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G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.*

RALPH P. TUA, petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG,

Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and
ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, respondents.

Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No.
9262); Protection Orders; Words and Phrases; A protection order is an
order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and
ability to regain control of their life.—In Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352
(2013) wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the
challenge and held: A protection order is an order issued to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily
life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the

victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in
the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children
from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure
their financial support.

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Constitutional Law; Congress; The primary judge of the necessity,

adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily
the function of the legislature.—Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function
of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of
protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights.
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No.
9262); Protection Orders; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The issuance
of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under
the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to
“maintain public order in the barangay.”—As to the issuance of protection
order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides: SEC. 14.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order

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to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis
of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available
Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that
the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad
shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service. The parties may be
accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay. Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay
or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature,

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in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all
laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”
Same; Same; Temporary Protection Orders; The court is authorized to
issue a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof.—Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a Temporary Protection
Orders (TPO) on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte
determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means
that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the
issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the
petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts
against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been
committed.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is settled doctrine that there is grave
abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation

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of law.—It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when

there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO. The factual
matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the hearing on
the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order (PPO).

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Tugonon & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Rommel N. Cariño for respondents.

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
annul the Decision1 dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua
(respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus,
Cavite a Verified Petition2 for herself and in behalf of her minor
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children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and Jezreel Abigail, for
the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004, against her husband, peti-

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1 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Noel
G. Tijam and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring; Rollo, pp. 54-58.
2 Rollo, pp. 129-132.

432

tioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05
and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her
children had suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct; that
petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm
for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was
actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and,
that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s
financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in
Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born
on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and
Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit3
attached to the petition, respondent claimed, among others, that:
there was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his
gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to
convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed;
she hid her fears although she was scared; there was also an instance
when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her
youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his
child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when
she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter’s
presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he
wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner got
furious and threatened her of withholding his financial support and
even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and,
on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions
went to her new home and forcibly took the children and refused to
give them back to her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO),4 which we quote in full:

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3 Id., at pp. 133-136.
4 Id., at pp. 60-61; per Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang.

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Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the

“Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from
date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary
Protection Order, the respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby
ordered to:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit
personally or through another, physical, verbal and emotional
harm or abuse against the herein petitioner (respondent) and
other family and household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner
(respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged in any
psychological form of harassment;
3. Stay away from the petitioner (respondent) and other
family and household members at a distance of 100 meters
radius from the place of residence of the plaintiff and likewise
to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment
and other places frequented by the herein petitioner
(respondent), and other family and household members.
4. Give and deliver the three (3) minor children of the
petitioner (respondent) to the [latter] who shall have their
temporary custody pending the determination of whether or
not a permanent protection order shall issue.

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers
of the Law are hereby commanded to effect

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this Order immediately and to use necessary force and measures

under the law to implement this Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9,
2005 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5

In his Comment6 to respondent’s Petition with Urgent Motion to

Lift TPO, petitioner denied respondent’s allegations and alleged,
among others, that he had been maintaining a separate abode from
petitioner since November 2004; that it was respondent who
verbally abused and threatened him whenever their children’s stay
with him was extended; that respondent had been staying with a
certain Rebendor Zuñiga despite the impropriety and moral
implications of such set-up; that despite their written agreement that
their minor children should stay in their conjugal home, the latter
violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their
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conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said
Zuñiga; and, that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually
and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the
petition and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction and hold departure order assailing the May
23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot
and to avoid grave and irreparable injury, issued a temporary
restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and

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5 Id. (Emphasis in the original)
6 Id., at pp. 62-66.

