STOIC PHILOSOPHY J. M. RIST rf a Gt ty Toe CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 196a Yada R53} ff era Bc a in Now at 088 CONTENTS es Lie of Abbreviations * , 4 Cynicism and Stoicism St 5. All Sins are Equal 8 { ll 1g Suicide 233 } 14 The Unity of the Person 256 1 Usiveaty Ping Hoe, Cambrge vente Cac, Unive Prt) Index 297ee | PREFACE Although there now exist excellent studies of areas of Stoic ‘ought, such a8 Mate? Steir Lapis and Sarmbursky's Ply of te Sti, the scape of thee tui Hed, and those who read them will firm a oneside pictare even of the Old Stox IF they are not supplemented by more rownded accounts. But these mote rounded accounts are aot realy accesible, par [eulaly in English. The Englsspeaking reer dlven back to works writen fifty years ago; and these works, though help ful are fl of eror, Ress of French or German are beter placed, bu Its aistarbing thatthe work which is most helpful tras dane by Bonhoelfer at the end of the last century. Since ‘hen the labours of Reinhardt, Brdhiee, Poklenz and’ many ‘others have added enormoualy to our Knowledge of the details ‘of Stoic thought, but purely philosophical consideration have ‘tien disappeared fom sight in a concentration on Stoicism a 2 historical movement, In the prevent bok, therefore, no at tempt has been made to provide biographical deals about 7 {nvidia Stir and the ef of Staci on the social ile of antiquity have ten second place. What T have attempted is to present a seis of Stoic plosphiel ideas in some deta. 1 top that lection on these ideas may both give a clearer pice tre of what Soi philophy in about and encourage the view thatthe Stic were serous plilxophes, “The ence voluminous work of the Old Stic is now repre- seated only by fragments The problem facing the interpeetr isto breathe lie inta thse drying bon, Ihave found tha his task i made considerably ener if wo baie rulhs are con samy remembered: that Stcie philosophy began at a time ‘when Atoi’s work dominated the posophicl scene; and that the divergent paychoogical theres of Chnsippus and. PPosidoni are mptomati of a fundamental diferene of oxt- look, Posdoniun though sl a Sti, ailed to understand many ofthe more interesting philosophical dheatea of Chrysipps. “The leer of 39 much of Chrysippat work tthe lot of pio sophical work of the highest calibre, representing a view ofthewold and of man sharply opposed wo dhe theories of Plato and ‘rite, but only the more inerting fr tat, For Stic a 2 curious mitre of the cre and the highly sopkinieated. IF Fete objected that in these dies there it more concentration fon th sophisticated, my defene is that any pilesopher i Dest (ceded iis mort onatare work i taken as ep Thave attempted to evaluate al work done on the Stoic that is relevant tothe problems Ihave dscusod. I have not, howe ‘ver, Ite in footnotes every study of each particular problem Sad every supporter of each particular bypothens T have Timited my relerenos to sues which provide new information or insight. Te is to be hoped that this procedure, designed (0 ‘make the book more palatable to de less advanced student, will tot offend the profesional n very gratefil to Dr A.A, Long and Profstor FH, Sandbach for reading Sue Phapy ia manus script. Ava rer oftheir comment T have managed toctminate many errors Naturally Ihave notalways sccepted ther judgment, but where [have dented iehas been with hetation and afer fl econsider- ation ofthe problem Gabriel 1968ap. aes ox o 69 cr or DG cs Gr sce pes jas ag (woo) pp 0, PR RE REA Bk Mas sr si APA ABBREVIATIONS Anerien Jara of Phill Dain ofthe Pst of Clas Stadia of he Unies of London Phutarc, De Communes Note Glas! Philly Cts Ovary Cts! Revie Cte! Wald Dorprphi Cron, ed. H. Dies ‘Dia Grishin Chichen Stifter ar ‘nse Drei Jalrundrte Grae and ome Harr Sais Clase Play Joa of Hele Sais ama of Roman Sues ‘Nachen der Akemi (Gerlach) der Wisco x Gainer Le Parla dd Posts, Phiesptcl Overly Philp! Reve Pons Res-Rnelpsie der clasickn ‘ernst Resse des Bde dite Bhs Base Piutare, De Sonn Repurantir Stara Varun Fragments oJ. von Arai, ‘Trans end Preset of th Sneian Phlolpeldscition 1 ARISTOTLE AND THE STOIC GOOD CCameades was inthe habit of claiming that the Stoica and Peripatetic. ught substantially the same ethical doctines, varying only in thee terminology. Cicero, who gives thi fae formation, seems to ind the idea ridiculous, and doubles at in agreement on the point with both Stoics and Peripattcs tmemielves. And theres obviowly much that could be si, for ‘amnple about the coet attitude to ny which night make ub baie too realy that Garneades was either joking or tall sing nonsense, But what we know of Carneades doesnot alow vr think he wat & fol; andi he was joking, good jokes often represent exaggerations of facts as fet demsles. Now that {Ce phrase “poxtArisotlin philosophy” is gradually being takes to refer to plop largely governed by Aristotle rather than eo piloophy posterior to Artotle but Targely elated to im, Wr we mote ready to accept chat the thought of the ost Arbwotclan schools & frequently grounded on pli ophiel problems bequeathed to them not by the Preocraies ‘reve, by Plate hit by Artie and hit flowers And the ‘writin Schou was init early days much concerned with problems of ethic, the most important of ll pilowphical poblems for Zenn ad his oats Te woul fri be rater ‘range if the Stace dd not take notice of what ad been Jn ue Lyceum. tis the purpose ofthis chapter to suggest some a the ways in which de Stoic seactd, both Svourably and tefacourably, to certain key postions of Asotin ethic ‘According ta Aristotle in the Nima Bh the end of ie is hanpines "Both pilosphers andthe general public are in Agreement ofr, aed oth alk of happies in tere of iving well and “prosperng'. But, continue Aristotle, i ie what Ippines is that causes the trouble; here there ie no kind af * Thr pnt hares bev phase in coco withthe Sts by eeserene Al hi, aching the npn hat happen rl Sauls talon. The pote the wes ope So Asin eh Se wee nl Sc foc nel aa cy eel me or—i™ ‘imc harready ad ht npc ong wel Cr —C STi ules unable ast he Ae a —UrLrt—~t—t—~—— ay Onc sired oat wry is ded on ete rr Ses ia aston wisest ate ee eu heltn wes beds Morais eo Socom wanes be dns (iy whieh oe oes a —CE "nh He ie nt tay ce ‘Mout they my prions ctw pred y su wel be ty eae thy hemo deep oo Lrrt~t—~— (Set baw ya pope nc pits il Zep bcc fone ire Soing _ += « _ wn sth sce bgp in ny ing eta den ys ag cade In Give ie eater eatin yw a TAT Shae arene mmeas se er tng ht Beet I, Ee a nin ae BEE ree per era SS a ton dare mening of pSayonvns Bt, Sas 228 DL Say gv sen, Aces Son aad (PP) sc, sll very much what was offered by Arial, though the ‘planation of vrtie that it harmony with nature, is none ‘Arttcian, We tall have t enquire ltr exactly where the tivergencis appear and what thir sigaieance i but for the ‘ioment we may proceed ae farther with the Stole acount ‘vita, leaving the problem ofthe harmony with nature ade According to Putarch Zeno and Chrysppus were agreed that ‘rtu isa fixed dspostion (Gabe) ofthe eulng part of the ‘oul, 2 power (Sivas) produced by reaton! For Arnotle ive foul virtue tbe ay nponpen Avitoue wer the ‘wordt, bu this should not mised us on the content of the ‘wo theories, Both Arote and Zeno cone the words they pe= fer for the diposition of the wate man withthe intention of selecting whatever would suggest the mos stability of haracts. Tn the Casgorie Arode ditnguisher i fromm Bess 0 precisely thir ground" whereas the Stok (oddly) peler Bidens, but intending the seme of the Ariteian top. For ‘hom, apparently, Busuag suggests gic, fy of prpore® However i nteanquity the fat thatthe diflecnoe betwee Aristotle and the Stois i, on this point, a8 Carmeades would hve said, merely one of terminology is ecogized ina pawsge ‘of Porpyey. Obsiouly thinking of the Stic, Porphyry ob Server tint there are to Kin of i one of which suggest fsity while the other doesnot ‘Virte then i for both Aristotle andthe Stic fixed di poston. Agua looking for points agreement, we can proceed Further, Virue ir alo, by common agreement of Zeno and CChrysippus, 2 Sivaus which arses fram reson Again we should be swate of confsions i terminology. Aritolle doesnot fall a virtue a Bivaus because he taker Seu to mean potentiality o capability, and, a he rghly points out, we are ot pra oe blamed because we are able 19 act well but ‘ther when we actually don But, when Zeno and Chiysippus Call srt a Bovis, they do not mean thatthe virtuous aa "De Yt M4 (S720, 2 Se Ie par 20 Kalbe (SV a 3 5may (or may not at vetaouly, but that he asthe power and tl always te the power to act virwoudy forall the act the Virtuous man are vimwows® Hence for the Stoic the word ‘ines very eleely connected with fi infact the word Sivan ir used io dasrbe the wie or operation of the tg. We have a somewhat smile tmge in English in he phrase "He is ‘capable of anything. This doesnot simply mean that he may ‘ormay not perform «criminal acton a particular occasion, but {hat he is by diapontion a criminal. The phrave wed, in 2 Stoic way, to describe moral character. “Arse int that 8 man cannot be called happy uni he in dead, and that hishappines, his activity of tesoul in accord nce with virtue, ma endure throughout his whole ie His fttude on this mate, however, is eomplicated bythe probes ‘what extemal gods are necesary fr hsppines, snd, i= ‘Breil arting out of ths by the dicley about whether it ‘am be sid "Once happy, always happy", Both thee problems foe in the Stoe context, ar we shall ver- Nevertele, i the first instance the Stes agree with Aristotle, Happiness