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Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations

in Northern Ireland
David A. Charters
Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: David A. Charters (1977) Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland,
The RUSI Journal, 122:3, 22-27, DOI: 10.1080/03071847709428732

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 which we are most clearly vulnerable, and which is to concert its efforts, harnessing its vastly superior
therefore promise the highest security return on our resources to the tasks of managing Soviet military
resource investment. Nor are the costs involved power and shaping an international order capable of
extraordinary; indeed, just this past year our political channelling inevitable and necessary historic change
authorities agreed that additional efforts of no more within the confines of international law and the
than 5 per cent annually in real terms constituted a accepted mores of international behaviour.
reasonable economic challenge to the member states. And yet, faced with pervasive socio-economic
Clearly, it would be preferable to avoid these costs. dilficulties, .some Western leaders today would divert
But unless we are able to achieve equitable force resources from security to feed the socio-economic
balances through negotiation, I can see no alternativc monster.
but to meet them. In the final analysis, the West must They are on a still-born course. For the c l y r pre-
recognise that it cannot indefinitely permit Soviet requisite to resolving our current socio-economic
military investment to outpace Western efforts without difficulties is the. recognition that our destinies are
risk to its vital security interests, in Europe or else- linked. And we can hardly expect to foster that sense
where. of collective endeavour if we begin by undermining
We need not accept that risk. As a group, the free the foundation of confidence in our mutual security
nations-from Japan, through North America, to which remains the strongest bond among our nations
Western Europe-enjoy one and a half times the and peoples.
manpower, twice the industrial capacity, and over Maintaining that confidence, and the security which
three times the trade of any conceivable conglomerate underlies it, is within our capacity. We need only set
Downloaded by [Monash University Library] at 23:50 11 April 2015

of Marxist/Socialist states. our priorities and muster our resolve. I am confident

The most pressing challenge facing the West today we will do so.

Intelligence and Psychological

Warfare Operations in Northern
Ireland
By DAVID A. CHARTERS

Tlie oiithor is Canadian. A t preserit, he is a research stirdent iri the Departnierit of IVar Stirdies, Kiug’s College,
Uriircrsity of Loiidort.

Between the end of World War I and the outbreak reorganisation, involving the premeditated use of
of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland in 1969, the criminal techniques by a clandestine organisation to
British Army had been involved in numerous counter- restructure society in accordance with its strategic
insurgency campaigns. Indeed, probably no army has aims, by creating a ‘‘rival state” within that society.
entered a conflict with such a wealth of relevant Using an on-going process of psychologically selective
experience as the British Army did in Ulster. It is not violence to iinmobilise and isolate the population, this
unreasonable to suggest that by 1969 the Army had “parallel government” attempts to expand its control
developed a proven counter-insurgency doctrine based of the population by infiltration and subversion of
on the experience of those campaigns. public institutions and organisations until such time as
But it has been difficult to apply this doctrine in it can successfully challenge the legal government’s
Ulster, owing to its unique status as a province of the power to rule, or at least force it to change policy or
United Kingdom while being part of geographical grant concessions.
Ireland. The purpose of this study is to discuss the The security forces, therefore, must give priority to
intelligence and psychological warfare aspects of defeating the clandestine subversive organisation. And
counter-insurgency, showing how and why the Army since “the problem of defeating the enemy consists
could not easily apply its doctrine in Northern very largely of finding him, it is easy to recognise the
Ireland. The sources for this study are predominantly paramount importance of good information”.’ Intel-
unofficial publications, but some are regarded as ligence thus becomes the most important task, and the
classic works by recognised experts, and without turn- security forces must concentrate on identification and
ing to official sources they provide a clear under- elimination of members of the subversive organisation.
standing of the issues. Under normal circumstances this task would be the
Terrorist insurgency is a violent process of social responsibility of the police Special Branch, but the
22
 Army may be required to protect and strengthen the 2. close Arniy/RUC cooperation, maintained by
Special Branch.2 This was the case in Ulster. joint operations centres;
There were good reasons for this. First, the Royal 3. local censuses to build up a street-by-street
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was politically suspect in register of the population, and a card index of known
the eyes of most Catholics because, in spite of elibrts or suspected terrorists, their families, friends, habits-
to make it otherwise, the force was almost completely the index is cross-referenced to reports and intelligence
Protestant. The Chief Constable was directly respon- summaries so that a complete dossier, including
sible to the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, a photographs, can be put together for any person;
situation which gave the impression, reinforced by the 4. constant mobile and foot patrols, which allow
RUC’s handling of civil rights demonstrations, that it troops to faniiliarise themselves with their area and to
was simply an arm of Protestant domination. As a pick up background information;
result, the RUC were not welcome in Catholic areas, 5 . snap searches, particularly vehicle check points
and in some places had ceased to function at all.3 established at short notice;
Secondly, the RUC were understrength and de- 6. joint Ariny/RUC patrols, and a special Army/
moralised. The 3,000-man limit imposed by the RUC murder investigation squad to deal with sec-
Northern Ireland Act of 1922 had been lifted in 1963, tarian killings;
but as late as spring 1969 plans were to expand the 7. covert operations-specially trained plainclothes
force to only 3,200 by 1975. Thus the RUC were patrols; use of the Special Air Service Regiment
vastly outnumbered in the widespread riots of August (SAS) in South Armagh; and use of infiltration,
1969 and were unable to contain them. By the time the captured documents, informers and defectors to gain
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Army was deployed in Ulster in August, the RUC was information;

