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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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JAPANESE OPERATIONAL ART IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

by

Paul S. Holmes

Commander, U. S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in

partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of
Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and

are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
Department of the Navy.

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14 June 1996

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Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

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8 . Xitle (Include Security Classification): Japanese Operational Art in the Russo Japanese War*
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9* Personal Authors: Commander Paul S. Holmes, U*S. Navy

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13.Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial

satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper
reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the
Department of the Navy. ___

14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Russo-Japanese War, Operational Design,
Port Arthur, General Oyama, General Kuropatkin, Admiral Togo, Mukden, Liaoyang,
Campaign Strategy, War Termination.

15.Abstract: The Russo-Japanese War offers unique opportunity to evaluate a campaign

in which the less powerful country was able to overcome its stronger adversary. The
Japanese campaign provides numerous clear examples of the application of
fundamentals of operational design. Taking advantage of its geographic position, and
through the execution of a well conceived military and political campaign, that
included predetermined and limited military objectives, the Japanese were able to
attain an advantage across the area of operations resulting in a favorable negotiated
peace. The Japanese were able to achieve their success, despite the Russians initial
superiority on land and at sea, and despite the Russian's original objective of total
defeat and occupation of Japan.

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 ABSTRACT

The Russo-Japanese War offers an almost unique opportunity to

evaluate a campaign, fought by conventional means, in which the

less powerful country was able to overcome its stronger

adversary. The Japanese campaign provides numerous clear examples

of the application of the fundamentals of operational design.

Taking advantage of its geographic position, and through the

execution of a well conceived military and political campaign,

that included predetermined and limited military objectives, the

Japanese were able to attain an advantage across the area of

operations, and concluded a favorable negotiated peace. The

Japanese were able to achieve their success, despite the Russians

having initial superiority on land and at sea, and despite the

Russian's original objective of total defeat and occupation of

Japan.

ii
 Table of Contents

Abstract ii

List of Appendices and Maps iv

I. Introduction 1

II. Strategic Background and the Theater of Operations 1

III. The Japanese Campaign Strategy 4

IV. Japanese Execution - The Historical Campaign 7

- Naval Operations in 1904 and the Role of Port Arthur 7

- Operations from War Declaration to Liaoyang 10

- Operations from Liaoyang to Mukden 13

V. Tsushima and War Termination 19

VI. Conclusions and Lessons Learned 20

- Conclusions 20

- Lessons Learned 25

Appendices 27

Map 36

Bibliography 44

Notes 46

iii
 LIST OF APPENDICES AND IILLUSTRATIONS

APPENDICES

Appendix-1 Key Events 27

Appendix-2 Cast of Characters 28

Appendix-3 Opposing Armies at Mukden 30

Appendix-4 The Battle of the Sha-Ho 31

Appendix-5 The Battle of San-de-pu 33

Appendix-6 The Battle of Mukden 34

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure-1 The Theater of War 36

Figure-2 The Area of Operations 37

Figure-3 Port Arthur and Environs 38

Figure-4 The Battles of Yalu and Telissu 39

Figure-5 The approach to Liaoyang and the Battle 40

Figure-6 Detail of the Battle of Liaoyang 41

Figure-7 The Battles of the Sha-Ho and Mukden 42

Figure-8 Detail of the Battle of Mukden 43

INTRODUCTION;

The Russo-Japanese War lasted from February 8, 1904, until

September 5, 1905. It was the first major war of the twentieth

century, and would have profound influence upon the planning of

all major powers leading up to World War I. This war was the

first truly modern war, in which machine guns and rapid fire

artillery were employed in significant numbers, and witnessed the

first major action at sea between fleets of modern armored

warships. Military representatives from every major European

power made their way to the theater of war, to observe and record

the events as they unfolded. This paper draws upon the

observations of some of those witnesses, as well as other

secondary sources, both Japanese and Western, to examine Japanese

operational design before and during the Japanese campaign, in

order to derive conclusions and enduring lessons from this

conflict.

STRATEGIC BACKGROUND AND THE THEATER OF WAR;

In January 1904, as hostilities approached, world opinion

was almost unanimous that the Japanese could not wage and win a

war against Russia. This was based upon the premise that the

overwhelming numerical superiority of the Russian Army and Navy,

would inevitably lead to Russian victory. To overcome the

numerical superiority of the Russian armed forces, Japan was

forced to develop a campaign strategy designed to create, and or

exploit, Russian weaknesses. The war itself was a clash of

1
interests, between two Imperial powers, each seeking to expand

their territory and influence at the expense of their weak and

tottering neighbors. War became inevitable once Russian

territorial aggrandizement, came into conflict with Japanese

territorial aspirations on the Korean Peninsula. Japan, had for

centuries considered Korea of special interest to her security,

and strongly desired that Korea remain solely within the Japanese

sphere of influence. In 1895, Japan had gone to war with China

with the intent of seizing control of Korea and the Liao-Tung

Peninsula in southern Manchuria. Despite a guick victory over the

Chinese, Japan was frustrated in its territorial aspirations by a

coalition of European powers, including Russia. While Japan was

supposedly granted a free hand in Korean affairs, it was forced

to relinquish the Liao-Tung Peninsula back to China. The Japanese

viewed the European intervention as a loss of prestige and as a

national humiliation. The subsequent acquisition of the Liao-Tung

Peninsula, and Port Arthur, by the Russians, as a concession from

the Chinese, only amplified Japanese displeasure and incited

great resentment toward the Russians. In the following years,

Russian economic interests in the north of Korea and Russia's

obstruction of Japanese political plans in Korea, led to the

deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two powers and

eventually led to the outbreak of war.

The area of operations included the Korean peninsula, the

Liao-Tung Peninsula, southern Manchuria, and the adjoining seas;

which consisted of the sea of Japan between the Korean Peninsula

2
and the Japanese home islands, and the Yellow Sea, which forms

the body of water between the Liao-Tung Peninsula and mainland

China (see Figure 2). The Korean peninsula is very mountainous,

is about 400 miles long on the western side and averages about

100 miles in width*. There was only one rail line, recently

completed by the Japanese, in southern Korea that ran from Fusong

to Seoul. North of Seoul, roads were barely more than cart

tracks, making the passage of large bodies of troops and

transport a slow and arduous affair. Japanese Engineers, were

heavily tasked throughout the theater during the war, in an

attempt to improve the roads and rail behind Japanese lines, to

facilitate supply and re-inforcement. Weather throughout the

theater was temperate in the summer, with July and August being

the hottest months, these months were also the rainy season,

winters were cold and harsh^.

Southeastern Manchuria, like Korea, was very rugged and

mountainous, with few good roads and limited passes through its

eastern mountains. The old Mandarin road, was the only major road

from Mukden to the Liao-Tung Peninsula and ran north-south,

parallel with the mountains to the east, and heavily cultivated

flatter land to the west. It was along the path of this road,

that the Russians had extended a spur from the Trans-Siberian

Railway, from Harbin to Port Arthur.

Russia relied upon the Trans-Siberian railway, as their sole

line of communication across the Euro-Asian continent, to deploy

forces to the theater (see Figure 1)^ and despite the rail line.

3
Russian forces remained heavily dependent upon local sources of

food. In contrast, Japan would enjoy comparatively short and

secure lines of communication throughout the war, subject to

their ability to obtain and maintain control the seas in the area

of operations.

THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY:

The Japanese strategic goals were; the occupation of Korea

and the Liao-Tung Peninsula including Port Arthur, and the de¬

militarization of the remainder of Manchuria. The Japanese

operational plan to achieve this, required the careful sequencing

operations on land and sea^. The Japanese intended to make a

total commitment of Japanese assets, to fight a limited war with

limited operational goals. The Japanese objective was to take the

offensive early, take as much territory as possible before the

Russians could deploy sufficient forces to shift the balance of

power, then seek a negotiated peace®.

In support of the military effort, Japan organized, armed,

and funded numerous anti-Tsarist and anti-Russian organizations

within the Russian Empire. The hope was that insurrection and

unrest in European Russia would disrupt and detract from Russian

unity of effort. If successful, it would be impossible for Russia

to conduct a protracted war of the type that would be necessary

to regain territory lost to the Japanese, early in the war. The

Japanese also dispatched an old Harvard classmate of President

Roosevelt, to Washington to request Roosevelt's assistance in

4
arranging a negotiated peace when the time was right.

