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RAMON K. ILUSORIO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 139130             November 27, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner is a prominent businessman running about 20 corporations and a depositor in good standing of
respondent bank, the Manila Banking Corporation. With his busy schedule, petitioner entrusted to his
secretary, Katherine E. Eugenio, his credit cards and his checkbook with blank checks. It was also Eugenio
who verified and reconciled the statements of said checking account.

Between September 5, 1980 and January 23, 1981, Eugenio was able to encash and deposit to her
personal account about 17 checks drawn against petitioner’s account with an aggregate amount
of P119,634.34. Petitioner did not bother to check his statement of account until a business partner apprised
him that he saw Eugenio use his credit cards. Petitioner fired Eugenio immediately, and instituted a criminal
action against her for estafa thru falsification before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Private
respondent also lodged a complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents against Eugenio on
the basis of petitioner’s statement that his signatures in the checks were forged.

Petitioner then requested the respondent bank to credit back and restore to its account the value of the
checks which were wrongfully encashed but respondent bank refused. Petitioner filed the instant case.

At the trial, the NBI then suggested that petitioner submit 7 or more additional standard signatures for
sufficient rendering of definitive opinion. Petitioner, however, failed to comply with this request. Thus, after
evaluation, the court a quo dismissed the case as well as its counteclaim for lack of sufficient basis.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA which held that petitioner’s own negligence was the
proximate cause of his loss. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that Manila Bank is liable for damages for its negligence in failing to detect the
discrepant checks. He adds that as a general rule a bank which has obtained possession of a check upon an
unauthorized or forged endorsement of the payee’s signature and which collects the amount of the check from
the drawee is liable for the proceeds thereof to the payee. Manila Bank contends otherwise.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against private respondent

Ruling:

NO. The Court found that petitioner has no cause of action against Manila Bank. To be entitled to
damages, petitioner has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the bank for failure to detect the
discrepancy in the signatures on the checks. However, petitioner failed to submit additional specimen
signatures as requested by the NBI from which to draw a conclusive finding regarding forgery. Moreover, the
CA and the RTC found that Manila Bank employees exercised due diligence in cashing the checks. The
bank’s employees did not have a hint as to Eugenio’s modus operandi because she was a regular customer
of the bank, having been designated by petitioner himself to transact in his behalf.

As borne by the records, it was petitioner, not the bank, who was negligent. Petitioner’s failure to examine
his bank statements appears as the proximate cause of his own damage. The bank was not shown to be
remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank statements to petitioner so that any error or discrepancy in the
entries therein could be brought to the bank’s attention at the earliest opportunity. But, petitioner failed to
examine these bank statements not because he was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because
he did not pay sufficient attention to the matter. Had he done so, he could have been alerted to any anomaly
committed against him. In other words, petitioner had sufficient opportunity to prevent or detect any
misappropriation by his secretary had he only reviewed the status of his accounts based on the bank
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statements sent to him regularly. In view of Article 2179 of the New Civil Code, when the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, no recovery could be had for damages.

FE CAYAO-LASAM vs SPOUSES CLARO and EDITHA RAMOLETE

G.R. No. 159132             December 18, 2008

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts:

On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought to the
Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Due to persistent and
profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner performed a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." and
Editha was discharged from the hospital the following day.

On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting
and severe abdominal pains. She was informed that there was a dead fetus in her womb. After, Editha
underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus.
Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a
child.

On November 7, 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence
and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations Commission. Respondents alleged
that Editha’s hysterectomy was caused by petitioner’s unmitigated negligence and professional incompetence
in conducting the D&C procedure and the petitioner’s failure to remove the fetus inside Editha’s womb.

In her Answer, petitioner denied the allegations contending that it was Editha’s gross negligence and/or
omission in insisting to be discharged on July 31, 1994 against doctor’s advice and her unjustified failure to
return for check-up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition. And that Editha’s
hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy known as placenta increta, which was an
extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or
not a D&C procedure was done by her or any other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any
stage of gestation before term, the uterus would rupture just the same.

