Political Thinking in Heidegger

Author(s): REINER SUHÜRMANN

Source: Social Research, Vol. 45, No. 1 (SPRING 1978), pp. 191-221
Published by: New School
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Political Thinking
III nGIClG99^^ /REINERSCHÜRMANN

It is a decisivequestionforme todayhowa
politicalsystem,and or whatkind,can at
all be coordinatedwiththe technological
age. I do notknowan answerto thisques-
tion.I am notconvincedthatit is democ-
racy.
MartinHeidegger(1966)

LJ NTiL his death Heidegger remained deliberately - and

-
embarrassinglydiscreet,to say the least, as to the political
dimensionof his project to phenomenologically "destroy"
metaphysics.As is well known,he committedan error of
politicaljudgmentin 1933 whenhe thoughthe knew"how a
politicalsystem,and of whatkind,can at all be coordinated
withthe technologicalage." Indeed, under NationalSocialism
he praised "the innertruthand greatnessof thismovement
(namelytheencounterbetweenglobaltechnology and modern
man)."1Later,havingacknowledgedhiserror,he wouldevade

1Martin in die Metaphysik

Heidegger,Einführung (Tübingen:Niemeyer,1953), p.
152; An Introduction
toMetaphysics,
translatedby Ralph Manheim(New Haven: Yale
University Press,1959),p. 199.The lecturecoursewasheldin 1935.Whencompared
to a latercommentary on it (interviewwithDer Spiegel,May 31, 1976,p. 206), the
parenthesis raisessome questions:
Whywas it not deliveredorallyalthoughit stood in the manuscriptin 1935?
Becauseof "thestupid,theinformers, and thesnoopers"in theaudience,Heidegger
says.Does Heideggerwanttogivethisparenthesis, thirtyyearslater,an anti-Naziring
whichwould have provokedan informer? Does the line containa protestagainst
NationalSocialism?
In thecontext,theparenthesis hardlysoundslikea criticism:in 1935Heideggerstill
truststhatif modernman can come to grips withtechnology it will be through
NationalSocialism.Then howfardid hisdisillusionment reallygo, whenhe resigned
fromthe rectoratea yearearlier?Does the line containsome formof
allegiancetò
NationalSocialism?

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192 SOCIAL RESEARCH

questions about the practicalimplicationsof his thoughtlike a

burnt child. When asked about his political stand he would
simplyreply: "I do not know an answer to thisquestion."2 It is
not established that we should believe him on this point. In a
hardly refutable study, Karsten Harries3 has recentlyshown
how deeply the themes of Heidegger's inaugural address "On
the Self-Determinationof the German University"(May 1933)
are rooted in Being and Time and how they reappear in the
praise of the great statesman (likened to other "creators,"the
poet, the artist,the thinker)in later writingsof the 1930s. The

In 1935technology is notyetseenin thecontextof Westernmetaphysics. The later

notionGestell,then,depoliticizestechnology, sinceman'sencounter withitis no longer
thematizedin the contextof politicalforces.So does the line perhapshintat a
relationshipbetweentechnology and fascismwhichHeideggerwouldnevertakeup
again?
Protest,allegiance,and an implicitchargethattechnology is the hand of fascism
cannotbe meantat the sametime.The basicambiguity in Heidegger'scommenton
hisearlierremarkslies in theunderstanding of technology.His attemptto read later
developments of his thinking into the line from An Introduction to Metaphysics is
somewhatself-contradictory: one cannotpraiseNationalSocialismforallowingcon-
trolof technology and at thesametimeequateNationalSocialismwith"Americanism"
and "theCommunist movement" as beingdetermined by"planetary technology."In
1935 NationalSocialismis said to possessan innertruthand greatnessbecauseof a
potentialitythatneitherAmericanism nor Communismcould offer.The same line
whichin 1935 opposesNationalSocialismto planetary technology is used in 1966 to
claima fundamental identitybetweenNationalSocialismand globaltechnology.
2The linesof the
epigraphare takenfrom"Nur nochein Gottkannuns retten.
Spiegel-Gespräch mitMartinHeideggeram 23. September1966" DerSpiegel23 (May
31, 1976): 206; "Onlya God Can Save Us Now,"Graduate FacultyPhilosophyJournal6
(Winter1977): 5-27.
3 KarstenHarries,
"Heideggeras a Political ReviewofMetaphysics
Thinker," 29 (June
1976): 642-669. Whetheror not the structureof "resolve"impliesa need for
authority- and thisseemsquestionable - Harries'sremarkson Beingand Timeshow
once againhowinconsistent was Karl Löwith'sattemptto drawpoliticalimplications
out of a supposedlynihilistic conceptof existencein SeinundZeit; see Karl Lowith,
"Les implications politiquesde la philosophiede l'existencechez Heidegger,"Les
Tempsmodernes,no. 14 (1946): 343-360 and his Heidegger:Denkerin dürftiger
Zeit
Fischer,1953).Harries,on theotherhand,failsto acknowledgewhatin
(Frankfurt:
1953 Habermascalledtheshiftin the"qualityof appeal" fromBeingand TimetoAn
Introduction
toMetaphysics.
In Beingand Time,Habermas wrote,"Heidegger stillpraised
thequasi-religious
resolveof theprivate,
singleexistenceas finiteautonomy,"
whereas
thepraiseof powerand violencewas themomentary "fascistcoloration"
of thelater
discoveryof the "historyof Being" (JürgenHabermas,Philosophisch-politische
Profile
[Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1971],pp. 67-75).

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 HEIDEGGER 193

evidenceproducedby Harriesthatthe call fora leader ready

to use violenceand able to "walkalone" is neitheran acciden-
tal nor an isolatedthemein theRektoratsrede providesa safe
platform for furtherreflection.In fact,it makes furtherre-
flectioninescapable: If before and afterthe "turn" in his
thinkingHeideggerwas,to be sure,a politicalthinker,and if
his politicalstandpointdoes shinethroughseveralof his writ-
ings,whatwas thatstandpoint? Or, in thevocabularyofBeing
and Time:If authenticexistencehas no higherauthoritybut
only its own resoluteactions to justifyitself,what kind of
action is adumbratedby that ontologicalinquiry?The link
betweenan onticwayof livingand the ontologicaldescription
of existenceis indeed said to be a "positivenecessity."Also,
once the politicaltendencyin some of Heidegger'stextsprior
to the lectureson Nietzsche(1936-40) has been established,it
willcome as no surpriseto some of his readers thirtyyears
later to hear him say about the most appropriatepolitical
systemfor today:"I am not sure thatit is democracy."But
wheredo we go fromthere?
One line of argumentsuggestsa pure and simpleidentity
betweentheenduringpoliticalstandpointbehindHeidegger's
thinkingin generaland his misledcommitments in the early
years of Nazism. The literaturethat argues such a direct
continuity betweenHeidegger'sfundamentalconvictionsand
those eventsis abundant.Theodor Adorno set the tone for
muchof itbypolemicizing againstHeidegger'slanguageas an
ideological expressionof fascism.4Several documentations
were published,followedby accusationsand rectifications.5
4 Theodor
Adorno,/argonderEigentlichkeit (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1965), espec. pp.
8-9; The Jargon of Authenticity, translated by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will
(Evanston: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1973). A similar course is followed by
Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörungder Vernunft(Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1954). Lukács
elaborates on "a climate of despair" in so-called existentialistwritings,a climate which
would have helped to prepare and enforce Nazism.
5 Guido zu seinemLeben und Denken
Schneeberger,Nachlesezu Heidegger:Dokumente
(Bern, 1962) and Paul Hühnerfeld, In Sachen Heidegger (Munich: List, 1961).
Schneeberger's and Hühnerfeld's positions,togetherwith that of Adorno, have been
carefullyanalyzed and criticizedby François Fédier in Critique,nos. 234, 242, 251

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194 SOCIAL RESEARCH

Heidegger himself remained aloof from these debates. His

remark,"I am not sure that it is democracy," taken together
with this aloofness (as well as the decision, after the war, to
repeat in print the praise of the inner truthand greatness of
National Socialism) may seem to provide a hint for a lifelong
nostalgia for the integrationunder one leader of the "service
of knowledge" (Wissensdienst), the "service of labor" (Ar-
and
beitsdienst), the "serviceof weapons" (Wehrdienst). Such was
indeed the project for a "community of combat between
teachers and students" as outlined in the Rektoratsrede.6
A second line of argument insists on the development of
Heidegger's thinking.Like other intellectualsof his genera-
tion, he would have discovered the necessity of political
thoughtonlyafteran initialshock or catastrophe.His disciples
considered him hardly familiar with political questions and,
initially,withouta definite opinion in this domain. It is true
that the lectures on Nietzsche, spread over five years
before and afterthe beginning of the war, contain some more
or less open criticismof the National Socialist ideology. In his
seminars and courses during the war his criticismwas actually
so plain (deutlich),Walter Biemal writes, that his students
clearlyunderstood it,although such claritycould have meant a
death sentence.7But articulatinga coherentpoliticalthinkingis
quite differentfromcourageouslyaiming occasional criticisms.
Heidegger obviouslyhas not developed a "political theory,"if

(1966-67). See the reviewof these debates in Beda Allemann,"Martin Heidegger und
die Politik," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger:Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks
(Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969), pp. 246-260.
6 M. Palmier,Les écritspolitiquesde Heidegger(Paris: Editions de l'Herne, 1968), by
J.
far the mostcongenial of all these studies,takes offfromthisthreefold"service" (pp.
114- 145) in order to develop "the figureof the workingmanas the epochal [historíale]
figure of the modern world" (pp. 169-293). He compares Heidegger's writingson
technologywithErnstJünger'sDer Arbeiter(1932): "We suggest as an hypothesisthat
the origin of Heidegger's meditationon the essence of technologyremains unintellig-
ible withoutthe encounter withErnstJünger'swritingsand the Germanyof 1933" (p.
215).
7
Quoted in Palmier,Les écritspolitiquesde Heidegger,p. 283.

