MAO'S PROTRACTED WAR: THEORY VS.

PRACTICE
by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W. WOODMANSEE. JR., USA

In the spring of 1938, Mao Tse-tung defeating the relentless Japanese military
delivered a series of lectures at the "Yenan machine. Mao used the theory of "protracted
Association for the Study of the war" to encourage and unify his people and
Anti-J apanese War." The Japanese War had to turn the energies of his party to expanding
been going on for almost a year. The political control over the peasants and
Communists and the Nationalists had joined establishing guerrilla bases. Mao's brilliant
in a tenuous "United Front," and the examination of the existing contradictions in
Communists' Eighth Route Army, the Sino-Japanese struggle and his three-stage
commanded by Chu Teh, was in the field. portrayal of China's victory plan has become
Japanese forces, driving out of Manchuria, a modern military classic. It is taught in many
had overrun the northern area of China down service schools and widely used by scholars in
to the Shantung peninsula and in the south explaining the Vietnamese Communist
were well established on the Yangtze River. strategy, first against the French and later
Chiang Kai-shek had borne the brunt of the against the US/South Vietnamese forces in
Japanese attack and, despite heavy losses the unending Indochina War.!
around Shanghai, had managed to preserve The purpose of this paper is to look at the
the fighting strength of his army. The essentials of this strategy and to see if the
Communists, in the meantime, had begun the historical evidence of the Sino-Japanese War
political organization of the thinly-held supports the contemporary acclaim accorded
Japanese territory in Shansi-Hopeh provinces. to Mao's theoretical opus.
Their base area in northwest Shensi had not
been reached by the Japanese. ON THE PROTRACTED WAR
Chairman Mao was being pressured to be
more active in the military fight against the Mao left no doubt that his thesis of
invading Japanese Army. Some were protracted war was not philosophical in
discouraged and felt there was little hope of nature, but was specifically related to the war
at hand:

The Sino-Japanese War is not just any

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Woodmansee, Jr.,
Annor, graduated from the United States Military war, it is specifically a war of life and
Academy in 1956 and received a master of science death between semi-colonial and
degree in Public Administration from George semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan
Washington University in 1965. He has held command
and staff positions with Armor, aviation, and air fought in the nineteen thirties.2
cavalry units and was a White House Fellow assigned
to the Secretary of State from Mao's conclusion that the Chinese struggle
September 1968 to
September 1969. He wrote against the Japanese could not be a quick
this paper while he was an victory, but that China would win in a
Army Research Associate at
the Hoover Institution on War,
protracted struggle stemmed directly from his
Revolution and Peace, assessment of the "contrasting features" of
Stanford, California. He is the two protagonists. "Japan's advantage," he
now assigned to the Training
and Doctrine Command at
reasoned, "lies in her great capacity to wage
Fort Monroe, Virginia. war, and her disadvantages lie in the
reactionary and barbarous nature of her war,

30
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in the inadequacy of her manpower and In order to be more precise in evaluating
material resources, and in her meager whether or not this process took place, one
international support."3 In contrast, Mao must look more closely into Mao's description
explained: "China's disadvantage lies in her of the three phases of the protracted war and
military weakness, and her advantages lie in see how he describes the tactics and
the progressive and just character of her war, characteristics of each stage.
her great size and her abundant international In the first phase, Mao explained, Japan
support."4 would be on the strategic offensive while
Mao Tse-tung concluded that the initial China would remain on the strategic

Mao Tse-tung (third from left) with some survivors of the Long March in May 1937.

disparity in military strength would allow the defensive. During this period the enemy
Japanese to advance deep into the spearhead after initial success would lose
countryside. At the point where her limited some of its sharpness, enemy troop morale
national resources of manpower and raw would begin to deteriorate, the Japanese
materials could not support a sustained attack nation would start to grow war-weary and
and a significant occupational force as well, a would feel the condemnation of the court of
stalemate would ensue. But with the passage world opinion. The correct tactic for China to
of time, because of the "just" nature of the employ in this phase was "mobile warfare,"
Chinese cause, the impact of international executed by regular forces. Neither guerrilla
support, and "provided ... we make no activity nor positional warfare was to assume
mistakes of principle and exert our best a major role in this phase. Mobile warfare,
efforts,"5 Mao predicted that the balance of Mao carefully defined as "the form in which
forces would shift in China's favor, and regular armies wage quick-decision, offensive
permit her victorious counteroffensive. campaigns and battles on exterior lines along

