efense Ma

fD
Otaiku AA, J Def Manag 2018, 8:3

na
Journal of Defense Management
o
Journal

gem
DOI: 10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
ent

Research Article
Research Article Open Access
Open Access

A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions

Ayodele A. Otaiku*
Faculty of Arts and Social Science, Department of Geography/Environmental Management, Kaduna, Nigeria

Abstract
To understand the problems involved in adapting to war, one must first come to grips with the complexities,
ambiguities, and nature of war itself. This paper aims at theorizing multi-dimensionality of modern warfare antecedent’s
non-state actors and state actor illuminated by Russia military capability to disrupt and deter Western activities and
Eastern Europe infrastructure leveraged by the network grid of modern infrastructure as decisive point of victory. A
framework for hybrid warfare (adaptive construct at war and peace time) set out a view of the character of conflict,
depicts how military doctrine must change because of constrains and influence by globalization, technology and
encapsulated by national interest in the battle space today. The framework components are (values/national interest,
warfare ecosystem. human capital, infrastructure, scenario and stakeholders) depicting war strategy (ends/ways/
means) recentre of gravity nizing the limits of military expertise for collaboration; where, environmental degradation
and food security are decisive point of victory that engage the most effective use of civilian buy-in during war
campaign. The consequence of the ability of armed forces and war ecosystem to learn, adapt with distributed
leadership capability and foresight to thrive on chaos because ‘hybrid warfare’ accentuate ‘anticipation war doctrine’,
war or peace is not declared, but in the continuum that examines the ‘military capability’ of every nation including the
‘extra-terrestrial’ like US Space Force, sixth military branch by 2020. Methodology thrives on change and evolution
like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria have shown that irregular warfare breaks from traditional understanding
of how military and civilian leaders should each contribute to the overall effort of modern warfare (multi-modality,
simultaneity, fusion, and catastrophic).

Keywords: Anticipation war doctrine; Framework; Hybrid warfare; approach provides high internal validity, at the cost of the external
Centre of gravity; Strategy; Space military; Internet of Things; Innovative validity and reliability [11]. These deficiencies are countered through
thinking; Methodology; War or peace; Information-dominant triangulation via diverse data sources. Additionally, the triangulation of
data sources allows for a “thick description of the phenomenon under
Introduction scrutiny” [12]. The cases that are selected for the comparative analyses:
The primacy of “influence operations” of hybrid warfare where it Russia’s actions in Crimea (November 2013 - March 2014) and Daesh
is hard to discern a beginning or indeed an end to hostilities or a form militant occupied territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria.
of permanent war in which it is increasingly difficult to distinguish This time period is chosen due to the enormous amount of
between normal legal activities, coercive diplomacy and war makes information that is available, and June 2014 marks the date that
the theory of hybrid warfare ‘anticipatory’ strategy; where, Non-State Daesh self-proclaimed the caliphate Islamic State. Daesh is a militant
hybrid warfare (battlefield in places like Chechnya and Lebanon, and movement that has occupied territory in western Iraq and eastern
was later applied to Afghanistan and Iraq) and State hybrid warfare Syria. The organization originates from the al-Qaeda Iraq faction,
(Russian actions in Ukraine) becomes a conceptual unify model to nonetheless, it has split from the faction. In June 2014, after conquering
statecraft and understanding military approach to Post-Cold War- territories in Iraq, as the cities Mosul and Tikrit; Daesh proclaimed itself
era international security. The ‘anticipatory’ strategy nature of hybrid as the Islamic State as the caliphate, claiming political and theological
warfare in the last twenty years of Post-Cold war era offer greater authority of Muslims all over the world [13]. However, its state-building
conceptual clarity as scenarios for case studies. It is meant as a common has been justified by Shari’a law, and its battlefield victories have
starting point for further discussion on the future security environment attracted thousands of foreign fighters [14].
and how to deter, mitigate and counter hybrid war threats, from states
or non-state actors. We must think broadly about security and defence Various characteristics have been attributed to hybrid warfare
challenges. Many of these lie outside of the traditional military domain, conducted by non-state actors. First, these actors exhibit increased
and we lack readily available ideas on how to respond to them. The three levels of military sophistication as they move up the capabilities ladder,
hybrid warfare scholars Hoffman, Glenn and McCuen identify together successfully deploying modern weapons systems (like anti-ship missiles),
eight different modes of warfare: Conventional capabilities, Irregular technologies (cyber, secure communication, sophisticated command
tactics, Terrorism, Criminal activities, Political means, Economic
means, Information means and Social means [1-10]. These modes *Corresponding author: Otaiku AA, Doctoral student, Nigerian Defence
of warfare encapsulate in Table 1. Adaptive theatre of war construct Academy (NDA), Faculty of Arts and Social Science, Department of Geography/
Environmental Management, Kaduna, Nigeria, Tel: +234 803 3721 219; E-mail:
at war and peace time for war ecosystem. The physical battleground,
[email protected]; [email protected]
therefore, includes the physical modes of warfare, whilst the conceptual
dimension includes the non-military means of warfare and where is Received September 26, 2018; Accepted October 26, 2018; Published
October 31, 2018
fought for the control and support of the societies [3].
Citation: Otaiku A. A. (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges
A case study methodology was chosen, because hybrid warfare and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178
is a complex and contested concept with lots of theoretical, but little Copyright: © 2018 Otaiku A. A. This is an open-access article distributed under
empirical evidence. Moreover, a comparative case study approach will the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
allow for an in-depth analysis and provide thorough insights. This use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and
source are credited.

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 2 of 13

and control), and tactics (combined arms) traditionally understood A. National Objectives - ENDS
as being beyond the reach of non-state adversaries. Combining these
B. National Strategic Concepts - WAYS
newly acquired conventional techniques and capabilities with an
unconventional skill set and doing so simultaneously and within the C. National Resources - MEANS [18].
same battle space is seen as a potentially new and defining characteristic
Thus, war is the enforcement of interests4. On the other hand,
of non-state [15]. This emphasis on greater military sophistication and
however, not every type of interest enforcement must be war. The
capabilities is one of the key features of non-state actors using hybrid
importance of state cyber-power has been illustrated by Edward
warfare. Examples like the growing sophistication and complexity of
Snowden’s revelations regarding National Security Agency (NSA)
non-state actors on the battlefield in places like Chechnya, Lebanon,
surveillance practices. Snowden was also aware that “[... he had
Afghanistan and Iraq.
increased the power of the state through his work...]”5.The ‘small wars,’
State hybrid warfare like Russian actions in Ukraine most notably hybrid wars tend to be long wars. The insurgency in Guatemala lasted
the “blurring” of traditional concepts of warfare, its unfamiliarity, the for over thirty years. The current war in Columbia began in the 1960s.
use of non-military means, and the asymmetric relationship to Western All the African insurgencies lasted for more than a decade. Israel fought
conventional war fighting have all contributed to labelling these Russian Hizballah in southern Lebanon for eighteen years [19]. In Syria, Russia
actions1. The concept hybrid warfare is currently used to explain certain will find it more and more difficult to keep its powerful position, as it is
threats and warfare acts. For example, both NATO and the European being constantly challenged by an assortment of regional actors. On the
Union reCenter of Gravitynize Russia’s aggression in Crimea and the domestic front, Putin’s Russia is experiencing internal change. The most
advances of Daesh in Iraq and Syria as hybrid warfare threats [16,17]. noticeable development is an on-going shift in the centre of gravity in
The cases that are selected for the comparative analysis are: Russia’s the Russian opposition to Putin away from liberals and democrats and
actions in Crimea (November 2013 – March 2014) and the actions of towards communists and nationalists.
Daesh2 in Iraq and Syria (June 2014 – December 2014). These cases are
selected, because multiple authors have labelled these as cases of hybrid Challenge
warfare. Nevertheless, it is not specified what exactly is identified as The rules of engagement both civilian and military developed for
hybrid warfare in the actions of Russia and Daesh, which makes it land, sea and air, over the centuries and millennia, require unprecedented
interesting to contrast these cases using similar modes of warfare and adaptation today. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 President Bush
dimensions of hybrid warfare. The analytics for solutions can only be declared an all- out war on global terrorism and emphasised that it
accommodated by framework.
was ‘a new war, a war that will require a new way of thinking’6. The
National interest/value understanding of the modus operandi of the non-state actor and state
actor hybrid warfare is the challenge to in practical terms, the Western
The formulation of national strategy, as it does at any level of
security community has, under the lead of the United States, outgrown
strategy, employs the strategic thought process based on the use of
and departed from the notions of large-scale state- based military
Ends, Ways, and Means:
threats, great-power politics and associated political manoeuvring, and
the defence of territory (national territory and alliance territory) as the
real and primary mission of the armed forces. The 2005 National Defence
Strategy was noteworthy for its expanded under- standing of modern
threats. The strategy even noted that the Department of Defence was
“over invested” in the traditional mode of warfare and needed to shift
resources and attention to other challengers7. Hybrid warfare is seen as
a concept that is a Western attempt to categorise what was witnessed
in Ukraine. The often cited Russian “Gerasimov doctrine” describes
modern warfare as joint operations utilising a mix of military and non-
military means to achieve political goals and taking full advantage of the
intentionally blurred line between war and peace8. Globalization makes
hybrid threats in large-scale warfare systems that requires networked
teams to perform in a reliable manner under changing mission tactics
and ad-hoc reconfiguration of mission tasks and force resources. If