On March 4, 1999, the Board of Medicine of the PRC exonerated petitioner from the charges filed against
her. Feeling aggrieved, respondents went to the PRC on appeal which reversed the findings of the Board and
revoking petitioner’s authority or license to practice her profession as a physician.

Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review but denied the same holding that the
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the ROC was an improper remedy, as the enumeration of the quasi-
judicial agencies in Rule 43 is exclusive. PRC is not among the quasi-judicial bodies whose judgment or final
orders are subject of a petition for review to the CA. Hence, herein petition.

Issue:

WON there is medical malpractice committed.

Ruling:

Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or
surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the
profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully
pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a
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reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to
the patient.

In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that
petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, was able to present the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, an expert witness
which proved that it is evident that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s
uterus. It was, however, conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that
any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there
was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.

It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner’s advise.
Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. Had Editha
returned, petitioner could have conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine
Editha’s health condition and applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of
Editha’s uterus. The D&C procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical
practice, it is clear that Editha’s omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a
contributory negligence on her part.

Again, based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence
can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was
her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner’s orders.
The immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the
injury.
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HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF
APPEALS

G.R. No. L-3422             June 13, 1952

BENGZON, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo,
Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its
engine and were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. Anyone could easily enter the said factory
as he pleased and there was no guard assigned on the gate.

At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing
with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in
one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
already a cadaver, having been died of asphyxia secondary to drowning.

The CA, and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the
tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises:

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to
induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

Issue:

WON the body of water an attractive nuisance?

Ruling:

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural,
in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held not to be applicable to
ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer
pools…The reason which is: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in
their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they
are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on
his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger.

Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the
petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner
— that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for
Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no further
discussion.

The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No costs.
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JOSE MENCHAVEZ, JUAN MENCHAVEZ JR., et al vs FLORENTINO TEVES JR.

Facts:

In February 1986, Petitoner Menchavez and Respondent Teves, Jr. executed a contract of lease for a
period of five years. During the lease period, the Cebu Regional Trial Court sheriffs demolished the fishpond
dikes constructed by respondent Teves. Teves subsequently filed for damages. He alleged that the lessors
had violated their Contract of Lease on the grounds of the provision that they were not able to have peaceful
and adequate enjoyment of the property during the agreed lease period. Respondent also adds that previous
finding of a trial court was withheld from him wherein the petitioners were ordered to remove the dikes that
were illegally constructed.

The RTC declared the Contract of Lease between both parties as void ab initio as the disputed property
was under the propery of the State. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. Respondent elevated the case to the
CA. The CA disagreed with the RTC’s ruling that both parties were at equal fault or pari delicto. While there
was negligence on the part of the respondent for having failed to verify the ownership of the property, there
was no evidence that he had knowledge of the petitioner’s lack of ownership. Thus, this petition was made.

Respondent citing Art. 1412 of the Civil Code, contends that he can recover from petitioners, because he
is an innocent party to the Contract of Lease. Petitioners allegedly induced him to enter into it through serious
misrepresentation.

Issue:

Were the Parties in Pari Delicto?

Ruling:

Unquestionably, petitioners leased out a property that did not belong to them, one that they had no authority to
sublease. The trial court correctly observed that petitioners still had a pending lease application with the State
at the time they entered into the Contract with respondent.

Contrary to respondents contention, he had notice of their doubtful ownership of the fishpond. Respondent
himself admitted that he was aware that the petitioners’ lease application for the fishpond had not yet been
approved. Thus, he knowingly entered into the Contract with the risk that the application might be
disapproved. Noteworthy is the fact that the existence of a fishpond lease application necessarily contradicts a
claim of ownership. That respondent did not know of petitioners’ lack of ownership is therefore incredible.

The evidence of respondent himself shows that he negotiated the lease of the fishpond with both Juan
Menchavez Sr. and Juan Menchavez Jr. in the office of his lawyer, Atty. Jorge Esparagoza. Both parties are
equally at fault, neither may recover against the other.
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NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM vs ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA"

G.R. No. 154259             February 28, 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at
around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, was invited by Dr. Violeta Filart to join her in a party at
the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.  At the
penthouse, while Mr. Reyes was lined-up at the buffet table, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment,
he was stopped by petitioner Ruby Lim, Executive Secretary. In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the
party. Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart but was completely ignored by her thus
adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step
out of the hotel. 

Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral
and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees. Ruby Lim, for her part,
admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by
the latter.

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony
of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated
that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited.

On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes and imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation
to pay Mr. Reyes damages. Thus, the instant petition for review.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot
be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

Issue:

WON petitioners are liable.

Ruling:

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"  ) refers to
self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury  which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.  As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.
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CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC. Vs PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-32611             November 3, 1930

STREET, J.:

Facts:

Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses for its
fishing trade. In order to save costs in running the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation
engaged in machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion
that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was
flooding and that the gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern was dismissed by
Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine stopped and upon being started, a back fire occurred which then
instantly spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was
destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The trial court ruled
for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest.

Issue:

Whether or not Quest was negligent.

Ruling: YES.

When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he
will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar
work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of
the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire.  But a person skilled in
that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances (risks) to
cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the
skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats . There
was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and
this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but
this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s
carelessness or lack of skill.
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MARGARITA AFIALDA vs BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE

G.R. No. L-2075            November 29, 1949

REYES, J.:

Facts:

Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses Basilio and Francisco Hisole as caretaker of
their carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending the animals on March 21, 1947, he was gored by one
of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries, the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor
to force majeure.

Plaintiff Margarita AFialda, sister and dependent of Loreto, filed an action for damages against
defendants under article 1905 of the Civil Code. Defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of a cause of action. The motion was granted by the lower court, holding that the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal
the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code .
Plaintiff appealed claiming that the article does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker and
makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.

Issue:

whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.

Ruling:

No. In the present case, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or
damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of
the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries, the death of an
employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was
by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws
rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action, however, is not brought under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the
Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if
action is to be based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the
part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no
allegation on those points.
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THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division)
LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA
JUAN

G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

PARAS, J.:

Facts:

After the strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte and when the floodwaters were
beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan or Nana Belen, ventured out of the house and proceeded
towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after
their merchandise that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, she was
electrocuted and was later on found dead.

In another place, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of INELCO, noticed certain fluctuations in
their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. He set out for an
inspection and found grounded and disconnected lines. He went to the INELCO office finding the office still
closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the NPC Compound.

Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health Officer examined the body and found an .electrically charged
wound in the hand of the deceased. He then stated the cause of death as “circulatory shock electrocution”.

Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte, only a few known
places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric lines and place of the plaintiff is not one of
them. Dr. Antonio Briones showed that the deceased could not have died of electrocution. The presence of
the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish her death by electrocution.

An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the CFI. In its Answer, petitioner
advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. After due trial, the CFI found
the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the
controverted decision.

Issue:

WON petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death

Ruling:

YES. A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger
he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril , or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the
deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs,
may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

The Court held that while it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was
through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. In times of calamities such as the one
which occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity  to be in constant vigil  to
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prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that
defendant did that.

Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done
to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care
required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be"
(Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now
absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act
of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable
if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" .

Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the
case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon.
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M. H. RAKES VS. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY (1907)

G.R. No. 1719

FACTS:
The plaintiff was one of eight laborers of the defendant company. They were transporting iron rails
from a harbor to the company yard by hand car. Some laborers would push the hand car while some would
assist by pulling the hand car by a rope. The plaintiff was walking alongside the hand car. At a certain spot at
or near the water's edge, the track which guided the hand car had sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted
or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about
the knee.
The plaintiff sought for damages against the defendant alleging that the accident happened through
the negligence of the defendant.
The courts found the defendant liable; that implied by the relation between the parties, the employer is
bound to provide safe appliances for the use of the employee; that it was the duty of the defendant to build
and to maintain its track in reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary
danger; that defendant failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred and, consequently,
the negligence of the defendant is established.
The most controverted question in the case was whether the plaintiff committed contributed
negligence on the grounds that (1) he noticed the depression in the track he continued his work, and (2) he
walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.

