THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 160619. September 9, 2015.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA and
EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA , respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA , J : p

The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that
the Rules of Court require that the Information allege the ultimate facts constituting the
elements of the crime charged. Details that do not go into the core of the crime need
not be included in the Information, but may be presented during trial. The rule that
evidence must be presented to establish the existence of the elements of a crime to
the point of moral certainty is only for purposes of conviction. It nds no application in
the determination of whether or not an Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an
accused.
The Case
Before us is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court led by the People of
the Philippines ("the People") through the O ce of the Special Prosecutor under the
O ce of the Ombudsman. The petition seeks the reversal of the Resolutions dated
January 9, 2002 1 and November 3, 2003 2 issued by public respondent Sandiganbayan,
granting private respondent Jessie B. Castillo's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss the
Information led against him and denying the People's subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.
The Facts
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite in the May 1998 elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was led
against Castillo charging him with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019, 3 in relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite
located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo, while in the
performance of his o cial functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted bene ts to
his co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the
Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certi cate
(ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB). 4
An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been led
against Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The O ce of
the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the
penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
set aside the decision of the O ce of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of
the administrative complaint against Castillo. 5 The Court of Appeals held:
. . . [Castillo] did not violate the DENR notice which was issued way back in 1998
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 yet, or before his actual assumption of o ce. Quite the contrary, while already a
mayor, [Castillo], upon being informed of the notice, immediately took steps in
resolving the municipality's aged-long garbage problem. True, the solution was
a long-term one, but the end results were just the same, i.e., what was once a
mountainous pile of trash covering a 2-hectare piece of property has been
remarkably reduced and what was left was a considerable area used as a
segregation and transfer station of garbage prior to their eventual dumping at
the San Mateo landfill.
Doubtless, in nding [Castillo] guilty of simple misconduct and penalizing him
therefor, the respondent O ce of the Ombudsman, in clear abuse of discretion,
ignored and did not take into account the foregoing reports, including no less
the letter of commendation of [DENR] Secretary Cerilles.
It is thus unfortunate that even as [Castillo] had taken concrete steps to address
a problem that was not of his own doing or tolerance but merely inherited by
him, he was instead rewarded by an administrative penalty even as the very
government agency (DENR) which issued the Notice of Violation commended
him for his efforts. If this is not a travesty of justice, then We know not what it
is. 6 CAIHTE

After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, led with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings. 7 He argued that the
case against him had been decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 9003 8 and
invoked the decision of the Court of Appeals absolving him of administrative liability.
His motion was initially denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September
6, 2001. 9
On September 21, 2001, Castillo led a Supplemental Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense. 10 He claimed
that a public o cer may only be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019
if he caused undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued
that the undue injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be
speci ed. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan , 11 Castillo
asserted that the claim of undue injury must be "speci ed, quanti ed and proven to the
point of moral certainty."
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division failed to decide unanimously on the
Supplemental Motion. Thus, a special division (composed of ve Justices of the
Sandiganbayan) was constituted. 12 Voting 3 to 2, 13 this Special Division, in its
challenged Resolution dated January 9, 2002, granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion:
Going over the elements of the crime vis-a-vis the allegations of the
information, the court agrees with the contention of movant that the allegations
of the information fail to measure up to the requirements of the law. While the
information charges Castillo with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019 for
"giving unwarranted bene ts to his co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano
Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dumpsite at Villa Esperanza, Molino,
Bacoor, Cavite" and "thereby causing undue injury to the residents and students
in the area who had to endure the stench, ies, rats and mosquitoes emanating
from the dumpsite" the court notes the failure of the information to
quantify the alleged unwarranted bene ts supposedly given by
movant to his co-accused as well as the undue injury caused to the
residents and students of the area affected by the dumpsite .
In the case of Alejandro vs. People, the Supreme Court had ruled that
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 undue injury requires proof of actual injury or damage. Thus, in Llorente, it was
held that "undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of
the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of
unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act
punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be
specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty . aScITE

