
15 Silver v. Lansburgh and Brother, 72 App DC 77, 11 F2d 518, 128 ALR 582; 61 Am Jur 2d 289.
16 Georgia State Examiners v. Friedman’s Jewelers (183 Ga 669, 189 SE 238).
17 State ex rel. McKittrick vs. Gate City Optical Co., 339 Mo 427, 97 SW 2d 89.
18 Dickson vs. Flynn, 246 App Div 341, 286 NYS 225.
19 State ex rel. Brother vs. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, Inc., 220 Ind. 276, 41 NE 2d 622, 141 ALR 876 (61 Am Jur

187); Kindy Opticians, Inc. vs. State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 1939, 291 Mich 152, 289 NW 112, 113; New
Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists vs. S.S. Kresge Co., 113 NJL 287, 174 A 353.
20 Dvorine vs. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 185 A 562.

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 VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 333
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

To accomplish the objective of the regulation, a state may provide by statute that corporations
cannot sell eyeglasses, spectacles, and lenses unless a duly licensed physician or a duly
qualified optometrist
21
is in charge of, and in personal attendance at the place where such
articles are sold.   In such a case, the patient’s primary and essential safeguard lies in the
optometrist’s 22control of the “treatment” by means of prescription and preliminary and final
examination.
In analogy, it is noteworthy that private hospitals are maintained by corporations
incorporated for the purpose of furnishing medical and surgical treatment. In the course of
providing such treatments, these corporations employ physicians, surgeons and medical
practitioners, in the same way that in the course of manufacturing and selling eyeglasses, eye
frames and optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed optometrists to examine, prescribe and
dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has ever charged that these corporations are engaged in
the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis for treating corporations engaged in
the business of running optical shops differently.
It also bears stressing, as petitioner has pointed out, that the public and private
respondents did not appeal from the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the holding
by the Court of Appeals that the act of respondent City Mayor in imposing the questioned
special conditions on petitioner’s business permit is ultra vires cannot be put into issue here by
the respondents. It is well-settled that:
“A party who has not appealed from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate
court other
23
than what he had obtain from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on
appeal.

_______________
21 Roschen vs. Ward, 279 US 337, 73 L Ed 722, 49 S Ct 336.
22 Small and Maine Board of Registration and Examination in Optometry, 293 A 2d 786.
23 Policarpio vs. CA, 269 SCRA 344; Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA

312; Quintanilla vs. CA, 279 SCRA 397.

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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

x x x an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain
the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot 24
seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.”

Thus, respondents’ submission that the imposition of subject special conditions on petitioner’s
business permit is not ultra vires cannot prevail over the finding and ruling by the Court of
Appeals from which they (respondents) did not appeal.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its business permit issued by
the City Mayor is not a contract entered into by Iligan City in the exercise of its proprietary
functions, such that although petitioner agreed to such conditions, it cannot be held in
estoppel since ultra vires acts cannot be given effect.
Respondents, on the other hand, agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
business permit in question is in the nature of a contract between Iligan City and the herein
petitioner, the terms and conditions of which are binding upon agreement, and that petitioner
is estopped from questioning the same. Moreover, in the Resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held that the contract between the petitioner
and the City of Iligan was entered into by the latter in the performance of its proprietary
functions.
This Court holds otherwise. It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the
nature of a contract but a special privilege.
“x x x a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is
not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against impairment
of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a
permission

______________
24 La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394, 398.

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VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 335

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
25
or authority to do what is within its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute.”

It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner
acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does
not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit
of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires  acts or acts which are clearly beyond the
scope of one’s authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of
estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject business permit as having been issued by
respondent City Mayor in the performance of proprietary functions of Iligan City. As
hereinabove elaborated upon, the issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality
or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local
government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the
police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 22995 REVERSED; and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue
petitioner’s business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Bellosillo,  Puno,  Mendoza,  Quisumbing,  Buena,  Gonzaga-Reyes,  Ynares-

Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Melo, Panganiban and Pardo, JJ., Join the dissent of Justice Vitug.
     Vitug, J., Please see dissent.

______________
25 Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.

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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of
 Appeals

     Kapunan, J., See concurring opinion.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Purisima. In addition, I would like to state the
following: The issues that present themselves in the case at bar are the following: First, can a
corporation which is not a natural person, engage in the practice of optometry? Second, can a
corporation, by employing optometrists as an incident to and in the ordinary course of its
business of selling optical wares, supplies, substances and instruments, be said to be indirectly
practicing optometry? Third, are the commercial restrictions in the business license a proper
exercise of police power under the specific circumstances of this case?