ISSUE:
Whether there was contributed negligence by the plaintiff.

HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but deducted from the award the amount fairly attributable to
the plaintiff’s negligence.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the
injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the
shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was
an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one
of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
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PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. vs MARICAR BASCOS BAESA et al

[G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.]

CORTES, J.:

Facts:

In the morning of June 12, 1981, while on their way to Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela to celebrate the 5 th
wedding anniversary of spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa, the passenger jeepney (with 15 persons) driven
by David Ico, had a collision with a PANTRANCO bus driven by Ambrosio Ramirez. This accident resulted in
the death of 5 persons and multiple injuries.

While taking the highway going to Malalam River, the speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri
encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. The driver of the
PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, went out on hiding and has never been seen.

All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein private respondents settled the case amicably
under the "No Fault" insurance coverage of PANTRANCO. Maricar Baesa, through her guardian Francisca O.
Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and her minor children, filed separate actions for damages arising from
quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.

In its answer, PANTRANCO, pointed to the late David Ico’s alleged negligence as the proximate cause of
the accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio
Ramirez.

The CFI of Pangasinan ordered against PANTRANCO awarding damages, plus attorney’s fees and
costs. On appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals modified the decision ordering
PANTRANCO to pay the another amount of damages. PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeal’s decision, but was denied for lack of merit. PANTRANCO then filed the instant petition for
review.

Petitioner faults the CA for not applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver.
Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had
the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

Issue:

WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.

Ruling:

The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water
District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this
case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the
last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise
of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does
not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that
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the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching
bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right
since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney
approaching from the opposite direction.

There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own lane or was prevented from
returning to the proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of
the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that
Ramirez had no choice but to swerve the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney’s lane
because there was a steep precipice on the right. However, this is belied by the evidence on record which
clearly shows that there was enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger.

The Court finds that the negligence of petitioner’s driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney
and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite
direction was the sole and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would not have
occurred. There was no supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would
have made the prior negligence of petitioner’s driver a mere remote cause of the accident.
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WILLIAM TIU vs PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, et al

G.R. No. 138060             September 1, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, just as the cargo truck marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and
General Merchandise" passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then
parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a
nearby shop. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed
the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming
vehicles. The truck’s tail lights were also left on.

At about 4:45 a.m., as the D’ Rough Riders passenger bus was approaching the bridge, driver Virgilio Te
Laspiñas saw the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to
swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the truck’s left rear. The
impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Felisa Arriesgado died shortly
thereafter.

Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and
attorney’s fees before the RTC against the petitioners, D’ Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his
driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast
and high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to
avoid the accident.

The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the following: respondent Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tiu’s insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the
registered owner of the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They alleged that
petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway in a moderate and normal
speed. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the
middle of the highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied
the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid damage to
property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo truck’s left rear.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent Arriesgado. It ruled that if petitioner Laspiñas had not been
driving at a fast pace, he could have easily swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck, thus, averting the
unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner Laspiñas was negligent. The trial court also ruled that
the absence of an early warning device near the place where the truck was parked was not sufficient to
impute negligence on the part of respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were fully on, and the
vicinity was well lighted by street lamps.

After the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied, the petitioners elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals who them affirmed the trial court’s decision with the modification that the
awards for moral and exemplary damages were reduced.

According to the appellate court, the action of respondent Arriesgado was based not on quasi-delict but
on breach of contract of carriage. As a common carrier, it was incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that
extraordinary diligence was observed in ensuring the safety of passengers during transportation. Since the
latter failed to do so, he should be held liable for respondent Arriesgado’s claim.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

According to the petitioners, the proximate cause of the incident was the gross recklessness and
imprudence of respondent Pedrano, creating the presumption of negligence on the part of respondent Condor
in supervising his employees, which presumption was not rebutted. The petitioners then contend that
respondents Condor and Pedrano should be held jointly and severally liable to respondent Arriesgado for the
payment of the latter’s claim.

