China and the BRICS

G. Venkat Raman1

Abstract

China has become an increasingly powerful actor in the global governance landscape. Till the

last few years of the twentieth century it was quite content to play a reactive role in international

affairs. In the first decade of the twentieth century the ‘Beijing consensus’ started grabbing

eyeballs. The coinciding of emergence of BRICS as an influential political coalition along with

the emergence of China as an important actor in the international system has the potential to alter

the global power structure. Today China seeks to play a more pro-active role and the political

leadership has been more assertive in the various international fora in terms of articulating its

national interests. Of all the various platforms, the BRICS has been the most important political

platform for Chinese leadership to put forward its views on global governance. This article looks

at the evolution of China as an influential player in the last one and a half decade. Further, it

looks into the evolution of Chinese political discourse in the nine BRICS summits till now. This

1
Dr. G. Venkat Raman is Associate Professor at Indian Institute of Management, Indore. Email:
[email protected]

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gives us an idea of the aspirations of the Chinese leadership to reshape the contours of global

governance and how it strives to play a critical role in this process.

"………… China has become a major driver of global change and de facto a significant global

governance actor. What China chooses to do or not to do can, and often does, have profound

consequences for many other players globally. The impacts of Chinese growth are changing the

conditions and room for maneuver in the global economy – for developing and developed

countries alike. As a result, many global problems will be insoluble without Chinese global

engagement."-Jing Gu / John Humphrey / Dirk Messner

Introduction

China is one of the most influential powers in international politics today. As it grows

as an economic and military power, China seeks to play a role in global governance which is

commensurate to its growing prestige. More importantly, the international community more than

welcomes this aspiration to play a very significant role in international affairs. More than two

decades back neither China was interested in to take the mantle of leadership of the developing

world nor was China seen as capable of playing a vital role. In the aftermath of the collapse of

the erstwhile Soviet Union, twenty-five years back, some third world leaders approached China

to take leadership in dealing with the developed countries. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of

China’s reforms, responded in Chinese by saying that “China could not, could never, take this

leadership." He said, "We are not capable. It would not be beneficial [to China] seize this

leadership.”1 In fact, Deng Xiaoping laid down the four premises which would be guiding the

Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao era. Popularly called the 24 character strategy of Chinese

foreign policy in the post-Mao era, the four premises are as follows: '' Observe and analyze

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calmly, Strengthen your position, Undertake change with confidence, Conceal your true

potential, Contribute your

part, never become the leader." However, in the recent past, one is witnessing a China not shying

away from bidding good-bye to these premises and charting a new course, In short, it is making

new strides in taking the ‘political leap forward. 2

China was not seen by the vast majority of observers in the field of International

Relations as a significant global player that could seriously challenge the western-dominated

global governance architecture in the aftermath of the cold war.3 Zbigniew Brzezinski argued

that China was still a ‘developing country’ (Brzezinski 2004). Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay's

study of the new dynamics in world politics as late as post 9/11 did not consider China as ‘a

game changer.’4China continued to be on the margins of discussions related to ‘global

governance’ as late as 2003-04. However, these perceptions changed with the emergence of the

‘peaceful rise’ versus ‘peaceful development’ debate (heping jueqi vs. heping fazhan). Even the

various U.S. and EU security strategy documents in 2002 and 2003 continued to neglect China. 5

All this changed with the emergence of new scholarship which started taking note of a

rising China. The University of Sussex based Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Asian

Drivers team detects that China (and other Asian countries) are becoming significant 'drivers of

global change'6. Robert Kaplan reflects on how to counterbalance the 'China Threat' 7. Joshua

Kurlantzick and Joshua Ramo emphasize the soft growing power of China in Asia and in other

parts of the developing world8, while Ted Fishman perceives the growing Chinese economy as

‘as a new industrial power challenging the world' 9 and Gabor Steingart dramatizes the ‘global

economic power shift, warning against an emerging world war on wealth. 10

 To many China observers, the Copenhagen conference in 2009 marked the

abandonment of Chinese passiveness in international politics and greater assertiveness. In the

aftermath of the financial crisis, the world could count on a financially stable China to play a

leading role in

financial management. In fact, Ed Miliband, former foreign secretary in Gordon Brown's

cabinet, summed up China's arrival on the world stage very aptly. He contended that ‘historians

will look back at 2009 and see that China played an incredibly important role in stabilizing

global capitalism. That is very significant and sort of ironic,' Miliband said. ‘There's a joke that

goes: 'After 1989, capitalism saved China. After 2009, China saved capitalism.' More

importantly, Miliband argued that ‘China's indispensability in part comes from size, but a second

part is that it wants to play a role.' Given this, it is worth examining, what kind of role China

seeks to play in today's international relations. This question assumes significant proportions for

two reasons. One, China has high stakes in ensuring that it continues to enjoy the privileges

which it has acquired from the post second world war system. For instance, it is not very keen to

expand the permanent membership of the UN Security Council by paying more than lip service.

China has also been very keen not to sabotage the international liberal order which has enabled it

to leapfrog in the thick of the action in international politics. Neither is China very keen on

allowing new emerging powers like India to be part of the elite groups like the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG). Second, not very surprisingly, today's China is equally, if not more, eager to don

the mantle of an active participant pushing to safeguard not only its national interests but also

advocate a different set of values by which international politics and questions of global
governance are discussed. These values have been generated from what Martin Jacques, one of

the eminent Sinologists, calls, a ‘civilizational-state.11

China’s Interface with the International system

Ever since China's liberation in 1949, China has witnessed different phases of its

foreign policy. To begin with, the cold war realities and the constraints that came with it made

the Chinese leadership overly reliant on the erstwhile Soviet Union. Till the destalinization

speech of Khrushchev, China's foreign relations were predominantly characterized by relations

with the socialist bloc. After that, the Sino-Soviet split and mistrust of the US-led west led to

China adopting a foreign policy supporting the causes of the Third World. The 1955 Afro-Asian

relations Bandung conference was a significant event in this regard. China's position in the

international system was characterized by ‘political alienation' with western countries. 12 The

visit of Richard Nixon and the Peoples' Republic of China replacing the Republic of China