Despite the war being fought in proximity to Japan, where it

would have the advantage of geographic position, and its line of

supply being comparatively short, it was essential to the

execution of the Japanese campaign plan® that the Japanese Navy

to seize at least temporary control of the sea. This was

especially critical during the early phase of the war when

Japanese Army forces were vulnerable to destruction at sea while

being transported to the mainland. The Japanese, were acutely

aware that without control of the sea, they could not

successfully prosecute the war. The Japanese Field Army, was

Japan's operational center of gravity, and could be defeated on

land in a decisive engagement with Russian land forces, or at

sea, by severing its sea lines of communication from its base of

supply and operations in Japan. Thus the Navy's mission, was to

operate against the Russian Navy, in such a fashion as to ensure

that Japanese troops could be safely transported to Korea and

Manchuria, and to maintain the security of the Japanese Army's

sea lines of communication to Japan.

The Japanese Naval Minister, Admiral Yamamoto, recognized

that the Japanese Navy was no match for the combined strength of

the Russian Navy. The balance of Naval power in the far east,

already in question, was in danger of tipping heavily in favor of

the Russians. The Russians had dispatched a re-inforcing squadron

enroute to the far east, with additional deployments planned. If

the Japanese were to have any hope of success in the war, they

5
would need to strike while there remained hope of seizing at

least temporary control of the sea^.

During the campaign, the sector of main effort, was to be

against the Russian Manchurian Army, which was expected to be

concentrating in the area around Liaoyang*. In the campaign's

first phase, the Japanese Irst Army, was to land on the Korean

Peninsula and establish a forward base of operations near Seoul.

If control of the sea was attained, it would land at Chemulpo

(modern Inchon), half way up the western side of the Korean

peninsula near Seoul. If sea control was not attained, then

Japanese forces would land at Fusan on the southeastern tip of

the Korean peninsula. Once established on the Peninsula, the

Japanese Irst Army was to push north along the western edge of

Korea to the Yalu river and form the eastern pincer of converging

lines of operation, on the main Russian Army near Liaoyang.

In the next phase of the campaign, the Japanese 2nd Army,

was to land on the Liao-Tung Peninsula’. The 2nd Army would be

transported from a forward staging base near Seoul, to the naval

forward base of operations in the Elliot Islands, off the east

coast of the Liao-Tung Peninsula. The Japanese transports would

shelter in the lee of the Elliot Islands, until it was safe to

commence landing. The Japanese Navy was expected to ensure local

sea control during the landing by confining the Russian Navy to

the area around Port Arthur (see Figure 3). Once firmly

established ashore, the 2nd Army, in a repeat of Japan's 1895

success, would quickly capture Port Arthur, denying use of the

6
port to the Russian Navy, and avenging the humiliation of 1895.

The 2nd Army, would then move north on the Liao-Tung Peninsula,

converging upon the main Russian Army from the south and west.

The combined armies would then execute Oyama's plan to envelop

and destroy the Russian Manchurian army at Liaoyang^**, to be

followed by negotiation of a favorable peace.

JAPANESE EXECUTION > THE HISTORICAL CAMPAIGN:

Naval Operations in 1904 and the Role of Port Arthur -

On February 8, 1904, Admiral Togo, the Navy Operational

Commander, launched a surprise night attack against the Russian

Fleet, while it was at anchor, outside the harbor at Port Arthur.

He hoped to inflict a crippling blow to the Russian Fleet and

reduce its strength sufficiently to give Japan local sea control,

and allow the army to be safely landed in Korea. The attack,

although completely successful in terms surprise, had limited

success inflicting physical deuaage to the Russian Fleet. Yet, the

attack did strike a severe psychological blow to the Russian

Pacific fleet from which it never fully recovered. After the

initial attack, Togo decided that his best strategy was to avoid

a general engagement, and minimize the risk of the losses to his

squadron, losses that could not be afforded or replaced”. Upon

filing his report, on the initial stage of his operation, Togo

informed the Naval Ministry, that his intention was to confine

the Russian fleet to Port Arthur and not let it escape to

Vladivostock, he would not seek a decisive sea engagement to get

7
command of the sea'^.

From his advance base of operations in the Elliot Islands,

Togo operated on interior lines against the divided naval forces

of the Russians. The Russian Pacific squadron was divided between

Port Arthur and Vladivostock. Vladivostock was ineffective as a

Naval base due to its position, removed from the main area of

effort and being ice bound part of the year. Port Arthur was an

ideal base of operations for the Russian fleet to operate against

Japanese SLOCs, however, it's weakness was that it was at the end

of a peninsula where it could easily be isolated by the land from

outside support. If the Russians attempted to sortie from Port

Arthur, he planned to block the attempt with his heavy units, and

attempt to influence them to return to Port Arthur. At the same

time, he sought to keep the Russian Cruiser squadron in

Vladivostock, from either operating against Japanese SLOC's or

from joining up with the Port Arthur squadron'^

The Russian's believed their main hope lay in maintaining

the strength of the Pacific squadron until re—inforcements

arrived from Europe. The Russians rationalized their position,

by drawing upon Mahan's concept, then in vogue, of a "fleet in

being" or "fortress fleet". The Russians believed that the

importance of the fleet still resided in its contribution to the

defense of the fortress, rather than in its ability to challenge

for control of the sea‘^. Therefore, as eloquently noted by

Mahan, "the Russian fleet lie like cattle, supinely in Port

Arthur, and allowed its throat to be cut". Had the Russians

8
chosen to come out and go down fighting, they must have inflicted

some damage upon the Japanese fleet, or may have fought their way

clear to open seas. Instead they remained in port, eventually to

be destroyed by the Japanese Army, with its siege guns.

By remaining in Port Arthur, the Russian fleet did add an

important operational objective, to what otherwise would have

been primarily a political objective’*. The siege of Port

Arthur, evolved into a branch in the Japanese operational plan,

that assumed increased importance due to the unexpected intensity

of the resistance by the defending land forces and the presence

of the Russian fleet. Port Arthur was a secondary sector of

effort, that would influence the outcome of the battles being

fought in the main sector of effort to the north. The Japanese

were compelled to take Port Arthur, prior to the arrival of

Russian naval re-inforcement, in order to protect the lines of

communication of their own center of gravity. Also, as long as

Port Arthur held out, the Japanese would not have unity of effort

on land, due to the dual operational objectives of, the Russian

Manchurian Field army and the Naval Base at Port Arthur’*. In the

end, the value of Port Arthur was that it had protected the

Russian fleet” and forced a division of Japanese strength’*. It

cost the Japanese 3rd Army, 60,000 casualties and diverted

almost 200,000 Japanese troops away from operations in the main

sector of effort against the Russian Army in Manchuria”. The

protracted siege, possibly prevented the Japanese from attaining

their planned decisive victory at Liaoyang^®.

9
Operations from War Declaration to the Battle of Liaovana -

Initially, the campaign proceeded according to Japanese plans^*.

On February 17th, the Japanese Irst Army landed at Chemulpo and

by the 25th of February, Japanese infantry had moved north to

Pyongyang^^. As ice began to break in the Northern ports along

the Korean coast, the Japanese moved their landing points north

from Inchon, to a new forward base of operations near Chinampo.

The early movement of Japanese troops north, was impeded solely

by their ability to supply themselves. On April 4th, the

Japanese had reached the southern bank of the Yalu river, thus it

the Japanese required almost 6 weeks to move 130 miles from

Chinampo to the Yalu, due primarily to the difficulty of

transport and supply along the way.

The basic theme of the Japanese plan at the Battle of the

Yalu (see Figure 4), would be repeated throughout the campaign. A

Japanese assault along the Russian center, designed to hold it in

place, while executing a flanking maneuver to envelop the Russian

position^. With victory at Yalu, Japan had obtained it's first

objective of the war, the occupation of Korea.

While the 1st Army had been moving north, the 2nd Army had

been deployed to its foirward staging base near Seoul. On May

Irst, in synchronization with the Japanese start of the Battle of

the Yalu, the Japanese 2nd Army moved aboard its transports to

shelter at the advance naval base in the Elliot Islands^'*. The

Japanese 1st Army crossed the Yalu and moved north, taking a

strong defensive position on the Russian eastern flank, until the

10
Japanese 2nd Army was completely ashore. The advantages of the

Irst Army advancing north over the Yalu, was that it would be in

a position difficult for the Russians to attack, while also being

in position to threaten the flank of any relieving force the

Russians might send to the Liao-Tung peninsula^^.

On May 5th, the 2nd Army commenced an unopposed landing on

the Liao-Tung peninsula. Togo screened the landing, by conducting

a diversionary attack against the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur,

and by setting up a dummy minefield in the fairway between the

Elliot Islands and the peninsula. The 2nd Army quickly isolated

the Kuan-Tung peninsula from the north, severing direct

communication between Port Arthur and Liaoyang. The 2nd Army

proceeded to invest Port Arthur, then moved north until meeting

and defeating the Russians at the Battle of Tellisu^®.

