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G.R. No. 82680. August 15, 1994.

NICANOR SOMODIO, petitioner,  vs.  COURT OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA and

Appeals; Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally binding on the Supreme Court; When
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme
Court may scrutinize the evidence on record.—The procedural issue raised by private respondents should
first be resolved. The issue is whether the instant petition is proper considering that petitioner “merely
touch(es) upon questions of fact which had been carefully considered” by the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p.
92). As a general rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. This rule,
however, is not without exceptions, one of which is when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and
the trial court are contrary to each other. In such a case, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on
record in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191
SCRA 1 [1990] Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 411
[1990]).
Ejectment; Possession; Ownership; The only issue for resolution in ejectment cases is who is entitled to
the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership.—In
ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.
Anyone of them who can prove prior possession  de facto  may recover such possession even from the
owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party’s possession, provided that he
has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by
a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (De Luna v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]).
Same; Same; Same; Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.—Petitioner took possession of
the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil-ipil trees and fruit
trees. In 1976, he started the

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Somodio vs. Court of Appeals

construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that
he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in
the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is sufficient
that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Same; Same; Same; Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title
to an estate.—Petitioner’s prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his right
of ownership over the same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of possession is far from the
resolution of the issue of ownership. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the
actual title to an estate (German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495
[1989]; Manuel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 [1991]).
PETITION for review on certiorari to reverse and set aside a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to
reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 29, 1987 and the Resolution dated
February 2, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 11602.

On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a Transfer of Rights,
conveying to Wilfredo Mabugat the possession of a residential lot situated at Rajah Muda,
Bula, General Santos City and described in the said instrument as:
“Lot No. (Unnumbered), bounded on the North by Temporary Road, on the South by Customs Zone
(Sarangani Bay), on the East by Public Land, and on the West by Public Land.”

Nicanor Somodio, herein petitioner, contributed one-half of the purchase price. On October 22,
1974, Mabugat executed an
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Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half undivided portion
of the lot. Later, petitioner discovered in the District Land Office that the lot was numbered
“6328-X, Csd 2281-D.” Thereafter, petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into two
portions, with petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the partition, petitioner
took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and other fruit-
bearing trees.
In 1976, petitioner began construction of a structure with a dimension of 22-by-18 feet on
his lot. His employment, however, took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left the
unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. He would visit the property every three months
or on weekends when he had time.
Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to transfer his
hut to petitioner’s lot. About six years later, petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate the
premises but such demand proved futile. Hence, on August 23, 1983, petitioner filed an action
for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco before the Municipal Trial Court,
Branch I, General Santos, docketed as Civil Case No. 2032-II.
Meanwhile, on June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and
constructed a house thereon. Four days later, petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a
complaint for forcible entry before the same court docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case
was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.
In his answer, respondent Purisima averred that the lot was a portion of the land subject of
his application for miscellaneous sales patent with the Bureau of Lands. Purisima described
the lot in question as:

“Lot No. 6328-Y, CSD-2281-D, Bula, General Santos, Cotabato. Bounded on the North by 6328-X; on the
South by Sarangani Bay; on the East by a Municipal Road; and on the West by Lot No. 6328-W,
containing an area of 1,095 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 9647” (Rollo, p. 36; Italics
supplied).

Respondent Purisima contended that his father, a geodetic engineer, had surveyed the parcel
of land comprising of Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328 for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association,
Inc. in February 1958, and that his father’s survey plan was approved
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by the Director of Lands in 1960. Respondent Ayco, on the other hand, did not present any
evidence but merely anchored his right to possess the property on the evidence of Purisima.
On April 30, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision finding that respondent Purisima
built his house “almost on the spot where Somodio’s unfinished house” stood “thru stealth and
strategy,” not knowing that the house was built on Lot No. 6328-X and not on Lot No. 6328-Y,
the lot said respondent was claiming (Rollo, p. 43). The court went on to state that:
“x x x. He (private respondent Purisima) was a frequent visitor in Rajah Muda and had sometimes
stayed with Mrs. Maturan in Judge Purisima’s house on the adjoining lots, and could not have remained
unaware of the possession of Somodio. He must have depended on the thought that it was his father who
made the subdivision survey and had fenced an area which he had claimed. He did not exactly verify that
the area fenced by his father had an area of only 1,095 square meters, which did not include the area Lot
No. 6328-X. As the situation exists, there is no expectation on his part that his house on Lot No. 6328-X
could eventually be standing on his property, for Lot No. 6328-X is not claimed by him and has not been
applied for even by his father. His father has been abroad and has not taken steps to apply for Lot No.
6328-X. This lot is not declared for taxation purposes in the name of any claimant-applicant. Unless and
until there would be an administrative proceedings and the title ultimately issued in favor of an
applicant, the possession of the actual claimant and occupant has to be respected and maintained in the
interest of public order x x x” (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