Issue:

WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable to this case.

Ruling:

NO. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the
instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It
does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of
last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code.

Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent Arriesgado’s wife due to the negligence
of petitioner Laspiñas, his employee, on this score.
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HEDY GAN y YU vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988

FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts:

In the morning of July 4, 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay
Boulevard. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a
jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other. As
the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle
coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of
it and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision with the
oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota
Crown Sedan hit Isidro Casino who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against
the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the
rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian died and damages on the cars were incurred.

An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above
incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.

Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the
trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner on the ground of lack of interest on the part of
the complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial
court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.

The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged.

On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence. Hence, the present petition for a complete reversal of the judgment.

Issue:

WON Gan is negligent and therefore liable.

Ruling:

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about
to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. 

A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence." 
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Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple
Imprudence resulting in Homicide.

Under the circumstances of the case, The Court found that the appellate court is asking too much from a mere
mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from
a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not
be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. The danger confronting
petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking
but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.

Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and
consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under
consideration.
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DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC. vs C & A construction, inc.

G. R. No. 156034 - October 1, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a
deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila. The project was completed in 1994 but it
was not formally turned over to NHA.

On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines,
Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil
tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express
received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight
(8) hours.

At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North
Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to
drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves
were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind
which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full
stop of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the
ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Consequently,
respondent filed a complaint for damages with the RTC. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was
caused by a fortuitous event.

The complaint filed by respondent was dismissed. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of
negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the "emergency
rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best
solution to a threatening situation. It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong
move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon "Katring",
which is an act of God.

On appeal, the decision was reversed and set aside. The CA found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in
deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held
petitioner liable for damages.

Hence, the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35 in the morning
of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had
the transfer been made earlier, the vessel could have sought shelter.

Issue:

Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent/ WON the emergency rule is applicable in this case.

Ruling:

The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
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In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to
transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20,
1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after
8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided
to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence
cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the
transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the
existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently
waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction.  He cannot claim
that he waited for the sun to rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the
report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he
did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy  and there was no
weather disturbance yet.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same
situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances of finding a space at the North
Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was very near North Harbor.  Even if the latter
was already congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not
applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his
own negligence.
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ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA
SHIPPING LINES, INC.

G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989

GANCAYCO, J.:

Facts:

In the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines
owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B
Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of
Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of
determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision and concluded that such was attributable to the
negligence of the employees of the private respondent (M/V Asia Philippines). This findings served as the
basis of a subsequent decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard suspending a second mate
of the inter-island vessel as marine officer.

Petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before the R TC. Private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a
maritime collision is four years. Petitioners should have filed within four years from the date when the maritime
collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint herein filed was instituted beyond the four-year
prescriptive period.

Petitioners contended that that the Complaint was seasonably filed. Maritime collisions have peculiarities
and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the
Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. They argued that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that the 4-year prescriptive period should be computed
from when the decision ascertaining the negligence had become final.

The trial court denied the Motion filed by the private respondent. It observed that in ascertaining
negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such
collision, and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine
Rules and Regulations. That the four-year prescriptive period should begin to run only from the date when the
negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained.

Private respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, which granted the Petition. It ruled that while it is true that the findings and
recommendation of the Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in ascertaining
which of the parties are at fault, still the court is not bound by said findings and decision.

Petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue:

WON a Complaint for damages arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.

Ruling:
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YES.. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within 4
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. It must be counted when the
last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the
right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the
fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not
apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by
alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.

Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages filed court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the 4
year prescriptive period.
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JOSE CANGCO vs MANILA RAILROAD CO.

G.R. No. L-12191             October 14, 1918

FISHER, J.:

Facts:

Jose Cangco, a clerk of Manila Railroad Company, was alighting the train as it slowed down when one or
both of his feet tripped on a sack of thus falling violently on the platform and rolling under the moving car,
where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. The accident occured between 7-8:00pm on a dark
night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, sack of
melons on the platform were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

It is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at
the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
readily to be credited.

