Well Operations Management Plan
Well Operations Management Plan
Abbreviations
AAR After Action Review
ACT Acceptance Criteria Table
AFE Approval for Expenditure
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
APB Annular Pressure Build-up
API American Petroleum Institute
BAT Barrier Assurance Table
bbl Barrel (42 US Gallon/~159 litres)
BHA Bottom Hole Assembly
BOD Basis of Design
BOP Blowout Preventer
CMP Competency Management Process
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
CVP Capital Value Process
DDR Daily Drilling Report
DGR Daily Geology Report
DMR Daily Mud (Fluids) Report
DOP Drilling Operations Programme
DP Dynamic Positioning
DPZ Distinct Permeable Zone
DSP Decision Support Package
DST Drill Stem Test
DWOP Drill Well on Paper (a key deliverable of the NWcp)
EIA Equipment Integrity Assurance (a BP internal group focussing on equipment)
eMOC Electronic Management of Change (online MOC management process)
EoWR End of Well Report (a stage of the NWcp)
EPP Exploration Permit for Petroleum
EWM Equivalent Mud Weight
FG Fracture Gradient
GAB Great Australian Bight
GOO Global Operations Organisation (the function within BP that is supporting logistics for this project)
GOP Geological Operations Programme
GWO Global Wells Organisation (the function within BP that delivers wells)
HoF Head of Function
HPWHH High Pressure Wellhead Housing
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide
IAT Integrated Acceptance Test
IMT Incident Management Team
JORP Joint Operating and reporting Procedure
KT Kick Tolerance
LCM Loss Circulation Material
LEL Lower Explosion Limit
LOT Leak off Test
LPWHH Low Pressure Wellhead Housing
Table of Contents
Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... 3
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ 5
Concordance Table ...................................................................................................... 7
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 10
2 Description of the Well .............................................................................................. 11
2.1 Description of the Activity ............................................................................... 14
3 Description of the Geology ........................................................................................ 16
3.1.1 List of Offset Wells............................................................................................ 16
3.1.2 Geological Prognosis ......................................................................................... 16
3.1.3 Primary Target Reservoir ................................................................................... 17
3.1.4 TD Criteria ......................................................................................................... 17
3.1.5 Interpretation of the Overburden ....................................................................... 18
3.1.6 Pore Pressure and Fracture Gradient ................................................................. 21
3.1.7 Predicted Temperature ...................................................................................... 22
3.1.8 Distinct Permeable Zones (DPZ) ........................................................................ 23
3.1.9 Predicted Reservoir ........................................................................................... 24
3.1.10 Non-Hydrocarbon Gasses .................................................................................. 25
4 Management of the Well Activity .............................................................................. 27
4.1 Governance Documentation and ALARP Principles ........................................ 31
4.2 Well Design (BOD Generation) ........................................................................ 31
4.3 Well Operations (Documentation and Workflow) ............................................ 32
4.3.1 Fluid and Cementing Programmes..................................................................... 35
4.4 Organisation Supporting Well Activities .......................................................... 36
4.4.1 Organisational Competency ............................................................................... 41
4.4.2 Self-Verification (SV) and Oversight (OS)............................................................ 41
4.4.3 Safety and Operational Risk (S+OR) Function .................................................... 42
4.4.4 Organisational Learning ..................................................................................... 42
4.5 Management of Change (MOC) ...................................................................... 44
4.5.1 Changes That Would Require an Update to the WOMP .................................... 47
5 Lifecycle – Well Design ............................................................................................. 49
5.1 Casing Design Philosophy ............................................................................... 50
5.1.1 Casing Design for Stromlo-1 .............................................................................. 51
5.2 Conductor/Wellhead Design Philosophy ......................................................... 58
5.2.1 Conductor/Wellhead Design for Stromlo-1......................................................... 58
5.3 Cement Design Philosophy ............................................................................. 59
5.3.1 Cement Design for Stromlo-1 ............................................................................ 60
5.4 Fluids Design Philosophy ................................................................................ 64
x Run 22” surface casing, c/w high pressure wellhead housing (HPWHH) and cement in
place.
x Run the BOP and test.
o Note that this includes some integrated acceptance testing (IAT) for the rig as it will
be the first time the BOP will be installed on a wellhead.
x Displace the well to SBM drilling fluid. Drill 17-1/2” hole.
o If problems occur during this hole section, a hole opening BHA may be run to allow
installation of an 18” contingency liner.
o In this case an 18-1/8” x 21” BHA would be run to open the well to allow
installation of the 18” liner.
o Following this, 16-1/2” hole would be drilled to allow installation of the 13-3/8” to
planned depth.
x Run 13-3/8” surface casing and cement in place. Install seal assembly and testing
integrity. Install lock down sleeve.
x Drill 12-1/4” hole.
o The primary plan is to then log and run a 9-5/8” liner (i.e. following steps).
However;
If problems occur during this hole section, a hole opening BHA may be run
to allow installation of an 11-7/8” contingency liner.
In this case a 12-1/4” x 14-1/2” BHA would be run to open the well to allow
installation of the 11-7/8” liner.
Following this, 10-5/8” x 12-1/4” hole would be drilled to allow installation of
the 9-5/8 liner to planned depth.
x Wireline logging (depending on LWD data and calibration to seismic)
x Run 9-5/8” liner and cement in place.
x Drill 8-1/2” hole to TD.
x Wireline logging.
x Abandon well.
No production, sidetrack coring or suspension is planned for Stromlo-1. However;
x Side-tracking may be required for operational reasons. This would be for remedial work
rather than the planned base case (e.g. a stuck pipe event).
x Short term temporary abandonment of the wellbore may be needed for weather or
unplanned events (BOP maintenance, weather issues, etc.), however no long term
suspension is planned for ‘keeper well’ type situations.
This WOMP therefore covers the ‘drilling’ and ‘abandonment’ phases for the Stromlo-1 well
activities only.
A shallow hazard study has been undertaken (Stromlo-1 SHA S-SST-0013-15). Below is a
summary.
The PPFG forecasts for Stromlo-1 integrates 2D basin modelling, 2D/3D seismic velocity-pressure
transforms and offset well data. The forecast has been performed in accordance with BP Practice
100208 – Pore Pressure Prediction (10-15) requirements and consists of ‘most likely’, ‘likely low’
and ‘likely high’ predictions. The actual pore pressure is expected to be within this range.
Most likely pore pressure: based on shale pressure derived from seismic velocities; sand
lithologies were superimposed to calculate sand pressure within shale boundaries.
Low pore pressure: based on sand and shale pressure derived from basin modelling, allowing for
up-dip pressure communication; both sand and shale pore pressure is reflected in the prediction.
High pore pressure: based on integrating seismic and basin modelling results assuming facies are
predominantly muddy.