(Taiwan) as one of the P5 in the UN Security Council set the stage for China's engagement with

the outside world. The post-Mao reforms and its ‘four modernization' programs paved the way

for the gradual integration of China in the international system. As Nicholas Lardy points out,

soon after China began to open its door, its trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) policies

became far more liberal than Japanese and Korean policies when the latter two countries were at

a comparable stage of development.13

 Since then China has gone from strength to strength to become one of the economic

powerhouses in contemporary times. It emerged in the eighties and galloped in the nineties as

one of the top FDI destinations for FDI. Meanwhile, around the early 1980s, China joined some

key international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and

the World Bank. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government began to negotiate membership in

the

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 14. Over a period the integration of China

encompassed broader range of ‘issue-areas' leading to transformation of the nature of its

engagement with the external world. Susan Shirk has labeled this shift as one from ‘shallow

integration' to ‘deep integration'. 15

The increasing engagement of China led to the world witnessing a new China in the

1990s. Especially, the second half of the 1990s saw a China which was increasingly more

confident in dealing with the external world. Scholars like Alastair Iain Johnston attributed

China's embracing of the international order to its ‘socialization by the prevailing international

norms.' This new attitude during this period manifested in significant changes in China's foreign

policy. Notable instances in this regard witnessed China signing and ratifying the UN human

rights covenants and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. The Chinese government had made

costly commitments to gain membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). These

instances represented a significant move on the part of the Chinese government towards

identifying with the existing international system. In the twenty-first century, China's entry into

WTO, successful hosting of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the world seeking China’s;

leadership after the 2008 financial crisis marked the beginning of a new era in China's foreign
policy. As mentioned earlier, the 2009 Copenhagen summit marked a watershed in China's

foreign policy. Any discussion on China's role in global governance has to be done against the

above background.

China and Global Governance

The topic of global governance (quanjiu zhili) has entered the Chinese discourse only

in the last few years. Unlike the west where this subject has been discussed and

debated since the early 1990s, China's approach and position on ‘global governance' were not

very matured, even in the beginning of the twenty-first century. 16 The evolution of Chinese

perspectives on global governance had come under the influence of a ‘new security concept'

advocated by Chinese leaders since 1996 when China presented a report to the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF) Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence-building Measures in Tokyo in

January 1996.17 Perhaps this was instigated by the then alarmist vies of western observers on the

‘peaceful rise of China’ thesis.

With American hegemony as its implicit target, the new security concept called for

using cooperative means to deal with security issues without diluting its state-centric version of

international relations.18.With this new security concept, China began to demonstrate a

‘preference for a multilateral approach to participating’ in foreign affairs and for taking an

active part in international forums involving various intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and

international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).19

 One comes across two divergent schools of thought. Whereas one school agree with

the underlying rationale of global governance, the other school has got some fundamental

problems with the idea of ‘global governance'. First, Chinese analysts agree with the view that

many challenges of our times are global in scale, affecting nations with different sociopolitical

systems and ideologies. Further, these analysts believe that given global problems such as

environmental degradation, transnational crime, and financial crises, governance at the global

level is necessary. They also believe that new communications technologies have made global

governance possible. First, they believe that some of the global problems like transnational

crime, environmental

governance and financial crisis (like the one in 2008) are of global nature and impact more or

less all the nations. Further, they accept the idea that outcomes of governance in current times

are influenced by not only state actors but also by non-state actors like Civil Society

Organizations (CSOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). These actors are interdependent

and work together to solve the world's pressing problems. They are cognizant of the distinction

between governance and government in that in contrast to the hierarchical nature of government;

governance is carried out through negotiation and coordination in a democratic fashion. 20

Diametrically opposite to the optimistic views are the views of those Chinese analysts

who are deeply suspicious of the concept of ‘global governance.' To begin with, these critics

suppose that the western notions of ‘global governance' emanate from the US-led west which has

orchestrated the crafting of an international system laced with liberal values anchored on its

understanding of ‘democracy,' ‘human rights' and ‘free markets'. Moreover, the Chinese

subscribing to this school of thought believe that the notion of ‘global governance' and its
associated ideas are a direct off-shoot of neo-liberal ideas promoted by the US-led west through

institutional mechanisms like the Bretton Woods institutions. Therefore, the Chinese analysts

believe that a ‘civilizational-state' like China has its value system stemming from values

originating in Confucianism and Daoism. In other words, they believe that the developing world

needs to find solutions to their problems by tapping into their own cultural and political

strengths. Needless to say, these analysts believe that the approach to ‘global governance' and

the institutions which regulate them should reflect the values of these emerging countries and

reflect the power shifts in the twenty-first century.

As a consequence of the western understanding and working of the idea of ‘global

governance', the Chinese point of view believes that the current international order has several

major defects. In response to such an international order driven by what is now called the

‘Washington Consensus,' China emerged as an alternative to the neo-liberal order which Joshua

Ramos termed as the ‘Beijing consensus'. In the words of Shaun Breslin, ‘China provides an

important example of an alternative to the neo-liberal project. It acts as a metaphor for

'difference' – ‘a different global order should be constructed and international relations

conducted'.21

China and BRICS

The Chinese leadership believes that today’s international system is characterized by

‘one superpower, many great powers’ (yi chao duo qiang). However, it doesn't see this position

as antagonistic to its stand on other issues relevant to its overall foreign policy objectives.
China's interest in BRICS is by its growing clout in the international system, especially in the

post-2008 era. China believes that BRICS as a platform would enable it to iron out its

differences in a peaceful manner by having a bilateral dialogue on the sidelines of the annual

meeting of BRICS summits. For instance, at the recent ninth annual BRICS summit in Xiamen,

China, India, and China got an opportunity to resolve the Doklam stalemate and initiate a series

of CBMs. Furthermore, China believes that BRICS will go a long way in helping other

developing countries as it would be an ideal platform to discuss various issues related to

negotiations concerned with ‘climate change, discriminatory trade regimes and protectionist

practices of the west, and hiding in group to avoid negative attention.’ 22 In the Chinese

perception as put by Wu Hailong, the then Director-General of the International Department at

the Ministry of Foreign affairs (in 2010)

BRICS is an ‘evolution from hypothetical (xuni) into a realistic platform for international co-

operation’. In fact, China characterizes it as a ‘logical choice’ (shunli chengzhang) and believes

that BRICS is a platform for ‘sharing experiences, exchanging what one has learned (fenxiang

jingyan, jiaoliu xin de).

