Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155831             February 18, 2008

MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner, 

vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 155840             February 18, 2008

ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner, 
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
(in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National labor
Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, respondents.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 158700             February 18, 2008

The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, petitioners, 
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an

employee’s spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her
life.1

Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002
Resolution of the CA’s Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified
the December 14, 2001 Decision3of the Court of Appeals’ Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the
Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.

All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the
NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual
harassment complained of, thus:

xxxx

4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot,
gumaganda ka yata?"

5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking

balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng
diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin
ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang
nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.

6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8 th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na
kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may
koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito.
Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan
ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:

Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.

At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay.
Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend
na raw ba ako.

Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?

Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.

Chairman: Nasaan na siya?

Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.

Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?

Lourdes: Nainip po.

Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa

iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.

Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.

Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.

Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.

 Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.

Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag

hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin
kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.

Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just
the two of us.

Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?

Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I don’t give them a damn.
Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.

Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko

na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang
kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong
piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot
ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang
nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong
isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging
bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.

7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman
Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.

Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?

Lourdes: Sir, wala po.

Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?

Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.

Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?

Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.

Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.

Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.

Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.

8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa
kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si
Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang
mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa
dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad
mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
 9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina,
sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:

Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa inyo.

Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya

Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).

10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina
upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng
unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza
Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok
na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang
balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:

Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?

Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay
niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay
pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga
at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay.
At saka ko sinabi:

Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!

Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-
isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.4

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately
transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being
a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered
Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such
purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280,
Series of 1998,5 constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance
with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the
Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty
of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO
250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.

The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and
Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119, 7 the pertinent
portions of which read:

Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of the
Committee as to the culpability of the respondent [Rayala], the same having been
established by clear and convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the recommendation
that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
considering the circumstances of the case.

What aggravates respondent’s situation is the undeniable circumstance that he took

advantage of his position as the superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the
highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office, it was incumbent
upon respondent to set an example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves
in public office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere
wherein co-workers treat each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the
end the public interest will be benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182
SCRA 785 [1990]).

What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano vs.
Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA
6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good
morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is
a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Given these established standards, I see respondent’s acts not just [as] a failure to give due
courtesy and respect to his co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government official must at all
times uphold, one that is contrary to law and "public sense of morality." Otherwise stated,
respondent – to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest official [of] the NLRC –
had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to
remain in the service.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National

Labor Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct and is herebyDISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt of this Order.

SO ORDER[ED].

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution 8 dated May 24,
2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14,
2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for

Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution 12 dated September 4, 2000, the Court
recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate
action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on
record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It said:

The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward and
uninhibited testimony was not emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or
his witnesses. x x x

Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo and her
witnesses to invent their stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to
accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his empty
conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a
hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence
(People v. Noroña, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant
would concoct a story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and
thereby expose herself to the possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal from
her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.

It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that
Rayala’s acts violated RA 6713:

Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National Labor
Relations Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as
he does such an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct
of his everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the acts
complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the
objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the
solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute.
His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal from office. 14

Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.

SO ORDERED.15

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the
December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the
penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day. 16 Pursuant to the internal rules
of the CA, a Special Division of Five was constituted. 17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA
modified its earlier Decision:

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the
challenged decision stands.
 SO ORDERED.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003
Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the
Court granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.

Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of
any act of sexual harassment.

Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s October 18, 2002 Resolution.
The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, (sic)

is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.

G.R. No. 155831

Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President.
She raises this issue:

The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to
suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The President has the
prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential
appointee. The President was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in
deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service. 21

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President
who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s decision was
arrived at after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative
that is entirely with the President.22

As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases
against presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE
Secretary is the disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power of the
President to dismiss an erring presidential appointee.

G.R. No. 155840

In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:

I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF

HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN
BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE OFAQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS
IN THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
 II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT
IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS
MALUM PROHIBITUM.

III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE
DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877,
BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.23

Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes
sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must
be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to
hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination
against the employee.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request
from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala,
the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of
malice in his alleged acts – a "product of her own imagination" 25 – that led her to file the sexual
harassment complaint.

Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum
prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual
harassment is considered an offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole.
Thus, he claims that intent is an essential element of the offense because the law requires as
a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to achieve certain
specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with the perpetrator’s deliberate intent to commit
the offense.26

Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails
the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:

Rule IV

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual harassment may be committed in any of

the following forms:

a) Overt sexual advances;

b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;

c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates,
outings or the like for the same purpose;

d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is
generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim. 27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not
constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power
granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did
not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional
forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment. 29

G.R. No. 158700

The Republic raises this issue:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment. 30

The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts
constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature,
which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim. 31

It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP.
Rayala’s dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC
Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the
due process clause.

The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will
not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even
though Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil
Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave
misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.32 The Republic adds that Rayala’s position is
invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the
service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which
states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good
behavior.33 Since Rayala’s security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be
removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.

All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:

(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?

(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?

Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No.
155840 before this Court.

We do not agree.

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered
in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or special civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. 35

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of
the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two
preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.36

Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the assailed
Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22,
2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002,
it was directed by this Court to file its Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on June 16,
2003.

When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for Review
with this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping"
(sic), that there was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R.
No. 155840. With respect to Domingo’s petition, the same had already been dismissed on February
19, 2003. Domingo’s petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received by the
OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition. 37

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must point
out that it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala
himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a
more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The
parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the
same on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court,
as did Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising
a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away
this right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayala’s petition, it had
to comply, even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for
contempt.

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment."

We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.

It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding
the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and
the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant
(Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the
appropriate imposable penalty.

That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment – is, therefore,
the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP
and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings
made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to
review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are
now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed
some of the acts imputed to him.

He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not
allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a
condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position. 41 Rayala urges us
to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42

We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for
each can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual
harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-
related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education

or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person
who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted
by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way
would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor
laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of
sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:

Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training

Environment. – It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related,
 educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts
of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office
shall:

(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly
approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment
cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for
unlawful acts of sexual harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include,
among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or
training institutions.

(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual

harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other
officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and
students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.

In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one
(1) representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.

In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at
least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors,
professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe.

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a
copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal
infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating
Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.

Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he
would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his
fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her
money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be
made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that
the respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo
is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA
that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of
absence and requested transfer to another unit.

Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is
different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and
Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now
Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She complained of several incidents when
Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case
was referred to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga
found that "the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in
greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso’ fashion, were carried out with lustful and
lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that
most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and special occasions," and they "took place in
the presence of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of the
moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:

In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant
should be understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities,
and not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing
escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice
and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the
'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms.
Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso'
or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when they meet each other, like
birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter
whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who
belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays,
respondent judge would likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner.
Interestingly, in one of several festive occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked
respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.

In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's
acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and
customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent,
only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the
complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably,
there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents. 47

This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.

To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the
Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done
during festive or special occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, Rayala’s acts
of holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s office when no other
members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala’s
acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by
her having reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of
absence and requesting transfer to another unit.

Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover
the NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and
policy coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is
not within its coverage because he is a presidential appointee.

We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real
consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against
Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the
administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the
Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties,
preparation of the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the
OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as
an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.

Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum
prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against
him.

We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether
the crime ofsexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.

We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him
out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by
Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact.
Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would
be ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact
that Domingo and her witnesses – all employees of the NLRC at that time – stood to lose their jobs
or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual
harassment.

Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the
Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OP’s
decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative
Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral
conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and total nullity."

We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:

[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process
safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, 49 he
appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.

On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the
offense is not controlling, thus:

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. 50

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral
conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we
now determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service
Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged administratively,
aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.

Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal. 52 On the other hand, Section
22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by
dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he
or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office. 55

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,
however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found
that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As
cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the
penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.

Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government
position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance57and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 58 Hence, the maximum penalty
that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus,
it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v.
Judge Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:

The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge.
He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent
was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.

