JAMES J. KENNEY, JR.

Lord Whitworth and the Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I:

The New Evidence of the Kent Archive

Tsar Paul I died at a critical moment in the affairs of Europe. During the last
fifteen months of his life he had become estranged from Great Britain and
Austria, his erstwhile allies, who were being hard pressed by their French enemy
on several fronts. By the beginning of 1801 the tsar's government seemed on
the verge of concluding an alliance with Napoleonic France. Russia's "cold war"
with Britain heated up as the tsar ordered the confiscation of British merchant
vessels in his ports and the incarceration of British seamen. A British fleet under
Admirals Parker and Nelson was dispatched to the Baltic to deal with the new
threat to British interests. Then, quite suddenly, the tsar was dead.
At about midnight on March 11/23, 1801, a number of embittered and
inebriated noblemen and officers, led by the military governor of St. Petersburg,
Count P. A. Pahlen, invaded the tsar's palace and strangled him. Many reasons,
political and otherwise, motivated this murder, but certainly one cause was that
the logic by which Tsar Paul had transformed his empire from an ally into an
enemy of Great Britain escaped many of his subjects. The eagerness with which
he had rushed to begin hostilities contributed to suspicions that the tsar was not
altogether sane.1 Consequently, Paul's son and heir, Alexander, quickly arranged
a peaceful settlement with the English. When news of this settlement reached
Paris, the official gazette editorialized: "It is for history to develope the mystery
which surrounds this tragical death, and to declare which Cabinet in the world
was most deeply interested in bringing about such a catastrophe."2
Many Russian contemporaries shared the suspicion that the British govern-
ment was directly involved in the assassination. V. P. Kochubei, former vice-
chancellor, observed to his friend Count S. R. Vorontsov: "You will see that the
English have bought powerful men among us. . . ."3 One of the most prominent
conspirators, Prince P. A. Zubov, was rumored to have prepared a draft of a
constitution for Russia modeled after England's.4 Zubov's sister, Ol'ga Zhereb-

1. A. P. Czartoryski, Memoires du prince Csartoryski et sa correspondence avec Alex-

andre 1", 2 vols. (Paris, 1887), 1:237. See also the testimony of Princess Lieven that
Alexander's first thought on assuming power was to recall the Cossacks sent by Paul to
invade India, in T. Schiemann, Zur Geschichte der Regierung Paul I und Nikolaus I, 2nd ed.
(Berlin, 1906), pp. 43-44.
2. Le Moniteur, quoted in M. A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and the Empire under
Napoleon I, 20 vols. (London, 1845-62), 2:246.
3. Letter of Kochubei to Vorontsov, March 16/28, 1801, Arkhiv Kniasia Vorontsova,
40 vols. (Moscow, 1870-95), 14:146-48 (hereafter cited as AKV).
4. See the testimony of A. Kotzebue in Tsareubiistvo 11 marta 1801 goda: Zapiski
uchastnikov t sovremmenikov (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 349. A similar story is told in G. R.
Derzhavin, Sochineniia Dershavina, ed. la. Grot, 2nd ed., 7 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1868-78),
7:364.
206 Slavic Review

tsov, who had been the mistress of Charles Whitworth, the former British
minister to St. Petersburg, declared that English gold had helped finance the
conspiracy.5 And many people professed to see yet another causal connection in
the friendship of Whitworth with Count N. P. Panin, one of the acknowledged
initiators of the plot."
Historians have rightly regarded this circumstantial and largely unsubstan-
tiated evidence with skepticism. The fact that King George's government resorted
to the use of the fleet in order to coerce the Russians suggests that they had no
definite knowledge of plans to depose or to assassinate the tsar. Moreover,
although the records of the British Foreign Office show that Whitworth and
Panin had been close and had exchanged many confidences, there is no evidence
of conspiracy in these papers, and no trace of the ''English gold" mentioned by
Zherebtsov.7 It is certain that Whitworth was expelled from Russia in June
1800, and that Panin was dismissed from the post of vice-chancellor and exjled
to his estates in December of that year. The final plan for Paul's overthrow was
hatched in January and February 1801 by Count Pahlen and the Zubov brothers,
when their dealings with Whitworth were a thing of the past. Historians, there-
fore, are led to conclude that the concurrent events which made such an impres-
sion on Napoleon—the appearance of the British fleet in the Baltic and the
assassination of Tsar Paul—were entirely coincidental.8
Yet the dismissal of the notion that the British stood behind the assassination
depends mainly on the paucity of evidence to support the charge, and not on
direct evidence to the contrary. It is only a tentative conclusion and need not be
regarded as final. There are some supplementary materials which indicate that re-
lationships between the parties involved (or allegedly involved) in the conspiracy
were more complex than they first appeared. For example, the private papers
of Count Panin" and Count S. R. Vorontsov,10 published in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, revealed the cooperation between Panin and Vorontsov (the
Anglophilic Russian minister to London), on the one hand, and the cooperation

