US WARS AND MILITARY ACTION AFRICA FOREIGN POLICY

Declassified: The Military’s

Border-Busting Operations in
Africa
Officials say military operations in Africa are only about assisting
partner nations. That’s not true.
By Nick Turse

DECEMBER 19, 2016

Malian special forces listen to instructions from a US Special Forces soldier

on counter-ambush tactics in Kita, Mali, during a joint training exercise,
May 2010. (AP Photo / Alfred de Montesquiou)
A l Qaeda doesn’t care about borders. Neither does the
Islamic State or Boko Haram. Brigadier General Donald
Bolduc thinks the same way.

“[T]errorists, criminals, and non-state actors aren’t bound by

arbitrary borders,” the commander of Special Operations
Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) told an interviewer early
this fall. “That said, everything we do is not organized
around recognizing traditional borders. In fact, our whole
command philosophy is about enabling cross-border
solutions, implementing multi-national, collective actions
and empowering African partner nations to work across
borders to solve problems using a regional approach.”

A SOCAFRICA planning document obtained by

TomDispatch offers a window onto the scope of these
“multi-national, collective actions” carried out by America’s
most elite troops in Africa. The declassified but heavily
redacted secret report, covering the years 2012–2017 and
acquired via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), details
nearly 20 programs and activities—from training exercises to
security cooperation engagements—utilized by SOCAFRICA
across the continent. This wide array of low-profile missions,
in addition to named operations and quasi-wars, attests to
the growing influence and sprawling nature of US Special
Operations forces (SOF) in Africa.

How US military engagement will proceed under the Trump

administration remains to be seen. The president-elect has
said or tweeted little about Africa in recent years (aside from
long trading in baseless claims that the current president
was born there). Given his choice for national security
adviser, Michael Flynn—a former director of intelligence for
Joint Special Operations Command who believes that the
United States is in a “world war” with Islamic militants—
there is good reason to believe that Special Operations
Command Africa will continue its border-busting missions
across that continent. That, in turn, means that Africa is
likely to remain crucial to America’s nameless global war on
terror.

Publicly, the command claims that it conducts its operations

to “promote regional stability and prosperity,” while Bolduc
emphasizes that its missions are geared toward serving the
needs of African allies. The FOIA files make clear, however,
that US interests are the command’s principal and primary
concern—a policy in keeping with the America First mindset
and mandate of incoming commander-in-chief Donald J.
Trump—and that support to “partner nations” is prioritized
to suit American, not African, needs and policy goals.

SHADES OF GRAY
Bolduc is fond of saying that his troops—Navy SEALs and
Army Green Berets, among others—operate in the “gray
zone,” or what he calls “the spectrum of conflict between war
and peace.” Another of his favored stock phrases is: “In
Africa, we are not the kinetic solution”—that is, not pulling
triggers and dropping bombs. He also regularly takes pains
to say that “we are not at war in Africa—but our African
partners certainly are.”

That is not entirely true.

Earlier this month, in fact, a White House report made it

clear, for instance, that “the United States is currently using
military force” in Somalia. At about the same moment, The
New York Times revealed an imminent Obama administration
plan to deem al-Shabab “to be part of the armed conflict that
Congress authorized against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, according to senior American
officials,” strengthening President-elect Donald Trump’s
authority to carry out missions there in 2017 and beyond.

As part of its long-fought shadow war against al-Shabab

militants, the United States has carried out commando raids
and drone assassinations there (with the latter markedly
increasing in 2015–2016). On December 5, President Obama
issued his latest biannual “war powers” letter to Congress
which noted that the military had not only “conducted
strikes in defense of U.S. forces” there, but also in defense of
local allied troops. The president also acknowledged that US
personnel “occasionally accompany regional forces,
including Somali and African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) forces, during counterterrorism operations.”

Obama’s war powers letter also mentioned American

deployments in Cameroon, Djibouti, and Niger, efforts
aimed at countering Joseph Kony’s murderous Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa, a long-running
mission by military observers in Egypt, and a continuing
deployment of forces supporting “the security of U.S.
citizens and property” in rapidly deteriorating South Sudan.

