45. Kondo vs Civil Registrar General, GR No.
223628, March 4, 2020
Facts:
On March 15, 1991, petitioner Edna S. Kondo and Katsuhiro Kondo, a Filipina and Japanese
national, respectively, were married before the Head of Hirano Ward in Japan. They registered their
Marriage Certificate with the National Statistics Authority of the Philippines. But on July 3, 2000, after
around 9 years of marriage, they obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan for which they were issued a
Report of Divorce. In 2012, Edna filed a petition for the judicial recognition of the divorce decree
through her sister as attorney-in-fact citing Article 26 of the Family Code. Luzviminda presented among
others, the report of divorce and Katsuhiro’s authenticated Family Register, both with English
translation, stating that the spouses divorced by agreement on July 3, 2000.
On May 20, 2014, Edna filed a Motion for New Trial alleging that she had a newly discovered
evidence which would alter the result of the case – copy of Katsuhiro’s report of divorce which states
that he has already married another Japanese woman named Tsukiko Umegaki. The petitioner argues
that it is absurd for the court not to accept such evidence and such would result to her staying in her
previous marriage even though Katsuhiro has already remarried in 2001.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
That the court should grant her Motion for New Trial since she has newly discovered evidence
which would materially alter the results of the case.
That the divorce between her and Katsuhiro capacitated Katsuhiro to remarry under Japanese
laws.
Respondent’s Contentions:
That the motion for new trial of the petitioner is denied for failure to file an affidavit of merit
as required under Rule 37, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
That under Article 26 of the Family Code the foreign divorce should have been obtained by the
alien spouse and not by mutual agreement of the parties.
That the divorce between Katsuhiro did not acquire the right to remarry under the Japanese
Civil Code.
RTC’s ruling (RTC Branch 4- Manila):
In the decision of the RTC in April 10, 2014, the trial court denied the petition citing Article 26
of the Family Code. That the divorce must be sought by the alien spouse and not by mutual
consent. In addition, Katsuhiro was not given the capacity to remarry under Japanese Laws.
On the motion for new trial, the RTC denied it due to the alleged failure to present an affidavit
of Merit as required by Rule 37, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.
CA’s ruling:
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA emphasized Rule 37, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which requires supporting evidence
by way of affidavits of witnesses or duly authenticated documents. The court emphasized that
Edna only submitted a mere photocopy of Katsuhiro’s records and asked for the relaxation of
the Technical Rules.
Issue:
Whether or not the case must be remanded to the trial court for reception of additional evidence.
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the aggrieved party may move the trial
court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following
causes materially affecting the substantial rights of the said party:
(2) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
In this case, Edna has presented an Authenticated copy of the divorce in Japanese and in English
and the original copy of Katsuhiro’s Family register. Edna has also actively participated in the
proceedings despite the logistical and financial constraints as she showed willingness to give the final
document to the court. The OSG also noted that since this case concerns Edna’s status, res judicata shall
not apply and she could simply re-file the case if dismissed. Finally, the court has decided that the
petition is meritorious as the petitioner has presented authenticated copies of the documents and has
substantially proven that the fact of the divorce and the relaxation of the rules will not prejudice the
state.
46. Heirs of P. Racaza vs Spouses Abay-Abay, GR No. 198402, June 13, 2012
Doctrine:
New Trial; Newly Discovered Evidence; Requisites for Newly Discovered Evidence.—While the Rules of
Court allows the introduction by parties of newly-discovered evidence, as in motions for new trial under
Rule 37, these are not to be presented for the first time during an appeal. In addition, the term “newly-
discovered evidence” has a specific definition under the law. Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for
newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment.
Facts:
Herein respondents Spouses Florencio and Eleuteria Abay-abay filed in July 1985 with the RTCof
Tagbilaran City, Bohol a complaint for the quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against
several defendants that included Alexander Miel (Alexander), the husband of herein petitioner Angeles
Racaza Miel (collectively known as the Miels). The subject of the complaint was the property covered by
the Tax Declaration No. 4501-663 situated in Poblacion Ubay, Bohol. The subject property, according to
the Spouses Abay-abay alleged that they acquired the property from one Emilia Garces by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale in 1979, however therein defendants began to erect residential houses on the
subject property without the knowledge and consent of the Spouses. The refusal of the defendants to
vacate the property prompted the latter to file the complaint with the RTC.
To support their petition, the petitioners argue that: (1) the disputed property is a foreshore
land and thus, owned by the State; (2) the respondents were buyers in bad faith when they purchased
the unregistered land; and (3) the order to demolish their property was inhuman and thus,
unconstitutional.