Anent the allegation of unwarranted bene ts given to the Arciagas, the

court likewise notes the failure of the information to specify and quantify the
s a m e. Whereas the Ombudsman's resolution nding prima facie
evidence against the herein accused made mention of the amount of
P250.00 to P300.00 allegedly collected from each garbage truck from
companies and factories allowed to dump garbage at the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite, the same was not alleged in the information
which charged Castillo with having given unwarranted bene ts to his
co-accused . 14
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Special Division 15 also resolved, on November 3, 2003, to deny the motion
for reconsideration subsequently filed by the People.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The case before us raises the question of what ultimate facts are required to be
stated in an Information charging an accused with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019. Speci cally, we are called to resolve whether an Information alleging the grant of
unwarranted bene ts and existence of undue injury must state the precise amount of
the alleged bene t unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged
injury to the point of moral certainty.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally
informed of the facts and the acts constituting the offense charged. 16 Where
insu cient, an accused in a criminal case can le a motion to have the Information
against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his plea. 17 A motion to quash
challenges the e cacy of an Information 18 and compels the court to determine
whether the Information su ces to require an accused to endure the rigors of a trial.
Where the Information is insu cient and thus cannot be the basis of any valid
conviction, the court must drop the case immediately and save an accused from the
anxiety and convenience of a useless trial. 19
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the
Information whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. 20 The question that
must be answered is whether such allegations are su cient to establish the elements
of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde. 21 In proceeding to resolve
this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1) what must be alleged in a valid
Information; (2) what the elements of the crime charged are; and (3) whether these
elements are sufficiently stated in the Information.
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 Sufficiency of Complaint or
Information
Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state —
Sec. 6. Su ciency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is
su cient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense ; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms su cient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as
well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment .
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan , 22 explained the two important purposes
underlying the rule. First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defense. 23
Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. 24 Thus, this Court held that the true test in
ascertaining the validity and su ciency of an Information is "whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged." 25
Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, the elements of
which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public o cer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or giving any private party unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions. 26
The subject Information filed against Castillo, on the other hand, reads to wit:
That in or about 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jessie B. Castillo, a public
officer , being the incumbent Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, while in the
performance of his o cial and administrative function, acting in
evident bad faith and manifest partiality , conspiring and confederating
with accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, caretakers of
Villa Esperanza, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give
unwarranted bene ts to his co-accused Melencio A. Arciaga and
Emerenciano A. Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dump site
located at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite, notwithstanding
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 the fact that no Environmental Compliance Certi cate (ECC) or any
permit has been issued by the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources to any
person or entity for such purpose , and despite cease and desist orders
issued by the DENR, thereby causing undue injury to the residents and
students in the area who had to endure the stench, ies, rats and
mosquitoes emanating from the dumpsite . 27 HEITAD

(Emphasis supplied.)
Information filed against
Castillo and his co-accused is
sufficient
We nd that the foregoing Information su ciently alleges the essential elements
of a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. The Information speci cally alleged that
Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such o cial capacity, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally gave unwarranted bene ts to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of
the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury of the residents and students in the
area who had to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.
The Sandiganbayan, however, allowed the quashal of the Information due to the
prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of bene ts granted
by Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the point of moral
certainty" the undue injury caused to the people of Molino. According to the
Sandiganbayan:
. . . the court deems it to be an exercise in futility to proceed to trial when the
information that was led failed to inform the accused of the quantity of injury
caused by Castillo to the residents of Villa Esperanza and the amount of
unwarranted bene ts given to the Arciagas as a result of the operation of the
dumpsite. Such failure is fatal to the prosecution's cause considering
that the public prosecutor is barred from presenting evidence on a
matter not alleged in the information. Otherwise , if the prosecution would
be allowed to present evidence to quantify the element of undue injury or
unwarranted bene ts, the same would violate the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him . 28
(Emphasis supplied.)
We disagree.
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the
point of speci city, the exact amount of unwarranted bene t granted nor specify,
quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. We have
consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an Information need only
state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the ner details of why and
how the crime was committed. 29
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted bene t was the privilege granted
by Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the
applicable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and students
were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details required by the
Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount actually received by the Arciagas as
a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite or the speci c extent of
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 damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence best raised
during the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing
the accused of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of unwarranted
benefits and undue injury under the Information suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when
one considers the period when a motion to quash is led, that is, before the accused's
arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It would be illogical, if not
procedurally in rm, to require speci c peso amount allegations of the unwarranted
bene t and proof of undue injury — to the point of moral certainty, no less — at this
stage of the criminal proceedings.
Application of Llorente ruling
is misplaced
The Sandiganbayan's application of the Llorente ruling in this case is misplaced.
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be speci ed,
quanti ed and proven to the point of moral certainty." 30 The validity and su ciency of
the Information, however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of the ruling therein
is that proof of undue injury must be established by the prosecution during the trial
and not when the Information is led. Nowhere in Llorente did we require that undue
injury be speci ed, quanti ed and proved to the point of moral certainty at the time of
the ling of the Information. Such an interpretation would effectively require the
prosecution to include all the relevant evidence in the Information and to present such
evidence of undue injury even prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the
Sandiganbayan's interpretation of Llorente, the accused would be required to face (and
even rebut) the evidence as soon as the Information is led and even before he pleads.
This runs counter to the function of a motion to quash as a remedy afforded an
accused before he proceeds to trial.
Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as a
tool for an accused to understand the crime for which he is being charged as it requires
that the Information already contain a long and detailed list of other matters not
necessary in informing the accused of the charge. It will also be prejudicial to the
prosecution who will then be forced to present evidence even before the trial proper.
This interpretation cannot be countenanced. ATICcS