China’s interest in BRICS stems not only from some idealistic aspirations but also

some hard-core realpolitique. It emerges from a realistic choice for Chinese diplomacy in the

twenty-first century through which it seeks to further its own strategic goals in the domain of

international relations.23The rationale for China’s interest in BRICS stems from multiple reasons.

First, emphasis on the BRICS mechanism is very significant for China to legitimize itself as the

leader of the developing countries. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that China has always

maintained that it is still a developing country.

 This policy of China is per one of the core foundations of its diplomacy, that is,

management of relations with developing countries.'24 Second, China also has a long tradition in

its cooperation with these countries (particularly in South-South cooperation and in North-South

dialogues) on issues such as climate change, UN reform, and how to achieve the millennium

development goals. Third, China is often seen to act with these developing countries shoulder by

shoulder on such global governance issues as South-South co-operation, UN reforms, climate

change, and etcetera. The BRICS take the existing cooperation one step further in the context of

the financial crisis. The invitation for South Africa to join the BRICs and invitation for a wider

range of African countries to be part of the BRICS meeting this year especially show such an

orientation for expanding and deepening cooperation with other developing countries. 25

Therefore, it doesn't come as surprise that in all the BRICS summits the Chinese President's

address has always been laced with words like ‘justice,' ‘greater co-ordination

among BRICS countries' to advocate the cause of emerging markets and other developing

countries, ‘political trust,' ‘multilateralism,' South-South Co-operation' and ‘North-South co-

operation'. A discussion on this is covered in the latter sections of the paper.

In the aftermath of the end of the cold war, China proposed deployment of the

‘harmonious world' concept. The idea of a "harmonious world" consists of four principles of

global governance reform, namely, a) ‘democratization of international relations,’ b) ‘justice and

common prosperity,' c) ‘diversity and tolerance,’ and d) ‘peaceful resolution of international

conflicts.’26 Given the enormity of the task involved in realization of such a lofty goal on its

own, China has been very keen to build a platform like BRICS. The BRICS mechanism is useful

in strengthening multilateral cooperation with emerging regional powers and enables building of
new coalitions to form coordinated positions in North-South dialogue.27 In short, active

participation in the BRICS mechanism is part of the concrete practice of China’s new diplomacy

in the twenty-first century and is the result of its ‘international responsibility consciousness’ as

well as a reflection of the reality of China’s economic strength. 28

Finally, development of the BRICS mechanism comprises an essential ingredient of

China’s development strategy and therefore intricately linked to China's national interests. To

cite an example, the Chinese leadership has undertaken a major diplomatic offensive in

championing the benefits of the new silk route (also called the one belt, one road initiative),

playing a very pro-

active role in the setting up of the new development bank (NDB/BRICS bank) in the various

platforms that BRICS has provided. Further, a quick look at China's trade and economic

engagement with the external world reveals that the interdependence between Chinese and

global economy has increased manifold, especially in the last decade. Also, it is evident that

trade and commerce and other forms of economic engagement has become more diversified. All

this necessitates that China deals with the developing countries more consistently and keep in

mind their unique sensitivities. Many of these countries have abundance in raw materials and are

promising markets which are so lucrative an option that China finds difficult to resist. More

importantly, engagement with these countries is an indispensable part of China's economic

growth and development strategy. Therefore, to maintain a stable and sustainable growth China

needs to find new and stronger economic partners. BRICS countries as the representative of the

emerging markets fulfill this diplomatic goal.

 Given the contradictions involved in China's growing assertiveness in international

system and at the same time it's apparent empathy with the developing countries, China

observers have been confounded with a conundrum. While it is evident as to why China is

already a developed country, it is not very clear as to how one can account for the Chinese

leadership portraying itself as a ‘developing' country for a very long time till recently. It is only

after the current President Xi Jinping has assumed leadership that China has started asserting for

a bigger say in various international affairs. Even in the light of a more assertive foreign policy,

individual scholars have not been very optimistic about China's role. Equally pertinent is the fact

that the US-led west is not very eager to accept a greater say of China in the international

system. This

arises from a deep-rooted suspicion arising from the following factors. First, China's domestic

political structure is authoritarian. Second, its worldview is determined by a value system

stemming from its deep-rooted consciousness of itself being a ‘civilizational state'. Finally,

Chinese nationalism owing its origin to a different sense of racial belongingness owing their

origin to the ‘yellow emperor' (huang di).29

Given that this is more of a recent phenomenon, it is important for us to understand

that various factors have shaped China’s role and perception towards global governance. First,

it’s lack of preparedness where a certain leadership role was thrust upon it post-2008. Second,

certain degree of trust-deficit on the part of other important players in the international system. 30

The first and the second factors are an offshoot of China's self-image which has oscillated

between different identities, especially in the last one and a half decades. This kind of a self-
perception has led to a mindset in which China is unsure of its status and role in the international

system. These uncertainties have mainly materialized because of ambiguities as regards whether

it's a stakeholder in the existing system or a reformer, a ‘developed' country or a ‘developing'

one. These uncertainties have led to Chinese diplomacy being confounded with the hows and

whys of exercising the twin options of ‘voice' and ‘exit'. To add to this complication, China's

stance on various issues has swung from one to another depending on mapping of its self-image

and protecting and promoting its national interests in certain issue-areas. It is not very difficult to

understand the stature of China as a significant power due to its high economic and military

capabilities. However, one needs to briefly dwell into China's self-perception as a ‘developing'

country. Therefore, it is appropriate

that we briefly dwell on the rationale behind China’s contention that it is still a ‘developing’

country.

Accounting for China as a ‘Developing Country’?

The Chinese leadership believes that China in many respects is still a developing

country. This perception has once again raised eyebrows of some China watchers as they think

that today China is the second largest economy in the world and enjoys an unprecedented stature

in the global arena. The primary motive for the portrayal of itself as a ‘developing country,' some

China watchers allege, is to continue to reap the benefits of being labeled as one belonging to the

developing world. This kind of selective low profile self-image may enable China to continue

gain concessions in the international system.