a force under considerable strain. 8. interrogation techniques.
Further blows were to follow. In October Storniont
adopted the!recommendations of the Muit Contnrissioti These methods are designed to destroy the sub-
Report: the B-Specials were disbanded, and the RUC versive organisation by increasing the flow of informa-
disarmed and made responsible to the courts, in tion to the security forces, by immobilising or elimi-
accordance with practice in the rest of the United nating members of the organisation, and by denying
Kingdom. Though the new establishment was set at them arms, explosives, refuge, recruits, and intelligence.
5,000, recruitment fell from 1970-73; in the face of a This in turn will break the organisation’s hold on the
hostile population with a “frontier mentality”, population and will prevent expansion of the “rival
morale was very low. In 1974 the force was still 1,000 state”.
below strength, and was suffering casualties at a rate Three problem areas have arisen in the Army’s
much higher proportionately than the civilian popula- intelligence operations. First, after Direct Rule was
tion. Its composition remained largely Protestant- imposed in March 1972 and William Whitelaw, the
terrorist intimidation ensured that it would remain new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, launched
so-and thus it was still suspect in Catholic eyes. No his politicaI initiatives, the Government ordered the
policeman would dare to patrol in a Catholic area Army to adopt low-profiled patrolling in the Catholic
without an Ammy escort.4 areas of Belfast and Londonderry. Street patrols were
Thirdly, the police intelligence organisation was reduced; some areas were patrolled only at night, and
suffering from neglect. then not at all; the Army stopped “hot pursuit” of
terrorists and put strict limitations on making arrests
Financial constraints and lack of foresight led, in Ulster, and conducting searches. At thesame time, the Govern-
to insufficient attention being paid to the activities of the
Special Branch and other intelligence-gathering agencies. ment began to phase out internment. These decisions
Thcse agencies were insufficient in size to cope with the immediately endangered the Army’s intelligence
situation once the conflict started and it is an unfortunate network, carefully constructed over nearly three
fact that any terrorist organisation can expand at a years to link intelligence centres to the community.
faster rate than the agencies responsible for providing Reduced patrolling led to a loss of overt and back-
information on them.5 ground intelligence; the ending of “hot pursuit” took
The RUC’s files were out of date, and their intelli- the pressure off the terrorists, allowing them to re-
gence network in the Catholic areas badly neglected. group-some released internees went right back into
the IRA; new recruits joined the IRA and remained
unknown to the security forces when the conflict
intensified, because there were no records on them;
The Army’s role and in what had become known as “Free Derry” the
Thus, the Army has largely taken over the intelli- IRA succeeded in establishing a “rival state” in
gence role, a task for which it was not suited initially, defiance of the Government. Intelligence did not begin
being a “foreign” force, unfamiliar with the area, the to flow again until after Operation Motorman in
people, and the sources of information. Aided by the August.7
Special Branch, the Army had to rebuild the intelli- Thc second problem concerns the Army’s covert
gence apparatus from scratch in a hostile and de- operations. These had mixed results in the early
teriorating environment. Its contribution to the stages because the terrorist organisation grew faster
“intelligence war’’ has included the fol1owing:G than the intelligence network. They became more
important in 1972 when the Army adopted its low
1. Army Intelligence Corps personnel seconded to profile, but as overt intelligence operations virtually
the R U C Special Branch; ceased, covert operations bccanie increasingly hazar-
23
 dous: in October 1972, one of these, the “Four political weapon, and to select, induct, and contro
Square Laundry”, was blown by the IRA. Further informers, secret agents, and stoolpigeons. For such
problems surround the use of the SAS. Until January purposes, interrogation of the type which holds the
1976, the Army and the Ministry of Defence con- public fascination is rather too primitive. If used at all
sistently denied that the SAS had been operating in in a really efficient system, its role is merely to cover
Ulster. The regiment’s popular image of “highly other methods, to throw the victim off his guard,
professional men pursuing enemies of the state by thereby making it easier to employ indirect and
highly uncivilised means” meant that there were grave clandestine methods. The hallmark of the expert
implications in using the force within the confines of interrogator is the ability to manipulate the prisoner’s
the United Kingdom. The propaganda risks are great: social situation, to manoeuvre the victim into a
the IRA has accused the Army of using “assassination position of stress, tension, or even ostracism, so as to
squads”, and incidents such as the border crossing in increase pressure and stimulate conversation. The
May 1976 and the kidnapping of Captain Nairac in Chinese Communists used such group dynamics with
May 1977 bring unnecessary publicity to the regi- devastating effect in Korea, and it was in response to
ment’s activities, which rely on secrecy for effect. this experience that the British Army developed its
Moreover, owing to a misunderstanding of its role, techniques. The Army trained its soldiers to resist this
the SAS was misused at first, its special skills wasted kind of interrogation if taken as POW, but they also
because ordinary infantry commanders did not know used these methods to obtain information, in Cyprus,
how to make best use of them.8 Aden, and eventually, Northern Ireland.12 This, of
course, raises the central question-were these
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methods appropriate to the situation?