and ‘rtye must be Iielong i they are to besigncant. Vewe a ‘onsxent daponition ofthe sul lasting Uroughout the whole ‘fone ies Before concluding this brie summary ofthe areas of agree sent between Aritote and the Stoies on the ends of if and tring tothe problem with which the Aritoelian formula tions present the Stoic we come tothe mos important pont ‘ofall de distinction beeen what good ine ad what it {good forthe sake of other things, As we shale, both ere and Isome ofthe other carer which we have tuched upon, the Stoce sat off in agneement with Aritote, but by taking up robles which ae ured over in dhe Niemacheon Bier they fre foreed into opposition. Inthe fist chapter of the Eis Asotle argues that there must be a rst goo or end which i ‘owen for ul. I'thete sno such end, he holds, a vious re- (rr would ensue. This end which of couse turns out to be Tnppines, we choote for ie own sake (wale af nora BF frepov lgoiyea). ‘There mus therefore be a radleal die cence between thi end and everything ee, fr everything ele, however "good", can be ueated asa means towards another ‘nd, a8 good fr obtaining this other end. And thi presiely the Stoe poston. Virtues to be chosen ently rae fat ‘eed itis not pomible wo choot efor any other reson. A sup Poted choice ef virte for any other reson would not bea hoe of rire a ll ‘Aristotle andthe Stocs ate theefne in general agreement that moral virtue ito be mearred by the wate of mind of the oer, that iis depoitona, that ti nrnscally good that it Tends to happines and that this happiness sory uses i lass lifetime, But the student of Arte will be well ware that «numberof problem in the Zr have heen passed over, ‘gad these problems gave the Stoies no litle trove. Some of them areas follows: Ifthe end i radially diferent froth the tothe so-called goods, what right have we to use the same word (good) in both cases? What isthe eae of these oer “good {@ssuming there re any) inthe good’ fe? That i, do we mad external goods forthe moral lie? Although the good i to be ‘hoten for fue there any philsophiea! problem involved in the fact thatthe Sti do not tall about virtue as a B8eng gospel, indeed that they hardly ever se the wo ‘reoapens before the rt centr a..? And, more general how ean the concept of the immoral man's coming to act ‘morally or the moral man's coming to act mamorally be inte Tigible? Why shoud the moral man suddenly ac immorally? [the moral man always (dapositonaly) acts morally, how ct “hice be included inthe account of his dspeston? Some at least of these question il become lex paling awe proetd. ‘According to Arnot’ account the happy man needs to be adequately soplid with external goods This statement not sclear ait may sound, for the word ‘adequately’ could mean almost anything: Thee of cours, s certain gene in which ‘ome extemal gods are neceaary fa virtuous lie to be lived Father than a virtuous death died Food and din, ia smal po ‘ons ar obvious neces ofthis Kinds but Arbol doesnot seem to have thi Kind of extemal good in minds nor do the 5; i ! Stole when the subject comes wp. Aristotle gives examples of the Kind of thing es elerring to when he suggest that, onlese the ‘realy good’ man has certain tols of his wade available and mect with tolerable condoms, he could ot be called “blend (unos, 11047). The good man needs someting to work on, jst asthe general needs an army and the shoe taker needs eather, Simul a the decipion ofthe "great fouled” man in book four, iv soggeted that bis vrwe will Somehow be diminished i he has no, for example, the eppor tunity to dsplay his powers of geueosy, Butts isa dangerous way of proceeding se much later Plots was able to point out, for the next step eto wish to ave the means of plying one's trade. And would the doctor with 4 have patient, that i ‘would he wish that people were il 'As i ell known the Stoic are brought up agains this prob lem by thee atte to “natal thing (1 xr quat). What isthe attitude ofthe good man towards thee to be? The asic Stole answer i given by Chrysippu, wo holds that they are the material on which vrtaous action is based? And it was ‘outer onthe basi ofruch theory that Diogenes of Babylon twat Ted to define the end of lie im terms of selecting what i ‘atual (rd mes gow) and gjecting what sunnatral What Dingenes meant by this was tha the good man wil elect what iscondncive to virtue and reject what of no ure. But the way in which thi expressed ie misleading, to ny the least fo Uae ‘unwary could eal frm the impresion Wat the search for those natural thing is tel the end, This understanding is ‘eepened if we use the term “choosing” in relation to what is hatural? The Stoke themselves were cael to avoid this ‘De wel deued yi "Te Rea oes {us Torte oy el! ry, Fes wpe (Bi a2) Sar trans fe wut ef Gyeppe ny S Rse ‘Mak not be Lira guotain, Bat Pain probably to rier Ke deo xy Lengo 9 6 speaking of selecting or taking wht x nataral but ony “choos ing’ the end itl tha i view. Howeven, the ambiity be. ones ell mote marked with Antpater of Tarsus, who wae the abc of speaking of the end of ie as “doing all in one's power to obtain (rvyytoey) the prime natural tinge’? ‘The uation here i probably that he war bemused by the els ofthe Stoic naar by Carmeades, and in his difficult postion ended towards untadtional formulations; he seems to have ‘inte Both tht vctue i forwarded, however lightly, by ‘external goods and atthe same time that the end isto exert, ‘oneself for certain ofthese extemal” ‘But although Antipater's position is not entirely cea, it ‘rings our present problem very clealy io the open” IF gtural things are the material on which vireo lifes bil, in wise sense can one say that vie ie seeuticent? At kart for Antipater isms that it would not be posable actually 0 livea virtuous le unless the natural goods were avaiable i ded we should strive to get them, fr the posit seems open that some of them ae nt invariably present to every man i050 far ashe is human. Te appears from avery woublesome passage ‘fDiogenes Laer that sme of theve natal gods wich ae ‘mos important in this context are helt, property (xeon) And strength, According to Diogenes it wae te view of Pana ‘ius and Posidonus, presumably developing that of Anipater, that virtue i nol auficent for Rappinesy but thet thee exes alr ar allo required. And it may even be that hee three are nly the mort obvious of « much wider group needed wo buttress the happines of the wise man "There as been much dicanon about how to take this pas sage of Diogenes a pasage which sande alone, Most interpre ters have held that Panatis introduced a major change i Stoie doteng, hile Kid has argued powerflly again thi! Pht CX 0714, CF ang 2-8 Wi 369 Anipatr Sen Eh {Rw ne hed yg ips ems fon Satna Mn {Tope aa belo a net onan, CO 7Th pag iu in singe wots view el ‘Scent’ Reap Dg stot 0 Ur —r—r—CW Seguin Digan! ew all sete hese te SS oe mins pred enews tog ae Ove we shal errand hc ing Peace ah tenn’ fom te tt — - ~=— Wr See se be nite fp) he wenllhveov telnteralrntne’ Hc Ur ——— ‘et een ete ‘gee Hague’ oe sinny of Ding ae Unt enema 0 comang? 2 pra Tog cn anew confer te cig Lr ————— Tet be ee dot ea hint ney Ia) ea te le mn ae fxr egos thane mon ohh heb sue co hat fo tne wt iy tate te ol t= etalng iis wow oe pe fhe Cpa, Bow cl ht tien te ata fo Hic one quae Sen yl, Eetpi ego! en wal outer |. —rtt—“ ding he fal nd for ma, Rappers eae nds Stich ae ot sought fr hel ow see night be sal, Buen noe in fat sy, that po? har one sete when Predicate of de ey that i, of hppines, and other sens When is prec of ober goo a propane Uke "Hach sgood ut although Ae sary dings the morale hm matt hat endian owed ar, the othe dateatd aboot fr example he docs nt rte toe the word gpd ofboth th end and the mesa le ‘dinate objec) of dese “This distinction, however, spec the dincton which the Sts make"aad mush minders they have etn fr dingo. Th propstion “The oly good vit’ when Seon in thi covte, evry fr om the award pao ‘osalysupponed co bee mesos that to confse the Foodnes ‘ofthe mal fe wis ay the tse things which ee come ‘Bony eile god eo make a category mistake of dangerous propondons. To avoid dong ty the Sic wee poepered fo elude the word “good in technical custo om chery. {hing exept ites One might ak how eke wey coud ina on thr dsincon war not pen to hao tee sb script or supe number inthe ways modern pope might he wha to sake the sme po The Ses cull ‘ot wrt tht Vie god? weet got "Th Sos had god eon tocmptadze her ia i= ‘usta he only goat and wate astling rm, hoping i woul sn nt they were not st enough and, as Kidd Taspined ot tony nde sight concen by Chysppt 1 I soto give Plutarch the chance to dinort the whole theory CCaryippas sid according to Puta, tha i permisble to imate 3 concesion to ordinary Greek to the extent of ealing refered things “good” when we are avare of what we are ‘cing, Plutarch claims that hi implies that the Stas, ied Ing Cheysppus, were in fact unclear ae tothe satus of things ‘preferred! A rceat commentator has remarked that 2 probs arises ao when the Stokes are talking technically aod when they ate making concesions to ordinary languages but the technical dsintiona are so emphasized in the general teaching ‘tthe school tat its har to ae how those who parport to be bf, ike Pitareh, are not gully wif miswoderstandng Tet ts look at sine ofthe dictions made. Sobacts gives tus the baste disinction: ies between what i be chosen (otperéy) and what i to be taken (hyn) Only the end, Virtue, ito be chen, and it eto be chase for its own sakes "Things prefered, that external goods, are to be take, for te in the procuring of