Soon after Telissu, the Japanese 4th Army, landed near

Takushan on the Manchurian coast, south of Liaoyang, and served

as a linkage between the previously divided Japanese Armies^’.

The three Japanese armies then began to cooperate as they moved

north and continued with operations designed to converge on and

envelop the main Russian force concentrated near Liaoyang^* (see

Figure 5).

The course of the campaign was in some ways being shaped by

the terrain. The Japanese, operating along the Korean and

Manchurian coasts, and on the Liao-Tung Peninsula, were mainly

supplied by sea. The Russians, in the central position, were

forced to stay close to the railway to maintain itself in supply.

11
and to protect reinforcements debarking as they arrived from

Europe. By the end of July, the Russian Army had grown to the

point where it was beyond Kuropatkin's effective span of control

and was accordingly re-organized into the Irst and 2nd Manchurian

Armies^’. The ultimate aim of the Japanese, remained the

destruction of the Russian operational center of gravity, the

Russian Manchurian field army, however, the capture of Port

Arthur and the destruction of the Russian fleet taking shelter

there, remained a critical point that influenced the prosecution

of the Japanese campaign^®. As the Japanese advanced into

southern Manchuria, they were being increasingly stretched

between these two major operational objectives.

Despite the unexpectedly determined defense of Port Arthur,

the campaign continued to unfold essentially as the Japanese had

planned. The Japanese had maintained a relatively high rate of

operational tempo, staying on the offensive and keeping the

Russians on the retreat. The individual armies were able to

continually press forward and maintained their operational

momentum driving numerically superior Russian advance forces back

toward Liaoyang. The Japanese lines of operation were converging

on Liaoyang, and for the first time 3 Japanese field armies would

be fighting together in a single battle. Unfortunately for Japan,

the Japanese 3rd army was still conducting the siege of Port

Arthur and was not available at Liaoyang^*.

The Battle was fought between 25 August and 3 September, and

was a Japanese victory, but not the decisive victory for which

12
they had hoped and planned^^ (see Figure 6) . The primary reasons

that the Japanese failed to attain their operational objective of

enveloping and destroying the Russian army at Liaoyang, was that

the Russians had been able to bring more men to the area of

operations on the Trans-Siberian railway, than was originally

believed possible and that Port Arthur had held out longer than

was expected, and therefore kept the 3rd Army away from the main

sector of effort.

Operations from Liaovanq to Mukden;

The Japanese campaign had fallen short of its goal of a

decisive victory at Liaoyang and now entered into a campaign

sequel or sequential phase. Up to the end of the battle of

Liaoyang the Japanese had been repeatedly the active or offensive

force, and the Russians the passive, or defensive force.

Operations had been a succession of intermittent but successful

Japanese offensive actions, resulting in steady advances by the

Japanese. After Liaoyang, Oyama realized that his forces needed

an extended pause to rest and regain their strength, recoup their

losses, and bring forward their supplies^^. By the middle of

September, the Japanese were able to consolidate their lines of

communication, completely repairing and re-bridging the route

along the Mandarin road and the Russian railroad, significantly

improving their ability to move supplies north. However, the

Japanese operational pause after Liaoyang, had allowed the

Russians to seize the initiative and they assumed the offensive

13
at the Battle of the Sha-ho^.

Operationally, the Battle of Sha-ho (see Appendix 4 and

Figure 7) was a Russian defeat, for it failed to drive the

Japanese back and did not relieve the pressure on Port Arthur.

The main effect of the battle was another psychological boost for

Japanese forces and a correspondingly depressing effect on

Russian forces.

The Battle of Sha-Ho provides a excellent opportunity to

examine the contrast in operational leadership of the opposing

Commanders. Oyama was a master of centralized planning and

decentralized execution. Oyama's operational leadership was

characterized by delegation, issuing general orders to the army

as a whole, as the tide of battle dictated. He assigned specific

duties, responsibilities or objectives, then allowed subordinates

to execute their tasks without interference. His role was limited

to assembling an Operational Reserve and sending re-inforcements

to the Commanders in the field, to provide them the means to

execute their orders^*. At the Sha-Ho, Oyama, did not leave

Liaoyang until October 10th, halfway through the battle. Once he

approached the front, he remained in constant telephone

communication with his Army Commander's Headquarters, through

whom he coordinated the whole line of the front. He rarely had

any units under his direct command, and once the units that were

under his direct command engaged the enemy, he rarely attempted

to interfere with details of the battle^*. At Sha-Ho, each

Japanese Army was given a specific task to perform during the

14
battle, the method by which it was to be executed was left

entirely up to the individual Army Commanders.

In juxtaposition, throughout the campaign, Kuropatkin was

near the front and sometimes bypassed his army Commanders to

communicate with tactical portions of the Russian army. He often

sought to meddle in individual tactical actions, instead of

remaining detached and effectively coordinating the movements of

the whole army. Many of his orders were sent by courier, at times

vaguely written or contradictory, contributing to the confusion

in the Russian lines. This sometimes resulted in units remaining

inactive when they were supposed to attack, while others marched

and countermarched, from one side of the battle to the other,

without ever effectively engaging the enemy. Thus Kuropatkin

frequently failed to remain at the operational level^^.

After the Sha-ho, there was another operational pause,

during which neither the Russians or the Japanese were capable of

conducting significant offensive operations. The Japanese would

prove unable to pursue further offensive actions until after the

fall of Port Arthur, due to lack of reserves and bad weather.

Consequently, the Japanese forward positions were constructed to

facilitate an active defense and the Japanese 7th Division, was

sent to assist the 3rd army at Port Arthur^*.

On the Russian side, supplies had become strained as local

sources of food became unreliable, reserve stocks were consumed

and with the onset of winter, the need for winter clothing could

not be fully met^’. During the pause, Russian forces were again

15
re-organized, this time into 3 field armies, as span of control

became increasingly difficult, as new Russian units continued to

arrive in theater'**’.

It was during this second operational pause in Manchuria,

that Port Arthur finally fell to the Japanese. Port Arthur's

capitulation, gave Japan temporary undisputed sea control, added

to Japanese prestige at home and abroad, gave Togo the

opportunity to effect much needed repairs to his ships before the

arrival of the Baltic Fleet, meant the Baltic Fleet had only one

Port of destination, and most importantly, released the Japanese

3rd Army to join operations with the main army, near Mukden"*’.

The fall of Port Arthur changed the operational scheme of the

campaign. The Russians were no longer compelled to attempt to

relieve pressure on Port Arthur. The Japanese now had unity of

effort for their forces, and the Japanese could resume offensive

operations, as soon as the 3rd army recovered and moved north.

On January 22nd, demonstrations in front of Winter Palace

had ended in bloodshed and Russian officials were becoming

desperate for good news from the front, to help improve the mood

of the people and help stem the tide of civil unrest^^.

Kuropatkin was aware of this, and with a series of options

available, chose to attempt another offensive"*^. Attack was the

correct decision, retreat would lengthen Japanese supply lines,

but would have had a negative impact on the already shaky morale

of his army, and meant the politically unacceptable abandonment

of Mukden without a fight. Attack would also take advantage of

16
the most positive balance of forces, that could be foreseen for

quite a period of time. The ensuing Battle of San-de-pu, was to

be the last attempt by the Russians to turn the tide of the

campaign, and was characterized by its bloodiness, yet resulted

in essentially no change in position being attained by either

side'*^.

The stage was now set for Mukden, the final and greatest

land battle of the war. This was to be a Japanese maximum effort

to attain the enveloping and decisive victory that had been the

original object of their plans and which had eluded them at

Liaoyang'**. Striking now was imperative, spring was not far away

and would soon turn the plains into mud and make rivers

unfordable, making offensive operations increasingly difficult.

Also, the Russian Baltic fleet was approaching, with uncertain

effect upon Japanese SLOGS'**.

By February 18th, the Japanese were ready, the 3rd Army had

re-deployed to the area north of Liaoyang, and the newly

established Japanese 5th Army (Yalu), had been positioned on the

Japanese extreme right flank*^. Critical to the Japanese

operational plan at Mukden (see appendix 6 and map 8), was

success of Japanese operational deception and the synchronization

of Japanese forces throughout the battle. The plan, which was

well conceived, was designed to only gradually reveal it's true

strength, disposition, and true point of attack. The Japanese

planned their first attack in the east, to draw off the Russian

operational reserve, followed by a major effort to envelop the

17
Russians in 'the west. The center of the Russian line was not to

be attacked until induced to pull back from its prepared

positions, into open terrain, by the flanking attacks. Once the

Russians had withdrawn from their prepared fortified positions,

there would be a general attack with the intent of enveloping

both Russian flanks^*.