 Today China is perceived to be a country with different perceptions. Some China

watchers believe that it is no more a developing country. In the wake of the 2008 subprime

crisis, China's standing in the international economic governance has also got bolstered with the

G-7 leadership calling upon the Chinese leadership to play a more significant role in the global

economic system. According to a Goldman Sachs report, during the period 2000-09 China

contributed more than 20% of world's GDP growth. To cite another reason supporting this

argument, in 2012, Chinese imports and exports totaled $3.866 trillion compared with America's

$3.822 trillion.31 According to another study done in 2006, America was the largest trading

partner for 127 countries, versus just 70 for China. By 2011, the situation had changed

drastically: 124 countries for China, 76 for the US.32 Some of the most powerful economic

regions of the world like Japan and South Korea who enjoyed a very high level of trade volume

between themselves

and the US is now sharing a much larger volume of bilateral trade with China. In fact, these East

Asian countries are increasingly dependent on China’s expanded market for their exports. From

the perspective of defense expenditure and its modernization also China has attracted the

attention of the so-called ‘alarmists’ as regards the ‘China rise’ theory.

If one looks at the Chines leadership, they put forth many arguments saying that

China has a long way to go before it calls itself a ‘developed' country. China today, they

contend, is grappling with outcomes of unabated economic growth for the last three decades.

The last ten years have witnessed the Chinese leadership steering the wheel of political discourse

and economic development from one based on GDP centric economic development to one based

on ‘people first' approach. The leadership also realized that it was gradually losing touch with its
traditional constituency, namely, the peasants and the working class. Prominent tensions in the

domestic front included growing regional inequalities, corrupt local governance, mass uprisings

inspired by problems related to agricultural and environmental degradation. It is in this light that

one needs to understand the sentiments of the Chinese leadership regarding their overall

development. For instance, in 2005, the former premier of China Wen Jiabao remarked, "for

China to be fully developed it will take unremitting efforts of several generations, or even a

dozen generations of the Chinese people." In yet another occasion (in 2008) the former president

Hu Jintao remarked "there is still a long way to go before all of the over one billion Chinese

people can enjoy greater prosperity in a modern country. We have to work hard for a long time

to achieve it."33

As has been the case with post-liberation era China, China's domestic political discourse

has influenced its foreign policy outcomes. For instance, the concept of ‘harmonious society'

discourse during the Hu Jintao leadership era led to the standardization of ‘harmonious world' in

its external dealings. Given the above factors, China faces, what Sun Xuefeng calls, the twin

dilemmas, namely, the dilemma of rising powers and an identity dilemma. 34 On the one hand, as

a rising power, it faces the challenge of translating its powers to protect and promote its national

interests. On the contrary, it also has to make efforts to see how other actors in the international

system do not collude with each other to contain a rising China. For, efforts to increase national

influence leads to containment and balancing by other dominant powers and by neighboring

states who hinder a growing power to preserve/protect/promote their status. In other words, this

dilemma is a constant struggle to maintain the required momentum while trying to shape a
favorable environment. The other dilemma China faces is its perception of its image in the

international system, that is, one regarding its status as a developed country or a developing

country.

If one talks of China as a developed country then one can see some China watchers

and some mainland scholars talking about the G-2 concept (US and China) in the current

international system. On the other hand, it also realizes that it cannot wish away its domestic

social and political concerns which entail China certain privileges stemming from its status as a

developing country. It also seeks to play from time to time the Messiah by raising its voice

against unfavorable international trade and climate regimes and at the same time continues to

safeguard its national interests. Perhaps the most significant way in which China will be

influencing the outside world is also by its degree of success in tackling its domestic social and

political ills.

Probably this is what Zheng Bijian, the famous party historian of China meant when he said:

"China has always influenced the world by changing itself."

China as a Leader of the Developing World: A Combination of ‘Voice’ and ‘Exit’ Options

Chinese leadership and diplomacy have always projected BRICS as one that has been

promoting democracy in international relations. BRICS countries, according to the Chinese

leadership have always stood for international equity and justice, and time to time have spoken

with one voice for emerging markets and developing countries on various international and

regional issues. Further, called for full compliance with the purpose and principles of the UN
Charter, international law and basic norms of international relations, and pushed for a peaceful

settlement of international disputes through political and diplomatic means. 35 The growing

eloquence of China’s leadership has not gone unnoticed. For instance, Gregory Chin of York

University, Canada, who specializes on evolving global governance and China’s role observed

the following about President Xi Jinping’s speech in the 2013 G 20 summit. He was quoted

saying ‘challenging world conditions are prompting the Chinese leadership to take bold, careful

and calculated global measures’.36He further opined that he ‘found that this new spirit of

boldness continues at the G20.’37 Interestingly, in some quarters, this new face of China has been

labeled as ‘not revisionist’; but ‘reactive.’ They further caution that if the ‘new powers are not

given access to the existing global governance structures, they will create structures of their

own’. 38 This means that the advanced countries have the power to prevent the international

order's fragmentation into ideological and economic blocs - but only if they can overcome their

‘strategic mistrust’ of China. Therefore, such scholarship feels

that the participation of more European countries in the China established Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank (AIIB)39 is to be viewed in a positive light. 40 Thus, new institutions like the

AIIB ensure that the new bank complements, rather than rivals, existing institutions.

Delivering his keynote speech in the seventh BRICS summit in Ufa, Russia,

President Xi Jinping expressed confidence in the future of the BRICS cooperation mechanism.

He stated ‘the more difficulties we face, the more confidence we must have.’ 41 In his address, Xi

called on BRICS countries to build a four-pronged partnership – ‘safeguarding world peace,

boosting common development, promoting diversified civilization and strengthening global

economic governance.’42 On boosting common development, Xi said the BRICS countries

should forge a community of shared interests and build a closer economic partnership.43

On another occasion addressing the UN Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a South-

South cooperation roundtable he hosted and addressed, Xi spoke of a new ‘six one hundred

initiatives’44 and proposed a four-point proposal45 on pushing forward collaboration between

developing countries in the new era. Under the auspices of the ‘six one-hundred initiative,' China

suggested that it will assist the developing world in many ways. Under this plan, in the next five

years, hundred poverty reduction programs, hundred agricultural cooperation projects, hundred

trade promotion and aid programs, hundred environmental protection and climate change

programs, hundred hospitals and clinics, and hundred schools and vocational training centers

will be set up.46Also during the period, Beijing will provide one lakh and twenty-thousand

opportunities and one lakh and fifty thousand scholarships for citizens of other developing

countries to receive training and education in China, and help nurture five lakh professional

technicians for the rest of the developing world. Besides, the Chinese president added that China

would set up an Academy

significant South-South Cooperation and Development, and provide two million dollars of aid in

cash for the World Health Organization. 47

Further, President Xi raised a four-point proposal for expanding South-South

cooperation in the new era.48 First, he urged developing countries to explore diversified paths of

development, saying that it requires ‘a matched key to open the lock.’ The developing countries,

Xi said, should stick to the development paths of their independent choice and with their unique

characteristics, share successful experiences in state governance, focus on capacity-building,

explore growth potentials, solve development difficulties and improve the well-being of the

people. Second, Xi called on the developing countries to conjoin their development strategies.