31
extensive fronts and over big areas of before his colleagues in 1938. We must now
operations."6 address the historical evidence to see how this
The second stage of war would be one of plan unfolded.
strategic stalemate. Japan would shift to the
strategic defensive, while China was preparing DEVELOPMENT OF THE
for the counteroffensive. This would be the NORTHWEST BORDER REGION
transitional and, Mao predicted, the most
trying stage. The enemy's advance will have An understanding of Mao's political and
been stopped, but there will still be large-scale military strength at the beginning of the
fighting. China could expect Japan to set up Sino-Japanese War is necessary to appreciate
puppet governments and plunder the both what action was taken and what was
occupied zones. Since China would not yet be possible.
technically capable of launching a The northern part of Shensi province
counter-offensive, the principal tactic of this offered an ideal sanctuary for Mao and the
phase would be guerrilla warfar« rather than remnants of the Long March. The terrain is
mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare would result
from large numbers of Chinese troops "basing
themselves on all areas not actually occupied AN UNDERSTANDING OF
by the enemy, and coordinating with the MAO'S POLITICAL AND
people's local armed forces; they will launch
extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE
enemy-occupied places."7 Another purpose BEGINNING OF THE
of guerrilla warfare in this phase was to evolve SI NO-JAPANESE WAR IS
into mobile warfare in phase three. The NECESSARY TO APPRECIATE
second stage, Mao proposed, would be the BOTH WHAT ACTION WAS
pivotal one. Victory for China would be TAKEN AND WHAT WAS
determined "not by the retention or loss of
the big cities in the first stage, but by the POSSIBLE.
extent to which the whole nation exerts itself
in the second."8
China's counteroffensive would mark the rugged. Hills were generally deforested, but
beginning of the third stage of the struggle. adequate agricultural land existed in the
This stage would demonstrate the increased valleys. After very successful diplomatic and
capability of China's military forces and military measures to expand and secure his
reflect considerable international support. base area, Mao turned to the internal
Japan, having been worn down militarily, problems of developing and administering his
war-wearied through heavy losses and domain. Land was redistributed more
condemned internationally, would fall before equitably to the peasants; small industries
the Chinese offensive. Mobile warfare would began producing paper, soap, shoes, and
regain preeminence in this phase; "positional textiles; sewing machines were brought in,
attack" (i.e., assault of defended positions) and the Red Army soldiers appeared in
would also be important; guerrilla warfare uniform. An arsenal was begun; radio
would be less useful, but could contribute communications were established. The:re was
some strategic support. coal in the area, giving Mao a vital source of
Mao admitted that the road to victory was fuel. Salt, a near-precious commodity, was
not an easy one and could be traveled only if also available; thus, the Reds had an item
the Chinese people became "tempered," the which could readily be exported in exchange
political parties became "steeled," and the for manufactured goods, particularly military
United Front was "persevered in."9 supplies. The key element in the development
This in brief is the theory of the protracted of the base area however lay in Mao's
war against the Japanese which Mao laid emphasis on training and indoctrination. A

32
 An artist's impression of the Long March titled "Comrade Mao Tse-tung at Wenchiashih_"

political-military school in Pao-An had, by Nationalist forces.l 1 Thus, the Eighth Route
1936, gained an enrollment of some 2,000. Army, under Chu Teh, was created. Mao was
The school offered a variety of courses to quick to dispel any misapprehension that his
officers, noncommissioned officers, party members might harbor concerning the
communications specialists, etc. A vast agreement. In a booklet entitled "Present
program to eliminate illiteracy in the anny Strategy and Tactics of the Chinese
was also begun because it is very difficult to Communist Party-very confidential," Mao
assimilate the "glorious thought of Comrad explained:
Mao Tse-tung" if one cannot read or write.
Meanwhile, Chu Teh and the remainder of the ... Our present compromise is designed
Red forces on the Long March arrived in the to weaken the Kuomintang and to
base area, swelling the Red Anny to about overthrow the National Government
94,000.1 0 under the Kuomingtang dictatorship by
utilizing the name of a democratic
republic.
FORMATION OF THE UNITED FRONT
... For the sake of strategy and during
the initial stage of the United Front, the
After the Sian incident in December 1936, Red Anny can change its insignia and
and in return for Chiang's agreement to form accept a united command. However, in
a united front, the Communists reportedly reality, the Red Anny should maintain its
promised to abolish their soviet fonn of independent entity so that it can act as a
government, stop propagandising the people, model army and become the center and
follow the goals of Sun Yat-sen, and allow the reliable force of the Communist
Red Anny to be incorporated into the movement in China.

33
 · .. For the present, the organization of easily supply the required munitions,
the Communist Party should still be kept provided the raw materials were made
secret while the members of the party available.
should openly participate in all patriotic Chinese Nationalist forces in 1937 totaled
organizations, forming a nucleus in around 2 million men. The quality of these
them. 12 soldiers ranged from miserably-armed,
ill-trained men of questionable loyalty, to
PHASE ONE 100,000 well-armed, German-trained and
advised elite troops. China had some German
The Marco Polo Bridge incident of 7 July 75mm and 88mm guns, but in general lacked
1937 rapidly expanded into a full-scale artillery, tanks, and air support. The Chinese
invasion of North and Central China, and a navy was, of course, no match for the
bitter 8-year struggle had begun. Japanese. It consisted of a few old destroyers,
The Japanese in 1937 had a regular army in gunboats, and 12 light cruisers. While China
China, plus an indigenous Manchukuoan was well endowed with natural resources, she
Army of 100,000 to 150,000 officered by had no war industrial capability beyond the
Japanese. To support this force, Japan had few mills and factories that the Germans had
the third largest navy in the world-some 200 constructed as part of their advisory effort.
warships-plus an air force of 2,000 first-rate China could not even satisfy her own
airplanes manned by a pool of surprisingly ammunition requirements.
effective pilots.! 3 Although Japan lacked the The Communist Eighth Route Army,
natural resources to feed her war machine, her commanded by Chu Teh, was supposedly,
industries had great capacity and were capable 45,000 strong, but some estimates put it
of rapid wartime mobilization. Japan could between 80,000 and 90,000. 14 The Eighth

A sentry on the Marco Polo Bridge.