4
Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy London: Faber, 1967 (2nd rev ed.) p. 321
Figure 1: The schematic of defence policy on military strategy3.
5
Edward Snowden Seibel, Alexandra: Die ganze Existenz aufs Spiel setzen
[Betting your entire existence]. reporter at the Guardian, met Edward Snowden in
Hong Kong in June 2013. In: Kurier, 29/12/2014, p. 21

John Vandiver, “SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia ‘hybrid war’”, Stars and
1 6
President George W Bush, BBC World TV News, 11 October , 2001
Stripes, September 4, available at: http://www.stripes.com/ news/saceur-allies- 7
Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue
must-prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war-1.301464 52, ( January 2009), 34–39
2
Daesh has many other names, such as ‘Islamic State’, ‘IS’ ‘Islamic State in Iraq
8
Janis Berzinš, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for
and the Levant’, ‘ISIL’, ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’, and ‘ISIS’. However, Daesh Latvian Defence Policy (Centre for Security and Strategic Research, National
is used because it is “neither Islamic nor a state” (Black, 2014). Defence Academy of Latvia, April 2014); Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’
and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014, https://
3
Alexander H. Montgomery Department of Political Science, Reed College ahm@ inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov- doctrine-and-
reed.edu Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/266421120/1-2 russian-non-linear-war/.

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 3 of 13

we are willing to accept that the fighting is going on perpetually and The primacy of “influence operations” accentuated by globalization and
that the frontlines may cover the whole of society, the defender must internet technologies in Post-Cold war era has allowed for framework
be able to put forward a comprehensive defence framework solution. thinking to military doctrine on warfare strategy today. The modes
This should allow an agile and distributed response to multi-pronged of warfare identified in the actions of Russia in Crimea and conflict
hybrid threats. Through this kind of comprehensive security approach, of Daesh in Iraq and Syria are: conventional capabilities, irregular
the defender can build a more resilient society able to face the threats, tactics, terrorism, criminal activities, political, economic, information,
in most cases ‘anticipatory’. and social as affirmed by Hoffman, Glenn, McCuen: multi-modality,
simultaneity, fusion, and catastrophic [2,3,20]. This can offer greater
Objective conceptual clarity about hybrid war but should not be read as a blueprint
To understand the ‘anticipatory’ model of hybrid warfare either state for action. It is meant as a common starting point for further discussion
and non-state actors by a case studies methodology (Russia’s actions in on the future security environment and how to deter, mitigate and
Crimea and Daesh’s actions in Iraq and Syria) was chosen, because hybrid counter hybrid war threats, from states or non-state actors. Hybrid
warfare is a complex and contested concept with lots of theoretical, warfare represent the latest manifestation of the Western need to (re)
but little empirical evidence and analytical framework. Moreover, a conceptualise and (re)define the Post-Cold War international security
comparative case study approach will allow for an in-depth analysis and logic and associated rules according to which states use military force
provide thorough insights in the era of globalization and antecedents -and other elements of statecraft in the international system. The hybrid
of participants as inputs to development of the framework. Modern war tactics that Russia uses today, however, are not identical to those
warfare is powered by “information supremacy,” like “the War Between used during the Cold War. Even if Russia used information operations
the Wars” Hezbollah / Israel war. The utilization of the framework back then, the volume and ambition of Russian information campaigns
allows the stakeholder groups to have a shared understanding of what today are far greater and facilitated by the existence of the Internet,
will constitute future military capability. Additionally, the different cable news, and especially social media encapsulated in globalization
service branches of the military can both explore and determine their campaign of capitalism. The use of cyber operations is also new, as is
degree of commonality and inter-service capabilities. Building a more Russia’s more extensive use of economic levers to influence foreign
resilient society should not be viewed only as an extra burden for already governments in third world countries. Because Russia and the world
economically struggling Western societies; it is also a great opportunity are much more closely interlinked than during the Cold War, it is easier
to change the status quo. The structures that allow a society to respond for Russia to penetrate Western societies. Russia’s use of these tactics
in an agile manner to hybrid threats also support better understanding also appears to be less ideological than during the Cold War, when the
and coping with the complex underlying interrelations that make our Kremlin held a hidebound Marxist ideology. Hybrid warfare is seen as
modern societies fragile because of globalization and the internet. The a concept that is a Western attempt to categorise what was witnessed
proposed hybrid warfare framework the will encapsulates all the key in Ukraine. The often cited Russian “Gerasimov doctrine” describes
stakeholders in various parts of the society and military statecraft to modern warfare as joint operations utilising a mix of military and non-
share a common situational awareness, threat and risk assessment, and military means to achieve political goals and taking full advantage of
planning and continuous processes of operational art of warfare called the intentionally blurred line between war and peace. Russian military
war ecosystem as shown in Table 1. experts have watched as the United States and its allies fought in the
Justification Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere over the course of the last
quarter- century. They seized upon the importance of an approach
Russia’s actions in the annexation of Crimea and Daesh’s actions that seeks to influence the population of target countries through
in Iraq and Syria help accentuate a need for the ‘framework for hybrid information operations, proxy groups, and other influence operations.
warfare’: “How can ‘hybrid warfare’ be identified and solutions crafted?

N/S Warfare ecosystem participants/communities Responsibility and value drivers

1 Institutions World class education and human capital development
2 University research and development Prototype, proof of concept and spinoff company
3 Military infrastructure Space-based assets and GPS guided munitions
4 The innovators Inventors, application development and futurist
5 Empire builders Venture capital
6 Bankrollers Capitalist/Finance
7 Architects/Intelligent cities Clusters/knowledge parks
8 Knowledgepreneur/Technocrats Disruptive technologies and indigenous knowledge
9 Energy Renewable/Non-renewable
10 Non-government agencies/media Improving the state of the world
11 WIPO (Intellectual Property) Idea, patents, finance, clusters, market and innovation-ecosystems link
12 Diaspora brain drain globally Distributed networks, data repositories and mining
13 Governance Policies
14 Communities of practice Business schools, job creation and standards
15 Industrialist Manufacturing
16 Environment sustainability Access to necessities. Vulnerability to shocks. Social cohesion
17 Social sustainability Environmental policy. Use of renewable resources. Degradation of the environment
Table 1: Adaptive theatre of war construct at war and peace time for war ecosystem.