Plaintiff instituted a complaint for damages against defendant company in the Court of First Instance on
the ground of negligence of its servants and employees in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and
leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passengers, under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code.
The trial judge ruled in favor of defendant, concluding that although negligence was attributable to the
defendant, plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore
precluded form recovering. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue:

1. WON Art. 1903 of the Civil Code is applicable to obligations arising ex contractu.

2. WON there is contributory negligence upon plaintiff.

Ruling:

No. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa  aquiliana
and not to culpa contractual.

In Rakes case, the court rest squarely that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.

The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who
exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they
should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with
equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he
incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their
employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is  juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
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may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own  negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to
the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the
negligence of the master.

In case of extra-contractual culpa  based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the
breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person
called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.

On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the
breach of his contract.

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has
its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members,
or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all
other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental
distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that
in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum  exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.

The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another,
is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie  to warrant a recovery.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume
the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
[1907 ed., p. 76]).

In no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to
constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.

It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the
pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed
from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof
disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the
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proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence
in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for
the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa
aquiliana or culpa contractual.

As Manresa points out whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in
damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the
selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it
is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the damages
negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the
fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court
would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory
of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and
control of the servant.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. That duty, being contractual, was direct and
immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.

2.) No. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident
was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. However, plaintiff did not
suffered the injury in alighting but from defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.

In Thompson's work on Negligence, the test by which to determine whether the passenger has been
guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It
is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger,
would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has
been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care
which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.

In Picart vs. Smith the test is this: Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the
time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the
train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting;
and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.

In this case,plaintiff was ignorant of the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe
egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to
the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure
upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — i.e., whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has
been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as
the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station.
There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
 CASES on
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(Defense)

required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of
the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
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(Defense)

RAYMUNDO ODANI SECOSA, EL BUENASENSO SYand DASSAD WAREHOUSINGand PORT

[G.R. NO. 160039 : June 29, 2004]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

On June 27, 1996, Erwin Suarez Francisco, an 18-yr old third year physical therapy student, was riding a
motorcycle along Radial 10 Avenue.At the same time, Petitioner Raymundo Odani Secosa, was driving an
Isuzu cargo truck,owned by petitioner, Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., on the same road.

Traveling behind the motorcycle driven by Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn was
being tailed by the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa. The three vehicles were traversing the southbound lane at a
fairly high speed. When Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle causing
Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over Francisco, which resulted in his
instantaneous death.Fearing for his life, petitioner Secosa left his truck and fled the scene of the collision.

Respondents, the parents of Erwin Francisco, thus filed an action for damages against Raymond Odani
Secosa, Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. and Dassads president, El Buenasucenso Sy.

The court a quo ruled in favor of herein respondents. Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the appealed decision in toto. Hence the present petition. Petitioners presented
testimonial evidence to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees.

Issue:

WON petitioners sufficiently proved that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

Ruling:

NO. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that
there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision
over him after such selection.The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of
the employer that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the
employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care.

In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with
respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure.
Although testimonies were offered that all these precautions were followed, the records of the driver’s
interview, of the results of his examinations, and of his service were not presented. The failure of MMTC to
present such documentary proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses.

The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but he must also support such
testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the biased
nature of the employers testimony or that of his witnesses.

Thus, petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to conclusively prove that it had
exercised the requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 CASES on
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(Defense)

However, the Court found petitioner El Buenasenso Sy no solidarily liable with his co-petitioners. While it
may be true that Sy is the president of petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., such fact is not
by itself sufficient to hold him solidarily liable for the liabilities adjudged against his co-petitioners.