The rule is that the corporate practice of any profession, including optometry, must never be
sanctioned. The public policy behind such rulings is universal, and is based on the notion that
the ethics of any profession is based upon individual responsibility, personal accountability
and independence, which are all lost where one verily acts as a mere agent, or alter ego, of
unlicensed persons or corporations.

II

The second question provides no easy answer and actually depends on the facts and
circumstance surrounding a particular case. What is well-settled, however, is that in the
absence of a statute specifically prohibiting a corporation from hiring duly licensed
optometrists, the employment by such corporation of said professionals is not tantamount to
practice of optometry by the corporation itself. Thus, in Samahan ng
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VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 337

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
1
Optometrists sa Pilipinas, et al. vs. Acebedo International Corporation, we held that:

x x x The fact that private respondent hires optometrists who practice their profession in the course of
their employment in private respondent’s optical shops, does not translate into a practice of optometry by
private respondent itself. Private respondent is a corporation created and organized for the purpose of
conducting the business of selling optical lenses or eyeglasses, among others. The clientele of private
respondent understandably, would largely be composed of persons with defective vision and thus need
the proper lenses to correct the same and enable them to gain normal vision. The determination of the
proper lenses to sell to private respondent’s clientele entails the employment of optometrists who have
been precisely trained for that purpose. Private respondent’s business is not the determination itself of
the proper lenses needed by persons with defective vision. Private respondent’s business, rather, is the
buying and importing of eyeglasses and lenses and other similar or allied instruments from suppliers
thereof and selling the same to consumers.
 For petitioners argument to hold water, there need be clear showing that R.A. No. 1998 prohibits a
corporation from hiring optometrists, for only then would it be undeniably evident that the intention of
the legislature is to preclude the formation of the socalled optometry corporations because such is
tantamount to the practice of the profession of optometry which is legally exercisable only by natural
persons and professional partnerships. We have carefully reviewed R.A. No. 1998 however, and we find
nothing therein that supports petitioner’s insistent claims.

It is interesting to note that during the Senate deliberations on the enactment of R.A. 8050, a
widely-debated and highly controversial provision directly prohibiting the indirect practice of
optometry, was eventually2
deleted from the original bill and was, therefore, not included in the
final version of the law.  That original provision states:

______________
1 270 SCRA 298, 306 (1997).
2 Record of the Senate, p. 351, Wed. Feb. 1, 1995, as read by Senator Gonzales.

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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Prohibition against the Indirect Practice of Optometry—No person, natural or juridical, other than an
optometrist in good standing or a partnership composed solely of optometrists, shall hire, employ, join
with or otherwise use the services of an optometrist for the purpose of practicing optometry:  Provided
however, That this prohibition shall not apply to the government of the Philippines or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities and to persons who are exempted under the immediate preceding section.

By deleting the aforequoted controversial provision and by deliberately failing to provide one
directly addressing the matter of whether or not duly-licensed optometrists may practice their
profession as employees of corporations, it is evident that it was the legislative intent to leave
to the judiciary the resolution of whatever issues that may arise in the application of the law.
Senator Shahani explained:
The optometry bills have evoked controversial views from the Members of the panel. While we realize the
need to uplift the standards of optometry as a profession, the consensus of both Houses was to avoid
touching sensitive issues which properly belong to  judicial determination.  Thus, the bicameral
conference committee decided to leave the issue of indirect practice of optometry and the use of trade3
names open to the wisdom of the Courts which are vested with the prerogative of interpreting the laws.

While the hiring by corporations of optometrists does not necessarily translate into
the corporate practice of profession, which is, without question, prohibited and against public
policy, factual relationships between the corporation and the employee-optometrist have been
inquired into by some courts in the United States to determine whether or not there is an
unauthorized corporate practice of the profession, that is, whether or not it is the corporation,
and not its licensed employees, which is unduly engaged in the practice of optometry.

______________
3 Record of the Senate, Sat. June 3, 1995, p. 847 (Emphasis ours.)

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VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 339

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
4
 4
In many cases, the measure of  control  is particularly determinative.   Where it appears that
the optical company has the power of regulation or control of the professional activities of the
licensed optometrists, including corporation’s power to dismiss, and including any influence
over the mode and manner of eye examinations and resulting professional judgments, 5
the
reciprocal arrangement is held to constitute the unlicensed practice of optometry.  In another
case,  advertisement  of the corporation is a factor. Where a statute provides that a person
licensed to practice optometry6 is forbidden to advertise, practice, or attempt to practice “under
a name other than his own,”   advertisement of the corporation is held to lead the public to
believe that it (the corporation) is practicing optometry. This provision, according to the court,
is certainly antagonistic to the view that a corporation might practice optometry through a
licensed optometrist.
The manner of compensation has also been held to be an important factor in determining
whether or not a corporation is unlawfully engaged in the practice of optometry. Where the
corporation 7exercises in any manner, control over the payment of fees to be charged by the
optometrist,  where an optometrist receives a monthly salary 8
from the corporation purporting
to be a percentage of payments made by certain customers,  and where the prescription does
not carry the name of the licensed optometrist, but rather that of the corporate defendant,
such has been
9
held as sufficient indications that there is unlawful corporate practice of the
profession.
In this case, the imposition of conditions by the respondent mayor in the business permit
was premature,there being no