virtue. Just oovsonally distinction ‘willbe made in things to be taken between thove which have ome nro yahe and there which ae tobe taken purely for the sake of ether thingy but even thore which have some ine {rise value are not to be called ‘chown’, Even in these cases, Furthermore, the intrns value (which s ot moral value) only ‘makes thet “preferred” fr their owa sake rater than prefered forthe sake of something ee? Everything prefered, including {ings prefered for thes ew ake, il only preferred in 30 far as it provides the material forthe moral ies We ean now tee why Stoic ike Diogenes of Babylon srupulously avoided Ising the word ‘chosen (alge) in relation to thelr defini tiom ofthe ea as living om bass of lating (ky and its ‘ogaate) what is primarily natural What then doe hi stir thsi amount to philosophically? Ki =n ohn (SF 9) {St Bip W. (VP 30 ie soe Sm {Sab pn We VP a) SEs SB gg fv npn eB a epee ‘asp gen ae pio and wea Diogenes sums it up wel. Vietue sto be chosen for ite own sake. ‘Virtue i good; everything ee ie goed” fr virtue, The Ari totclisn ditnedon between the end and the means or sub ‘ordinate endr is given proce Iinguiie formulation: Iv the Stoic world ther ie only one thing which canbe called good without any qualification whatioever, This end, which isthe provideaaly ordered life im acordauce with season, it in 3 tategory by Hell, Moral term only have their sensei the moral sphere, Once we ey to se them outside that sphere, only Inellectual confusion and moral vacation will ensue, Better than that is the paradox: Only vr ie good, Teahere isa single good, virtue, and everything ele as at best no positive moral Value there would eem to bes problem bout how itis poate to become vito, How can the per- formance of nom-moral sions (nommeral Beaute not done ‘wih the moral intention) be transfrmed into morality? Be- {ove considering thi, we must clear up s commen misconeep- sion. Ie as been suggeted by Edelitcin that "Poidonis, ia ‘oppasiion to the general Stoie dogma, aise that there ate ‘ot oaly immoral men aud wie men ut also ten who make progres There isn statement to tht eflet inthe texte cited. by Baelscin; the tue positon is thatthe Soe lten did not Alstingush Detween amoral and immoral, Thee are simply moral men and othes. Nevertheless that ome ofthe others make progres towards virtue whe others do not ie wel t= tested for Chnsippus by the remark that the most succes ssprantto virtue, who does everything he hould do (Eobio ‘8 eabijovra, cannot yee be calle happythat ihe ie not yet achieving the good fe~because his motives are not et fntvely moral; Fhe continues athe is however, he may be= ‘ome moral because his actions may in ne arise fom the right Kind of disposition? ‘There are many similar passages which suggest that for Cheyippur—and in ll probability forall the early Stoics—the man who perform & large number of +S Fe ogee ty a WHEE 3ppropate ac (evo) far ondegiate roan cn be Uf (gto and wasn cto ld yt he sl on Serato Swe tarmac thay tet aly a8 Chips she Stihl at rept igh cn end tords the prormance gt acon st he fg ead Ahsan often een eagle tex the theo Ar they tung so de we become gots or ane Sea oniaprtety iby song sponte om non-mor Mou atone const peo ese st or ral tate is iw ay spree Chip cary ‘waSourin use af Cras Ico ny be dtd wrth bs or Se pycteoy Repon a igh acon wl evar te even of mg ome ew) ie 2g, TRs Coe comes ane ese Tatmonne hte anal concep ewe man fr om something ge hee one wintn era cacog morally, yl mone edo SEM at cy prope see? To snr (Eos couttentsas bate be imate. Vitae, meng tvcnonsu cums tan Rati Secale ile inns htere stew bay nc ne Bat alengh we emo ak Sipe oar lk than tr, Wha thi sean ppcho Tey he esa god” Set ery oa em ote or etd pe to pate At ayone ho Peabo dings god dad oma ied move on SPM dos bd dn. Ye re Sts ee rea Pee inex nn tse des ey mn cpa Sanpete ga cv tse me ‘Raley pol eo ins pre sper i owneting (toon ming tnechsrcte el hed) mabe (hii gun be epee, Late Ai he Boas ele that een has te ality of ite and ‘Eon hin, bu wn yok hips cone siderably diferent Aristotle thinks of his moral man a8 pos. tessd of dipoition to make the right decons and choices “He will apparently evaluate he parelar situation and then choose what is best. No metaphysics of this power of choice ie ‘fleed, and indeed iis hard f we how it could be offre for, fccording to Artote the power is developed ag the reat babi, but the power ists a given in any and in man alone ‘And the word choice” Sel & ambiguous fori i dele to see why Aritode did not uy, athe Soi did that al the got ‘man's choices willbe good, that he cannot fn fact ehoove the bry that “choice” in the good man i the conforming of the ‘mind to a reality in the extemal world insofar au that seaity {is good. Infact Arstties theory of choice” evades this prob Jem. We think of moral man as making eaice and on moral language has words for choice for ut to ute; hence Aritotle ems to say, we do infact make choices, Ined eve the good sian males chives ‘Thete i reason to believe that this the Hight in which the Stole, a any rate saw the Avtotein theory. And the La sage they se about de wise man in tis connection indicates their evitcam, for, whereas for Aristotle virtue i defined as 8 Aispottion to make choies, the Stole define i ata fied die Potion that is consistent (psoyeasims)* The farther del ition of virtues reason chat x contre [Ayo iyo) is atuibuted to Zeno himssif Ifthe reason of the virtuous tan is wholly ‘consistent, den all it et wil be morally ‘ood, asthe Stoes held, and he wil not make any teal choice Tretween good and evi Te probably not scedental that the any Stoies void the Aristotelian word lor choice (npoaiens, both when talking about external goods and when abuering ‘tha virtues to be chosen fort own ake Fri aay onary sense of choice de good man does nat ase vrties he simpy Virtuous. And although the good is to be chosen for its own sake, the good man does nots choose it Ie only the spirat {© vir Who has need to calculate what really good and what isnot and then try to act accordingly. Te ahold also be TREDL pas orem 15evident that this explanation of the Stoic atitnde to choice Srould not be afected fit were ere (whic sully) that the Word “consistent (ashoyeatons) varies in mesning accorde Tug to ferent Stses, for example between Zeno and Chirp ippus- For the Stoic there sno valid distinction eo be drawn telwecn selfconssteney and conateney with nature, foe the Inictoconm represents the nacrocoam aid vie eat. For the Stoka, the, sot the special mark ofthe moral man to be Able to seeet what wil be conducive 0 virtue (hough he wil, ‘tenure, do that) rather be i to be defined in erms of the fay ois eapaiton, which ste measured in relation to Hantard, namly reaon, At we svat the beginning of this ‘Sapte, Arse may have meant to say thi fore evtainky ‘Gmpaized that tot what one does but why one does it that tmatter Bu the ioe have apparently good grounds fr agree Tig with this much, while veecting the defntion of vrte a ‘hatred with ehece (npg), which tends to bein cone tition to it, Nevrtele, once agai tis the lack of cat inthe Aritotlan starting pint which affords an opportunity for he farther Stole fvesigaton rom what we have mid ie would seem to follow aot only natal the wise man’s ate il be geod bu that ce wise man il always bea wise man in other words that virtue cannot be Ton Thin was i fat the original view ofthe school; but for Seme reson or other I war sgiicanty modied by Chip fu Our evidence forthe controversy is not at al good, bet we Ere old by Dicgeac that, whereas Cleans beived that wit- ‘ae eanaet be ent (ven@physo), beens iis the esl of & ‘Sccure bed on realty, Chrypps thought chat it cane lst {Sa result of druakennes sad tnelancholy, that lack bile Simplicius also knows of both doctrines, In his vein, which flow not mention parceular Stoie teachers hy mame, one pase ‘Sge sage that acording to the Soi irae eainot be lst, ‘Wie anor says that it ean be lost ipelanchoy"s heavy Crows, lethargy aad a reat of aking drugs? All the Tater mates were Tegarded by the anlens as physical lines 6 | cided to commit suicide. Now Plotinus agrees with the Swies Here the matter is plain; ‘melaneholy" i outside human con ‘the original doctrine, 7 7 Gt he pte ta pao Sbs F103, vl 3 909 9 SVE ag "Since, therefore, Chysppat wat not ols at think thatthe wise man never pally we can understand Why he hl tha wre ea be lon. There are ccustancs When he mit oral man magia not master of is ens If he eau freee nich a creamance arin, he ould be igh, Chnsippa vw, to commit mice, bat he ‘hhnot sway ose what i store for hime Sof 10 food bu oc of theca of theo ete se dierent {fom the other given. The apparent od man ou i dranken- nor We cam seaily undeatand that drnkennes could Tead {Dt ln of ius but why should the vuoas maa get Sk? Aristotle dos ot scr oi there ny reason why fe should or he aludes several tines to slaw of itacor of Dytlne that thn eho commit crimes wader the inne of dak should have i sentence doled Presomably Ch Sppus asin mia ocsions when tis ncwabent om the we hun to drink even tothe point of Graniennes. Although it Sec to have been the general Stic viewpesps after Geippur the univenl vw tha he we man wl ot gt Arun the mater was apprntly sl a moe point wih the Ainpis of Zeno, swe havea eeeence to statements made by Pesueas ins Mo of Diking Poti dst gentlemen do fer dew? The defence would pressmably be that geting hk if ila aac inferences hence i am be ie dlged on vaca cea. The Cyne spect of ay Stim ‘apparent here, ths account of erly Stic views is coret, we cans she aside of Chysppan in a dierent ght His tatement that ‘iru can be lo trough dren could see ara warsng Un alicughdrunkennes nam ndieent, isnot profred ‘cele mt the matron which iweb That would betre frthe ovis reason hat vee depend on neato, td Sntetion jp lured by deuskennesn Hence Chysippan ould appear to have argu that druskenns ii the sane TASS por and “ncancaly However, thre had obs 1 sigh nd elo gie by Grier sd Jot (EB & + ate, 19,6074 (SHH 48 0 ‘ously been no dispute about whether one shod become mel ‘holy since this war viewed as a physica lle Cheyapp Srgumen is chat aloeng one to Become rusk virtually the equivalent of deiberstly coutrscting a pli! ines Since the question whether the wise man sould be drunk dacs ot sem 1 occur agaln i later Stes, appears that he made is pst “There a corllary tothe problem about the doctrine that all he sets of the wise man wil be good which should be bre iy ‘mentioned. 