They should make better use of their comparative advantages, enhance macroeconomic policy

coordination, and advance cooperation simultaneously in such areas as economy, trade, finance,

investment, infrastructure construction and environmental protection, to improve the overall

competitiveness of the developing countries, he added. Third, the Chinese leader said the

developing countries should strive for practical development results. He said that the developing

countries concentrate on rolling out some strategic flagship projects, to instill vigor to South-

South cooperation. To do that, Xi said, they can focus on interconnectivity and production

capacity cooperation and give full play to such new mechanisms as the Asian Infrastructure

Investment Bank and the New Development Bank of the emerging-market bloc of

BRICS.Fourthly, Xi called for concerted efforts to improve the global development framework.

The developing countries should promote the reform of global economic governance,

consolidate the multilateral trading system, and expand communication and exchange with

developed countries, to build a community of shared interests.

On strengthening global economic governance, Xi urged the BRICS countries to push

for IMF reforms by expanding the representativeness and raising the voice of the emerging

market economies and developing countries. BRICS countries should work together to elevate

their position and role in the global governance system, and push the international economic

order to conform with the historical trend of rising influence of emerging economies and

developing countries, Xi said. Further, BRICS countries have worked to boost world economic
growth and improve global economic governance. It sought to enhance the representation and

voice of emerging markets and developing countries in international economic and financial

affairs and instilled new momentum to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and

other international financial institutions.49These statements from time to time have shown that

China in partnership with other BRICS countries is keen to negotiate and bargain with the

established institutional mechanisms of global governance in the international system. In the

process, it would not hesitate to voice its disagreement with its partners in all the major

international fora.

More importantly, China in partnership with BRICS countries has not hesitated to

adopt the ‘exit’ option and espouse the need for new institutions reflecting the values of the

BRICS countries. Not surprisingly, political leadership in BRICS countries don't think that

global governance is working.50The creation of the BRICS Development Bank could be seen as

a manifestation of their frustration. The inspiration to establish these new institutions came from

their keenness to move beyond the era of WB and IMF preeminence in the international financial

architecture. This desire is commensurate with their growing economic prowess.BRIC countries

together enjoy less than 10% of the IMF's total votes, while the USA alone enjoys around 15%. 51

The G8, on the other hand, consisting of the world's eight most-developed economies plus

Russia, enjoys nearly 50% of the total votes. 52 Another example of BRICS voicing the ‘exit’

option is the proposal of setting up the Brics energy association, under which the Fuel Reserve

Fund and the Energy Policy Institute were identified as structures, demonstrates another possible
resolve to try to gradually disengage from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) and begin initiating an alternate structure. 53

China’s Diplomatic Posturing on BRICS as Expressed through the Presidential Summits 54

China's approach towards BRICS has evolved ever since the first summit in

Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009. Given that the world in the post-2008 US financial crisis-era has

witnessed significant changes it is worthwhile exploring the changing Chinese discourse on

BRICS. Due to spatial constraints, one would like to confine the analysis of China's approach

towards BRICS by studying some of the key ideas floated and proposals made during the various

BRICS summits. For the sake of convenience, one has divided this into two periods. In the first

section, one would like to discuss Chinese diplomacy through President Hu Jintao's speeches.

This discussion will be followed by a brief analysis of China's approach as put forward by

President Xi Jinping's address.

China’s approach towards BRICS during Hu Jintao Era

Table I below summarizes the Chinese leadership's approach towards BRICS

in each of the summits. In the first BRICS summit, Hu Jintao did not come up with a specific

theme in his summit address. Being the first summit of BRIC nations in the year after the

financial crisis the summit provided an ice-breaking platform to initiate a new chapter in the

international relations

arena. No wonder, two dominant themes dominated the Chinese President discourse. First,

enhancement of ‘political trust’ through track I and track II channels in the form of promotion of

people to people contacts between the BRIC countries. Second, how BRIC nations can actively

address the various issues that emerged from the 2008 financial crisis in the US. Apart from
these, the other important subjects that were raised included an appeal to the BRIC countries to

commit themselves to food security, energy security, and public health security. 55 In the second

BRIC summit the Chinese President’s speech was delivered on the theme ‘cooperation,

openness, mutual benefit and win-win strategy’. This speech was very much in alignment with

the overall theme of the summit, namely, ‘common vision and global governance.' In this

summit held in Brasilia, Brazil, the President's speech was laced with terms like ‘dialogue and

co-operation;' ‘peace; and development,' and promote co-operation. Further, the Chinese leader

appealed to all countries to contribute their lot to the global economic recovery and have better

‘co-ordination in macroeconomic policies.'56One can infer that President Hu Jintao’s address was

influenced by his domestic political discourse on ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific outlook of

development,’ and ‘putting people first.’

The third BRIC summit was very crucial for China because it was organized in

Sanya, in the province of Hainan. The theme of the President’s address was per the summit

theme, namely, ‘broad vision, shared prosperity’ implying that China wanted to make a deep

impression, ushering a new era of activism of BRIC countries in the international system. This

summit marked the transformation of BRIC to BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa. One

can see that inclusion of South Africa was a signaling to the world that BRICS leadership is not

about safeguarding the

interests of the member nations but also advocating the cause of other emerging markets and

developing countries. The Chinese leader called upon the BRICS countries to broaden the scope

of co-operation in the areas of trade, health-care, and sister-city relationships. The highlight of

the summit was the Sanya declaration which indicated that the BRICS leadership has consensus

on main issues related to critical domains of global governance, namely, ‘global economy,
finance, and development.’ The Presidential address deliberately made use of words like ‘just,

fair, inclusive, and well-managed international monetary and financial systems’ to support global

economic development.’57From China’s perspective, the most significant achievement of this

summit was an apparent intent to broaden the scope of intra-BRICS co-operation but also

expressing the desire to expand the scope of BRICS activism by taking the cudgels of fighting to

facilitate a greater say of the developing countries in global governance.