_________________
4 Stateex. rel. Fatzer v. Zale Jewelry Co., (1956) 179 Kan 628, 298 P2d 283.
5 Stateex. rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan 881, 51 P2d 995, 102 ALR 334.
6 Eisensith v. Buhl Optical Co. (1934)—W. Va.—, 178 S.E. 695.
7 Rowe v. Burt’s, Inc. (1939, App) 17 Ohio Ops 1, 30 Oio L Abs 203, 31 NE2d 725.
8 Eddy v. Board of Optometry (1935)—W. Va.—, 182 S.E. 870.
9 Kendall v. Beiling (1943) 295 Ky 782, 175 SW2d 489.

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340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

factual basis for him to conclude whether or not there was a danger that corporate practice of
optometry was to take place should the business permit to operate an optical shop be granted
to the petitioner. The conditions on the business permit were imposed even  before  petitioner
began operating its optical shop in Iligan City, the alleged breach of which was the basis for
the permit’s cancellation and the institution of this case in court. It was not within respondent
mayor’s functions to determine the proper scope and application of the Optometry Law by
imposing the conditions in the business permit.

III

In this connection, I do not fully share with the view that the exercise of the optometrists’
specialization is no different from the practice of other regulated professions which can be
done individually or in association with duly-licensed colleagues only.
Section 3 of R.A. 8050 defines optometry as:
The science and art of examining the human eye, analyzing the ocular function, prescribing and
dispensing ophthalmic lenses, prisms, contact lenses and their accessories and solutions, low vision aids,
and similar appliances and devices, conducting ocular exercises, vision training, orthoptics, installing
prosthetics, using authorized diagnostic pharmaceutical agents (DPA), and other preventive or corrective
measures or procedures for the aid, correction, rehabilitation or relief of the human eye, or to attain
maximum vision and comfort.

The words “ophthalmologist,” “optometrist” and “optician,” though closely related, should be
distinguished. An ophthalmologist is a duly licensed physician who specializes in the care of
eyes. Optometrists merely examine the eyes for refractive error, recognize (but does not treat)
diseases of the eye,
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VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 341

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
10
and fill prescriptions for eyeglasses.  Optometrists also adapt frames and lenses to overcome
errors of refraction and restores, as nearly as possible with these mechanical appliances,
normal human vision. The  optician  is engaged in the business of furnishing lenses to
customers on the prescriptions of licensed optometrists or qualified physicians,11
putting the
lenses into frames selected by the customer, and fitting the frames to the face.
Optometry is distinguished from other professions by the nature of relationships created
between the optometrist and the client. It has been held that the traditional relationship
between physician and patient does not exist in the practice of optometry, since such practice
involves no relationship of trust and confidence as exists between a physician and a patient, or
as between an attorney and client. The argument is that, considering the nature and scope of
the optometrist’s functions, no such trust relationship exists and, consequently, there is no
public policy to be subserved by prohibiting optometrists to practice their profession as
employees of corporations. In the case of Silver v. Lansburgh, a U.S. Court held:
x x x Both in the case of the physician and the lawyer, the person seeking his services must break down
the barriers of reserve which otherwise serve to protect him and deliberately reveal to his professional
adviser secrets of physical or mental disability or secrets of business of the most intimate nature. These
necessary disclosures create the personal relationship which cannot exist between patient or client and a
profit-seeking corporation. The universal recognition of this immediate, unbroken, and confidential
association between doctor and lawyer and those who engage their services early created and still
justifies the rule that their allegiance must be

_______________
10 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma (1955) 348 US 483, 99 L ed 563, 75 S Ct 461, reh den 349 US 925, 99 L ed 1256, 75 S
Ct 657.
11 State v. Rones (1953), 223 La 839, 67 So 2d 99.

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342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

wholeheartedly12
to the patient or the client, not to another. Nothing of this nature applies to the practice
of optometry.”