5. Letter of S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, July 31, 1801, AKV, 10:113-14. See

also K. Waliszewski, Le fils dc la Grande Catherine: Paul Icr (Paris, 1912), pp. 574-75,
581; and Thiers, History of the Consulate, 2:245.
6. See, for example, A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii in Schiemann, Zur Geschichte, pp.
261-68. Cf. Waliszewski, Paul I™, pp. 572-75.
7. See, for example, Whitworth's reports to Grenville in the Public Record Office
(hereafter cited as PRO), F.O. 65/46, no. 17, March 18, 1800; no. 22, April 2, 1800; and
no. 30, April 30, 1800, where Whitworth speaks of confidences made "in strictest secrecy"
by Panin. More generally, see Waliszewski, Paul Ier, p. 575, n. 1; and C. Grunwald,
L'Assassinat dc Paul Icr (Paris, 1960), pp. 181-82.
8. The best sources concerning the final phase of the conspiracy are T. Schiemann,
"Des Generals Grafen von Bennigsen Brief an den General von Fock iiber die Emordung
Kaiser Pauls," Historischc Vierteljahrschajt (1901), pp. 57-69; and L. Loewenson, "The
Death of Paul I and the Memoirs of Count Bennigsen," Slavonic and East European Rcvieiv,
29 (1950): 212-33. Thiers, Waliszewski, and Grunwald all reach the same conclusion. An
exception to the prevailing opinion is that of V. Zubow, Zar Paul I: Mensch tmd Schicksal
(Stuttgart, 1963), p. 66. Zubow, the great-grandson of one of Paul's assassins, considers
the question of English involvement "bisher noch nicht gelost."
9. Published by A. Bruckner [Brikner], in Materialy dlia zhizneopisaniia graja N. P.
Panina, 6 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1888-92).
10. AKV, especially vols. 9 and 11.
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 207
between Vorontsov and Lord Grenville (the British foreign secretary), on the
other. Recently the British Museum acquired the correspondence of Grenville and
Vorontsov spanning a twenty-year period. These letters document the existence
of an unusually close friendship between the foreign secretary and the foreign
minister, and they call into question Vorontsov's ultimate loyalties, particularly
in this period of Anglo-Russian crisis.11 Although it can be shown that Vorontsov
knew of the plans (as they stood prior to January 1801) to depose Tsar Paul,
it has yet to be proved that he communicated any such information to his friend
Grenville.12 Along with the other circumstantial evidence, the Panin and Voron-
tsov papers contribute to the suspicion that members of the British government
at least knew something of the plot against the tsar, but they must be labeled
inconclusive.
If one wishes to probe the question of a connection between the British
government and the Russian conspirators, Lord Whitworth is the logical focus
of attention. What were his relations with Panin and with the other conspirators,
what part did he have in the development of their plans, what might have been
his motives, and what exactly was Whitworth doing in St. Petersburg during
the last six months of his mission? Despite disclaimers by historians, such as
Thiers's statement that "Whitworth was an honorable man, incapable of par-
ticipating in such a plot,"13 the fact is that historians have had little but intuition
and hearsay to guide them in their search for answers to these questions. The
discovery of Whitworth's private papers in the Kent Archive Office in Maid-
stone, England, makes possible, for the first time, an answer based on docu-
mentary evidence.14

11. See especially the letters of Vorontsov to Grenville dated April 27, 1800, June 27,
1800, February 11, 1801, and April 17, 1801, in the Dropmore Manuscripts in the British
Museum. The Museum acquired this correspondence, bound in four quarto volumes, from
the estate of the Fortescue family in late 1972. At the time I examined the letters, they had
not yet been assigned Additional Manuscript numbers; however, the documents are easily
identifiable by their dates. A report on the collection of which these manuscripts were a part
was published by the Historical Manuscripts Commission—Report on the Manuscripts of
J. B. Fortescue preserved at Dropmore, 10 vols. (London, 1892-1927).
12. On Vorontsov's knowledge of the plot, see the letters to him from N. N. Novosiltsov,
January 20 and February 4, 1801, AKV, 18:435-38; and from him to Novosiltsov, February
5, 1801, AKV, 11:380-81. The published Vorontsov papers are but a fraction of the entire
Vorontsov holdings, now broken up among several Soviet repositories (see P. K. Grimsted,
The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969], pp. 312-13). But
neither the Soviet historians nor the few Western historians who have used these papers
have had anything new to say about the death of Paul.
13. Thiers, History of the Consulate, 2:246.
14. Lord Whitworth married the widowed Duchess of Dorset in 1801, and took up
residence at Knole, near Sevenoaks, in Kent. His private papers, along with others of his
family (including those of his great-uncle, envoy to the court of Peter the Great) were joined
with the papers of the Sackville family and passed eventually to the Kent Archive Office in
Maidstone. They are listed now among the Sackville of Knole Manuscripts, catalog num-
bers U 269, O 195 to O 198. There are hundreds of documents, contained in bundles, not
individually catalogued. Their grouping and order suggest that they have not been much
disturbed during almost two hundred years. (Hereafter I will cite individual documents
as KAO, U 269, their file number, and date.)
208 Slavic Review
Enough evidence exists outside the Kent Archive, of course, to challenge
the depiction of Whitworth as a man of impeccable morals. Whitworth was one
of Lord Grenville's favorite agents precisely because he possessed the attributes
so necessary to a diplomat in an age of poor communications. He was intelligent,
devious, and honest when it was convenient. Most important, he was resourceful.
He had an independent mind, but his willingness to take risks frequently got
him into trouble both with London and with the courts to which he was ac-
credited. For example, he had to be admonished more than once on the proper
use of government funds.15 An act of Parliament required that diplomatic agents
account in full for all monies spent under the head of Secret Service, but Whit-
worth interpreted this law rather loosely. During his ten-year residence in St.
Petersburg, he complained continuously that the funds at his disposal were inade-
quate to meet his needs, which included a sizable annual outlay for Secret Service.
The Foreign Office was particularly annoyed when Whitworth drew on his
bankers for large sums in round figures, then submitted the bill months later
accompanied by a general description.16 Grenville was willing to turn his back,
more or less, on this peccadillo and pay the bills, as long as the mission produced
results, but Whitworth was apparently incorrigible. He had a predilection for
conducting business dans les coulisses, and his eagerness to spend his govern-
ment's money seemed to increase as time went on. In a series of secret dispatches
to the foreign secretary during a mission to Paris in 1803, Whitworth enthusias-
tically recommended spending as much as £ 2 million to bribe Napoleon's
brothers, Lucien and Joseph, and Talleyrand, in order to get Malta.17
Whitworth's monetary extravagance was not his only fault. His enthusiasm
sometimes caused him to overstep his authority. In December 1798, negotiations
were under way to unite Great Britain, Austria, and Russia in a coalition against
France. Whitworth recommended, on his own authority, a draft of a treaty
worked out in St. Petersburg between himself and Austrian and Russian nego-
tiators, thereby undermining the direct negotiations between Great Britain and
Austria then proceeding in Vienna. This action nearly cost Whitworth his job.
The Austrian envoy in London reported to his court that he had never seen a
government more angry at one of its agents. Only a plea by Count Vorontsov
to his friend Grenville saved Whitworth's post. Whitworth received instead
what was undoubtedly the harshest rebuke of his career.18
Whitworth obviously possessed a great deal of personal charm which he used
to the mutual advantage of his government and himself. During the latter part
of Catherine's reign, he assiduously courted Prince Zubov, became his friend,