Sand fracture gradient: based on the Eaton equation with a Poisson's ratio of 0.33 in accordance
with BP's worldwide recommendation. The Low/ML/High forecasts are based on the respective
pore pressure profile.
Shale fracture gradient: is based on the Brumfield shale FG equation. The shale FG prediction was
constrained to be equal to or higher than sand in the riser-less section. The Low/ML/High
forecasts are based on the respective pore pressure profiles.
The pressure discontinuity in ‘most likely’ and ‘high’ case pore pressure at the K65 is due to the
buoyancy/centroid effect of the target reservoir section.
x For most likely case this is based on a predicted oil column (0.337 psi/ft) of 177m in the
K65 sand.
x For high case this was calculated for a dry gas (0.1 psi/ft) column of 342m in the K65 sand.
The predicted fluids associated with the various charge models that have been simulated are
tabulated below.
SCENARIOS MOST-LIKELY HC SCENARIO
K60 Base Case K60 Oily Case K60 Gassy Case K55 DOM Case K45 Late Trap case K60 Base Case + DOM
Depth most-likely shallow deep most-likely most-likely
thermal model most-likely cool hot most-likely most-likely K60 Oil charge plus top up gas
source rock interval K60 K60 K60 K55 (DOM) K45
charge from deeper DOM.
source rock organofacies 100% B 100% B 100% B 20% DE, 80% F 50% A, 50% B
Gas fraction and Geochemical
TOC (%) 5 5 5 1.5 5
Parameters calculated by
HI 500 600 300 DE 330, F 150 500
assuming 75% charge from
Inputs / Assumptions
surface gas gravity (air) 0.97 0.98 0.88 0.8 0.61 0.92
surface oil density (kg/m3) 891 904 819 795 772 845
surface oil gravity (°API) 27 25 41 46 52 36
Glasso bubble point pressure (psi) 1213 667 4726 8882 19232 3092
Saturates (%) 34.8 32.8 47.7 72 65.5 38.0
Aromatics (%) 40 41.1 33.8 16.2 22.5 38.5
Geochemistry
Temperature, depth and efective stress histories were extracted from the Ceduna Trinity model, which is calibrated to a series of 1D Genesis models (August 2014).
Fluid Predictions were made in the BP Petroleum Predicition Toolkit (BP-PPT 5.1.8.1963)
Geochemical paramters calulated in the BP-PPT Source & Fluids Advanced module, Bulk properties caluclated in the BP-PPT Phase Calulator (using Gas Fraction from source & fluids
and PVT assumptions detailed above).
Gas exapansion factors calulated in the BP Reservoir Engineering Toolkit (BP-RET 1.1.4.904) using reservoir gas gravity as an input (Caluclated in BP-PPT Phase Calulator).
Oil formation Volume Factors were calulated in the Amoco Black Oil Calulator (excell sheet)
x Drilling Programme
x Relief Well and Capping Plans
x Updated Project Plan
x SimOps Plan
Stage Gate 4 – Execute to Review
x Not applicable to this WOMP – production well based activities.
Stage Gate 5 – Review/Close out
x End of Well Report (EoWR)
x Well Closeout Checklist
x Integrated Well Review
Approval to move into the next stage is determined by the ‘gatekeeper’ who holds the ‘decide’
rights as per the Recommend, Agree, Perform, Input, Decide (RAPID) decision rights, shown in
Figure 12.
Figure 12 – NWcp RAPID Decision Rights as per BP Practice 100100 – New Well Common Process (Version 1.4)
Note; Regional organisations that do not have all roles assigned in the New Well RAPID shall delegate Decide rights to a higher level in the
organisation and Recommend, Agree, and Input rights to the same or a lower level. For Stromlo-1 this is specifically applicable as the region
does not have a ‘Wells Superintendent’. This role has been delegated up to a ‘Wells Manager’ (see Figure 16) which is a role that encompasses
both the ‘Drilling Engineering Manager’ and ‘Wells Operation Manager’ (i.e. the three roles have been amalgamated for this, limited campaign,
project).
The Stromlo-1 well design is described in the Well BOD Summary and has been selectively
included in the sections 5 and 6 of this WOMP to provide context without providing excessive,
non-relevant information. Some modifications have been made to clarify company specific jargon,
references, etc. As shown in Figure 12, well BODs do not follow the same RAPID rights. Instead,
the following is used. This is to assure that the correct technical specialists are involved in key
design aspects. The elevated sign-off of the ‘Well BOD Summary’ allows the engineering team to
elevate key risks and issues to the appropriate level.
Figure 13 – Well BOD RAPID Decision Rights EXTRACT from the BP Practice 100100 –
New Well Common Process (Version 1.4)
Note; Regional organisations that do not have all roles assigned in the New Well RAPID shall
delegate Decide rights to a higher level in the organisation and Recommend, Agree, and Input
rights to the same or a lower level. For this table during Stromlo-1, this is specifically applicable as
the region does not have a ‘Drilling Engineering Manager’. This role has been delegated up to a
‘Wells Manager’ (see Figure 16).
o The drilling programme delivers well information and task-based procedures for the
planned operation and is consistent with the SoR and Well BoD. The DOP provides
operational instructions to convert a specific engineering design and permit
requirements to a tangible well product in the ground that meets evaluation
objectives. It includes detailed information on components of the drilling operation
including casing, cement, fluid, directional drilling, logging equipment, and others.
o The drilling engineer completes the well programme with input from the
multidisciplinary team and suppliers. The Wells Manager uses the programme to
execute the well with the field operations team.
x Geological Operations Programme (GOP)
o This document is developed by New Well Delivery (NWD) and supports the drilling
programme by detailing the geological scope of work during drilling operations. This
GOP is a subsurface document that operationalises the SoR. It is intended to be the
subsurface reference document for the team during Execution (this includes the
office based team, wells superintendent, wellsite geologist(s) and suppliers).
o The document contains the final version of the well objectives, subsurface
prognosis and uncertainties, PPFG forecast, well specific hole section montages,
detailed TD criteria for each hole section, detailed data acquisition plan (formation
evaluation), detailed data collection and distribution requirements, and an up-to-date
contact list. Additional attachments may include well specific hole section
montages, decision trees, and offset data package or information.
x Drill Well on Paper (DWOP)
o A DWOP session, will be led by the drilling engineer, in a line-by-line review of the
drilling programme with a group of reviewers, selected to critique and improve the
document. Attendees will include supplier company representatives, Rig
Contractor Representative, NWD personnel, GWO engineers, technical specialists,
and field personnel. These sessions will be used to review the entire drilling
programme.
x Readiness to Execute Review (RtE)
o The RtE Review is a peer review.
o It is performed on wells classified by the GWO Well Classification Process as Well
Category A or B or on any priority well (Note, Stromlo-1 is classified ‘B’). This
review evaluates the robustness of the final well design, the well programme
and/or work instructions, the GOP, and contingencies. Equipment and service
provider availability and preparedness are confirmed, and the team assures that the
skills and competence can deliver the plan. Examples of topics discussed in an RtE
review may include:
Quality and robustness of execution plans.