The Sanya declaration in the third summit catapulted BRICS leadership's desire to

play a more active role at the global level. Therefore, it was not surprising to see ‘Global

Stability, Security and Prosperity' as the theme of the fourth BRICS summit. The Chinese

leadership outlined its stance on the Western-dominated by weaving its approach to BRICS

diplomacy by opting to tune its discourse on the theme ‘Strengthening Mutually Beneficial

Cooperation for a Better Future.’ This summit saw the Chinese leadership claiming that BRICS

has developed as a significant member of the big family of ‘emerging markets and developing

countries’. Chinese leadership put forth four proposals on cementing the ties between BRICS

countries. First, they should all aspire for ‘common development and common prosperity’.

Second, they should strive towards ‘deepening of political trust with

mutual respect'. Third, the member countries should develop pragmatic co-operation with

emphasis on cementing the foundations of co-operation. Last, they should aim to ‘promote the

development of the whole world,' advocating the reform of ‘global economic governance' and

boost ‘south-south co-operation' and expand ‘north-south dialogue'. 58 The Chinese leadership

announced unequivocally a determination to espouse the cause of multilateralism and greater

coordination among BRICS countries to reinforce better coordination and communications

among BRICS countries. To quote President Hu, ‘China is determined to support the BRICS

cooperation and will always stand together with all developing countries’. 59

Table I: Chinese Approach to BRICS as Expressed in the Form of President Hu Jintao’s

Address in BRICS Summits

Serial Time and Venue Overall Theme Keywords of the Key Theme from China’s

No. of the Summit of the BRICS BRICS Summit Perspective

 Summit

1 First Summit, Theme: None Financial crisis, Absence of an explicit theme

June 2009 global

Yekaterinburg, development,

Russia food security

2 Second Summit, Theme: Exalting the Cooperation, Openness,

Common Vision financial Mutual Benefit and Win-

April 2010
and Global contribution of Win Strategy Cooperation,
Brasilia, Brazil
governance the BRICS to the Openness, Mutual Benefit

International and Win-Win Strategy

Monetary Fund-

Inputs from civil

society, Voting

quotas of IMF

3 Third Summit, Broad Vision, Clean energy, Broad Vision, Shared

Shared increasing Prosperity

April
Prosperity engagement and
2011,Sanya,
cooperation with
Hainan, China
non-BRICS

countries

4 Fourth Summit, BRICS Global stability, Strengthening Mutually

March 2012 New Partnership for Security in the Beneficial Cooperation for
 Delhi, India Global Stability, Middle East, a Better Future

Security, and Climate change

Prosperity

Source: The table is formed based by the data published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

People's Republic of China, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of

America and various press reports which have covered the keynote speeches of the Chinese

Presidents during different BRICS summits.

China’s approach towards BRICS during Xi Jinping Era

Table II depicts the Chinese approach towards BRICS. It is pertinent to note that the

elevation of President Xi Jinping as China’s numero uno led to a more ambitious China vying

for a greater say for itself in global affairs. It shed its earlier hesitancies to come out in the open

and announced measures which have made more than a dent in the western dominance of

various international institutions. This era started with President Xi's call to the Chinese to strive

for realization of the ‘China dream.' It was also marked by a major anti-corruption drive and call

for a growth of rate termed ‘new normal.' President Xi Jinping's first term also witnessed the

announcement of the much contested ‘one belt one road' (shortly called OBOR) initiative. The

establishment of the New Development Bank (also known as the BRICS bank) headquartered in

Shanghai and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has for the first time challenged

the unparalleled dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions. Another significant development

was not only the establishment of institutions like the AIIB but more importantly the willingness
of some of the western countries and US allies to join this bank. President Xi Jinping's foreign

policy stemmed from many of these developments.

In the fifth BRICS summit organized outside the BRIC countries in Durban, South

Africa for the first time President Xi Jinping displayed a benevolent approach by deciding to

speak on the theme ‘work together for common development’. Using the platform of the BRICS

summit which was held in Africa, the Chinese leadership was very astute in calling upon BRICS

countries to work for ‘democratization’ of international relations. He also called upon the

BRICS leadership to work jointly to increase the pace of ‘transformation of economic growth

mode and pursue new economic growth points.’60

Like in the first BRICS summit, in the sixth BRICS summit organized in Fortaleza,

Brazil, the Chinese President Xi Jinping did not have a unique theme in which he reached out to

the BRICS leaders. However, the summit’s theme being ‘inclusive growth: sustainable

solutions,’ President Xi used the venue of the summit to reach out to the South American

countries. He exhorted the BRICS leadership to ‘push forward the international order towards a

fairer and more rational direction’ and contribute to the cause of global economic governance.

He called upon the BRICS leaders to pay attention to various issues related to ‘poverty

alleviation and sustainable development.’

The seventh BRICS summit in Ulf , Russia saw Chinese diplomacy for the first time

advocating for new global governance mechanisms which reflect abandoning of the ‘cold war

mentality, resisting a non-zero –sum game, and safeguarding world peace and stability.’ He

called upon the BRICS leaders to ‘safeguard interests of emerging markets and other developing

nations on main issues concerning global development as post-2015 development agenda and

climate change’. He also exhorted the BRICS leadership to ‘firmly adhere to multilateralism’

and play a critical role in advancement of ‘global economic governance.’ Further, he advocated

that BRICS countries should redefine their role in the ‘global governance system,’ narrow the
‘North-South gap’ and ‘intensify South-South co-operation.’ For the first time, the Chinese

leader openly urged the BRICS countries to support China’s multilateral initiatives like the

AIIB, and the ‘belt and road’ initiative. President Xi’s address was carefully crafted around the

theme ‘Jointly Build Partnership for Right Future’ and was in tune with the theme of the

summit, namely, ‘BRICS Partnership – a Powerful Factor of Global Development.’ 61