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 HEIDEGGER 195

under thattitleone expectsto find a doctrineof law, or of

representation and participation, etc.
Thus a thirdline of argumenthas to be attempted.Myown
startingpoint is threefold:Heidegger's thinkingis by no
meansdeprivedof a politicaldimension;the politicalimplica-
tionsmustbe interpreted out of hisfundamental philosophical
project,and notthe other wayaround; a middleterm between
Heidegger'sthoughtof Being and a politicalthinkingthat
mightagree withit was neverdevelopedby Heideggerhim-
self.Hence the gropingin the darkin tryingto discovereven
the elementarycontoursof his politicalthinking.If further
reflection is inescapable,thenits primarytaskis to workout
the missinglink betweenwhat has traditionally been called
ontologyand practicalphilosophy.Traditionalphilosophiesof
actionhave consistently been supportedby some philosophy
ofbeing.LikewiseHeidegger'snonmetaphysical wayof raising
the questionof Being affects,and mustbe carriedover into,
thedomainof politicalthinking. This paper shouldbe read as
an attemptto contributeto the elaborationof such a middle
term.The fivetitlesdevelopedbelow resultfroman inquiry
intotheontologyof symbolsundertakenearlier.8This inquiry
led to a reformulation of the ontologicaldifferenceas "sym-
bolic difference." Whatis meantby thistitle?Furthermore, if
the symbolicdifferenceis to exhibit political thinkingin
Heidegger,how is the symbolrelatedto the ontologicaldif-
ference,and whatkindof politicalthinkingresultsfromsuch
a reformulation of the ontologicaldifference?It maybe un-
fortunatethat withHeideggerwe neverescape speakingof
Being and its differencefrombeings,but thereis no other
access to his thought.

8 Reiner Schürmann, "The

Ontological Differenceand PoliticalPhilosophy,"Philos-
ophyand Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).In this article the symbolic dif-
ference is derived from the referentialessence of both Being and language.

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196 SOCIAL RESEARCH

The Symbolic and theDestruction

Difference of Metaphysics

The ontologicaldifference can be thoughtof metaphysically

as well as phenomenologically. In metaphysics "the Being of
beingsis thoughtof in advance as the groundingground."9
Phenomenologically, on the other hand, the differencebe-
tweenBeing and beingsappears as the preservation of both
"in a processof unconcealment thatkeeps in concealment."10
To thinkof the ontologicaldifference in a metaphysical con-
text precludes any historicalperspective:the metaphysical
Firstis a conquestoverbecoming,time,history.To stepback
frommetaphysicalconstructions to their phenomenological
destruction11 allowsus to thinkof theontologicaldifference in
its historicalprocess{Austrag). Phenomenologically the "is" of
beings is one mode, ever new, in which Being appears in, or
gives itselfover to, beings. The step backwardfrom the
metaphysicalto the phenomenologicalversion of the dif-
ferencenotonlyallowsus to thinkthepossibility of history but
also to think Being otherwisethan as the most universal
groundof beings.Even more,phenomenologically it is "im-
possibleto represent'Being' as the general characteristic of
particularbeings."Being has a thoroughly historiccharacter:
"Physis,Logos,Hen, Idea, Energeia,Substantiality, Objectivity,
the
Subjectivity, Will, the Willto Power, the Will to Will"12as
wellas Technologyare namesfora mode of self-disclosure of
Being by which it shows and hides itselfat the same time.
Thus the questionariseswhetherinsteadof a representable
universalitysomethingall-pervading{etwasDurchgängiges)
9 Martin
Heidegger, Identitätund Differenz(Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 55; Identity
and Difference,translatedbyJoan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 58.
10 p. 65 (translation
and Difference,
Heidegger, Identitätund Differenz,p. 63; Identity
sliehtlymodified).
11The titleof the
unpublished section ofBeing and Timewas to be: "Basic Features
of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology According to the
Guiding Thread of the Problem of Temporality" (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time,
translatedby John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [New York: Harper, 1962], p.
39).
12 p. 66.
Heidegger, Identitätund Differenz,p. 64; Identityand Difference,

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 HEIDEGGER 197

comesto light"whichpervadesBeing'sdestinyfromitsbegin-
ningto itscompletion."13 This all-pervading aspectis the du-
of
plicity concealment and unconcealment throughout thefig-
ures in whichBeing has historically been represented.
There is one domain among beings that thematizes
explicitlythissimultaneity ofconcealmentand unconcealment,
namely, the symbol. In a symbola manifestsense points
towarda hiddensense,and thisreferencerequiresinterpreta-
tion.The symbolicrealmis definedby this"double sense."It
is the realmin whichthe questionof Being showsitselfto be
inseparablefromthe hermeneutics of veilingand unveiling.
This traitproperto the symbolis preservedin the etymology
of the word itself:symballein designatesthe movementby
whichtwo elements(the twoshardsof a tessera hospitalis) are
"joinedtogether," literally"thrown together." Without rehears-
ing here analyseswhich have been carriedout elsewhere,14 let
it sufficethatit is in thisliteralsense in whichthe adjective
"symbolic" comesto be coextensivesemantically withtheAris-
totelian"energetic"thatthe title"symbolicdifference" has to
be understood.To the metaphysicalunderstandingof the
difference the symbolis paradigmatic of whatit manifests and
occultâtesat the same time;to the phenomenological under-
standingof thedifference it is paradigmatic ofhowit signifies.
In a metaphysics of analogiaentisand participation, it is the
firstcause thatis bothrevealedand hiddenby itseffects;in a
phenomenologywhich has taken the step backwardfrom
onto-theological constructions, it is symbolization as such,that
in-between the firstsense (present)and the secondsense (ab-
sent)whichis bothrevealedand hiddenin thehistoricconstel-
lationsof truth.The phenomenologicaldifferencedoes not
eliminate,or disprove,or rejectmetaphysics, it surmountsor
surpassesVerwinden) it. In his latest writingsHeideggerpoints
13Heidegger, Identitätund Differenz,p. 66; Identityand Difference,
p. 67.
14Besides the articlementionedin n. 7, see a seriesof fourarticlesin Cahiers
deSymbolisme
Internationaux 21 (1972): 51-77; 25 (1974): 99-118; 27 (1975): 103-120;
29/30(1976): 145-169.

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198 SOCIAL RESEARCH

clearly to a way in which the phenomenological difference

preserves, while still overcoming, the metaphysical dif-
ference.15Ontology can be both ousiology and phenomenol-
ogy. The latter does not abolish the former,although it de-
stroysits constructionsby asking how Being has come to be
understood as constant presence. The symbolis paradigmatic
for the phenomenological understanding of the ontological
differencebecause of its referentialnature and the interpre-
tive effortthat it requires to be comprehended. This is the
firstelement of the symbolicdifference.
It is the second element that brings us into the realm of
human practice. A symbol requires some kind of action in
order to be understood; unless one actuallyjoins the maenads
in their frenzied Bacchanalia one will never understand the
symbolicreality of Dionysiac dissection and regeneration. A
symbol, to be understood, requires a type of doing as its
practical a priori. In Heidegger's vocabulary: In order to
understand the essence of Being as releasement, one has to
exist as released oneself. Releasement is the properly
phenomenological attitudewhich lets thingsbe so thatin their
being "Being itself may show itself.In a phenomenon which
is left to itself Being appears as letting-be.To recognize an
attitudeof existence as the condition for the understandingof
Being is to recognize that it is neither Being nor beings that
make man act, but a certain way in which Being appears as

15
Schematically,the metaphysicaldifferenceis that between beings and beingness
and the phenomenologicaldifferenceis thatbetween beingness
{dasSeiende-Seiendheit),
and Being (Seiendheit-Sein).The two are preserved by "the differencebetween 'being'
as the being of beings, and 'being' in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect of
its truth(the clearing)" (Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache[Pfullingen:Neske,
1965], p. 110; On the Way to Language, translated by Peter D. Hertz [New York:
Harper 8c Row, 1971], p. 20). In Zur Sache des Denkens,the metaphysicaldifference
appears between what is given and "givenness,"whereas the phenomenological dif-
ference appears between presence and presencing,or again between "givenness" and
Es gibt(MartinHeidegger,Zur Sache desDenkens[Tübingen: Niemeyer,1969]; On Time
and Being, translated by Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper & Row, 1972], p. 5).
Thus Heidegger speaks of the "enduring truth"of metaphysics(Martin Heidegger,
Zur Seinsfrage[Frankfurt:Klostermann,1956], p. 35; TheQuestionofBeing, translated
by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde [New York: Twayne, 1958], p. 91).