34
Route Army was organized with three some of the artillery,19 The victory provided
hand-picked divisions: the I 15th, commanded a tremendous boost to Communist morale
by Lin Piao; the I 20th, commanded by Ho and gave the Reds a "show-piece" battle on
Lung; and the I 29th, commanded by Liu which Chairman Mao could claim the
Po-cheng. correctness of the concept of mobile warfare.
Japanese operations in 1937 aimed for a It was, however, as one authority noted,
rapid victory over the di~ointed Chinese "the first, last, and only occasion during the
forces. An early dash across the Anti-J apanese War when the Communists
Kalgan-Paotow railway cut the main Chinese committed a unit as large as a division to
supply routes to Russia and protected the formal battle-despite the fact that there were
right flank of the attack. The main attack many opportunities to have done SO."2 0
then plunged south towards Taiyuan. The Despite this setback to the Japanese Fifth
plan was to drive the Chinese forces back to Division, the remainder of the Japanese forces
the North China Sea, cut off all lines of poured around the Communist 115th Division
communications and administer a swift coup and seized Taiyuan on 8 November 1937.
de gr/tce15 To assist the main attack, a This left the Red division completely isolated
secondary attack was launched into the in Japanese-held territory. There, in the Wutai
Shanghai area on 13 August. This would fix mountains of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar
Chinese forces in the defense of Shanghai, border region, Mao's forces began the second
obtain an excellent port from which to supply part of their mission, the conversion of the
further operations, gain control of the masses and the organization of a Communist
Yangtze and so cut off the Chinese lines of base area, Meanwhile, the 129th Division was
communications from the south, and, finally, in southeast Shansi facing the Japanese on
deal an economic blow to China by capturing three sides. The other division of the Eighth
the financial center and cutting off revenue Route Army, the I 20th, remained out of
from customs duties. contact in northwest Shansl. All of the areas
Meanwhile, the Eighth Route Army crossed picked by the divisions were mountainous,
the Yellow River from Shensi to Shansi were not occupied by large Japanese
province in September 1937. Its orders were garrisons, and thus were quite suitable for the
probably to produce a significant victory in development of guerrilla baseareas. 21
order to cement the "United Front" and then One must recall that Mao's discussion of
to organize and sovietize the peasants. Certain the protracted war assumed a united front.
conditions led to the successful execution of Although it is facetious to suggest that Chiang
these missions. The Japanese commander of Kai-shek's strategy conformed to Mao's, it is
the 5th Division, General Itagaki, was known worthwhile to see what type of military
as an arrogant, over-confident leader, and he activity the Generalissimo was adopting.
was marching blindly into the rugged In Hopeh province, Chiang Kai-shek
Pinghsing Pass.l 6 The great lesson of refused decisive battle and withdrew his
providing front and flank security for forces to the south. Chiang's strategy for the
marching columns was to be relearned. Nieh war was surprisingly similar to Mao's concept
Jung-chen, the deputy commander of Lin of a protracted struggle, Recognizing the
Piao's I I 5th Division, conducted the Japanese need for a battle of annihilation,
ambush'! 7 As described by Chu Teh: Chiang proposed instead a war of attrition. It
"... two regiments struck the enemy's flank was to be a trading of space for time, a
and two battalions enveloped his rear. The strategy of "accumulating minor successes
Japanese were caught in a trap."18 A large into major victory,"22 By late October the
portion of the Japanese division was defeated, Japanese had crossed the Yellow River and
the remainder dispersed. The 115 th captured captured Tsinian. Then winter fell, and
five tanks, five armored cars"50 field guns, operations ground to a halt. In November,
and another I 00 assorted vehicles. However, Chiang moved the capital inland to Hankow.
all this material had to be destroyed except While the advance in the north had been

35
making rapid progress, the invasion of circumstances of time and place is a
Shanghai had met determined resistance. fundamentaJ tenet of Mao's doctrine. With
Japan had been forced to reinforce this effort the exception of the Red ambush at Pinghsing
with troops from the north. After severaJ Pass and Chiang's counterattack at
costly frontal assaults, the Japanese enveloped Tai-erh-chuang, the main activity of the
the Chinese on the peninsula by the Communists was politicaJ agitation, while the
imaginative employment of amphibious NationaJists were paying rigid adherence to
landings on the north shore of Hangchow Bay the fIrst part of Mao's basic principle of
and the south shore of the Yangtze River. warfare: preserve your forces and destroy the
Shanghai fell in early November. On 13 enemy.2 3
December, Nanking was evacuated and PHASE TWO
Japanese troops began the infamous "Rape of
Nanking." Chiang again withdrew his armies The Japanese plan for consolidation of the
before they were destroyed. While the Battle overrun territory followed Mao's prediction.
for Suchow was raging, Chiang The next important step for the
counterattacked at Tai-erh-chuang trapping Japanese army is to create conditions
60,000 Japanese troops and inflicting 30,000 favorable to the sound development of
casualties. It was the fIrst time in modern the new central regime in China, in
history that a Japanese army had suffered process of being set up. It is not
such a military disaster. After the fall of considered necessary to conduct a
Suchow in early June, the Japanese turned large-scale, prolonged war against the
southwest and drove to Wuhan, occupying Chiang Kai-shek regime but rather to
this area by the middle of November, Chiang establish a new regime which will
defended stubbornly and, in a last resort, cooperate with Japan, at the same time
destroyed the dikes of the swollen Yellow maintaining sufficient Japanese strength
River. Water inundated the countryside in China to secure peace and order. 24
spoiling the offensive and miring down large
quantities of trucks, tanks, and artillery, all of In a country which had traditionally been
which the Japanese had to abandon. Hankow under the oppressive rule of landlords, an
fell in October, and Chiang was forced to enlightened occupying power, working
move the capital further inland to Chunking, through a liberal indigenous puppet
also on the Yangtze River. While the attack government, should have been able to create
on Hankow was in progress, an amphibious stable conditions. In fact, Japan did establish
landing struck Canton and secured it in 9 a puppet regime. In December 1937 the first
days. By the end of 1938 the Japanese provisional government was established at
advance had stalled, with the Japanese Peking. It was moved to Nanking in 1938 and
generally controlling the major cities and bolstered in March 1939 by the defection of
communications routes in the eastern third of the Nationalist Prime Minister, Wang
China. With I million totaJ troops in China Ching-wei, who was immediately installed as
and Manchuria, almost one-half of them the head of the Chinese Government. Over
(450,000) were required as support troops to the next 3 years Wang was to build an
maintain the lines of communication. In indigenous force of over 800,000-many. of
retrospect, the strategies of both Mao and whom defected from Chiang Kai-shek's
Chiang seemed to have properly estimated forces. 25 However, the Japanese Army
that the Japanese advance would extend itself generally outdid the previous warlord regimes
until the problem of defending and organizing in cruelty and plundering. As a result, the
its conquered territory out-weighed the Communist cadres found that all areas
capability to continue advancing. Though occupied by the Japanese Army were ready
Mao's prescription for mobile warfare in targets for their ideology and organiZation.
Phase One may be judged to have been One authority has significantly observed tha,
somewhat euphoric, it should be noted that in north China, in areas where the Japanese
adaption of basic strategy to the had not penetrated, there was little

