Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of Spot Audit in the RTC Branch 170

Facts:
On April 26, 2016, the OCA sent a team to conduct a spot audit of search warrant applications
raffled to Branch 170, due to persistent reports pertaining to the alleged irregular issuance of
search warants by Presiding Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena).

First, a total of 938 applications for search warrants were filed before the RTC of Malabon City
from January 2015 up to April 13, 2016. These applications were distributed among the
following judges: Judge Docena, Branch 170, with 761 applications; then Executive Judge
Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr. (Judge Magsino), Branch 74, with 175 applications; and Judge
Jimmy Edmund G. Batara (Judge Batara), Branch 172, with two applications.

Second. the RTC of Malabon City exceeded the number of search warrants issued by the RTC
of Manila (with 56 branches) and the RTC of Quezon City (with 48 branches), notwithstanding
the fact that the latter courts are allowed to issue search warrants which are enforceable
nationwide. Third, out of the 761 applications assigend to Branch 170, Judge Docena issued
113 search warrants which are enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Malabon City. Fourth, Judge Docena issued 418 search warrants which are also enforceable
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, but this time the applicants
specifically invoked Section 2(b) of Rule 126 which allows, for compelling reasons, the filing of
the application with any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed or where
the warrant shall be enforced. Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued a Resolution
dated May 31, 2016 placing Judge Docena under immediate preventive suspension for a period
of six months.

The Audit Team also found that Judge Docena granted 758 search warrant applications even
though the places of commission of the crimes involved therein were outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City. Out of 758 applications, 130 had completely failed to
cite compelling reasons to warrant their filing in the RTC of Malabon City. The Audit Team
likewise observed that there are instances where the compelling reasons cited by the applicant
appear to be without merit, and Judge Docena failed to ask the required probing and exhaustive
inquiry on the veracity of the compelling reason invoked. The Audit Team noted that Judge
Magsino also granted a considerable number of search warrant applications from January 2015
up to May 10, 2016, where the offenses involved were committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC ofMalabon City. In his Comment dated October 28, 2016, Judge Docena
submits that he granted the search warrant applications before him "in the good faith belief that
there was probable cause for their issuance and in compliance with law and procedure."

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Docena violated Section 2 Rule 126.

Ruling:
It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search warrant
application that is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory requirement, and the absence of such
statement renders the application defective. The absence of a statement of compelling reasons,
however, is not a ground for the outright denial of a search warrant application, since it is not
one of the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. In other words, the statement of
compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far as the proper venue for the filing
of search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be viewed as an additional requisite for the
issuance of a search warrant.

It is also important to stress that an application for a search warrant merely constitutes a
criminal process and is not in itself a criminal action. The rule, therefore, that venue is
jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply thereto. Simply stated, venue is only procedural,
and not jurisdictional, in applications for the issuance of a search warrant. Note, too, that the
determination of the existence of compelling reasons under Section 2(b) of Rule 126 is a matter
squarely addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such application is filed, subject
to review by an appellate court in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.

Clearly, this administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to review the search warrants
issued by Judge Docena and Judge Magsino in order to determine whether the compelling
reasons cited in their respective applications are indeed meritorious.

Given these circumstances, we cannot agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Docena and
Judge Magsino violated Section 2 of Rule 126 by simply issuing search warrants involving
crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City where: a) there is
no compelling reason to take cognizance of the applications; and b) the compelling reasons
alleged in the applications appear to be unmeritorious.

It is obvious that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply exercised the trial court's ancillary
jurisdiction over a special criminal process when they took cognizance of the applications and
issued said search warrants. And as previously discussed, the propriety of the issuance of these
warrants is a matter that should have been raised in a motion to quash or in a certiorari petition,
if there are allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing judge.
Dimal and Castillo vs People
Facts:
At around 7:30 p.m., Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to Dimal's compound, asking for
information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison
that they had left an hour ago. Unable to locate his relatives, Edison went to the police station in
Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were missing, then proceeded to seek assistance from the
police station in Echague.

Thereafter, Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they allegedly
stayed and observed the premises in the absence of Dimal until September 7, 2010. On even
date at around 5:30 a.m., Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a warrant
Dimal's compound, but found no evidence linking him to the disappearances.

