Strategic Analysis
ISSN: 0970-0161 (Print) 1754-0054 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20
The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an Eelam
Warrior , by S. Murari
2012, Sage, New Delhi, 362 pp., INR 425, US$ 11, ISBN 978-81-321-0701-9
(pbk)
Gulbin Sultana
To cite this article: Gulbin Sultana (2013) The�Prabhakaran�Saga:�The�Rise�and�Fall�of�an�Eelam
Warrior , by S. Murari, Strategic Analysis, 37:4, 514-516, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2013.802529
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514 Book Reviews
dissimilar in all respects; yet they have forged a close strategic relationship based on oil
interests and senseless arms exports. If Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be invaded by any
foreign enemy, and if avoiding war best ensures Saudi oil security in the Gulf’s east
coast, as Lippman mentions on page 231, then what is the justification for US arms
exports and the arms build-up in Saudi Arabia? How would one explain the excep-
tionally close ties between the so-called champion of democracy and the citadel of
authoritarianism? Lippman’s narrative confirms that it is naked self-interest, and not
the lofty ideals of freedom and human rights, that matters to the Americans. In his 2004
book Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia, Lippman
had predicted the fraying of the relationship between Riyadh and Washington. In a
marked departure from that, he now writes: ‘For better or for worse, the United States
and Saudi Arabia are closely intertwined on matters of defense and security, as they
have been for nearly seven decades’ (p. 265).
Lastly, the title of the present book appears inappropriate, and does not reflect its
actual contents. It asserts that the Al-Saud rulers are safe, that the Wahhabi ulama who
promote regime survival are under control, that al-Qaeda forces have been stamped
out, that King Abdullah’s modernisation programmes create social tensions but are on
track—and, of course, that the Americans are there to guarantee the Saudi regime’s
survival and national security. How then, is ‘Saudi Arabia on the edge’? Nevertheless,
the book is a valuable source of primary and up-to-date information on Saudi Arabia
and a good read for the students and analysts of Middle East studies programmes.
∗
The Reviewer is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Gulf University for Science
and Technology, Mishref, Kuwait.
S. Murari, The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an Eelam Warrior, 2012,
Sage, New Delhi, 362 pp., INR 425, US$ 11, ISBN 978-81-321-0701-9 (pbk)
Gulbin Sultana*
V. Prabhakaran, the man who took up arms at the age of 17 and led one of the
world’s most ruthless terrorist organisations to realise the dream of the Tamil
Eelam, died in the final battle with the Sri Lankan forces in May 2009, leaving
behind Tamils who are a disillusioned and demoralised ‘nation’. The end of the war
established the writ of the Sri Lankan state and re-established Sinhala hegemony. S.
Murari, in his book The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an Eelam Warrior,
depicts the Prabhakaran era in the history of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict in an objective
manner.
S. Murari, as a special correspondent of the Deccan Herald in Chennai, made innu-
merable visits to Sri Lanka to cover the ethnic conflict. The experiences, earned during
these extensive visits and interactions with both Sinhalas and Tamils involved in the
conflict, are well presented in the book. Beginning from 1987 until the end of the war
in 2009 and beyond, the author elucidated the political developments in Sri Lanka in a
lucid manner without being judgmental. The author points out:
Strategic Analysis 515
Prabhakaran continued with the struggle till his last breath and chose to take with him the
Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which he started in a small way and built into an
organisation with international network and presence. In destroying the organisation in the
spirit of ‘after me, the deluge’, Prabhakaran had undone whatever good or bad he had done
for his people and left them where they were before the start of the armed struggle, toothless.
(p. 332)
Like many analysts writing on the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the author also
feels that Prabhakaran made a historical blunder by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi and
alienating the LTTE from India. Another big mistake of Prabhakaran is living with
the illusion until the end that India would come to his rescue under pressure from
Tamil Nadu, regardless of his indictment in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. He did
not realise that the so-called Tamil Nadu factor ceased to exist after the assassination
of Rajiv Gandhi. The author argues that if only Prabhakaran had acceded to Anton
Balasingham’s advice, the course of history might have been different.
After the war, when the Sri Lankan government is debating a home-grown solution
to the ethnic conflict, The Prabhakaran Saga reminds the reader that various home-
grown solutions initiated earlier were rejected due to LTTE’s ‘all-or-nothing approach’
(p. 195), and also the partisan approach of the Sinhala leaders on the solution to the
ethnic question. The author argues that Chandrika Kumaratunga’s devolution package
was the farthest any Sinhala leader could go to meet the Tamils’ demand short of
separation. But it was rejected both by the LTTE and the United National Party (UNP).