It is a settled precept in this jurisdiction that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate
from that of its stockholders or members. There is no evidence that will justify the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction such as to hold the president of Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. solidarily liable
with it. The Isuzu cargo truck which ran over Erwin Francisco was registered in the name of Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., and not in the name of El Buenasenso Sy.Raymundo Secosa is an
employee of Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. and not of El Buenasenso Sy.All these things,
when taken collectively, point toward El Buenasenso Sys exclusion from liability for damages arising from the
death of Erwin Francisco.
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(Defense)

ERNESTO SYKI vs SALVADOR BEGASA

G. R. No. 149149 - October 23, 2003

CORONA, J.:

Facts:

On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger
jeepney driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the
passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger
jeepney), a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear end of
the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone and suffered lacerations and
abrasions in his left leg.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carriers contractual obligations and
quasi-delict against Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, the
owner of the truck;, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the truck.

The trial court dismissed the complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and operator of the passenger
jeepney, but ordered petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent
Salvador Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and moral damages plus attorneys fees. Petitioner Syki and his
driver appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed the same in toto and denied
their motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner Ernesto Syki filed the instant petition for review, arguing that Begasa is guilty of
contributory negligence. Hence, the damages awarded to him should have been decreased or mitigated.
Petitioner also contends that he presented sufficient evidence to prove that he observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee, thus he should not be held liable for
the injuries sustained by respondent.

Issue:

1. WON Begasa is guilty of contributory negligence.

2. WON petitioner proved sufficient evidence of the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising its employee.

Ruling:

NO. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent, either or both, in the selection and/or supervision of his said employee duties. The
said presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. If the employer
successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved of liability.

Based on jurisprudential law, the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he
had observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but
he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence.

In this case, petitioners evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence. However, they never
presented the alleged clearance, results of driving test, and records of the regular inspections that his
mechanic allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-serving testimonies were insufficient to
overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.
 CASES on
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(Defense)

2.) NO. There was no evidence that respondent Begasa and his three companions flagged down the
passenger jeepney at in a prohibited area, violating laws.

The sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver who did not slow
down even when he was already approaching a busy intersection within the city proper. The passenger
jeepney had long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions and, in fact, respondent was
already partly inside the jeepney, when petitioners driver bumped the rear end ofrear-ended it. The impact
was so strong such that respondent fell and fractured his femur, and suffered severely woundeds in his left
knee and leg. No doubt that the driver was reckless speeding.

Since the negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident, in the present
case, petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to respondent Begasa for the
injuries sustained by him.
 CASES on
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(Defense)

LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION

[G.R. NO. 184905 : August 28, 2009]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

In the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Avenue, a vehicular accident took place between a
Toyota Altis Sedan (owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin) and a Ford
Expedition (owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the sedan, one Estela
Maliwat sustained injuries.

Aquilino, was speedily driving when Ramos crossed the barricade and violently rammed against the car's
right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction
where it came from.

Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Rodel for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent
reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela which fell on
deaf ears prompting C.O.L. Realty to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the MeTC.

Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino which was the
proximate cause of the accident for violating MMDA rule. Ramos maintained that the sedan car crossed
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting
vehicles to pass through the intersection. He asserted that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.

The MeTC exculpated Ramos from liability and C.O.L. Realty appealed before the RTC. It affirmed the
decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. C.O.L. Realty appealed to the CA which
modified the decision ruling respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo. It
affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing the barricade placed along the intersection of
Katipunan Avenue. However, it likewise noted that the driver Rodel is guilty of contributory negligence for
driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

WON petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo.

Ruling:

There is no doubt that Aquilino's violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident. However, Ramos is also liable vicariously for
Rodel's contributory negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.

Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the part
of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee,
an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection
and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
Employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything
that was incumbent on them.
 CASES on
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(Defense)

Regrettably, Ramos' evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained unsubstantiated and
are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which would support Ramos' bare
allegation of Rodel's 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed to present convincing proof that he went to
the extent of verifying Rodel's qualifications, safety record, and driving history.

So too, Ramos did not bother to refute C.O.L. Realty's stance that his driver was texting with his cellphone
while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew that Katipunan Avenue was
then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with barriers. The presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence in the selection of driver remains unrebutted. As the employer of Rodel, Ramos is
solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.