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 HEIDEGGER 199

differentfrombeings. In a symbolwhat is symbolizedcalls

upon thehearer.Likewise,in a symbolic understanding of the
difference,Being incitesexistenceto "rejoin,"symballein, its
origin. The symbolic difference is thatway to be of Being itself
by which it as
appears callingupon existenceto let itselfbe in
orderto understandBeingas letting-be. The phenomenologi-
cal differencesays how Being shows itselfto thought;the
symbolicdifference sayshowitcallsupon existenceas upon its
own. This calling,or thisadventand address,pertainsto the
verystructureof symbols:theirsecond sense calls upon the
interpreterand lets itselfbe explored by way of renewed
existence.The symbolicdifferencethus says more than the
ontological differencein either its metaphysicalor its
phenomenological version:it speaksof Beinginsofaras Being
itselfurges our existenceupon a more originaryroad.
The thirdelementlocates the symbolicdifferencewithin
phenomenology as practicedby Heidegger;16it also indicates
that the practice required by the symbolicdifferenceis
irreducibly polymorphous. Indeed, the ontologicaldifference
whenthoughtofwithinphenomenology revealsBeingnotas a
but The
selfsameuniversal as multifarious. preservation of the
"metaphysical differencein the phenomenologicaldifference
alreadyindicatesthisseveralness:Being appears as "beings,"
as "beingness," and as "Beingitself."But "Beingitselfis nota
subsisting One. Heideggeris notan ontologicalmonist.This is
the pointthatmakesthe translation of his thinkinginto the
-
politicalrealmso difficultand, as we shallargue,subversive.
The severalnessof Being has been thematizedfirstunderthe
titleof "Historyof Being,"thenas theGeviert (quiteappropri-
ately translated by Richardson as "four-foldpolyvalence").Be-
ing as symbolization, as concealment-unconcealment, mustbe
16Until his latest
writing,Heidegger maintains that it is "Being of beings in its
unconcealedness and concealedness" whichis " the thingitself in accordance withthe
principle of phenomenology (Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens,p. 87; On Time and
Being, p. 79). That Heidegger alwaysconsidered his thinkingto be phenomenological
is underlined for instance in Unterwegszur Sprache, pp. 121-122 {On the Way to
Language, pp. 38-39).

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200 SOCIAL RESEARCH

thoughtof as an ever new eventratherthan as a subsisting

originin a sequence of causation.The symbolicdifference
carriesthe destruction Firstto its practical
of a representable
consequence,that is, to an existencewithoutarcheor telos,
"withoutwhy,"but one appropriatedby ever new constella-
tionsof truth.
The activesense of symballein,the practicala prioriin the
understanding of the symbolized, and the severalnessof the
event of symbolization are the three characteristicsof the
symbolicdifferenceas a phenomenologicalreformulation of
the ontologicaldifference.

The Symbolic as Subversion

Difference

The symbolicdifferenceso understoodcan be used as the

missinglinkbetweena phenomenological ontologyand a prac-
tical philosophy.It is totallycorrectto say, as one commen-
tatordoes, thatMerleau-Ponty and Heideggerhave "undercut
all of what Heidegger would call the metaphysicaltheories
concerningthe relationbetweenwhat is to be thoughtand
whatis to be done or achievedpolitically."17The same author
also rightlystatesthat "the realm of politicsis a derivative
realm,and the legitimacy of conductin thisrealm is deter-
minedbyprincipleswhichdo not,in thefinalanalysis,belong
to it." Politicalphilosophyis derivativeof ontology.Yet I
doubt that the enduring political preoccupationbehind
Heidegger'sthinkingis withestablishingthe "essentialchar-
acteristicof legitimate,effectivepoliticalconduct."18The
phenomenological destruction has concreteconsequencesthat
invalidate,and finallyreverse,the groundingof politicalcon-
duct: legitimationcannotmean,forHeidegger,referring ac-
tion to some primordialgroundor ultimatereason. The re-
17Bernard P. Dauenhauer, "Renovating the Problem of Politics," Review of
Metaphysics 29 (June 1976): 629.
l*Ibid., pp. 628, 639.

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 HEIDEGGER 201

versalof the essenceof reason,or of foundation,resultsdi-

rectlyfrom the way in which the symbolicdifferencehas
appeared to us: it is not beings thatcall for a ground,but
Being as the "groundlessground"whichcalls upon existence.
Such reversalis literallya subversion,an overthrow(vertere)
fromthe foundations(sub-).The symbolicdifference, as the
middle term that carriesthe phenomenologicaldestruction
intopracticalsubversion, translatesthe"turn"in thinking into
an "overturn"in action. The categoriesfor understanding
suchaction,as I see them,are at leastfive:(1) theabolitionof
the primacyof teleologyin action; (2) the abolitionof the
primacyof responsibility in the legitimationof action; (3)
actionas a protestagainsttheadministered world;(4) a certain
disinterestin the futureof mankind,due to a shiftin the
understandingof destiny;(5) anarchyas the essence of the
"memorable"requiringthoughtas well as of the "do-able"
requiringaction.
The symbolic
(1) Teleology. wouldfailas an opera-
difference
tional conceptif it did not help us to thinkthe abolition of
in
teleology practice.But of
phenomenologists religions tell us
that conduct induced by symbolshas indeed no goal; the
"greattime,"magnum tempus, whichrecurswitheveryfestivity
containsitsown goal, namely,havinga greattime.Heidegger
borrowsfromMeisterEckhartthe expression"livingwithout
why"in order to suggestthispracticalabolitionof teleology.
He also borrowsfromNietzsche,whosethoughtof theeternal
recurrence,he writes,"eternalizesthe lack of a finalgoal."19
Goallessactionthusis not onlytheconditionforthinkingthe
symbolicdifference,it is also its consequence.Being shows
itselfas releasementonlyto an existencethatis itselfperfectly
released;and to thinkBeing as releasementrendersexistence
released. If thereis politicalthinkingin Heidegger,its elab-
orationhas to take intoaccountthisrelease frompurposein
action. The strictreciprocity betweenthe thoughtof Being
19Martin 2 vols. (Pfullingen:Neske,1961), 1: 437.
Heidegger,Nietzsche,

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202 SOCIAL RESEARCH

and existential letting-beprovides the critical- both crucial

and discriminating - access to the political dimension implied
in the phenomenological version of the ontological difference
and made explicit by its symbolicreformulation.Besides the
scarce allusions to Eckhart or Nietzsche, some better known
phrases in Heidegger point to the same abolition of teleology
in practice, for instance "woodpaths." These are paths of
peregrinationtoward originaryBeing, he says, but they lead
nowhere:

"Wood"is an old nameforforest.In thewood are pathswhich

mostlywind along until theyend quite suddenlyin an im-
penetrablethicket.They are called "woodpaths."Each goes its
peculiarway,but in the same forest.Oftenit seemsas though
one were like another.Yet it onlyseemsso. Woodcuttersand
forestrangersare familiarwiththesepaths.They knowwhatit
meansto be on a woodpath.20

Being and language call existenceupon a road, but thisroad

has no other goal than the origin of Being and language,
which is manifold and which is so close to us that it is not a
goal at all. Heidegger's thinkingabout human action is no
more a "practicalphilosophy"than his thoughtof Being is an
"ontology."The most prominenttreatiseof "practical philos-
ophy" in the Western traditionbegins with a declaration of
faith in teleology: "Every art and every investigation,every
action and pursuit,is thoughtto aim at some good," Aristotle
writes in the NichomacheanEthics. But in "thinking" about
human action practicewill no longer be defined exclusivelyas
purposive activity.The paths upon whichexistencefindsitself
engaged when it thinksBeing out of symbolsand as symballein
"end in an impenetrablethicket."They lack an assignable end.
20Martin
Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt:Klostermann, 1950), p. 3; Early Greek
Thinking,translatedby David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper &
Row, 1975), pp. 3-4 (withone change in the translation).Hannah Arendt, "Martin
Heidegger at Eighty,"The New YorkReviewofBooks,Oct. 21, 1971, p. 51, says of the
thinkingso described: "One cannot say that it has a goal"; it is not conducive to
"reaching a goal sighted beforehand and guided thereto. . . . The metaphor of
'woodpaths' hits upon somethingessential."