Understanding and communication of risks and subsequent risk
management plans.
Understanding and communication of key decision and verification points.
Resourcing the team to successfully deliver the plan.
x Rig Site Crew Engagement
o Crew engagement in the Execute stage engages the field personnel to foster their
understanding of the well programme and rig site details. Crew engagement
activities will include pre-spud meetings, pre-tour meetings and pre-job meetings.
These meetings are led by the Well Site Leaders and rig contractor leadership and
include rig personnel and supplier crews.
o Pre-section meetings may also be held onshore with specific vendors to review
detailed procedures around specific technical equipment. Participation in these
meetings may extend to the offshore teams as appropriate.
x Daily morning calls
o Each morning a call will be held between the rig and the shore based support team
to discuss operations. These will focus on the activities of the previous day and
forward planning.
x Written Work Instruction (WWI)
o WWIs are generated for specific work scopes to provide detailed, specific and
sequential information needed to carry out the well activity. They are based on the
DOP/GOP however involve more detail as to how the rig crew are planning to
execute the operations. These instructions are prepared by the Well Site Leader
and are strictly oriented toward rig operations.
o For Stromlo-1, the following flowchart (Figure 14) provides an example as to how
the DOP/GOP, pre-section meetings, WWIs and AARs interact.
x After Action Review (AAR)
o An AAR captures lessons by obtaining immediate feedback with the office and field
participants of the activity while memories are fresh and field personnel are
available. The objective is to obtain a shared understanding of occurrences
following an activity, why it happened, and determine if changes are needed to
enhance performance for future activities. Examples of activities where AARs are
often used include the end of a hole section, completion of a production casing run,
or the end of a logging phase.
o The outputs of AARs are lessons that are identified and captured in TeamLink
(discussed in Section 4.4.4).
Drilling
Operations
Plan After Action
Pre-section Updated
Written Work Review
Meeting DOP/GOP Execution
Instructions (AAR)
onshore send to rig
Geologic (WWI’s) offshore
Operations
Plan
Pre-section After Action
Meeting Review
offshore (AAR)
onshore
In addition, the following regular reporting will take place during operations.
x Daily Drilling Reports (DDR)
o Daily for every day of wells operations.
o BP uses OpenWells to manage DDRs.
x Daily Mud Report (DMR)
o Generated by the drilling fluids vendor on a daily basis.
x Daily Geology Report (DGR)
o Generated by the wellsite Geologist each day (drilling activities take place)
x Cementing Job Report
o Generated by the cementing vendor after every cement job. Prepared by the
offshore Cementing Engineer.
x End of Well Report (EoWR)
o At the end of the well prepared by the Drilling Engineer.
x Pressure Test Results
o Report showing the pass/fail of all Well Barrier Element (WBE) pressure tests
(including charts).
x Leak Off Test (LOT) Report
o Generated for every LOT/FIT by the wellsite DE
o Used for the official kick tolerance calculation
x Top of Cement (TOC) calculation report and acceptance verification checklist.
o Generated by the Engineering team to provide an official TOC for each annular
cement job.
Company BP
Segment Upstream
Operating Function GWO
Region New Ventures
Team working Stromlo-1 GAB team
Stromlo-1 drilling operations in the Great Australian Bight will be managed by the ‘New Ventures’
region. New Ventures is a region of the Global Wells Organisation (GWO). GWO New Ventures
deliver BP’s Deepwater Exploration and Appraisal wells globally, in locations where GWO does not
have a pre-existing ‘Regional’ team with the required expertise. This project is one of several
ongoing in the overall New Ventures portfolio.
GWO New Ventures follows a controlled organisational structure. This develops as operations
expand into multiple concurrent locations across the globe. The present organisational structure is
aligned to existing operational commitments. As programmes progress, the structure will
incorporate the additional capabilities as required.
GWO New Ventures organisational structure will retain a ‘core’ wells team, and be supported by
upstream functions, geographical regions and by using third party contractor resources. The roles,
accountabilities, responsibilities and expectations are clearly defined, with clear lines of reporting
relationships.
x GWO New Ventures are accountable for the delivery of safe, reliable and compliant wells,
including identification, self-verification, contractor oversight, and management of safety
and operational risk.
x S&OR Function provide independent verification and assurance, and GWO technical
functions will be used to provide technical support to deliver major activities.
Specifically, the current Australian New Ventures team, along with the defined upstream support
functions, is outlined in Figure 16.
Change out of any personnel, or change to the structure, that could lead to a loss of knowledge,
continuity or experience is managed under the MOC process as described in section 4.5. It is
expected that this structure may change as operations evolve.
New employees are on-boarded through a formal process called ‘Discover BP’ / ‘Discover GWO’.
It provides checklists to assure personnel are introduced to BP’s values & behaviours, risk
management, code of conduct and other important requirements in a systematic way.
New Ventures will use the eWells tablets (https://ewells.bpglobal.com) and dashboard for
conducting Self Verification and Oversight of BP and contractor operations and performance. The
eWells tablet is a handled portable device (tablet) that is used at the wellsite. It is zone rated and
used for SV+OS checks as well as regular well control drills. It contains templates for the
checklists, has the ability to maintain records, take photos, log users and participants, etc. It also
pushes relevant learning alerts to BPs Wellsite Leaders as they become available, ensuring
personnel see these when they log on to the device. The eWells dashboard data is reviewed
centrally by GWO HSSE quarterly for global trends in the operations and potential areas of
intervention by management.
Practical barrier checks and frequency of SV and OS will be based on the GWO Safety Plan and
reviewed for GAB prior to spud.
Figure 18 – MOC RAPID Decision Rights EXTRACT from the BP Practice 100100 – New
Well Common Process (Version 1.4)
MOCs for GWO operations are controlled through the ‘eMOC’ system. This assures changes are
consistent, tracked and implemented in a controlled and verifiable manner. As can be seen, Well
AU000-DR-PLN-600-00003 Page 44 of 131 Rev: B02
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Uncontrolled when printed or stored locally
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BOD changes in the Define phase are defined under a different RAPID (as per the original sign off
rights shown in Figure 13).
For day-to-day operations, management will be via an ‘operational decision making’ matrix (Figure
19). This describes the process the operational personnel will undertake under certain changes.
Note that if the changes are to the SOR, BOD or drilling programme, they may still require an
additional eMOC to be generated (i.e. if they are a ‘people’, ‘process’, ‘plant’ or ‘deviation’ type
changes).