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 4 of 13

Russia uses hybrid warfare to work within existing political and social warfare, irregular warfare and cyber warfare. Hybrid warfare can be
frameworks to further Russian objectives. used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battle space
requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response. There are a variety
British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (JWP):
of terms used to refer to the hybrid war concept: hybrid war, hybrid
Doctrine is not a set of rules, which can be applied without thought; it
warfare, hybrid threat, or hybrid adversary (as well as non-linear
is, rather, a framework for understanding the nature of armed conflict
war, non-traditional war or special war). US military bodies tend to
and the use of force... Its purpose is to guide, explain and educate, and
speak in terms of a hybrid threat, while academic literature speaks of
to provide the basis for further study and informed debate.”9
hybrid warfare. For the purposes of this paper, these terms are used
A Soviet View: A nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically interchangeably. Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting
founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions [22]. There is no
forces in them, and on the requirements arising from these views universally accepted definition of hybrid warfare which leads to some
regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war”10. debate whether the term is useful at all. Some argue that the term is
“Future Conflict will be increasingly hybrid in character. This is not a too abstract and only the latest term to refer to irregular methods to
code for insurgency or stabilisation, it is about a change in the mind counter a conventionally superior force. The abstractness of the term
set of our adversaries, who are aiming to exploit our weaknesses using means that it is often used as a catch all term for all non-linear threats
a wide variety of high-end and low-end asymmetric techniques. These [23,24]. Hybrid warfare is warfare with the following aspects which is
forms of conflict are transcending our conventional understanding of shown in Figure 2.
what equates to irregular and regular activity; the “conflict paradigm”
A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary [23,24].
has shifted and we must adapt our approaches if we are to succeed”11.
• A hybrid adversary uses a combination of conventional and
What this tour of definitions reveals is that no single definition
irregular methods [25]
of military doctrine considered so far captures its many constituent
parts. The art of writing good military doctrine, Codner suggests, “is • A hybrid adversary is flexible and adapts quickly [26]
essentially a simplifying process”12. Setting out a view of the character
• A hybrid adversary uses advanced weapons systems and other
of conflict is something fundamental to the construction of any military
disruptive technologies [27,28]
doctrine. This is usually done in capstone or highest-level doctrine
or as a separate study to provide the necessary understanding of the • Use of mass communication for propaganda [29,30]
character of conflict in order to determine its impact on the doctrinal
• A hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields [31]
principles shaping the employment of armed forces [21]. Finding the
correct balance is the source of inherent tension in modern warfare Framework
doctrine.
A framework can be defined as a reusable design of an application
Modern Warfare and Hybrid Warfare together with an implementation[32-35]. In February 2013, Russia’s
Chief of the General Staff Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov, authored
Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional an article in Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, “ The Value of Science

Figure 2: Hybrid threats.13

9
British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, First Edition 1999,
p. 1.2. Valeriy Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy
13

Kuryer, February 26, 2013, Available at: http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.

Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, (Washington D.C., U.S.
10

Government Printing Office, nd), p. 37 “Moscow’s Visions of Future War: So Many Conflict Scenarios So Little Time,
14

Money and Forces,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 1 (January-March 2014):
11
Future Character of Conflict, Strategic Trends Programme, DCDC, nd, p. 1. 63-100;
12
Marshal V.D.Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, Richterová , Jitka (2015). NATO Hybrid Threats Background Report. e-mail:
15

(London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp.41-42 [email protected] © AMO

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 5 of 13

is in Foresight”14. It dealt with Russian military perspectives on the regime-linked corporations, cyber weapons, and propaganda. On
future of warfare and the nature of its implications for military science. December17, 2015, Putin named the United States a national security
Gerasimov intended the article to serve as a rallying call to the military threat, the first time Russia has so designated Washington since the
scientific community in Russia to refocus on the challenges of future Soviet collapse about a quarter-century ago [37]. The U.S. has done
conflicts at a practical and meaningful level15. Modern warfare requires, the same ­the Department of Defence’s updated Cyber Strategy names
“resilience thinking” to addresses the dynamics and development Russia as the top threat to American interests and security. Russia's
of complex scenarios by constrains and influences of geography and conduct is in fact novel in the modern age, deploying comparatively few
externalities. This is known as the adaptive cycle, as it describes how conventional forces explicitly aimed at attacking the West, but focusing
an ecosystem organizes itself and how it responds to a changing world instead on the agile coordination of other instruments of national
as shown in Figure 4. Hamel’s metaphor for 21st century management power. In practice, Russian hybrid attacks have employed diplomacy;
is the Internet: ‘I’m willing to bet that Management 2.0 is going to look cyberspace and information warfare; the threat of and actual use of
a lot like the Web 2.0 [36]. The framework for examining military military force, including scorched - Earth tactics against civilians;
economic inducement and coercion; and legal tactics such as utilizing
capability as the output dimension of national power is patterned
court systems [38]. Contrary to total war, hybrid threats are not aimed
analogously to the larger framework for assessing national power. It
at the complete elimination of the adversary and the destruction of vital
seeks to identify the strategic resources a military receives from the
structures. Instead, hybrid threats are to be classified as overextension
government it serves; the variables bearing upon the means by which
strategies on various levels in multiple spheres that collectively lead to a
these resources are converted into effective capabilities the combat force multiple institutional breakdown.
itself understood via a spectrum of war fighting competencies that may
be attained to a greater or lesser degree and which may be compared Modern warfare framework
across countries as shown in Table 1 and Figure 3.
Russia’s special forces - the Spetsnaz have played a significant
The possibility of denying cyber-attacks after the fact has already role in Russia’s operations in Crimea and Ukraine Capitalization of
become a strategic element in a new type of computer-based conflict non-military means on the one hand allows a country like Russia to
even between states. The armed conflict between Georgia and manipulate the globalized world from inside18 and on the other hand
Russia prevailing since 2008 shows evidence of similar hybrid power it exposes the inability of the Western security institutions to counter
projection whilst also making use of cyberspace. Attacks planned well those threats the way its predecessors did during the Cold War.
in advance, with synchronized procedures including a similar approach The world is becoming turbulent faster than organizations are
as used in the case of the Stuxnet16 malware, being conceivable. In becoming resilient [39]. Ideas must be adaptive to local challenges
what is effectively a permanent state of war, Putin holds together a epitomized by adaptive theory thinking addresses the dynamics and
Russian national consensus through tightly scripted, state-controlled development of complex social-ecological systems [40]. Modern
media that sustain a drumbeat against a morally bankrupt and power­ warfare should be a framework or construct that encapsulate decision
obsessed West. support and enabling technologies to achieve value streams or course
The instruments of this asymmetrical battle often involve major of action (CoA). The growing complexity of our infrastructure, which
has now permeated throughout our society’s systems, is becoming
ever more vulnerable because of its increasing reliance on technology.
Worthy of emphasis is the enormous increase in dependency on
technical products which, in turn, creates new potential forms of state
power (as well as for non-state actors). Challenges result in cyberspace,
because there is scarcely any guarantee of identifying the aggressor.
Arguments for internet exceptionalism applied to incitement stem
from these features but also rely on other claims. Humans must adapt
to collaborate with machines, and when that collaboration happens, the
result is stronger as shown in Figures 4 and 7 respectively.
Hybrid war relatively low expense, an aggressive player intentionally
blurs and exploits distinctions of war and peace, civilian and military
operations, and state and non-state actors19. The framework for
preventing hybrid wars and deterring/defeating hybrid adversaries is
based on two pillars indicates that modern warfare must understand
the cultural and political factors that drive non-state and state actors
to resort to violence. This is what Goertz’s structure begins with a basic
level concept that ontologically describes the phenomenon of interest

17
U.S. Department of Defence, "The Department of Defence Cyber Strategy," April
Figure 4: Internet of things schematic showing the end users and application 2015. Available at: (http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ features/2015/0415 cyber-
areas based on data for global collaboration with aspects of hybrid attack and strategy/Final 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy for web.pdf).
defence systems as shown in Figure 5.
18
Pomerantsev, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes,
Information, Culture and Money, The Interpreter, 2014.