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 HEIDEGGER 203

In otherwords,such an existenceis alreadymisunderstood

whenitis pressedto producereasonsforitsbehavior.It itwere
possible to dismantlethe entiremachineryof behavior,of
goal-directed actionsand theirevaluationof innermotivations
and outer determinations, if action could be thoughtof
otherwisethanas strategy, thenthinking wouldintroduceinto
practicalphilosophy what is has alreadybecome accustomed
since Heidegger to discover in ontology:that each path
"goes itsparticularway,butin thesame forest.Oftenit seems
as thoughone were like another.Yet it onlyseems so."
Traditionallythe normativeconceptof teleologyservesto
regulateand eventuallylegitimizehuman conduct.It makes
acceptableconductdepend on therationalestablishment of an
end thatis thoughtto be good or desirableifachieved.But if
conductinduced by symbolshas no goal, then thereare in-
deed momentswhen we dare renounce the dominanceof
meaningand purpose. Those are the momentsin whichwe
adhereto symbolsand in whichBeing manifests itselfas sym-
bolization.Strivingand performing are basiccharacteristics
of
existenceonlyif,priorto any practicaltheory,Being is fixed
into causal schemes.Only upon the conditionof such a cal-
culativeontologicala prioridoes human actionexhibita nat-
ural proclivitytowardends, toward final causes. One may
wonderwhetherthe descriptionof "care"in Beingand Time21
and the insistenceon projection22 have entirelyleftthistele-
ological perspective behind. In later writings,though,the
"withoutwhy"is preciselyintroducedto restrict thedomainof
the a prioriprinciplethatnothingis withoutreason,thatis,
withouta cause:
We see ourselvesbrought beforea remarkable stateof affairs:
something, therose,is,to be sure,notwithout and itis
reason,
21"Care"is - beingalreadyin . . .- beingalongsidewith. . ."
"beingahead ofoneself
(Heidegger,SeinundZeit[Halle: Niemeyer,1941],p. 196;Beingand Time,p. 241).
22
"Understanding projectsthe beingof existenceupon its 'for-the-sake-of-which'
'WorumwillenT; however,"projectinghas nothingto do withcomportingoneself
towardsa planthathas beenthoughtout"(Heidegger,SeinundZeit,p. 145;Bang and
Time,p. 185).

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204 SOCIAL RESEARCH

without
nevertheless why.Something therangeof
fallswithin
ofthecommonly
validity conceived Principle Rea-
ofSufficient
son.The samesomething fallsout of therangeof thestrictly
conceivedPrinciple Reason.23
of Sufficient
This principlecommonly statesthatnothingis withoutreason,
but"strictly conceived"itstatesthatnothingis without why.All
thingscertainly have theircauses,theyhave a "because";but
thereare phenomenathathave no "why."Even the abolition
of teleologyin actionseemsto be clearlyseen byHeideggeras
a resultof thiscritiqueof theprincipleof reason:"Man,in the
mosthidden groundof his Being, trulyis onlywhen in his
own wayhe is like the rose- withoutwhy.We cannotpursue
thisthoughtany furtherhere,however."24 This last sentence
revealsa remarkableshynessof a thinkerbeforethe practical
consequences - subversionby goalless action- of his own
thought.
The thoughtof thesymbolic
(2) Responsibility. differencealso
displacesresponsibility.Howevercomplexthe problems con-
nectedwiththe conceptof responsibility maybe (its role in
legal and moralphilosophy, the frequentidentification of re-
and to the
sponsibility liability punishment, understanding of
freedomwhichthoroughlycommandsthis concept,etc.), it
seemsto alwaysimplya personalcommitment (theLatinspon-
deremeans"to promise";the Greekspondeis a "libation"or a
vow)whichone can be summonedto accountfor.A responsi-
ble personis able and readyto respondto such a summons
and therebyto legitimizehis doings. He is answerableto
othersforhis dealings.Now, the acknowledgment of a sum-
monsis also at theveryheartof thesymbolic difference. What
is "symbolic" aboutthedifference is preciselythecall bywhich
Being claimsa certainmode of existence fromman and thus
calls himupon anotherroad. On thisotherroad we shallnot
be surprisedif we experiencea transvaluation of responsibil-
ity.Is thecountingof dutiesand rightsand the accountingfor
23Martin
Heidegger, Der Satz vomGrund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 73.
24Ibid.

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 HEIDEGGER 205

performances and wrongsnot thoroughlycalculativein na-

ture?If the originof thesummonsappearsto be Beingitself,
mustresponsibility notbe thoughtof otherwisethanin terms
of accountability? But what would be a nonmetaphysical
understanding of responsibility?

Unexpectedly it mayhappenthatthinking findsitselfcalled

upontoask:. . . whatdo youmakeoftheDifference ifBeingas
wellas beingsappearbyvirtueoftheDifference,eachinitsown
way?To do justiceto thisquestionwe mustfirstassumea
properpositionfaceto facewiththeDifference. Sucha con-
frontationbecomesmanifest to us oncewe accomplishthestep
back.25

The step backwardthatbringsus intothe properposition

forthe thoughtof Being displacesresponsibility so thatit no
longer means accountability respondence. no longer
but It
refersto contentsand actions"for"whichone maybe held
accountable,but it designatesa wayof life.The "for"disap-
pearsfromsightaltogether. This does notmeanthatno one is
ever responsiblefor any decision,action,or outcome.The
displacementlocatesthe questionof responsibilityon another
it
level; puts man into another The
position. properposition
out of whichtheDifference can be thoughtis thatof response
and correspondence.To what?To "the callingof the Dif-
ference."26Thus in the phenomenologicaldifference,re-
sponseand correspondence are attitudesof thinking:Being as
the Differencecalls upon thoughtso thatin responseit may
thinkthe Differenceas it appears in historicaleventsor in
speech events.
In the symbolicdifference, responseand correspondence
25
Heidegger, Identitätund Differenz,p. 61; Identity pp. 63-64. The
and Difference,
stepbackis a stepout of theproblematic of legitimation:thequestionof metaphysical
ontologyis "a questionof thelegitimation of the Being of beings"(Heidegger,Zur
p. 17; TheQuestion
Seinsfrage, ofBeing,p. 55). One does notsurmountmetaphysics,
Heideggeradds, by constructing otherformsof legitimation, thatis, by turningto
someotherfigure(Gestalt) thanthe"humanessenceas thepreviously uniqueformof
the legitimationof the real" (ZurSeinsfragem, p. 24; TheQuestion
ofBeins,p. 69).
26Martin zur Sprache,p. 30; Poetry,Language, Thought,trans-
Heidegger, Unterwegs
latedby AlbertHofstadter
(New York: Harper& Row, 1971),p. 207.

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 206 SOCIAL RESEARCH

are attitudesnot onlyof thinkingbut of doing.The practical

transformation of responsibilityis rootedin Heidegger'sno-
tionof the address.Whathappensto responsibility whenre-
sponseand correspondence are mediatedby the symbolicdif-
ferenceand are understoodpractically? What kind of doing
resultsfromthe displacementof responsibility? Heidegger
comes amazinglyclose to describingsuch practicalconse-
quences when he commentson Nietzsche'sdoctrineof the
EternalRecurrence.He quotes the followinglines fromThe
WilltoPower:"Let us thinkthisthoughtin its mostterrible
form:existenceas it is, withoutmeaningor aim,yetrecurring
inevitablywithoutany finale into nothingness;the Eternal
Recurrence."27 Then Heideggerwrites:"This thought[of the
EternalRecurrence]thinksbeingsin such a way thatout of
the wholeof beingsa constantcall reachesus." This call, he
says,not only"eternalizesthe lack of a finalgoal,"as already
stated,but it also requiresa decisionfromman, an active
response.28In regard to the thoughtof the symbolicdif-
ferencethisactiveresponseis easy to describe:it consistsin
intopracticetheeternallack of a
nothing other than introducing
"yes"to the abolitionof
finalgoal; it consistsin the existential
teleology. This of
displacement responsibility - sheerresponse
to the constantcall out of the whole of beings- can onlybe
labeledas irresponsible by calculativethinking.In Nietzsche's
vocabulary,it givesbirthto the Dionysianchild.
In MeisterEckhart'svocabulary,responsibility as it is ordi-
narilyunderstoodis utterservitude:"Those who seek some-
thing with their actions, those who act for a why, are
bondsmenand hirelings."29 "If you ask a genuineman who
actsout of hisown ground:'Whyare youdoingwhatyoudo?'
he willreply,if his answeris as it shouldbe: 'I do it because I
27Friedrich TheWilltoPower,translated
Nietzsche, byWalterKaufmannand R. J.
Hollingdale(New York:RandomHouse, 1967),p. 35 (withone minorchangein the
translation).
28 1: 437.
Heidegger,Nietzsche,
*"MeisterLckhart,Die Deutschen editedbyJosefQuint,5 vols. (Stuttgart:
Werke,
Kohlhammer, 1936-76),2: 253.