Mandatory Decisions
Level Description Documentation Protocol Communication Protocol
(those which MUST be treated in this level)
Level
NWD/Base Mgmt TL
VP Wells
Wells Manager
Engineering Team Leader (ETL)
Drilling Engineer (DE)
Well Site Leader (WSL)
GAB HSE Manager
Minor changes only, outside the Well Programme.
E-mail only Initial verbal communication confirmed by e-mail Examples of Programme Changes:
(Changes which clearly do not change the risk of the
(initiated by DE or WSL) and acknowledged verbally or - Changes to BHA
programmed operation.)
D A Level 1 e-mails stored electronically in the office G:drive by e-mail (DE or WSL) BEFORE action is taken - Changes to mud rheology
Well File, printed e-mails may be saved in the Rig Site
Conflict:
Well File DE to cc ETL and Wells Manager
Minor
ETL - D
Initial verbal communication confirmed by e-mail (DE) - Unplanned Well Barrier or Well Barrier Element
after I, A and D are acquired - and receipt acknowledged changes:
Operations Change Notice (OCN)
Major changes outside the Well Programme verbally or by e-mail (WSL) BEFORE action is taken. OCN - Number, type, pressure rating, position, weight (fluid)
is not required prior to proceeding. or Wellbore WBE's
Level 2 OCN's stored electronically in the office G:drive
Includes changes to Pressure Testing and Well Barriers - Cement tops
Well File, printed OCN's may saved in the Rig Site Well
D A R R or Well Barrier Elements. DE completes OCN e-mail ASAP (& within 12hrs) and
File
sends. Rig to acknowledge OCN (verbal or e-mail). Unplanned Pressure Test changes:
Inform Only
Conflict: - Pressure, duration, verification method
Proof of D is required documentation, required
WM - D DE to cc ETL, Wells Manager & NWD TL on OCN.
before proceeding
Additional Correspondence as required (Ops Notes, Unplanned Well Control Operations:
etc.). - Level 1 Well Control Event
Major
Unplanned Process Safety related activities:
Operations Change Notice (OCN)
ETL escalates and acquire D and A consent. DE completes - BOP ram configuration changes
Decision having potential for Process Safety Impact OR OCN email ASAP and send. Rig to acknowledge OCN - BOP modifications
Level 3 OCN's stored electronically in the office G:drive
which deviates from Standard Operating Procedures. (verbal or e-mail) BEFORE action is taken. OCN is - Operating with rig SCE protective systems defeated
Well File, printed OCN's may saved in the Rig Site Well
I D A R R I required prior to proceeding. - Operating outside the Well Control or SMS Bridging
File
Conflict Documents
VP Wells - D DE to cc ETL, Wells Manager and VP on OCN. Additional
Proof of D is required documentation, required
Correspondence as required (Ops Notes, etc.). Unplanned Well Control Operations:
before proceeding
The following assumptions have been made for the Stromlo-1 well design:
x Design to Most Likely PPFG case and temperature, with enough latitude to satisfy the
High and PPFG case.
x DST is not required.
x The well will be abandoned immediately following the final TD data acquisition phase with
wellhead left in place.
x The risk of encountering H2S in high percentage is low, however the most likely
concentration of H2S is <10ppm.
o The 13-3/8” casing shall be classified for partial sour service resistance based on
the most likely H2S concentrations and most likely reservoir pressures.
The following boundary conditions have been made for the Stromlo-1 well design;
x BP Practice Requirements to be met (including management of change where required),
x Rig equipment capabilities, including landing string limits,
x 18 ¾” BOP nominal ID,
x All casing and liners able to withstand the stresses caused by relevant load cases as
approved in the casing Basis of Design.
Specific challenges and risks facing the Stromlo-1 well casing design are;
x Frontier basin; limited offset data
x Deepwater environment
x Uncertainty in PPFG
x Potential loss zones resulting in casing shoes being set shallower than desired.
x Failure of the liners results in a significantly different risk profile (i.e. underground crossflow
rather than release of reservoir fluids at seabed).
intends to use a 6 joint conductor (1 x 24m low pressure housing with extension and 5 x range 3
joints). Accounting for stickup, this will put the shoe approximately 84m BML.
In addition, the BP Upstream Engineering Centre used this information to carry out a wellhead and
riser fatigue analysis.
The wellhead selected is considered suitable for the planned Stromlo-1 operations. For this
WOMP, the following should be noted;
Wellhead and Riser Fatigue;
This analysis considered various cement shortfalls for wave and Vortex Induced Vibration (VIV)
fatigue. It showed the wellhead and riser to have a minimum fatigue life of 457 days (wellhead
limit under surface casing cement shortfall). This is considered a suitable fatigue life for Stromlo-
1.
Drift Off Analysis;
Analysis of the riser, wellhead and conductor shows that, in the event of drift off, failure would
occur above the BOP; provided the TOC is brought to mudline. For the modelled load of a 10m
shortfall on TOC, failure occurs below the BOP in some environmental situations.
Operating limits analysis concluded that under normal operating conditions disconnect is possible
before reaching the ‘Point of Disconnect’ (point where equipment limits are reached). However,
for extremely conservative weather loading this is not the case.
The drift off analysis has been accepted as suitable due to;
x A top up cement system will be run to cement around the top of the conductor (if needed),
x Using a drillpipe stinger to top up cement is a further option if a low TOC occurs,
x ROV can confirm cement returns visually or with a pH meter,
x The likelihood of all the conservative assumptions occurring simultaneously to cause this
failure is extremely low. i.e. This would be;
o Cement job results in low TOC and;
o Top up system fails to rectify TOC and;
o Drillpipe stinger fails to rectify TOC and;
o Vessel black out occurs during operations and;
o This black out occurs during high wind and current conditions and;
o The BOP cannot be disconnected in the required time limit.
Drive Off Analysis;
Analysis was also conducted on the possibility of drive off under max thruster power. For
Stromlo-1, all cases (even cement shortfall) resulted in the weak point being above the BOP.
The candidate materials for building the sweeps are prehydrated bentonite (PHB), guar or xanthan
gum. Guar/xanthan reduces reliance on drill water and reduces the time required to build the
viscous fluid. PHB may provide some stability to loose sands.
Displacement fluid (PAD mud) is required to provide some degree of mechanical borehole stability
for casing running and should be built from PHB and weighted with barite. The addition of 5%
potassium chloride will provide a degree of chemical borehole stability should clays be present in
the interval. The inclusion of small concentrations of LCM will minimise loss of the PAD mud to
the formation maintaining fluid hydrostatic in the wellbore.
A flat rheology, synthetic oil based mud (SBM) drilling system has been selected for all following
hole sections on Stromlo-1. The synthetic base oil selected is a Linear Alpha Olefin (LAO),
Amodrill 1200. Selection of the drilling fluid and base oil is detailed extensively in the Stromlo-1
Fluids BOD. This fluid has been selected as it offers the best solution considering;
x Performance in deepwater temperature environment,
x Fluid stability,
x Formation stability (chemical),
x Ability to use lighter (than water based mud) weights for shallow hole section where
needed,
x Greater kick tolerance due to gas solubility,
x Hydrate inhibition.
