Supreme Court of the Philippines

380 Phil. 156

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 107427, January 25, 2000
JAMES R. BRACEWELL, PETITIONER, VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional

[1]
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,
which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its
[2]
Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
[3]
respondent court on September 30, 1992.

The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six

hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in
1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr.,
acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and
Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which corresponding
Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of
land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale
which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter
issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax
Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of
[4]
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The case was docketed as
L.R.C. Case No.4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of
Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed
petitioner’s application on the grounds that neither he nor
his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to
the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application,
[5]
and that the subject land is part of the public domain.

The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on

account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against

1
 Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in
G.R. No. 5263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld
[6]
over those of the oppositor Leonardo.

On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration

[7]
case were forwarded to the Makati Regional Trial Court
where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77.
The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the
[8]
application on July 22, 1985, this time alleging the
following additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and
(2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do
not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for.

On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting

[9]
the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General
promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29,
[10]
1992, reversed and set aside the lower court’s Order. It
also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its
[11]
Resolution of September 30, 1992.

Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following

grounds -
"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in
finding that the commencement of thirty 30) year
period mandated under Sec. 48 (b ) shall commence
only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the
classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in
First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an

ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and inference that
prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry
in Marc 27; 1972, the parcels of land sought to be
registered by Applicant was part of the forest land
or forest reserves.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and

failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of the
applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest
[12]
land occupied from 1908."

The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts

his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through
his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand it is
the respondents’ position that since the subject parcels of
land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March
[13]
27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when
he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite
thirty years possession met.

2
 We agree with respondents.
[14]
In Republic vs. Doldol, the requisites to acquire title to
public land were laid down, as follows --

"x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141

provided for possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded b R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation
by an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The same, however, has already
been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section
48(b) now reads:

‘(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter." (italicized in the
original)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we
stated that the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable
public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued."
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant
must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this
score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to
show that the parcels of land subject of his application are
alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively
shown by the government that the same were only classified
as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even
granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest
had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title
thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject
parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor
capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession
which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of
an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
[15]
portions of the public domain.

3
 A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of
[16]
Appeals, where a homestead patent issued to the
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the
ground t at at the time it was issued, the subject land was
still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court
ruled as follows --
"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 219 SCRA 340).

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the

presumption of State ownership of lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for
registration. The applicant must show that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
This petitioners failed to do.
We have stated earlier that at the time the
homestead patent was issued to petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to
the inalienable and undisposable portion of the
public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by
mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the
time the homestead parent was issued to
petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original
patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then
authorized to dispose of the same because the area
was not yet classified as disposable public land.
Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners
by the Bur au of Lands is void ab initio."
Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land
were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the
same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect
title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over
[17]
lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land until released therefrom and open to disposition.
[18]
Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
[19]
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject

Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested
rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record
[20]
the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development
from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

4
 Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his
application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no
need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.,

concur.

[1]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 268-271.
[2]
CA Records, pp. 30-34.
[3]
Id., p. 45.
[4]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 2-16.
[5]
Id., pp. 20-21.
[6]
Id., pp. 136-142.
[7]
Order, Las Piñas Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 79;
Records, Vol. I, p. 98.
[8]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 107-108.
[9]
See Note 1.
[10]
See Note 2.
[11]
See Note 3.
[12]
Petition for Review, p. 8; Rollo, p. 15.
[13]
See Exhibit "U" for the petitioner, Exhibit "1-A" for
respondent; 1st Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest
Development, dated 20 August 1986, with the following
remarks: "Verification disclosed that subject areas fall
within the Alienable or Disposable Land, under Project No.
13-A of Las Piñas, Metro Manila certified and declared as
such on March 27, 1972 as per Forestry Administrative
Order No.4-1141 per LC Map 2623."
[14]
G.R. No. 132963, 295 SCRA 359, 364 (1998)
[15]
Spouses Villarico vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912,

5
 28 June 1999.
[16]
G.R. No. 94524, 295 SCRA 295, 310 (1998)
[17]
Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals. G.R.
No. 81961, 172 SCRA 455 (1989)
[18]
Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R.
No.73974. 244 SCRA 537, 546 (1995)
[19]
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 50464, 181 SCRA 443, 448 (1990)
[20]
See Note 13.

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