Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn.
Of Greater Bombay 1
SPECIAL PROCEDURE, IF DISCRIMINATORY?
FACTS: Occupiers of govt premises of the Municipality were give notice of eviction under
the contended Acts. The occupiers challenged the validity of the provisions on the basis of in
violation of Article !4.
LAW IN CONTENTION: Chapter VA was introduced in the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act, 1888, by Maharashtra Act 14 of 1961. According to the Act, the
Commissioner, by notice served on the person in unauthorised occupation could order him to
vacate within one month of the date of service of the notice on any of the grounds mentioned
in the Act.
The Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, also lays down special procedure
for eviction of persons from government premises which is more or less similar to the
Municipal Act. The power to order the eviction is given to an authority with no jurisdiction of
the civil court. The constitutional validity of Chapter VA of the Municipal Act and the
provisions of the Government Premises (Eviction) Ac was challenged on the ground that they
contravene Art. 14 on the basis of the decision of Northern India Caterers [1967] 3 S.C.R.
399, wherein it was held that amongst occupants of public premises inter se there was
discrimination in as much as the special procedure in the Punjab Public Premises and Land
(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, was more drastic and prejudicial than the ordinary
procedure of a civil suit and that it was left to the arbitrary and unfettered discretion of the
Government to adopt such special procedure against some and not against the others.
HELD (By Full Court)
1. The impugned provisions of the two Acts are not violative of Art. 14.
2. It could not be contended that the special provisions of law applying to government
and public bodies are not based upon reasonable classification or that they offend Art.
14.
3. In the present cases, the statutes themselves, in the two classes of cases, that is,
premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government, clearly lay down the
purpose behind them namely that they should be subject to speedy procedure in the
matter of evicting unauthorised persons occupying them. The fact that the legislature
considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective for evicting
the unauthorised occupants and provided a special speedy procedure therefore,
is a clear and sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the duty of
evicting such occupants and the power to do so has been conferred.
4. The simple fact that there are two forums with different procedures would not
justify the quashing of the impugned provisions as being violative of Art. 14
especially when both procedures are fair and in consonance with the principles of
natural justice. What is necessary to attract the inhibition of the Article 14 is that
there must be substantial and qualitative differences between the two
1
1974 AIR 2009, 1975 SCR (1) 1
procedures so that one is really and substantially more drastic and prejudicial
than the other.
5. A dogmatic and finical approach in applying Article 14 should be avoided.
6. The impugned provisions provided for the giving of notice to the party affected; he
has to be informed of the grounds on which the order for eviction is proposed to be
made; he has to be afforded an opportunity to file a written statement and
produce documents; and he can be represented by lawyers. The provision-, of the
C.P.C. regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining the
on oath as also those relating to discovery and production of documents which are
made applicable, provide a valuable safeguard. The aggrieved party has a right of
appeal and the appeal lies not to an administrative officer but to a judicial officer of
the status of a Principal Judge of the Civil Court. Therefore, the procedure envisaged
in the impugned provisions is not so onerous and drastic as would justify an
inference of discrimination.
7. It does not follow that every law which gives differential treatment to government or
other public bodies is necessarily immune from challenge on the
ground of discrimination. To fall under Art. 14 it must appear that not only a
classification has been made but also that it is one based on some real distinction
bearing just and reasonable in relation to the object of the legislation and is not a mere
arbitrary selection. In the present case, the speedy machinery for eviction of
unauthorised occupants of public premises is justified in that it is in the interest of
public that speedy and expeditious recovery of such premises from unauthorised
occupiers is made possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure instead
of the elaborate procedure by way of civil suit involving both expense and delay.
There is thus a valid basis of differentiation and the constitutional validity of the
impugned provisions in the two statutes cannot, in the circumstances, be assailed on
the ground that they make unjust discrimination between occupiers of government or
municipal premises and occupiers of other premises.