In yet another case, this Court declared:

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live
up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors. 60

It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct
themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere.
Courtesy demands that he should set a good example. 61

Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even
puts Domingo’s character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who
ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not
significant factors in the disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here and sadly,
the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831,
155840, and 158700 areDENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justic
 EN BANC 

[A. C. No. 5033, July 28, 2008] 

MARY JANE D. VELASCO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN AND ATTY. HECTOR
CENTENO, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N 

PER CURIAM:

This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco on March 31, 1999, against
respondent lawyers for forgery and falsification constitutive of malpractice. [1]

On June 21, 1999, the Court's Second Division required the respondent lawyers to comment on the
complaint within (10) days from notice. [2]

On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for respondents, filed a Motion for Extension to File
Comment praying that an extension of sixty (60) days from August 16, 1999 be given to them to file their
comment.[3]

On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension with a warning that the same shall be the
last and no further extension will be given.[4]

The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.

On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and their counsel to show cause why they should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution
requiring the comment. Copies of the resolution dated June 20, 2001 were returned unserved from Atty.
Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations "party out/unknown at/party moved out" and "moved out." Atty.
Doroin received the said resolution on July 27, 2001.[5]

On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the correct addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty.
Centeno, while Atty. Charlie Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply with the show cause
resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was ordered to submit his comment. [6]

Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.

On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for her non-compliance with the said directive and to submit her compliance within ten (10) days
from notice. In the same resolution, the fine imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was increased from Php
500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file his comment on the complaint as required by the Court, or to
suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in case he fails to pay and to submit his comment on the complaint
within ten (10) days from notice.[7]

In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed the Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid
the fine of Php 1,000.00. However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit the comment on the administrative
complaint required of him and has not complied with the show cause resolution dated April 17, 2002 by
submitting the correct addresses of Atty. Quintin P. Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno. [8]

In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie
Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Mr. Juanito C.
Perez to prosecute the instant case.[9]

On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the compliance of the complainant as well as the
latter's manifestation and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record. [10]

On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala
issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to the case scheduled on October 26, 2005
with a strict note that "[n]on-appearance by any of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
participate in further proceedings."[11]

On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complainant, together with his counsel
Atty. Andres Villaruel, Jr. appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno had not
filed their comment, they were directed to submit it within (10) days from receipt of notice. The hearing of
the case was reset on November 30, 2005.[12]

On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of the complaint, together with his
counsel, Atty. Villaruel, appeared. The notices sent to respondents were returned to the Commission on Bar
Discipline with a notation "RTS-Moved." As respondents had not filed their comment on the complaint, they
were declared in default. In an Order dated November 30, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala
submitted her report and recommendation, viz.[13]

The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:

xxxxxxxxx

In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was appointed as Administratrix in Special
Proceedings Case No. Q-96-27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 87, entitled "In the matter of the Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo Doroin, Monina E.
Doroin, petitioner." The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January 1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this
Special Proceedings case, respondents were collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.

On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means into making her sign an Extra-
Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum of P1,216,078.00 giving the
paramour of complainant's father, Josephine Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and also allotting
complainant's two (2) alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of
P1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law. But no share was assigned to
complainant's mother, who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.

To partially satisfy complainant's share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a
paper which was an alleged Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of complainant's father located at
Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885, Complainant told Atty.
Doroin that she will first consult a lawyer regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of Authority to Sell
before she signs the same. Eventually, she was not able to sign the said Confirmation because complainant's
lawyer, Atty. Marapao, failed to confer and negotiate with Atty. Doroin regarding the same.

When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was
no house constructed thereon, but when she visited it again on January 1999, there was already a four-door
townhouse constructed. Complainant was informed by the caretaker at the site that the owner is one
Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also learned later on that the property, which was one of the
properties submitted to the Court handling the Special Proceedings case in the Inventory of Property dated 3
April 1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura [sic], by forging the signature of
complainant's late father. Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City, knowing that
complainant's father was already dead as of 21 January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute
Sale, that complainant's father appeared before him in Quezon City on 17 January 1997.

Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document was filed against respondent Atty. Hector
Centeno before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as Criminal Case No.
104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12 September 2001 and pleaded "not guilty." After the
arraignment, Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared [sic] in court and jumped bail. [14]
The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they caused "extreme and great damage to the complainant." [15] The Commissioner also
noted that the failure of the respondents to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on
several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearing set showed "flouting resistance to lawful orders of
the court and illustrates despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction."[16] The Commissioner recommended that the respondent lawyers be disbarred.

On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline with the modification that
respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitely instead of being disbarred.

The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, were
submitted to the Court, through the Director for Bar Discipline, in a transmittal letter dated January 22,
2007.

The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their
lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would merit their
disbarment.

We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the penalty to be imposed on
respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." [17]
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients
or the public at large,[18] and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. [19] In Marcelo v. Javier,[20] we
reminded the members of the legal profession that:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his
clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this
end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege and right to practice law during good behaviour and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded
him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license
or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. [21]
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests upon the complainant, and for the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof.[22]

In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale and forced her to
sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was "in accordance with law."
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath to
uphold the law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in
dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in succession law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse shall
have a share in the estate by way of legitimes [23] and no extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of
said right except if she gives it up for lawful consideration, but never when the spouse is not a party to the
said settlement.[24] And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must "give every man his due." [25]

The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They failed to answer the complaint filed against
them. Despite due notice, they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims
and allegations of the complainant remainuncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade,[26] we ruled that "[a
lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are
evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of
office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court." [27]

The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty. Considering that the license to practice law, though
it is not a property right, sustains a lawyer's primary means of livelihood and to strip someone of such
license amounts to stripping one of a career and a means to keep himself alive, we agree with the
modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the
more appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector
Centeno who, aside from committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her rightful inheritance, also
committed a criminal offense when he falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from the
criminal proceeding against him after having posted bail.

We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and their regional and city
chapters to maintain an updated record of the office and residence addresses of their members to help
facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the court, lawyers should be readily available upon the Court's
beckoning.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is suspended indefinitely, and Atty. Hector Centeno is
hereby DISBARRED.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
also be placed on the personal records of the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA 
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

(on official leave) 

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA 
Associate Justice 

(on official leave)

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice 

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5321             September 27, 2006

RAMON C. GONZALEZ, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, C.J.:

Disbarment cases are sui generis. Being neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are not intended to
inflict penal or civil sanctions. The main question to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.

The Case and the Facts

This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by Ramon C. Gonzalez with the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court. The Complaint was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 2Complainant charged Atty. Arnel
C. Alcaraz with grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and acts unbecoming a lawyer. The
antecedents were summarized by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) as follows:

"x x x [C]omplainant alleges that on 11 August 2000, while he was driving along the South
Superhighway upon entering the Sucat Toll Gate heading towards Makati, respondent, who
was driving a Nissan Infiniti suddenly cut across his path while overtaking him and almost hit
his car had he not been able to evade it. According to complainant, he chased respondent's
car and when he was side by side with respondent's car, he angrily confronted respondent
and then drove on. Complainant claims that respondent then chased him and shot him twice
but fortunately missed him by a few inches[,] but broken glass coming from the shattered
window allegedly hit him and slightly wounded his right arm and stomach. Complainant adds
that respondent allegedly tried to escape but he was able to chase him and block his way at
the Nichols Toll Gate where the PNCC guards responded to his call for assistance.
According to complainant, respondent attempted to escape and avoid the PNCC guards by
'proclaiming boisterously that he is a lawyer and a customs official' but complainant was able
to block his way again and their vehicles collided in the process. Complainant claims that he
requested the PNCC guards to confiscate respondent's firearm and accompany them to the
nearest police station. At the time of the 'arrest,' respondent allegedly opened the back door
of his car and pretended to have accidentally dropped so much money which distracted the
policemen from further searching the car.