As part of their present petition, the petitioners also ask this Court to admit as “newly
discovered evidence” a Certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Bohol, and a cadastral map of Poblacion, Ubay, Bohol, purportedly to support their claim
that the subject property is a foreshore land which cannot be owned by herein respondents.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
To support their petition, the petitioners argue that: (1) the disputed property is a foreshore
land and thus, owned by the State; (2) the respondents were buyers in bad faith when they
purchased the unregistered land; and (3) the order to demolish their property was inhuman
and thus, unconstitutional.
Respondent’s Contentions:
Spouses Abay-abay invoked the valid judgment and writ of execution already issued in Civil
Case No. 3920.
They also raised the issues of estoppel and laches in view of the petitioners’ failure to
intervene in Civil Case No. 3920.
RTC’s ruling:
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 4, 2005, which dismissed the complaint
for lack of preponderance of evidence, and affirmed Spouses Abay-abay's ownership and possession
over the subject property.
CA’s ruling:
On appeal, the CA affirmed the rulings of the RTC via the assailed Decision dated September 8, 2010 and
Resolution dated August 8, 2011. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may admit as “newly discovered evidence” a Certification of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Bohol, and a cadastral map of
Poblacion, Ubay, Bohol, purportedly to support their claim that the subject property is a foreshore
land which cannot be owned by herein respondents.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of
such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
The two documents which the petitioners seek to now present are not of this nature.
Undeniably, the CENRO Certification and cadastral map annexed to the petition could have been
produced and presented by the petitioners during the proceedings before the court a quo. Further to
this, the petitioners’ purpose for submitting the said documents is only to prove that the disputed
property is a foreshore land that should have been declared owned by the State. Thus, even granting
that the documents may be admitted at this stage, the certification and cadastral map fail to support the
petitioners’ claim of ownership over the disputed property. On the contrary, these documents only
negate their claim of ownership and better right to possess the land because foreshore land is not
subject to private ownership, but is part of the public domain.
47. Ruiz vs Delos Santos GR No. 166386, 27, January 2009
Doctrine:
Since the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the perfection of appeal, the counsel of
petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of court of the acceptance of
the late payment of docket fees—as an officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the
clerk of court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the rules.—It bears stressing that the
Rules of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the perfection of appeal. The counsel of
petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of court of the acceptance of
the late payment of docket fees. As an officer of the court, he should know that the affirmation of the
clerk of court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the rules. The rules of procedure are
meant to be followed and not to be subjected to the whims and convenience of the parties and their
counsels or by mere opinions of the clerk of court. Atty. Ang should not have presumed that the rules of
procedure would be relaxed in favor of his clients. His reliance on jurisprudence that the application of
the technical rules of procedure would be relaxed if the same was subsequently complied with is not
justified. The liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and
not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.
Atty. Ang’s negligence in not paying the docket fees on time cannot be considered as excusable. The
circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules.
Facts:
Dominga, Apolonia, Florencio, Cornelia, Tomasa and Olimpio, all surnamed Ruiz (petitioners),
were the original owners of seven parcels of land with a total area of 194,284 square meters located in
Barangay Kaytinga, Alfonso, Cavite. Cirila delos Santos (respondent) is a duly licensed real estate broker.
Sometime in 1995, Olimpio gave respondent the plan of the subject property and verbally
authorized her to sell the same. Thereafter, respondent referred in writing the subject property to
Odessa Antiporda (Antiporda), a realtor and a fellow estate broker, who had earlier informed
respondent that she had a prospective buyer interested to buy a land with an area of about 15 to 20
hectares to be used as a retirement village. Antiporda in turn referred the subject property to one Alfred
Tantiansu (Tantiansu). Olimpio then gave respondent a written authority to sell the same.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Piñas City, a complaint for
collection of sum of money and damages against all petitioners, alleging that it was through her effort as
a real estate broker that she was able to bring about the consummation of the sale of the subject
property, to petitioners’ immense gain and benefits; that despite the sale and her repeated demands,
petitioners refused to pay her broker’s fee.
Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal. On November
6, 2003, respondent filed her Comment and/or opposition thereto, alleging that the appeal was not
perfected for failure of petitioners to file the docket/appeal fee within the reglementary period to
appeal.
In an Order dated January 16, 2004, the RTC denied petitioners’ appeal and considered the
appeal barred for failure of petitioners to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period as provided
under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It ruled that the decision had already become
final and executory.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
That at the time of the consummation of the sale of the subject properties, there was no longer
any existing broker’s agreement between them; that respondent had no more authority from
them to sell the properties or, assuming there was such authority, the same had already lapsed
or expired; that it was petitioners’ understanding at the time of the sale of the subject
properties that Tantiansu, the buyer, would be responsible for the payment of the broker’s
commission, whoever the broker may be; that petitioners knew that respondent had initially
claimed her broker’s commission from Tantiansu; but after Tantiansu’s death, and failing to
collect any broker’s commission from said buyer, respondent commenced the present action
against them.