The president offered only two sentences on US military

activities in Libya, although a long-running special ops and
drone campaign there has been joined by a full-scale
American air war, dubbed Operation Odyssey Lightning,
against Islamic State militants, especially those in the city of
Sirte. Since August 1, in fact, the United States has carried
out nearly 500 air strikes in Libya, according to figures
supplied by US Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Odyssey Lightning is, in fact, no outlier. While the “primary

named operations” involving America’s elite forces in Africa
have been redacted from the declassified secret files in
TomDispatch’s possession, a November 2015 briefing by
Bolduc, obtained via a separate FOIA request, reveals that
his command was then involved in seven such operations on
the continent. These likely included at least some of the
following: Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa, Octave Shield,
and/or Juniper Garret, all aimed at East Africa; New Normal,
an effort to secure US embassies and assets around the
continent; Juniper Micron, a US-backed French and African
mission to stabilize Mali (following a 2012 coup there by a
US-trained officer and the chaos that followed); Observant
Compass, the long-running effort to decimate the Lord’s
Resistance Army (which recently retired AFRICOM chief
General David Rodriguez derided as expensive and
strategically unimportant); and Juniper Shield, a wide-
ranging effort (formerly known as Operation Enduring
Freedom—Trans Sahara) aimed at Algeria, Burkina Faso,
Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
and Senegal. A 2015 briefing document by SOCAFRICA’s
parent unit, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
also lists an ongoing “gray zone” conflict in Uganda.

On any given day, between 1,500 and 1,700 American special

operators and support personnel are deployed somewhere
on the continent. Over the course of a year they conduct
missions in more than 20 countries. According to Bolduc’s
November 2015 briefing, Special Operations Command
Africa carries out 78 separate “mission sets.” These include
activities that range from enhancing “partner capability and
capacity” to the sharing of intelligence.

MISSION CREEP
Most of what Bolduc’s troops do involves working alongside
and mentoring local allies. SOCAFRICA’s showcase effort, for
instance, is Flintlock, an annual training exercise in
Northwest Africa involving elite American, European, and
African forces, which provides the command with a plethora
of publicity. More than 1,700 military personnel from 30-
plus nations took part in Flintlock 2016. Next year, according
to Bolduc, the exercise is expected “to grow to include SOF
from more countries, [as well as] more interagency partners.”

While the information has been redacted, the SOCAFRICA

strategic planning document—produced in 2012 and
scheduled to be fully declassified in 2037—indicates the
existence of one or more other training exercises. Bolduc
recently mentioned two: Silent Warrior and Epic Guardian.
In the past, the command has also taken part in exercises
like Silver Eagle 10 and Eastern Piper 12. (US Africa
Command did not respond to requests for comment on these
exercises or other questions related to this article.)

Such exercises are, however, just a small part of the

SOCAFRICA story. Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET) missions are a larger one. Officially authorized to
enable US special operators to “practice skills needed to
conduct a variety of missions, including foreign internal
defense, unconventional warfare, and counterterrorism,”
JCETs actually serve as a backdoor method of expanding US
military influence and contacts in Africa, since they allow for
“incidental-training benefits” to “accrue to the foreign
friendly forces at no cost.” As a result, JCETs play an
important role in forging and sustaining military
relationships across the continent. Just how many of these
missions the U.S. conducts in Africa is apparently unknown—
even to the military commands involved. As TomDispatch
reported earlier this year, according to SOCOM, the United
States conducted 19 JCETs in 2012, 20 in 2013, and 20, again,
in 2014. AFRICOM, however, claims that there were nine
JCETs in 2012, 18 in 2013, and 26 in 2014.

Whatever the true number, JCETs are a crucial cog in the

SOCAFRICA machine. “During a JCET, exercise or training
event, a special forces unit might train a partner force in a
particular tactical skill and can quickly ascertain if the
training audience has adopted the capability,” explained
Brigadier General Bolduc. “Trainers can objectively measure
competency, then exercise…that particular skill until it
becomes a routine.”

In addition, SOCAFRICA also utilizes a confusing tangle of

State Department and Pentagon programs and activities,
aimed at local allies that operate under a crazy quilt of
funding schemes, monikers, and acronyms. These include
deployments of Mobile Training Teams, Joint Planning
Advisory Teams, Joint Military Education Teams, Civil
Military Support Elements, as well as Military Information
Support Teams that engage in what once was called
psychological operations, or psyops—that is, programs
designed to “inform and influence foreign target audiences
as appropriately authorized.”
Special Operations Command Africa also utilizes an almost
mind-numbing panoply of “security cooperation programs”
and other training activities including Section 1207(n) (also
known as the Transitional Authorities for East Africa and
Yemen, which provides equipment, training, and other aid to
the militaries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen “to
conduct counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-
Qaeda affiliates, and al-Shabab” and “enhance the capacity of
national military forces participating in the African Union
Mission in Somalia”); the Global Security Contingency Fund
(designed to enhance the “capabilities of a country’s national
military forces, and other national security forces that
conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and
counterterrorism operations”); the Partnership for Regional
East Africa Counterterrorism (or PREACT, designed to build
counterterror capacities and foster military and law
enforcement efforts in East African countries, including
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda);
and, among others, the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism
Partnership, the Global Peace Operations Initiative, the
Special Operations to Combat Terrorism, the Combatting
Terrorism Fellowship, and another known as Counter-
Narcotic Terrorism.