On September 24, 2010, petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague Police, and
allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. On
September 25, 2010, a certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement
made by Castillo. Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three
victims, and ordered him, Castillo and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by throwing
the bodies in a river.

On September 26, 2010, Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. On September 27, 2010,
the Echague Police filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, a
criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Dimal, Castillo,
Sapipi, Miranda, Marvin Guiao and Robert Baccay.

On October 8, 2010, Police Inspector (P/lnsp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a commissioned officer of
the Philippine National Police assigned with the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response in
Camp Crame Quezon City, filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant before the
R TC Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of
Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma.

In his application for search warrant, P/Insp. Malixi stated that "he was informed, and verily
believed that JA YLORD ARIZABAL DIMAL @ JAY, 28 years old, a resident of Felix Gumpal
Compound, Ipil Junction, Isabela and CMJ Building Dubinan East, Santiago City, has in control
of the following items" in the said address. P/Insp. Malixi stressed that he has personally verified
and ascertained the veracity of the information and found the same to be true and correct, as
narrated and sworn to by Ernesto Villador, a long-time employee of Dimal, Edison Uy Pua, the
nephew of the victims Lucio and Rosemarie Pua, and Shaira Mae Eugenio, daughter of the
victim Gemma Eugenio. P/Insp. Malixi claimed that the application was founded on his personal
knowledge and that of his witnesses, acquired after conducting surveillance and investigation.
P/Insp. Malixi attached to the application as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" the Vicinity/Location
and Floor Map.
After the hearing of the application on October 8, 2010, Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of
Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17, issued a Search Warrant. In the Return on the Search Warrant,
P/Insp. Gary Halay-ay Macadangdang, Deputy Chief of Police, Echague Police Station,
Echague, Isabela," manifested that (1) Search Warrant No. 10-11 was served at the premises of
Dimal at Barangay Ipil, Echague, Isabela, on October 9, 2010 at about 9:00 a.m., and (2) the
search was conducted in an orderly manner and in the presence of owner/custodian Carlos
Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio Miguel, Barangay Kagawads Rodolfo Vergara and Mariano
Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo reporter Romy Santos. On February 20, 2012, petitioners Dimal
and Castillo, together with Michael Miranda, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash Search Warrant
No. 10-11 and to declare the seized items as inadmissible in evidence. They argued that the
search warrant is invalid because it was issued in connection with, not just one single offense,
but two crimes, i.e., kidnapping and multiple murder. They also contended that except for
witness Ernesto Villador, applicant P/Insp. Malixi and witnesses Edison and Shaira Mae have
no personal knowledge surrounding the two crimes committed; hence, their statements did not
provide basis for a finding of probable cause, much less for the issuance of a search warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.

Ruling:
Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly issued, but most of the items seized pursuant thereto are
inadmissible in evidence, as they were neither particularly described in the warrant nor seized
under the "plain view doctrine". At the outset, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the
search warrant was applied for in connection with two unrelated offenses, i.e., kidnapping and
murder, in violation of Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which requires that such
warrant must be issued in relation to one offense. Asked by Judge Ong during the hearing as to
what particular offense was committed, search warrant applicant P/Insp. Malixi testified that
Dimal "allegedly committed the crime of kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio and
Rosemarie Pua and one Gemma Eugenio on September 6, 2010." It is not amiss to add that a
search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule.

Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining judge failed to ask searching questions,
and to consider that the testimonies of the applicant and his witnesses were based entirely on
hearsay, as they have no personal knowledge of the circumstances relating to the supposed
disappearance or murder of the 3 victims. Having in mind the foregoing principles, the Court
agrees with the RTC and the CA in both ruling that Judge Ong found probable cause to issue a
search warrant after a searching and probing personal examination of applicant P/Insp. Malixi
and his witnesses, Edison, Shaira Mae and Villador. Their testimonies jointly and collectively
show a reasonable ground to believe that the 3 victims went to Dimal's compound to sell palay,
but were probably killed by Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within its
premises.
During the hearing of his application for search warrant, Judge Ong was ab.le to elicit from
P/Insp. Malixi the specific crime allegedly committed by Dimal, the particular place to be
searched and items to be seized:

Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/Insp. Malixi
and his witnesses, Edwin, Shaira Mae and Villador, whose collective testimonies would prompt
a reasonably discreet person to believe that the crime of kidnapping with murder was committed
at the Felix GumpaL Compound on September 6, 2010, and that specific personal properti'es
sought in connection with the crime could be found in the said place sought to be searched.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified with
particularity the place to be searched, namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay
warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela.