The Japanese 5th Army was to be the first to attack in the

east, against the Russian left flank, followed by the 4th Army's

attack on the Russian right flank. The Irst and 2nd Armies when

directed, would attack the Russian center. The last and most

important aspect of the plan, was the movement and attack of the

concealed 3rd Army against the Russian extreme right, in an

attempt to turn the Russian right flank, envelop the Russians and

cut their line of coitanunication. However, the wide wheeling

attack demanded of the 3rd army turned out to be beyond its

capability to execute, despite Oyama's commitment of the Japanese

operational reserve to the enveloping effort. In this era just

prior to mechanical transport, all movement was by foot. Due to

this lack of maneuver speed, the Japanese were unable to turn the

Russian retreat into a rout, and the defeated Russian forces were

able extract themselves from the battle and to withdraw from the

field despite suffering heavy losses.

At Mukden, the Japanese had attacked a numerically superior

enemy and forced it from a entrenched position, driven it in

disorder from a second, and compelled it to retreat one hundred

miles. Yet, the Japanese had advanced as far as their resources

18
and supply lines would allow, the Japanese undoubtedly reached

their culminating point sometime during the Battle of Mukden, and

now could only eagerly hope for, and actively seek peace'*’.

TSUSHIMA AND WAR TERMINATION:

On May 27, 1905, the naval battle at Tsushima took place.

The result was the destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet, the

end of Russia as a first class naval power and guarantee of

permanent control of the seas and security of it's SLOGS for the

Japanese. The Japanese victory at Tsushima had its greatest

effect in Moscow, where the Russian governing nobility, who had

previously steadfastly supported the war now urged peace. The

cumulative damage to Russian prestige resulting from Mukden and

Tsushima, as well as to the will of the Russian people, proved to

be terminal and made peace negotiations possible. On June 9th,

President Roosevelt, called on the belligerents to open direct

peace negotiations*®. Peace negotiations commenced on August 9th

and peace terms were concluded September 5th. At the wars end,

the Russian Field Army in Manchuria was about 470,000 men,

whereas Japanese strength was estimated at 300,000 men. The

balance of power seemed to have clearly shifted to the Russian

Army in the field and Japan was reaching the point of exhaustion

of its financial resources and its ability to send men to the

field. There were several reasons why the Russians accepted an

uneven peace. At the operational level, there was serious

dissension in the ranks, large numbers of troops in the field had

19
low morale and only wanted to go home, and the limit of Trans-

Siberian railway had been reached, and could not long support and

maintain so large an army. More important though, at the

strategic level, the Russian center of gravity had been defeated.

The Russian nation was now tired of a war that was never popular,

and the will of the Russian people had collapsed. The Russian

Empire was in danger of being torn apart by grave internal

political revolt that threatened to overthrow Tsar Nicholas II

and the Romanov dynasty.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

Conclusions -

1. strategically and operationally, the war was a Japanese

victory, yet the Russian Manchurian Army Group was more powerful

at war's end than at its beginning.

2. The Japanese repeatedly used frontal attacks to pin the enemy

and reduce his ability to respond to flanking attacks.

3. Frontal attacks against well prepared positions usually failed

and only generated large casualties.

4. Heavy field guns were critical to the capture of heavily

fortified positions, especially Port Arthur.

5. Russian forces were hampered by the absence of unity of effort

within its command structure**.

6. The effectiveness and lethality of the machine gun was proven

throughout the campaign and came into greater demand and use as

the campaign wore on.

20
7. Aerial Reconnaissance would have been invaluable but saw only

limited use by either side.

8. Final Japanese victory was due to the collapse of the will of

the Russian people

9. Control of the sea was essential to allow the movement of

Japanese troops safely to Korea and China without which, it could

not conduct the war.

10. The timing of the commencement of hostilities was an

important contribution to the Japanese campaign'’^.

11. The Japanese campaign plan was always one of limited war, it

did not envision a conflict ending in the overthrow of the

Russian government by force of arms.

12. The Japanese had reached their culminating point, but were

able to convince the Russians that they had more to lose by

continuing the conflict than by making peace’^.

13. Port Arthur was a double edged sword for both the Russians

and the Japanese^.

14. The Japanese Navy lost more ships to mines than to Naval

action.

15. It was essential to the success of the Japanese campaign that

they destroy the Russian fleet with minimal naval losses.

16. For strategic political reasons, the Russians could not bring

to theater the weight of their best land forces”’*’.

17. The Russians delayed in mobilizing reserves for the far east

and in any event, the poor quality of initial reserves sent to

the front contributed to early Russian defeats.

21
18. The war was fought over territory that belonged to neither

power, Russia's true interests were so limited that enlisting the

will of the Russian people in a protracted conflict was unlikely.

19. The geographic division of the Russian fleet between

Vladivostock and Port Arthur was a potential strength that the

Russians never exploited and the Japanese succeeded in

neutralizing.

20. The long and narrow line of supply of the Russians, was a

critical vulnerability that limited the ability of the Russians

to deploy forces to the field, as well as determined the maximum

forces that could be supported in the theater.

21. Feeding the Russian army depended upon local resources, which

were vulnerable to disruption from local population, and which

for the most part supported the Japanese'*.

22. The Japanese campaign plan was based upon their ability to

exploit their temporary regional Naval and Land superiority.

23. The Japanese deliberately chose to attack the will of the

Russian people, hoping they would not support a war that involved

high costs and casualties for territories far away and of no

historical importance to Russia, and by inciting and funding

revolutionary activities in the Russian Empire.

24. The Russian prejudice and bigotry, viewed the Japanese as an

inferior culture, people and power that would be easily defeated.

25. The Japanese successfully manipulated world opinion to

support them, they created the image of an embattled and

chivalrous Japan versus the bullying and oppressive Russians.

22
26. The Japanese fought for pre-determined limited goals and

initiated peace talks as soon as possible.

27. Russian infantry tactics were antiquated.

28. The Japanese reconnaissance effort and intelligence net was

excellent compared to that of the Russians*’.

29. The Japanese utilized local Chinese forces with some success

as unconventional forces and intelligence gatherers in the

Russian rear areas and against the Russian line of communication.

30. The Russians put too much faith in the concept of a "fleet in

being/fortress fleet", ending to its uncompensated destruction*®.

31. "Knowing your enemy", is of great advantage. Admiral Togo was

a student of Russian Naval, and especially, Makarov's tactics.

32. The Japanese correctly ignored Russian naval raids on

Hokaido, as they had insufficient naval forces available to

detail to hunting down the Russian ships. All ships were needed

to guard their supply lines and to invest Port Arthur*’.

33. The Russian army was tied to the railway line from Harbin to

Port Arthur, as the only way it could be supplied and reinforced.

There were no road systems sufficient to serve as alternate

routes of advancement, retreat or supply for their forces. Thus

the main line of attack and defence was predetermined.

34. Russian field artillery and heavy transports for the most

part could not traverse the hill roads of Manchuria*”.

35. The Japanese were compelled to attack Port Arthur to get at

the Russian fleet, before the combined Russian Fleets could prove

powerful enough to defeat the Japanese fleet*'.

23
36. The inability of the Japanese to effect the coup de grace

after each successive defeat of the Russians, due to exhaustion,

and over extension, can be attributed to the absence of the 3rd

Army, tied down around Port Arthur. But even at Mukden, the final

envelopment failed due to the inability of the 3rd Army to

complete the maneuver.

37. Mahan, believed the war validated the superiority of the

Battleship, and discredited submarines and torpedo boats“.

38. The Russians lost control of the sea due to the division of

their fleet, combined with the unacceptable delays re-inforcing

their Pacific squadron.

39. Battleships should be armed with the maximum number of big

guns, smaller calibre guns are irrelevant*^.

40. The speed of Togo's ships at Tsushima, had proven critical

to allowing the Japanese to maintain the long range they wanted

to fight at, as well as allowing them to cross the Russian "t"**.

41. "There is extreme danger to remain in fixed positions, in the

face of modern weapons, only mobility offers the means to escape

destruction. The Russians overcrowded their trenches and

accordingly sustained heavy casualties from artillery"**.

43. Local residents can be used as sources of intelligence if

properly motivated**.