1 does not follow from tis doctrine elf in lat tin rom other Soi positon) that he acto the wite an are ‘etermined, that he cannot act in any oer way th hatin which he docs infact ac, All that i feed i that whatever soton he undertakes is undertaken in accordance with virtue ‘There may be several equally good coures of action open to im, and he wil bere to take ny one of hem. ‘elbre concluding, we should notice ae otto further ares where i vem clear dat the Stole acouat of virtue took its Starting point fom Arstole's definition inthe ir, Artie, wwe real, says thatthe dspoeion which virtue iin ean In elation tw, that this mean ie determined by fea, and that ie theeore takes 4 wie matt (gobs) to determine ie [Naturally enough de Stes will ave nothing odo with virtue ‘fined sa meas of any kind. Arto defines virtue a aman, in eience and by definition, tut in ration to excellence iis fn extreme, The Stocs have no room for such dichotomy, Virtue is either an extreme oi not ts excellence sd ite Aefnition and mature must coincide, However, the idea that ‘rtue has some relation to reason (Reyes) much more to their taste, althongh once again dileeners ahold be noticed. For ‘whereas Aitode says at vee a mean whichis iid by Feason the Stoic, ar we have sen, identify the two. Virtue reaton, Neverthels, in practice this dilerence may be more pparent than real, fr wmately ts human beings, those who ate wie, who are capable of deciding about wht ie viewous ‘and what is not~and it i thee duty to lay dowels fo the at. The role of the Aritotelian man of practical widom (spénscs) is not very diferent om that ofthe Stoic ypsios 9 ”or onouSctog. We saw how, ftom Diogenes af Babylon on- ward, the Stier were i the habit of saying thatthe good le fnvolies the corer election of what i conducive to srtue from among external good. Here the role ofthe wite mam it lear. As Fronto puts it ina Teter to Marcus Aurela eis the Decline tak of te wise man to take hie selctions with the Proper moral motivation! And the Aristotelian term Hell oc ‘arin similar pastge of Patarch, where the Soi end of ie Bb spoken of as requiring the selection and taking of external gomds ina pradent manner (govinay) And the parallel goes further sll fa valuable mggetion made by Kidd i appliod here. According to Kid the actions ofthe apiran to ete ag, in the opinion ofthe Old Stoa, governed by rules: do thiss don't do that? Theseus wil be lad down by the man who ows the wie man, the gpSros or ewouSai. Perhaps is not fanciful to notice thatysthough both the Stic and Ari {ode were exercised over the question ofthe relation ofthe best. Ue tothe ie of politi, both of them tended in general to sap ‘por pica fear a vali activity for maa. The wie man will be involved in public fe, wrote Chryspp ules there it something specie to prevent him And in Imperial Roman ties thi theme beeane dominant. If the spirane to wisdom iethe aspirant to the forwarding of the univer ul of reas, then che wise he becomes, the more he will regard tax hi duty toattemnpto regulate the word fr the best by aw I this trade tion oes bark through Aristotle to Pato and even behind Pato, ively tae the Stoic ook inthe St stance from Are totlian ides, ‘Teh not been the purpose ofthis chapter to sugges thatthe Stoic definition of virtue and related areas of Sake thought are ‘unoriginal, or that dey sre mere gloses on the Nitmachan ils, Despite Carnes ibe that in ethics the dfeences ber toreen the Stoics and dhe Peipates are merely terminological, ‘he ancient word in general, and doubles Carseades hime, ecogaized the cath ofthe two school, What we have ted sigs Naber (SVE ag). * Pa sya (SVP 98) SR ally Semen ap oA oly hea hat em on show ix rather hat the very originality of the Stoics is best. “undertood in terms ofan attempt to revolve certain in thee ‘iew) halruths and confused athe in the Aristotelian ac Count. Their attitude to Arte wat not that ofthe commen: tator but that ofthe erie, We have tried to how that many of their postions are Irom an attempt to purse the logical coe fequences of Aristotelian theoiea Ofen Aristotle would not have recognized, let alone accepted, thee logis!” conse ‘quences. Finally we have attempted to show that many ofthe ‘modifications and changer offered by the Stks were bot the product of oversimplineation ot of acination with etheal Paradoxes, at they have often licen represented, but were the Fest of philosophical puzelement over significant philosophical problems2 ZENO AND CHRYSIPPUS ON HUMAN ACTION AND EMOTIO It's fashionable fo rege the Sto doctrine that ll fol are ‘ad with ary ile Ths attitude ais for two reasons. eis {uppone that the Stoic confi moral and paehological cat forte, and that madnes ian abot term hich was wed by the Stoic to give sanction to ther equally strange view ha ll sins ate equal, The suggestion tht all desintons from pelo behaviour are equaly culpable will ot be dicused directly here, hough what flows may shed some indirect light upon i The view that ii impossible to disingish between Lally fad madnes, however, needs immediate consideration, aot Teast because although i runs contrary to many tadional thentis about the nature of moral activity, i beats some rla- ‘onto views propounded by contemporary payehologist. The Stoic potion, however didnot carry witht he cooly often faded in contermporary dicuaons that fll, whichis madness, is therefore not ntl blamed, o, ina cruder version, that ‘we are not reeponible for oor aesions "The thei widely curtent inthe Midle Ags and at de ne ofthe Renaisance, that certain types of behavior, for example, the behaviour of heretics which the contemporary believer ‘might explain in teres of mitalenjugreats, are ia fct mo ated by a (diabolical) corruption of the whole personality, bears a'much stronger resemblance to the Stoic view~and Is perhaps one ofthe principal contributory factors in tecommen Fsundestanding Ot For ies perfect pouible to argue that Iistaken judgments are thenselvessbetraons of he personal ity (the view of Chrysipps), or that they are the direct ease of uch aberrations (he apparent view of Zeno), wihout claiming that one iene re fom such aberration, or that they can ‘erooted out by the inition of pain or by anyother external ‘eans-or even that an ovtuider ean determine peecily how and why the aberration aries Its significant, and in the f= Semmes somewhat uprising, tat none ofthe Sto leners ‘Rough of themes a wie en, that iy ae nen who could propery dagnone the fa judgonnt nna xe ndeed Tey auppond such wise ment be sare ste phen: This Shows them i he light o's Huoiity which snot commonly romped "When we think of srneone commiting erie, our usual reaction ito imagine tate has dae eer Because be was Cie sway" or Beane he called that woo to hia sass Hen nh on cy thee he eling ‘inde, we eval hot thatthe eiinal hot complete ‘evi of morals but shat he ealcltes Us the rena time, the mtiacton of en or thr of hi dee, me i Stor while commiting & ove, even i vestigal Flings af onncience have tobe suppres, In eter words we operate ‘rh a ushPaone mel ofa ba between tw part the Penonalcy, a moral sense of what sign sod -dcaing Fecal. We think ofthese two cles cont, and the Case ofthe criminal we imagine the “dete” coming out onto. ‘Wermay then goon to sk wy in vome men such daira a vaya seem to predominate, when thet they do ye we tee to anower in erm of heredity or environmental actors Thow of ws who watt to preerve tome vesge of moral fe ‘ponstly inthe aditona son, however, flen argue that these factors are great nso to ston but do ot eine Aetrmine any fod couse af oral Bebssiur, Men, we uy, fre ile fm asin f ainalscanot be mai to ae ‘orally thre inthe no pony of ses of wat ight Festaiing the animal rom acting in acerdance with its Go Stsor iin mberesyin the hut eg, whatever factors, hereditary or etvzonmental have bern operon te nate odes sn prope thera he ean Courterbalance them. We ean chose tit to follow our dee for prot ihe urge total comes upon ne "A common ental ampiony wheter cOmect oF not i therefore, tat in man beings the wil need at be orp 11 can operate fr moral nds whatever pesnese bought °3to bear upon it This sumption ie wuallyboitered by the dea {atthe moral wil a wil to ratonality, thatthe man nee 405, propery ued, will mpport the mora sexs, the wily by tmabling it to reengnie that moral action isi the long ron Fatal actian. Hence we tend am very good autorie fom ‘utgulty on, to view many moral problems ax arising Rom the fombination of kaowing what rghit with an inability to bring itabou through our own deliberate setions, We assme et, ven when we are being corupted in our moral seme and in ‘our will we hnow the beter enrae. Once agin we view moral problems ae struggle between elements inthe personality and {general we make dhe assumption tha either our eaton or on" wil the two together, or some other mental culty, emai “usu, precotingsteithpoublealkeratvecoursof action tothatto which ur “desie” impel ue when we commit crime. ‘This thes, that moral aon isthe result ofa struggle be- tween various element inside the personality Hef is what ‘Zeno and Cheysipps deny. 1 wil Be argued here that on the ‘more substantial point relating to this problem, at in most other cary, the two greatest of the carly Stoics are in agree ‘ment, In place ofthe model af a struggle in the personality, they with tose the model ofthe heal siknes ofa unitary Individual. Using fr the time being the language which can ‘efnitely be ateibated to Chrysippus, we ean say that they ‘ngucd that all moral activity fand indeed for Chrysippus all fcivity) must be viewed se diferent staten ofthe ‘penonalty” ‘of man, for peronality isin many ways the most convincing modern equivalent forthe Ste term fyssovety.