Testing of fluid stability under predicted downhole conditions is currently being carried out. Once
this testing is complete, the exact chemical make-up of the drilling fluid will be finalised. The
fluids programme and drilling programme will then detail the allowable variations from these
properties. Testing shall be carried out, and reported, in line with API RP 13B-2 at a minimum of
three times per 24 hour period (when drilling).
x Maximum drill to depth is 3,013mRT. This is ~10m shallower than the fault with
uncertainty.
Note; if no shale can be found, no design change is needed. Kick tolerance for the following hole
section has been based on sand fracture. Setting the shoe in a shale package is preferred, but not
mandatory.
The following flow chart is shown to provide guidance for forward planning only. All operational
decisions will be discussed with Wells Manager.
Figure 22 – 13-3/8” Shoe Placement Strategy with 18” Contingency Liner Consideration
A maximum drill to depth of 4,160mRT exists based on being ~15m shallower than the shallowest
a fault identified at 4,383m (±210m) could be at (i.e. preventing the risk of losses during casing
run).
The following flow chart is shown to provide guidance for forward planning only. All operational
decisions will be discussed with Wells Manager.
6.1.1 Documentation
For Stromlo-1, the following well control documents are required;
x A Well Control Bridging Document (WCBD)
o This document outlines a gap assessment between well control procedures
between BP and the drilling contractor (Diamond Offshore General Company).
o Where gaps or differences exist, it provides clarity on which requirement is to be
adopted for operations in the Great Australian Bight (including for Stromlo-1).
x A Well Control Response Guide (WCRG)
o This plan addresses the first 48 hours of operations during a various severity well
control events.
o This document also defines the activation of the regional incident management
team (IMT) who will define the following activities as per operational needs.
x Cap and containment plan
o Discussed at length in section 12.2
x Relief well plan
o Discussed at length in section 12.3
x Well monitoring and responsibility document
o This document outlines the various parameters that require monitoring. It provides
guidance on the recommended levels alarms should be set, however the alarms
themselves will be defined in the hole section specific work instructions (at the rig
site).
Day to day tracking of well control drills, kick tolerance and other issues will be reported in the
Daily Drilling Report (DDR).
2. Swab Kick – an influx that occurs when formation pressure is less than the hydrostatic
pressure of the mid.
BP Practice 100204 – Well Control (10-10) outlines the requirements for kick tolerance.
Specifically, the requirements relevant to Stromlo-1 are;
x Kick tolerance shall be based on high side anticipated pore pressure (for exploration wells),
x For intensity and swab kicks, the kick tolerance shall be greater to or equal to 25bbl in all
hole sizes,
o 25bbl is the BP globally used standard for minimum kick tolerance as per BP
Practice 100204 – Well Control (10-10). This is applied as a baseline starting point
for all BP operations (including UK and Norway North Sea).
o BP’s view is that kick tolerance volume is driven by alarm limits and should not be
expected to vary with hole size/system volume. This is why BP uses a consistent
25bbl across all operations.
x Kick tolerance calculations shall be performed while drilling all hole sections after the first
pressure containing string has been set,
x The kick tolerance of the weakest known point of the hole section being drilled shall be;
o Verified or updated daily,
o Updated if mud weight changes by 0.5ppg or more,
o Updated if changes to the pore pressure or fracture gradient are encountered while
drilling.
BP uses the Well Monitoring and Responsibilities and Requirements Practice (NV001-DR-PRO-
600-00001) to define monitoring requirements. Specific to kick tolerance, this includes guidance
on;
x Pit alarm levels. BP’s requirement is that the maximum pit alarm limit is set at 50% of
calculated kick tolerance for the hole section, not to exceed 25bbls. Alarms will be set
below this, at the lowest resolution of the system, considering operational practicalities.
x Flow in/out monitoring. To be set at 25% from midpoint on the normal operating
envelope.
x Responsibilities, including a matrix to define roles.
Furthermore, kick drills will test the responsiveness of the set alarms and personnel. These tests
will be implemented as per the BP/Rig operator well control bridging document (AU000-HS-PLN-
600-00004). These are described below with the minimum test frequency;
x D1 – Tripping
o Performed inside casing and at a minimum of every 7 days.
x D2 – Drilling
o Performed inside casing and at a minimum of every 7 days.
x D3 – Diverter
o After running the BOP and installing the diverter.
x D4 – Well Kill
o Prior to drilling a hydrocarbon-bearing interval.
x D5 – Stripping.
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x Dog legs will be minimised. Allowance of 1.0deg/30m will be defined in the survey
programme. Exceeding this may be acceptable, however this will be subject to approval
from the Wells Manager.
o A survey frequency of one per stand will be applied.
x Inclination will be minimised, however provided drilling target can be achieved, minor
inclination is not a concern (i.e. <10° inclination).
x No infrastructure or wellbores exist in the nearby area. There are no anti-collision concerns
for Stromlo-1.
x For relief well planning, an error ellipse report has been generated to show that;
o At the planned 13-3/8” shoe, absolute lateral uncertainty is 10.42m at 2;
o At the planned 9-5/8” shoe, absolute lateral uncertainty is 10.56m at 2.
x BP Practice 100221 – Zonal Isolation (10-60). This document provides requirements and
permissions for cement WBEs installed during well construction and permanent
abandonment. e.g. cement barrier length requirements, compressive strength, etc.
x BP Practice 100222 – Well Barriers (10-65). This practice specifies the minimum
mandatory requirements for well barrier management throughout the life cycle of the well.
e.g. casing, BOP, fluid column, shoetrack, etc. It does define annulus and plug cement
ACTs, however, it points to BP Practice 100221 for the specific requirements (as cement
barriers are defined in the zonal isolation practice).
Essentially, Practice 100221 – Zonal Isolation talks to cement barriers and barriers specific to
hydrocarbon bearing zones. Practice 100222 – Well Barriers covers all barriers to be used in the
lifecycle including plugs, valves, etc.
To summarise the general philosophy, a primary and secondary well barrier is required during all
operations after the BOP is installed. Other, relevant, specific requirements include;
x The primary annular cement WBE above any DPZ shall be across a natural seal for that
DPZ.
x Annulus cement height requirement is;
o 30mMD when using the circumferential logging method.
o 300m when using a TOC estimate method.
x During temporary abandonment (suspension), mechanical barriers are acceptable. To be
qualified as a suitable WBE, the well component must meet the acceptance criteria
detailed in its specific Acceptance Criteria Tables (ACT), which specify test requirements,
depending on the specific WBE being used.
o BP define three levels of temporary abandonment; short, medium and long term.