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 HEIDEGGER 207

do it.'"30 The thoughtof the phenomenologicaldifference

takesthe conceptof responsibility altogetherout of the con-
textof actionand interprets it as a responsein thoughtto the
adventof Being in beings.The symbolicdifference, on the
otherhand, reintroducesresponsibility into action,but as a
respondenceto the practicalsummons existoriginarily.
to In
thisreappropriation responsibility is freedfromthemetaphys-
ical preoccupationwithlegitimation of action.WhateverI do,
"I do it because I do it."
(3) Protest.Such actionis assuredlythe mostpowerfulpro-
test against the technologically organized universe. Pierre
Klossowki,commentingon Nietzsche'scirculusvitiosusdeus,
calls such abolitionof sense and goal "the blossomingof a
delirium," Vépanouissement d'undelire?1Indeed, theabolitionof
teleology and the displacementof responsibility are harmful.
How could societyfunctionif Eckhart's "without why,"
Nietzsche's"eternalrecurrence," and Heidegger'sontological
difference understoodas symballein wereto be takenseriously?
Whathappensto the commonwealth "whenthemostpowerful
thoughtoccursto one, thento many,thento all?"32Now that,
in one formor another,it has occurredto some(at leastEck-
hart,Nietzsche,and a fewHeideggerians),it launchesa liter-
allysubversiveattackagainstthe Aristotelian question,"What
is thefunctionof man?" as well as against the universally
sharedinterestin the orderlyfunctioning of collectivities.
Heidegger's protestagainst the technologically organized
worldis theaspectof his thoughtmostfrequently solicitedby
thoseof his followerswho wantto elaboratea politicalphilos-
ophyon thebasisof his phenomenological destruction.33Here
30Ibid.,1: 92.
31Pierre Klossowski, "Circulusvitiosus,"in Nietzsche
aujourd'hui?, 2 vols. (Paris;
UnionGénéraled'Éditions,1973),1: 101; see also hisNietzsche
etle cercle
vicieux(Paris:
Mercurede France,1969),passim.
32FriedrichNietzsche,Werke: Kritische editedby GiorgioColli and
Gesamtausgabe,
MazzinoMontinari, 8 vols.(Berlin:de Gruyter,1967-77),2: 306, n. 11; cf. Heideg-
ger,Nietzsche,1: 345.
33Otto Pöggeler,Philosophie undPolitikbeiHeidegger(Freiburg:Alber,1972),pp.
43-67. According to Pöggeler,HeideggeragreeswiththereformMarxists on at least

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208 SOCIAL RESEARCH

again the discoveryof the symbolicdifferenceonly makes

explicitthe practicalimplicationsof this destructionwhich
remainhiddenin Heidegger.It triesto thinkof individualsas
linkedby the originsymbolized by Being and language;such
originary existence,if it is livedconcretely,upsetstechnologi-
cal functioning.
Technologyhas neverbeen an objectof condemnationfor
Heidegger. In the interviewalready quoted he says that
technology indeed "tearsman moreand moreawayfromthe
earthand uprootshim,"and yetHeideggerdoes not see the
situationof man in a technological worldas "a fate,inescapa-
ble and impossibleto disentangle."34 This stand is in agree-
mentwiththe essay"The Questionof Technology,"in which
he saysthat"thereis no demonryabout technology, but only
themystery of itsessence."35 The essenceoftechnology, "prov-
ocationand challengeto nature,"is not itselftechnological,
ratherit is the mode in whichthe truthof Beingis preserved
for our times.Technologyis one mode of unconcealment.
Heideggercallsa mystery whateverconcealsitselfwhileat the
same timeit showsitself.Technologyconcealsand discloses
the truthof Being in thisfashion.As a constellation of truth,
technology is bothdangerous(it is the supremeprovocation)
and salutary(we have no otheraccess to the truthof Being
than throughtechnology).It is probablynot by chance that
Heidegger first developed this ambiguous character of

four points: the critiqueof totalitarianism,

the opposition between reason and nature,
science as an ideology, and the claim to theoryas protest (pp. 40-41). See also the
more elaborate treatmentof the political implications of Heidegger's critique of
technologyin Palmier, Les écritspolitiquesde Heidegger,pp. 213-293.
34
Heidegger, "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten," pp. 206, 214. Such dis-
entanglementis preciselythe task of "the other thinking"{dasandereDenken),of which
Heidegger says: "I do not know how thisthinkingmaybecome efficacious.It may well
be that the path of a thought today leads to silence, in order to preserve thinking
from becomimg sold out [verramscht] within a year" (ibid., p. 212). Nevertheless,
Heidegger anticipates such an efficacy,"perhaps in 300 years." The repeated and
deliberate"I do not know" thus does not exclude a practicaldimensionof his thought;
Heidegger only wants to avoid that terrain.
35Martin Heidegger, Vorträgeund Aufsätze(Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 20.

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 HEIDEGGER 209

technology in the lecturecoursealreadymentioned, An Intro-

ductiontoMetaphysics, givenonlyone year afterhis resignation
fromthe university rectorate.In these lecturestechnology
ceases to be thoughtof as a masterabletool, althoughthe
notionof Gestell(frameor constellation) is not yetreached.
Heideggeris one among contemporary philosopherswho
shows that asking questionsis no small matter;his protest
againstthe technologically administeredworldpreciselycon-
sistsin questioningtheessenceof thatworld.As in thelifeof
Socratesthe questioningis the protest(exceptthatthe Athe-
nian senateperceivedthissubversionthroughinquirybetter
than the Germanchancelleriesafter 1935). Yet one can go
furtherahead in actual protestwithoutfallingback into
idealistconstructions. The stepahead becomesthinkablewith
the symbolic difference. Protestthen becomesan imperative
foropenness to new constellations of truth:Exist in such a
waythatnew epochs of disclosuremayuniteyou to the man-
ifoldoriginof Being and language.Whyis technological man
necessarilyunable to live accordingto such an imperative?
Because it requiresdetachment, Abgeschiedenheit.The praxisof
calculativethinkingis technology,whereas the praxis of
meditative thinking is detachment. HeideggerfollowsTrakl in
theexpectationof a newbreed,"thebreed,notyetcarriedto
term,whose stampmarksfuturegenerations.The gathering
powerof detachmentholdstheunborngenerationbeyondall
thatis spent,and saves it forthe comingrebirthof mankind
out of the originary."36 The protestthathastensthiscoming
rebirthacts not throughstrategiesbut throughdetachment.
Then the "thereis," thees istof the ontologicaldifference, in
itsmetaphysical understanding, "takes itsleave" De-
{Abschied).
tachmentis the practicalprotestwhicheventuallyproducesa
breed detachedfrommetaphysical ontologyand its remains.
Afterthe abolitionof teleologyand the displacementof re-
36
Heidegger, Unterwegszur Sprache, p. 67; On the Way to Language, p. 185 (with
minor changes in the translation). The next quote is taken from p. 154 of the
German, p. 54 of the translation.

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210 SOCIAL RESEARCH

sponsibility,detachmentis the principalcriterionleftforver-

ifying which pathis aberrantand whichis not. One has to be
perfectly detachedin order to bringabout a generationde-
tachedfrommetaphysics. "Protest"thusrecoversitsprimitive
meaning,whichis to "testify" to truth.
(4) HumanDestiny. Heidegger'sthinkingseemsto be deeply
concernedwiththe futureof man. In our centurythe total
provocationof nature has led to "the all-outchallengeto
secure dominionover the earth,"he says.37Yet provocation
and challengeas the ultimateformsof Westernmetaphysics
notonlyrevealitsessencebut also pointtowarda newbegin-
ning:"The completionof metaphysics as the essentialfulfill-
ment of modern times is an end only since its historical
ground is alreadythe transitioninto anotherbeginning."38
Texts abouttheimminenceof a newera- and about Heideg-
ger'sown role in it- abound. But in insistinggreatlyupon his
concernwithour futureone easilymissesanotherdisplace-
mentthatoccursin Heidegger'sthinking, namely,thatof the
of
understanding destiny. The displacementof destiny,away
fromman,can evenbe tracedas the guidingthreadthrough-
out his writings.
In his firstperiod,Heideggerraisesthequestionof Beingas
thatof the "meaningof Being."This was also the vocabulary
used by such neo-Kantiansas Diltheyand Rickert.But since
the talk about meaningseemed to tie understandingas an
existentialeto valuesand to valuing,Heideggerspeaks,in his
second period,witha less humanisticring,of aletheia,"the
truthof Being." Paradoxically,the displacementaway from
man occurswitha new emphasison history:"recollection in
metaphysics as a necessaryepoch in the historyof Beinggives
us foodforthought:thatand how Being determines thetruth
of beings in each case."39In this second period, Being is
37Heidetrger,Unterwegs zur Sprache,p. 212; On the Way to Language, p. 105.
38Heidecreer.Nietzsche.2: 29.
39Ibid.,
p. 481; The End of Philosophy,translatedby Joan Stambaugh (New York:
Harper Row, 1973), p. 75. The followingquote is taken fromp. 482 of the German,
&
p. 76 of the translation.