In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be
seized in connection with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely: (1)
blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket and a
black tshirt, and (2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol. Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600
sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to Dimal and found in his warehouse,
cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant because they do not fall under the personal
properties stated under Section 3 of Rule 126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense, can be the proper subject of a search warrant.
People vs Pastrana & Abad
Facts:
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati
City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors.

In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H.
Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of respondents' former
employees who actually called clients abroad; the articles of incorporation of domestic
corporations used by respondents in their scheme; and the sketch of the place sought to be
searched. On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC,
Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-118. Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI
agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to
respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino and
Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate
Center. Pursuant to the Return, dated 2 April 2001, and the Inventory Sheet attached thereto.
On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118 because it
was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for
estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal
procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with
specificity the objects to be seized.

Issue:
Whether or not search warrant should be quashed.

Ruling:
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The
Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."

First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under
the said law such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker
without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered
clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and
dealers among others. Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for
there are three ways of committing the said crime: ( 1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means.
The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of
confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that
Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect. Aside from its failure to specify what particular
provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also
covered estafa under the RPC. Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first
and foremost a codification of various rules and regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike,
the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs,
the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in categories. Hence, it is
imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated.

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific offense
alleged committed by respondents. Consequently, it could not have been possible for the
issuing judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that the items sought
to be seized are connected to any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was
issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and
items enumerated in the search warrant failed the test of particularity. The terms used in this
warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of
respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other
showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does
not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was indeed issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations'
certificate of registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as
brokers or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one
offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.
Nograles vs People
Facts:
On July 30, 2007, Special Investigator Garry Meñez (SI Meñez) of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) applied for a search warrant before the RTC to authorize him and his fellow
NBI agents or any peace officer to search the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing
Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific) and to seize/confiscate and take into custody the
items/articles/objects enumerated in his application.

That he has been informed, verily believes and personally verified that JUN NICOLAS, LOREN
NUESTRA, FREDRICK FELIX P. NOGALES, MELINDA P. NOGALES, PRISCILA B.
CABRERA and/or occupants PHIL-PACIFIC OUTSOURCING SERVICES CORP. located at
Mezzanine Flr., Glorietta De Manila Building, 776 San Sebastian St., University Belt, Manila
have in their possession/control and are concealed in the above-mentioned premises various
material[s] used in the creation and selling of pornographic internet website, to wit:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be used in the commission of the crime.

The application for Search Warrant No. 07-11685 of SI Meñez was acted upon by Judge
Alisuag. On August 3, 2007, a hearing was conducted wherein Judge Alisuag personally
examined SI Meñez and two other witnesses in the form of searching questions and their
answers thereto were duly recorded by the court. The witnesses’ affidavits were also submitted
and marked as supporting evidence to the application for the issuance of a search warrant. On
the same date of the hearing, the application was granted and the corresponding Search
Warrant.

On August 8, 2007, SI Meñez submitted a Return of Search Warrant6 to the RTC manifesting
that in the morning of August 7, 2007, the operatives of the Special Task Force of the NBI
implemented the said search warrant in an orderly and peaceful manner in the presence of the
occupants of the described premises and that the seized items were properly inventoried in the
Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized. The items seized were the following:
1. Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units (CPUs);
2. Ten (10) units of monitors;
3. Ten (10) units of keyboard;
4. Ten (10) units of mouse; and
5. Ten (10) units of AVRs.
The RTC then issued an order granting the prayer of SI Meñez to keep the seized items in the
NBI evidence room and under his custody with the undertaking to make said confiscated items
available whenever the court would require them.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties. Hence, on May 6, 2008,
petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Release Seized Properties manifesting that the
complaint against them was dismissed, and that, for said reason, the State had no more use of
the seized properties. The Motion to Release Seized Properties is partially granted. Accordingly
therefore, let the computer sets be hereby returned to the respondents. The CPU and all the
rest of the softwares containing obscene materials which were seized during the implementation
of the valid Search Warrant are hereby retained in the possession of the National Bureau of
Investigation thru applicant Special Investigator Garry J. Meñez.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in ordering the
removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and obscene materials.