Frank Hoffman, “On Not -So -New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats,”
19

Cyber-Physical System Security. SAP Research, Germany Available at : http://

16
War on the Rocks, July 28, 2014. Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/
papers.duck dns.org/files/2011_IECON_stuxnet.pdf, on-not-so-new-warfarepolitical-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 6 of 13

of warfare strategy? [41]. For Clausewitz, in order for a theory of war to ensuring that the human operator is engaged, and by asking where
be universal, it had to satisfy two criteria: first, it had to accommodate human operators can safely be removed from control.
the essential nature of war that, in its extreme, drove to absolute war;
and, second, it had to demonstrate war in actual practice, as reflected Military operational interactions and total environment
the often times limited aims and means reflected in history. As It refers to the capacity of human capital war ecosystems
Clausewitz noted, his was necessary in order to avoid a theory that was communities to evolve towards higher order complexity and harmony,
only applicable to a time period analysed, reflecting only the unique through such innovation mechanisms as differentiation and integration,
practices of a historical age, that is, intelligence driven war. Jomini’s competition and collaboration at the centre of gravity. The collective
theory contributions weren’t necessarily in the realm of what we today activity of individuals and their modifications to the environment are
call strategy. As Delbrück would later note, “Jomini sought the nature of responsible for intelligence. The commander can identify the character
strategy in the lines of operation and tested the advantages of the inner of operational art and optimize where necessary. In hybrid threat, hard
and outer lines of operation” encapsulate the theory of ecosystem that power is often insufficient. Often the conflict evolves under the radar
helps manage uncurtaining [42]. In the anticipation war doctrine called and even a "rapid" response turns out to be too late. Overwhelming
war ecosystem Table 1. force is an insufficient deterrent. Many traditional militaries lack the
flexibility to shift tactics, priorities, and objectives on a constant basis
In this context, the actors/participants of warfare ecosystem would
[31,46].
include the material resources, means and ends concept on war strategy
which includes funds, equipment, facilities, etc.) and the Human Internet of Things (IoTs)
capital (H) (students, faculty, staff, industry researchers, industry
representatives, etc.) that make up the institutional entities participating Connected devices made possible by the IoTs are here to stay and
in the ecosystem (e.g. the universities, colleges of engineering, business the trend will only grow with Enables Informed Manufacturing (EIM)
schools, business firms, venture capitalists, industry-university research which are shown in Figure 3.
institutes, federal or industrial supported centres of excellence, and An informed manufacturing organization contains four elements:
state and/or local economic development and business assistance
organizations, funding agencies, policy makers, etc.), where each • informed products
component works interdependently for adaptive solution based on • processes
scenarios and value creation called warfare ecosystems (Table 1). Figure
4 simplified the nature of modern warfare as integrated strategy with • people
adaptive features for the war planners [43-45]. • infrastructure
• End: (An intended result of an action; an aim, purpose) - Now an active component of CENTER OF GRAVITY doctrine
Objectives for course of action. These essential elements of manufacturing are
• Means: (Being the “instruments” by which some end can be converging like never, creating a more automated, intelligent and
achieved) - Resources streamlined manufacturing process. Knowledge is more quantitatively
and qualitatively important than ever before (era of Big Data), and
• Way: (A course of action). Concept - that, Centre of gravity applications of information and communication technologies are the
drivers of the new economy Godin and a coefficient of innovative
• Anticipation war doctrine: Adaptive theatre of war construct at
opportunities [47,48]. The potential unintended consequences of
war and peace time for war ecosystem and armed forces with the
overstating Russian strategic prowess and ‘hybrid warfare’ capabilities
trajectories of foresight (see Table 1 below).
powered by Putin’s hands. After all, it is clear that Russian military
• Forward/Back- loop: The primacy of “influence operations” of aggression in Ukraine was motivated not least by the longstanding
hybrid warfare. demand for respect on the international stage, as explicitly confirmed
by Putin in his “Crimea speech ‘outlining what was, in his view, a
The forward-loop (Preparation of war) characterized by uncertainty,
long history of Western meddling in Russia’s affairs domestically and
novelty, and experimentation, and during intelligence possibilities of
in its near abroad, he concluded that the events in Crimea set a sign
battlefield (IPB) of all forms and in Figure 4. The back-loop (determinant
that it was time ‘to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent,
of warfare) is the time of greatest potential for intelligence collection
active participant in international affairs. Like other countries, it has
and analysis in order to understand the actors (national interest and
its own national interests that need to be considered and respected”20.
objects of threats) involved in theatre of war and the forces driving in
Gerasimov’s doctrine 20 rooted in the military historical framework
the centre of gravity (CENTER OF GRAVITY) or creative change in the
of the Great Patriotic War and the need to avoid repeating the shock
thresholds system like internet of things (machine-to-human interface)
of invasion in June 1941. Gerasimov’s theme reflects a long-standing
impacts on the agility of the battlefield. The scenario narrative gives
interest within Russian military theory in seeking to utilize military
voice to the important qualitative factors shaping development such as
science to gain foresight (predvidenie) in terms of future conflict21. (see
values in the three levels of war, behaviours and institutions, providing
Table 1 and Figure 4).
a broader perspective than is possible from mathematical modelling
alone. Back-loop narrative offers texture, richness and insight, while the
CENTER OF GRAVITY offers structure, discipline and rigor. Scenarios 20
Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith. Project “Russia and Hybrid Warfare: definitions,
(A) can catalyse and guide appropriate action today for a coalition capabilities, scope and possible responses” report 1/2016. Aleksanteri Papers is an
online working paper series published by Kikimora Publications at the Aleksanteri
force interoperability and for execution and global collaboration. The
Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. ISSN 1457-9251
Stakeholder (S) analysis will illuminate the vulnerably of enemy and
allies. The Infrastructure (I) critical and vulnerable powered by network Jacob W. Kipp, “Smart Defence from New Threats: Future War from a Russian
21

Perspective: Back to the Future After the War on Terror,” Journal of Slavic Military
infrastructure. Risk can be managed by limiting autonomous functions, Studies, no. 1 (January-March 2014): 36-62.

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 7 of 13

Clearly, the fact that Russian foreign policy has often been based on This new form of warfare has arisen from the loss of the nation-state’s
prestige and status rather than on material/economic considerations has monopoly on violence; from the rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious
been hard to understand for the West. This is because of the assumption conflict; and from the spread of globalization, particularly advanced
that economics and trade relations matter most in international policy, technology [50]. It is conducted in an increasingly decentralized manner,
coupled with an expectation that countries do not act against their own dispersed throughout a region or even the world. It has no defined
economic interests. This might in fact be one of the biggest Western battlefield; instead 4GW is conducted simultaneously in population
misperceptions about Russian behaviour and might therefore represent centres, rural areas, and virtual networks. It moves constantly to avoid
an important root cause of current tensions: Russian behaviour is not detection and to target its enemy’s vulnerabilities. Modern warfare is
all about the economy and economic interests. powered by “information supremacy,” unprecedented quantities of
Application of framework accurate, speedy intelligence have become available as a result, making
the hybrid wars possible from globalization and technology today as
“In today’s dangerous world, there is no credibility without shown in Figures 3,4,7 and Table 1).
capability” [49]. As ideas and technologies forge change throughout
history, the ways humans wage war changes accordingly. This perpetual Fourth Generation Warfare’s targets are not just soldiers, but also
change has recently accelerated with a major geopolitical shift in non-combatants, religious ideas, legal frameworks, media outlets,
which the fall of the Soviet Union ended a bipolar world; many ethnic international agencies and agreements, economic activities, political
and national groups quickly sensed a new opportunity for freedom power, and the minds of the people. Accordingly, targets are selected
or reCenter of Gravitynition. We should not be surprised by these not just for physical destruction, but more for their mental and moral
actors’ innovative methods and techniques of warfare as they release impact on an adversary. In the end, 4GW’s goal is to exploit an adversary’s
pent-up energy and pursue long-held ideological and nationalistic weaknesses and undermine its strengths in order “to convince the
objectives. In the context of the information technology revolution of enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either
rapid globalization, of ethnic and nationalist struggles and reactionary unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit [50]”. Competition
religious movements - all layered against the back-drop of the end of for resources - water, energy, commodities and food is also fuelling
the Cold War and the subsequent break- up of a familiar geopolitical the potential for conflict. The existential character of the competition
and balance-of-power dynamic - a concept like Fourth Generation for these basic resources will make the choice of violence increasingly
Warfare (4GW) would inevitably emerge (relies on employing ‘’small, frequent and will increase the likelihood of regional instability. Also,
highly manoeuvrable, agile forces’’) Figures 4 and 7. Hammes, stated, climate change and natural disasters are destabilizing phenomena
that can blend into their environment and avoid being targeted [50]. The known as scenario (S) in Figures 4 and 7 respectively. They both
economic impact of terrorism as percentage of Nigeria Gross Domestic exacerbate infrastructure vulnerabilities in many developing countries
Product, (GDP) is 4.5% by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), 2016 and and increase the likelihood of humanitarian crises, the potential
with 9.314 score third globally, the effects of Boko Haram groups and for epidemic diseases, and the prospect of regionally destabilizing
others. GTI ranks Nigeria 3rd most terrorised country globally (2017). population migrations [51]. Lastly, proliferation of or increased access
In general, 4GW blurs the lines between war and politics, conflict to all forms of weapons of mass destruction increases the potential for
and peace, soldier and civilian, and battlefield violence and safe zones. catastrophic attacks.

