No. L-16394. December 17, 1966.

JOSE SANTA ANA, JR. and LOURDES STO. DOMINGO, petitioners, vs. ROSA HERNANDEZ,
respondent.

Supreme Court;  Court of Appeals;  Appeals;  Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on
Supreme Court.— The credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence are matters within
the exclusive authority of the Court of Appeals, and it is not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial
court. Both the Judiciary Act (Rep. Act No. 296, Sec. 29) and the Rules of Court (Rule 45, Sec. 2) only allow a
review of decisions of the Court of Appeals on questions of law. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or
required to examine and contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. The law
creating the Court of Appeals was intended mainly to take away from the Supreme Court the work of
examining the evidence, and confine its task for the determination of questions which do not call for the
reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.
Sale; Sale of land for a lump sum.—Where the two parcels of land sold for a lump sum were identified
by the conspicious boundaries consisting of a long and continuous pilapil or dike that separated them from
the other lands, the sale made was of a definite and identified" tract, a corpus certum,  that obligated the
vendors to deliver to the buyer all the land within the boundaries, irrespective of whether the real area
should be greater or smaller than what is recited in the deed. This is particularly true where the area given
is qualified to be approximate only i.e., "more or less."
Same; When buyer must accept only the area recited in deed of sale.—To hold the buyer to no more than
the area recited in the deed, it must be made clear that the sale was made by unit of measure at a definite
price for each unit. As be-

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974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez

tween the absence of a recital of a given price per unit of measurement and the specif ication of the total
area sold, the former must prevail and it determines the applicability of the.norms concerning sales for ?
lump sum.
Same;  Rule as to sale of land as a cuerpo cierto was not modified by Act 496.—The rule as to sales
"a cuerpo cierto" was not modified by Act 496, Section 58, prohibiting the issuance of a certificate of title to a
grantee of part of a registered tract until a subdivision plan and technical description are duly approved by
the Director of Lands, and authorizing only the entry of a memorandum on the grantor's certif icate of title
in default of such plan. The latter provision is purely a procedural directive to Registers of Deeds that does
not attempt to govern the rights of vendor and vendee inter se, which are subject to New Civil Code. It does
not even bar the registration of the contract itself in order to bind the land.

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.
     J. T. de los Santos for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.;

Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case CA-G.R. No. 20582-R, in effect
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case No. 1036.
The petitioners herein, spouses Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo, owned a
115,850-square meter parcel of land situated in barrio Balasing, Sta. Maria. Bulacan, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3598. On 28 May 1954, they sold two (2) separate
portions of the land for P11,000.00 to the herein respondent Rosa Hernandez. These portions
were described in the deed of sale as f. ollows:
"Bahaguing nasa gawing Hilagaan. Humahanga sa Hilaga, kina Maria Perez, at Aurelio Perez; sa Timugan,
sa lupang kasanib; sa Silanganan, kay Mariano Flores at Emilio Ignacio; sa Kanluran, kay Cornelio Ignacio;
Mayroong (12,500), m.c. hu-

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Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez

migit kumulang."
"Bahaguing nasa gawing Silanganan. Humahanga sa Hilagaan, sa kay Rosa Hernandez; sa Silanganan,
kay Domingo Hernandez at Antonio Hernandez; sa Timugan, sa Sta. Maria-Tigbi Road; at sa Kanluran, sa
lupang kasanib (Jose Sta. Ana, Jr.), mayroong (26,500) metros cuadrados, humigit kumulang."

After the sale (there were two other previous sales to different vendees of other portions of the
land), the petitioners-spouses caused the preparation of a subdivision plan, Psd-43187, was
approved on 13 January 1955 by the Director of Lands. Rosa Hernandez, however, unlike the
previous vendees, did not conform to the plan and refused to execute an agreement of subdivision
and partition for registration with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan; and she, likewise, refused to
vacate the areas that she had occupied. Instead, she caused the preparation of a different
subdivision plan, which was approved by the Director of Lands on 24 February 1955. This plan,
Psd-42844, tallied with the areas that the defendant, Rosa Hernandez, had actually occupied.
On 28 February 1955, herein petitioners-spouses filed suit against respondent Rosa
Hernandez in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, claiming that' said defendant was occupying
an excess of 17,000 square meters in area "of what she had bought from them. Defendant Rosa
Hernandez, on the other hand, claimed that the alleged excess was part of the areas that she
bought.
The trial court observed:
"The only question, therefore, to be determined by the Court is whether or not the plaintiffs had sold two
portions without clear boundaries but with exact areas (12,500 sq. m. and 26,000 sq. m.) at the rate of ?.29
per square meter or, as defendant Rosa Hernandez claimed, two portions, the areas of which were not
definite but which were well defined on the land and with definite boundaries and sold for the lump sum of
P11,000.00."

