Case Name: Evangelista v People

G.R. Nos: 108135-36

Date: August 14, 2000

Plaintiff: Potenciana Evangelista

Respondent: People of the Philippines and the Honorable Sandiganbayan

Crimes: Violations of Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) andSection 3(e) of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

**Note: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of previous Supreme Court decision**Supreme Court
Decision (Sept. 1999): Acquitted of the charge of violation of NIRC but convicted for violation of RA
3019.Motion for Reconsideration-SC (August, 2000, present case): Acquitted of violation of RA3019.

Facts: Tanduay Distillery, Inc, filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) an application for tax
credits for allegedly erroneous payments of ad valorem taxes (taxes based on value
of property). Tanduay claimed that a previous BIR ruling only made Tanduay liable to pay specific taxes
and not ad valorem taxes. Thus, Tanduay requested the BIR to check and verify whether Tanduay
previously paid advalorem taxes. After making necessary verification, a certification was issued, stating
that Tanduay was a rectifier not liable ad valorem tax with a recommendation that the application for
tax credit be given due course. Sometime thereafter, BIR received a complaint, alleging that the grant of
tax credit was irregular and anomalous. Due to this, petitioner, along with three other officers of BIR,
was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the NIRC and RA 3019. They were convicted,
except for one officer, of crimes pursuant to said violations. In a consolidated petition for review, the
two officers were acquitted, except for Evangelista, who was found guilty of gross negligence in the
exercise of his duty; thus, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019?

Ruling:

“Motion for Reconsideration is well-taken.”

 The certification issued by petitioner did not endorse approval of said application for tax credit but
actually showed that Tanduay was not entitled to such. Contrary to allegations, petitioner did not cause
any undue injury to the Government, give unwarranted benefits or preference to Tanduay, display
manifest partiality to Tanduay, and act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Furthermore, the acts from which her conviction was based on were different from those described in
the Information under which she was charged with. It is a well-settled rule that  an accused cannot be
convicted of an offence unless it is clearly charged in the complaint of information.

Finally, petitioner’s act of issuing the certification did not constitute corrupt practices as defined in
Section 3(e) of RA 3019; thus, the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime where
there is no law punishing it) is applicable.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. This Court’s Decision dated September 30,
1999 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charge against her.
U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)

27JUL

FACTS:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at “Officers’ quarters. On the night, the defendant,
who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” He heard no answer and was convinced by
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the
room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out:
“If you enter the room, I will kill you.” He was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair and he
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate. The roommate
eventually died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ah Chong is liable for the death of his roommate.

HELD:

NO. Ah Chong was acquitted.

RATIO:

The decision of the lower court was reversed. The case was a “mistake of fact” resulting to self-defense
justified under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code where there is (1) unlawful aggression,
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Had the deceased be a robber as he thought,
his actions would not be criminally liable.

Some maxims cited:

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, “the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were
so;”

Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, “an act done by me against my will is not my act;”
57. Filinvest Credit vs. Relova

117 SCRA 420

FACTS:

On August 2, 1977, Filinvest Credit Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FILINVEST) filed a

complaint in the lower court against defendants Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as

RALLYE) and Emesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of money with damages and

preliminary writ of attachment.

Praying for a writ of preliminary attachment, FILINVEST submitted with its complaint the affidavit

of one Gil Mananghaya.

Judge Jorge R. Coquia (now Justice of the Court of Appeals), then presiding Judge of the lower

court, granted the prayer for a writ of attachmen.

More than a year later, in an Urgent Motion dated December 11, 1978, defendant Salazar

prayed that the writ of preliminary attachment issued ex parte and implemented solely against

his property be recalled and/or quashed. He argued that when he signed the promissory note

and chattel mortgage on May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE, FILINVEST was not yet his creditor

or obligee, therefore, he could not be said to have committed fraud when he contracted the

obligation on May 5, 1977. Salazar added that as the motor vehicle which was the object of the

chattel mortgage and the consideration for the promissory note had admittedly not been

delivered to him by RALLYE, his repudiation of the loan and mortgage is more justifiable.