Figure 3A: Internet of Things (IoTs)22 B: schematic showing the end users and application areas based on data for global collaboration with aspects of hybrid attack
and defence systems23.

22
Jacob Kipp, The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs (Fort Leavenworth,KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988), http://www.dtic. mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf

Gobi, Jayavardhana, Rajkumar Buyya, Slaven Marusic,Marimuthu Palaniswami (2013). Internet of Things (IoT): A Vision, Architectural Elements, and Future Directions
23

Journal Future Generation Computer Systems. Volume 29 Issue 7, September, Pages 1645-1660 Elsevier Science Publishers, The Netherlands.

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 8 of 13

Even the prospect of these attacks can be destabilizing because In addition, Russia has introduced a new version of its surveillance
such attacks dramatically increase the number of potential victims technology called SORM, which intercepts and stores phone calls and
and the scope of damage. These separatist or nationalist groups and Internet traffic. SORM provides state security services, particularly the
religious radicals gain their strength from the urbanized and deprived domestic Federal Security Service, with backdoor access [55]. Facebook
regions of the world. These unconventional actors with a substantial and Twitter are subject to traffic filtering at the network level; they are
following from the masses, some of whom belong to global networked also compelled to store the data of Russian users in Russia, to provide
terrorist groups, operate beyond state control and regularly disregard it on the request of Russian authorities, and to block content if the
international boundaries, norms, and agreements. Many work alongside Kremlin so desires [56]. Countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas are
criminal groups to fund operations and destabilize targeted regions still struggling to implement peaceful democratic rule after centuries
even further (like Boko Haram in Nigeria).These groups have become of colonial rule. In the greater Middle East, underlying historical,
masters of the “battle of narratives” (their perceived values) - a struggle religious and ideological differences that were masked by the rule of
beyond the physical elements of a conflict in which the manipulation pan-Arab Nationalist dictators during the Cold War and its immediate
of the media, the use of the internet, and the integration of information aftermath are now rising to the surface and producing violent conflict.
operations with a strategic communication program are as important as This struggle is often driven by a secular/fundamentalist divide - as
weapons systems or even success on the battlefield. seen in Libya and Egypt, or Shi’a/Sunni divide-as seen in Syria and Iraq.
Cultural, religious and ideological struggles for power are not limited to
Case Studies the greater Middle East. In Africa, we are seeing the continued growth
Gerasimov’s doctrine rooted in the military historical framework of Islamic fundamentalist non-state actors and insurgent groups - like
of the Great Patriotic War and the need to avoid repeating the shock Boko Haram in Nigeria, who are attempting to resolve their differences
of invasion in June 1941. Gerasimov’s theme reflects a long-standing using violence.
interest within Russian military theory in seeking to utilize military
science to gain foresight (providence) in terms of future conflict24. Warfare Multi-Dimensionality
Gerasimov reCenter of Gravitynized Russia must avoid the The myth of Russian hybrid warfare capability became embedded
economically dangerous exercise of trying to play “catch up” with in Western commentary and political discussion on how to strengthen
other powers but commended an approach to produce adequate defence capabilities vis-à-vis Russia26. The challenges posed by the
countermeasures to expose potential enemy vulnerabilities (Figures 3, weaponization of non-military means in a modern-day conflict are
5 and 6). Moreover, he appealed to the uniqueness of every conflict, distinctly of 21st century in nature. The multi-dimensional deployment
which requires an understanding of the special logic involved in of capabilities and resources for the purpose of conducting conflict
individual wars, drawing on the celebrated Soviet military scientist forms the core element of hybrid threat. Alongside direct attacks on the
Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938) who famously noted war is “difficult adversary’s armed forces, the strategy of hybrid threat also targets the
to predict”25. The idea that ‘hybrid warfare’ is a successful innovation economic, infrastructural, social and other prerequisites of the target
of Russian military thinking also imbues the Russian political and state and its allies. Theoretically, the assumption would be that not all
military leadership with an undue degree of strategic prowess and, in effects would be foreseeable and that the pattern of reactions of the
this sense, might represent a repetition of old mistakes. Interpreting target state under attack would be difficult to predict. “Military power
Crimea as evidence of a grander master plan of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ expresses and implements the power of the state in a variety of ways
is reminiscent of organisation and coordination (Figures 1, 3 and 7). within and beyond the state borders and is also one of the instruments
As it turned out, the Soviet Union leadership’s centralisation and with which political power is originally created and made permanent.”
strategic foresight was not as strong as had been presumed. Fettweis For this reason, the ultimate “output” of national power should be
stated, seeking patterns in the creation of enemy images throughout -ideally- the ability of a military force to successfully prosecute a
history, “people are aware of their own internal deliberations and variety of operations against a country’s adversaries. The aggressor is
divisions but see only the outcomes of decisions made elsewhere, which confronted with counterintuitive consequences. Unintended effects
makes other actors seem unified and strategic [52]”. Russia aggressively on collateral persons or property (e.g. civilians, allies, domestic
manipulates news and other public data with a military doctrine under export business, etc.) are capable of injecting unforeseen impetus to
which the operating environment is continuously shaped, in times the dynamics of conflict. Such sources of impetus – even if they are
of war and peace. The Russian military conducts operations both in un- foreseen and surprising – can be used in turn with other spectra
the country’s own information sphere - its media and Internet space- of hybrid threat for further attacks, assuming enough flexibility of
and outside its borders [53]. In addition to espionage, Russia has the actor. As well as unintended consequences, a set of effects can
the capability to disrupt and deter Western activities, should open arise, which were neither predictable nor estimable ex ante. Financial
war break out. In October 2015, the United States detected Russian transaction systems, wholesalers and the associated stock of customer
intelligence-gathering vessels and submarines operating near critical data possess a previously unimaginable power projection potential
undersea data cables [54]. In many of the former Soviet Republics, large for weakening a state’s commercial position. War ecosystem examples
Russian minorities have expressed their desire to re-establish closer ties concerns like Amazon or the Chinese counterpart Alibaba. The latter
with Russia, as opposed to the various ethnic majorities who seek to has now grown larger than Amazon and eBay combined and operates
establish relations with the west. at a remarkable level of profit27.

24
Cederberg, Aapo, (2015). Geneva Centre for Security Policy Institute, presented 26
Alibaba: After the Float. In: The Economist, 06/09/2014, p. 60.
in PSSI’s NATO Summer School, Měřín, July 23, 2015.
“Forecast: The Internet of Things, Worldwide, 2013,” Gartner, Inc., Nov. 18,
27

25
Ruslan Puhkov, “The Myth of Hybrid Warfare,” Nezavisimaya Voyennoye Oboz- 2013, Available at: https://www.gartner.com/doc/2625419/forecast-internet-things-
reniye, May 29, 2015, Available at: http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html. worldwide