Finding for the plaintiffs, the said court ordered the defendant, among other things, to vacate
"the excess portions actually occupied by her and to confine her occupation only
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976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez
to Lots 4-a and 4-b as shown in the plan, Exhibit E, of the plaintiffs x x x," referring to Psd-43187.
Not satisfied with the judgment, defendant Hernandez appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint and declared Rosa Hernandez the owner of lots
4-a and 4-b in her plan, Psd-42844, upon the following findings:
"The contract between appellees and appellant (Exhibit D) provided for the sale of two separate portions of
the same land for the single consideration of P11,000.00. Appellee Jose Santa Ana, Jr. said the transaction
was by a unit of measure or per square meter, and that although the actual total purchase price of the two
parcels of land was P11.300.00 at P0.29 per square meter the parties agreed to the sale at the reduced price
of P11,000.00. The appellant denied this claim of appellees. Gonzalo V. Ignacio, the notarial officer before
the contract of sale was executed, failed to corroborate Sta. Ana upon this point. Upon the contrary, Ignacio
testified that appellant complained to him and the appellees to the effect that the areas stated in the
contract were less than the actual areas of the parcels of land being sold and here we quote the notarial
officer's own words:

'That the area stated in the document will not be the one to prevail but the one to prevail is the boundary of the land
which you already know.' (p. 74, Innocencio).

"Sta. Ana is the nephew of the appellant, and the former's assurance probably appeased the latter against
insisting in the correction of the areas stated in the contract of sale.
"Two witnesses testified for the appellant. Jesus Policarpio divulged that the same parcels of land
involved in this case were previously offered to him by the appellees for the single purchase price of
P12.000.00. Julio Hernandez stated that his sister, the herein appellant, had offered P10.000.00 as against
the appellees' price of "12,000.00, and that he was able to persuade the parties to meet halfway on the price.
Furthermore the previous conveyances made by the appellees for other portions of the same property
(Exhibits B and C) are also for lump sums.
"The difference in area of 17,000 square meters is about one-half of the total area of the two parcels of
land stated in the document, but not for this alone may we infer gross mistake on the part of appellees. The
appellees admit the lands in question were separated from the rest of their property by a long and
continuous 'pilapil' or dike, and there is convincing

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proof to show that the bigger lot (Lot 4-a) was wholly tenanted for appellees by Ciriaco Nicolas and Santiago
Castillo and the smaller lot (Lot 4-b) was wholly tenanted for said appellees by Gregorio Gatchalian. These
facts support the theory that the two parcels of land sold to the appellant were identified by the conspicuous
boundaries and the extent or area each tenant used to till for the vendors. Again, appellees should not be
heard to complain about the deficiency in the area because as registered owners and possessors of the entire
land since 1949 they can rightly be presumed to have acquired a good estimate of the value and areas of the
portions they subsequently sold."

The Court of Appeals concluded by applying to the case Article 1542 of the new Civil Code:
"In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or
number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be greater or less area or number
than that stated in the contract.
"The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price; but if, besides
mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number
should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said
boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to
do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless
the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been
stipulated."

and declared Rosa Hernandez the owner of the whole of lots 4-a and 4-b of her own subdivision
Plan Psd-42844, notwithstanding their increased area as compared to that specified in the deed
of sale.
In turn, the Sta. Ana spouses appealed to this Court, assigning the following errors:

"The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, by disturbing the findings of fact of the trial court, made upon conflicting testimonies
of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, now in the petitioners, and the defendant, now the respondent, Rosa
Hernandez.
"The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it held that the deed of sale, Exhibit D, was
for a lump

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Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez

sum, despite the fact that the boundaries given therein were not sufficiently certain and the boundaries
indicated did not clearly identify the land, thereby erroneously deciding a question of substance in a way not
in accord with law and the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court."

On the face of the foregoing assignments of error and the petitioners' discussions thereabout,
their position can be summarized as follows: that the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its
own findings of fact for that of the trial court's, without strong and cogent reasons for the
substitution, contrary to the rule that appellate courts shall not disturb the findings of fact of
trial courts in the absence of such strong and cogent reasons; and that Article 1542 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines does not apply, allegedly because the boundaries, as shown in the deed of
sale, are not definite.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner spouses complain against the failure of the
Court of Appeals to accept the findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance. The credibility
of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence are matters within the exclusive authority
of the Court of Appeals, and it is not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial court. Both
the Judiciary Act (R.A. 296, section 29) and the Rules of Court (Rule 45, section 2) only allow a
review of decisions of the Court of Appeals on questions of law; and numerous decisions of this
Court have invariably and repeatedly held that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court (Galang vs. Court of Appeals, L-17248, 29
January 1962;  Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals,  96 Phil. 418, 421; and cases therein
cited; Onglengco vs. Ozaeta, 70 Phil. 43; Nazareno vs. Magwagi, 71 Phil. 101). Barring, therefore,
a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand,
for this Court is not expected or required to examine and contrast the oral and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. As pointed out by former Chief Justice Moran in his
Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed., Vol. 2, p. 412), the law creating the Court of Appeals
was
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 Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez

intended mainly to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and
confine its task for the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study of
transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses.
The first assignment of error must, therefore, be overruled. We now turn to the second.
Despite the incontestable fact that the deed of sale in favor of Rosa Hernandez recites a price
in a lump sum (?11,000.00) for both lots (Annex “C”, Complaint, Rec. on App., p. 21), appellants
insist that the recited area should be taken as controlling. They combat the application of Article
1542 of the Civil Code, on the ground that the boundaries given in the deed are indefinite. They
point out that the southern boundary of the small parcel is merely given as "lupang kasanib" and
that the same occurs with the western boundary of the bigger lot, which is recited as "lupang
kasanib (Jose Sta. Ana, Jr.)". The Court of Appeals, however, found as a fact that—
"the two parcels of land sold to appellant (i.e., appellee herein, Rosa Hernandez) were identified by
the conspicuous boundaries"(Italics supplied)

consisting in a long and continuous pilapil or dike that separated the lands in question from the
rest of the prop-erty. On the basis of such findings, that can not be questioned at this stage, for
reasons already shown, it is unquestionable that the sale made was of a definite and identified
tract, a corpus certum, that obligated the vendors to deliver to the buyer all the land within the
boundaries, irrespective of whether its real area should be greater or smaller than what is recited
in the deed (Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. 490; Teran vs. Villanueva, 56 Phil. 677; Azarraga vs.
Gay, 52 Phil. 599; Mondragon vs. Santos, 87 Phil. 471). And this is particularly true where, as in
the case now before this Court, the area given is qualified to be approximate only ("humigit
kumulang", i.e., more or less Rec. on App., p. 22).
To hold the buyer to no more than the area recited on the deed, it must be made clear therein
that the sale was made by unit of measure at a def inite price for each unit.
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Santa Ana, Jr. vs. Hernandez

"If the defendant intended to buy by the meter he should have so stated in the contract" (Goyena vs.
Tambunting, supra),

The ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain, in construing Article 1471 of the Spanish Civil Code
(copied verbatim in our Article 1542) is highly persuasive that as between the absence of a recital
of a given price per unit of measurement, and the specification of the total area sold, the former
must prevail and determines the applicability of the norms concerning sales for a lump sum.
"La venta a cuerpo cierto indudablemente se verif ica cuando en el contrato no solo no es precisado el precio
singular por unidad de medida, sino que tampoco son indicadas los dimensiones globales del inmueble, pero
tambien se verifica cuando aun no habiendo sido indicado un precio singular por unidad de medida, sin
embargo es especificada la dimension total del inmueble, en cuyo ultimo caso  entre los dos indices en
contraste, constituido uno por la falta de un precio singular por unidad de medida, v. otro por la concrecion
de las dimensiones globales del unmueble,  la Ley da prevalencia al primero,  v. presume que aquella
individualizacion no habia tenido para las partes valor esencial, que solo constituia una superabundancia, v.
no significa que las partes hayan convenido aquel precio global solo en cuanto el inmueble tuviese
efectivamente aquellas dimensiones totales, siendo de estimar que esta es una presuncion absoluta, contra la
cual ni el comprador ni el vendedor pueden articular prueba contraria.
 Por tanto, ni el comprador ni el vendedor pueden pretender una disminucicion o, respectivamente un
suplemento de precio, cuando las dimensiones globales del unmueble resulten despues mayores o, menores
de las indicadas en el contrato, aunque aduzcan que solo en tanto han convenido el aquel precio en cuanto
creian que las dimensiones de la cosa fueran las precisadas en el contrato." (Tribunal Supremo de España,
Sent. de 26 Junio 1956; Rep. Jurisp. Aranzadi, 2.729) (Italics supplied)

The Civil Code's rule as to sales "a  cuerpo cierto"  was not modified by Act 496, section 58,
prohibiting the issuance of a certificate of title to a grantee of part of a registered tract until a
subdivision plan and technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, and
authorizing only the entry of a memorandum on the grantor's certificate of title in default of such
plan. The latter provision is purely a procedural directive to Registers of Deeds that does not
attempt to govern the rights of vendor and vendee  inter se,that remain controlled by the Civil
Code of the
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Sabino vs. Cuba

Philippines. It does not even bar the registration of the contract itself to bind the land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, in its case No. 20582-R, is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the appellants, Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo.

          Concepcion, C.J.,  Barrera,  Dizon,  Regala,  Makalintal,  Bengzon,

J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,concur.
     Castro, J., did not take part.

Decision affirmed.

Note.—As to the rule regarding finality of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
exceptions to that rule, see Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967,
19 Supreme Court Reports Annotated 289.