Interrogation From a purely intelligence point of view, the answer
is yes-they were effective in obtaining information
Finally, there is the question of interrogation tech-
which could not have been acquired by any other
niques. On 9 August 1971, 342 persons were arrested
and interned. Twelve of these were subjected to means, and which probably saved many lives. The
methods worked directly and indirectly. Those
“interrogation in-depth”, the techniques of which
caused a public outcry, both in Britain and in Ireland. interrogated in-depth gave information on 700
Two committees investigated allegations of brutality members of the Provisional and Official IRA, includ-
ing the identification of those responsible for 85
and the interrogation methods themselves, and after
incidents hitherto unsolved, and made possible the
March 1972 the security forces stopped using interro-
gation in-depth. But the issue remained a political discovery of a large quantity of arms, ammunition and
explosives-more than had ever been previously
football, and in 1976 the European Commission on
located.13 Indirectly, publicity played an unique, if
Human Rights condemned such methods as torture.9
short-lived, role. The IRA had so frightened themselves
Two problems emerge here: first the public image of
interrogation; and secondly, the applicability of such with their own propaganda about torture (enhanced,
methods in the Ulster situation. Cyril Cunningham,
no doubt, by the public hue and cry) that for a while
soldiers found it almost impossible to prevent arrested
formerly Senior Psychologist for POW Intelligence at
IRA members from telling all before they were handed
MOD, makes some interesting observations on the
over to the appropriate authorities. Unfortunately,
public image of interrogation. He feels it is a widely
this attitude changed when the security forces stopped
held impression that,
using these methods; the IRA, realising what was
by definition interrogation consists of close and hostile happening, soft-pedalled their propaganda to their
questioning with the sole object ofextracting information own members and introduced training in resistance to
from a suspect or prisoner, if necessary by force.10 interrogation .14
He goes on to say that such attitudes, beloved of Interrogation in-depth had revealed a great deal of
novelists and film directors, have created a series of information in a war where intelligence was at a
myths, premium. But success in counter-insurgency operations
cannot be measured in purely military terms. The
which endow interrogators, . . . with superhuman interrogation issue was a political setback for the
powers and para-psychological insight in order to security forces and a propaganda victory for the IRA.
account for their apparently exceptional knowledge of As such, however, it provides a useful vehicle to
their victims’ activities and psychological weaknesses.11 I