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 9 of 13

The internet has access to innumerable sub-networks28, yet there any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted
is a dearth of diversity in system elements. Consequently malware, for to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer
example, can spread very quickly. In a world of limited resources, it is space, on the Earth, or inflict damage on them. In Syria, Russia will find
not sustainable and has a self-destructive effect. The essential question it more and more difficult to keep its powerful position, as it is being
here is whether we could still successfully turn away without any constantly challenged by an assortment of regional actors.
creative destruction, in which old goods and production techniques
are continuously replaced by new ones, as the motor of economic Centre of Gravity (Center of Gravity) and Network-
development. Creative and imaginative entrepreneurs play a central role Centric Warfare
in this (warfare ecosystem) in Table 1. In nature, disturbances are not
overridden but rather they are integrated into the process. This requires Centre of gravity
vacant spaces, buffers, redundancies, variations, diversity, flexibility “Invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of victory in the
and capability of change and adjustment, attributes of the philosophy attack.” - Sun Tzu. The centre of gravity (Center of Gravity) is a concept
of anticipation war doctrine. Of importance are barriers, in order to developed by Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, in his
ensure the limitation of effective range in the event of disturbances. work On War31. The definition of a Center of Gravity is "the source of
Today the European electricity supply system possesses insufficient
power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or
barriers capable of preventing the propagation of a disturbance.
will to act32." Thus, the centre of gravity is usually seen as the "source of
Therefore, a major disruption could spread across the entire strength". The United States Army tends to look for a single centre of
continent within a few seconds. Russian military thinkers agree that the gravity, normally in the principal capability that stands in the way of
biggest threats to Russia’s security come from aerospace. Aerospace has the accomplishment of its own mission. In short, the army considers a
become the main sphere of military conflict, and weapons employed "friendly" Center of Gravity as that element - a characteristic, capability,
in aerospace are the primary weapons of 21st‐ century wars since they or locality - that enables one's own or allied forces to accomplish their
can achieve many kinds of missions (operational tactical, operational, objectives. Conversely, an opponent's Center of Gravity is that element
operational strategic and strategic), without the employment of nuclear
that prevents friendly forces from accomplishing their objectives.
weapons [57]. Russian thinking about military operations in aerospace
seems to follow the Soviet tradition of emphasizing offense over defence. For example, according to US Army Counterinsurgency Field
Condoleeza Rice’s description of Soviet strategy and doctrine as one of Manual 3-24, the centre of gravity in a counterinsurgency is the
a dichotomy is valid even today: “Soviet political doctrine is explicitly protection of the population that hosts it33.The result of the Center of
defensive, but Soviet military strategy is undeniably offensive, even pre- Gravity analysis provides input for what objectives and decisive points
emptive in character.” Rice (1986) early 2000s, Russian periodicals have that should be accomplished and how to use the forces in order to reach
included articles dealing with “network‐centric” warfare Raskin and the desired end-state34 Warden Center of Gravity is useful in planning
Pelyak and the need for the creation of unified information, command
operations since it “describes the point where the enemy is most
and control systems [58,59]. In modern warfare, Russia is pursuing
vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of
network centric capabilities, including the transition from vertical to
being decisive” [62]. Leonhard claims that the Center of Gravity is the
global networked automation systems [60].To prepare for war in space,
the USSR also developed and tested anti‐satellite systems (including enemy’s vulnerabilities and not his strengths [63]. Echevarria asserts
a co orbital one) and deployed the Fractional Orbital Bombardment that Center of Gravity is not the strength, not the source of strength
System (FOBS)29. and not a weakness and the Center of Gravity is what holds the enemy’s
force together [64]. Center of Gravity is the “focal point” that holds the
“In the Russian view of national security, military security is system together, but only exists if there is a certain degree of connection
fundamental and the only aspect of security which is indispensable” as shown in Figure 4. The effective Swedish doctrines35 emphasizing
[61]. Thus, prioritizing the reconstitution of Russia’s military over other that Center of Gravitys is connected to strength, either the source of
economic considerations can be expected to be maintained into the strength or the strength itself.
future regardless of the state of relations with partners (war ecosystem
Table 1) and competitors, and while relations with the West run through • Critical Capabilities (CC): every centre of gravity has some
their familiar predictable cycle of thaw and freeze [61]. Russia and primary ability (or abilities) that makes it a centre of gravity in
China submitted the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of the context of a given Infrastructures (I)situation or mission –
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space including phases within campaigns or operations”36
Objects (PPWT) to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva30. Given
that the PPWT’s definition of a space weapon is inherently unverifiable 31
DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02. 2008.
and thus dooms the draft to failure, it is doubtful how genuine this US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, p. 3-13 (page 69 of the PDF)
32

attempt to prevent weaponization of space is. The PPWT defines a FAS Intelligence Resource Program
“weapon in outer space” as “any device placed in outer space, based on 33
DGemO doktrin för gemensamma operation. (2005). Stockholm: Försvarsmak-
ten: pp. 63 – 66

Johnson, “Soviet Strategy For War in Space;” Johnson, “Soviet Offensive Satellite
28 The Swedish doctrines referred to consists of a hierarchy covering the strategic,
34

Systems, A First Step.” operational and tactical levels

29
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China and Russia Strange, Joe and Iron, Richard (2005). Understanding centres of gravity and
35

Jointly Submitted the Draft Treaty on PPWT to the Conference on Disarmament,” critical vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Department of War Studies, Swedish National
February 12, 2008, Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/jkxw/ Defence College: pp. 35
t408634.htm.
Strange, Joe and Iron, Richard (2005). Understanding centres of gravity and
36

General Carl Von Clausewitz (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside
30 critical vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Department of War Studies, Swedish National
Press LLC. pp. 144, Defence College: pp. 35

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 10 of 13

Figure 5: Centre of gravity (CENTER OF GRAVITY) suggested graphic Figure 6: Centre of gravity analyses. “Conduct two side- by-side” for Critical
description of the elements and their connection adapted from Jonas Vulnerabilities (CV)39.
Andersons (2009)38.

the Wars ” Israel’s low-profile campaign to disrupt Hezbollah’s bases in

• Critical Requirements (CR): are conditions, resources and means
Lebanon achieved success based on “information supremacy41”
that are essential for a center of Gravity to achieve its critical
capability. Moscow appears to understand that it must continue to improve if
it wants to compete and win. The Russian hacker group Cyber Berkut42
• Critical Vulnerabilities (CV): are those critical requirements,
attacked routers, software, and hard drives at Ukraine’s National
or components thereof, that are deficient,or vulnevulnerable to
Election Commission with the objective of hobbling the release of the
neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a centre
official vote count and producing false results [66,67].
of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability37”
Amid a show of hybrid tactics, Putin has awarded financial support
Figure 5 illuminate Stakeholders (A) in Figure 4. However, when
to fringe political movements in Western Europe, launched cyber-
the Center of Gravity and its CC are identified the model becomes more
attacks and espionage in Europe, and ordered probing and actual attacks
comprehensible and clears again (Figure 6). When conducting planning
on U.S. and European energy and communications infrastructure. He
the professional officer needs to “conduct two side- by-side” Center of
has continued to attempt to use control over energy- pipelines, nuclear
Gravity and CV analyses. Strange/Iron claim that a Center of Gravity
plants, and natural gas supplies to wield influence across Europe. The
has both intrinsic and external weaknesses and that they can be of many
main source of power of a Center of Gravity is situated in the inner core
types including technical, geographical or more abstract factors such
while elements providing integration, protection and sustainment are
as national psyche. Interestingly, a weakness in one context can be a
placed in the outer core. Importantly, the two cores need to be viewed
strength in another, which means that the “window of opportunity” is and the inner core cannot function well if the outer core is deficient.
many times based on time as an essential factor and adaptability. While a cyber-espionage case harking back nearly 30 years may sound
The theories of Vego, Strange and Iron claim that Center of Gravity dated, it highlights Moscow’s long, keen interest in an advantage in
in its essence belongs to the strengths in the system [51,65]. Due to cyberspace, and its grasp of its strategic importance [68].
the iterative and brainstorming nature of the Strange/Iron method Russia must promote a massive 'fog of war' and ambiguous 'centre
the process is hard to provide in detail. The process is initiated by an of gravity' for its adversaries, while ensuring minimum 'friction factor'
iterative brainstorming, summarized below, where Center of Gravitys in its hybrid warfare campaigns. Such military thinking necessitates
and their CC are identified, which forms the foundation for CR and CV a highly centralized politico-military structure in Moscow, while
identification. requiring decentralized freedom of movement, permanent readiness,
and combined arms war fighting capabilities at least at battalion level
When continuing the analysis, each CC is tracked backwards to for elite formations and what I called war ecosystem [69].
identify what is required to maintain that capability and to identify
possible vulnerabilities connected these requirements In order to make Network-Centric Warfare
the analysis easier to conduct and view, they propose that the model IoT technologies offer promise for data gathering, as well as
is used in a four column format. The format including the connection information generation and dissemination. IoT in Command and
between Center of Gravity, CC, CR and CV in Figure 5. The example Control (C2). The Internet of Things (IoT) stands to provide new means
of CENTER OF GRAVITY vigor and sophistication of Russian hybrid for establishing C2 situational understanding. Integration of Artificial
operations. Russia has developed its hybrid capabilities over a two­ Intelligence (Target Identification / Classification / Prioritization -
decade period and incorporated its evolving doctrine and capabilities Conducting pattern reCenter of Gravitynition and extrapolation).
into its strategic thinking. Its years of on-the-ground experience Integration of Autonomous sensor platforms (Unmanned Vehicles,
include increasingly complex examples of maskirovka (subterfuge) Ground Sensors, Autonomous Robotic Platforms).
-the elements of surprise, iversion, and deception40“The War Between The internet of things (IoTs) is not new to the military. In the

Jen Weedon, "Beyond ‘Cyber War': Russia's Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage
40

37
Alexander H. Montgomery Department of Political Science, Reed College ahm@ and Information Operations in Ukraine," Cyber War in Perspective: Russian
reed.edu Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/266421120/1-2 Aggression against Ukraine, Ed. Kenneth Geers, (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD
COE Publications, 2015), pages 67-77.
Strange, Joe and Richard Iron (2005). Understanding centres of gravity and
38

critical vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Department of War Studies, Swedish National Pasi Eronen. Russian Hybrid Warfare: How to Confront a New Challenge to the
41

Defence College West Foundation for Defence of Democracies Washington, Dc, 2016 p 6

Vego, Milan (2008). Joint operational warfare: theory and practice. 1. ed.
39
Critical Juncture by Yaakov Lappin BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 812,
42

Stockholm: National Defence College April 26, 2018

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 11 of 13

Figure 7: Military operational art shift to automation in 21st century war ecosystem narrative of Table 143.