FILINVEST filed an Opposition, but on February 2, 1979, the court a quo, this time presided

over by herein respondent Judge, ordered the dissolution and setting aside of the writ of

preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977 and the return to defendant Salazar of all his

properties attached by the Sheriff by virtue of the said writ.

Petioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was improperly or irregularly issued for

being issued ex parte without notice to him and without hearing.

(b) Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment already enforced by the Sheriff of Manila

may be dissolved without Salazar's posting a counter-replevin bond as required by Rule 57,
Section 12.

HELD:

(a) NO. Nothing in the Rules of Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and mandatory

requisites for the issuance of a writ of attachment. a writ of attachment may be issued ex parte.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 57, merely require that an applicant for an order of attachment file an

affidavit and a bond: the affidavit to be executed by the applicant himself or some other person

who personally knows the facts and to show that (1) there is a sufficient cause of action, (2) the

case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57, (3) there is no other sufficient security

for the claim sought to be enforced, and (4) the amount claimed in the action is as much as the

sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims; and the bond to be "executed

to the adverse party in an amount fixed by the judge, not exceeding the applicant's claim,

conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and

all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge

that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

(b) YES. A writ of attachment may be discharged without the necessity of filing the cash deposit

or counter-bond required by Section 12, Rule 57.

Sec. 13, Rule 57 grants an aggrieved party relief from baseless and unjustifiable attachments

procured, among others, upon false allegations, without having to file any cash deposit or

counter-bond. In the instant case the order of attachment was granted upon the allegation of

petitioner, as plaintiff in the court below, that private respondent RALLYE, the defendants, had

committed "fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is

brought," covered by Section i(d), Rule 57, earlier quoted. Subsequent to the issuance of the

attachment order on August 17, 1977, private respondent filed in the lower court an "Urgent

Motion for the Recall and Quashal of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment on (his property)" dated

December 11, 1978 precisely upon the assertion that there was "absolutely no fraud on (his)

part" in contracting the obligation sued upon by petitioner. Private respondent was in effect

claiming that petitioner's allegation of fraud was false, that hence there was no ground for

attachment, and that therefore the attachment order was "improperly or irregularly issued." This

Court was held that "(i)f the grounds upon which the attachment was issued were not true ...,
the defendant has his remedy by immediately presenting a motion for the dissolution of the

same. We find that private respondent's abovementioned Urgent Motion was filed under option

13, Rule 57.

The last sentence of the said provision, however, indicates that a hearing must be conducted by

the judge for the purpose of determining whether or not there reality was a defect in the

issuance of the attachment. The question is: At this hearing, on whom does the burden of proof

lie? Under the circumstances of the present case, We sustain the ruling of the court a quo in its

questioned Order dated February 2, 1979 that it should be the plaintiff (attaching creditor), who

should prove his allegation of fraud. This pronouncement finds support in the first sentence of

Section 1, Rule 131, which states that: "Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations."

The last part of the same provision also provides that: "The burden of proof lies on the party

who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side." It must be borne in mind that

in this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed

Monday, January 26, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Facts: A shipment from Hong Kong arrived at the port of Manila, aboard the S/S Seadragon. Its inward
foreign manifest indicated that it contained various hand tools. Acting on an information that the
shipment violated provisions of tariff and customs code, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) agents seized the shipment while in transit to the container yard. The EIIB recommended
seizure of the shipment, and for which a warrant of seizure and distraint was issued by the District
Collector.

For failure of petitioner, to appear during the hearing despite due notice, collector decreed the
forfeiture of the shipment in favor of the government.

Issue: Whether or not Transglobe is allowed to redeem the forfeited shipments.

Held: As a means of settlement under Sec. 2307, TCC, redemption of forfeited property is unavailing in 3
instances:
1. Where there is fraud;
2. Where the importation is absolutely prohibited;
3. Where the release of the property is contrary to law.

