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Hermosisima vs. CA

- Soledad Cagigas, a former teacher, filed a complaint against Hermosisima for acknowledgement of their child, child support, and moral damages for breach of promise to marry. Hermosisima admitted paternity but denied promising to marry. - The trial court found in favor of Cagigas. However, the issue on appeal was whether moral damages can be recovered for breach of promise to marry. - The Supreme Court ruled that breach of promise to marry is not actionable in the Philippines based on experiences in other countries showing such suits lend themselves to abuse. Therefore, the award of moral damages for alleged breach of promise was untenable.

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88 views2 pages

Hermosisima vs. CA

- Soledad Cagigas, a former teacher, filed a complaint against Hermosisima for acknowledgement of their child, child support, and moral damages for breach of promise to marry. Hermosisima admitted paternity but denied promising to marry. - The trial court found in favor of Cagigas. However, the issue on appeal was whether moral damages can be recovered for breach of promise to marry. - The Supreme Court ruled that breach of promise to marry is not actionable in the Philippines based on experiences in other countries showing such suits lend themselves to abuse. Therefore, the award of moral damages for alleged breach of promise was untenable.

Uploaded by

jane
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Hermosisima vs.

CA
G.R. No. L-14628. September 30, 1960.
Concepcion, J

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High


School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she,
used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and
became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy
developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening, in 1953, when after
coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño" to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954,
Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24,
1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which
was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.

Soledad Cagigas file a complaint for the acknowledgement of her child, as natural
child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for
alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and
expressed willingness to support the later, but denied having ever promised to
marry the complainant.

RTC rendered judgment declaring the child as natural daughter of defendant and
confirming the order pendent lite, ordering defendant to pay the said child and
sum for damages, including the sum of 5,000 as moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to
marry.

Ruling: No.
The breach of promise to marry is not actionable. In the case of De Jesus v.
Syquia, 53 Phil., 366. The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous man. It is this experience which has led to
the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the
American States.

In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to
sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages
made by the lower court is, accordingly, untenable.

However, in case defendant-appellant’s seductive powers, plaintiff-appellee,


overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of
her age and self- control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant- appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may
be recovered from him under the provisions of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the
new Civil Code."

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals,
and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction"
therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who
was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became
intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

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