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 HEIDEGGER 211

understoodas "sending."Destinyno longerrefersto man's

past or future,but ratherBeing destinesrealmsor epochs of
possiblelifeand thoughttowardman.These epochscannotbe
planned or fabricated,the futureis not a matterof human
powers:"Recollectionof the historyof Being entrustshistori-
cal humanity withthetaskof becomingawarethattheessence
of man is released to the truthof Being beforeany human
dependencyon powersand forces,predestinations and tasks."
In his third period Heidegger abandons this referenceto
and the historyinto whichman's essenceis released.
al'etheia
Now releasementis said to be "the event of Being," it no
longerrefersto manat all. The preoccupationwiththefuture
of man ceases altogether:Being as the appropriating eventis
thoughtof "withoutregardfora foundationof Being out of
beings,"40 thatis, outsideof systemsand theses,and not for
the sake of man.
This moreand more radicaldisinterest in man'sdestinyas
the titles"meaningof Being," "truthof Being," "event of
Being"suggest,thisantihumanism in otherwords,has politi-
cal consequences.To develop the politicalimplicationsof
Heidegger'sthinking, as some authorsdo,41chieflyfromthe
"setting intowork" of truth(secondperiod) missesthe muta-
tionof the understanding of destinyintothe eventofEs gibt
(thirdperiod). By this "thinkingstandsin and
radicalization
40
Heidegger,Zur Sache desDenkens,p. 2; On Timeand Being, p. 2 (translationslightly
modified).
41Alexander Schwan, Politische
Philosophie im Denken Heideggers (Cologne:
Westdeutscher Verlag,1965).ForSchwan,thekeytextis: "One essentialwayin which
truthestablishes itselfin the beingsit has opened up is truthsettingitselfto work.
Anotherwayin whichtruthoccursis theactthatfoundsa politicalstate"(Heidegger,
Holzwege, p. 50; Poetry, Language,Thought, pp. 61-62). Pöggeleris probablyrightin
assumingthatifin thelectures"On theOriginof theWorkofArt,"fromwhichthese
lines are taken,Heideggeranalyzesonlythe firstof the two waysin whichtruth
occurs,and iftheanalysisof thesecondway,thepoliticaldeed, was notcarriedout,
thisomissionis probably"due to the politicalcircumstances" in 1936 (Pöggeler,
PhilosophieundPolitikbeiHeidegger, p. 122). See also n. 58, below.The expression
"antihumanism," muchpopularizedby Althusser, refersto Heidegger's"Gegenden
Humanismus," in his PiatonsLehrevon der Wahrheit (Bern: Francke,1947), p. 75;
translated byEdgar Lohnerin RichardM. Zanerand Don Ihde, eds.,Phenomenology
and Existentialism(New York: Putnam,1973),p. 158.

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212 SOCIAL RESEARCH

before That which has sent the various figures of epochal

Being. This, however, what sends us Appropriation, is itself
unhistorical,or more preciselywithoutdestiny.""One cannot
speak here of a why.Only the 'that'- thatthe historyof Being
is in such a way- can be said."42
The event of the There is (Es gibt)is the extremesymballein.
"That" which gives Being plays itselfout: not in henological
but in ever new topological multiplicities.The
self-sufficiency,
ahistorical,always finite"event"of Heidegger's latestwritings,
when translated by means of the symbolic difference into
in thefutureof mankind.The
action, produces playfuldisinterest
event not onlystops the historyof Being, but it also cancels the
three temporal ecstasies of existence (firstperiod). The event
brings man into authentictime, the Now. This radicalization
whichresultsfromthe Es gibtis eminentlypolitical.The event
brings man into his ownmostby abolishing the last enemy of
freedom, time as ecstatic temporality(first period) and as
cultural history(second period). As in Nietzsche'sdoctrine of
the eternal recurrence, the playful Now puts an end to the
struggleto decide what man's next world will be like.
(5) Anarchy.The originsymbolizedby Being and language is
multiple and finite.It is not the principle of things,the one
and simple arche. It is not a principle at all, rather it is anar-
chic. This same character must pertain to the practice of
symballein,peregrine identitywith the origin.
In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger explains that
the word "origin" must be understood literally,as a leap
{Ursprungmeans "primal leap"). In an artwork,for instance,
truthsets itselfinto work with a leap. The artworkfounds a
constellationof referencesand therebybrings truthinto be-
ing. This rise of truthin a constellationis always other and
always new. The originis alwaysotherand alwaysnew. As such it
42
Heidegger,Zur Sache des Denkens,pp. 44, 56; On Timeand Being, pp. 41, 52. It is
out of the later writingsthat one may challenge Harries's statement:"Heidegger's
understandingof destinyrules out all attemptsto draw anarchisticconsequences from
Being and Time" (Harries, "Heidegger as a Political Thinker," p. 651).

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 HEIDEGGER 213

requiresa decisionfromman: Do we giveheed to theswayof

the originor not?In theearlierwritings an either/or is urged
upon our existence:whetherthe originappears as manifold
origination or as firstcausationis decidedbya wayof existing.
Heidegger wantsus to exist accordingto the rise of truth
whichis historical, thatis, ever new: "Are we in our existence
historicallyat the origin?"43 The originis seen as the mul-
tifariousemergenceof thephenomenaaroundus. In thelater
writingsthis understandingis modifiedonly insofaras the
historicaldimensionrecedes.Heideggerquotes fromGoethe:
"Look for nothingbehind phenomena:theythemselvesare
whatis to be learned."44In conversation he also quotes from
René Char: "Give but a quick look on the wave castingits
anchorin the sea." Char calls the poet "the greatBeginner"
whosewordis the everchangingorigin."Poetryis of all clear
watersthe one thatlingersthe leastwiththe reflection of its
The
bridges."45 understanding of the originas an appropriat-
ing eventin whichfiniteconstellations of truthassembleand
disassemblethemselvesis not monistic;to eliminateall rem-
nantsof metaphysical ontologyHeideggersaysthat"It," the
origin which grantsBeing,is a neutrale tantum. It is not Being
itself,ratherit grantsBeing in ever new articulations. The
origin as "It" which grantsBeing defiesmonism.
Translatedby the symbolicdifferenceinto practicalthink-
ing,theanarchicessenceofEs gibtdefiesfixedsocialconstella-
tions.In a symbolthe originbeckonsman upon a road made
of ever new beginnings.His practiceespouses discontinuity.
This has someconcreteconsequences,amongotherthings,for
the understandingof authority.As suggestedearlier, the
structureof metaphysical ontologyis the same in theoretical
and in practicalphilosophy:in eitherdisciplinebeings are
43Heidecrcrer.
Holzweere.d. 64: Poetry.Laneuase. Thought.D. 78.
44 Zur Sache des Denkens,p. 72; On Time and Being, pp. 65-66.
Heidegger,
45The firstquoteis takenfromRené Char,La Paroleenarchipel (Paris:Gallimard,
1962),p. 152,and thesecondfromPoèmesetProsechoisis (Paris:Gallimard,1957),p.
94. See also myarticle"SituatingRené Char: Hölderlin,Char,Heidegger,and the
2 4 (1976): 513-534.
'There Is'," Boundary