15. Concerning these episodes see Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/23, no. 21,
May 3, 1792; Grenville to Whitworth, ibid., no. 2, June 31, 1792; Whitworth to Grenville,
PRO F.O. 65/28, no. 56, October 13, 1794; and Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/35,
no. 349, October 12, 1796.
16. Grenville to Whitworth, PRO F.O. 65/35, no. 33, December 2, 1796.
17. Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, "Most Secret," March 14 through 31, 1803,
British Museum Add. Ms. 38238.
18. Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/42, no. 54, December 4, 1798; Grenville to
Whitworth, ibid., no. 1, January 25, 1799; also Vorontsov to Grenville, January 22, 1799,
in the Dropmore Manuscripts; and the report of Cobenzl to Thugut in the Haus-, Hof-,
und Staatsarkhiv, Vienna (hereafter cited as HHSA), Russland, series 2, karton 90, no. 12,
February 17, 1799.
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 209

and persuaded his government to lavish its attentions on the influential prince.19
At the same time, Whitworth became the lover of Zubov's sister, Ol'ga
Zherebtsov.20 This connection troubled Whitworth's relationship with Tsar Paul.
Early in Paul's reign, the Austrian ambassador, Count Cobenzl, reported to his
court:

In order to give Your Excellency an idea of how dangerous the position of

every foreign minister has become in the present reign, I believe it my duty
to report to you what has just happened to the English minister. For a
number of years he has been en liaison with Mme. Zherebtsoff, the sister of
Prince Zuboff, and at whose home the latter has been living since quitting
the court. The emperor has known about this intimacy for a long time, and
he has often teased Mr. Whitworth about it. The latter has only seen Prince
Zuboff a single time; in truth he goes every three or four days to Mme.
Zherebtsoff's, but only to see her—and no longer every day, as he used to do.
On the 22 of this month the emperor sent someone to Prince Zuboff to ask
why he was visited every day by the English minister. The prince was com-
pelled to write a letter on this subject to His Imperial Majesty. For his
part, Whitworth was warned by Rostopchin of the emperor's displeasure;
and indeed at court on the 23rd the emperor affected not to speak to him.21

On this occasion Whitworth was able to smooth things out by assuring Rostop-
chin—"de gentilhomme a gentilhomme"—that his purpose in visiting the house
so frequently did not concern Zubov, and the tsar dropped the matter.
There is also testimony that Whitworth carried on, or at least attempted
to carry on, another affair with political implications—with Countess Anna
Tolstoi, whose husband was an aide to Grand Duke Alexander, and who was
herself very close to Grand Duchess Elizabeth. Whitworth pressed his attentions
upon the lady from the latter part of 1799 until the moment he left Russia six
months later, possibly as an excuse to gain access to the grand duke's household.
However, it is not known whether his private or political purposes met with any
success in this quarter.22
• After years of residence in St. Petersburg, Whitworth knew the workings of
the court well. Through his acumen, the British government was able to add to
its payroll two of Paul's influential favorites. In 1797 Whitworth succeeded in
reaching both Catherine Nelidov, the tsar's mistress, and Ivan Kutaisov, his valet,
who, for the sums of 30,000 and 20,000 rubles respectively, were instrumental in
ensuring terms favorable to England in the commercial treaty concluded at that

19. To cite only a few examples: Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/22, no. 62,
December 1, 1791; PRO F.O. 65/23, no. 32, June 19, 1792; PRO F.O. 65/33, no. 15, March
9, 1796 (where Whitworth solicits a team of horses for Zubov) ; and Grenville's obliging
response, PRO F.O. 65/33, no. 7, April 15, 1796.
20. On Zherebtsov, see V. Zubow, Karlik favorita: Istoriia zhizni Ivana Iakubovskogo
(Munich, 1968), pp. 302-12; and S. A. Adrianov, "Ol'ga Aleksandrovna Zherebtsova,"
Istoricheskii vestnik, 62 (1895): 843-56.
21. Cobenzl to Thugut, HHSA, Russland, series 2, k. 84, no. 79, apostille 11, Decem-
ber 26, 1796.
22. V. N. Golovina, Memoirs of the Countess Golovine, ed. K. Waliszewski (London,
1910), pp. 174-75, 206-12.
210 Slavic Review

time.23 Whitworth, in describing this investment, observed that "both these per-
sons, as they can render extraordinary services, are, from their situation in life
much beyond the reach of an ordinary bribe." (In Kutaisov's case, at least, this
was not always true—in 1792 the Austrians had bought him for a paltry 300
rubles.24) In 1798 Grenville authorized Whitworth to draw on his banker for the
sum of 40,000 rubles, to be paid to the ever-corruptible valet on the occasion of
the treaty which brought Russia into the coalition against France. This time
Whitworth remarked, "It could not have been employed at a more seasonable
moment or in a person more capable of making a suitable return." 25
Whitworth also had been friendly with Count Panin for many years before
the latter became Russian vice-chancellor in the autumn of 1799. Panin was a
haughty aristocrat, a Francophobe. and a friend of the English.-" As early as
1798, when a volte-face in Russian foreign policy encouraged hopes of Anglo-
Russian cooperation. Whitworth had listed Panin's attributes: "sound principles,
good judgment, an uncommon facility in the dispatch of business, a thorough
sense of the danger to which Europe is exposed, and a rooted hatred for the
maxim and character of the French Nation."-7 At the end of 1799. as he and
Panin worked to prevent the breakup of the anti-French coalition, Whitworth
told Grenville. "I want words to express how grateful I am for the able assis-
tance of Count Panin. Nothing can be compared to his wise and salutary prin-
ciples unless it be the zeal and energy with which he avows them."-8 At that
time, the struggle within the Russian government between the factions of Panin,
who favored continuation of the war against France, and of Count F. V. Rostop-
chin, the emperor's aide-de-camp, who advocated an independent Russian
policy which inclined more and more toward accommodation with France against
the continental ambitions of Austria and the imperial pretensions of England,2"
was intense. Whitworth and Panin were obliged to combat the "poison" spread
by Rostopchin and his associates, in order to convince the tsar that his honor
and duty lay on the side of the coalition. Officially Whitworth was instructed
to work for additional Russian forces in Italy and Switzerland. He also was to
win approval for the use of Russian troops, then wintering on the Channel
Islands, in another Anglo-Russian expedition to the continent. He was author-
ized, if necessary, to accept a Russian proposal of a triple alliance between Great