Ruling:
While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
was dismissed as there was no concrete and strong evidence pointing to them as the direct
source of the subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the
confiscated hard disks. At the risk of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the seized
computer units belonging to them contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly,
petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection of their supposed property rights. The CA
is correct in stating that the removal of the hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of
permanently removing the obscene or pornographic files. Taking into account all the
circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction of the hard disks and the
softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses the purpose of
minimizing if not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson for those engaged
in any way in the proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country. The Court is not
unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed property rights must be balanced
with the welfare of the public in general.
Dahon vs People
Facts:
Law enforcement agents applied for a search warrant after the surveillance and test-buy
operations conducted by the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Bohol, which confirmed that Dabon was engaged
in illegal drug activity.

Search Warrant No. 15, which armed law enforcement agents to search Dabon's residence for
violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, was issued.

On July 26, 2003, at about 5:30 a.m., Police Inspector Hermano Mallari (P/Insp. Mallari), Senior
Police Officer 2 Arsenio Maglinte (SPO2 Maglinte), SPO1 Noel Triste (SPO1 Triste), Police
Officer 3 John Gilbert Basalo (PO3 Basalo), PO3 David Enterina (PO3 Enterina), PO2 Gaudioso
Datoy (PO2 Datoy) and PO2 Herold Bihag (PO2 Bihag) of the Bohol Criminal Investigation and
Detection Team proceeded to an apartment unit at Boal District, Tagbilaran City where the
residence of Dabon is situated.

Upon reaching the two-storey apartment at about 7:30 am, the CIDG operatives requested
Barangay Kagawad Ariel Angalot (Brgy. Kagawad Angalot), City Councilor Jose Angalot
(Councilor Angalot), Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman Marianne Angalot (SK Chairman
Angalot), media representative Charles Responte (Responte) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative Zacarias Castro (Castro) to witness the search. The group entered the house
and the CIDG, together with Brgy. Kagawad Angalot and SK Chairman Angalot went to the
second floor where Dabon and his family resided. The second floor had two bedrooms, a
kitchen and a living room. They found Eusubio Dumaluan (Dumaluan) in the living room while
Dabon was inside one of the bedrooms.

After P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of the search warrant to Dabon, the CIDG operatives
searched the kitchen where PO2 Datoy and PO2 Enterina found, in the presence of Brgy.
Kagawad Angalot, drug paraphernalia. The police officers then frisked Dumaluan and recovered
from his pocket, a coin purse, a lighter, a metal clip, three empty decks of suspected shabu, two
pieces of blade and crumpled tin foil. The police officers proceeded to search one of the
bedrooms where PO2 Datoy and PO2 Enterina, in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Angalot,
found three plastic sachets containing suspected shabu, which were hidden in the folded of
clothes inside a drawer. They also recovered the following drug paraphernalia: empty
cellophane wrapper, rolled tinfoil containing. suspected shabu residue, twisted tissues, plastic
straw refiller, three pieces of bamboo clip, improvised metal clip, and blade. The three plastic
sachets and the drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom of Dabon and the drug paraphernalia
recovered from Dumaluan were turned over to SPO1 Triste who inventoried and placed them in
evidence bags in the presence of Councilor Angalot, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, SK Chairman
Angalot, media representative Responte and DOJ representative Castro. Two Information were
filed against Dabon for violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. For his
defense, Dabon argued that he was surprised when he was. awakened by alleged members of
the CIDG, who entered his room, pointing guns at him and telling them that they will conduct a
raid.

Dabon and Dumaluan claimed that they were not allowed to witness the search conducted by
the CIDG. Instead, they were ordered to stay and sit in the living room while other members of
the household were locked inside the room of their house helper.

Issue:
Is the evidence obtained against Dabon admissible?

Ruling:
In this case, it is undisputed that Dabon and his wife were actually present in their residence
when the police officers conducted the search in the bedroom where the drugs and drug
paraphernalia were found. It was also undisputed that, as the CA recognized, only Brgy.
Kagawad Angalot was present to witness the same. Here, the hierarchy among the witnesses
as explicitly provided under the law was not complied with. For one, the lawful occupants of the
premises were not absent when the police authorities implemented the search warrant. Even
so, the two-witness rule was not complied with as only one witness, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot,
was present when the search was conducted.