36
 The inauguration of the Japanese Ambassador to the puppet Manchukuo.

enthusiasm for communism from the struggled against both his "friends" and
peasants. 26 "enemies" and after shifting troops down
Despite Chiang's many demoralizing battles from the north, managed to stabilize his
and continual retrograde movement, his army positions. 27 General Hu then dug in and was
was growing, exceeding 3 million by late satisfied to contain the Reds in their reduced
1939. When compared to the Japanese I base area. The "United Front," shaken by this
million, it seems that more could have been assault, still held together, but hardly in
expected of the Nationalists. But Chiang, accord with Mao's protracted war scenario.
instead of directing his power at the Japanese, When the Chinese Nationalists had been
was more concerned with the progress of Red driven out of the northern zone, most of the
political activities. Chiang still refused to give public administrators pUlled back with them.
them arms, discounted any of their claims of The combination of the oppressive
large-scale military operations, and ordered occupation by the Japanese and the
them to adhere to their earlier agreement to administrative vacuum provided fertile ground
refrain from political organization. In for Communist indoctrination. Much of the
December 1939, the Generalissimo even Communist progress was similar to the success
directed one of his major forces in the north in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh region where the
to attack the Red Northwest Border Region. 115 th Division had established its base. 2 8 In
General Hu Tsung-nan responded with a this region, administrative committees and
driving assault, to include air strikes, against even local officials were elected among the
the southwest corner of the base. The peasants. Land reforms based on the National
Japanese, obviously pleased about the Government's plan of 1930 were also put into
si tuation, attacked simultaneously. Mao effect. As one author noted, "Although most

37
landlords escaped with their lives, they paid Remarks - Replace the door when you
for them. "2 9 leave the house; roll up the bedding in
T ax reform was' also instituted. In which you have slept; be courteous; be
well-organized soviets there were regular honest in your transactions; return what
income and property taxes. Michael Lindsay you borrow; replace what you break; do
states that the rates for 1941 would have not bathe in the presence of women; do
assessed a peasant about 5 percent of his not without authority search the
income, while a well-to-do landlord could pocketbooks of those you arrest.
expect to pay around 45 percent. 30 This was
quite a change over the old system which was The administration and supply of the
both "inequitable and inefficient."31 Local guerrilla forces were also well handled. Troops
security police kept the community purged of on the move were issued "grain-tickets"
"suspected collaborators, overt Nationalist which they could use to pay the peasants for
sympathizers, local bullies, evil landlords, and any food required. The peasant could, in turn,
rich peasants"32 whose social attitudes were use these tickets to pay his taxes to the
umicceptable. The women and children of a Communist government. Supply procedures
village were particularly encouraged to reached impressive standards. In one instance
volunteer for one of the numerous auxiliary in the main base area of the 115th Division,
groups. In this way all members of a village the Japanese in 1943 had launched a
developed a feeling of loyalty for a long-term sweep that dragged on into the
party-sponsored organization and a sense of winter. The supply agencies were reputedly
participation in community affairs. able to distribute winter uniforms to the men
The peasants could also expect equally "although Japanese columns were moving
well-organized military programs. At village about all over the area."3 6
meetings the people would be asked to form Neither was the psychological weapon
local self-defense units and eventually regional neglected. In each soviet the propaganda
militia units. Thus, cadres were developed section arranged for schools to eliminate
which would ultimately swell the ranks of the illiteracy, "staged theatrical and other
Red Army.33 Weapons were easily obtained entertainments," and saw to the posting of
for these local forces. Wars had been waged in large anti-J apanese slogans on wall
and around these villages literally since the newspapers. 37 Local newspapers tried to
advent of gunpowder. And, although many maintain publication even during Japanese
types of weapons had been used, the Chinese "mopping-up" operations,38 Japanese
armies had apparently used the same prisoners were usually treated with kindness
cartridges since the 1890's; therefore, and after a short period of indoctrination,
ammunition was limited but obtainable. 34 might be released to rejoin their units. 39 This,
The political indoctrination of the of course, discredited the official Japanese
Communist military forces was perhaps the policy that prisoners of the Chinese would be
key factor in its success. Emphasis had been tortured. It also must have had some
placed on relationships between the soldier influence on the Japanese soldier's will to
and the peasant. One eyewitness account told resist the next time he found himself in a
of seeing insurgent forces who "were prepared tight position. Some of the more cooperative
to do without a meal rather than override a prisoners were used in combat against their
cantankerous old peasant woman who refused own forces, while others were organized into
the loan of a cooking vessel." 35 Each member a Japanese Communist-front, called the
of the Eighth Route Army was required to People's Emancipation League and were used
memorize a code called "Three Rules and for propaganda work against the Japanese
Eight Remarks." Army.40
As the Communist military organization
Rules - All actions are subject to developed, there were some efforts directed at
command; do not steal from the people; harassing Japanese troops and employing the
be neither selfish nor unjust. guerrilla warfare which Mao had predicted