While the UNP had rejected Chandrika’s package as giving too much to the Tamils,
the LTTE had not considered it worthwhile as it offered too little. Similarly, Chandrika
Kumaratunga later accused Ranil Wickremesinghe, leader of the UNP, of compromis-
ing the country’s security by giving into pressure from the Tigers. As a result, Ranil
could not respond positively to the LTTE’s proposal for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA), although LTTE said that it was open to discussions. Thus, according
to Murari, the government missed the opportunity to make the Tigers stay the course.
Murari points out that through the ISGA proposal, the LTTE had indirectly agreed
to accept, though vaguely, Colombo’s suzerainty, if not sovereignty, over the north
and the east, but Colombo was not ready to trust the LTTE. The book under review
also mentions the All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) Report submitted to
the President, Mahinda Rajapaksa. The Report contained crucial recommendations on
how to implement the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. However, the President
disregarded almost all important recommendations, and the modified version accepted
by the President, merely says implementation of the 13th Amendment where practica-
ble would be the interim solution. Again the UNP withdrew from the APRC and the
Tamil National Alliance (TNA) rejected the interim proposal.
As far as the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 is concerned, Murari feels that it was
drafted by people who did not have any clue of the ground situation and the resistance
not just from the Sinhala South but also from the LTTE. Indian policy towards the
Tamils, according to the author, has been flawed from the outset. The two-track diplo-
macy of Indira Gandhi of giving arms training to the militant groups and encouraging
the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)—the Tamil political party—to talk to the Sri
Lankan government proved a total failure. Even Rajiv Gandhi was proved disastrously
wrong in his assumption that since Tamil leaders are dependent on India to achieve
their goals, they would be amenable to his suggestions or buckle under pressure.
516 Book Reviews
Murari also feels that although India under Manmohan Singh supported Mahinda
Rajapaksa’s war against the LTTE, it could have protested the Sri Lankan Supreme
Court’s move, which set aside the merger of east and north under the Indo-Lanka
accord. However, India’s protest would not have served the purpose as the merger was
temporary and not endorsed by a popular referendum, which was a requirement under
the 13th Amendment for finalising the merger.
According to Murari, now that the LTTE has been defeated, President Mahinda
Rajapaksa has taken the Indo-Lanka Accord off the shelf and dusted it down, to see
how the 13th Amendment can be improved upon to bring about a settlement to the
Tamil question. The author hopes that ‘if it happens, India can claim moral victory.
But at what cost! At the cost of over 1,000 (IPKF) soldiers, who laid down their lives
in a thankless war, unwept, unhonoured’ (p. 100).
The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an Eelam Warrior is an important
source of first-hand information on the Prabhakaran era in Sri Lanka’s history. The
strength of the book is that it provides a simple narrative of the complex develop-
ments in the country over three decades of ethnic war. At one point, the author argues
that Mahinda Rajapaksa’s homegrown solution relies on the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord
which in turn relies on the Indian model of a quasi-federal set-up with a measure of
autonomy for the Tamil provinces (p. xxii). However, his reference to an interview
of Mahinda Rajapaksa, where he said that from the Indian experience he has learnt
that ‘federalism is a dirty word’ and land and police power should never be devolved to
provinces (p. 294), which makes it clear that devolution of power is not an option for the
Sri Lankan government. It is an essential read for those who want to understand the last
phase of the war and how the politics in Sri Lanka was shaped by both state and non-
state actors. The book also provides a detailed account of how various commissions
appointed by the Sinhala government in the past, recommended full implementation of
the 13th Amendment in spite of the Rapaksa government’s attempt to distance itself
from this particular Amendment.
∗
The Reviewer is a researcher at IDSA New Delhi.
Torkel Brekke, Fundamentalism: Prophecy and Protest in the Age of Globalisation,
2012, New York, Cambridge University Press, xii + 291 pp., Rs. 1835.00, ISBN 978-
0-521-14979-2 (pbk)
Saurabh Mishra*
he book is based on the premise that ‘fundamentalism’ that gives an impres-
T sion of antiquity is a modern phenomenon and ‘relatively a recent thing’ (p. 17).
It explains fundamentalism as a powerful reaction against modernity that has brought
unprecedented linear transformations in the economic, political, scientific and edu-
cational spheres undermining the influence of tradition and religion over the past
couple of centuries. Fundamentalism is an endeavour to reverse the ‘negative side’
of modernity.
The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with the definition, meanings,
origin, scope and different dimensions of fundamentalism. It narrates a brief history of
the term and attempts to clear any confusion related to it. The second part of the book