The fraud contemplated by law must be actual and not constructive. It must be intentional, consisting of
deception willfully and deliberately done or resorted to in order to induce another to give up same right.
Ejusdem generis

Of the same kind or specie

LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012

Facts:

 In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner
of T. P.Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned
all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the
lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is
available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for
thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was issued to the latter. In2003, Hermogenes died.
Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the
removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the
surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the
things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot
11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on
appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open
space.

Issue:

 Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as defined in P. D.
1216.

Ruling:

 Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.”

 The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the
area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of
areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows
an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers
to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase “other similar
facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was
used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the
community would be impossible
G.R. No. L-58973-76 July 20, 1982

INOCENTES AMORA, JR., and CLAUDIO MURILLO, petitioners,

Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioner .

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Asst. Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Josefina
C. Castillo for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners Inocentes Amora, Jr. and Claudio Murillo were accused of four (4) counts of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 1220 to 1223 of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol. Typical of the four informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 1220 which reads as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accuses Claudio Murillo and Inocentes Amora, Jr. of
the crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of October 1972, in the municipality of Guindulman, province of Bohol,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with abuse of
confidence, did then- and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Time Book and Payroll bearing
Voucher No. 172 of the municipality of Guindulman, Bohol, covering the period from September 1 to 30,
1972 by making it appear in lines 18 and 20, Sheet II of said voucher that Vicente Begamano and Alfredo
Bagtasos rendered 21 days services each in "gathering boulders for shore protection" for the period
from September 1 to 30, 1972 when they did not in fact render said services and by misappropriating
and converting to their personal use, the amount indicated in said voucher as having been received by
the said Vicente Begamano and Alfredo Bagtasos in the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P210.00) Philippine currency, belonging to and owned by the municipality of Guindulman, Bohol; to the
damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines, particularly the municipality of Guindulman,
Bohol.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 315 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Article 48 of the same Code.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bohol rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Guilty as charged. Each of them is hereby imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from Two (2) Years and One (1) Month to Six (6) Years and to
pay a fine of P1,500.00 for each of the four (4) above-entitled cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that the accused were not guilty of estafa
because —
Evidently, as shown above, the Municipality of Guindulman did not suffer any loss or damage arising
from the payrolls. On the contrary, the government gained from the said project. This stubborn fact was
expressly admitted by Municipal Treasurer Salutan, Jr. in his testimony to the effect that said
municipality suffered no loss or damage on any of these payrolls (tsn, pp. 42-43, May 26, 1976).

However, the Court of Appeals found that Inocentes Amora, Jr. was a municipal employee and convicted
him of falsification by public officer. Although Claudio Murillo was not in the government service he was
also convicted of falsification by public officer on the ground that there was a conspiracy between him
and Amora. The Court of Appeals also held that the appellants were motivated by a single intention and
so found them guilty of only one (1) instead of four (4) crimes. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, [the] judgment is hereby modified in that appellants Claudio Murillo and Inocentes Amora,
Jr., are guilty of Falsification by public officers penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Six (6) Years to Ten (10) Years and One
(1) Day of Prision Mayor; the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs
against appellants.

The factual background is as follows:

The town of Guindulman, Bohol, had a project which required the placing of boulders as rip-rap in its
wharf. The town appropriated P15,500 for the project and a canvass of prices for the boulders was
made. Claudio Murillo, a private contractor, submitted the lowest bid of P10,000 per cubic meter of
boulders so he was awarded a contract to supply the same, including their hauling and-piling at the
municipal wharf.

Pursuant to the request of Guindulman Mayor Lilio Amora, Murillo used around 200 workers supplied by
barrio captains under the "bayanihan" system, so-called because the workers were paid P8.00 for every
truckload of boulders loaded, unloaded and piled. A truckload was 3 cubic meters and was handled by
about 6 to 7 workers who divided the P8.00 among themselves. Payment was sometimes made in the
form of rice or corn grits.