Like Africa’s terror groups and Bolduc’s special ops troops,

the almost 20 initiatives utilized by SOCAFRICA—a
sprawling mass of programs that overlie and intersect with
each other—have a border-busting quality to them. What
they don’t have is clear records of success. A 2013 RAND
Corporation analysis called such capacity-building programs
“a tangled web, with holes, overlaps, and confusions.” A 2014
RAND study analyzing U.S. security cooperation (SC) found
that there “was no statistically significant correlation
between SC and change in countries’ fragility in Africa or
the Middle East.” A 2016 RAND report on “defense
institution building” in Africa noted a “poor understanding
of partner interests” by the US military.

“We’re supporting African military professionalization and

capability-building efforts, we’re supporting development
and governance via civil affairs and military information
support operations teams,” Bolduc insisted publicly. “[A]ll
programs must be useful to the partner nation (not the
foreign agenda) and necessary to advance the partner
nations’ capabilities. If they don’t pass this simple test… we
need to focus on programs that do meet the African partner
nation’s needs.”

The 2012 SOCAFRICA strategic planning document

obtained by TomDispatch reveals, however, that Special
Operations Command Africa’s primary aim is not fostering
African development, governance, or military
professionalization. “SOCAFRICA’s foremost objective is the
prevention of an attack against America or American
interests,” according to the declassified secret report. In
other words, a “foreign agenda,” not the needs of African
partner nations, is what’s driving the elite force’s border-
busting missions.

AMERICAN AIMS VS. AFRICAN NEEDS

Special Operations Command spokesman Ken McGraw
cautioned that because SOCAFRICA and AFRICOM have
both changed commanders since the 2012 document was
issued, it was likely out of date. “I recommend you contact
SOCAFRICA,” he advised. That command failed to respond
to multiple requests for information or comment. There are,
however, no indications that it has actually altered its
“foremost objective,” while Bolduc’s public comments
suggest that the US military’s engagement in the region is
going strong.

“Our partners and [forward deployed US personnel]

recognize the arbitrary nature of borders and understand the
only way to combat modern-day threats like ISIS, AQIM [Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Boko Haram, and myriad
others is to leverage the capabilities of SOF professionals
working in concert,” said Bolduc. “Borders may be notional
and don’t protect a country from the spread of violent
extremism… but neither do oceans, mountains… or distance.”

In reality, however, oceans and distance have kept most

Americans safe from terrorist organizations like AQIM and
Boko Haram. The same cannot be said for those who live in
the nations menaced by these groups. In Africa, terrorist
organizations and attacks have spiked alongside the increase
in US Special Operations missions there. In 2006, the
percentage of forward-stationed special operators on the
continent hovered at 1 percent of total globally deployed
SOF forces. By 2014, that number had hit 10 percent—a jump
of 900 percent in less than a decade. During that same span,
according to information from the National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the
University of Maryland, terror incidents in Africa increased
precipitously—from just over 100 per year to nearly 2,400
annually. During the same period, the number of
transnational terrorist organizations and illicit groups
operating on the continent jumped from one to, according to
Bolduc’s reckoning, nearly 50.
Correlation may not equal causation, but SOCAFRICA’s
efforts have coincided with significantly worsening terrorist
violence and the growth and spread of terror groups. And it
shouldn’t be a surprise. While Bolduc publicly talks up the
needs of African nations, his border-busting commandos
operate under a distinctive America-first mandate and a
mindset firmly in keeping with that of the incoming
commander-in chief. “My foreign policy will always put the
interests of the American people and American security
above all else. It has to be first,” Donald Trump said earlier
this year in a major foreign policy speech. Kicking off his
victory tour earlier this month, the president-elect echoed
this theme. “From now on, it’s going to be America first.
Okay? America first. We’re going to put ourselves first,” he
told a crowd in Cincinnati, Ohio.

In Africa, the most elite troops soon to be under his

command have, in fact, been operating this way for years.
“[W]e will prioritize and focus our operational efforts in
those areas where the threat[s] to United States interests are
most grave,” says the formerly secret SOCAFRICA
document. “Protecting America, Americans, and American
interests is our overarching objective and must be reflected
in everything we do.”

Nick Turse TNick Turse is a fellow at Type Investigations and the author
of Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan.

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