™ elore continuing, however, we should pause a moment on this quetion of the seme of Aywemdy. Te har often been rgd or ames dat discussions about wheter or not Zeno ‘would have sibserbed to Chesippu’ dfiniion of met as ate of the fymoundy are angamentesbout whether Chry- pp ‘rationalized the orginal Stoic theory. This misconeep- “Fe yaing aa ate oh rsd rng» Cheops (nd iE "eye en Gt along Ta a coe 4 se fn te et th i ao Esha fy Sgn ee Econttrpetncemrner renee oan dle ie ula efter SE ey ce SCHL aetna ot satan arash ban lb a Se 5the Stoic view, fora man ina healthy conditon there no con teat between reo aad the emotions; hence thee “emotions fh be devceibed a rational sate, These rational stata then fre preent in the wie man; they afe called by the Stes ‘on, Obviously there i a diflence between a yates fd a eonddeay and the ama the wise mans to be viewed ‘ta tan without nin, Aefor the ene of ros here, whatever it may mean in the writings of eter philouphers, there is dubs that Cicero's Cato asthe mater in almost the right pes= spective in a pasge ofthe De Fir where he observes that {he literal translation ofthe teen mesos im its technical sense ‘would be mori (deat) He shrinks fom this eansaton, Nowever, and prefers the more colourless patio on the round that penple do not call pty or anger diseases, This linking i nt well suited tothe originally radical Stoic com ‘pion, which i precy chat all way oe diseases and that the viet is mentally deranged. Iie probably no acldent that Zeno himelf defined top 8 4 weal (violent Buteriog) of the sul? for the mos common rola iz sexual excitement (Ero), and thie wat widely regarded fom carly Greek mes like a divas or asa disease fel (too). In is refs to Smit the word morbur Cicero's Cato shows Kise t shrink from the orginal conception of the ey Lactntis, though fonfesing hime ontraged atthe tea, nearer tothe vew of CChrysippis and Zeno when he obiervs that Zeno pus mercy ftnongthe vce and dieses (ier ts mars)? Td then are ot exotions but excetive and rational m= pales For Chrysippas they are nt the product of an imp {ive or desiring faculty of the human soul; chat is generally usec, Hence te Stole language about the total elimination ‘of mn become ineligible and he eonfict between the Pei pateie and Platonist, who both advocated moderation of {he emotions (sponse), and the Stoke, who advocatad ‘Ere revalad ar abate in which both sides might have 1 Stns ip 6s (YF gs ac, Di ut ng FP a 6 found themselver i agreement f they had been able to agrce fon wat a tosis. For if the way are viewed a disease, at pathological disturbances of the pesonality, i is eaty 0 300 try the Stois advocated thee complete suppression. It would be rather stupid wo argue thatthe effects of date should be moderated vwhen it would seem to be posible to bats the seas altogether with mach more desirable rele. The Stok, ‘many of whom regarded their school az Kind of hospital ‘would have been very peli doctor if they had not fought For the total suppresion of what they eld to be serious te ‘a illnases(peofuare). After all, who wants to be @ partial Tes agreed that fom the ane of Cheysippus there was a doctrine widely held among the Stoic that won are state of the fyetornde, There has been considerable arguient about ‘whether this formulation e due to Cys or whether it was sso offered by Zeno; and the dchate has ranged beyond the {question of the formal expreaion ofthe theory in term ofthe Stole categoria, to the wider fase of whether Cheysppt ‘heory dlfers in sistance from that of Zeno. _ “The problem ofthe farmulation af Uh theory i the fs in portant and can be eadily disposed of [tis omnes ssuned, for even argued, thatthe Stoic eategoricy, inching of courte the ‘alegory of state or disposition (rb may Ey), were introduced by Chrysippus® Theres no good evidence or this ts asmimed ‘on the bai ofthe undoubted fct chat Chryipps had great eal more interes in loge than Zeno of Cleantes, Aguas however are the statements of Diogenes Laeri that Ceanthes ‘wrote a book entided Caugn,* and of Clement of Aeeandria that Cleans refered t0 the categorie as hac If these sMatements are to be relied on, and Cleats didi fat talk eran Chip, Cle, De i of Pa 3489 $8 ‘3 Mo. (re) but neue a commence ohn he «Piel oS eR Od Sct ‘Renor (The Sux Canept ef Quai geen to bev at te Seer Sn abn ht by SDE TE ves aen, 4 Cen. Alo Sim 8946 (VE 48 about categorie its almost certain that some kindof doctrine of catgorcs was part of the orga teaching of Zen, or ‘modern scholarship at ale to modify the view ofthe ancien {ety anal eset that lente mate ony nor ‘anges in the doceoe which he bad leaned fom hi mater trv pouble for Psdonss to argue tata doctne held by Gieanthen even if apparently diferent from the positons of Gheysippus, mus represent genuine Stoic option, ha the pion of Zeno? Finally i shouldbe recalled tat Plutarch Aas Tangusge whic accurate, sgget that Zeno employed the category of relative dipestdon® “Whether or not Zeno himsl hel the doctine of categories, or what doctine of eateries he held, i ower, much le aportnt lor or poset enguty than wheter he would have rcpted a thcory which wa cerunly explained by Chrysippas in terms of categorie, the theory that wn are simply sates of the fyevovntn Sine we have no texts of Zeno hi deal wits problem diel, we muse approach iin aighty {routous ay. It barbeenapued, parry by Polen in enon und Chri’ tat Chippy very con siderably diferent Hom that of Zanoy a that tis diferenee Ispart ofa wider dference between te two which affects helt theory of Knowledge sr well a ther pyebology and thie, ‘According to Poke an isporant area in which the difer- ‘nce between the co can be ace shee account of, for, ‘whereas Chejsippus holds them to be Sudgments (oe), Zeno thinks they are dintrbances which aise n the sol afer jdgments* A tat of Galen to this eect hasbeen geacrally Taken, since Pohfeg, to suggest that wherest Zono held that the néoy ate ewe iratona, Chnpipas ratonalized them We mut ccamine this txt nd certain other relied ‘eatin deta "Glen, yi 1-6 4g MoS), Otero tenn’ 6-3 and Ti Stoke Concept of at Set 1 Glen Belig Sam mes Mi VF ic Poe “evan ad 8 ‘The first thing to be clear about is where Chyippus does not diverge fom Zeno, Poblens seems tn have eb that there are some significant differences between Zeno and Chey Sippus in their accounts of ren, that there areal ifference between saying that a mos fa Kind of gent and Saying hati rupervens upon judgment. But tus not be oo ready to fllow Pohlens in bis Poidonin iterreaton ofthis ier face There are some surviving verses of Cleathes in which Ressn is imagined debating with Pasion (s)® According to Gales Posidonis used thee verso “prove that Clenthes {and therfore Zen) held a quas-Pltonic doctrine of parts of thesoutin oppesion to oraliance with oue another Itteary to sce why Poidonioe wanted to fther this doctine on Cleanthes. He himself accepted aversion ofthe Platonic tipastion of te soul, and wished to believe himself in agreement with the Cale Stoica and in opposition tothe innova of Chrysie pus. But, as Zeller already recognized, the pin of Cleanthes ‘eed note rea in the way in which Poder read it Clearly tren for Chrysippus both Aayiep (eeaton) and ay cn isin the soul; i oer word, we ae able bol oreavon and to deste. And clearly there two powers ofthe human payehe an be dramatized But Chrsippus could readily observe tha IF poet dramatines tue and fae judgments as debates about a course of action, it deer not follow that he subscribes to a Plilosophcal theory of parts or facut of the soul, eae fepatate fom the others and each forming x selEasertng pine tiple of motivation. We must rernember that apparent for all the Sti, incuding Zeno himsl, Sys a vaety of res, and shat ares i defined by Zeno aga unnatural movement ‘ofthe sul once nara impulse which snow out of hand Ta the wise man, therfore, Bass like the other mt, wil be eliminated. That being a0, there ie po cea to believe that Ceanthes (ot Zeno himself held the opinion that Suns is ‘asic element in the soal in any quat-Patnic sion puch as Zin ont hops ign, eRe Si ‘aye Hip a 496 Ma. SV 70) DL rt tce sth aay 9Posdonius wished to propor. ‘The poem of Cleanthes must be ead aga dramatic rendering of the chaes, the mental ness inthe unitary peroslity of the individual man when he tx. Wor Cleanthes 6s tan unwholeiome state its obviowsly tot present inthe healthy personality. ‘We sould now turn from what Poidonis supposed Clean- thes to have belived tothe Key satement about the diflerence between