44. The area of operations was too remote to be considered of

vital national interest by a majority of the Russian populace.

This was in stark contrast to its vital importance in the minds

of the Japanese people.

24
45. Both armies were too large to be controlled as a single army

under one commander, and both armies were required to re-organize

their forces in the field as they became too large.

46. The Japanese successfully employed field telephones and

telegraph to maintain communication between the operational

commander and the forces in the field.

Lessons learned:

1. No matter the desire, the will and the valor of your troops,

insufficient operational mobility can make the best conceived of

operational plans impossible to execute.

2. Reconnaissance of enemy forces, by both conventional and

unconventional methods is essential. Knowledge of the battlefield

and your enemy's dispositions can decide the outcome of the

conflict.

3. Strategic and Operational Logistical support is critical to

maximizing your force's capabilities. The ability to rapidly

deploy forces to the theater of operations and to sustain

operational forces in the field, may ultimately determine the

outcome of the conflict.

4. A clear concise chain of command is critical to the war

effort. Without unity of command; dissension, conflicting orders

and confusion will undermine combat effectiveness.

5. The support of the people is critical to the morale of the

armed forces and the ability of the government to effectively

prosecute any prolonged military operation.

25
6. Mine Warfare can make a major contribution to shaping the

nature of a Naval actions.

7. The value of the ultimate objectives of the war, to the people

of each nation, will determine their support of the government

and the sacrifice that they are willing to make to win the war.

8. Control of the sea, where sea lanes of communication are

involved, is a critical aspect of the land campaign and can mean

the difference between possible victory and sure defeat.

9. Timing and synchronization of both military and political

iriitiatives, before and at the commencement of hostilities can

influence the outcome of the campaign.

10* it is possible for a weaker power to defeat a stronger power,

through combination of limited war, advantage of geographic

position and psychological and political manipulation.

11. Span of control limits the size of forces that can remain

under the direct control of a single commander. Electronic

communications capability, will play a critical role in the

coordination and the unity of effort of large modern forces.

12. In a protracted conflict, a country's main battle fleet

should not be divided. Any adversary with Sea LOCs will have them

throughout the war, not only for the amount of time necessary to

reposition a concentrated fleet®’.

26
 KEY EVENTS

8 Feb 1904 Attack on Russian Fleet at Port Arthur

30 Apr - 1 May 1904 Battle of the Yalu

14-15 Jun 1904 Battle of Telissu

10 Aug 1904 Naval Battle of the Yellow Sea

25 Aug - 3 Sep 1904 Battle of Liaoyang

5-18 Oct 1904 Battle of the Sha-Ho

6 Dec 1904 203 Meter Hill captured

9 Dec 1904 Russian Pacific Squadron destroyed

5 Jan 1905 Port Arthur surrenders to Japanese

26 - 27 Jan 1905 Battle of Sandepu

21 Feb - 10 Mar 1905 Battle of Mukden

27 - 28 May 1905 Naval Battle at Tsushima

5 Sep 1905 Peace Terms agreed at Portsmouth, NH

Appendix-1

27
 CAST OF CHARACTERS

JAPANESE;

General Oyama - Japanese Army, Chief of Staff

Major General Kodeuaa - Oyama's Chief of Staff

Admiral Yeunamoto - Navy Minister

Admiral Togo - Japanese Operational Fleet Commander

Baron Komura - Japanese Foreign Minister

General Kuroki - Commander Japanese Irst Army

General Oku - Commander Japanese 2nd Army

General Mogi - Commander Japanese 3rd Army

General Modzu - Commander Japanese 4th Army

Lieutenant General Kawamura - Commander Japanese 5th Army (Yalu)

RUSSIANS;

Sergei Witte - Russian Statesman and advisor to the Tsar; former

minister of transport and finance minister.

Admiral Alekseev - Viceroy of the Far East, overall commander of

Russian forces in the far east until recalled

General Kuropatkin - Minister of War (1903), CINC of Russian land

forces in the far east until Battle of Mukden

General Linievich - CINC after Kuropatkin, appointed after Mukden

General Grippenburg - Commander 2nd Manchurian Army

General Kaulbars - Commander 3rd Manchurian Army

Lieutenant General Samsonov - Cavalry Commander Right Wing

Major General Rennenkampf - Cavalry Commander Left Wing

Lieutenant General Stoessel - Governor and Commander of the Port

Arthur Fortress

Major General Smirnov - Garrison Commander at Port Arthur

28
Major General Kondratenko - Commander of the land defenses at
Port Arthur

Major General Fock - Commander of the land defenses at Port

Arthur after General Kondratenko's death.

Vice Admiral Stark - Commander of Russian Pacific Squadron at

Port Arthur when war started.

Vice Admiral Makarov - Relieved Admiral Stark as Commander of

Russian Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur following Japanese
surprise attack

Rear Admiral Witgeft - Commander of the Russian Pacific Squadron

after Makarov's death until killed at Battle of the Yellow Sea

Rear Admiral Viren - Commander of Russian Pacific Squadron after

Witgeft's death

Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky - Commander of Russian Baltic Squadron

sent to the far east.

Lieutenant General Zasulich - Commander of Russian forces at Yalu

Lieutenant General Stakelburg - Commander Irst Siberian Corps at

Telissu

Appendix-2

29
 OPPOSING ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN

JAPANESE:

Irst Army General Kuroki 3 Divisions, 2 Brigades, 2 Reg

2nd Army General Oku 4 Divisions, 1 Brigade

3rd Army General Nogi 3 Divisions, 2 Brigades

4th Army General Nodzu 3 Divisions, Heavy Artillery

5th Army LtGen Kawamura 2 Divisions, 1 Brigade, 1 Reg

General Reserve 3 Brigades

Also 2 Cavalry Brigades, one operating on each Flank.

RUSSIAN:

Irst Manchurian Army General Linievich 4 Corps + Cavalry

2nd Manchurian Army General Grippenburg 3 Corps

3rd Manchurian Army General Kaulbars 4 Corps

General Reserve 3 Corps

Total Combatant Strengths at Mukden:

Jaoanese Russian

200,000 Infantry 276,000

7,300 Cavalry 16,000

1,000 Artillery 1,200

254 Machine Guns 54

CASUALTIES®*

15,892 Dead 20,000+

59,612 Wounded 49,000+

Appendix-3

30
 The Battle of the Sha-Ho

The Russians, despite repeated defeats on the battlefield,

were gaining confidence. The Russian army had not only made up

its losses at Liaoyang, but had actually increased in size*’. It

appeared to Kuropatkin, that it was time for the Russians to

attack before the stream of Japanese reinforcements could arrive

on the field, and before Port Arthur would fall and allow the

Japanese 3rd army to be re-deployed’”. It was important to make

an effort to relieve the pressure on Port Arthur, in hope that

the ships there could be preserved until the Baltic fleet could

arrive, thus the Russians attempted to conduct offensive

operations’*. The Russian advance which began on the October 5th

was the greatest offensive effort made by the Russians during the

war. The main objective was to defeat General Kuroki's Irst army

and to push it backwards. The western force was essentially a

containing force with the object of attacking the main strength

of the Japanese to pin it, so that the Japanese Irst army could

be defeated. The flaw in the Russian plan, was that the main

attack would go against the Japanese right flank in hilly

mountainous terrain, easily defendable, and where the Japanese

held the superiority in mountain artillery, and the Russians were

unable to effectively utilize their advantage in cavalry. They

also exposed themselves to counterattack by the Japanese forces

from the Japanese left flank, where the ground was flatter. The

Japanese counter-attack threatened to cut the Russian line of

communication and threatened the isolation the Russian eastern

31
force. The Japanese counterattack, might be more dangerous to the

Russians than the original Russian attack was to the Japanese.

The Russian attack was not made against Oyama's principal

line of communication along the railway. Thus the attack was not

necessarily against the Japanese operational center of gravity,

or in this case the operational-tactical center of gravity, which

would have been better identified as the combined second and

fourth armies. A successful attack by the Russians in the east,

would only have the effect of driving the Japanese Army, toward

the west, where it would join up with the 2nd and 4th Armies

along the Japanese main line of communication’^.

Oyama, from the moment that he realized that the Russians

were advancing to attack, took actions to regain the initiative.

In response to the Russian attack in the east, the Irst Army went

on the offensive and tried to advance, the 4th Army applied

pressure against center of the Russian main force, pinning it and

pushing back it back on its main line of communication, and the

2nd army was to swept out to the west and tried to envelop the

Russian right flank. The Russian main attack in the east failed

against the Japanese Irst Army, and in concert with the Japanese

counter-attack, resulted in the Russian abandonment of their

offensive and subsequent retirement. Across the entire battle

field the Japanese armies had advanced, and the Russian armies,

despite having a significant majority in manpower, had witnessed

a change from an offensive advance, to the defense, to retreat.