38
would characterize phase two of his southeast Shansi province: "Japanese-too
protracted war. These actions did, to a degree, many killed; Kuomintang-too many
fix Japanese troops and maintain the image of meetings."43
Red participation in the "United Front," but THE HUNDRED REGIMENTS CAMPAIGN
they did not accomplish the attrition which
Mao had predicted in his earlier thesis. Mao By late 1939 the Communists were
later admitted that their overall efforts were progressing quite well. The areas infiltrated by
generally divided into "seventy percent the troops of the Eighth Route Army were
self-development, twenty percent compromise developing from a condition of temporary
and ten percent fight the Japanese. "41 influence through guerrilla presence to a
Michael Lindsay analyzed the Communist condition of solid political support for and
success in North China as being due primarily sustenance of the revolutionary forces. (Mao
to superior administration. d;escribed this process as the transitioning of a
"guerrilla zone" into a "base area.") In the
The Communists carne to dominate the meantime, Red forces made small attacks to
resistance movement in North China antagonize and harass the Japanese. But there
largely because they were able to provide was no major attack or increasing intensity of
the essential elements of effective military activities to coincide with Mao's
organization, while, in most cases, forces proposed phase two of this protracted war. If,
under National Government leadership as Mao stated, the purpose of guerrilla warfare
failed to do so.42 was to support and evolve into mobile
warfare, it was obvious that the Red
Or, as similarly analyzed by the cryptic operations in North China were dragging their
humor of one local saying in a peasant area in feet.

Chiang Kai-shek.

39
 As Mao's organization grew, he also became initial objectives were rail lines, road
more dependent on outside support. Despite networks, and industrial areas (principally
the fact that the United States was showing mines). After these attacks, the Reds turned
increasing support for Chiang, very few to the reduction of isolated blockhouses and
supplies were filtering down the Nationalist small garrisons. For several weeks the Red
channels to the Reds. Neither could the Reds guerrillas seemed to be everywhere, taking
expect to get aid directly from the Nationalist prisoners, seizing arms and ammunition, and
Americans because the newsmen and avoiding engagement by any of the Japanese
diplomatic representatives of foreign brigades that were beginning to respond to
countries were only accredited to and the crisis. 46 Then with their momentum
received news releases from the headquarters spent, the guerrillas resought anonymity and
in Chunking. 44 Needless to say, Chiang was refuge from the reprisals which they knew
not extolling the virtues of the Eighth Route would be forthcoming.
Army. In fact, Chiang constantly complained The Communists claimed to have killed
about both the Red political activity and their more than 20,000 Japanese and 5,000 puppet
military inactivity. troops. In addition, they reportedly cut
Besides the Nationalist neglect, a new several hundred miles of railroads, and
Japanese officer, Lieutenant General Tada destroyed almost 3,000 forts. The Japanese
Hayao, had taken over command of the North admitted that "these totally unexpected
China Area Army and was determined to attacks caused serious damage, and it was
eliminate the Red guerrilla bands and pacify necessary to expend much time and money in
the countryside. His plan was similar to restoration work."4 7 Communist losses must
Chiang's "Fifth Encirclement and have been quite serious. After the Japanese
Suppression" plan of 1934, in which the retaliation and "mopping-up" operations,
German advisers proposed a massive network Japanese records indicate that the "heavy
of barriers, ditches, and blockhouses
surrounding and dissecting the infested area.
Although it was a slow, costly plan, Tada TH E JAPANESE REPRISALS
built hundreds of miles of new roads with PROBABL Y EXCEEDED IN
protecting ditches and blockhouses. These FEROCITY AND BRUTALITY
roads began to divide and seal the area into THE WORST RED
manageable compartments. The EXPECTATIONS.
compartments could then be dealt with one at
a time. 45 Not only would Tada's "cage
policy" threaten the guerrilla movement, but blow suffered by the Communist forces and
it would bring the Japanese administration their bases ... forced them to resort to
down to a closer working level with the guerrilla warfare, and thereafter they offered
people, and thus destroy or endanger the very little resistance in this area."4 8
crucial factor of party influence in the area. The Japanese reprisals probably exceeded
Thus, in order to prove his theories of in ferocity and brutality the worst Red
protracted warfare, to defend his growing expectations. In July 1941, General Okamura
bases against the new Japanese plan, to Yasuji instituted the "Three-All" policy-kill
repudiate the Nationalists' claims of all! burn all! destroy all! His wrath was
inactivity, and to try to gain some directed toward the guerrilla bases in the hills
international recognition for his movement, and the nearby towns and villages that had
Mao was forced to attempt the "Hundred apparently supported the Reds. Villages were
Regiments Campaign." burned to the ground, inhabitants shot, and
The campaign, a well-coordinated series of livestock slaughtered. This policy remained in
surprise attacks executed by most of the effect throughout 1942,49 and
elements of the growing Eighth Route Army, unq uestionably hurt the Communists.
began on the night of 20 August 1940. The Strength figures of the Eighth Route Army