23. Whitworth to Grenville, "Most Secret," PRO F.O. 65/36, no. 12, February 23, 1797.
24. Cobenzl to Thugut, HHSA, Russland, series 2, k. 76, no. 30, apostille 12, May 19,
1792.
25. Grenville to Whitworth, PRO F.O. 65/40, no. 32, October 16, 1798; and Whitworth
to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/41, no. 54, November 20, 1798.
26. See especially Panin's correspondence with many Englishmen in Bruckner, Matcrialx,
5:73-114.
27. Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/39, no. 18, April 18, 1798.
28. Whitworth to Grenville, private, PRO F.O. 65/45, November 28, 1799.
29. See the excellent reexamination of Russian foreign policy under Paul by Hugh
Ragsdale, "Was Paul Bonaparte's Fool?: The Evidence of the Danish and Swedish Ar-
chives," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 7, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 52-67. Whitworth dole-
fully reported Rostopchin's influence as increasing, "I am sorry to say, in proportion to his
disinclination to operations (against the French)" (Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O.
65/45, no. 102, November 13, 1799).
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 211

Britain, Russia, and Denmark. Captain Home Popham. a military expert who
had impressed Tsar Paul the previous year, was dispatched from London to help
with the arrangements.30
A recent biographer of Paul, V. P. Zubow, suggests that Popham's mission
might have had a sinister purpose connected with the conspiracy against Paul. 31
But nothing in the Foreign Office archives lends itself to this interpretation.
Moreover, a half-dozen of Popham's private letters to Whitworth dating from
November 1799 to May 1800 survive in the Kent Archive Office. They are
concerned exclusively with military proposals and the incredible series of mishaps
which befell Popham on his journey to Russia. He finally arrived at Kronstadt in
March 1800, but was not allowed to proceed further to St. Petersburg. 32 By this
time, Tsar Paul had already made up his mind to withdraw from the coalition,
and he had requested the recall of Whitworth and Cobenzl by their governments.
Popham's voyage was entirely in vain.
As they were waiting for Popham to arrive. Whitworth and Panin became
increasingly apprehensive about Rostopchin's ascendancy, and at some point,
so the theory goes, they began to meet with various disgruntled and dissatisfied
persons at Mme. Zherebtsov's house.33 Count Pahlen became a party to these
discussions because he feared, like many others, that the tsar's unpredictable
behavior and erratic policies might prove threatening to Russia's domestic tran-
quility and external security.34 Since Pahlen controlled the military police, his
presence at Zherebtsov's was an indispensable guaranty of the conspirators'
security. But Whitworth's role must still remain a matter of speculation. None
of the papers in Maidstone mention these meetings, so it is not possible to add
to the little that is already known or surmised about them.35
Other sources do indicate that Tsar Paul suspected the English and
Austrian diplomats of conspiring behind his back. In February 1800 he declared
Cobenzl to be persona non grata at court, and he ordered Mme. Zherebtsov to

30. Grenville to Whitworth, PRO F.O. 65/45, nos. 101-3, November 23, 1799.
31. V. Zubow, Zar Paul I, pp. 67-68.
, 32. Six letters of Popham to Whitworth, KAO, U 269, O 196/1, dated November 1798
to May 1800. Popham's ship was detained by ice off the coast of Sweden; he made his way
to Stockholm and eventually to Finland, where he fell violently ill with "the fever." When
he finally reached Vyborg in Russian Karelia, he wrote to Whitworth, "Here I am all Skin
and Bone, but thank God no Fever!" (March 19, 1800).
33. See Whitworth's bitter comments about Rostopchin in his report to Grenville,
PRO F.O. 65/44, no. 94, October 10, 1799. For some of Panin's comments, see his letters
to Vorontsov (for example, October 4, 1799—"C'est qu'il est tres mauvais fils, interesse,
avare a l'exces, et qu'il n'ambitionne des places que pour s'enrichir" [AKV, 11:93]; and
November 3, 1799 [AKV, 11:96-97]). Whitworth later drew up a memorandum in which
he accused Rostopchin of causing the break between England and Russia, KAO, U 269,
O 197/8, n.d. It is impossible to date the beginning of discussions at Mme. Zherebtsov's,
but Rostopchin's letter to Vorontsov (October 9, 1799, AKV, 8:250-51), where he speaks
of Panin's "love of intrigues," may be a reference to Panin's association with dissident
elements. Cf. Czartoryski, Memoircs, 1:231-36, where he discusses the start of the con-
spiracy without giving any dates, and Waliszewski, Paul Ier, pp. 569-74.
34. See the letter of Bennigsen to Fock, Historische Vierteljahrschaft (1901), p. 60;
the testimony of Veliaminov-Zernov in Schiemann, Zur Geschichtc, pp. 277-79; and Czar-
toryski, Memoircs, 1:237.
35. The most complete summary of this matter, based primarily on the sources cited
in the above note, is still Waliszewski, Paul Ier, pp. 572-75.
212 Slavic Review