Appendix-4

32
 THE BATTLE OF SAN-DE-PU

The Russian's attempted an envelopment of Japanese left flank in

combination with a frontal assault. However, the offensive was

not engaged along the whole front and the point of attack was not

seriously pressed. The Japanese were still in a defensive

posture, awaiting the 3rd Army, before resuming another offensive

thrust. The battle as executed, was simply an attack on the

Japanese left wing, with the Japanese remaining in fortified

positions all along the front, and meeting the Russian attack

with the Japanese Operational Reserve, supported by units from

the center and right wing in a direct counter-attack. The battle

was another poorly coordinated, half-hearted attempt at an

offensive, executed by only a portion of the Russian force. The

Russian cavalry raid of a few days earlier, might have been more

effective had it been executed in synchronization with a more

determined Russian advance at San-de-pu’^.

Appendix-5

33
 THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN

The majority of the Japanese 3rd Army was kept carefully

concealed, positioned behind the Japanese 4th Army on the

Japanese left flank. The 11th Division of the 3rd Army, was

attached to the 5th Army on the Japanese right flank. When the

5th Army advanced it was reported by Russian forces, that

elements of the 3rd army were advancing on the Japanese right.

This led to the belief that the entire 3rd and 5th armies were on

the move on the Russian left, and induced the shift in the

Russian operational reserve to that flank, just as Oyama hoped’**.

With the shift in Reserves the 3rd Army went forward in an

all out attack against the Russian far right flank. Japanese

attacks in the west forced the entire Russian line back at right

angle to its original position. Japanese Cavalry diversionary

raids against the railway north of Mukden led to detachment of

additional Russian units from the main area of effort, while

attacks against the Russian center and left, kept them from

sending major re-inforcement to the Russian right wing. In hope

of overwhelming the Russian right, Oyama committed the Japanese

operational reserve was to the enveloping action on March 4th.

By March 7th, the Japanese 3rd army was North and only 4

miles from the Russian rail line, in position to deliver the Coup

de Grace to the Russian right wing. On the 7th, there was

Appendix-6

34
a brief operational pause in preparation for a general assault.

When operations resumed on the 8th, the opportunity had passed

and when the attack went forward, the Russian right wing had been

re-inforced and the Russian Center had pulled back^\ The

Japanese had either failed or were unable to make the necessary

effort to achieve the long sought envelopment of the Russians,

despite them being demoralized and in retreat.

Appendix-6

35
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Kearsey.A., A Study'of the Strategy and Tactics of the Russo-Japanese

War-1904, Aldershot; Gale and PondLtd, London.
 FIGURE-3

Warner, Denis and Peggy. The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the

Russo-Japanese War, 190A-05, New York: Charterhouse, 1974.

38

Tir.z
FIGURE-4
 FIGURE-7

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-43
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bird W. D., AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG■ Aldershot:

Gale and Polden Ltd, London.

Connaughton, R.M., THE WAR OF THE RISING SUN AND THE TUMBLING
BEAR A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904-05.
Routledge, London and New York.

Corbett, Julian S. SOME PRINCIPLES OF maritime strategy. London:

Longman, Green, 1911.

Corbett, Julian S. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

1904-1905. 2 VOLUMES. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute
Press and Naval War College Press, 1994.

Crankshaw,Edward. THE SHADOW OF THE WINTER PALACE. RUSSIAS DRIFT

TO REVOLUTION 1825-1917. The Viking Press,1976.

culmann F., ETUDE SUE LES CARACTERES GENEREAUX DE LA GUERRE

D'EXTREME-ORIENT. Berger-Levrault and Cie, Paris 1909.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, OFFICIAL

HISTORY (NAVAL AND MILITARY) OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR IN THREE
VOLUMES, London:Harrison and Sons, 1910.

Fuller, William C. STRATEGY AND POWER IN RUSSIA 1600 - 1914. New

York: Free Press, 1992.

Kearsey, A..A STUDY OF THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE RUSSO-

JAPANESE WAR - 1904. Aldershot: Gale and Polden Ltd, London.

Kornatz, Steven, THE OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF ADMIRAL TOGO.

Naval War College, 1995.

Kuropatkin, General A.N., THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR.
2 Volumes. London, J Murray, 1909.

Liddel Hart, B.H., STRATEGY. Signet Books,1954.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. THE INFLUENCE OF SEAPOWER UPON HISTORY.

1660-1783. New York Hill and Wang, 1957

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. RETROSPECT UPON THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND
RUSSIA, in Naval Administration and Warfare, Boston Little Brown,
1908.

Massie, Robert K., DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN. GERMANY AND THE COMING

OF THE GREAT WAR. Random House, 1991.

Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department,

OPERATIONAL DESIGN: THE OPERATIONAL SCHEME January, 1996.

44
Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department,
OPERATIONAL DESIGN! THE FUNDAMENTALS. January, 1996.

Negrier, General de, LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Hugh

Reese Ltd, 1906.

Nogine E.K., THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR. John Murray, London,
1908.

Okamoto Shumpei, THE JAPANESE OLIGARCHY AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE

WAR. Columbia University Press, 1970.

Ross Charles, AN OUTLINE OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904~1905.

Macmillan and Co Ltd, London, 1912.

Smith, W. Richmond, THE SIEGE AND fall of port ARTHUR. Eveleigh

Nash, London, 1905.

Storry, Richard. JAPAN AND THE DECLINE OF THE WEST IN ASIA 1894 -
1943. New York St Martin's Press. 1979

The Military Correspondent of the Times, THE WAR IN THE EAST.

John Murray, London, 1905.

Togo, Captain , NAVAL BATTLES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Tokyo:Gogakukyokwai,1907

Warner, Denis and Peggy. THE TIDE AT SUNRISE: A HISTORY OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. New York: Charterhouse, 1974.

Westwood, J.N., WITNESS OF TSUSHIMA. Sophia University, Tokyo,

1970.

Westwood, J.N., THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE

WAR. Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1973.

Westwood, J.N., RUSSIA AGAINST JAPAN 1904-05. State University of

New York Press, 1986

45
1. Korea is very mountainous and easily defended. Once in
Japanese control and as long as the Japanese held control of the
seas, it is highly unlikely that Russia would ever put forth the
magnitude of effort necessary to dislodge Japan. So even if the
war had continued and Russia made good its Manchurian losses, it
is unlikely that Port Arthur (sustained by sea) or Korea would
have been overwhelmed due to the level of effort that would have
been required

Corbett, Julian S. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

1904-1905. 2 VOLUMES. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute
Press and Naval War College Press, 1994, 65.

2. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Official History fNaval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol I 42.

3. The Trans-Siberian railway, begun in 1891, extended from

Vladivostock, through Manchuria to European Russia, almost 5,500
miles. In the early phase of the war, this supply line was not
yet completed around the southern end of Lake Baikal, thereby
restricting the volume of traffic that could be moved.

4. The Japanese planned to seize Korea, as their most important

objective, before the Russians were capable of preventing it and
establish a defensive position so strong as to make it
practically impregnable to a force sent against it. It was
important for Japan to seize permanent sea control to not only
endure its own lines of supply but to make its position in Korea
that much stronger and unassailable and to restrict the Russians
to its single limited line of supply by the Trans-Siberian
railway, making unlimited escalation problematic for the Tsar.

Corbett, Julian S. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

1904-1905. 2 VOLUMES. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute
Press and Naval War College Press, 1994. 66.

5. At the same time the Russians had a clear vision of how they
expected the campaign to proceed. As minister of War, Kuropatkin
wrote about the anticipated campaign:

”1. Struggle of the fleets for command of the sea

2. Japanese landings, and operations to prevent them
3. Defensive operations, accompanied by guerilla and delaying
actions, until sufficient forces are concentrated
4. Assumption of the offensive
a. expulsion of the Japanese from Manchuria
b. expulsion of the Japanese from Korea
5. Invasion of Japan; defeat of the Japanese territorial troops;
operations against a popular uprising"

46
Warner, Denis and Peggy. THE TIDE AT SUNRISE; A HISTORY OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. 174.

Despite General Kuropatkin's belief in their inevitable victory,

his greatest weakness was his fear of defeat. Like most Russian
senior officers he was a bureaucrat, who as a group, were
inclined to avoid doing things that would result in criticism
from above. Thus they were risk adverse, and unwilling to allow
junior officers independence of action. Thus Kuropatkin would be
inclined to be over cautious throughout the campaign.