The Municipal Trial Court further held that petitioner was the actual possessor of Lot No.
6328-X. The court did not believe respondent Ayco’s claim that the administratrix of the estate
of respondent Purisima’s father authorized him to build a hut on Lot No. 6328-X in 1976. At
any rate, the court said that respondent Ayco was willing to vacate the premises provided he
be given financial assistance to do so (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
Noting that the ocular inspection of the area showed that the houses of respondents
Purisima and Ayco were “inside Lot No. 6328-X” and not on Lot No. 6328-Y, the Municipal
Trial Court held that the case became one which entailed mere removal of the houses from the
lot in question. Accordingly, the court ordered private respondents to remove their respective
houses, to deliver the land to petitioner, and to pay attorney’s fees and
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litigation expenses.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General Santos City, affirmed in toto  the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. Respondents then elevated the cases on a petition for
review to the Court of Appeals, which, in its decision dated September 27, 1987, set aside the
decisions of the two trial courts and ordered the dismissal of the two complaints filed by
petitioner.
 The Court of Appeals held that herein petitioner had not “clearly and conclusively
established physical, prior possession over Lot No. 6328-X.”
Petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals having
been denied, he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
We grant the petition.

II

The procedural issue raised by private respondents should first be resolved. The issue is
whether the instant petition is proper considering that petitioner “merely touch(es) upon
questions of fact which had been carefully considered” by the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 92).
As a general rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. This
rule, however, is not without exceptions, one of which is when the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other. In such a case, this Court may
scrutinize the evidence on record in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record
(Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1 [1990]; Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 411 [1990]).
Upon a review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner indeed enjoyed priority of
possession over Lot No. 6328-X, notwithstanding respondent Purisima’s claim to the contrary.
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of
the party-litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such
possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a
party’s possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of
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time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having
a better right by either  accion publiciana  or  accion reivindicatoria  (De Luna v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]). Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974
when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil-ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he
started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was
unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property
only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos
v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175[1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the
property to the action of his will.
Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
“Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that
it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.”

Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing
improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because
respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983.
It should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals noted that none of the parties had
produced tax declarations or applications as public land claimants. As such, what should have
been scrutinized is who between the claimants had priority of possession.
Moreover, neither is the fact that respondent Purisima’s father surveyed the property of
help to his cause. As the Court of Appeals found, respondent Purisima’s father surveyed the
land for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc., not for himself. Although respondent
Purisima now claims that Lot No. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for the services of his
father and that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not
mean that respondent Purisima himself had prior possession. He did not present any proof
that his father had authorized him to enter the land as his successor-in-interest.
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Neither did he present proof that between 1958, when his father allegedly took possession of
the land, and 1983, when said respondent himself entered the land, his father ever exercised
whatever right of possession he should have over the property. Under these circumstances,
priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession.
The Court of Appeals opined that petitioner had not properly identified the lot he had
occupied. The matter of identification of the land, however, had been resolved by respondent
Purisima’s admission in his pleadings, as well as by two ocular inspections.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent Purisima claimed possession over Lot No. 6328-
Y, while petitioner identified the lot adjacent to it, Lot No. 6328-X, as the area where private
respondents built their houses. That these two lots are distinct from one another was resolved
by the ocular inspection conducted by a Senior Geodetic Engineer of the Office of the City
Engineer, who found that “south of lot 6328-H across a 10-meter wide road is lot 6328-Y and
from thence to the south is lot 6328-X.” On June 13, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court judge
himself went to the premises in question and discovered that aside from the houses of
respondents Purisima and Ayco, five other houses had been built on Lot No. 6328-X.
Petitioner’s prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his right of
ownership over the same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of possession is far from the
resolution of the issue of ownership. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate (German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 177 SCRA 495 [1989]; Manuel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 [1991]).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
that of the trial courts REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside, and that of the trial court reinstated.
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Note.—The rule is that pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance may
not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
(Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627 [1994])