leave St. Petersburg "in a quarter of an hour's time."3" A few weeks later the
Russians partially succeeded in cracking the English and Austrian diplomatic
codes, and the tsar learned that many unflattering things were being said about
him by his allies. In response, he took the highly unusual and provocative step
of denying passports to the official couriers of Great Britain and Austria, in effect
holding Whitworth and Cobenzl incommunicado.37 Because of this action, Great
Britain and Austria suspended diplomatic relations with Russia in May.
Papers in the Kent Archive Office give a glimpse of what Whitworth and
Panin were doing between February and June 1800. Initially, before the tsar's
attitude had turned decisively against prosecuting the war with France, Whit-
worth and Panin, in collaboration with an adventurer named Charles Francois
Dumouriez, were attempting to secure Russia's participation in an invasion of
France. General Dumouriez had defected from the French Revolutionary Army
in Belgium seven years earlier, and had spent most of the time since traveling
from court to court, ever ready with plans for a counterrevolutionary invasion
of France in association with different emigre groups. 38 His peregrinations
inevitably brought him to St. Petersburg in January of 1800. He already had
acquired the backing of Charles of Hesse, Staathalter of Schleswig-Holstein, a
powerful figure behind the Danish throne, and he now hoped to get a warm
reception from the tsar, who was known to be seeking a substitute for his
Austrian ally.
Whitworth and Panin tried to stall Dumouriez until Popham's arrival in
order to work out a detailed and unified plan of action to submit to the tsar.30
Whitworth had no specific instructions from London on this matter, but he
knew that time was of the essence, and he must have felt that Dumouriez's
scheme could be reconciled with London's. Dumouriez presented him with two
detailed memorandums calling for a diversionary action in Provence by French
emigres transported from Naples, which was to coincide with a major invasion of
Brittany by English, Russian, and Danish troops.40 Dumouriez emphasized the
feasibility of his plan and its presumed compatibility with London's desires, but
there actually were a great many unresolved difficulties—for example, the ques-
tion of command responsibility, and who was going to foot the bill for the
expeditions. Moreover, Lord Grenville was known to have a very poor opinion
of Dumouriez.41 It is unlikely that he would have entertained seriously any plan

36. Cobenzl to Thugut, HHSA, Russland, series 2, k. 94, no. 12, February 11, 1800.
37. Ibid.; see also Cobenzl to Thugut, ibid., no. 19, March 17, 1800; Whitworth to Gren-
ville, PRO F.O. 65/46, no. 17, March 18, 1800; and Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O.
65/47, no. 32, May 19, 1800, concerning the broken codes.
38. On Dumouriez, a readable but quite dated biography is that by A. Chuquet,
Dwitouries (Paris, 1914); see pp. 240-41.
39. Dumouriez to Whitworth, February 15/26, 1800, KAO, U 269, O 197/3. From this
letter it is clear that Dumouriez was growing impatient with waiting.
40. Ibid. One memorandum was a ten-page proposal, "Diversion dans le midi de la
France," and the other was a forty-seven-page document, "Plan d'expedition maritime sur
les cotes de France." Whitworth also received a paper entitled, "Note sur le projet d'employer
les troupes danoises." See also Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/46, no. 20, March
25, 1800.
41. See Chuquet, Dumouriez, pp. 232-33. Grenville felt that Dumouriez, unlike Lafayette,
did not have the merit of being attached to his principles.
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 213

in which the ex-revolutionary general figured prominently. Panin and Whitworth

were in fact grasping at straws. Even as they met with Dumouriez, Tsar Paul
was requesting Whitworth's recall, indicating that his mind was already made
up.42 Dumouriez remained in St. Petersburg for two months, and returned to
Holstein empty-handed.
All hopes that Paul might choose to remain in the anti-French coalition
were dashed on March 18/30, 1800, when Panin was told that Whitworth's recall
had been requested four weeks earlier without his knowledge. Panin was now
ordered to tell Whitworth that his couriers would no longer be allowed to pass.48
Whitworth was shocked at this announcement, and could find no rational ex-
planation. It was at this time that he penned his much-quoted secret dispatch in
which he charged that "the Emperor is literally not in his senses."44 Whitworth
was allowed to continue to see the vice-chancellor, but he was not able to conduct
any official business. What he and Panin talked about is not known, but the Kent
Archive contains some tantalizing scraps of information.
On "lundi 19," that is, March 19, 1800, Panin sent Whitworth a personal
note apologizing for what he had had to tell him the day before, declaring that
it had been "odious" to him. The note closed with the invitation, "Je vous at-
tendrai ce soir."45 Two days later Whitworth penned an interesting dispatch to
Lord Grenville, suggesting that he not be recalled, but that he merely be granted
a leave of absence, because "the storm must soon blow over." Whitworth blamed
Rostopchin for the current animosity toward England, but he indicated that a
change was in the offing. "It is perfectly impossible that he can remain long in
power, and whatsoever the change may be, it must be favorable to the cause. . . .
One way or another" the present difficulties would shortly be removed.46
It is tempting to speculate that Whitworth's dispatch was prompted by the
knowledge that Panin intended to approach Grand Duke Alexander for the
first time to ask him to take over the government from his father. Others in the
Russian capital were also aware of changes in the air, as is demonstrated by a
most interesting note sent to Count S. R. Vorontsov by his friend Dr. John
Rogerson (who was the ideal observer at court, being on terms of intimacy
with many members of the Russian aristocracy, including Rostopchin as well as
Panin):

Tout l'entourage se trouve au bout de leur latin. Celui que je viens de

quitter [Rostopchin] je vois etre dans un etat (de) deperissement et in-
quietude; il dit qu'il ne sera plus ici dans le mois de mai. Meme le favori
[Kutaisov] devient tres inquiet, et je vois (entre nous) que tous veulent se