40
showed that from the end of 1940 to the end With the Japanese forces in a static position,
of 1941, Red forces decreased from 400,000 the Reds and the Nationalists stared each
to 350,000. Also, the population base which other down in what might best be called an
the Reds controlled was almost halved, from armed truce.
80 million to 50 million. The "Three All" The "Three All" policy had been effective
retaliation had been successful in the short in reducing the size and influence of the Red
run. In the long run, the troop shortage movement. But other international designs
rendered it ineffective and the peasants, if crippled the Japanese occupational efforts
they had been uncommitted before, were now and these designs were not (as Mao had
flocking into the communist camp. predicted) associated with condemnation of
the court of world opinion. In 1941 Japan
FRACTURE OF THE UNITED FRONT made the fatal mistake of bombing Pearl
Harbor. By 1943 the tide of the war had
The Communist New Fourth Army, which changed, and the Japanese were forced to
had been created in the lower Yangtze in draw seven experienced divisions from
September 1937, never reached the size and occupational duty in China to more necessary
influence of its sister unit, the Eighth Route battlefronts in the central and southwest
Army. For one reason, the terrain did not Pacific. The few replacements received in
permit the' Fourth to develop secure base China were inferior in quality and lacked any
areas. Most of the valley was open plain, experience in counterinsurgency warfare. S 2
criss-crossed with waterways and irrigation General Okamura, Japanese Commander in
canals. s 0 But, if a permanent camp could not North China, stated to an American officer:
be built and defended, the Reds c.ould still
avoid major engagements with the Japanese If you people had not come into the
and continue an active program of political Pacific when you did, there would be no
indoctrination of the countryside. In the Communists in Peking. My operations in
rainy season, the technological superiority of 1942 and 1943 reduced their strength by
the Japanese Army was especially nullified, more than 100,000. But the troops that
and the Reds could move about much more replaced my good divisions were
freely and openly. Certainly the major threat worthless. For one thing, the average age
to the Fourth Army was the Nationalist of the men was ten to fifteen years older.
troops to their south and west. Clashes had These older men could not campaign as
occurred as early as 1938, and they grew in the youngsters could, and they had no
size and frequency as the months passed. By heart in it a11. S3
late 1940 Chiang was upset with the political
machinations of the Fourth, and since this This decrease in priority gave the Reds
was taking place in an area felt to be a another chance to develop and expand their
Nationalist stronghold, Chiang Kai-shek organization and to prepare for the real test
ordered the Fourth to move north across the after the war. There were several main facets
river. On 7 January 1941, most of the Red of this Communist expansion that should be
Army had crossed over; its headquarters and stressed: the continual improvements in the
perhaps 8,000 - 10,000 troops remained Northwest Base Area, the development and
behind. Chiang, claiming that the army was refinement of the "militia," and the division
refusing his orders, attacked the forces on the of the regular forces into regional and main
south bank, capturing the commander, Yeh forces.
Ting, and inflicting 9,000 casualties on the In 1942 Mao brought Liu Shao-chi in from
surprised Reds. s 1 The Fourth reorganized the New Fourth Army to organize and train
after this incident and consolidated its the political cadres. It became Liu's
position in North Kiangsu. The facade of a responsibility to see that all the developing
"United Front" between the Nationalists and base areas had trained party officials who
the Communists had finally been shattered. were loyal to Mao and who "thought" and

41
could be expected to "perform" along the to rush to the defense of a base area or to be
party line. Each of the base areas was also used in mobile warfare to attack the Japanese.
directed to strive toward self-sufficiency. In To assist the regular army, the Reds
the Northwest Base Area, the number of developed the concept of a Ming Ping or
"industrial" workers rose to 12,000 and Militia. The idea originally grew out of the
limited quantities of radios, grenades, rifles, need for village "Horne Guard" or
and mines were produced. 5 4 "Self-defense Corps." By 1944 the militia had
As previously stated, Mao relied primarily reached the staggering size of 2 million and
on his "regular" army to go forth and contributed significantly to the capabilities of

Chinese guerrillas.

organize the people. The army was to the regional and main forces. Most
educate, mobilize, assist and protect the importantly, the militia furnished the sound
masses. To do this task Mao divided his intelligence on which military plans could be
regular army into two distinct groups-the based. They would act as guides to the
main forces and the regional forces. The Chinese forces and provide the guerrilla forces
regional forces were to be permanently with vital knowledge of the terrain. The other
associated with a geographic area. The troops main contribution was the militia's
were encouraged to marry into the development of mine warfare. Realizing that
settlements and develop the area into a the Chinese guerrillas fought with almost no
self-sufficient "base area." 5 5 The "main" external assistance, it is easy to appreciate
forces were to act as the military reserve. that as the size of the Eighth Route Army and
They were not to be tied down to one area its militia forces expanded, there were
but were to remain "mobile" and to be able increasing demands placed on the