Outright quashal of the Information not proper

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Information was defective on
the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense, outright quashal
of the Information is not the proper course of action.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It
provides —
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured
by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment . The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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 When a motion to quash is led challenging the validity and su ciency of an
Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion
to quash and order the prosecution to le an amended Information. 31 Generally, a
defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an
offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. 32 In such instances, courts are
mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the
prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. 33 This rule
allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by
simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result
to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process
underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade , 34 the State,
just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant
the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly
granted under the Rules of Court and a rmed time and again in a string of Supreme
Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.
Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan
should have rst ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have
saved the parties from resorting to an appeal to this Court and this case from
remaining in the docket of the Sandiganbayan for a long period.
WHEREFORE , and in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED . The
Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated January 9, 2002 and November 3, 2003 are
REVERSED and the Information charging Castillo and the Arciagas with violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 is ordered REINSTATED . As this case has been pending
for almost fteen years, the Sandiganbayan is directed to resolve the case with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED .
Sereno, C.J., * Carpio, * Villarama, Jr. and Perez, ** JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated as additional Members per Ra e dated September 2, 2015 in view of the
recusal of Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. and Diosdado M. Peralta due
to relation to a party and prior action in the Sandiganbayan, respectively.
** Designated as Acting Member in view of the leave of absence of Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, with Associate Justices Narciso S. Nario,
Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr.,
rollo, pp. 68-75.
2. Penned by Associate Justices Rodolfo G. Palattao, with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong,
Norberto Y. Geraldez, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr.,
rollo, pp. 101-108.
3. Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
4. Rollo, pp. 119-121.
5. Id. at 248-273.
6. Id. at 270-271.
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 7. Resolution dated September 6, 2001, rollo, p. 122.
8. Otherwise known as the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000.

9. Rollo, pp. 122-124.

10. Id. at 125.
11. G.R. No. 122166, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 382.
12. Administrative Order No. 278-2001 dated October 30, 2001. This Special Division of Five
was composed of the following Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan: Narciso S.
Nario, Rodolfo G. Palattao, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and
Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. Resolution dated November 3, 2003, rollo, p. 68.

13. Associate Justices Palattao, Nario and Cortez-Estrada voted to grant Castillo's motion,
with dissents from Justices Ferrer and Villaruz, Jr., rollo, p. 75.

14. Rollo, pp. 72-73.

15. This Special Division of Five was now composed of the following Associate Justices of
the Sandiganbayan: Rodolfo G. Palattao, Gregory S. Ong, Norberto Y. Geraldez, Ma.
Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. Associate Justices Palattao,
Ong and Cortez-Estrada voted to deny the People's motion. Associate Justices
Geraldez and Villaruz dissented, rollo, 108.
16. People v. Arnault, 92 Phil. 252 (1952).
17. Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 1.
18. Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009, 586 SCRA 303.

19. Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145.
20. People v. De la Rosa, G.R. No. L-34112, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 190.
21. Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 322
citing People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 492.
22. G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 431.
23. Id. at 446.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Uriarte v. People , G.R. No. 169251, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 471, 486, citing Santos
v. People , G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 185, 194; Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 386; and
Jacinto v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 84571, October 2, 1989, 178 SCRA 254, 259.
27. Rollo, pp. 119-120.
28. Id. at 74.

29. See Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 431; People v.
Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 492; Go v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, G.R. No. 178429, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 322.
30. Supra note 11 at 399.
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 31. People v. Andrade , G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014; People v. Talao Perez , 98 Phil.
764 (1956).
32. People v. Andrade, supra.
33. Id.
34. Id.

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