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214 SOCIAL RESEARCH

seen as organizedin relationto a princeps, whichmeans"prin-

ciple," but also the If
"prince." symbolspoint to an origin
whichdoes not satisfythe requirementsof the principleof
reason,thatis, if the symbolicdifferenceis essentiallyanar-
chic,thenthe speculativegroundforthe legitimation of cen-
tral authorityis lost altogether.The middle term between
Heidegger'streatment of the questionof Being and a theory
of the state,of law,property, etc.wouldthenbe anarchy.His
thought,if it yieldsthispoliticaldimension,wouldthusintro-
duce radicalfluidity intosocialinstitutionsso as to honornot
only the concreteclaims made by the symbolsbut also the
revolutionary way in whichHeideggerhas reformulated the
question of Being. Political thinkingin accordance with
Seinsdenken wouldbe as criticalof Utopianconstructions as of
centralauthority. In eithercase itwoulddenouncean underly-
ing staticideal. Such ideals, togetherwithextrinsiclegitima-
tions of power, have been destroyed by Heidegger's
phenomenology.
It seemsto me thattheoretical anarchy,46as opposed to the
principleof reasonor of foundation, becomesthinkableat the
end of an "epoch."This claimcan be verifiedat theend of the
Middle Ages (MeisterEckhart)and at the end of German
Idealism(Nietzsche).Heideggerhimselfis aware of thinking
the end of the entireWesterntraditionunderstoodas one
such epoch.47WhetherMeisterEckhartsaw the implications
of some formof anarchyin his doctrineof releasementde-
pends to a large extenton the stillunsolvedproblemof his
46In
"thinking,"as it is understood by Heidegger, the distinctionbetween theory
and practice actually does not obtain.
47This characterizationof the entire Western tradition as one
single epoch of
metaphysics("a deplorable stand taken by Heidegger," according to Paul Ricoeur,La
Métaphorevive [Paris: Seuil, 1975], p. 395) mightbe nuanced by the introductionof
the category of "problematic" borrowed from Althusser. In our context: Meister
Eckhartputs an end to the "mysticalproblematic"begun withPlotinus,and Nietzsche
puts an end to the "transcendentalproblematic"begun withKant. This does not mean
that after these periods mystical(as in Angelus Silesius) and transcendental(as in
Husserl) thinkingis impossible. But the one Western metaphysicaltraditionis made
of problematics which have their time. They may occasionally reappear within an
already new problematic.

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 HEIDEGGER 215

linksto the Begard communities, who reallylived a kind of

"lifewithoutwhy."At any rate,his time,markedby the de-
clineof themedievalorder,was one of socialexperimentation.
As for Nietzsche,he saw these practicalimplicationsclearly.
His last yearsshow patentlywhat it meantfor him to be a
tempter(ein Versucher)makingan attemptwithtruth(einen
VersuchmitderWahrheit).Heidegger,finally,was evidentlymis-
takenabout the convergencethathe believedto witnessdur-
ing ten monthsbetweenhis emergingunderstandingof the
originas anarchicand the establishment of the new political
In
power. retrospect Eduard Sprangerjudged "the national
movementof the students[in 1932] stillgenuineat the core,
only undisciplinedin its form":48Heidegger'serror would
thushave consistedin confusinga totalitarian
regimewithhis
own, more antiauthoritarian
and anarchic which
expectations,
may have been prepared by the authenticelementsin the
youthmovement.

The Onticand theOntologicalLoss of theOrigin

At firstsightHeidegger'slaterwritingsseem stillless con-

cernedwithpoliticsthan some earlierones. This impression
is reinforcedby his frequentlydeclared inability - or un-
willingness- to see any practicalimplicationto his thinking.
On closerexamination,however,the reversehas appeared to
be the case: the severalnessof Being as wellas the "symbolic"
(in theetymological sense)essenceofbothBeingand language
becomethinkableonlyin thecontextsof the Historyof Being
and stilllaterof the Topologyof Being. Again, Heidegger's
proper,althoughhidden,politicalthinking appearsonlyfrom
the writingsmisleadinglyentitledHeidegger II. Ontically,
that is, in a descriptionof innerworldly occurrences,this
48E.
Spranger,"Mein Konflikt
mitder national-sozialistischen
Regierung,"
quoted
in Fritz K. Ringer,The Declineof theGermanMandarins:The GermanAcademicCommu-
1890-1933 (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
nity, Press,1969),p. 439.

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 216 SOCIAL RESEARCH

standpointentailsthe practicalabolitionof archeand telosin

action,the transvaluation of responsibility
and destiny,and
the protestagainsta worldreducedto functioning withinthe
coordinatesof causality.Perhaps Heidegger'stopologicalin-
terpretation of Leibniz's principlethat "nothingis without
reason"(nihilestsineratione)revealsmostclearlythe anarchic
essence of his politicalthinking:to Leibniz's metaphysical
tenetthateverything has a "because"(warum)Heideggerop-
poses Meister Eckhart's"lifewithoutwhy"(ohnewarum).49
The hermeneuticaldilemma is remarkable: reading
Heidegger forward,from the Fundamental Analysis of
Being-Thereto the Topology of Being, one is leftwiththe
evidenceof an "idealizationof unityat the expenseof plural-
ity,"50that is, ultimatelyof the Führerprinciple.Reading
Heideggerbackward,fromthe Topologyto the Fundamental
Ontology,the pictureis quite different:instead of a uni-
taryconceptof ground,the Fourfold;insteadof the praise
of "the hard will"(the main themein Heidegger'seulogyof
theNazi heroSchlageter),releasement;insteadof theintegra-
tion of the universityinto the "fields of construction"
(Heidegger'sarticlein the studentnewspaperof June 1933),
protestagainst technologyand cybernetics;instead of the
identificationbetweenthe Führerand the law (Heidegger's
articlein the studentnewspaperof November1933), anar-
chy.51
49
Heidegger,Der Satz vomGrund,pp. 68 ff.See J. Caputo, "MeisterEckhartand the
Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought," Journal of the
Historyof Philosophy12 (1974): 479^494; 13 (1975): 61-80.
50Harries,
"Heidegger as a Political Thinker," p. 669.
51All three texts in
Schneeberger,Nachlesezu Heidegger,pp. 47-48, 63-64, 135-
136. Palmier, Les écritspolitiquesde Heidegger,p. 124, addresses himself to the am-
biguityof declaring the "state of Labour" {Arbeitsstand) "the sole German state of life"
"This can be understood in line withHitler'sspeeches, but it can also be
(JLebensstand):
elucidated out of Aristotle'sPhysics,"Palmier writes.It seems to me, however,that the
safestway of substantiatingin a positivefashion the intimatelink between these texts
and "the whole of Heidegger's problematic"(ibid.,p. 125) is the restrospectiveher-
meneutics which replaces, as we have tried to do, the utterancesof 1933-34 in the
contextof Heidegger's one dominatingproblematic,the question of Being. All other
elements are correctlyunderstood only in relation to this one problematic.

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 HEIDEGGER 217

Since it tookseveraldecades to appropriately workout the

questionof Being,therecan be no doubtthatonlythe retro-
spectivehermeneuticsproduces a correctunderstandingof
Heidegger'soverallproblematic. of the
Here is one illustration
of
necessity reading Heidegger backward: until 1947 such
carefulinterpreters as Paul Ricoeurand MikelDufrennewere
stilltotallymistakenabout the verybasic driftof Heidegger's
thinking.52
From the vantagepoint of the laterwritings, the anarchic
elementas the keyto Heidegger'senduringpoliticalthinking
appearsevenin theearlywork.In Beingand Timethiselement
showsforthin theunderstanding of potentiality.The authen-
ticityof humanbeing-there in
is described relationto "poten-
for
tiality being a whole": authentic existencebecomesfreefor
itsown finitudein the anticipation of itsdeath. "Anticipation
turnsout to be thepossibilityof understanding one's ownmost
-
and uttermostpotentialityfor Being that is to say, the
possibilityof authenticexistence."53Originarypotentialitythus
reveals itselfin the anticipationof death. The anticipatory
resolutionof humanbeing-there is wholeand authenticonly
in projectingitselftowarditsowntotalnegativity. "Potentiality

52Mikel Dufrenne and Paul

Ricoeur,Karl Jasperset la Philosophiede l'Existence(Paris:
Éditionsde Seuil 1947),pp. 327-331, 364-372. Heideggeris said to be a nihilist(p.
306),who,withBeingandTime,pretendstoa doctrineof Being;however, theauthors
say,"we wantto showthatit isJasperswhohas a doctrineof Beingin itself,whereas
Heideggerhas notemerged,as yet,fromhispreparatory works"(p. 327). "Heidegger
hasconfessedhimself ratherthanmanifested man.. . . His philosophy climaxesin the
heavilysubjective experienceof finitude and distressbeforetheabsenceof God. . . .
His universalclaimsare betrayedby his privatepresuppositions" (pp. 329-330).
"FromthebeginningHeideggerhas lockedhimselfup in thesquirrel's cage. To him,
transcending is no longera methodof deliverance, but the veryprojectof prison
itself(p. 364). His projectis "nauseating"as itonlyknowsof"onefocalpoint,"thatis
"the merelyexistent"(l'existant brut)(pp. 371-372). These linesare important: they
showthatto fullyunderstandHeidegger'searlyproblematic (cf.the firstchapterof
BeingandTime)one has tobe awareofitsverylatesttreatment (inOn TimeandBeing).
More recently, however,Ricoeurhas written - and one can onlyagree- that"it is
impossible to referto the'first'Heideggerwithout takinga standregarding the'latest'
Heidegger"(La métaphore vive,p. 388).
00
Heidegger, Sein und ¿eit, p. 263; Being and Time, p. 307.