In the eighth BRICS summit in Goa, India, President Xi chose to deliver his address

with a firm conviction that BRICS as co-operation has grown into an ‘international mechanism

of major influence and yielded fruitful results.’ Therefore, it was not a surprise to witness him

speaking on the theme ‘cement confidence and seek common development.’ Like the previous

summits, he appealed to the BRICS leaders to play a pro-active role in reforming ‘global

economic governance’ and champion the cause of emerging markets and developing economies

by voicing concerns affecting them. 62

In the latest summit in Xiamen, China, President Xi Jinping used his speech to

‘strengthen China’s advocacy for economic globalization in the face of signals from the Trump

administration of rising protectionism.’ 63 . President Xi reiterated what he had shared in the

earlier summits. In his speech he once again stressed on words like ‘spirit of openness,

inclusiveness, and win-win co-operation’; ‘firmly uphold multilateralism’; ‘abide by

international law’ and ‘people-to-people exchanges.’ In his speech, he lavished praise on the

evolution of BRICS as an international institution and urged the BRICS countries to work

towards the second ‘golden decade' of co-operation. However, for the first time, a Chinese leader

openly criticized the growing trends of ‘protectionism' in international trade and strongly

advocated that the international trade regime adheres to ‘multilateral trading system.'64Another

first in President Xi’s speech was a call to ‘implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development to achieve balanced economic, social and environmental progress.’

Table II: Chinese Approach to BRICS as Expressed in the Form of President Xi Jinping’s

Address in BRICS Summits

Serial Summit Summit Theme Keywords of Key Theme from China’s

No. Number the BRICS Perspective

and Summit
 Venue

1 Fifth BRICS Development Work Together for Common

Summit,
March, and of institutional Development
2013, Africa: links-Lending
Durban, Partnership for
South
Africa for infrastructural
Development, projects in the
Integration developing
and world and it
Industrialization
was announced

that it would be

lending in local

currency, and

open up

membership to

non-BRICS

countries in the

coming months

2 Sixth Like the first summit, there was no

Summit, explicit theme mentioned in this

Inclusive Growth: Multilateral
July 2014, summit
Sustainable Economic

Fortaleza, Solutions Cooperation,

Brazil BRICS

Exchanges
 Alliance, inter-

institutional

relationship,

energy security

3 Seventh BRICS Cooperation, Jointly Build Partnership for Bright

Summit Partnership – a Peace and Future

July 2015, Powerful Factor security,

Ufa, Sustainable
Of Global
Russia development,
Development
Poverty

eradication

4 Eighth Building Terrorism, Cement Confidence and Seek Common

Summit Responsive, research Development

October Inclusive and centers in the

2016, Collective fields of

Goa, India Solutions agriculture,

railways and a

BRICS sports

council,

strategic

partnership,

openness,
 solidarity,

equality,

mutual

understanding,

inclusiveness

5 September Stronger BRICS Partnership for a

2017, Brighter Future

Xiamen,

China

Source: The table is formed from the data published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

People’s Republic of China, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of

America and various press reports which have covered the keynote speeches of the Chinese

Presidents during different BRICS summits.

Conclusion

There is a dispute among China observers as regards the magnitude of power that a

country like China commands in the international system. However, there is unanimity among

all of them that China has come a long way from being a country which used to abide by sagely

advice of Deng Xiaoping that China should not be assumed the mantle of leadership too

soon.(bu dang you). In the wake of the 2008 crisis, the US-led west credentials have definitely

suffered a moral blow. The expansion of G-8 to G-20 and the simultaneous rise of China and

more importantly its growing assertiveness is a reality which one can’t wish away. It has always
been a critic of western values, especially the ones that have manifested themselves from the

US-led international order. Being what Martin Jacques has termed a ‘civilizational state,' China

firmly believes, today it is militarily and strong enough to raise its voice to achieve and effect

significant changes to tune with its foreign policy ambitions. In the recent times, especially since

the elevation of Xi Jinping as the President of China, it has become more vociferous in its

pronouncements on reshaping institutional mechanisms of global governance which are not only

reflective of today’s international politics but also the values which are not necessarily an off-

shoot of the liberal order. In the case of China, these values can be traced to Confucianism and

Daoism. The diplomatic language as exemplified by the Presidential addresses in the BRICS

summits and its diplomats in various other international fora is replete with words like ‘justice,'

‘equality,' ‘mutual trust'. However, the most formidable challenge for Chinese diplomacy is to

overcome the suspicions of the rest of the world which is unsure of dealing with China. Until

and unless the Chinese diplomacy invests in addressing concerns emanating from these

suspicions and bridges the apparent gulf between what it says and what it does it is going to be

increasingly difficult for China to craft its ambitions in achieving its desired goals to reshape the

rules of global governance.

End-notes

1
Keynote - Chinese Traditional Culture and Foreign Policy Wang Zaibang, Vice President, CICIR, Global
Governance Conference Toronto, Canada June 11, 2010

2
' Jonathan Pearlman, The time for waiting is over: China has taken its great political leap forward, The
Sunday Morning Herald, December 2009