Respondent’s Contentions:
That the appeal was not perfected for failure of petitioners to file the docket/appeal fee within
the reglementary period to appeal.
RTC’s ruling:
RTC denied petitioners’ appeal and considered the appeal barred for failure of petitioners to pay
the appeal fee within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It ruled that the decision had already become final and executory, and there was nothing
more to be appealed to the CA.
CA’s ruling:
The CA dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for relief against the order of the RTC may be granted on the
grounds of mistake and excusable negligence committed by their counsel.
Ruling:
No.
Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that when a judgment or final order is rendered
by any court in a case, and a party thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has
been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying
that the appeal be given due course.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. Petitioners’ counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period for filing
the same without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. Counsel very well knew that under the
Rules of Court, the full amount of appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same
period that the notice of appeal was filed, as he even allegedly communicated to the clerk of court his
request for additional time in order to consolidate the confirmation of petitioners’ desire to appeal.
It bears stressing that the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the procedure for the perfection
of appeal. The counsel of petitioners should not have relied on the alleged assurance by the clerk of
court of the acceptance of the late payment of docket fees. As an officer of the court, he should know
that the affirmation of the clerk of court could not prevail over the specific requirement of the rules. The
rules of procedure are meant to be followed and not to be subjected to the whims and convenience of
the parties.
48. Heirs of Aurio T. Casino vs. DBP GR No. 204052-53, March 11, 2009
Facts:
On December 28, 1975, spouses Casino obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
in the amount of Php 130, 000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated
in the municipality of Valencia, Bukidnon. After the spouses failed to settle their loan obligation, DBP
cased the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on March 24, 1977. DBP emerged as the winning
bidder and was issued with the certificate of sale in 1977. The spouses failed to redeem the properties
within the prescribed redemption period and so DBP caused the consolidation of the title in its name.
Baldomero Casino later filed a complaint against DBP for the annulment of the REM and the foreclosure
proceedings, quieting of title, redemption and damages before the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon. In
1994, Baldomero executed a documents denominated as Kasabotan where he relinquished to his son
the rights over the three properties. On the other hand, DBP sold the properties to Green River Gold.,
Inc,. The Green river filed for a writ of possession which the sheriff is unable to enforce due to the
threats of the son of Sps. Casino. Aurio, the son, filed a third party claim alleging that he is the true and
lawful owner of the same. DBP, in response argued that his complaint is already barred by res judicata
that the ownership was already transferred to DBP through the extrajudicial foreclosure.
RTC’s ruling:
The RTC bukidnon dismissed the complaint.
CA’s ruling:
Granted the appeals of the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the grant the motion for execution
pending appeal.
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 2a of Rule 39 of the rules of court provides that on motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction the motion for
execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
In this case, the RTC Branch 10 granted the motion for execution pending appeal based on the
advanced age of the petitioner’s wife. Based on jurisprudence, “good reasons” depends upon the
situation of the parties. The advance age of the petitioner’s wife is not considered as one of those good
reasons based since it must be supported by very special reasons which were not provided in this case.
49. Autocorp Group vs CA (2004) G.R. No. 157553
Facts:
Respondent bank extended a loan of eighty-five million pesos (P85,000,000.00) in favor of petitioner
Autocorp Group (Autocorp). The loan was secured by pledge and real estate mortgage on several lots.
The agreement provided that in any case of default, creditor shall treat the whole obligation as due and
demandable. Petitioner Autocorp failed to pay the loan. Despite its failure, petitioner asked for an
additional loan, to which he defaulted again. Hence, respondent bank requested for the sale of the six
(6) mortgaged lots.
Before the deputy sheriff could prepare the requisite publication and notice, the petitioners filed a
complaint for "Annulment of Loan Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage/ against respondent bank. RTC
granted the petition but CA reversed the trial court’s order.
The six (6) properties were awarded to respondent bank as the lone bidder. the certificate was
entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds of Cebu. However, the entry fee and the
registration fee were paid only the following day as the cashier in charge of receiving payment had
already left.
Petitioner once again filed a motion, contending that payment of the entry fee is a condition sine
qua non before any valid entry can be made in the primary entry book. RTC ordered a preliminary
injunction on the basis of the evidence adduced by petitioners while CA reversed the said order. The
latter held that the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book was equivalent to
registration.
ISSUE: IS CA’S Contention correct?
HELD: YES, CA’s contention is correct.
Sec. 27, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as provided in the last
preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter
provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment obligor; or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property
sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under which the property was sold. Such
redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner. (29a)
In this case, the objection as to the payment of the requisite fees is unavailing. There is no
question that the fees were paid, albeit belatedly. Respondent bank presented the certificate of sale to
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City for registration on January 21, 1999 at 4:30 p.m. As the
cashier had already left, the Office could not receive the payment for entry and registration fees, but
still, the certificate of sale was entered in the primary entry book.