6. The Japanese campaign plan, was primarily devised by General

Kodama, the Vice Chief of the General Staff to General Oyama, the
Japanese Army Chief of Staff, who exercised overall operational
command of the land forces during the war.

Warner, Denis and Peggy. THE TIDE AT SUNRISE: A HISTORY OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. New York: Charterhouse, 1974, 150.

7. The opening move of the Japanese campaign was synchronized to

coincide with the arrival of two new Japanese Heavy Cruisers in
the Pacific Theater, while the Russian re-inforcing squadron was
still far away near Djibouti.

Westwood, J.N., RUSSIA AGAINST JAPAN 1904-05. State University of

New York Press, 1986, 34.

8. There is some evidence to indicate that the Japanese were

aware of General Kuropatkin's pre-war plan that advocated the
concentration of Russian forces near Liaoyang until strong enough
to assume the offensive.

9. The roads in Manchuria are few and poor. The Japanese plan of
campaign therefore necessitated a dispersion of force over a wide
front.

10. Oyama had been an observer with the Prussians during the
Franco-Prussian War, and hoped to achieve a repeat of the
Prussian victory over the French at Sedan. General Kuropatkin,
the Russian CINC, was an observer with the French at Sedan, some
of his actions may have been as equally influenced by that
experience.

Westwood, J.N., RUSSIA AGAINST JAPAN 1904-05. State University of

New York Press, 1986, 31.

47
11. Japan was going to have to fight with the ships they
currently had available. Japanese Naval losses could not be
replaced due to laws of neutrality and lack of their own
industrial capability. Ibid, 34.

12. To do this, he attempted to sink merchant ships in the

channel, while the Russian Squadron was in the inner harbor,
thereby physically confining them inside Port Arthur. These
attempts met with only partial success, narrowing, but not
blocking the channel. Second, he planted hundreds of mines in the
approaches to the port.

13. Togo knew the Russians still had a large fleet in Europe,
that was making preparations to sail for the Pacific. He hoped
to deter the Russians from going to Vladivostok, where they would
be relatively safe until additional Russian Navy units arrived
from Europe to tip the naval balance heavily in the Russian's
favor. So as long as the Russians could be induced to stay in
Port Arthur, and not interfere with the Japanese plans, Togo was
more that content to keep them there and not seek to engage them.

Corbett, Julian S. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

1904-1905. 2 VOLUMES. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute
Press and Naval War College Press, 1994. Volume II.

14. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. RETROSPECT UPON THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN
AND RUSSIA, in Naval Administration and Warfare, Boston Little
Brown, 1908.

15. Port Arthur held a special psychological position for both

the Japanese and the Russians but especially so for the Japanese.
One of the absolute objectives of the war, demanded by Japanese
public opinion, was the restoration of Port Arthur to Japanese
control. In Japanese minds at the end of the war. Port Arthur
must become Japanese territory to redeem the humiliation of 1895.
Holding the fortress at the end of the war, when the peace treaty
would be negotiated, would make it more likely to become
Japanese, than if the Russians had held out.

16. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Official History fNaval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol II, 81.

17. Though Port Arthur would not likely be the base of

operations, for the Russian Baltic fleet due to its increasing
vulnerability to land attack, there were still 5 battleships in
Port Arthur that could have been added to the Baltic fleet. The
entire Japanese Navy had only 4 first class battleships. The
combined weight of Russian forces would almost inevitably lead to
the defeat of the Japanese forces at sea, and the Russians

48
seizing control of the sea.

18. In the end, the Russians held out until the end of December
1904, with the Russian Fleet safely in the harbor until the
Japanese capture of 203 meter hill on December 5, 1904. From that
position the Japanese were able to employ 11 inch guns and by 9
December 9th, sink the majority of the Russian squadron in place.

19. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Official History fNaval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol II, 67-68.

20. With the eventual fall of Port Arthur and the destruction of
the Pacific squadron in December 1904, Japan gained temporary
unchallenged control of the sea. The approaching Baltic Squadron,
would have to face the Japanese fleet alone and had only one base
as a destination.

21. After its surprise attack and blockade of the Russian

squadron at Port Arthur, and the destruction of two Russian
Cruisers at Chemulpo (modern Inchon), the Japanese felt their
line of communication secure enough to proceed with the landing
on the west coast of Korea.

22. General Kuroki and his staff, arrived in Korea on March 17th
to take command of the Irst Army.

23. At Yalu, successful execution of this plan, resulted in the

Russians abandoning their position and withdrawing along their
line of communication toward Liaoyang. The Russian Commander, had
been ordered to delay the Japanese crossing and to observe the
Japanese army but was not to engage in major or unequal combat,
but was to retire slowly, keeping in touch with the enemy, to
essentially fight a rear guard action. The Japanese vigorously
pursued the retiring Russian forces and engaged the Russian rear
guard, inflicting heavy casualties and eventually capturing the
Russian rear guard.

24. During this operation the Japanese laid a cable from Korea to
their landing position so that they were able to have telegraphic
communication from the battlefield to the Imperial quarters in
Tokyo.

25. Also, it was being supplied primarily by sea, with relatively

short land lines of communication, whereas any Russian force that
was sent against it would have had to traverse the mountains and
obtain it's supply along the poor Manchurian roads far from the
Russian railway line. It was unlikely that the Russians could
keep a large body of troops supplied far from the railway

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

49
History CNaval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910.

26. At Telissu, the Russian made an aborted and half-hearted

attempt at taking the offensiye on the Liaotung Peninsula, but
failed to execute their plan and in eyent, withdrew in the face
of Japanese attacks, toward Liaoyang.

27. Initially only the 10th Diyision under Lieutenant General

Kawamura. By the 16th of July the 4th Army had been strengthened
and General Nodzu assumed command.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

History fNayal and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol II, 238.

28. Kuropatkin's original intention, was that his adyanced forces

at the Yalu and near Telissu, would fight delaying actions while
he consolidated his army at Liaoyang, and receiyed reinforcements
from European Russia. At the right time, once he had sufficient
strength, he intended to go oyer to the offensiye and the
adyanced Russian units that had been his rear guard or delaying
units, would then become his own adyanced guard.

29. Command of Russian forces was increasingly complicated.

Kuropatkin had command of the field army, but Viceroy Alexsiev
had command of the units guarding the Russian line of
communication, so some Diyisions diyerted from the front line
Corps to protect the line of communication oyer Kuropatkin's
protest.
Howeyer, by the end of July, the Russian Army had grown to
the point where it was beyond Kuropatkin's ability to effectiyely
manage. So it was re-organized by formation of a Irst and 2nd
Manchurian Armies instead of a single army. Kuropatkin retained
oyerall command of the Army Group, as well as personal command
the Irst Manchurian Army. General Grippenberg was giyen command
of the 2nd Manchurian army.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

History fNayal and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 2, 450.

30. Had the Russian fleet not been in Port Arthur, is likely that
it would have been treated just as any other land fortress. The
Japanese would have probably put a blocking force on the
peninsula near Nanshan and freed the majority of divisions of the
Japanese 3rd army to join the other forces in northern Manchuria
much earlier, possibly providing enough weight in the early
battles for a decisive victory. Thus the Japanese were forced to
attempt their strategy with insufficient numbers, also they were
constrained by terrain which did not allow them sufficient room

50
to maneuver large formations of troops.

Ibid 412.

31. On the Russian side. General Kuropatkin was also preparing to

fight the battle he had planned for, on ground of his choosing,
and in prepared defensive positions. He had ordered the Russian
forces prepare two lines of strong defensive positions around
Liaoyang and he was now receiving constant stream of
reinforcements.

32. The total Russian strength at the battle of Liaoyang was

about 229 thousand soldiers, of which 158 thousand were
combatants. The Japanese total strength was about 125 thousand
men divided between the first, second, and fourth armies. The
battle took place in four phases; the first phase was from the
initial attack by the Japanese until the Russian retirement to
their prepared advanced positions. The second phase was from the
Japanese assault on the advanced positions until the Russian
retirement to their main defensive position. The third phase was
the Japanese assault on the main position in an attempt to
envelop and cut the Russian line of communication, as well as the
Russian counter attack against the Japanese Irst army. The
fourth phase was the general retreat of the Russian army ordered
by Kuropatkin and the rear guard action.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

History TNaval and Military^ of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 2, 12.