"At the police station, respondent allegedly identified himself and his lady companion, a
certain Ferlita Semeniano, and [said] that he was the Deputy Customs Collector assigned at
Batangas City. Complainant claims that respondent yielded 'one (1) Super .38 cal.
Springfield Automatic Pistol, SN NMII 3138, one (1) magazine with seven (7) live ammos and
three (3) spent (empty) shells.' Complainant adds that respondent presented only an
 unsigned Memorandum Receipt (MR) of the firearm without any Mission Order or Permit to
Carry. Complainant claims that respondent allegedly kept calling persons to help him and a
'fabricated Mission Order was brought and presented by another person more than eight
hours after the shooting incident and apprehension.'

"Complainant alleges that the Nissan Infiniti used by respondent is allegedly a luxury vehicle
which was not covered by any document whatsoever and 'it was not verified whether stolen
or smuggled.'

"Complainant finally alleges that the PNP Crime Laboratory examined his car and 'they
recovered one slug in between the wall of the left rear door while the other bullet went
through the right front seat and exited at the left rear door of complainant's car and that
cases of Frustrated Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms were already filed at the
Parañaque City Prosecutor's Office.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"In his Comment dated 04 January 2001, respondent claims that the present administrative
case is unfounded and unwarranted and was allegedly filed in bad faith, with malice and ill
motive and allegedly has no other purpose but to harass, vex, humiliate and dishonor him. In
support thereof, respondent points to the fact that complainant filed 'substantially identical
complaint affidavits with the same identical alleged cause of action as that of the present
administrative case at [various] judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals and
accused him of forum-shopping.

"Respondent denied the narration of facts stated in complainant's Complaint-Affidavit as

'self-serving, a misrepresentation of facts and obviously tainted.' Respondent claims that he
was not the aggressor during the incident and that he did not provoke complainant.
Respondent claims that he 'justly acted in self-defense and defense of a stranger under the
true actuality of facts and circumstances the[n] prevailing.'

"Respondent also claims that the acts complained of in the present case were not connected
with the practice of the legal profession and the fact that he was a lawyer is merely
coincidental, immaterial and irrelevant.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"In connection with the cases filed by the parties against each other, respondent submitted
the xxx Resolutions/Decisions issued in said cases to show that the charges filed against
him by the complainant were dismissed while the criminal cases he filed against the latter
[were] filed in court.

xxx   xxx   xxx

"Finally, it is the submission of the respondent that since the alleged acts complained of are
not within the sphere of his professional duties as a lawyer, but rather are acts done in his
non-professional or private capacity, the same, cannot allegedly be the subject of an
administrative complaint for disbarment." 3

Report and Recommendation

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
In his Report,4 IBP Investigating Commissioner Rafael Antonio M. Santos said that the dismissal of
the criminal and other administrative charges filed by complainant indicated that respondent's
version of the incident was given credence by the investigating officials and agencies of the various
other tribunals in which these charges were filed. Consequently, since no sufficient evidence
warranted the imposition of further disciplinary sanctions on respondent, the investigating
commissioner recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.

In Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 dated March 12, 2005, the board of governors of the IBP adopted the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Santos.

On July 8, 2005, the Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court
for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On August 4, 2005,
complainant asked this Court to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 of the IBP board of
governors. Upon orders of this Court,5 respondent filed on August 22, 2005, his Comment on
complainant's plea.

The Court's Ruling

The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

At the outset, we stress that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent did not erase the
occurrence of the shooting incident, which he himself does not deny. Moreover, this incident has
been established by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, he must face the consequences of his
actions.

The first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as follows:

"CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."6

Furthermore, respondent bound himself to "obey the laws" in his attorney's oath, 7 which underscores
the role of lawyers as officers of our legal system. A lawyer's brash transgression of any, especially a
penal, law is repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be countenanced by this Court. 8

Admitting that he fired shots in the direction of complainant while they were speeding along South
Luzon Expressway,9 respondent justifies his actions by claiming self-defense and defense of a
stranger. During the traffic altercation, complainant allegedly exchanged angry words with
respondent and, from an open car window, even threw a handful of coins at the latter. 10 Respondent
further avers that, from his higher vantage point, he saw complainant draw a pistol. 11 The former
contends that when he fired the shots, he had no intention of hitting complainant but merely wanted
to scare him away.