introduce the discussion of psychological warfare in

These myths, of course, reveal an appalling ignorance Northern Ireland.
on the part of the informed public, not to mention , The definition of terrorist insurgency offered-at the
governments themselves, of the nature and purposes of beginning of this article places no small emphasis on
interrogation, and they go a long way to explain the the psychological effect of the terrorism process-to
public reaction to the mere mention of the word. immobilise and isolate the population. If the intelli-
Though in the short run the popular image had some gence branch has the task of physically breaking the
useful effects, in the long run making an issue of it subversive organisation, then the role of the psycho-
destroyed interrogation as a useful weapon. logical warfare section is to break it psychologically,
The second problem is more complex. Cunningham and to end the “climate of fear” in which the popula-
argues that since 1917, interrogation has been declining tion lives by restoring their sense of security. To this
in use as a means of obtaining useful military informa- end, the psychological warfare programme should be
tion. Instead, it is used as it has been used since ancient closely integrated with the other elements of the
times-to extract confessions, thereby providing a counter-insurgency campaign. A Director of Psycho-
24
 logical Warfare should sit on the security committee, deal with because they \\.‘erepolitical problems related
with easy access to the Director of Operations, and directly to Ulster’s status as part of the United
with a psyops staff to support him. The government’s Kingdom. The first problem was that until Direct
message, which must be the truth, should be spoken Rule, there was no one voice speaking as the authority
by one voice, directed at two targets: first, the insur- on Northern Ireland. Stormont and Westminster
gents, to sap their morale, to sow dissension, to could disagree publicly on political and security issues,
encourage surrenders, and to put across the image of a and there was not even unity of outlook within the
firm, efficient, just, and generous government; ruling Unionist Party at Stormont. Thus for nearly
secondly, the people themselves, loyal, uncommitted, three years, the Government’s approach to psyops and
and hostile, t o ensure that the insurgents’ objectives countering propaganda failed in this crucial aspect.
do not coincide with those of the people, and to From 1972 onwards the problem was of a different
convince the people that they stand to benefit from nature: the Army, which was supposed to be neutral
supporting the government.’s in the conflict between Catholic and Protestant, found
itself fighting terrorism from both sides. So it was
difficult for the security forces to put out a single,
The offensive direct message drawing a clear distinction between
“good” and “bad”.
The Army recognised that in counter-insurgency, Secondly, complete freedom of the Press, any
“actions speak louder than words”, and within a few restriction of which would be politically unacceptable,
months of its initial deployment in the province, the left the Government and the security forces at the
Army went on the psychological “offensive”. Its
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mercy of the media. Unfortunately, emotions run high