Optometrists must also exercise the amount of care, skill and diligence which is exercised
generally in the community by other practitioners in the same field, and as is mandated by the
rules regulating their profession, wherever and however they practice their profession.
Optometry has also been distinguished from other professions in that the selling of services in
the former, is intertwined with the selling of goods. It has been held that “the optometrist and
optician are also engaged in the sale of a product, corrective lenses, and accordingly the
activities of an optometrist lie between those associated
13
with the practice of a profession and
those characteristic of a merchandising concern.”
Anent the question of whether optometrists may practice their profession as employees of
corporations, many courts in the United States have based their decisions on the distinctions
and differences in the required degree of learning and training required. Generally, such
decisions depend on Whether the courts classify optometry as a mere “mechanical art” or as a
“learned profession” such as law or medicine. Where courts consider optometry as a mere
mechanical art, optometrists are not prevented from being employed in corporations, the
courts holding that where the statute itself does not specifically control, the reasons for
preventing the practice of law and medicine to corporations do not apply to optometry. In the
case of Silver v. Lansburgh & Co., the court found:
x x x Optometry is a mechanical art which requires skill and a knowledge of the use of certain
mechanical instruments and appliances designed to measure and record the errors and deviations from
the normal found in the human eye, but is not a learned profession comparable to law, medicine, and
theology and that, though certain standards of education are prescribed by the statute and by

_________________
12 Silver v. Lansburgh & Bro, (1940) (—App DC—, 111 F[2d] 518).
13 Barbee v. Rogers (Tex) 425 SW2d 342.

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Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
14
rules of the board created under it, optometry is not a part of medicine.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to which the aforementioned case was
appealed, did concede that in their view, optometry is a profession, as the term is colloquially
used, nonetheless, the court also said that there is no reason why a corporation cannot employ
licensed optometrist. Thus:
x x x but that fact is not enough to bring the rule into effect. There is no more reason to prohibit a
corporation, organized for the purpose, from employing licensed optometrists, than there is to prohibit
similar employment of accountants, architects or engineers. We know of no instance in which15
the right in
any of these cases has ever been challenged, though universally all are deemed professions.

IV

The assailed conditions imposed in the subject business permit are  ultra vires  because they
are unreasonable. Police power is often characterized as the most essential, 16
insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.  It is the inherent
and plenary power in the State 17
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.
In the area of local governments,18
the police power of a municipality exists solely by virtue of
legislative or constitutional grant.  In view, however, of the constitutional grant of local

_______________
14 Supra note 12 at 583.
15 Id., at585.
16 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967).
17 Ibid., Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1918).
 18  Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991), Sec. 16.  General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,

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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

autonomy, the argument on presumption of reasonableness in the exercise of the police power
by local government may be persuasive. But this awesome character of police power is not
without limits because the determination
19
of what is proper exercise of such power is subject to
the supervision of the courts.  This is specially true in this case where police power is used to
justify restriction on the right to engage in a legitimate employment or business, which right
receives protection and recognition as a portion of the individual freedoms secured by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
A justification for a licensing requirement and other forms of restrictions generally requires
a showing that the measures at least tend to promote public health, morals, safety or welfare.
Whenever a business is affected with public interest it may be subject to regulation to protect
the public against danger and injustice. However, the scope of regulations of trades and
occupation is determined by the principle that an exercise of the police power must confer
public benefit commensurate with the burden imposed upon private rights and property, and
the means adapted must be suitable
20
to the end in view, impartial in operation, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.   The burden imposed must not interfere 21
with rights of private
property and freedom of contract beyond the necessity of the situation.  The test, thus, is the

_________________

appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
19 US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 98 (1910).
20 Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St 540, 38 NE2d 70 (1941).
21 Akron v. McElligott, 166 Iowa 297, 147 NW 773 (1914).

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classic  reasonableness  and  propriety  of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends
sought to be accomplished.
Under the rubric of general welfare, what is the specific public policy involved in the
exercise of police power in this case? Or in constitutional language, what is the end sought to
be achieved?
The City Mayor in its comment to the petition cites the22
“safety and well-being of the people
of Iligan—especially the poor and naive among them.”   The Solicitor23 General, on the other
hand, cites protection of “public morals, health, safety or welfare”   and “to promote24
the
prosperity and general welfare of the local government unit and its inhabitants.”   With the
lack of discussion in the pleadings on how these general concerns will be served by the specific
means adapted, we can only speculate.
 In terms of promoting safety, public health or welfare, it may be argued that allowing
corporations to employ licensed optometrists may compromise professional accountability.
Because corporations are generally seen as more concerned, at bottom, with profits, the
motivation to sell might prevail over professional ethics. Again, this is mere speculation. Just
being “big” is not a sin. Under the general scheme of the equal protection clause of our
Constitution, “bigness” should not be a disadvantage in terms of benefits conferred and
liabilities imposed.
Jurisprudence in the United States is replete 25
with cases on the issue of validity of
governmental regulations relating to optometry.  In a case upholding the validity of a statute
prohibiting a corporation from practicing optometry, directly or indirectly, and from employing
registered optometrist to ex-

__________________
22 Rollo, p. 55.
23 Id., at 77.
24 Id., at 78.
25  See for example E.W.H, Annotation, Constitutionality of Statutes and Validity of Regulations Relating to

Optometry, 98 A.L.R. 905 (1935); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Validity of Governmental Regulation of Optometry, 22
A.L.R. 2d 939 (1952).