1990s, military leaders mapped out a vision for how networks and data imbalance for global engagement, warned that U.S. aid to Africa is
would transform the way that war was fought. This concept formed the becoming increasingly “militarized,” favouring kinetic operations to
foundation of “network-centric warfare” [70,71]. IoT is an ecosystem restore order and protect populations over long-term development
of technologies that generates, shares, analyses, and creates value from projects aimed at the root causes of terrorism, genocide, and
data (Figures 3, 4 and 7). The deployment of IoT- related technologies displacement the percentage of development assistance controlled by
by the military has primarily focused on applications for Command, the Pentagon went from 3.5 percent to nearly 22 percent during the past
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and decade, while the U.S. Agency for International Development’s share
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and fire-control systems AS SHOWN IN of development assistance declined from 65 percent to 40 percent)44.
Figure 7 [72]. The military has millions of sensors connected through The optimization of space, now contributes to military power with
an extensive network infrastructure, but few systems leverage the full the concepts of network centric warfare, and reconnaissance and
IoTs stack, from connected sensors to digital analytics and automated information strikes like drones. The growing complexity of our
responses. The military has also developed and deployed IoT- related infrastructure, which has now permeated throughout our society’s
technologies in segregated “stovepipes,” making it difficult to secure systems, is becoming ever more vulnerable because of its increasing
and limiting the ability to communicate across systems and generate reliance on technology. IoT technologies have redefine Command and
economies of scale or synergies from different types of data. Gone are Control (C2) for modern warfare with the advancement of Multi-Team
formal bureaucratic structures, and Multi-Team System (MTS) designs System (MTS) designs. Compulsory military service should be used to
train young people in self- efficacy and the capacity for self-help and
are becoming the norm [73,74]. Recent team-focused research has
introduction of deep learning in education curriculum for modern war
emphasized the point that teams need to well manage interfaces with
planners (Figure 3).
their external environments if they are to be effective [75-77]. Although
Marks framework was designed to apply to team-level processes; The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular
Mathieu et al. (2001) submitted that it also applies to MTS-level warfare which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted-
processes [78]. The key distinguishing issue, however, is that in a MTS, breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and
the component teams need to synchronize their joint actions so as to civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort. Success in the
facilitate the accomplishment of higher order goals. highly political requiring resiliency and “Anticipation War Doctrine”
framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military
Anticipation war doctrine leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. The
These works epitomize “Anticipation war doctrine” accentuate adaptive theory that better respond to complexity with converge IoTs
Gerasimov’s doctrine of blurring divide between 'war and peace' in the technologies can be used as best practices for defining clear objectives,
21st century threat landscape: "Wars are no longer declared and, having the use of scenarios, emphasis on pattern analysis, and ensuring greater
begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template." Civil-Military scope for creative and decentralized critical infrastructure for decision

43
Zheng, Denise E. and Carter, William A. (2015). Leveraging the Internet of Things
for a More Efficient and Effective Military. A Report of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) Strategic Technologies Program September. 44
Refugees International, press release, July 17, 2008

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 12 of 13

making will help illustrate challenges of modern warfare and solutions. References
Anticipated war doctrine accentuate the distributed leadership 1. Hoffman FG (2009) Hybrid vs. Compound War. Armed Forces Journal pp: 1-6.
capabilities of war ecosystem for course of action at the centre of gravity
2. Glenn RW (2009) Thoughts on ‘hybrid’ conflict. Small Wars Journal pp: 1-8.
of modern battlefield (Table 1) will need to change proactively in war
and peace time. On the domestic front, Putin’s Russia is experiencing 3. McCuen CJ (2008) Hybrid Wars. Military Review pp: 107-113.
internal change. The most noticeable development is an on-going shift 4. Weigley RF (1973) The American way of war: A history of united states military
in the centre of gravity in the Russian opposition to Putin away from strategy and policy. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
liberals and democrats and towards communists and nationalists45. 5. Reyeg FM, Marsh NB (2011) The Filipino way of war: Irregular warfare through
the centuries. Master Thesis Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
Conclusion
6. Arquilla J (2011) Insurgents, raiders and bandits: How masters of irregular
The principal aim of using the warfare framework is to develop warfare have shaped our world.
a single visual representation of future military force structure 7. Kiras JD (2006) Irregular warfare: Terrorism and insurgency in strategy in the
Implications and future warfare validated by Fourth Generation contemporary world, Baylis J, Cohen E, Gray C, Wirtz J (ed.) Oxford: Oxford
University Press pp: 163-191.
Warfare (4GW) with the resultant impact on space weaponization.
Warfare will occur concurrently throughout all participants. A hybrid 8. Fernando R (2010) A new composite global terrorism threat to western
societies from Pakistan? Making sense of the January 2008 suicide bomb plot
adversary can be state or non-state (the Israel–Hezbollah War and the in Barcelona. Working Paper 18: 13.
Syrian Civil War, Russia’s ‘hybrid approach’ in Crimea).The utilization
9. Hoffman FG (2009) Hybrid warfare and challenges. Small Wars Journals 52:
of the framework allows the stakeholder groups to have a shared 34-39.
understanding of what will constitute future military capability (Figure
10. Lamb JM (2013) Black. Bloomington: Author House.
7). Additionally, the different service branches of the military can
both explore and determine their degree of commonality and inter- 11. Bryman A (2012) Social research methods. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
service capabilities similar construct (United Kingdom, United States 12. Shenton AK (2004) Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative
and Canada). The Internet has changed the global battle space and research projects. Education for Information 22: 63-75.
our understanding of New Global Insurgency. Hybrid war framework 13. Laub Z (2016) The Islamic state. Council on Foreign Relations.
encapsulates decision support and enabling technologies to achieve 14. BBC (2015) What is ‘islamic state’? BBC News.
value streams for coalition force interoperability. The hybrid warfare
15. Hoffmann FG (2009) Hybrid threats: Re-conceptualizing the evolving character
framework provides a basis for military competence based on trust and of modern conflict. Strategic Forum 240: 5.
challenges of 4GW. Thus, military leaders face incentives to develop
16. Council of the European Union (2015) Food-for-thought paper “Countering
expertise and to offer their best advice while reCenter of Gravitynizing
Hybrid Threats.” 2: 1.
the limits of military expertise (Figures 4, 5 and 6 respectively).
17. Calha MJ (2015) Hybrid warfare: NATO’s new strategic challenge?. NATO
Although civilian and military leaders both share responsibility, Defence and Security Committee General Report pp: 1-13.
Policy permeates all military operations according to this framework 18. Neuchterlein JE, Donald E (1985) National interest as a basis of foreign policy
establishes the source of war, dictates the available means, and formulation, in Neuchterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National
Interest University of Kentucky Press.
determines the desired ends. What all Army operations will have in
common is a need for innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive 19. Corum JS, Johnson WR (2003) Airpower in small wars: Fighting insurgents and
terrorists, Lawrence University, Press of Kansas.
teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty like space
weaponization ecosystem communities success of Space X promoted by 20. Paul L (2011) The inherent tensions in Military Doctrine Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst, Sandhurst Occasional p: 5
United States including use of drones in modern warfare encapsulate
distributed weapons coordination (DWC) concept development trade 21. Clausewitz CV (1984) On War, (ed.) Howard M, Paret P, Princeton University
Press.
space perspective of future warfare. We are scarcely aware of the extent
to which our moral imagination has been transformed since 1945 22. Moreland S, Jasper S (2014) The islamic state is a hybrid threat: Why does that
by technology and globalization. Defence establishments must stop matter?. Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation.