effortssinceautumn 1969 have included the following.1G in the Ulster situation, and the first story, or the most
sensational story, out of any incident is the one most
1. A “hearts and minds” offensive beginning in
likely to be believed. The Army has always felt that the
November 1969-community projects; bisectarian truth will out in the end to the satisfaction of all
youth clubs in Belfast; dances, hiking trips, sports
concerned, but this has not necessarily been the case.
facilities for young people; and a , meals-on-wheels Thorough investigation of incidents takes time, and by
service for the elderly in Londonderry.
the time a report appears, the damage already done
2. About the same time, the establishment of joint may be irreparable. Internment, interrogation, and
Army/RUC county security committees, to coordinate “Bloody Sunday” are classic examples of issues which
activities outside Belfast and Londonderry. were cleverly exploited by IRA propagandists before
3. From October 1970, the Army used civil repre-
the government could respond in detail. It was not
sentatives (civil servants) in districts to coordinate
until this year that the Army changed the way it issued
civil-military efforts and to win over the population.
information to the Press-emphasising Army successes,
The civil representatives acted as trouble-shooters,
and reporting incidents only when specifically re-
dealing with a wide range of problems, from youth and quested to provide details.17
welfare work to damage claims following violence. Thirdly, it has proved impossible to counter IRA
With representatives from the Army, RUC, and local propaganda internationally. Until recently, American
councils, they sat on coordinating committees which politicians exploited the strongly Republican Irish
were open to all and would hear complaints and lobby for their own domestic purposes. Furthermore,
organise action. because it regards Ulster as an internal problem, the
4. The public relations programme was stepped up
British Government refuses to discuss it at the United
at Army HQ at the end of 1971, with the establish- Nations, where damaging charges have gone un-
ment of an information policy cell-a “PR think tank“
answered.
which studied trends in reporting and tried to keep Finally, during the first few years of the emergency,
one step ahead in the propaganda war. the Army’s own psyops capabilities were limited. One
5. Operation Motorman, 31 July 1972-a classic officer remarked that, “It would take an advertising
security operation, perfectly timed to exploit a major campaign of genius to sell the British Army in the
IRA blunder (Bloody Friday, 21 July). The Army
Catholic ghettoes . . .”,la but in 1970, the Army’s
drove a wedge physically and psychologically between entire psyops resources consisted of 30 men, half of
the IRA and the Catholic population, and re-estab- whom were overseas and the remainder in England.
lished itself as the protector of the people. As late as 1973 there was still a need for a high-
6 . A basic policy of openness with the Press, making ranking civilian to advise the security committee on
every facility available to them, providing information, public relations forward-planning to pre-empt hostile
allowing them to come on patrols and operations, and
propaganda.19
encouraging individual soldiers to explain their job
to the press-the Army recognised that on TV the
private soldier is sometimes more credible than the British doctrine
GOC. The Army’s counter-insurgency doctrine, evolved
over 25 years of fighting insurgency in the Empire, was
Problems dificult to apply in Ulster because the doctrine was not
designed for domestic use, that is, for a semi-peace-
Even so, the security forces encountered major keeping role between two warring communities within
problems in the psychological warfare campaign, the United Kingdom. The restrictions and harsh
most of which were beyond the scope of the Army to measures which had made a successful campaign
25
 possible in Malaya could not be applied readily in 1 Frank Kitson, Low hitensity Operations: Sirbversiori,
Britain, with its long traditions of individual liberty Itisiirgericy. Peacekecpiiig (London), 1971 ; repr. 1972, p. 95;
and freedom of the press. In Malaya, thousands of see also Sir Robert Thompson, Dcfeatiirg Coaiitiiiiiist Iiiairgericy.
Experiericesfiorr~Alalaja arid Vietriatii (London), 1966, p. 55.
miles from home, operations beyond the jungle fringe 2 All of the standard works on counter-insurgency devote a
could be conducted in almost complete secrecy; in great deal of attention to intelligence. See Kitson, pp. 95-131;
Ulster, the daily movements of a patrol may be seen Thompson, pp. 55-57, 84-89; Richard Clutterbuck, The Lorig,
on TV that evening, in Belfast and in London. More- Lorig JVar: The Emergency in Malaya 19-18-1960 (London),
1966, pp. 95-1 11, 122-31 ; Julian Paget, Coirriter-irrritrgericy
over, because Northern Ireland is constitutionally part Compo@iiug (London), 1967, pp. 157-63; and Simon Hutchin-
of the United Kingdom, the problem is a domestic son, “The police role in counter-insurgency operations”,
one, and politicians in London are more inclined to RUSI Joimiol, 114, December, 1969, pp. 56-61.’
intervene directly in the actual conduct of security 3 Richard Clutterbuck, Protest arid the Urban Giierrillo
policy and operations, the decision to order low- (London), 1973, pp. 60-66.70-93.
4 Ibid.; see also Tom Bonden, “hien in the middle-the U K
profile patrolling being a case in point. Thus, British Police”, Corijlicf Stitdies, 68, February 1976, pp. 7-8, 17-18;