Reviewing the factual circumstances, we are convinced that the defenses proffered are mere
afterthoughts. Based on the physical and documentary evidence, complainant's version of the
incident is more credible.

First, the allegation of respondent that complainant hit him with coins is highly improbable. At that
time, both vehicles were speeding along the highway. Since the PNP Crime Laboratory
Report12 showed that the bullets fired by respondent had come from the right side, his vehicle must
have been to the right of complainant's. If we were to accept this version, the coins hurled by
complainant had to pass through his car's right window and then through the left window of
respondent's admittedly taller sports utility vehicle (SUV). Given their relative positions, it is highly
incredible that the coins could have hit respondent and his companion.

Second, assuming that respondent and his companion were indeed hit by coins, this alleged fact
was not a sufficient unlawful aggression that would justify shooting at complainant.

As a lawyer, respondent should know that the following three requisites must concur to justify self-
defense: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. 13 On the
other hand, in defense of a stranger, the first two requisites must also be present together with the
element that the person defending was not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive. 14

Of these requisites, unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding both self-defense
and defense of a stranger; the fundamental raison d'etre of these defenses is the necessity to
prevent or repel an aggression.15 The alleged throwing of coins by complainant cannot be considered
a sufficient unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent threat to life and limb.16 There was no aggression to prevent or repel. Absent this imminent
threat, respondent had no legal reason to shoot "in the direction of complainant."

Third, for lack of supporting evidence, neither can merit be accorded to respondent's claim of
imminent threat after allegedly seeing complainant draw a pistol. The Joint Affidavit 17 of PNCC
Officers Florencio Celada y Seso, Jr. and Mario Puso y Visaya mentioned no firearm found in the
possession of complainant. Except for the bare and belated allegations of respondent, there was no
showing that complainant's alleged possession of the pistol had been reported to the PNCC officers
or later to the police headquarters. Thus, without proof of the existence of the firearm, respondent
has not convincingly shown any legal justification for his act of firing at complainant. 18

Fourth, right after the shooting incident, respondent fled the scene. He stopped only when PNCC
officers blocked his vehicle in response to complainant's call for assistance. If respondent was only
protecting himself and his companion, then his righteous indignation should have propelled him to
report immediately his version of the incident to the PNCC officers.

Disbarment Proceedings
Sui Generis

Respondent maintains that the dismissal of the cases filed by complainant against him in the various
tribunals and agencies proves that the present case for disbarment is unfounded.

We do not agree.

Well-established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
These cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. 19 In Re
Almacen,20 the Court discoursed on this point thus:

"x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, x x x [they do] not involve x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather
investigation[s] by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
 interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x." 21

Respondent's administrative liability stands on grounds different from those in the other cases
previously filed against him; thus, the dismissal of these latter cases does not necessarily result in
administrative exculpation. Settled is the rule that, being based on a different quantum of proof, the
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not necessarily
foreclose the finding of guilt in an administrative proceeding. 22

Misconduct Committed
in a Private Capacity

Untenable is respondent's argument that the acts complained of cannot be the subject of a complaint
for disbarment, because they were done in his private capacity.

Whether in their professional or in their private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct. This penalty is a consequence of acts showing their unworthiness as officers of the
courts; as well as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor. 23 When the
misconduct committed outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them to be
morally unfit for the office and the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, they
may be suspended or disbarred. 24

In Cordon v. Balicanta,25 this Court explained the rationale for this holding as follows:

"x x x. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because 'vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all.'" 26

The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited by respondent in what should have been a simple traffic
altercation reveals his conceit and delusions of self-importance. By firing his gun openly in a
congested highway and exposing complainant and the general public to danger, he showed his utter
lack of a sense of responsibility, as well as of respect for law and order.

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent's gross misconduct. In line with Lao

v. Medel,27 Co v. Bernardino,28 andSaburnido v. Madroño,29 suspension from the practice of law for
one year is appropriate in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.