the theoriesof Chrysippus and Zeno, Peshape the tat wil be easier to discern when the perpetually confused views of Paina have been cleared any. Avcording to the relevant section of Galen, Chrsippas held that rn are sme Kind of jirdzment while Zeno sid they arise sem rel of judgments From thsi clear that Zeno and Chrysippus agree that the seul has wo faculty independent of the yesorade ia which ‘rath cam aie. The difereace between Zeno and Cheyippus Ferather in their account of a judgment eon) itsel. Zeno ‘st have eld that judgments jus judgment are to be viewed effec from any irationl “colouring”, thatthe colouring ithe inevitable reult of wiguided judgments which thus damage the fymovmen, Chysipas, onthe other hand, held that there Js no such thing ar a merely mental act and that all judgments ust have soe ind of emetional eoloring ener judgmen nade only by the wiwe—presamably involving emBoc, {ale judgment Involving some degree of ato. He certainly held that both impulsive nd rational actty must be actity of the Ayo, the personality Het Pohlens har properly argued that late authors suchas The situs provide no bate forthe belie! that Zeno as well as Ghrysppus thougit ofthe On simpy at xplouy® Zend's Account of ion at arsag ab res of judgments must be taken feriualy, We mst als however, take srouay the fact that these mai which aie from judgments are said by Zeno hin telftn be raonal, wo be disobedient to ream So far then we 2 Det. 42. gs Ma (SUF m Bem Stee es Pica 'Be nn po. Hee (SUP x sl ee Roles (Zenon a “ad Chip 8) asin Gee Age Se ign Ye ap: BL 7200 (YF 03); Stab Eis peeW. iim) ° snus gee wit the view of Zeller and Pippen tha for Zeno {ne ndln are ently lations I Zeno maintained a dc. nc of omen, a thre crery reason to bleveyalhough the’ word ina atte fn hr tant remains then hee ‘Gnsi would be rational For Zeno tna the test of jadgmenty the Ayemonay is peed rally oF ition Aly yetithe wore wit he eatery ros ono oething ike i he cold al have acceped Chapa accu of al teeny and tol sae of i In thelight ofthis attude uf Zeno we cen undersand Lie nore about the poston of Chips Tuto al jt asthe rei are iralional fr Zeno, 0 they ae for Caysppus the Teary that Chysppus rationalized the nbn when he eed them sates of mind or mistaken jalgments ule absurd There never war any dispate between Zeno and Ceysppan Aout wether ao ir rttonal or ian feo irational The dt rater abou the nasre f what they cal judgments (pow) tht iy ic about whee or nok is posible to performs prey shetl act: Zen sama to have held that an immoral decom I ake inp, but that ‘various pathologie ats wil neitay fellow; Chryippun tn the other had, thought that the devon andi emotenal Counterpart ae tly iascparable: Brena concept separa tion would be misding, ae “There ares number of reasons or bling that what Cy Sippus med to be the theory of Zeno was in fat Zen try, and that he was ight ping at Zee’ neon vas thesame thir own. Cys aude can be esplined om the saposton that he thought that Zeno bad the sn ne {enton at hime, ut had been wale to get de loi fom thither coe nh ts en ey see ath ‘iseading thing At we have alteay observed although Gere i no diet evidence Uat Zano formated ihe dectrine oper emosionl states (toa) i highly ely that he Ads, Had he regarded the Geof he we mana tt Inierene t9 everything whauwever other than vite snd vic, hi inenstvity woud have Den n goal deal nearer to ‘hedevntonit Stoic of his pupil Arion han was known Eato have been. Tes tue shat Zeno was a pit of the Cynic Gates tts brea with Ceater ws over sobtanal ues sea he pblem of the cone stideswwards what ini ‘earn son easy oe then te Ze, {ie Chippy, believed tht the wary personality can Ther well i alec, but the neither of thee sates de Sang pon an emotona oot nthe sul past fom the Fre Once agin we shuld emphasize tat the que eTown acs mt De separated fom the i or wt x jgment is tse een that Chr pips (lufed Zea teary on the eccurvence of udements Dut TeeSstion has nothing to-do ith te queson of the tear part a the woul in which judgments and emoconl MISE Zei's view dat = wos i to be defined at 9 Bosh sobgine a alhough again we have no det evidence TAU pec relay nis powphy beweeh the Sls he yewonnde heres Rarer tdet source of rteace wtp the engiry along. I acems to have bees & Sect fom te bain tat the diference between SESE "Sn tyaonal erent tats the dees be ‘en numan ag ane ail eanot be weeps: 1WSSgt be suppowed hat thew Stiles ily co accep the TOE os tninton wou be thowe closest to Cynic. Paha the pup of Zoo who sas he mat arated Me ae Chnicom a his master and ho for his reason wos tee ante by iter Stic, himself old ths doctrine Hey? ‘Phere canbe ua dubs that Zen held ial. "We knw they tat for Zena ary, wich am impube nbc ha ot out finds the result of 2 wrong ud ee ee wuldgeem o mean hatmae-rsh are eseatally “Either bom tha of animal fn that hey mole rar he saat snc kind ntl steity. Bat what about he Se eit core elas ben tomlted a the sul of judge =e aaa helhy or poologial phenomenon? What & 18 RStn be Zen? For Chiyeippa we knw hat i 0 ea ate wi asym 96) ak any athe el a SPF 38-8 VBbadigg leaked ast We Pear s af the Ayo Again, unfortunately, theres o diet ev dence. Bat sould be noticed that pt in thewelves ake of Vela for Zeno; tony when they become uncontrolled tat they ate patna And i they are helty they must be {nol 4 at we can astme that in the ewe f 8 uma ‘eign a nia, Zan wn ages wit Cry Spor a let tothe point of rounding the Suh as a inyyeanor ofthe rex ofa usitry wi he foregoing arguments are coret and weare to conclude hata unitary sul the desideratum ofboth Zeno and Chr ‘opus where dos the diference between ten le? What did Ctryippur intend wen he replaced Zeno defniion of soy ar something serve won Judgment with the Theory tha ies a judgment el, though’ a mitaken one? Te Soul again be empha that hs hs mohing todo wih the {question ofthe way in which (according to Pehlens) Chyspe pu lore Zens they show hnowleige acquire We sre ot concerned with theory of knowige as applied to ioral knowedge: we ae not once wih te problem of How we aie hk nt cry ng, but i the ate of mind in which one maker the (correct) judgment that cruelty wrong andthe incoret jgment a i ate 0 vow tha Sa th jgment sade andthe, a coring to the moral worth of the judgment, a appropiate Ste of iad flows Ciyppin at lent seems to have sup ose that Zen eninge Atul temporal acquence; fist thule hate ste nin Theres reo nk that ths incre. In the dispute between Chupa and ‘Glanthe about the natu of walking a sina problem rise According to Ceanthes walking can be dries the moves ment ofa ae eutrent from the iil (hyescim) t the tes. Cheap ean hardly have denied th bac he hough sor informative to debe walking simply a ate of he “Zeoon und Chyipp', 16"7, 00 Ny had o 8lays! It not clear whether Cleanthes envisaged the ‘ranamssion ofthe ar current ae iatantancous, but ths seems Unlikely, and even i he di a9 understand bis formulation ‘ould ely suggest a temporal sequence of evens tothe un- ‘wary. What seems to have happened is that Gleandhes had in Inind a concepe of beginning ta walk similar to that worked out by Arstol, who envisages sequence a events taking place in ‘he potential welker, "For thi reson’ be obcrves, ‘a man ses that he smst wall ad italy snltaneouay (a ees) he was unless styehing prevents im fom doing soc" The Aisoeian passage echoed by Seneca, who remarks" T must ‘vale Ithea immediately walk (ne dma eda) when Uhave Sito anecl "T-must walk”) and have aseated co this {pinion of mine.” To avoid this idea ofa sequenent which in ft explains beginning to walk but not walking, Chryspput prefers to speak of walking as an act ofthe personality ie [And thie ha something to be eid for for when we are walle ing we do not keep on going through » proces in whieh atone Imoment we deide to walknd the next moment we begs (0 ‘do so, Rather, one we have deeded to walk weeamy on walk- Sng, ualey, a the Stes might phrase i anydhing sands in our tray, Walking ea facta sowing forth or tate of our continu Ing decision; oe, we might say conversely, our continuing deci fon isthe concepts! image of our action, At any rate itis ‘en dificult to separate the twor and that & probably why Cryipps rfid to do oo THoentaly, according to Chryipps the problem about in fs similar tothe problem of any bodily act. In his view, it teeing we do not make judgments and then fee emotional ‘Fees, The extodooal effects are a partand indeed an in +m nae) Ati 44 (01) oan es th etd boy ett bn as Ft weet pate bye pcarsey “ula A anbiguty mode he Sian cane eb ere oe separable part—of the judgment self In other words, for ‘Ghrysppas there in each thing a purely rathonal sey if by {ational we mean ‘peslrmed yan etotionl intellect lone All mental sets are coloured by being a the same time emo- ‘onal acts. Thus all judgments are enange a the personality ‘or pew states ofthe personality This why the wise mani not tocally pasionles, why «som, «proper Health ofthe soy find ot meze impart, isthe Stole eal, otal impasiity iin Chrysippas view a enele ad indeed unintelligible amy, since mental set themselves are not impatve. Anyone who ‘eck drt, inthe sense of total elimination ofl fling and ‘notion, is aking foe a state when all activi, even metal Scie are supended, Such a sate would fn fat be equi- ‘alent to death four interpretation i ght, therfore, the relation between the views af Zeno and Chiysippus about ny i that Chey pus was ed to correct Zeno's formulation because of is learer stasp of the nature of human activity as tually pryehosomatic Secivity, almost se personal activity. Ie isnot