42. That Paul made this decision and instructed Rostopchin to write London without
even informing Vice-Chancellor Panin is the point made by V. N. Aleksandrenko in Russkie
diplomatichcskie agenty v Londone v XVIII veke, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1897), 1:75-77.
43. Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/46, no. 17, March 18, 1800.
44. Ibid.
45. Panin to Whitworth, KAO, U 269, O 197/11, "ce lundi 19" (March 19, 1800 O.S.).
From its position in the bundle, this note clearly pertains to 1800. A check of the Julian
calendar for 1800 shows that there was no other "lundi 19" during the time Whitworth
was in Russia.
46. Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/46, no. 22, April 2, 1800 (March 21 O.S.).
214 Slavic Review
repatrier vers le grand-due. Je vous prie, mon cher comte, tachez de pro-
crastiner; e'est l'idee du comte [Panin] aussi.47

But Alexander refused to consider Panin's proposal the first time it was put to
him. This was a cruel blow to those who counted on his support, but it gave a
further lease on life to Rostopchin. Thus, Whitworth, not Rostopchin, was forced
to depart in May.
Whitworth and Panin continued to meet secretly right up to the moment
of Whitworth's departure. In a private note of "mercredi," probably May 9/21,
1800, Panin arranged an inconspicuous rendezvous with Whitworth: "J'ai un
mot a vous dire, Milord. . . . Ce que j'ai a vous dire n'est point officiel, mais un
avertissement d'ami."48 Apparently Panin feared that some disaster was about to
befall them, for the next clay, "jeudi 10," he expressed relief that the threat was
past: "J'eprouve une satisfaction infinie en vous annoncant, Milord, que nos
apprehensions n'etaient point fondees, qu'un conducteur invisible a detourne'la
foudre, quoique le nuage fut sur nos tetes. Par le rapport qu'on vient de me faire,
je suis completement rassure. Malgre cela, le regime que vous voulez suivre
aujourd'hui me semble tres convenable a l'etat de votre sante."49
Shortly thereafter, instructions arrived from London concerning the protest
to be made about the withheld passports.50 Whitworth and Panin first discussed
the matter in private, but could think of nothing to soften the blow.51 Whitworth
and his secretary of legation, Justinian Casamajor, jointly delivered the protest.
Tsar Paul, using as a pretext an alleged slight to the Russian ambassador in
Stockholm by his British counterpart, then ordered Casamajor expelled along
with Whitworth. Panin had to announce this additional misfortune to his friend
"dans la plus profonde douleur."52 As he was leaving St. Petersburg the next
day, Whitworth sent a note of encouragement to Panin:

Je m'adresse a Mons. le Vice Chancelier pour remettre a Son Excellence

la lettre pour accuser la reception de celle qu'elle m'a communique hier par
ordre de S. M. l'Empereur. Je m'acquitte avec peine de ce devoir. Mais
comment exprimer a l'ami que j'aime, que je respecte, toute la douleur que
je ressens en me separant de lui. Recevez, mon cher comte, les adieus d'un
homme qui vous est tendrement attache. Pensez a moi, comme je penserai
bien souvent a vous. La derniere priere que je vous ferai est pour vous
exhorter au courage, a la patience, a la resignation. Pensez combien depend
de vous dans des circonstances si critiques. Tant que vous etes consacres a

47. Rogerson to Vorontsov, April 8, 1800, AKV, 30:122.

48. Panin to Whitworth, KAO, U 269, O 197/11, "mercredi." The precise date is
deduced from the connection of this note to the one which follows, "jeudi 10," which could
only have been May 10, 1800 O.S.
49. Ibid., "jeudi 10" (May 10, 1800 O.S.). There were no other Thursdays falling on
the 10th of the month during the first half of 1800.
50. Grenville to Casamajor, PRO F.O. 65/47, nos. 1-3, May 2, 1800. The instructions
were addressed to the secretary of legation because it was assumed that Whitworth would
have already left Russia.
51. Panin to Whitworth, KAO, U 269, O 197/11, May 20, 1800 O.S.
52. Panin to Whitworth, private, ibid., "ce vendredi 25"; also Panin to Whitworth, as
vice-chancellor of Russia to the minister of Great Britain, ibid., May 25, 1800.
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 215

la cause je ne perdrai pas tout espoir, et je me laisserai aller a la bonne

esperance de vous revoir. Adieu, mons. le comte. Adieu mon digne et
respectable ami. Accordez moi ce t i t r e ; je scaurai toujours l'apprecier. 53

On the same day, Whitworth received a note from the military governor, Count
Pahlen, which indicates that they had been in amiable contact before, and is, as
far as I know, the only surviving proof of a connection between them:

Je suis penetre des plus sinceres sentimens en vous voyant, Mylord, quitter
cette ville. Soyez persuade que rien n'effacera de mon coeur la vraie estime
et l'attachement que j'ai toujours senti envers la personne de Votre Excel-
lence, ni le souvenir des agreables momens que j'ai passe en votre societe.
Je souhaite de tout mon coeur que vous finissiez votre voyage de la maniere
la plus heureuse, et que j ' a y e un jour le plaisir de vous recevoir ici, esperant
que ce souhait ne manquera pas d'etre accompli. 54

Even taking into consideration the elaborate formal politeness of the time and
place, this hardly sounds like the notification of a chief of police to an undesirable
alien being expelled from his city! Could it have been an assurance to Whitworth
that measures discussed in his "agreeable" company would continue without him?
Many months later, Whitworth expressed his satisfaction on learning of
the death of Paul: "I shall, so long as I live, celebrate as a festival the day on
which I learned of the death of that arch-fiend Paul." 5 5 Whitworth could have
returned to St. Petersburg (Count Vorontsov in particular urged him to resume
his station there), but Whitworth chose, for whatever reasons, to remain in
England. H e was succeeded in St. Petersburg by Alleyn Fitzherbert. now Lord
St. Helens. 5 6 Among the papers in Maidstone is a private letter in which St.
Helens gives Whitworth some information about the death of Paul: " I must
defer political and private anecdotes till another opportunity, apprising you only
that the accounts we had rec'd of a certain transaction were tolerably exact,
excepting as to the H e r o of the executive part, who was a certain Gen'l
Bennigsen. . . ," 57