As told, based on the testimonies of PO2 Datoy and Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, it is clear that the
mandatory rule under Section 8 was violated. Clearly, the contention of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that SK Chairman Angalot was there was belied by the statement of PO2 Datoy
and Brgy. Kagawad Angalot.

Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search warrant
makes the search unreasonable. Thus, the exclusionary rule applies, i.e., any evidence
obtained in violation of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. We emphasize that the exclusionary rule ensures that the fundamental rights to one's
person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.

Lastly, We find that the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained was not defeated by the fact that
Dabon failed to timely object to such evidence's admissibility during trial.

Although Section 14 of Rule 126 states that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to
suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the
action has been instituted, the purpose for which such provision was enacted must nevertheless
be considered. In the case of Ogayon v. People, We clarified that "the provision was intended to
resolve what is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence. seized by virtue thereof. It was certainly not intended to
preclude belated objections against the search warrant's validity””.
Bulauitan y Mauayan vs People
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from an Information dated November 7, 2003 filed before the RTC,
charging Bulauitan of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that on October 3, 2003, the
Philippine National Police of Solana, Gagayan constituted a team headed by P/Insp. Kevin
Bulayungan (P/Insp. Bulayungan) as leader, with SPO2 Lito Baccay (SPO2 Baccay) and PO3
Elizalde Tagal (PO3 Tagal) as search officer and investigator, respectively, to implement a
search warrant issued by Executive Judge Vilma T. Pauig to search Bulauitan's residence.
Before going to the target residence, the search team first went to the house of Barangay
Chairman Jane Busilan, who in turn, assigned Kagawad (Kgd.) Jerry Soliva (Kgd. Soliva) and
Kgd. Herald de Polonia (Kgd. Polonia) as search witnesses. Upon arriving at Bulauitan's
residence, the search team was met by Bulauitan's two (2) children and housekeeper, who
informed them that Bulauitan was not home. This notwithstanding, the search team explained to
the children and housekeeper the reason for their presence, prompting the latter to allow them
inside the house and conduct the search. SPO2 Baccay then proceeded to Bulauitan's room
and there, discovered three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting that the contents are shabu, the search team showed the sachets to the
children and housekeeper and photographed the same. SPO2 Baccay then gave the sachets to
P/Insp. Bulayungan, who in turn, handed them over to PO3 Tagal who wrapped the confiscated
items with a piece of paper for transport to the Solana PNP Station. When Bulauitan arrived at
his residence, the search team effected his arrest and took him to the police station with the
seized sachets. Upon arrival thereat, PO3 Tagal prepared the police blotter and request for
laboratory examination, marked the sachets with his initials, and delivered the same to forensic
chemist S/Insp. Myrna Madriaga Tulauan of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

Issue:
whether or not Bulauitan's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.

Ruling:
Under this provision, a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the
lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon
their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals
that the policemen involved in the search of Bulauitan's residence — as shown in their own
testimonies - did not conduct the search in accordance with Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. While Bulauitan's absence in the search, per se, did not violate
Section 8, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the search team committed other
errors which led to such violation. For instance, Bulauitan's daughter, Maria, was effectively
precluded from witnessing the search conducted by SPO2 Baccay in Bulauitan's room as PO3
Tagal kept her in the living room by searching the area and asking her a lot of questions. Worse,
the search team even instructed Maria to contact her father via telephone, which she could only
do by leaving their residence and going to the house of a certain Dr. Romeo Bago (Dr. Bago) to
use the telephone therein. It was only after her return to their residence that SPO2 Baccay
announced that they have allegedly found shabu in Bulauitan's room.

The testimonies given in the case at bar ultimately prove that: (a) Bulauitan was not in his
residence when the search was conducted; (b) his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness
SPO2 Baccay's search of Bulauitan's room as PO3 Tagal kept her in the living room and even
instructed her to leave the house to contact her parents; and (c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia
neither witnessed the search as they remained outside Bulauitan's residence. Accordingly, the
search conducted therein by the search team fell way below the standard mandated by Section
8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus deemed unreasonable within
the purview of the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. As a consequence, the three (3)
plastic sachets containing an aggregate amount of 0.22 gram of shabu recovered therefrom are
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Bulauitan must necessarily be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
Worldwide Web Corp vs People
Facts:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation
(WWC) located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon
City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)
located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio,
Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered
Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be
searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers
that would be taken.