42
conservation and local fabrication of the Red forces then immediately jumped
ammunition. "Frequently the first shots a from 507,000 to 1,029,000. In June as the
(militia) recruit ever fired were at a real, live Japanese began to pull back the Communists
enemy."56 Since land mines and hand could boast of controlling a "population of
grenades were types of weapons which could 95 million, [that] held over 300,000 square
be locally produced, they naturally became miles of territory, and had over 500 miles of
the prime weapons of village self-defense. One coast line."6 0
author described the various tactics which the The situation of the Nationalist army
militia employed to increase the effectiveness during the period of stalemate had been very
of its mines. difficult. The China theater was at the
complete end of the allies' lines of
When the Japanese compelled civilians communication. Supplies were scarce;
to walk ahead of them, the Chinese inflation weakened the economy; graft,
developed mines with the firing device hoarding, and speculation were unwelcome
some 15 to 20 yards behind the mine, so offspring. Despite the determination of
that the mine would explode among the Chiang Kai-shek, his administration was
Japanese. When the Japanese sent out unable to make good use of the remaining
detector squads whQ marked the places industrial capacity of the nation and unable
where mines Were buried, the militia to mobilize and train the manpower resources
observed their marks and duplicated them available to him.
to show almost impenetrable mine
JAPANESE OCCUPATIONAL TECHNIQUES
fields. 57
In occupied areas that were relatively
To increase the effectiveness of local units secure, Japanese measures for controlling the
and base areas to defend themselves, population were basically sound and have
insurgents in some areas developed an bee nus e d successfully in other
elaborate underground tunnel system. At first counter-revolutionary experiences. First,
air raid shelters were built to protect the there was complete registration of the
villagers from Japanese bombers. Then these population and the issuance of identification
shelters were later expanded to connect cards. (In the Peiping area these cards even
houses within a village or to provide an escape in eluded photographs.61) An additional
route out of the village. In central Hopeh, control measure was a block warden system
where the sub-soil was particularly easy to whereby the residential population was
tunnel and required few supports, tunnel organized into cells of ten families (called a
networks were constructed which even pao). Five of these groups constituted a
connected villages.5 8 tai-pao. The Japanese then appointed a
One additional measure that aided the Reds responsible, respected Chinese in charge of
was the ability of local militia and regional the tai-pao. He in turn appointed subordinates
units to reach an "understanding" with and was responsible to the Japanese
Chinese puppet troops employed by the authorities for the actions of the families
Japanese. In some cases guerrilla units were under him. 6 2
ordered not to attack puppet garrisons In areas where control was marginal or
without specific permission. In another case, non-existent, such as the Red base areas, the
puppet troops later sent word to guerrillas methods generally centered around the fort
that they apologized for firing on them and and barrier plan and, in North China, the
hoped that no one had been hit, but that "Three All" plan.
Japanese had been in the garrison, and they In the spring of 1944 there was one massive
were forced to shoot at them. 59 Japanese offensive that interrupted the
The development of the R,ed base areas stalemate condition. The Japanese code name
continued in this manner until 1945. In April was 0 peration Ichi-g6. This operation
1945 Mao ordered the expansion of the involved 620,000 first-line troops and was
militia units to regular anny units. The size of undertaken because the reverses in the Pacific

43
had endangered the Japanese positions on the
mainland and exposed them to possible B-29 AS FOR MAO'S THEORY OF
raids from airfields under Chiang's control. THE PROTRACTED WAR, IT
Objectives of the plan were basically to REMAINS A CLASSIC OF THE
"destroy the backbone of the Chinese Army MILITARY ART.
and force increased pressure on the political
regime in Chingking" and "to forestall the
bombing of the Japanese homeland by forces of the US Navy and the land power of
American B-29's from (the Chinese) base of the US Marines and Army. In August, Russia
Kweilin and Uu-chow" (in Kwangsi Chuang declared war on Japan and marched into
Autonomous Region). Despite a gallant Manchuria. On 14 August 1945, 9 days after
defense of Hengyang wherein 16,000 Chinese the first atomic bomb was dropped on
troops fought off six Japanese divisions for 47 Hiroshima, the 8-year Sino-Japanese war came
days, Ichi-go was successful in seizing the air to an end.
bases and in severely punishing Chiang's Both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung
armies. 63 In Honan province Japanese troops had been farsighted in planning their "joint"
overran 30 Chinese divisions led by the able struggle against the Japanese. Each had
General Tank En-po. The local peasants, realized that the Japanese would ultimately
racked by famine and burdened with taxes, be defeated by the Allies and that the crucial
refused to assist the government troops and in struggle for control of China would be
some cases rose to help the invading between themselves.
Japanese. 64 As for Mao's theory of the protracted war,
Phase Two of the theoretical "Protracted it remains a classic of the military art. Mao
War" thesis can hardly be equated to that was wrong when he stated that the thesis
corresponding portion of the Sino-Japanese specifically applied to the Sino-Japanese war
War. The "United Front" was a myth. in the nineteen thirties. There is enough of
Communist political activities were excellent, the literary value of universality for that
but the "fierce guerrilla warfare" that was to theory to be applied to many similar
keep the enemy on the move so he could be conditions both in the past and the future.
attacked and destroyed in mobile warfare His essays "On the Protracted War" will be
only materialized in rare instances. On these read, digested, and admired by many to
occasions the Japanese reprisals dealt a severe whom it will be completely irrelevant that the
punishment that must have driven the war never worked out that way.
Communist leaders back to their theoretical
NOTES
roots to see what had gone wrong. Chiang, of
course, never accepted Mao's protracted war 1. Par example, see George K. Tanham's highly
game plan; he seemed to be as much regarded study Communist Revolutionary Warfare
concerned with the Red Eighth and Fourth (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 23.
Armies as with the whole Japanese force. The 2. Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected
decay in Japanese strength did occur, as Mao Military Writings (peking: Foreign Language Press,
had predicted, but for other reasons-the 1963), p. 195.
United States advance through the western 3. Ibid., p. 197.
Pacific. 4. Ibid.
END OF THE WAR 5. Ibid, p. 211.
6. Ibid., p. 245.
Perhaps the Third Phase of the protracted 7. Ibid., p. 214.
war began in the summer of 1945, as the 8. Ibid.
Japanese forces were withdrawing from 9. Ibid., p. 215.
China. But they had not been defeated by a 10. Information on the development within the
people's war; they had been defeated by the base area was taken from O'Ballance, The Red Army
overwhelming power of the Allies, in China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp.
spearheaded by the attack aircraft carrier 107-109.