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346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

amine the eyes of its customers, a US court cited the public policy that one who practices a
profession is apt to have less regard for professional ethics and to be less amenable 26
to
regulation for their enforcement when he has no contractual obligations to the client.
There 27are generally four types of commercial restrictions in the practice of
optometry.  These are:

1) Employment Restrictions which usually provide that it is unprofessional conduct or an

illegal practice for an optometrist
28
to accept employment from unlicensed person or non-
professional Corporations;
2) Restrictions on Location  prohibit optometrist to work in an office not devoted
exclusively to the practice of optometry or in which materials are displayed pertaining
to a commercial undertaking not related to the practice of optometry;
3) Branch Office Restrictions  usually set a maximum number of branch Offices an
optometrist may operate or require the optometrist to be on personal attendance a
certain proportion of time the office is open to the public;
4) Trade Name Restrictions  declare illegal or unethical for an optometrist to practice
under a name other than his or her name or under a false or assumed name. This last
type of restriction
29
has a distinct discriminatory impact on non-professional
corporations.

The public policy cited to justify these different types of restrictions is generally consumer
protection by elimination of

_______________
26 Neilv. Gimbel Bros., 330 Pa 213, 199A 179 (1938).
27 Deborah Hass-Wilson, The Effect of Commercial Practice Restrictions. The Case of Optometry, 29 J.L. & Econ.
165 (1986).
 28  Ibid.  In the US,  Professional Corporations  differ from nonprofessional corporations in that Professional
Corporation law requires each stockholder of a professional corporation to be a licensed member of the profession for
which the corporation is organized to practice.
29 Id., at 170-172.

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Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
30 31
low-quality services.   Lay-employed optometrists,   may employ various cost-cutting
techniques like brief and inadequate eye examinations, in order to increase profits. Those who
practice under a trade name lack personal accountability and the motivation to maintain a
personal reputation for highquality service. The management of non-professional optical firms
may, likewise, interfere with the “doctor-patient” relationship and professional judgments
concerning patient welfare. Thus, the argument is offered that commercial practice
restrictions are necessary to prevent lay-employed optometrist from increasing their market
share by selling services at lower prices and32substituting low for high quality case without
consumer recognition of the change in quality.
Closer to home, the Senate proceedings discussing Senate Bill No. 1998, the precursor of
RA 8050, is enlightening as to the rationale behind 33
the original proposal to specifically
prohibit employment by corporations of optometrists.
The exchange between Senator Webb, Chairman of the Committee on Health and
Demography, and Senator Macapagal is instructive:
Senator Macapagal:  Mr. President, what I will ask comes from the concern of corporations that hire
optometrists. What they would like to know from the Gentleman is what is the rationale behind
prohibiting corporations from engaging the services of optometrists.
Senator Webb:  Mr. President, a corporation is not the same as an individual human being for one
thing. A corporation cannot be a doctor or a lawyer. Only a human being may be permitted to practice
medicine or law.
xxx

________________
30 Id., at 183. However, the study found that commercial practice restrictions increase the price of ophthalmic goods
and services without statistically significant effect on quality. In plain language, these commercial restrictions are not
protecting the consumers.
31 Ibid. Optometrist employed by drug and department stores and other non-professional firms.
32 Id., at 169.
33 Supra, notes 2 and 3.