attempting to develop military solutions to the challenges they prefer 23. Fleming PB (2011) Hybrid threat concept: Contemporary war, military planning
to solve instead of addressing the way their adversaries will most likely and the advent of unrestricted operational art. United States Army Command
and General Staff College.
engage in conflict. The mapping of capabilities onto the framework then
allows the stakeholders to develop their transformation roadmaps and 24. Hoffman F (2007) Conflict in the 21st Century: The rise of hybrid war. Arlington:
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies P: 24.
synchronize the associated capability development plans for execution.
Hybrid warfare framework encapsulates the concept of war everywhere 25. Mawy EL, Reda (2014) Islamic State 'adapting to US-led air strikes. BBC
News. BBC.
and how to manage the challenges. President Donald Trump declared
US Space Force as the 6th branch of the military by 2020 that will 26. Whitney CR (2012) Ruling arms. World Policy Journal 29: 86-93.

seeks to measure national power in military terms and undertake the 27. Schroeder M, Lamb G (2006) The illicit arms trade in Africa. African Analyst.
“information-dominant” operations that are seen to revolutionize 28. Kim L (2016) Russia having success in hybrid war against Germany. Academy
warfare, must gather and assess information pertaining to the variables of Management Review 26: 356-376.
and vulnerably of modern warfare46. 29. Sullivan S (2016) A joint centre to combat hybrid warfare threats. F-Secure 2: 1.

30. Pindjak P (2014) Deterring hybrid warfare: A chance for NATO and the EU to
Emil Avdaliani Despite His Victory, Putin’s Problems Will Grow BESA Center
45
work together? NATO Review.
Perspectives Paper No. 795, April 15, 2018
31. Fayad ME, Schmidt DC, Johnson RE (1999) Building application frameworks
Published 12:36 PM ET Mon, 18 June 2018 Updated 6:22 PM ET Mon, 18 June
46
object-oriented foundations of framework design. Wiley Computer Publishing.
2018 CNBC.com

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374
Citation: Otaiku AA (2018) A Framework for Hybrid Warfare: Threats, Challenges and Solutions. J Def Manag 8: 178. doi:10.4178/2167-0374.1000178

Page 13 of 13

32. Johnson RE, Foote B (1988) Designing reusable classes. Journal of Object- 56. Paret P, Craig GA, Gilbert F, Condoleeza R (1986) The making of Soviet
Oriented Programming 1: 22-35. strategy, in makers of modern strategy from machiavelli to the nuclear age.
Oxford University Press p: 658.
33. Ted L, Glenn A, Paul C, Wolfgang PE, Larry R, et al. (1995) Object-oriented
application frameworks. Manning Publications Co. 57. Raskin AV, Pelyak VS (2005) On network centric warfare. Military Thought 14: 86.

34. Fayad M, Schmidt D (1997) Object-oriented application frameworks. 58. Roger MD (2013) Kondratyev, Network- Centric warfare and the race against
Communications of the ACM 40: 32-38. time (Part one). Eurasia Daily Monitor p: 10.

35. Hamel G (2007) The future of management. Harvard Business School Press, 59. Giles K (2011) The state of the NATO-Russia reset. Conflict Studies Research
Boston. Centre pp: 1-7.

36. Soldatkin V (2016) Putin names United States among threats in new Russian 60. Warden J (2000) The air campaign. Excell Press: USA p: 7.
security strategy. Reuters 2: 1. 61. Leonhard, Robert R (1991) The art of maneuver: Maneuver-warfare theory and
air land battle. Presidio Press, Novato, California pp: 20-24.
37. Schadlow N (2015) The problem with hybrid warfare. War on the Rocks 2: 1.
62. Echevarria, Antulio J (2003) Reining in the centre of gravity concept. Airpower
38. Gary H, Liisa V (2003) Harvard business review “On Point orders”.
Journal, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AU Press.
39. Folke C (2006) Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social– 63. Strange J, Richard I (2005) Understanding centres of gravity and critical
ecological systems analyses. Global Environmental Change 16: 253-267. vulnerabilities. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College.
40. Goertz G (2006) Social science concepts: A user's guide. Princeton, NJ: 64. Gubbi J, Rajkumar B, Slaven M, Marimuthu P (2013) Internet of Things (IoT):
Princeton University Press.
A vision, architectural elements and future directions. Future Gener Comput
41. Delbrück H, Walter J, Lincoln R (1990) The dawn of modern warfare.in history Syst 29: 1645-1660.
of the art of war NE: University of Nebraska Press.
65. Cederberg A (2015) Geneva centre for security policy institute. Prague Security
42. Bartholomees J, Boone K (2010) Theory of war and strategy the U.S. Army war Studies Institute's NATO summer school, Merin, Czech Republic.
college guide to national security, 14th Edition 2: 1.
66. Wirtz JJ (2015) Cyber war and strategic culture: The Russian integration of
43. Miller M (2015) Hybrid warfare: Preparing for future conflict, air war college air cyber power into grand strategy. Cyber war in perspective: Russian aggression
university. United States Air Force. against Ukraine, NATO CCD COE Publications pp: 29-36.
44. Deep A (2015) Hybrid war: Old concept, new techniques, Small Wars Journal. 67. Can K (2015) Russia's renewed military thinking: Non-linear warfare and
Small Wars Foundation. reflexive control. Research Papers 121, NATO Defence College, Rome.
45. Godin B (2003) The knowledge-based economy: Conceptual framework or
68. Alberts DS, Garstka JJ, Stein FP (1999) Network centric warfare: Developing
buzzword? Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics. Working
and leveraging information superiority (2nd ed) 2: 1.
Paper p: 24.

46. David P, Foray D (1995) Assessing and expanding the science and technology 69. Alberts DS, Garstka JJ, Stein FP (2001) Understanding information age
knowledge base. STI Review p: 16. warfare 2: 1.

47. Robertson G (2000) NATO in the 21st Century. Speech by the Secretary General 70. Alberts DS, Hayes RE (2003) Power to the edge: Command control in the
to the Millennium Year Lord Mayor's Lecture, London. information age pp: 1-303.

48. Hammes TX (2004) The sling and the stone: On War in the 21st Century. MN: 71. Gully SM (2000) Work teams research: Recent findings and future trends. In
Zenith Press. Beyerlein MM (Ed.), Work teams: Past, present and future pp: 25-44.

49. Milan V (2008) Joint operational warfare: Theory and practice. (1st Edn). 72. Kozlowski SWJ, Bell BS (2002) Work groups and teams in organizations.
Stockholm: National Defence College. In W Borman, D Ilgen, and R Klimoski (Eds.), Comprehensive handbook of
psychology: Industrial and organizational psychology 12: 333-375.
50. Fettweis CJ (2015) Misreading the enemy. Survival: Global politics and strategy.
John Wiley & Sons. 57: 149-172. 73. Ancona DG, Caldwell DF (1992) Bridging the boundary: External activity and
51. Darczewska, Olanta (2015) The devil is in the details: Information warfare in performance in organizational teams. Administrative Science Quarterly 37:
the light of Russia's Military Doctrine. Ofrodek Studi6w Wschodnich, Poland, 634-666.
pp: 5-39.
74. Choi JN (2002) External activities and team effectiveness: Review and
52. Sanger DE, Eric S (2015) Russian ships near data cables are too close for U.S. theoretical development. Small Group Research 33: 181-208.
comfort. The New York Times.
75. Tesluk P, Mathieu JE (1999) Overcoming roadblocks to effectiveness:
53. Soldatov A, Borogan I (2013) Russia’s surveillance state. World Policy Journal Incorporating management of performance barriers into models of work group
30: 23-30. effectiveness. Journal of Applied Psychology 84: 200-217.
54. Kathrin H (2015) Twitter told to store Russian data in Russia. Financial Times, UK. 76. Mathieu JE, Marks MA, Zaccaro SJ (2001) Multi-team systems. In N Anderson,
55. Barvinenko VV, Vorobyov IN, Kiselev VA (2009) Aerospace defence: Modern D Ones, HK Sinangil, C Viswesvaran (Eds.) International handbook of work and
aspects. Military Thought 18: 51. organizational psychology, London: Sage pp: 289-313.

J Def Manag, an open access journal Volume 8 • Issue 3 • 1000178

ISSN: 2167-0374