It has been clearly established in this case, however, that respondent's negligence was not merely
contributory, but the sole proximate cause of the accident. On the other hand, respondent conceding that
petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and insisted on his vicarious liability as Rodel's employer.

Aquilino's act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for
any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if
he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of
the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error
for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that
when the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel's contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino's recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
Rodel's contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award
of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only
the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent's liability for Aquilino's negligence which is the proximate result
of the accident.
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(Defense)

NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT vs HEIRS OF RAY
CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG

[G.R. NO. 160709 : February 23, 2005]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon, borrowing Joel Castillon’s motorcycle, invited his
friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.

At around past 10:00 p.m., as they traversed the highway and reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in
an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot,
which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the
instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.

Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents
but reduced petitioner's liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence the present petition. Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray
Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages.

Issue:

WON there is contributory negligence on the part of Castillon.

Ruling:

YES. In the examination of the records it is clear that the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first
establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured
Sergio. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly
held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.

While the Court agree that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory negligence as defined under Article
2179 of the Civil Code, it found equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the
victim's negligence.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own
injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendant's liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case.

In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at
a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was
not wearing a protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all
considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P,
the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
 CASES on
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(Defense)

GREGORIO GENOBIAGON vs COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Facts:

On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an eighty-
one-year old woman named Rita B. Cabrera, who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T.
Padilla Market.

The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross
when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the
steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's
rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road.

The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who saw the incident right
before him, shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking
the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman
that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old
woman was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours later.

Petitioner was charged and found guilty of homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision in toto and denied the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review. Petitioner argued that the
reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death.

Issue:

WON defense of contributory negligence is applicable in criminal case.

Ruling:

NO. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The defense
of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since
one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta,
CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs. Quinones, 44 O.G. 1520).
 CASES on
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(Defense)

LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION

[G.R. NO. 184905 : August 28, 2009]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

In the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan Avenue, a vehicular accident took place between a
Toyota Altis Sedan (owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin) and a Ford
Expedition (owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the sedan, one Estela
Maliwat sustained injuries.

Aquilino, was speedily driving when Ramos crossed the barricade and violently rammed against the car's
right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction
where it came from.

Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Rodel for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent
reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela which fell on
deaf ears prompting C.O.L. Realty to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the MeTC.

Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino which was the
proximate cause of the accident for violating MMDA rule. Ramos maintained that the sedan car crossed
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting
vehicles to pass through the intersection. He asserted that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.

The MeTC exculpated Ramos from liability and C.O.L. Realty appealed before the RTC. It affirmed the
decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. C.O.L. Realty appealed to the CA which
modified the decision ruling respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo. It
affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing the barricade placed along the intersection of
Katipunan Avenue. However, it likewise noted that the driver Rodel is guilty of contributory negligence for
driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

WON petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo.

Ruling:

There is no doubt that Aquilino's violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident. However, Ramos is also liable vicariously for
Rodel's contributory negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection.

Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the part
of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee,
an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection
and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
Employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything
that was incumbent on them.
 CASES on
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(Defense)

Regrettably, Ramos' evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained unsubstantiated and
are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which would support Ramos' bare
allegation of Rodel's 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed to present convincing proof that he went to
the extent of verifying Rodel's qualifications, safety record, and driving history.

So too, Ramos did not bother to refute C.O.L. Realty's stance that his driver was texting with his cellphone
while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew that Katipunan Avenue was
then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with barriers. The presumption juris tantum that
there was negligence in the selection of driver remains unrebutted. As the employer of Rodel, Ramos is
solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.

It has been clearly established in this case, however, that respondent's negligence was not merely
contributory, but the sole proximate cause of the accident. On the other hand, respondent conceding that
petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and insisted on his vicarious liability as Rodel's employer.

Aquilino's act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was
prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for
any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident
occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if
he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of
the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error
for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that
when the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel's contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino's recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
Rodel's contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award
of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only
the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent's liability for Aquilino's negligence which is the proximate result
of the accident.