Depending on the term of temporary abandonment, different barriers are
considered allowable. For Stromlo-1, no temporary abandonment is planned
(however short term temporary abandonment may be required for Non Productive
Time (NPT) events such as weather suspension).
Short term is defined as a duration in which the response time could be
sensitive, a weather or safety threat could be imminent, or BOP repair is
required, all with the intention of returning to the well as soon as practical
(typically days or weeks). This is not planned for Stromlo-1, however may
be needed for NPT events.
Medium term is defined as a duration in which the response time is not
sensitive, and plans do exist to return to the well for additional construction
activity (typically months or years). This is not planned for Stromlo-1.
Long term is defined as a duration in which plans do not exist to return to
the well, yet access to the wellbore could be required for future activity
(typically many years). This is not planned for Stromlo-1.
When permanently abandoning the well, other specific requirements are;
x At least two lateral cement barriers shall be in place for;
o Each potential flow path between any DPZs,
o Any DPZ and surface,
o A DPZ and a hydrostatic permeable zone.
Method 2; ACT 5.5.2 (from BP Practice 100221) – Circumferential logging verification for
annular cement WBE.
The annular cement can be verified to the required length in intervals of circumferential cement
built up from 2mMD intervals to a total of 30mMD of verified cement (for a single barrier).
In line with globally available guidelines, BP Practices require a single, verified barrier to be
30mMD length. However unlike these guidelines, BP specifies how the quality of the barrier is
assessed. This is because there are practical limits when interpreting these types of logs (i.e.
there are regularly minor points of concern that could be interpreted as a log issue or formation
change). It should be noted that ‘continuous bonded cement’ is not the same as ‘circumferentially
verified cement’. BP believes that the requirement for circumferentially verified cement is a more
stringent requirement.
For that reason, BP has defined the specific requirement to verify the 30mMD as circumferentially
verified cement to be considered as indicating an effective barrier. This requirement must show
that 100% of the casing annulus circumference is cemented for that given interval to be
considered as part of the barrier. As this is a very strict requirement, BP allows this to be made up
of intervals, no less than 2mMD in length. A minimum of 2m has been selected as it provides an
adequate number of data points to determine if a log response is valid or anomalous. This is
based on the transmitter to receiver spacing and firing frequency. BP also has offsets where short
(2-3m), circumferentially verified cement lengths have been proven to be effective barriers.
Note that in addition to this, the barrier must be verified by a BP cement bond log interpretation
specialist.
As this is a more stringent definition of what constitutes an effective barrier, BP considers this
approach to be ALARP and will use this method to verify annular cement when using a
circumferential logging technique. In practice, this method is used for BP globally (including
Norway and UK North Sea) where globally available guidelines require a 30mMD continuous
bonded cement barrier.
Combination Barriers
BP Practices allow an annular cement barrier to be used as a ‘combination barrier’ (i.e. primary and
secondary barrier in a single annular cement column) if the annular cement height is, at minimum,
1.5 times the height of a single annular barrier.
For combination barriers verified using non-circumferential log methods (ACT 5.5.1) this will result
in a 450mMD cement column.
x Although this is not 2x the height of a single column, it has been compared with other
globally available guidelines.
o OGUK Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines Issue 3 (paragraph 465) states that
annular cement shall be 300mMD if the TOC is calculated indirectly and is
considered adequate for two permanent barriers or a combination permanent
barrier for the eventual abandonment of the wellbore. Paragraph 466 states that
this may be reduced if verified by a direct measurement (i.e. log).
o NORSOK D-010, 15.22, Table 22 requires a 50mMD verified by displacement
calculations (i.e. not circumferential logging) for a single barrier. In line with other
sections of this practice, 2 x that length (i.e. 100mMD total) would be required for a
combination barrier. Non-circumferential logging of TOC is not discussed as it is
only required for production casing or liners (i.e. large sizes where non-
x Cement plug height shall be a minimum of 30mMD above the DPZ and place across a
natural seal.
x To construct a lateral barrier in casing, the wellbore cement WBE shall be placed across
the equivalent height of the annulus WBE.
x Primary barriers in the open hole to be weight tested only.
x The deepest barrier inside the casing shall be both positively and negatively pressure
tested and mechanically weight tested.
x Weight and pressure testing on all subsequent plugs can be omitted if;
o The cement plug is placed on a reliable base*
o The plug is effectively placed as per design
o Greater than 90% of cement volume is mixed at a density of no less than 0.25ppg
below the planned density
o The cement plug is at least 100mMD long.
x The primary barrier to the shallowest hydrocarbon bearing zone shall be mechanically
weight-tested.
x Where an annular ‘combination barrier’ (i.e. primary and secondary barrier in a single
cement column) has been used, a combination wellbore cement WBE shall be installed
across the vertical extent of the annular barriers and set of a reliable base (i.e. viscous
reactive pill).
*Note that BP considers viscous reactive pills or cement support tools to be considered ‘a reliable
base’. However, globally available guidelines have differing requirements regarding this. For this
reason, the use of viscous reactive pills on Stromlo-1 is not considered ALARP.
Instead, for Stromlo-1, a ‘reliable base’ will only be considered to be a mechanical or cement plug
that has been tagged and pressure tested. Negative pressure testing will be omitted provided the
lower plug has been successfully negatively tested in the same direction of flow.
Various other details are contained in BP Practice 100221 – Zonal Isolation. However the above
sections describe the general philosophy the GAB project used to design the cement barriers for
Stromlo-1. This practice aims to assure the geological seals, that were broken in order to drill the
well, are replaced by suitable cement barriers.
6.3.2 Casing and Liner Hanger Barrier Verification (ACT 5, 23 and 65 from BP
Practice 100222 – Well Barriers (10-65))
For casing or liners to be used as a barrier during the Stromlo-1 well lifecycle, they must comply
with the relevant ACT regarding casing, liner packer or hanger adapter system defined in BP
Practice 100222 – Well Barriers (10-65). These ACT points to the casing design practice
(discussed at length in Section 5.1) for design requirements. The verification and testing is
described in a different practice; BP Practice 100218 – Pressure Testing (10-45).
For Stromlo-1, all pressure tests will be performed in line with this Practice. The values shown
below are notional only. Actual test will depend on the mud weight that is required to TD the
section or, for negative tests, the DPZ identification and pressure evaluation.
o For Stromlo-1 these will be defined in the well specific fluids programme. Testing
is being conducted on the planned fluid chemistry currently. This testing will
provide guidance on allowable limits and desired properties.
6.3.4 BOP Barrier Verification (ACT 4 from BP Practice 100222 – Well Barriers
(10-65))
As defined in BP Practice 100204 – Well Control (10-10), BOP equipment must conform to API
standard 53 Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7. Verification shall be in the form of pressure testing, conducted
in line with BP Practice 100218 – Pressure Testing (10-45). This defines that;
x Testing frequency will be in line with API Standard 53, Section 7.
x Test Acceptance Criteria and durations are in line with the table shown above in Section
6.3.2 (Table 26).