counter-insurgency doctrine, while applicable from the and Rt Hon. James Callaghan, A Hoiise Dirided. Tlie Dileirinia
point of view of general principles, required specific of Nortliern Ireland (London), 1973. The police suffered 368
modification to take into account Ulster’s unique casualties in the 1969 riots, and 522 between 1970 and August
1975, which means that nearly one policeman in four had been
position. Owing to police weakness, the Army had to killed or wounded. Civilian casualties for the same periods
adapt intelligence-gathering techniques which had amounted to 1 in 150. Sec Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urbaii
been developed in less visible environments, where Gricrrilla, p. 88; and David Barzilay, The Britisli rlrriiy 11Ulster
they were less open to question or criticism. It is (Belfast), 1975, v. 2, p. 254.
5 Brigadier G. L. C . Cooper, “Some aspects of conflict in
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obvious, however, that more thought should have been Ulster”, British Antiy Review, 43, April 1973, p. 72.
given to interrogation, which was an obvious target 6 “Ulster: politics and terrorism”, Coriflict Stiidics, 36,
for press interest and IRA propaganda. And it is in the (June 1973), pp. 9-10; Brigadier W.F. K.Thompson, “Northern,
field of psychological warfare that the greatest weak- Ireland to 1973”, Brassey’s Aniiiml, 1973, p. 77; Robert hioss,
nesses were revealed. Despite several decades of “The spreading Irish conflict, Part 2: the security of Ulster”,
Coiijlict Stridies, 17, November 1971, p. 22; Barzilay, British
experience in fighting against “propaganda wars Ariiiy iii Ulster, v. 2, pp. 89, 91; Clutterbuck, Protest and ,lie
backed by force”, both the British Government and Urban Girerrilla, pp. 100-103; Colonel Norman L. Dodd, “The
the Army appear to have been unprepared to fight corporals’ war: internal security operations in Northern
that kind of war in Ulster. The Army’s psyops re- Ireland”, Militnry Review, 56, July 1976, pp. 62-63; Simon
sources were insignificant a t the outbreak of the \vary Winchester, “HOW thc SAS moved in on the terrorists”,
Gimrdiori, 11 December 1976, p. 11.
so its efforts tended to be ndhoc. The British Govern- 7 “Ulster: politics and terrorism”, Corflict Stirdies, pp. 6,
ment, for its part, showed a complete lack of under- 10; Thompson, “Northern Ireland to 1973”, Brossey’s Atinrial,
standing of the power (for good and evil) of propa- p. 76; Clutterbuck. Protest and the Urban Girerrilla, pp. 129-31.
ganda. Apart from letting itself get trapped into propa- 8 Covert operations, by their very nature, must remain
secret to be successful; sources on such operations, therefore, arc
ganda disasters such as internment, the Government sketchy a t best. See “Ulster: polities and terrorism”, Conflict
does not appear to have made a conscious effort to Studies, pp. 6, 10; Barzilay, British Ariiiy irr Ulster, v. 2, p. 91 ;
“sell” the British case either to the people of the Colonel hi. A. J. Tugwell, “Revolutionary propaganda and the
province or to the rest of the United Kingdom. Nor role of information services in counter-insurgency operations”
Cariadiari Defence Quarterly, 3, Autumn, 1973, p. 29; Win-
was there, until 1972, an organised plan to counter
IRA propaganda or to discourage bad journalism;
chester, “How the SAS .. .’’ Giiordioii, p. 11; Derek Brown,
“SAS men join army patrols”, Girarrliarr, 11 December 1976,
until that time the IRA held the initiative in the p. 20. There have rarely been more than 60 SAS members in the
propaganda war. It was weakness in this aspect of the province a t any one time, but soldiers from other units, trained
campaign that posed the greatest threat to the intelli- by the SAS, have served in Northern Ireland. Since thc summer
of 1976 the role of the SAS has been expanded beyond County
gence side: the Government was unable to prevent Armagh. The Army has denied that Captain Nairac \\.as a
certain methods from being compromised simply by member of the SAS, but said that he has worked with them.
virtue of their being called into question, either 9 “Ill-treatment but not brutality”, Giiardiaii, 20 November
deliberately by IRA propagandists or unwittingly by 1971, p. 8-a summary of the evidence and findings of the
merely inquisitive journalists. The Government and Compton Tribunal; Stewart Tendler, “Ulster interrogation is
condemned as torture”, The Tinies, 3 September 1976, p. 4;
the security forces were continually on the defensive, staff reporter, “Techniques were changed after report”, The
forced to justify rather than to explain. Tinies, ibid.; the objectionable methods included the ivall
It is probably fair to say that, in the light of the cur- standing posture, hooding, noise, sleep deprivation, and diet.
rent state of affairs in Northern Ireland, many of these Twelve persons were subjected to these methods in August 1971,
problems have been overcome. The security situation, and two more in October, making ;1 total of 14. The Compton
Tribunal investigated allegations of brutality against the
while far from stable, is vastly improved since 1972, security forces, and the committee of Privy Councillors under
owing in no small part to successful intelligence and Lord Parker studied interrogation techniques.
psychological warfare operations. But it is not un- 10 Cyril Cunningham, ’ “International interrogation tech-
reasonable to conclude that Northern Ireland’s close niques”, RUSIJournal, 117, September 1972, p. 31.
proximity to Britain and its status as a province, the 11 Ibid. %‘

