LABOR
CASE DIGEST
CASE NO. 24
ELENA P. DYCAICO vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
and SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,
G.R. No. 161357
November 30, 2005
FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data record (SSS Form RS-
1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and
Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He
continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his
death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacio’s death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivor’s pension. Her
application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or
the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his
retirement. The said proviso reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. –
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive
the monthly pension.
Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the –
Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was
cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application, submitted marriage
contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date; hence, you could not
be considered his primary beneficiary.
Petitioner contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1
and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the member to
be entitled to the survivor’s pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacio’s designation of them as his beneficiaries.
Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice.
The SSC refuted the petitioner’s contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by
citing the definitions of “primary beneficiaries” and “dependents” in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under
paragraph (k) of the said provision, “primary beneficiaries” are “[t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children …” Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the
other hand, defines “dependents” as the following: “(1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed
and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is
receiving regular support from the member.”
Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivor’s pension are those who
qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the
legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the pension.
HELD:
YES
For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 similarly violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The proviso infringes the equal protection clause
As illustrated by the petitioner’s case, the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
which qualifies the term “primary beneficiaries” results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into
two groups:
(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the latter’s retirement;
and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement.
The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his
retirement. She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso “as of the date of his
retirement disqualifies them from being considered “primary beneficiaries” for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s
pension.
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does
not bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” to qualify the term
“primary beneficiaries” in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Court’s mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with
the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits.
REASON OF THE PROVISO:
In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons
solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.
This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor’s
pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the
duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., “provide meaningful
protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden." The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague
and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective.
For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in contemplation of imminent death, then
it should have prescribed a definite “duration-of-relationship” or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements
for entitlement to survivor’s pension.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were
contracted prior to or after the latter’s retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension does not rest on real
and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory.
The proviso infringes the due process clause
As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,[18] the Court characterized retirement
benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that “[i]n a pension plan where employee
participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension
where the pension is part of the terms of employment.
The proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as
it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the
latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without
giving them an opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of the proviso “as of the date of his
retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.[29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso
is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present
their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to
render substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the
survivor’s pension accruing upon the death of her husband.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The proviso “as of the date of his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared
VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