53. Copy of a letter from Whitworth to Panin, in Whitworth's hand, KAO, U 269,
O 197/7, May 26/June 7, 1800. I have reproduced this copy as it appeared, evidently written
in great haste. A slightly different version of the letter was published, but with the wrong
date, by Bruckner, Materialy, 5:111.
54. Pahlen to Whitworth, KAO, U 269, O 197/8, May 26, 1800 O.S.
55. Whitworth to Grenville, April 16, 1801, in Report on the Manuscripts of J. B.
Fortescuc, vol. 7 (London, 1905), p. 4 (cited in N. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean,
1797-1807 [Chicago, 1970], p. 153, n. 80).
56. See the letter of Vorontsov to Whitworth, PRO F.O. 65/48, April 15, 1801; and
Vorontsov to Grenville, Dropmore Manuscripts, April 17, 1801. Vorontsov liberally ad-
vised his friends concerning whom they should send to Russia, and he asked Whitworth to
pass on his recommendations to Lord Hawkesbury in case Whitworth should decline to
return himself.
57. St. Helens to Whitworth, private, KAO, U 269, O 197/12, May 31, 1801. Bennigsen
was recruited at the last moment by Count Pahlen (see Bennigsen's letter to Fock, Histo-
rische Vicrteljahrschajt [1901], p. 60). Cf. St. Helens to Hawkesbury, "Secret and Con-
fidential," PRO F.O. 65/48, May 31, 1801.
216 Slavic Review

By far the most interesting documents among the Whitworth papers in Kent
are the ones touching on the matter of a large, secret disbursement made by
Whitworth in the last days of his mission in St. Petersburg. In May 1800,
Whitworth reported to Grenville that he was making preparations for his de-
parture. His report ended with the statement that he had had to draw on his
banker, Mr. Daniel Bayley of the Russia Company, for a total of 40,000 rubles
"necessary for the expense in closing down the Mission."58 But Whitworth later
failed to submit a satisfactory account of how this money had been spent, and he
seems to have been in no hurry to do so. In November 1808, His Majesty's Com-
missioners of Audit discovered the draft on Bayley's account, and notified Whit-
worth, who was now living in retirement in Kent, that in the absence of a proper
accounting he would be held liable for this sum of money. It was suggested that
Whitworth appear before the commissioners to swear an oath concerning how
the money was spent.50 Whitworth replied somewhat cavalierly that "I have only
to observe that [this money was] as Mr. Bayley stated, paid by him to me . . .
on Account of Secret Service. I have no accounts whatever, it having been in-
variably my practice during the course of my Mission in Russia to destroy all
traces of disbursements made under such account."60 The commissioners did
not consider this reply satisfactory.
Whitworth turned for help to the current foreign secretary, George Canning,
protesting that "I do not recollect that on my return from Russia . . . any such
oath was required of me." Canning replied firmly that this was required by law.61
Whitworth then wrote two additional letters, another one to Canning, and one
to Lord Grenville, now also out of office. The second letter to Canning was more
conciliatory in tone than the first had been:

The money was taken up by me as I stated at the time to Lord Grenville,

in part to make good some payments on the account of Secret Service con-
nected with the accomplishment of the object for which the cash subsidy
was given, and partly to enable me to leave Petersburg in conformity to the
will of the Emperor Paul signified to me in so abrupt a manner as to put
me to great inconvenience.

Whitworth went on to say that under the circumstances, Grenville had authorized
him to include his personal costs under the head of Secret Service, and that he
remembered swearing an oath on his return, which he implied might have been
somehow lost by the Office of the Exchequer. 62
Whitworth, in his letter to Grenville, complained that Bayley and the
Foreign Office had somehow failed to submit their accounts of the Secret Service
money to the Exchequer in 1800, and he pleaded with Grenville to intercede
now with the commissioners in his behalf. Grenville replied that this would be
impossible. The only solution would be for Whitworth to make a full statement

58. Whitworth to Grenville, PRO F.O. 65/47, no. 35, May 22, 1800.
59. Commissioners of Audit to Whitworth, KAO, U 269, O 196/5, November 5, 1808.
60. Whitworth to the commissioners, ibid., November 9, 1808.
61. Whitworth to Canning, ibid., November ll, 1808; Canning to Whitworth, ibid.,
November 12, 1808. Copies of these two letters also appear in PRO F.O. 65/74.
62. Whitworth to Canning, PRO F.O. 65/75, November 15, 1808.
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 217
to Canning, and to ask him in his official capacity to recommend to the Treasury
Board that Whitworth be absolved from the debt.83
Whitworth wrote again to Canning on December 4, proposing to dispose of
the matter as Grenville had suggested, and explained:

The part of the 40000 rubles appropriated to my use was 12000 rubles,
equivalent at that time to £1500 Stl. For the employment of the remainder
I am ready to account in the manner prescribed by law.

I will only mention that this was the winding up of a mission of twelve
years, during which I concluded a Treaty of Alliance, a Treaty of Com-
merce, and three Conventions for cooperation in the war against France.
Such being the result of a mission to a court where more is (or at least was)
to be done with money, and less without it, than in any court in Europe,
I trust that I shall not be charged with an improvident use of that discre-
tionary power entrusted to me.84

Canning was now willing to handle the matter as suggested, and after a further
exchange of letters, Whitworth submitted statements under oath to the Treasury
and to Canning. The statement to Canning, dated December 20, 1808, was quite
vague:

I beg leave to state to you that on the 10th and 14th of May, 1800, being at
that time His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
at the Court of St. Petersburg, I received of Mr. Daniel Bayley, through
whom the subsidy paid that year to Russia was remitted, the amount of
28000 rubles, at that time equal to 3500 pounds Sterling, which sum was
duly applied by me to purposes of Secret Service.85

In an accompanying letter of the same date, Whitworth asserted that he could

not remember exactly on what the remaining 12,000 rubles had been spent, only
that it went to cover debts which had accumulated over the years of his mission.66
At first the Treasury Board balked at accepting Whitworth's vague ex-
planation at this late hour, especially since both the manner in which he got the
money and the way he accounted for it were "not in the manner set forth (by
law) ."8T Whitworth was obliged, therefore, to seek Canning's help once more to
extract him from his difficulty. The business was finally settled before the Board
on December 30. Whitworth submitted a new affidavit to the lords which con-
tained no more information than the one he had given Canning. But on the

