AREEJ

CASE NO. 42
RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AREEJ
Spouses Lim, Agusan Institute of Technology et al v. CA | G.R. No. 190134 CASE NO. 43
RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
FACTS: Petitioners obtained loans and executed several real estate mortgages and Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Domingo Samut | G.R. No. 154407
chattel mortgage in favor of respondent First Consolidated Bank. Petitioners failed
to religiously pay said loans as they became due and demandable, hence, private FACTS: Petitioner’s father, Emiliano Cortez, filed a Free Patent Application with the
respondent bank was forced to file for an application for Extra-judicial Foreclosure Bureau of Lands, which was approved and an OCT was issued in Cortez’ name.
of Real Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage. Petitioners filed an action for Domingo Samut filed a protest alleging that they had been in possession of the
revocation and annulment of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage with plea properties since WWII. The State later filed a complaint for Reversion of Land to
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with Public Domain before the RTC. In her Answer with Third Party
the RTC, which ruled in favor of respondent bank. CA denied petitioners’ appeal Complaint,12 petitioner averred that herein respondent Samut cannot legally acquire
with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of the properties by possessory rights. Petitioner likewise averred that upon
Preliminary Injunction. investigation, she discovered that a portion of the property was sold by the heirs of
Samut to Chito Singson. Petitioner then prayed for the issuance of a temporary
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA, in denying petitioners’ application for a writ of restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent respondents
preliminary injunction, committed GADALEJ. Samut and Singson from selling or cultivating the properties. RTC denied the plea
for injunctive relief. CA affirmed.
RULING: NO. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a temporary
restraining order may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits ISSUE: WON the RTC committed GADALEJ in denying her plea for injunctive relief.
or by verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the
applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be hear. To be entitled to RULING: NO. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may
an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the
which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there pendency of an action.22 Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the
must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial, and merits of the case can be heard fully. Status quo is defined as the last actual,
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy,24 that which
damage.7 is existing at the time of the filing of the case. 25 Indubitably, the trial court must not
Worth nothing also is the fact that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.
injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards To entitle a petitioner to the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction, he must
that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court injunctive protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
discretion. prevent serious damage. The records before this Court fail to reveal a clear and
unmistakable right on the part of petitioner that would entitle her and her co-heirs
In the present case, CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying to the protection of an injunctive writ to be placed in possession of the properties.
petitioners’ application for preliminary injunction and TRO. As aptly held by the CA, On the other hand, it is undisputed that private respondents have been in
it neither appears from the facts shown by the TRO application that great or possession of the properties prior to and during the institution of the complaint. A
irreparable injury would result to petitioners before the matter can be heard, nor prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted for the purpose of taking the
did they show any clear and positive right to be entitled to the protection of the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the possession of one person
ancillary relief of TRO as they only claim that debts would have been paid had and putting it into the hands of another before the right of ownership is
respondent bank not impose astronomical interests on its loans. determined.
 well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to agree to a
contract through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction.

AREEJ
CASE NO. 44 AREEJ
RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CASE NO. 45
Thunder Security and Investigation Agency v. NFA | G.R. NO. 182042 RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Universal Motors Corporation v. Judge Francisco Rojas | A.M. No. RTJ-03-1814
FACTS: Petitioner Thunder Security and Investigation Agency entered into a
Contract for Security Services with respondent National Food Authority (NFA), FACTS: Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC) ordered from complainant UMC
Region I. Subsequently, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 was enacted which governed Nissan vehicles and spare parts and issued several postdated checks in favor of
the bidding procedure of service contracts in the Government. complainant to pay for the purchases. NSSC repeatedly failed to comply. UMC
terminated its dealership agreement with NSSC. NSSC filed a case for breach of
Since petitioner’s contract with the NFA was about to expire on September 15, contract against complainant and its officers, which was raffled to respondent Judge
2003, the NFA caused the publication of an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Rojas. NSSC filed an amended complaint which inserted a prayer for temporary
Bid. NFA-RBAC informed petitioner that its application to bid had been rejected due restraining order which was not found in the original complaint. Judge Rojas
to its failure to submit the required documents. Petitioner filed before the RTC a issued a TRO. Respondent judge subsequently ordered the issuance of a writ of
Petition for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction, with a prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction upon posting by the plaintiff of a bond.
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) plus Damages, seeking to enjoin respondents
from awarding the contract to another security agency. RTC granted the petition. Complainant filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
Respondents sought recourse via certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA which it preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge. CA ruled in favor of complainant.
granted. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint against respondent judge for serious
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and grave abuse of
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC orders which granted discretion. It alleges that respondent judge has exhibited manifest partiality toward
injunctive relief to petitioner.NO. NSSC.

RULING: NO. The following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge’s actions constitute grave abuse of
injunction, be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue: (1) The applicant must have a authority.
clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) There is a
material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the RULING: YES. First, respondent judge ordered a hearing on the issuance of a
writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, temporary restraining order although it was not prayed for in the complaint. A
speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 32 temporary restraining order may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown
by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
In this case, it is apparent that when the RTC issued its December 1, 2005 Order, result to the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
petitioner has no more legal rights under the service contract which already The relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted mainly of its
expired on September 15, 2003. Therefore, it has not met the first vital requisite reinstatement as dealer of Nissan vehicles and spare parts in Northern Mindanao,
that it must have material and substantial rights that have to be protected by the and the termination of the dealership agreement between UMC and NICAD. NSSC
courts.33 It bears stressing that an injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a temporary restraining
contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse order to prevent any great or irreparable injury that it might suffer while the
and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause preliminary injunction is being heard.
of action. There must exist an actual right. 34 Verily, petitioner cannot lay claim to an
actual, clear and positive right based on an expired service contract. Moreover, Second, respondent judge issued the temporary restraining order without requiring
the plaintiff to post a bond. While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge
the discretion to require a bond before granting a temporary restraining order, the
Rules did not intend to give the judge the license to exercise such discretion
arbitrarily to the prejudice of the defendant. Certainly, each member of the Bench is
not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.