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348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The optometrist for one thing has a peculiar relationship with a patient and this is primarily based not
on profit, though people will say that one enters a profession primarily to make money. But under their
Code of Ethics, it is clearly stated that one goes there as a doctor primarily to cure people.
A corporation, Mr. President, is a different entity. Primarily it is there to make money. In fact, if a
corporation were to hire an optometrist then he is divided between his loyalty to the corporation and his
love and affection for his patient because a corporation may have a specific product that it wants to push.
And as such, an optometrist is told to push a particular product for whatever it is worth. “Kailangang
itulak natin ito sapagkat ito ang ating produkto.”
 Sa optometrist po ay hindi ganoon sapagkat wala kayong makikitang abogado o duktor na nag-a-
advertise na ang ginagamit ay trade name or corporate name. In fact, in advertisement, though not very
clear kung pinapayagan itoy, ay hindi kayo puwedeng gumamit ng korporasyon kundi iyong mga
pangalan. At iyan po ang ipinagbabawal.
Hindi po ipinagbabawal ang pagpapatuloy ng negosyo ng mga optometrist. Ang ipinagbabawal
lamang ay iyong korporasyon dahil alam naman nating pag mayroong sakunang nangyari ay
napakahirap idimanda ang korporasyon. Hindi katulad ng isang tao na personal ang pagdadala ng
serbisyo kaya mas madaling matunton ang kaniyang pagkakamali hindi kapareho ng isang korporasyon.
Senator Macapagal:  Subalit kung ihahambing po natin sa isang hospital, mayroong duktor iyong
hospital at nagkaroon ng sakuna, nadidemanda rin naman iyong hospital. Hindi po ba pareho na rin
iyon kung ididemanda iyong korporasyon na mayroong optometrist na nagtatrabaho doon?
Senator Webb:  Tama po iyan ngunit ang hospital ay regulated by the Department of Health. Ang
korporasyon po ay hindi man lamang regulated by Professional Regulation Commission hindi kapareho
ng mga optometrist, they are regulated. Wala pong nagreregulate sa korporasyon. Kung mayroon kayong
optical shop ngayon, wala pong nagre-regulate diyan kaya ang maaaring mabigyan ng kasalanan ay
iyong optometrist na nagtatrabaho sa kanila. Ngunit sila po ay libre sa kasong pagkakamali. Nabanggit
din ng

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Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

isang korporasyon
34
na napakarami nilang trabahador na madidisplace. Iyan po ay aking sasagutin
mamaya.

After intense interpellation by Senator Gonzales, Senator Webb conceded that the proposal
was also meant to “equalize
35
the playing field” between a corporation and one personally
practicing optometry.
While the above-mentioned objectives are legitimate, the means employed may be unduly
oppressive upon individuals. For example, one distinct feature of the regulation involved is
that on its face, it purports to regulate business and commerce. In its application and effect,
however, the business license practically prohibits individuals from seeking legitimate
employment from corporations. The nullity of the regulation, therefore, arises from its
operation.
That the exercise of police powers is subject to judicial review is without question. Police
powers being the most pervasive and most demanding of the three inherent powers of the
State, its exercise is not unbridled and must in all cases meet the tests of legitimacy, both in
the ends it seeks to achieve as well as in the means employed to achieve them. Applying such
tests to the present case therefore, it is clear that the respondent mayor acted in excess of his
legitimate authority. The purported ends sought to be achieved go no deeper than a recital of
the General Welfare clause:  i.e.,  “the safety and wellbeing of the people,” “safeguarding the
general public, especially the poor . . .,” without establishing how those goals could be
reasonably achieved by imposing such conditions in the permit. Furthermore, the means
employed effectively deprive optometrists of basic property right: that is, the right to seek
legitimate employment of their choice, which cannot be arbitrarily infringed upon by
regulations that are contrary to law.

_________________
34 Record of Senate, Volume IV, p. 56 (January 31, 1995), pp. 273-274.
35 Id., at 58, (February 1, 1995), p. 352.

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350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The primary purpose of the Optometry Law is to ensure

The primary purpose of the Optometry Law is to ensure that the service would be rendered by
competent and licensed persons and thereby protect the public from inexpertness. Despite the
public respondent’s assertions that the conditions in the business permit were made for the
purpose of “safeguarding the general public and especially the poor who are easily gulled by
misleading advertisements,” hence, falling within the ambit of police powers granted to local
officials under the Local Government Code, this Court sees no cogent reason why such purpose
cannot be attained even if the persons rendering the service are employed by a corporation.
Optometrists, like any other professionals are, nonetheless, bound by the same standards of
professional conduct, care, skill and diligence, whether they practice as independent
optometrists or as employees of unlicensed persons or corporations.

DISSENTING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

The instant case on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assails
the decision, dated 24 January 1991, and the resolution, dated 15 May 1991, of respondent
Court of Appeals in  CA-G.R. SP No. 22995, entitled “Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.-,
petitioner, vs. Hon. Mamindiara P. Mangotara in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Iligan City, Samahan ng Optometrists
sa Pilipinas-Iligan City Chapter, Leo T. Cahanap, City Legal Officer of Iligan, and Hon.
Camilo P. Cabili, City Mayor of Iligan, respondents,” affirming that of the trial court. The
issue focuses on whether or not petitioner corporation is, in fact, engaged in an unauthorized
practice of optometry. The trial court and the appellate court have both held in the
affirmative.

The relevant antecedents.