63. Whitworth to Grenville, KAO, U 269, O 196/5, November IS, 1808; Grenville to
Whitworth, ibid., November 28, 1808.
64. Whitworth to Canning, PRO F.O. 65/75, December 4, 1808. See also the following
letter from Whitworth to Canning, ibid., December 9, 1808.
65. Whitworth to Canning, KAO, U 269, O 196/5, December 20, 1808.
66. Ibid.
67. Commissioners to Whitworth, ibid., December 15, 1808.
218 Slavic Review
recommendation of the foreign secretary, they decided to relieve him of the debt.
The king's warrant for this release was issued to Whitworth on February 7,
1809.68
What is most significant in all of this? First, Whitworth's handling of funds
in the closing days of his mission was quite irregular. Second, he was deliberately
vague about how the money was spent. Third, he resisted attempts to make him
tell what he had done with it. It might well be asked why His Majesty's govern-
ment was willing finally to accept Whitworth's vague and belated explanations,
if not because it was privately understood by a few key individuals that these
matters ought not to be probed deeper.
Drafts of two private letters from Whitworth to Lord Grenville, dated
May 19 and 20, 1800, which perhaps were never sent, suggest even more strongly
the irregularity and the uneasiness which Whitworth felt:

The winding up of a long and expensive mission throws some difficulties

in my way, which it will be impossible to remove without assistance. I have
therefore taken from Mr. Bayley a sum sufficient to answer every demand,
either public or private, and for this I have given drafts on Mr. Bidwell in
the usual manner. The sum which I have thus taken up amounts to 40000
rubles, about fifteen of which have been in part due to Mr. Bayley since
last year, and in part expended on the account of Public Service. I had no
other means of satisfying Mr. Bayley's demand on my own occasions than by
giving him drafts on the Office. But at the same time that I entreat Your
Lordship's assistance in procuring His Majesty's pardon for the freedom
I take, I beg leave to assure Your Lordship that should my claim under all
the circumstances of my long residence in the country with a salary totally
inadequate to the expenses of the place . . . and of my so sudden departure
under circumstances also which make it doubly necessary to leave no demand
unsatisfied, be deemed in the smallest degree unreasonable, I pledge myself
to refund every shilling of it with the most scrupulous exactness within a
month of my arrival in England.

Whitworth was so worried about "abusing the confidence reposed in me" that he
returned to this subject again the next day, reiterating his promise to make
restitution.89
What is of particular interest, however, is not the portion of the money
applied to his private debt, as unethical as that might have been, but rather the
28,000 rubles applied to Secret Service. To whom was it paid and for what
purpose, since Whitworth was in the process of leaving Russia? Does Whit-
worth's assurance that this was a court where more was to be done with money
and less without than in any other court, and his allusion to circumstances which

68. Whitworth to Canning, PRO F.O. 65/75, December 23, 1808; Whitworth's affidavit
to the Lords of the Treasury, KAO, U 269, O 196/5, December 24, 1808; Minutes of the
Board of Treasury, PRO, T. 29/98, December 30, 1808; Canning to Whitworth, KAO, U
269, O 196/5, January 9, 1809; Lords of the Treasury to Whitworth, ibid., January 20,
1809; and King's Warrant to Whitworth, ibid., February 7, 1809.
69. Drafts of two letters from Whitworth to Grenville, KAO, U 269, O 196/5, May 19
and 20, 1800.
Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I 219

"make it doubly necessary to leave no demand unsatisfied," justify our supposi-

tion that the money was spent on bribery? And if it was spent on bribery, why
not in the interest of the conspirators? A most likely recipient would have been
Kutaisov, who was subsequently manipulated by Pahlen into persuading the tsar
to restore the Zubovs (who had been in disgrace since 1797) and to dismiss
Rostopchin prior to the execution of the conspirators' plan.70
This, of course, is still speculation, and the evidence against Whitworth is
only circumstantial. Yet the very fact that Whitworth's final explanations were
so vague (especially when contrasted with his earlier mention of Kutaisov and
others by name) leads one to suspect that there is more to this business than
meets the eye. Was the money perhaps left at the disposal of Panin or Pahlen,
to be used by them at a timely moment ? Whitworth had no specific authorization
for such a disbursement, but this would not be inconsistent with what we now
know of Whitworth's character or of the latitude he customarily ascribed to his
"discretionary power," and it would explain his reluctance to account specifi-
cally for what he had done with the money. At the very least, even if the docu-
ments do not allow a definite conclusion, the business of Whitworth's disburse-
ment of Secret Service money in May 1800 provides definite grounds for the
charges about "English gold" so long dismissed by most historians.71
The Whitworth papers at the Kent Archive Office include many letters
written subsequent to 1801. showing Whitworth's continued interest in Russia,
and illustrating his friendship with Panin, Vorontsov, Novosiltsov, and others.72
None of these, however, sheds any more light on his activity in the final months
of his mission to St. Petersburg. Future historians may uncover additional
pertinent information in other archives in Great Britain or the Soviet Union
but, until they do, the papers in the Kent Archive will remain the best, if still
uncertain, guide for those who would, in the words of the French editor of long
ago, "develope the mystery."

70. See Rostopchin to Vorontsov, June 30, 1801, AKV, 8:286-88; the testimony of
Kotzebue and Veliaminov-Zernov in Schiemann, Zur Gcschichte, pp. 278, 321-24; and E.
Shumigorskii, Imperator Pavel I: Zhisn' i tsarstvovanie (St. Petersburg, 1897), pp. 195-96.
71. See, for example, Thiers, History of the Consulate, pp. 245-46; Waliszewski, Paul
Ier, p. 575; and Grunwald, L'assassinat, pp. 180-82.
72. These letters make up the bulk of KAO, U 269, O 197. They are personal in char-
acter, and almost exclusively concerned with small, private matters.