12 Ibid., pp. 32-33; hiajo6 hiichael Banks, “Thc Army in

ambivalent position of the Army between the Catholic Northern Ireland”, Brassey’s A~niiral, 1972, pp. 151-52. The
and Protestant communities, and the high visibility latest instructions on interrogation proccdures, Including basic
that ensued from this unique position, made intelli- safeguards, were issued in 1965 and were revised after a rcport
gence and psychological warfare operations difficult on interrogation methods used in Aden. Two changes were
in the first few years of the emergency, and forced the made-a requirement for daily medical inspection, and a
decision that interrogation should not be carried out by Army
British Army to modify its counter-insurgency doctrine personnel. In Ulster, the Armytrained the R U C in interrogation.
to fit the special requirements of Northern Ireland. See hir Roderie Bowen, QC, Report, onprocediires for rlie arrest,
26
 iriterrogntiorr mid deterifion of siispccfed terrorists iti Aden, 18 Banks, “The Army in Northern Ireland”, Brnssey’s
Comd. 3165 (London). November 1966; Francis Boyd and Arniiinl, pp. 153-54.
David Fairhall, “Lord Parker heads inquiry”, Girarrliuri. 20 19 According to Kitson, Low Iriteiisity Operations, p. 188,
November 1971, p. 7. the total psyops forces available t o the three services in 1970
13 Clutterbuck, Protest a d tlie Urbnri Gircrrilla, p. 101. consisted of: 1 staff officer a t hloD. and I at each of three ovcr-
14 Thompson, “Northern Ireland to 1973”. Brnssey’s seas IiQs; 2 oflicers on strength a t the Joint Warfare Establish-
Aruiiral, p. 77. ment, who ran courses o n psyops-those i\ho attended thc
15 As with intelligence, the classical writers devote a great courses were earmarked as being suitable for employment in
deal of attention to psychological warfare. See Chapter 8. psyops should the need arise; a service team, consisting of 1
“Information Scrvices”, in Thompson, Defeotirig Cortinrrrriist officer and 11 other ranks, deployed at that time in a n undis-
Irisirrgetrcy, pp. 90-102; Kitson, Low Iriferrsily Operafiorrs. pp. closed overscas location (not Ulster); and one reserve team
77-79. 187-97; Paget, Corirrter-irisirrgerrcy Cunrpoigriirig, pp. 123, being formed as part of a n infantry battalion-if required for an
148-50, 160, 173-74, 178; and Tugwll, “Revolutionary propa- operation it would have to be detached from the unit which
..
ganda .”,Canudiun Defence Qirurterly, pp. 32-34. would therefore lose all thc benefit of having raised and trained
16 Banks. “The Army in Northern Ireland”, Brnssey’s the team. See also Thompson, “Northern Ireland to 1973”.
Arinirnl, pp. 153-54; Clutterbuck, Protest oridtlie Urbnn Giierrilln, Brassey’s Anriirul, p. 79.
p. 89; Cooper, “Sornc aspects of conflict .. .”, Brifish Arrtry Aside from thc sources already quoted, the following provided
Review, p. 73; Lieutenant-Colonel P. W. Graham, “Low-level useful background reading: Brigadier C. N. Barclay, “British
civil/military coordination, Belfast, 1970-73”. RUSI Joimial, Forces and internal security: past experiend and the future”,
119, September. 1974. pp. 80-84; Lieutenant-Coloncl H. C. Brassey’s Anrriiul, 1973, pp. 81-95; J. Bowyer Bell, “Revolts
hlillman, “The watch on the Foyle”, The Irfurrtrytiari, 86, against the Crown: the British response to imperial insurgency”,
November 1970, pp. 21-23, 25-26; Captain T. A. Coutts- farurriefers,4, 1974, pp. 31-46; Gencral The Lord Bourne, “The
Britton. “Clausewitz on Ulster”, British Army Review, 43, direct ion of ant i-guerrilla operations”, Brussey’s Aririiml, 196-1,
April 1973, p. 13; “Ulster: politics and terrorism”, Co~rflct pp. 205-13; Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Clutterbuck. “Bertrand
Stirdies, p. 7. Stewart Prizc Essay, 1960”, Arttry Qirurterly orid Deferice Joirrrial,
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17 Banks, “The Army in Northern Ireland”, Brassey’s 81, October 1960, pp. 161-SO; Anthony Dane-Drumniond,
Arirrirul, pp. 151-52, 154-55; Cooper, “Some aspects of con- Riot Coritrol (London), 1975; General Sir Richard Gale, “Old
..
flict .”,Brifislr Army Review, pp. 76-77; Chris Ryder, “Arnmy problem: new setting”, KUSI Jorrrtinl, 117. hiarch 1972, pp.
plans t o stress ‘successes’ ”, Sii/rduy Times, 27 February 1977 43-46; and Julian Pagct, Lasf Post: Aden 1961-67 (London),
p. 2. 1969.