In addition, operating and monitoring the BOP shall be conformant with BP Practice 100206 –
Subsea Blowout Preventer (BOP) Systems (10-11).
x When used in casing above an open hole, shall be pressure tested from above to a value
that exceeds the strength of the formation.
An example of this, short term abandonment, barrier status is shown below;
Secondary barrier;
BOP and shear ram.
Primary barrier;
Casing and RSPV.
In recent years with the introduction of BOPs with two shear-seal rams these have been used in
some operations to provide the primary and secondary barriers. Both these configurations may
be used in the event weather predictions do not allow suitable time to suspend the well as per
Figure 24. As per BP Practice 100222 – Well Barriers, this would require a risk assessment and
MOC to be performed. This will be in place before drilling operations begin. In these situations,
the following barrier configurations would be used.
8 Risk Management
BP defines risk (OMS Glossary) as “A measure of loss/harm to people, the environment,
compliance status, Group reputation, assets or business performance in terms of the product of
the probability of an event occurring and the magnitude of its impact.”
GWO New Ventures Risk Management follows the Global Wells Organisation Risk Management
Procedure 100096. This Practice is in conformance to:
x BP Policy 000030 Risk Management
x BP Procedure 100363 Upstream Risk Procedure
Additionally, the Risk Management Procedure 100096 provides:
x A structured risk management process
x Incorporates change to notification and endorsement requirements per Upstream Risk
Management and Reporting – 2015 Simplification Plan
x A GWO risk register hierarchy that facilitates risk aggregation and simplifies documentation
of risk information, (see Figure 28)
x Defines the GWO Level 1 and 2 Risk Registers that are used for BP Risk Process and
redefines the GWO Level 3 and 4 Registers that are used for New Well Common Process
x A reference to common risk management tools, (e.g. GWO Standard Level 3/4 Risk
Register Template, level 2 risk register in BP Risk Assurance Tool, (RAT), GWO Standard
Bowties, Group Risk Classification Tool).
Risks within BP are assessed on an 8x8 matrix. These consider likelihood against severity.
Likelihood varies from 1 (the lowest) to 8 (the highest). Guidance on scoring likelihood is provided
in BP Policy 000030 – Risk Management. Essentially, a quantitative criteria is used where data
sets can be used. Otherwise, qualitative values are assigned based on BP and industry
experience.
Consequence is considered across 4 key segments. Qualitative guidance is also provided in BP
Policy 000030 – Risk Management.
x Health and Safety
x Environment
x Financial
x Non-Financial (Accounting and control, Media/Public reaction, License to Operate,
Government/key stakeholder reaction and Management time)
Depending on the level of risk identified, notification levels and endorsement are elevated to
assure suitable visibility at the appropriate management level (Table 28).
BP uses a tiered risk register approach for identifying and managing risks for well operations;
This contingencies will be managed through the MOC process and will be communicated to the
rig though modifications to the programme (described in section 4.3).
10 Well Abandonment
Stromlo-1 will be permanently abandoned in line with BP Practice 100221 – Zonal Isolation (10-60).
Section 6.3.1 describes the philosophy standards and verification methods for cement barriers
(note that only cement barriers can be used for permanent abandonment). That section also
describes the required quantity and verification methods.
Figure 31 shows the pre-drill abandonment assumption. Currently the assumption is;
Well Barrier#2 is a combination barrier (primary and secondary) and isolates DPZ #2 from surface.
Well Barrier #2 = WBE #2a + WBE #2b;
x WBE #2a; annular cement, combination barrier;
o Annular cement can be verified and used as a ‘combination barrier’ provided it
meets the requirements in Practice 100221.
o Circumferential logging will be required to verify this as a combination barrier. In
this case, minimum 60mMD would need to be verified.
o This process is described in section 6.3.1.1.
x WBE #2b; cement plug, combination barrier;
o This plug requires tagging as well as positive and negative pressure testing as it is
the deepest inside casing (as per Practice 100221)
o This will be set at the top of DPZ #2
o Minimum 30mMD, however;
Length, at a minimum, will match WBE #2a (i.e. if used as a combination
barrier, this length will be matched at minimum).
o This process is described in section 6.3.1.2.
Well Barrier #1 is a combination barrier (primary and secondary) and isolates DPZ#1 from surface
and from DPZ #2. Well Barrier #1 = WBE #1a + WBE #1b;
x WBE #1a; annular cement, combination barrier;
o Annular cement can be verified and used as a ‘combination barrier’ provided it
meets the requirements in Practice 100221.
o Circumferential logging will be required to verify this as a combination barrier. In
this case, 60mMD would need to be verified.
o This process is described in section 6.3.1.1.
x WBE #1b; cement plug, combination barrier;
o This will be set at the top of DPZ#1.
o This plug will be tagged as well as positive and negatively pressure tested
o Tag and test can be omitted provided lower plug meets conditions in Practice
100221 and it is set on a tagged and positively pressure tested mechanical plug or
previously set cement plug (as described in 6.3.1.2).
o Minimum 100mMD (a condition of omitting a weight test), however;
Length, at a minimum, will match WBE #1a (depending on verification
method of WBE #1a).
o This process is described in section 6.3.1.2.
As an indication of what could potentially change, Figure 32 shows the abandonment strategy that
would be implemented in the event only 100m annular cement around each shoe is achieved. In
this scenario;
x Circumferential logging would be required to confirm 60mMD annular cement around the
9-5/8” shoe (as described in 6.3.1.1).
x The lack of cement in the 13-3/8” annulus would change the DPZ#1 abandonment
strategy. Perforation would be needed to allow cement to be installed in the annulus
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above DPZ#1. A single plug across the entire annular and wellbore would be installed and
tested as per Section 6.3.1.2.
BP intends to leave the wellhead in place following the abandonment of the Stromlo-1 well.
Cutting and removing the wellhead is common in some areas to prevent the wellhead interfering
with other industries (e.g., commercial trawl fishing). In the GAB, fisheries fish to depths of a
maximum of about 750m. Beyond this water depth, leaving the wellhead in place will not impact
other marine users. The benefits of leaving the wellhead in place are:
x Reduced safety exposure by eliminating operations required to remove the wellhead (e.g.
manual handling).
x Ability to re-latch onto the wellhead with a BOP system. Although this is highly unlikely, it
may be required for;
o Further well evaluation (or reservoir or barriers).
o Emergency response.
o Future BOP acceptance testing in the region with other rigs.
x Leaving the annulus seal in place provides a mechanical, third annular barrier to any DPZ’s
identified during drilling. Although note that BP does not consider mechanical barriers
suitable for permanent abandonment (i.e. it will not be used as a primary or secondary
barrier).