44
 11. "'Communism in China," Committee on 35. Ibid., p. 25.
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee, No.5, pp. 23 as 36. Ibid.
quoted in Oron P. South, The Rise of Communism in 37. Griffith,op. cit., p. 68.
China, 1919-1949 (Maxwell AFB: Air University 38. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 25.
Documentary Research Study, May 1952), p. 47. 39. Ibid., p. 26.
12. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2d 40. Ibid.
Session, Vol. 92, Part 12, pp. A 4495-96, as quoted 41. Taken from O'Bailance, op. cit., in a footnote
in South, op. cit., p. 48. at the bottom of p. 131, referring to an interview
13. Most of the discussion of the strengths of the with Mao, quoted in Time magazine, I December 1958.
opposing forces was taken from T. Dodson Stamps 42. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 17.
and Vincent J. Esposito, editors, A Military History 43. Ibid., p. 25.
of World War II (West Point: United States Military 44. Griffith,op. cit., p. 69.
Academy, 1956), Appendix 5, pp. 525-528. For the 45. Taken from U.S. Senate, Committee on the
strengths of the Red forces I have used Griffith, The Judiciary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings
Chinese People~ Liberation Army, p. 61, and before the Subcommittee to Investigate the
O'Ballance, The Red Army of China, p. 123. $ Administration of the Internal Security Act and
14. See Samuel B. Griffith II, The Chinese Other Internal Security Laws, 82d Congress, 1st
People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951-52), Part 7A,
Book Company., 1967), p. 61, and Robert C. North, Appendix h, "The Chinese Communist Movement,"
Chinese Communism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book p. 2366. Quoted in Griffith, The Chinese People ~
Company, 1966), p. 147. Liberation Army, p. 70.
15. General discussion concerning main attack and 46. O'Ballance, The Red Army of China, pp.
secondary attack is based on Stamps and Esposito, 134-5; Griffith, The Chinese Peopld Liberation
op. cit., pp. 529-534. Army, pp. 70-71; and US Army, Forces in the Far
16. Griffith,op. cit., p. 62. East, North China Area Operations Record, July
17. Ibid. 1937-May 1941 (Tokyo: Military History Section;
18. Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, 1955),
(New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1940), pp. "Japanese Monograph 178," pp. 316-20.
70-71. 47. "Japanese Monograph 178," pp. 316-17.
19. O'Bailance,op. cit., p.125. 48. Ibid., p. 320.
20. Griffith,op. cit., p. 63. 49. Griffith,op. cit., pp. 70-71.
21. This discussion is based on Michael Lindsay, 50. Lindsay,op. cit., pp. 30·31.
"China (1937-1945)" (an unpublished paper written 51. Ibid., p. 32; O'Bailance, op. cit., p. 135.
for the Center of Research in Social Systems under 52. Griffith,op. cit., p. 75.
contract to the Department of Army), p. 7; and 53. Conversation between General Okamura
Griffith,op. cit., pp. 65-68. Yasuji and B.G. Samuel R. Griffith II, Office of War
22. F.F. Liu, A Military History ofModem China History, Tokyo, November 1963, as quoted in
(princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. Griffith,op. cit., p. 75.
104-5. 54. O'Bailance,op. cit., p. 139.
23. Mao,Ibid., p. 153. 55. Ibid., p. 140.
24. US Armed Forces in the Far East, Chinese 56. Ibid., p. 141.
Area Operations Record, July 1937 - November 1941 57. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 36.
(Tokyo: Military History Section: Headquarters, 58. Ibid., p. 51.
Army Forces Far East, 1957), "Japanese Monograph 59. Ibid., p. 40.
70," p. 29. 60. O'Ballance,op. cit., p. 145.
25. O'Bailance,op. cit., p. 130. 61. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 51.
26. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 14. 62. Ibid, p. 53.
27. O'Bailance,op. cit., p. 133. 63. For a more complete discussion of Ichi-go,
28. Discussion of this example is based iUmost refer to F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modem
entirely on Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 21-27. China, pp. 219-20; also US Army, Forces in the Far
29. Griffith,op. cit., p. 68. East, China Area Operations Record, Command of
30. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 23. the China Expeditionary Army (Tokyo: Military
31. Ibid., p. 22. History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far
32. Griffith,op. cit., p. 68. East, 1952), "Japanese Monograph 129," pp.
33. Ibid. 22-40.
34. Lindsay,op. cit., p. 15. 64. Liu,op. cit., p. 220. ill

45