The Soviet-Syrian Military

Relationship 1955-77
By PETER MANGOLD

In its dealings with the Middle East, the Soviet The origins of the Soviet-Syrian military relation-
Union has had frequent occasion to exploit its military ship go back to the mid-l950s, when Syria came under
capability and prestige. It has done this through the pressure to join the Baghdad Pact, pressure which
occasional issue of public warnings or private promises, included Turkish and Iraqi troop movements along
through the alerting and deployment of some military the Syrian border. The Syrians, however, were strongly
units during periods of heightened tension and through opposed to an organisation which they regarded as a
the almost continuous transfer of a variety of military new form of veiled colonialism and as a distraction
resources to local clients. All of these modes of military from what they saw as the more important problem of
policy have been applied in the case of Syria, for the Israel.
country’s importance in Soviet Middle Eastern policy To MOSCOW, the Pact appeared as a link in the
was substantial. Politically progressive, Syria played encircling chain of capitalist alliances, NATO and
a key role both in inter-Arab politics and in the SEATO, and as a potential threat to the security of
ArabIsraeli conflict. It outflanked Turkey to the southern Russia. Thus it is not so surprising that on
south, and it had, of course, a Mediterranean coastline. 23 March 1955, in a clear reference to Turkish and
Strategically and politically therefore, it was a com- Iraqi prcssure, Molotov informed the Syrian envoy in
plement, and at a later stage an alternative, to the Moscow that the Soviet Union supported Syria’s
more important Soviet-Egyptian connection. Although attitude and was “willing to extend to it aid in any
for many years the Russians did not attempt to build form whatsoever for the purpose of safeguarding
Syria up as a major military power, they did seek Syria’s independence and sovereignty”.l This assur-
military facilities of their own in the country, as well ance was followed by offers of economic and technical
as influence over its domestic and foreign policies. aid. But it was the sale of arms, previously denied by
In so doing the Soviet Union became closely involved the Western Powers, which had the real impact on
in Syria’s foreign and defence policies becoming, in Soviet-Syrian friendship, strengthening the precarious
effect, the country’s armourer and its protector of last domestic position of the Sabri al-Asali government,
resort. and its anti-Western orientation. As Patrick Seale
27