eniely leat ‘whether he was awvate in his gwn mind of thi relationship. He ‘nay have thought of hinsef arnt so mich coreting Zeno as lariving him and working out the consequences of his i Sight in more etal But i his dgpate with Cleanthes about walking gives us any lus about the nature of his relaonhip {© his predecesors ia general it may be that be was fn fact ware that dhe concept of coresponding and preceding mental ac foreach bodily movement or emotional response could not be sutained, “Zeno had atleast moved inthe direction ofthe concept of a ‘itary sll, He had given up the ides of coating Incl in the human psyehe and dropped the Platonic or qustiPlataic talk about divergent pars of the soul, He was aleady suggest. ing, a8 were all the earlier Sts, chat i is changes in the sth {hat matter when we are trying to explain moral Behaviour, ot civil warsin dhe soul. But he was ell under the old rational. ist sway in 9 far athe sapped tha, although judgments i ‘italy lead wo emotions, yet they themrcves are “Pre act of “hough” Doubdes the much mundertood Stee material 35 ”‘ad something todo wth thi for it robo ta ita ine fone ate eject to aft anther Tosvoi is dcAly, 2 iat ain ota ofthe now notoriosghot a the ma caine theory ofthe soul Chyspp tought oat there as nly one way out: be must defbeemotiogs themes st Kt STjedgmen. For Chosipps al jigmestsinvave emotion; Soin ef them ave ood ols ae bad But hs step proved co Talla ora les tughcminded generation of Sti, nnd wader the guidance of Poona bey reverted to the concept af wratng cuties the only posible explanation of mora ‘roel andeonequen moral Feavior Seeing the rie theory ef Chyuipps now in clearer Lights we can aly ern bey to the queton ith which tte began, the queion of theses ad feath of the soul Sed the nce toenirpate the wn This ew, leady out ied by Zeno tw opponent the Poise sd Peripatcts, tras given renewed cps by Chryupet I rn ae Meat ofthe fyromer, snarl oth to be of them Shope At soon hee nd become elements something ites tipo nol the medal neato have tochange thet tote ale From Chesppat doctrine tat eah i eedon Tom net wehavetretrn omomething mor ie the atone sew at ean bulanceor harmony between diferent he Trent ofthe a And the problem of te mature a he aly of Ue welfare all ovr apse. 6 3 PROBLEMS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN “These is widely held belief, much fared by the work of PPohlena, that the Stoic phiksophy should be viewed primatily fn terma af ateaction (othe Epicurean, Thethessisexaggerated, hut has certain elements of uth. Clearly the radical ant thsi bebween Seale and Epicurean views onthe roe of plese ture in the feof the good man give ita certain subtnce, But the fact that Epcurus rofarded pleasure (of ome nd) asthe mast important thing im il! wile the Stic bee towed the acolade on virtue, bar led to various misconcep tion as Uhe weatinent accorded by the Stok to plearure "These misconceptions have been partially corrected by Haynes in recent arc; but some tl remain, and Haynes has into duced few farther source of confon* Tn the dacuion that {sto follow, it shouldbe sumed tht the evidene feed late othe views of Chryippi, unl specifically attbuted to then, However, there are no good reasons for denying that similar, though sometimes es sophisticated, postions re main tained by Zeno, ‘Only 2 fool would maintain that any human being could be totally senile to pleasures and pal, Zeno accordingly held ‘hat, while the wise mam doct not lel nm which arse from mistaken judgment he nevertheles feels “certain suspicions nd shadows" of these ny ‘These thadows are the sary re ‘maining after a wound has healed up Werking along silat Hines, Chrysipps holds dat the wise man wil fl ping and it isthe standard opiaion in the school that although “leat? {in the sense of 4 mistaken judgment) wil be eacated frm the wise man, yet he wil enjy a raonal tate of exhilaration * Mera in Sui i pars nd dre he oe ee aa 11h ay Hn a *SatThin Fao ps6 GIES ny Oe 37(nd) One thing thatthe term Erde, which denotes the sim ofthe Stoic rage, docs not mean, i inseasibility. The wise man fees both plese and pai. Tn order to understand the significance ofthis, we must con sider in more deal the Stoic explanation of the phenomenon ‘of pleasure, Tes lear that they dstinguithe, ply nat text, between two types of pleasure, which can roughly be described asthe simple fectng of physical sxtiaction and the more postive open enjoyment ofthat stfacon which Ist be in some way asoctated with 2 ecognton that itis ‘tying, and with an accompanying eeognion that cought (oe ought not to be aatihing To give an example of how this Aludintion can be applied, we can sy that eating good meal affords simple physical” pleasure, whereas enjoying the meal in full knowlege tht the fod hasbeen tlen is, as the Stes would put an stent of the moral personality by which the tater agree to enjoy delicous fod in fall knowledge ofthe fat that he should not be eating i tall, Daring the couse ofthis chapter it willbe convenient to call the psa!” pleasure firstorder pleasure and the more peyctologially complex pleasure a second-order plesure, The ut of these terms i not Intended to suggest hat ether f the type of pleasure more Plesmurable, or more genuine in any Cer senge, What we Should avo is thea of term ike “phys which have had to be used up to ths pont, boeaue they sugges theory of the ‘ature of anand of his pacts or faculties which, wll be ‘rqued, would be unacceptable to Chryippus. Haynes, when ‘lscusing similar problems, x prepared, However to eal rx order pleasures bodily pleasures; second-order pleaares he re- fers oa mental teen? Haynes apparently secs so jut thin wort of language by reference to patage of Aulus Gli? Gli tying tee plain how a Stic age, in present pal, stages aginst beng Sula Stoic It Epica OF nob v9 sopel an tin nae yx SoA ene itn we Po deluded ino the bei that pain i el Hef however, com ed to adit thatthe Stl, though denying paint be eu Tn il el and be freed to groan, How can this be? TO niwer ths queton, Cli, who i quoting a decoure of 9 pisopber named Faun, gives sme Kind of Scie explana too ofthe gradual growth of reason nth human being en hin bird up tothe sinc of hi ll atrty. Hayes pot ot that secoring to Geli the Stoic hol that the seruations of pais and pleasure are given by nature Beloe the appearance et judgment and resem. By ths Geliun ses to mean tat ther are sme plesnies and palin the man og which fre not judgment or, 38 Chiysppus woud putt sates ofthe From. Bt this would bes seangeponton Tor Chap: ps Tn he fist place the passage of Gels is concerned not nly with the development ofthe infant, for whom i might reasonably be argued that, overwhclnigly 2 fet sod de “essing a me goes on sd the ead begin to deel into {raional eeature, pai and pleasure precede judgment But Gli reports at Haynes sys that cven in the grown and developed man pleasure and pa precede and are separate {rom judgment na number cs, parca in what we are cling torr please "nerder to udenstand tha ile more clearly, we must out line Chysippu explanation ofthe peycholgial mechanins af least anit shoul be expel that threw no reson to believe thc there any base diference i kind, but ony & dierence in degree, Between se and second-order pleas ‘When the word ord menne bad pleasure, fis ered by Use Stoica denoting a os or neal state ofthe por tonality. All ain ate themselves to be dened as imple, (Gyo) wich have got oat of hand, or at iationsl move Inens ofthe sol Simi he proper enna states should lio be regarded as Spt his tine, however, ofa rational "ature nother worl leases whether ceptable or nt ‘re Epa of sme Kid of other Hence, if we want to know hata pleasure iy we all have to kw what am impale (Gout ™ (expe SH 378, 8 39We are already aware that impulses ate movements ofthe soul And what sre thee movements? Chrysippus at ast teaches thatthe are act f stent. There io evidence that he ‘hough that sme impulse asents wil ther ae followed (temporally) by act of ase? Tt fellow therefor, that both the reaton and ete of judgment. Hence it cannot be true, a8 iaynes would have it thatthe sensation of pain and pleasure sce present tothe adult without some kind of judgment and Some Kind of asen, Haynes has made his mistake brea in the cate of the ld he, and perhaps Gels or his source, be- Tiews tha ata ery enriyagr when the human i cetaaly not rational, he ha no kindof rational faculey a all Ta Get, what Glu says is that the child has seeds (aia) of reson. On Haynes theory these sees would simpy be “potentialities there would be no ata aang power, and therefore no as- tenting power, however weak, preset in the new-hoen nf Pethape a plstge of Seneca makes this interpretation le ely, even for Gels? For, according o Seneca, nature pro- luctus with capacity fr learning and give wean impertct reson (ai inpreta). In terme ofthe Stoic vtalisn this in perfect reton” cannot be identibed with merely the potenti- Sty or poabilty of reaoning, An imperfce reson mut be fa Actual sate of dhe personality according to which the ini- idl e capable of the weaket pouuble acts ofan which ill remain act of sent. Now the very fit actof the aew-bora finaly whether human oF not i an impale towards el Preservation! This i the Bist dspaiion (oie) it adopts tic is governed by its phyiealconmtation sv an animal Tn the cae ofthe human beng this penton mast therefore, be disposition ofthe rao inet, I's the ist stat ofthe pet {DL yy LSP ey Py i asta (VF 7) 1 tc op be 18 SF gt Seneca, Hh. 11508 (SPP an 169); sonality or fysvome. Its obsios, of cours that all act of