435

their agents from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in
Civil Case No. 0464-05.
7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Manifestation,8 praying that the
enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC and all
the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing9 was, subsequently,
conducted on the motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant

petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case
No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.10

In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent

under RA 9262 is still pending before the RTC; thus, the factual
matters raised therein could not be passed upon in the petition for
certiorari filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of
the herein proceedings, petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash
warrant issued by the RTC and which matter could not also be a
subject of this petition which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005
and that the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly
issued by the RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion

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7 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices

Hakim S. Abdulhawid and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; CA Rollo, pp. 86-87.
8 Id., at pp. 93-94.
9 Id. at pp. 144-177; In attendance were Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion,
Hakim S. Abdulhawid and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of the Supreme
Court).
10 Rollo, p. 58. (Emphasis in the original)

436

in the issuance thereof as the same were in complete accord with the
provision of RA 9262.
As to petitioner’s argument that there was no basis for the
issuance of the TPO, considering that the provision authorizing such
issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter
raised herein was the RTC’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the TPO, such matter could be resolved without having to
rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that
the requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the
very lis mota of the case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the
following issues:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A
MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED RULES AND
JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER
ISSUED THE TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO)
DATED 23 MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS
OF LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO
RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS
OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN
ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA
OF THE CASE.11

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11 Id., at p. 25.

437

Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not

deciding the issue of the constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue
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presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.

The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by
petitioner in his Comment to respondent’s Petition with Urgent
Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC.
However, without awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued
for violating the due process clause of the Constitution. Contrary to
the CA’s finding that the matter raised in the petition filed with it
was the RTC’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO
which could be resolved without having to rule on the
constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since
petitioner is assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent’s
right to a protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the
said law must first be decided upon. After all, the alleged
unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a
valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.12
Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to declare RA 9262
unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section
15 of RA 9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance
of the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of law and
had properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned
provision simply encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to
basic constitutional rights which affects his life, liberty and property.
We are not impressed.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders.—Temporary

Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protec-

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12 Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 401.

438

tion order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court
may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this
Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order]
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court
shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of
the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that

Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
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A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of

violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves
to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the
victim and any designated family or household member safety in the
family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to
protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

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13 Supra.

439

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,

signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
“time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle
but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that
the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational
basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to
verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’
affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the
victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in
the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and
hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests, among which is protection of women and

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children from violence and threats to their personal safety and

security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of
the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.

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Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order

the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on
the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.14

Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of

legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is
primarily the function of the legislature.15 The act of Congress
entrusting us with the issuance of protec-

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14 Id., at pp. 426-429. (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
15 NPC Employees Consolidated Union v. National Power Corporation, 550 Phil.
199, 208-209; 522 SCRA 12, 22 (2007).

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tion orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable

controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights.16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay,
Section 14 pertinently provides:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue

and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b)
of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO
shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance
of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its
personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his

unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature,

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16 Philippine Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

442

in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to

“enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in
the barangay.”17
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May
23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for

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the issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of
the TPO is ex parte, there must be a judicial determination of the
basis thereof. He contends that the allegations in respondent’s
affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a
husband and wife which are not grave or imminent enough to merit
the issuance of a TPO.
We are not persuaded.
We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders.—Temporary

Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the
court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in
a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall
be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing
on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of
the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the
TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the
assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance
of a PPO.

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the

filing of the application after ex parte determination

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17 Garcia v. Drilon, supra note 12, at p. 432.

443

that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the
issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based
on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that
the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of
a TPO have been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their

Children.—The crime of violence against women and their children
is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
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(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman’s or her child’s freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation
directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but
not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose
or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her
child’s movement or conduct:

444

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the

woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman’s children
insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
or controlling the victim’s own money or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to
engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape,
by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his
immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman
or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;

445

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the

residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his will;

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(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings

or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or
her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the
woman’s child/children.

In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he

cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to
convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case;
feeding his other children with the food which another child spat
out; and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from
crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her
nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come often
to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their agreed
separation and threatening her of withholding half of the financial
support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the
issuance of a TPO. Petitioner’s actions would fall under the
enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a, d, e (2), f,
h, and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judg-

446

ment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power

is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.18
We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be
presented during the hearing on the merits on the issuance of the
Permanent Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court’s issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to
resolve with dispatch respondent’s Petition for a Permanent
Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.

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Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex

parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the
very purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and
Children. (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352 [2013])

_______________
18 Chua Huat v. Court of Appeals, 276 Phil. 1, 18; 199 SCRA 1, 18 (1991).

447

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of

violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules require that
petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. (Ibid.)
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