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218 SOCIAL RESEARCH

as an existentiale is the mostoriginaryand the ultimateposi-

tivewayin whichbeing-there is characterizedontologically."54
But whatis appropriatedwhenexistencebecomesauthentic?
The possibilityof one's own not being at all, Heideggeran-
swers. Nothingis appropriated.In seeing the chief char-
acteristicof authenticity in potentialityHeidegger clearly
wantsto eliminatethe teleologicalstructurefromauthentic
existence.To be sure,death as the objectof anticipation is a
concretionof theteleologicalstructure whichis thatof care in
general.But to speak of death as one's ownmostpossibility
whichhas to be takenoveralwaysanewintroducesan anarchic
elementintoauthenticity whichis absentfromthedescription
of care. Because itanticipatesdeath,potentialityis relationless,
unbezüglich.Death is "the ownmost,relationless,unsurmounta-
ble potentiality."55Heideggerthus thinks
authenticity as a rela-
tionlessfullnessof potentiality.Realityhas a whyand a what-
for:"presentat hand,"it correspondsto a viewpointof man,
and "ready to hand," it is good for some usage by man.
Correspondence and usefulnessare thetwowaysaccordingto
whichrealityexhibitsits teleologicalstructure."But higher
than realitystandspotentiality."56 Whyhigher?Because the
potentialis neverpresentat hand or ready to hand. Poten-
tialitythus does not fall withinthe coordinatesof causality,
thatis, withinthe domain delimitedby archeand telos.
The politicalconsequencesof thisanarchicelementin au-
thenticexistenceas describedinBeingand Timeare suggested
by the verymeaningof the wordMöglichkeit, potentiality, as
opposed toSeinkönnen, Möglichkeit
possibility: derivesfrommö-
gen,in the sense of vermögen, beingable to do something.Its
fullmeaningis preservedinMacht,power(whichhas thesame
root as "mechanics"and "magic"). I submitthat Hannah
54
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 144; Being and Time, p. 183 (translation slightly
modified).
55
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 250; Being and Time, p. 294 (translation slightly
modified).
5b
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 38; Being and Time,p. 63 (the translatorsput actu-
ality" for Wirklichkeit).

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 HEIDEGGER 219

Arendt'sconceptof power57containsan implicitreferenceto

Heidegger'sunderstanding out of potentiality.
of authenticity
Power thuswould retainthe anarchicessence of potentiality
insofaras it resultsfromagreementamong actorsand not
fromconstraint upon the next,thatis, insofaras it is opposed
to sheer forceor strength(Gewalt).To understandpowerout
of anarchicpotentialitywouldmean thatpowerhas no extrin-
sic purpose; thatplayfully reachingever new socialconstella-
tionsis an end in itself;thatitsessenceis boundlessinterplay
without a direction imposed by authority.Interpreting
Heidegger'searlywritings in thelightof his understanding of
potentialityand of the"powerpotential"whichresultsfromit
yieldsquite a differentkind of politicalimplicationin the
projectof a FundamentalOntologythanestablishing parallels
with the inaugural address as rectorof the Universityof
Freiburg.I agree,however,thattheessentially anarchicthrust
appears only on the conditionof reading Heidegger back-
ward, that is, of interpreting, as he did himself,his early
writingsout of the later ones. "As you began, so you will
remain" (Wie du anfingst, wirstdu bleiben,Hölderlin, The
Rhine).
Finally,theelementsfor"theotherpolitics"(consistent with
"theotherthinking") whichhave been sketchedhereallowfor
further specification themorefrequently
of invokednotionof
The essentialtraitof truthis said to lie in its
setting-to-work.58
57Hannah Arendt,TheHumanCondition of Chicago Press,
(Chicago: University
1958),chap. 28, for instance:"Poweris whatkeeps the publicrealm,thepotential
space of appearancebetweenactingand speakingmen,in existence"(p. 200; italics
added). It is true thatthismethodof isolating"themes"in Beingand Timeis as
questionablein our comparisonwithArendtas it is in Harries'sstretching of the
"theme"of resolve. Anysuch treatmentneeds to be justifiedin a retrospective
her-
meneutics, as has been said.
58Schwan, Politische
Philosophiein DenkenHeideggers,very accurately describes this
settingintoworkoftruth.However,forSchwantheepitomeofsuchsetting intowork
is thetotalitarian
state.Schwan'spointofdepartureis wellfounded,althoughinsuffi-
cient:namely,thatHeidegger'sphenomenological destructionpulls the rug, so to
speak,fromunderneathtraditional But,as Palmierputsit,"for
politicalphilosophy.
us, whatcountsis to understandhow Schwan,starting fromcorrectprinciples, has
endedwithabsurdconsequences"(Lesécrits deHeidegger,
politiques p. 152). See similar

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220 SOCIAL RESEARCH

settingitselfto workin art,religion,philosophyas well as in

thedeed whichgroundsa politicalstate.The phenomenology
of this"trait"of truthaids in uncoveringtheontologicalstruc-
tureof politics,quiteas Beingand Timeuncoveredtheontolog-
ical structureof human being-there.To limit Heidegger's
politicalthinkingto this "trait,"however,would implythat
phenomenology, forall itsshowingof essences,wouldhave to
remainspeechlessbeforethe question,"WhatmustI do?" A
much betterstartingpoint for renovatingthe problemof
politicsin thisline is the symbol;indeed,here practiceis not
derivedfromontologybut is its verycondition:One has to
exist in a certainway- accordingto the five characteristics
developed above- in order to understandBeing out of the
symbolicdifference. The abolitionof teleologyin practiceis
the ontic conditionfor understandingontologicalan-archy,
thatis, for understanding the destructionof a hypostatized
First.But the recognitionof the paradigmaticstatusof the
region of symbolsallows us to raise the questionof doing
onticallyas wellas ontologically.It does so byapproachingthis
questionotherwisethanin termsof politicalleadershipand its
legitimacy.
In a culturewherephilosophy has so radicallyabandonedits
task of criticismas to cooperatewiththe existingsystemby
unendingenforcements of itstechnological rationale,Heideg-
ger's destruction of metaphysics opens an alternative way of
thinkingof life in society.What indeed is a more powerful
challengeto the merry-go-round of reasonin the calculithat
have usurped the title of philosophy,particularlyin the
remarksin Pöggeler, pp. 121-125. Dauenhauer,
undPolitikbeiHeidegger,
Philosophie
"Renovatingthe Problemof Politics,"wantsto startfromthe same principlesas
Schwanand thenshow"thedelimitation of therealmof politicsfromotherrealmsof
humanexpression"(p. 639). But he merelyoutlinesfiveelementsthatappearwhen
"whatHeideggersaysaboutartis translated intothequestionof whatis thepolitical
on meditative
and is thenconjoinedwithhis reflection thoughtand technology": the
historical, manifold,
irreducibly speechlike,autonomouscharacterof politicalaction
as well as the preservationof traditionwhichit musteffectuate. These remarks
happilycorrectSchwan,buttheystopshortof indicating a kindof politicsin agree-
mentwithHeidegger'sdestruction of metaphysics.

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 HEIDEGGER 221

Anglo-Saxonworld,than to say no to philosophy'suncondi-

tional surrenderto technology?The symbolicdifference
allows for the elaborationof an alternativetypeof political
thinking. This is nota theoryof the organizationof man into
collectivities.But it is certainlynot the celebrationof pure
interiorityeither.Betweena systemof socialconstitution and
or
its negationby spiritualindividualism apoliticalsolipsism
thereis room for a thinkingabout societywhichrefusesto
restrictitselfto the pragmatics of publicadministration as well
as to theromanticescapesfromit.The "end of philosophy,"59
whichsuspendsontological justificationsof dominationbyde-
the
priving political deed of groundsforlegitimation,
exterior
radicallyputs into questioninstitutionalized authority.This
does not eliminatethe taskof preservation fromthe political
realm. But the traditionto be preservedis that of the re-
sponse,in thinkingas well as in politicalconduct,to the ever
new constellations of "the truthof Being." "The rebellious
elementin Heidegger'senterprise"60 led him to hail, not the
chief,butradicalmutability in accordancewithan understand-
of as
ing Being irreducibly manifold.

59The expression"end of philosophy"appears firstin the title"La fin de la

vivant(Paris:Gallimard,1966),p.
et la tachede la pensée,"inKierkegaard
philosophie
167.JeanBeaufretquotesHeideggeras saying:"Thereis no philosophy ot Heideg-
ger,and eveniftherewereto be something likethatI wouldnotbe interestedin this
nhiinsnnhv"fMartin Heideererer. [Paris:Gallimard,1958],p. viii).
EssaisetConferences
60Arendt,"MartinHeideggerat Eighty,"p. 50.

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