Sy human Being other than the wite man ar inadequate ate ft seat. This Bist cid senee of sellpreservation, with tvhich will immediately be amoctated flings of pleasure and pai, oll be the weaket pore act of stent. The important thing, however, is thatthe impule (Spe) wil nevertelest Fnvolte assent. The Sis spparelly emphadaed the ditine: tion between human Beings and animals in ration to their atitudes to the base urge to elepreservation. In the ease of ‘ational beings, says Diogenay, resin ix the crafteman (sexs) ofthe inspule.”It tee that Diogencs uses, the ward Emyivera: ete, a word which could indicate «temporal sequence Teneed not do, however, aad that it should not be to taken shown by Seneca? who observes that, wil ttre {hat every animal hs a naurdl sense ofthe vale of el, nen hatually values himself not merely at an animal but at a rational animal. Ici imposible even forthe Sst glinesingt of man's selFawarenes to be other than the glimmesings of = ‘ational seltawarenes We may conclude, therefore, that every act of every human being, young or old, mate or immature, Ss both a rational and a phsieal act? Hence there cat be 20 Such thing asa purely “body” or “psi” pleasure. ‘What then are we to make ofthe passage of Gellua? Obvi- ‘uy that it does no represent the views ofthe Old Stoa at al, ‘The paychology in fet that of Posidonits. The whole avout ofthe pasage is one of conflict of parts ofthe soul, reson SMrugeling again the passions, However, let wt look at» ptt ofthe narrative to ste if we ea understand what Chrysppur feaction oft would have been. The problem, we recall that {he Stoic groasing. And the question at Why isthe Stole Dlilosopher compelled to utter groans ayaa hit wil? Geli Answer to this is that iti only tue that the wie man cannot be ‘compelled on ozaions when he has the opporeinty to use his enon There are many actions, such a sweating it ot eee “‘weather over which the wite man has no kind af contol what soever. Here the wil, the judgment snd the reason do not operate, Man i under the sway of mature and necesiy. Te would be very exty for Cheyippus to argue that the ine voluntary actions mentioned by Gell re not tall analogous {o groaning invohntarily when in pin, The difrence that Gellas pictures the sage strugstng agains his urge to gran, but no one struggles agaist the proces of sweating in Bot weather Chaps would prestmabhy say that sweating in bot weather it part ofthe nature of man gus man. Sweating it ‘natural inthe same way that selfpreervation is natural, By {Oise would onan that all men sweat uta all men have the Instinct for sclepreservaion. He woul, However, deny that roaning when in pn comes under thitae head, Some me might have auficient fortode to bear the most exerucating ‘in ia slence, Ia matter of degrees of set {Chrysippus would isis at sweating is 2 prychowmati activity jt as mec a anything ele All human sctvites, Without any exeepdons whatever, involve some. degree of sent. A totally nensvoluntary ation ian insposbiity. This ie the only conclusion to be drawn from dhe large body of ev dence which shows that fr Cheysppa every action aad reac- ‘ion ofthe human being iin some tense "in the yeu’? Tis the consstent opinion of Chnysippus that the soul hha eight “part, the Hive tenes, apecch, sex_and ream (fymovnds)? Since the Ayton ir invoved in every ac lly, every actity must Be vatonal at Feast in an Impeetiet ‘way, There ae, dherelre, no ently involuntary actions Te this assiment of Chysippu’ postion correct, i should be noticed that he rejects the dint between voluntary aad involuntary movements and Behavioural symptoms like sweat Sng which dean by Artolle, Ina important passage ofthe De Mow Asinatum, to which atention hae recently been ‘raw by Furey Atoll speaks of movements such atthe e beating of the heart or the erection ofthe pena involuntary Iecause the bodily activity taker place without the command af the mind (60 vr wiadoarrog ol vo). Chrys view would be that although the mind enay ot command it une ‘seat inthe ease ofthe heart othe pens) because such mone ments afe natural and chus themselves manitation of he Ings. For Chesippus the ejection ofthe Aristotelian theory of Involuntary motion is the only alternative to breaking up the personality into actually, not merely conceptually epee Pats or faculties. And then, he would Bold, how could these parts be joined together? If there were no hyesovnde, it ‘would be necessary to invent onee Farley has piated ost, however, that Aristo acount of the involuntary is not competed in the De Mote Thete ist passage inthe De Anime which mae have delighted Chrysippost “The mind’ sys Arte, “often thinks of someting thee sroues fear or pleasure, but it docs not give the order to be iMrid but the heart moves, and ifthe abject pleasurable, ‘ome other part (thats in vew of the De Mots pase the ens). Thi text is clay mach tothe Sti taste. We have the moral imperative (od mde 88 goof), whieh would be inwlved in second-order pains and pleasures, andthe Chryip- ean view that slhough the ain doesnot command, it inks ‘of something painful or plearrabl. Peshaps the difference bee ‘oveen the Stoics and Aristotle here terminologies! Aros seems tobe calling reactions in which the ad thinks But does ot command “involuntary, while Chrysppas view i that, i ‘the mind is involved in amy way (however imperfctly), there sa degree of aca There isa pastage of Diogenes Laertius, who quotes ffom CChoysippus, which bears out our interpretation of Caysippa view with most paradosieal exmphasis® The fs thing thet spproprite (chow) to every atial sie own natere and the awarenes ofthis nature. 'The word uted for awareness striking; its ewwiSne. Cicero, in a pale posnge, wane, Jates this as sss Jaf? which is alent ineviably Bong © 8appear in English as consciousness oF awareness of sel. A Snlar phrase (cout suse sens) is given by Seneca wrth relrence not any to maa but to all animals! Although Tninals and: new-born Infints are not canciones of themelves in the obvious sense of the phase, Chrysippas wat ap- pparealy prepared to argue that they have some rudiments (Gemia) of tht concioumen, Conscousneay therefor, in towne degre ental flr animale and «fort fr hua Iie There could hardly bea stronger affirmation that in some senve all human ats are partially mental ct, even the most primitive. Thus there ean be no nonsvaluntary act in the ese fof an act perlrmed without the operation af the Ayesory- Temust alo, ar ee have argued before, that dente he Pa donian Stoickm of Gelli, for the Ol Sto all pleasures and Pans, even fstorde pleasures and pains, are ats of assent. ‘Before leaving ths matter, however, we should observe that some scholars have tied to evade this solution by emending che text of Diogenes, Palen was apparently theft to argue that, Instead of evwlonew we should read evvelodnag# There i to manscripe evidence fr this change, and iis not noteed (or pethaps is unnotced) bythe recent Gnfrd edie Pohleny” that ground forthe change thats a we have sen, Cicero uses the phrace sn as an equivalent; and thi rage i paral Teed elewhere. However, even if the reading ovelatnons vere correct, there is no mawon to belive that our vw of {Ghrysippu theory is affected, Phutarch, ins most iisminating passige, defins olla as «perception and grasp of what is kin (aloSyow wat deni)? Even Ii is claimed that the ‘word efednoig doer not imply an act of vent, no aul claim is Pomible abost tings The word i admittedly wed both for perception and for thought, but it represents an activity (perception) which i apeifeally contrasted with bare pasive senation If then Chrysippan, in the pamage quoted. by Diogenes, actually wrote ovelotye and ot evans the Bp. 1a (SVP "Relea," Gnahaee Die Su ay, Polen’ view be cep by Tia Boe VE ph hay Rl, SOPs. 4“ apprehension the mental cms al ave been in his mid FRutarsvenion would bee flr frmulaton, Howey, Considering the lack of mamunrpt evidence there ie te font change Digene text vero of Stam offered by Gtao or Hic or Masons or Senseo eters produced ‘yr Potts mut st be regarded se providing ence the (acters Cheysipp may have wed fn Works other than ‘hone with which the othe tesa themselves concerned. Weare nw in poson wo detemine elton the wise santo what we have ele aver pear He wl fertne such pleases proviled hey ae not elle orth by tora objec. Ths the true see of dre The ge freensble to immoral (aid teste ition emaions, A ‘dea soatogy may help tomate thi cleer, tis appary orb to cute varios Kn a sl peer by pute ts In front of a seen and fing ont the sien pte of thse objets wich arowe th somal apps Lahey rc ‘pond physically tothe sbjet on the sere they expen ai lec shock: Gradually nth tentnen "contin thy soca thepatularsevl objet wih the pane te eee Wie shock. Hence the appt nied and eventual ds appear The Soc wie a isin asim etn, Chas Tegra adler ar unnatural hens, wh the ight he ele’ wil inthe ude migh have an ete eet onthe “rdinary ma, i would ave mo such eect on the mages What this mena nc that inthe wie mn the disinean bes ‘en it andsecndorder plese, with which we have cen working upto this point wil be diminish aot to Vanishing pit Tie wie a far mein contol oh ples. ‘tes than the oriary mortals and ins far wane af he ‘ilelearGoverinmorl ejtshewbeaty nco ol, He wil not beim conuouscoatel ofall his ectngs of plesure, but wil have ind ef eto power over them oat he wall utomataly sj hve tat se bd The leases ‘shch he wl actly ft wil be raioal ste the emorions, Ge yop. This the word which the Sts pee forthe ples, Ser ofthe sage, but there re cern pasa so of Chem "Sh 99, 5 W. YE a)