33. Oyama had lost about one-sixth of his strength during the
battle of Liaoyang and the strain to meet the number of men
required to replace those losses was exceeding the ability of
Japan to provide reinforcements.
The Japanese preparations during September 1904 consisted of
bringing forward reinforcements and fortifying the position that
they currently held, against a possible counterattack by the
Russians, while they prepared for their next offensive phase

34. It is interesting to note that this role reversal occurred

after the Japanese forces had succeeded in concentrating their
armies and not previously when they were isolated and presumably
more subject to being attacked by the Russians and possibly
destroyed in detail

Corbett, Julian S. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

1904-1905. 2 VOLUMES. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute
Press and Naval War College Press, 1994. Vol 2, 237.

51
35. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
Official History TNaval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol , 230.

36. Ibid. Vol 2, 508.

37. Ibid. Vol 2, 512.

38. Ibid. Vol 3.

39. Ibid. Vol 3, 9.

40. The Irst Manchurian Army was

corps), the 2nd Manchurian army
corps) and the 3rd Manchurian array under General Kaulbas (4
corps. Kuropatkin retained coramand as the overall Array Group
coramander but no longer held coraraand of an individual array.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

History fNaval and Military^ of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 3, 10.

41. Despite the general inactivity of the main force during these
months, the Russians did attempt a major cavalry raid in mid-
January, utilizing 7,500 cavalry with main objective being to
interdict the Japanese line of communication on the Liaotung
peninsula. This was meant to disrupt Japanese reinforcements, or
least slow the re-deployment of the 3rd Army to the north. The
raid had limited tactical success and actually only succeeded in
accelerating the movement of the 3rd Army, which had been resting
and recuperating after the strain of the siege.

42. This was to be only a prelude to the coming civil unrest that
would rack the Empire and sap Russian morale and the will of the
people to continue the war.

Crankshaw,Edward. THE SHADOW OF THE WINTER PALACE. RUSSIAS DRIFT

TO REVOLUTION 1825-1917. The Viking Press,1976.

43. He could a maintain defensive position, retreat north and

continue to await re-inforcements until accumulating overwhelming
strength, or attack before 3rd Army could join Oyama. Doing
nothing was not a real option, the government, eager for good
news to do something to help stem the growing discontent and
civic unrest in the Empire, urged Kuropatkin to attack.

44. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 3, 1.

52
45. The Japanese knew this was likely to be their last
opportunity and the arrival of the 3rd Army and creation of the
5th Army, gave them the most favorable balance of forces they
were ever going to be able to achieve.
The strain on the Japanese ability to send fresh reserves to
he field was showing, casualty rates were beginning to exceed the
ability of Japan to provide trained replacements, while the
Russians simply continued to grow stronger.

Westwood, J.N., RUSSIA AGAINST JAPAN 1904-05. State University of

New York Press, 1986

46. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 3, 705.

47. The 3rd Army had actually marched north because the rail
line was fully taxed moving ammunition, heavy guns, and supplies.

48. Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence,

Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War
in Three Volumes. London:Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 3, 716

49. Ibid Vol 3, 721.

50. Though little change occurred in Manchuria during summer

1905, the Japanese now in control of the sea, made use of that
advantage to invade and capture Sakhalin Island with an
expeditionary force in July 1905. The effect was to strike
another psychological blow at Russian will and to add another
bargaining chip at the peace table.

51. No where was this more clear and damaging than the squabbling
amongst the senior officers within the fortress of Port Arthur

52. By commencing operations at the proper time, it enabled the

Japanese to manipulate world opinion, to muster maximum advantage
in land and naval strength, and amplified the weakness of the
Russian supply line. From a military point of view the Army was
ready to move and nothing was to be gained by waiting, a delay
only increased the chances the Russians would move forces to the
Yalu or into Northern Korea, making occupation more difficult.
There was also the chance more Russian ships would be sent to the
far east.

53. They achieved this through execution of limited offensives,

seizing Port Arthur, Korea, parts of Manchuria and Sahkalin
Island, and by fomenting revolt inside the Russian Empire.

53
54. The Russians felt compelled to hold it and as long as they
did it was a threat poised at the rear of the Japanese army
position that must be neutralized but more importantly, provided
haven for the Russian fleet. However, it also tied up 50,000
troops that may have been better utilized early on by Kuropatkin
in the north and ultimately retaining Port Arthur led to the
destruction of the Russian fleet in port, with little
compensatory loss to the Japanese fleet. The Japanese for their
part were compelled by public fervor to take Port Arthur as the
symbol of their national humiliation in 1895. This led to huge
losses in frontal assaults on the battlefield, when a blocking
position at Nanshan, would have isolated Port Arthur just as well
and freed the 3rd Army under Nogi to fight in the north, where
they may have been sufficient to lead to a significant Russian
defeat at Liaoyang.

55. The concerns Russia had in Europe, with the Germans,

Austrians and Ottomans, made it impossible to send its entire
armed forces against Japan.

56. Kuropatkin, General A.N., THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE
WAR. 2 Volumes. London, J Murray, 1909, 35.

57. Japan had a well developed intel net headed by Colonel Akashi
Motojiro. He penetrated the Russian Ministry of defense and was
able to obtain classified documents. He was fully cognizant of
Russian troop movements to the far east.
Throughout the war the Russians had difficulty in obtaining
information about the movements of the main Japanese forces.
Their cavalry (Primarily Cossacks) proved especially ineffective
at recognizance, on the other hand the Japanese spy network and
Cavalry provided accurate and valuable information about the
Russian movements and disposition.

Warner, Denis and Peggy. THE TIDE AT SUNRISE; A HISTORY OF THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. New York: Charterhouse, 1974.

58. After the initial surprise attack, with the exception of a

short period under the command of Admiral Makarov, the Russian
fleet was dispirited and inert.

59. Corbett, Julian S. MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE

WAR 1904-1905. 2 VOLUMES. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute
Press and Naval War College Press, 1994, 339.

60. Kuropatkin, General A.N., THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE
WAR. 2 Volumes. London, J Murray, 1909, 33.

54
61. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. RETROSPECT UPON THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN
AND RUSSIA, in Naval Administration and Warfare, Boston Little
Brown, 1908, 142.

62. Ibid. 156.

63. Massie, Robert K., DREADNOUGHT; BRITAIN. GERMANY AND THE

COMING OF THE GREAT WAR. Random House, 1991, 171.

64. Ibid, 474.

65. Negrier, General de, LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Hugh

Rees Ltd, 1906, 54-56.

66. The Japanese used father and son from the same Chinese to be
sent on recon. Then compare their stories when they return. The
Chinese knowing fully well that a poor report will result in
death

Ibid, 59.

67. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. RETROSPECT UPON THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN
AND RUSSIA, in Naval Administration and Warfare, Boston Little
Brown, 1908, 173.

68. Warner, Denis and Peggy. THE TIDE AT SUNRISE; A HISTORY OF

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. New York; Charterhouse, 1974.
480.

69. On the 20 September 1904, the gap at lake Baikal was finally
closed, and traffic began passing over the line by October 3rd.
Thus, the tide of the campaign was in danger of going over to the
Russians, who had improved their line of communication, had
amassed superior strength, and had an exhausted and not yet
replenished Japanese army in front of them.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 2, 450.

70. At this point, the paramount strategic factor was sea

command, control the local waters. It was upon the control of the
local waters that the whole Japanese campaign plan depended and
the very existence of the armies.

55
71. Kuropatkin had considered retreating beyond Mukden despite
the fact the loss of prestige that would have cost him by
surrendering the historic capital of Manchuria without a fight,
but he had been so impressed by the Japanese efforts at
Liaoyang, and the exhaustion of his own forces that he was
prepared to retreat north of Mukden, However the pause provided
him during September, allowed him to consolidate his position to
reinforce himself more quickly than the Japanese and to actually
make preparations to go over to the offensive south of Mukden.
While continuing to prepare or improve the defensive positions in
Mukden. Kuropatkin's deliberations went through a transition
from an idea of passive defense to one of active defense, and
finally to a definite plan of attack during this time period.

Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Official

History fNaval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War in Three
Volumes. London;Harrison and Sons, 1910, Vol 2, 243.

72. Ibid. Vol 2, 492.

73. Ibid. Vol 3, 216.

74. Up till 24 February, Kuropatkin had been preparing to launch

another attack in the West against the Japanese left, this was
abandoned in favor of re-enforcing in the east for 4 days. Until
he realized the real threat was in the west and that the 3rd Army
was actually operating there.

Ibid. Vol 3, 696.

75. Ibid. Vol 3, 714.

56