On 26 November 1988, the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan issued Business Permit No. 5342
to petitioner, upon its
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VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 351

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

application therefor, for the operation of a branch office-store of Acebedo Optical Clinic in the
city. The permit was subject to various conditions, among them being that Acebedo was not to
put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store and that Acebedo could not examine and/or
prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients nor to advertise or sell reading and
similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent
optometrist or an independent optical clinic. Nevertheless, Acebedo was authorized to
advertise or sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar
eyeglasses. It could also grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.
For the alleged breach of the conditions specified in the business permit granted to Acebedo,
private respondent  Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas  (“SOPI”), Iligan Chapter, filed a
complaint with the Office of the City Mayor. SOPI sought the revocation and/or cancellation of
Acebedo’s business permit. Acting on the complaint, the Office of the City Mayor directed its
City Legal Officer, Leo T. Cahanap, to look into the matter. On 12 July 1989, the latter
submitted his report which confirmed that Acebedo had indeed violated the conditions of its
business permit. Acting on the recommendation of the City Legal Officer, the city government,
on 19 July 1989, sent petitioner a “Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit”
effective “immediately” and gave it a period of three months within which to wind up its
affairs.
The action of the city government prompted petitioner to bring up, on 17 October 1989, a
petition for  certiorari,prohibition and  mandamus,  with a prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Iligan City, against
respondents Mayor Camilo Cabili, Leo Cahanap, and SOPI.
The petition substantially averred that petitioner was denied due process because it was
not given an opportunity to present its evidence during the investigation; that it was denied
equal protection because the conditions imposed on it were not being imposed on other
business enterprises in Ili-
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352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

gan City; that respondent mayor had no authority to impose special conditions; that
respondent City Legal Officer had no jurisdiction to conduct the investigation since the matter
was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional Regulation Commission and the
Board of Optometry; and that respondents City Mayor and City Legal Officer had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in cancelling petitioner’s permit.
Respondent SOPI interposed a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that Acebedo had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara
deferred the resolution of the motion but granted the prayer of petitioner for a writ of
preliminary injunction. On 30 May 1990, however, the Regional Trial Court ultimately
dismissed the petition for the failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies and
thus dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied in an order, dated 28 June 1990, of the trial court.
In the petition for  certiorari,  prohibition, and  mandamusfiled with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner sought to set aside the assailed order of dismissal, aforementioned, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The appellate court, on 24 January 1991,
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It also rejected, in its Resolution of 15 May 1991, a
motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal.
In its petition for review on certiorari before this Court, Acebedo would have it that—
“A.

“THE RESPONDENT COURT, WHILE CORRECTLY HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT CITY
MAYOR ACTED BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN THE
PERMIT AS THEY HAD NO BASIS IN ANY LAW OR ORDINANCE, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SAID SPECIAL CONDITIONS NEVERTHELESS BECAME BINDING ON PETITIONER UPON
ITS ACCEPTANCE THEREOF AS A PRIVATE AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT.

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Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

“B.
“THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND THE CITY OF ILIGAN WAS ENTERED INTO BY THE LATTER IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.”

Petitioner, in fine,
1
does not now dispute its having violated the conditions stated in the
business permit  issued by the City Mayor but would instead assail the authority of the mayor
to impose the aforesaid conditions.
The courts below, in my humble view, should be sustained.
The questioned conditionalities imposed on the business permit of Acebedo are activities
that cannot be performed by a corporation without such engagement being translated into an
unauthorized practice of optometry. The exercise of this profession is no different from the
practice of other regulated professions which can only be undertaken by individuals duly
licensed therefor.
Republic
2
Act No. 8050, otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law, like Republic Act
No. 1998,   the old Optometry Law, specifically prohibits any person from practicing or
attempting to practice optometry without such person having been first admitted to the
practice of that profession and granted a valid certificate of registration signed by the
Commissioner3
of the Professional Regulation Commission and by all members of the Board of
Optometry.  Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8050 reads:

“SEC. 5.  Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Optometry.—No person shall practice
optometry as defined in Section 3 of this Act nor perform any of the acts constituting the practice of
optometry as setforth in Section 4 hereof, without having been first admitted to the practice of this
profession under the provi-

________________
1 Rollo, p. 27.
2 Section 2, R.A. No. 1998, An Act to Regulate the Practice of Optometry in the Philippines.
3 Sec. 5, in relation to Sec. 3(e), Republic Act No. 8050.

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354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

sions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations: Provided,  That this prohibition shall not
apply to regularly licensed and duly registered physicians who have received post-graduate training in
the diagnosis and treatment of eye diseases: Provided, however, That the examination of the human eye
by duly registered physicians in connection with the physical examination of patients shall not be
considered as practice of optometry: Provided, further, That public health workers trained and involved
in the government’s blindness prevention program may conduct only visual acuity test and visual
screening.”