On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly,
the following warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police
officers to seize various items:
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308
(theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin
L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International
Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B.
Sison with business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark
Libis, Quezon City:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information, applying the
process of the information and supplying the results of this process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information;
and c) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.

2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet Internet
Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C.
Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such
as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the
prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different
sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.

3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308
(theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against Planet Internet
Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C.
Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such
as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the
prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different
sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that
even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk,
were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their respective motions to quash the
search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act
complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the
objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrants should be quashed.

Ruling:
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched." There is no
exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a
matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial
function. They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the offender. When a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is
accorded respect by reviewing courts. The peculiar circumstances attending the situation
compel us to rule further on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to
quash the search warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have
connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.

A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him
based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents
clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they
committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. In that case, the finding of probable
cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.

On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not
cause the quashal of a search warrant. In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the
test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however,
to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the
Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a
deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls
bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."

On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial
judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the
issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search
warrants are general warrants.

A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion
over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued,
vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are
searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to
pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to
secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent
precision. In

People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of
their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by
superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued.

To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as
identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to
the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of
petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications
equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.
Vaporoso vs People
Facts:
This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations filed before the RTC charging petitioners
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged that at around
7:00 in the evening of August 25, 2013, while Police Officer 2 Alexander D. Torculas (PO2
Torculas) was patrolling along National Highway, Barangay Salvacion, Panabo City, he noticed
two (2) men - later on identified as petitioners - aboard a motorcycle with the back rider holding
a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a vehicle parked on the side of the road.
When PO2 Torculas shouted at petitioners to halt, the latter sped away. At this point, the owner
of the vehicle, Narcisa Dombase (Dombase), approached PO2 Torculas and told him that
petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. This prompted PO2
Torculas to chase petitioners until the latter entered a dark, secluded area in Bangoy Street,
prompting him to call for back-up. Shortly after, Police Officer 1 Ryan B. Malibago (PO1
Malibago), together with some Intel Operatives, arrived and joined PO2 Torculas in waiting for
petitioners to come out of the aforesaid area.

About six (6) hours later, or at around 1:00 in the morning of the following day, PO2 Torculas
and PO1 Malibago saw petitioners come out and decided to approach them. Petitioners,
however, attempted to flee, but PO2 Torculas and PO1 Malibago were able to apprehend them.
After successfully recovering Dombase's bags and belongings from petitioners, the police
officers conducted an initial cursory body search on the latter, and thereafter, brought them to
the Panabo Police Station. Thereat, the police officers conducted another "more thorough"
search on petitioners, which yielded (5) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
from Vaporoso and four (4) plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik.
PO1 Malibago then marked the said items in the presence of petitioners and conducted the
requisite photo-taking and inventory in the presence of Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative Ian Dionalo, Kagawad Elpidio Pugata, and media representative Jun Gumban. At
around 10:15 in the morning of August 26, 2013, the seized items were turned over to the
Provincial Crime Laboratory of Tagum City, where, upon examination, tested positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. On December 18,
2013, the subject sachets were delivered to the court.

During arraignment, or on October 9, 2013, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges. On
September 10, 2015, trial was dispensed with as the parties agreed to simply stipulate on the
factual matters of the case. On September 16, 2015, they were directed to submit their
respective memorandum.

In a Decision dated December 14, 2015, the RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners should be convicted.
Ruling:
At this point, the Court notes that petitioners failed to question the legality of their arrest, and in
fact, actively participated in the trial of the case. As such, they are deemed to have waived any
objections involving the same. Nonetheless, it must be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a
waiver only as to any question concerning any defects in their arrest, and not with regard to the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. Having ascertained
that petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant pursuant to the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the
Court now examines the two (2) searches made on them, namely: (a) the body search after the
police officers apprehended them; and (b) a "more thorough" search conducted at the Panabo
Police Station where the seized drugs were allegedly recovered from them, as to whether these
may fall within the purview of a valid search incidental to their lawful arrest. The purpose of
allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is therefore a
reasonable exercise of the State's police power to protect: (a) law enforcers from the injury that
may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (b) evidence from being
destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity
of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer
as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. On this note, case law requires a strict
application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is
lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to
'dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.'
Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest."