The method for installation and verification of the barriers for abandonment will not differ due to
the wellhead remaining in place. The ROV will be equipped with video and a 2D (or 3D) sonar,
which will be used to provide a permanent record of the seabed at each drill site before and after
operations. At no stage does BP intend to remove this wellhead. Removal adds no technical
benefit and, while the wellhead is intact, offers the benefits described above. Environmental
impacts have been addressed in the GAB EP.
Using the BP Practices for zonal isolation, which are benchmarked against globally recognised
practices, assures that the abandonment of Stromlo-1 will be managed to an ALARP level.
For vendors providing service for Stromlo-1, the following contractual requirements are in place
regarding key personnel.
Rig Operator;
Rig operator shall provide BP with evidence documenting proficiency of personnel on request.
The following roles are considered ‘Key Personnel’;
x OIM
Well Placement;
BP requires that the contractor develops and implements an internal process for assessing
competency. No changes can take place without prior BP agreement and a comprehensive
management of change review for the following positions;
x Service Coordinator
x Drilling Engineer/Well Planner (accountable for survey management and well planning)
In addition, BP requires specific offshore roles (lead directional driller and lead MWD/LWD
engineer) to have specific competencies as outlined in the contract. This includes review of these
competencies with BP before operations.
Generic story boards that detail the minimum capping and containment conditions for a well blowout are outlined below.
Well Incident ROV Surveillance/ BOP Subsea Dispersant Injection (SSDI), Debris Clearance and LMRP Well Capping Operation
Intervention Removal
Response Timeline (<48 hours) (<10 days for SSDI) (<35 days)
On the BOP
The primary capping stack landing point is on the top of the BOP following LMRP removal.
The OSRL 10kpsi or 15kpsi capping stacks, with the OSRL 27” 15kpsi H4 connector below it, can
land on the BOP mandrel without a spool piece or any additional connector. The Ocean
GreatWhite BOP mandrel is an 18 ¾” 15k H4 connector.
A fixture to check clearance for the 27” 15kpsi H4 connector, which fits bottom of the 10kpsi or
15kpsi OSRL capping stack, was placed over the LMRP connector mandrel and the fixture was
rotated 180 degrees to find any potential clash issues. The fixture was rotated around the LMRP
connector mandrel and there was at least ¼” clearance between the fixture and the any
obstructions (Figure 34 and Figure 35). CAD modelling was also completed to confirm the
interfaces between the capping stacks and BOP.
On the Wellhead
The secondary capping stack landing point is on the wellhead following BOP and LMRP removal.
The wellhead for both Stromlo-1 is the 15kpsi Dril-Quip Big Bore II system. The wellhead
connector is a 30” SHD H-4 High Capacity Connector.
The OSRL 10kpsi or 15kpsi capping stack, with the BP owned 30” 15kpsi GE SHD H4 connector
installed below it, can land on the wellhead without a spool piece or any additional connector
between them. Figure 36 below shows the BP owned 30” 15kpsi GE SHD H4 connector over the
test stump.
Note that to achieve this, the BP owned 30” 15kpsi GE SHD H4 connector is (stored in Houston)
would have to be mobilised by air to Singapore or Australia to be installed on the capping stack
prior to loading the capping stack onto the vessel. Details for this are covered in the Containment
Response Plan.
Figure 36 - The BP owned 30” 15kpsi GE SHD H4 connector and Test Stump
There are 3 stages to landing the capping stack on the riser flex joint.
1. Install the FJ tool to straighten the riser adapter, then restrain it in place by using the
segmented wedges.
a. The planned system for the OGW is the Oil States Industries CRS Flexible Joint
Alignment and Locking System – Dual API Tool. Figure 37 and Figure 38 show a
high level overview of the system and how it straightens the flex joint.
2. Land the H4 adaptor, with the FT-H Adaptor below it, on to the connection above the flex
joint. See Figure 39.
a. This needs to be run prior to the capping stack as the bottom connection of the FT-
H adaptor is bolted. Trying to bolt this connection with the weight of the capping
stack above it would make the operation extremely difficult.
b. Both the H4 adaptor and FT-H adaptor are BP owned, stored in Houston and would
have to be mobilised by air to Singapore or Australia to be installed on the capping
stack prior to loading the capping stack onto the vessel.
3. Land the OSRL capping stack, with the OSRL 27” 10kpsi H4 connector below it, on to H4
adaptor.
Below is a high level plan of events during a capping stack installation. Detailed scenario specific
procedures will be developed covering all phases of the installation including risk assessments,
vessel details, flow regime, hydrates mitigations, vessel waypoints, story boards, etc. in the event
of having to land the cap,
x Once the LMRP has been removed and any debris protruding above the upper mandrel of the
BOP has been removed, the capping stack can now be installed.
x The capping stack running tool or rigging is installed on the capping stack assembly.
x Note the capping stack bore will be open to allow flow from the well to pass through it
while landing.
x The capping stack will be run to a predetermined depth at a predetermined safe location away
from the BOP while being followed by an ROV.
x The ROV will provide instructions to enable the vessel to follow waypoints until the capping
stack is within a short distance of the BOP and ready to be landed.
x The capping stack will be oriented and brought into the well stream and landed. The well
stream is shown to have a centralising effect on the capping stack.
x The ROV will disconnect the running tool / rigging while another ROV handles the locking of
the connector.
x The well is closed in by closing the rams or the gate valves and then choking back the outlets
for final shut-in assuming the well can be shut in.
x Perform a survey of the BOP and capping stack to ensure that there are no additional leaks
formed during shutting in the well.
x Survey the seabed, BOP and containment cap over the next 24-hours to confirm no additional
leaks have formed during shutting in the well.
x Overboarding of the capping stack would be limited by a maximum sea state of around 3.5-
4m. Any sea state at the wellsite beyond this may necessitate ‘waiting on weather’
(WOW) delays.
x Times relating to the sourcing and readiness of a suitable subsea construction vessel are
estimates based on potential regional availability.
x Casing design for Stromlo-1 includes consideration for full displacement to gas. This is
described at length in Section 5.1.
x Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis to confirm the uplift force generated by WCD can be
overcome by the weight of the capping stack. This has been confirmed for all OSRL capping
stacks. Details are in the Containment Response Plan.
x Wellhead analysis to confirm the stack could be installed on the WH or BOP, and the loads
would not exceed the design. This showed that the cap can be installed on the BOP up to
inclinations of 8.3°. This is well beyond operational limits that are enforced for general
operations. Details can be found in the Upstream Engineering Centre Report EU-2015-0028.
The overall results graph is included in Figure 41 for reference only (load cases on LMRP
should be ignored).
The above rig options have been assessed for mobilisation suitability. The average timing has
been used as the assumption for the relief well timing shown in 12.3.7.