Under Section 4 of that law, any of the following acts would constitute the practice of
optometry; to wit:

a) The examination of the human eye through the employment of subjective and objective
procedures, including the use of specific topical diagnostic pharmaceutical agents or
drugs and instruments, tools, equipment, implements, visual aids, apparatuses,
machines, ocular exercises, and related devices, for the purpose of determining the
condition and acuity of human vision to correct and improve the same in accordance
with subsections (b), (c) and (d) hereof;
b) The prescription and dispensing of ophthalmic lenses, prisms, contact lenses and their
accessories and solutions, frames and their accessories, and supplies for the purpose of
correcting and treating defects, deficiencies and abnormalities of vision;
 c) The conduct of ocular exercises and vision training, the provision of orthoptics and
other devices and procedures to aid and correct abnormalities of human vision, and the
installation of prosthetic devices;
d) The counseling of patients with regard to vision and eye care and hygiene;
e) The establishment of offices, clinics, and similar places where optometric services are
offered; and
f) The collection of professional fees for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in
paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section.

The case at bar is notably different from that of “Samahan ng Optometrists Sa Pilipinas, Ilocos
Sur-Abra Chapter vs.
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VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 355

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
4
Acebedo International Corporation”  where the only issue submitted is whether or not Acebedo
can hire licensed optometrists without impinging on the Optometry Law (R.A. No. 1998). In
ruling that Acebedo can have duly licensed optometrists in its employ, the Court held:
“Petitioners’ contentions are, however, untenable. The fact that private respondent hires optometrists who
practice their profession in the course of their employment in private respondent’s optical shops, does not
translate into a practice of optometry by private respondent itself. Private respondent is a corporation
created and organized for the purpose of conducting the business of selling optical lenses or eyeglasses,
among others. The clientele of private respondent understandably, would largely be composed of persons
with defective vision and thus need the proper lenses to correct the same and enable them to gain normal
vision. The determination of the proper lenses to sell to private respondent’s clientele entails the
employment of optometrists who have been precisely trained for that purpose. Private respondent’s
business is not the determination itself of the proper lenses needed by persons with defective vision.
Private respondent’s business, rather, is the buying and importing of eyeglasses and lenses,
5
and other
similar or allied instruments from suppliers thereof and selling the same to consumers.”

In much the same vein, there would be no legal impediment for a lawyer, a physician, an
accountant or any other person duly licensed to engage in the practice of a regulated
profession to be hired or employed by a corporation but, by such employment, the corporation
may not itself then carry on and exercise the regulated activity.
Petitioner argues that respondent City Mayor has acted beyond his authority in imposing
the conditions expressed in Acebedo’s permit. The contention is bereft of merit. The City
Mayor has merely restated what the Optometry
6
Law mandates. Under Section 171, paragraph
2(n), of the then Local Government Code,  the City Mayor, being the Chief Executive

______________
4 270 SCRA 298.
5 At p. 306.
6 B.P. Blg. 337.

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356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
of the Local Government, has had the authority to “grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law,
city licenses or permits, and revoke the same for violation of law or ordinance or the conditions
upon which they are granted.” Its equivalent provision in the Local Government Code of 1991
is now found in Section 445, paragraph 3(iv), which empowers city mayors to “issue licenses
and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licenses or permits (are) issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.” Municipal corporations
are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-governance and are
endowed7 with police power in order to effectively accomplish the declared objects of their
creation.   An attribute of sovereignty, police power has been defined to be the power to
prescribe regulations to promote
8
the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.
A license or permit is not a contract between the sovereign and the grantee; rather, it is a
special privilege, a permission or authority to do what would be within its terms; it is neither
vested nor permanent that can at no time be withdrawn or taken back by the grantor. The
Solicitor General has posited correctly in disagreeing with the appellate court which has
mistaken the conditions imposed by respondent City Mayor as being binding on both the city
government and petitioner upon the thesis that the permit issued by him partakes the nature
of a private agreement or contract. For a permit to be impressed with a contractual character,
it must be clearly demonstrated that the very administrative
9
agency, which is the source of
the permit, can place that burden on itself as such.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition.
Petition granted, judgment reversed.

_______________
7 Tatelvs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157.
8 Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71.
9 See Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.

357

VOL. 329, MARCH 31, 2000 357

Imbuido vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Notes.—Advocacy of liberalized franchising and regulatory process is tantamount to an

abdication by the government of its inherent right to exercise police power, of the right to
regulate public utilities for protection of the public and the utilities themselves. (Kilusang
Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994])
The charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. (Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42[1995])

——o0o——