3
Gu, Jing, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner. "Global governance and developing countries: the
implications of the rise of China." World development 36, no. 2 (2008): 274-292
4
Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Lindsay. "America unbound: The Bush revolution in foreign policy."
(2005).
5
Gu, Jing, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner. "Global governance and developing countries: the
implications of the rise of China." World development 36, no. 2 (2008): 274-292, pp. 1-2
6
Kaplinsky, Raphael. "Revisiting the revisited terms of trade: will China make a difference?" World
Development 34, no. 6 (2006): 981-995
7
Kaplan, Robert D. "How we would fight China." The Atlantic Monthly 295, no. 5 (2005): 49- 64.
8
See Kurlantzick, Joshua. "The decline of American soft power." Current History 104, no. 686 (2005):
419. Also see Ramo, Joshua Cooper. "An Image Emergency: The gap between how China sees itself and
others see it is wide and dangerous." Newsweek International 25 (2006)
9
Fishman, Ted. China, Inc.: How the rise of the next superpower challenges America and the world.
Simon and Schuster, 2005
10
' Steingart, Gabor. The war for wealth: The true story of globalization, or why the flat world is broken.
McGraw Hill Professional, 2008
11
' Jacques, Martin. When China rules the world: The end of the western world and the birth of a new
global order. Penguin, 2009.
12
Wang, Hongying, and James N. Rosenau. "China and global governance." Asian Perspective (2009): pp.
5-39, p 7
13
See Lardy, Nicholas R. "China in the world economy." Peterson Institute Press: All Books (1994).
14
See Jacobson, Harold Karan, and Michel Oksenberg. China's participation in the IMF, the World Bank,
and GATT: toward a global economic order. University of Michigan Press, 1990
15
See Shirk, Susan L. How China opened its door: the political success of the PRC's foreign trade and
investment reforms. Brookings Institution Press, 1994
16
Chan, Lai-Ha, Pak K. Lee, and Gerald Chan. "Rethinking global governance: a China model in the
making?" Contemporary Politics 14, no. 1 (2008): 3-19, pp. 4-5
17
Ibid, p.5
18
Ibid
19
Ibid. To put flesh on the bones of this new concept, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a
Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues in 2002 (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2002)
20
Wang, Hongying, and James N. Rosenau. "China and global governance." Asian Perspective (2009): 5-
39, pp 11-15
21
Breslin, Shaun. "The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of
governance?" International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1323-1343
22
Glosny, Michael A. "China, and the BRICs: A real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world." Polity
42, no. 1 (2009): 100-129.
23
Cui, Yue. "Why the BRICS? A Chinese view." Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-
West Cultural and Economic Studies 10, no. 1 (2013): 4.
24
Ibid, p.3
25
Ibid
26
Wang, Hongying, and James N. Rosenau. "China and global governance." Asian Perspective (2009):
pp. 5-39
27
Cui, Yue. "Why the BRICS? A Chinese view." Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-
West Cultural and Economic Studies 10, no. 1 (2013): 4.

28
Ibid
29
Wang, Hongying, and Erik French. "China's Participation in Global Governance from a Comparative
Perspective." asia policy 15, no. 1 (2013) pp. 109-110.
30
Ibid, p104. Time to time various surveys conducted by the BBC, Pews' survey on ‘Global attitudes
Project,' and survey by the Chicago Council on Global affairs have come out with results where other
countries in general, especially the US and European countries have expressed their reservations about
China’s constructive role in global governance.

31
China denies ‘biggest trader' status, insists it's ‘developing country,' http://rt.com/business/china-
trading-us-partner-577/, February 19, 2013

32
Ibid

33
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/SXF_The_Dilemmas_of_the_Rise_of_China.pdf
34
Xue-Western-dominated, S. U. N. "The Idea of Harmonious World and Chinese Studies on Theory of
International Relations [J]." Teaching and Research 11 (2007): 00
35
Pretoria News (South Africa), July 21, 2015,Excerpts from interview with the then Ambassador to
South Africa, BRICS countries cement ties, build partnerships; China's ambassador to South Africa,
Ambassador Tian Xuejun, shares his views on Brics Summit in Ufa, Russia

36
Fu Jing and Xie Songxin, Speech earns praises from global leaders, China Daily, September 7, 2013
37
Ibid
38
Javier Solana, China and global governance, Korea Times, April 2, 2015
39
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Beijing in October 2013 saw China's proposal to
spearhead the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). And it has established a $40
billion Silk Road Fund, to support its ambitions to re-create the ancient overland and maritime routes
connecting Asia to Europe. In implementing its so-called 'one belt, one road' strategy, China will pursue
investments affecting some 60 countries - including in Central Asia, where its portfolio already contains
projects worth more than $50 billion. The maritime route will include the Indian Ocean, the South China
Sea, and the Mediterranean. Together, they will form not just a road, but a network to facilitate the transfer
of goods and ideas across Eurasia
40
Javier Solana, China and global governance, Korea Times, April 2, 2015
41
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, July 10, 2015, China president voices confidence in BRICS
future
42
“Chinese President Xi Jinping Attends 5th BRICS Summit in Durban and Delivers an Important
Speech,” 2013. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_665694/t1026742.shtml
43
Ibid
44
China President launches South-South initiative in UN summit, September BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific
– Political 28,2015
45
Ibid
46
Ibid
47
Ibid
48
Ibid
49
Ibid
50
The Daily Telegraph (London), July 26, 2014, BRICS' frustration with global governance led to a new
bank
51
Daily News, Sri Lanka, July 30, 2014, Laying the BRICS for a new global financial architecture
52
Ibid
53
The Sunday Independent (South Africa), Pathway to Sustainable Growth, July 20, 2014
54
Given the constraints of space one has tried to understand the Chinese approach to BRICS through the
various addresses made by China's President. A brief insight into these speeches will give us an idea of
how BRICS discourse has evolved over a period. This portion including the accompanying tables have
been presented on the basis of the data published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic
of China, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America and various press
reports which have covered the keynote speeches of the Chinese Presidents during different BRICS
summits
55
“Remarks by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People’s Republic of China at the BRIC Summit,” 2009.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t568774.shtml.
56
“President Hu Jintao Delivers an Important Speech at the Second Summit Meeting of BRIC Leaders,”
2010. http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t683054.htm

57
“Hu Jintao Presides over and Delivers an Important Speech at the Third BRICS Leaders Meeting in
Sanya, Hainan Province,” 2011. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t816047.htm.

58
“The Fourth BRICS Summit Kicks off Hu Jintao Delivers an Important Speech,” 2012. http://dk.china-
embassy.org/eng/TourChina/t919321.htm.

59
Ibid
60
“Chinese President Xi Jinping Attends 5th BRICS Summit in Durban and Delivers an Important
Speech,” 2013. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_665694/t1026742.shtml.
61
Xi Jinping Attends 7th BRICS Summit and Delivers Important Speech,” 2015.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcxjzgjldrdqchwhshhzzzcygyslshdswchy/t1280846.s
html.

62
“Xi Jinping Attends the 8th BRICS Summit and Delivers Important Speech, Stressing to Cement
Confidence and Seek Common Development and Announcing China to Host the 9th BRICS
Summit.” Accessed September 7, 2017.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1406785.shtml.

63
https://news.cgtn.com/news/34556a4d33557a6333566d54/share_p.html. Accessed on 10th of September
2017
64
“Ninth BRICS Summit Opens Xi Jinping Chairs the Summit and Delivers Important Speech Stressing
Stronger BRICS Partnership for a Brighter Future,” 2017.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1490468.shtml.