Applying the foregoing parameters to this case, the Court concludes that the first search made
on petitioners, i.e., the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but only
personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest
as it was done contemporaneous to their arrest and at the place of apprehension. On the other
hand, the same cannot be said of the second search which yielded the drugs subject of this
case, considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the
arrest to the time of the second search, not to mention the fact that the second search was
conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest, i.e., the Panabo Police Station.
People vs Comprado y Bronola
Facts:
On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CJ) sent a text message
to Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of
Police Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together
with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in
his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to
Cagayan de Oro City. At 9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the
alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988
bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in
black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the
police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station.

At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body and plate
numbers. P/Insp. Orate, Police Officer 3 Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De Oro), Senior Police Officer 1
Benjamin Jay Reycitez (SPOJ Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie Tenio (PO1 Tenio) boarded the bus
and saw a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the
back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked the man to open
the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.

SPO1 Reycitez took photos of accused-appellant and the cellophane bag containing the dried
marijuana leaves. PO3 De Oro, in the presence of accused-appellant, marked the bag "RCB-2"
and the contents of the bag "RCB-1." Thereafter, PO1 Tenio and PO3 De Oro brought accused-
appellant and the seized bag to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. On 16 July 2011, at
around 1:40 in the morning, Police Senior Inspector Charity Caceres (PSI Caceres) of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office 10, Cagayan de Oro City, received the requests for examination and
the specimen. PSI Caceres, after conducting qualitative examination of the specimen, issued
Chemistry Report No. D-253-20119 stating that the dried leaves seized from accused-appellant
were marijuana and which weighed 3,200 grams. In its decision, the RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.

Issue:
Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence

Ruling:
The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search and seizure is
valid because it could be considered as search of a moving vehicle:

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e.,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction. The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a· specific
person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to
transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was
that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers
boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their
informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so
happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the
scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless
searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride
a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such
vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person.
People vs Manago y Acut
Facts:
On April 10, 2007, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging Manago of Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio Din
(PO3 Din) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a
haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up.
PO3 Din identified himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots with the two suspects.
After the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a red
Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were noted by PO3 Din.

After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano), that
the robbery suspects were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp. George Ylanan
(S/Insp. Ylanan) conducted an investigation in the said barangay, and discovered that before
the robbery incident, Manago told Cano that three persons - namely, Rico Lumampas, Arvin
Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his employees in his roasted chicken business, and they
were to stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the getaway vehicles with the
Land Transportation Office, the police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in
Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was registered in the name pf Zest-O
Corporation, where Manage worked as a District Sales Manager.

With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers, comprised of a team including
PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the robbery
incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in
the evening of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by Manago, passed through
the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the vehicle. The police officers then ordered
Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a thorough search of the vehicle. As the
search produced no contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago, resulting in the
discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the plastic pack, arrested
Manago, informed him of his constitutional rights, and brought him and the plastic pack to their
headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters, S/Insp. Ylanan turned over the seized plastic
pack to PO3 Joel Taboada, who in turn, prepared a request for a laboratory examination of the
same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered the said sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude
Daniel Mendoza of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who, after conducting an examination, confirmed
that the sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause and/or
Motion for the Suppression of Evidence, contending, inter alia, that there is neither probable
cause nor prima facie Evidence to conduct an arrest and search on him; as such, the item
seized torn him, i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu, is inadmissible in evidence pursuant to
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. However, in kn Order dated May 31, 2007, the RTC
denied the said motion. The RTC held that while (a) the police officers, through PO3 Din, had no
personal knowledge of Manago's involvement in the robbery as they had to conduct in
investigation to identify him as the registered owner of the motorcycle and (b) there was no in
flagrante delicto arrest as Manago was merely driving and gave no indication that he was
committing an offense, the RTC nevertheless held that there was a valid warrantless search of a
moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din had probable cause to believe that Manago was part
of the robbery, because the latter was driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, 2007
robbery incident.

In a Decision dated March 23, 2009, the RTC found Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
possession of 0.3852 grams of shabu

Issue:
whether or not Manage's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be
upheld.

Ruling:
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under Section
5 (b) above was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery incident
and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of immediacy was
not met. This is because, at the time the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon
Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted, which
consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident. As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had gathered therefrom would
have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants against the robbery suspects.
However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which - considering the lack of
immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor. Thus, there being no
valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that Manago was
lawfully arrested.

In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in ruling
that the incidental search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said search was
made even before he was arrested and thus, violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to
lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made.

For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the police officers conducted a lawful
warrantless search of a moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.

A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or
police checkpoints - as in this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as
long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists. Case law further states that routine inspections in checkpoints are not
regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches, and thus,
permissible, if limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c)
flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the Vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte blanche
discretion to conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search - as opposed to a mere routine inspection - such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a
thorough investigation and verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the
identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the ownership of the
getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla. As
adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already enough for said police officers to
secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no
longer any exigent circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting up the
checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the subject vehicle. In addition, it is well to
point out that the checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was already
identified as the culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be said that
the checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary and indiscriminate search of moving vehicles.
Rather, it was used as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the fleeing suspect.
Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the legal requirement of - procuring
a valid search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case. Hence, the search conducted
on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful.

In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his
moving vehicle were all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from him
is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability
People vs Acosta
Facts:
This case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC accusing Acosta of the crime of
Illegal Planting and Cultivation of Marijuana Plant, defined and penalized under Section 16,
Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around seven (7) o'clock in the morning of
September 10, 2015 in Purok 2, Barangay San Juan, Gingoog City, Alfredo Salucana
(Salucana) went to the Gingoog City Police Station to report a mauling incident where Acosta
purportedly hit him with a piece of wood. He also reported that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. Salucana's foregoing reports prompted Police Inspector Ismael Virgil O. Gundaya
(P/Insp. Gundaya), Senior Police Officer 4 Henry B. Legaspi (SPO4 Legaspi), Senior Police
Officer 2 Jan Jomen (SPO2 Jomen), and Police Officer 3 Leo Pontillas (PO3 Pontillas) to
proceed to Acosta's home in Purok 2, Barangay San Juan, Gingoog City. Thereat, Salucana
positively identified Acosta who was then walking on the trail leading towards his house. The
police officers then rushed towards Acosta and arrested him before he entered his home. After
the arrest, SPO4 Legaspi found thirteen (13) hills of suspected marijuana plants planted
beneath the "gabi" plants just outside Acosta's home, and around a meter away from where he
was arrested. Upon seeing the marijuana, SPO4 immediately called Barangay Captain Rodulfo
Maturan (Brgy. Captain Maturan), Barangay Kagawad Danilo Macaraig (Brgy. Kagawad
Macaraig), and Mrs, Joyce Donguines (Mrs. Donguines) of the Farmer's Association, to witness
the uprooting of the suspected marijuana plants. Thereafter, they brought Acosta and the
uprooted marijuana plants to the police station for the marking and inventory of the seized
items. At the police station, the suspected marijuana plants were marked and inventoried in the
presence of Acosta, Brgy. Captain Maturan, and Mrs. Donguines. SPO4 Legaspi then delivered
the seized items to Police Chief Inspector Joseph T. Esber (PCI Esber) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory where, after examination, the plants tested
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. PCI Esber then turned over the specimens to the
Evidence Custodian. RTC found Acosta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Issue:
Whether or not accused should be acquited.

Ruling:
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain
view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. In this
case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta. Instead, he argues
that the second requisite is absent since the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana
plants was not inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the
records, this Court is inclined to agree.

The testimonies of P/Insp. Gundaya, SPO4 Legaspi, and Salucana collectively paint the picture
that the police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with
prior knowledge that he was also illegally planting marijuana. It is clear from Salucana's
testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even prior to the mauling incident. In fact, it
may be reasonably inferred that the mauling incident had something to do with Acosta's planting
of marijuana. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal planting and
cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the mauling incident. Thus, when the police
officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that there could
possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the
plants was inadvertent. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis
plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the
area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently,
the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and
hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the seized
marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous
tree.