In claiming payment from the town, Murillo prepared and accomplished 4 daily timebooks and payrolls
which had the names and signatures of the workers, the number of days worked, the daily rate, the
amount paid and information in respect of their residence certificates. The accomplished payrolls were
certified by Inocentes Amora, Jr. as a government time-keeper and checker. Thereafter the payrolls
were presented to Mayor Amora for approval and lastly to the Municipal Treasurer for payment. In this
manner Murillo was able to obtain payment under his contract.

There is no question that the petitioners committed falsification of public documents.

The issue presented in the instant petition are legal, not factual, and may be stated as follows:

1. Whether or not the petitioners may be convicted of falsification by public officer under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code considering that there is no allegations in the four informations that they are
public officers; and

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding their defense of good faith.
On the basis of the second issue alone, the petition is highly impressed with merit and should be
granted.

The petitioners claim that "(1) they were simply following the 'bayanihan' system adopted by the
municipality of Guindulman and by the engineering district since 1969 which consisted of making
payrolls the total amount of which equal the price the municipality was to pay the contract of a certain
piece of work and (2) the municipality suffered no actual damage." Murillo specifically said, in the words
of the trial court, that "that in July 1972, the municipality of Guindulman awarded him the contract,
after bidding, to supply boulders and place them in rip-rap on the causeway to the wharf at P10.00 per
cubic meter of boulder. He utilized between 100 to 200 laborers and he paid them under 'pakyao'
system at P8.00 per truckload of boulders which included loading and unloading. He used another group
of laborers to undertake the rip-rap. Although the project was truly a contract for a piece of work,
nevertheless he used the daily wage method and not the contract vouchers, 'This was not his Idea but
by the municipal mayor and treasurer to prepare a payroll and list of laborers and their period of work
and to pay them the minimum wage so that the total payment would equal the total contract price. 'This
is the so-called bayanihan system practiced by former Mayor Bertumen and Engineer Bertumen of the
2nd engineering district. In the payrolls only some 20 names of the 200 laborers were listed as not all of
them, could be accommodated. Those not listed received their wages from those listed. As all of the
utilized laborers were duly paid, not one complained. Neither did the municipality complain. All the
payrolls were thus prepared by him, had them approved by the municipal mayor and had them paid by
the municipal treasurer. The group leaders of the laborers, who collected the sums indicated in the
payrolls, then delivered them to his house and he issued no receipts therefor."

It is quite obvious that the proper method for claiming payment under the pakyaw contract was for
Murillo to simply bill the town for so many cubic meters of boulders which had been delivered and piled
at the municipal wharf. Instead he and Inocentes Amora, Jr. resorted to the payroll system which is not
only cumbersome but also involved falsification. The reason could only be that they were ignorant and
ill-advised as claimed.

Both Mayor Amora and Treasurer Salutan knew that Murillo's contract was of the pakyaw type and so
there was no need for the presentation of payrolls. Both Amora and Salutan are not unlettered as their
positions indicate Amora is also a lawyer. But why did both officials cooperate in using the payroll
system instead of a simple direct billing? If the petitioners are guilty of falsification, Mayor Amora and
Treasurer Salutan are equally guilty because notwithstanding their knowledge of the nature of the
contract Amora approved the payrolls and Salutan made payments pursuant thereto.

From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no damage and even
gained on the project (the cost of the boulders actually delivered was P18,285.00 but Murillo was paid
only P13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the
informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that
the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith; there was no criminal intent. "The
maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent." (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504, 507 [1911].) There car!
be no conviction for falsification of a public document in the absence of proof that the defendants
"maliciously perverted the truth with wrongful intent of injury the complaining witness." (U.S. vs. Reyes,
1 Phil. 341, 344 [1902].) Thus the learned Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino has said, "there is no falsification
of a public document if the acts of the accused are consistent with good faith. Thus, it has been held
that 'a conviction for falsification of a public document by a private person will not be sustained when
the facts found are consistent with good faith on the part of the accused.' In other words, although the
accused altered a public document or made a mistatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not
be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or
error." (II Revised Penal Code, pp. 986-987 119761.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals which adjudged the
petitioners guilty of falsification is hereby reversed and the petitioners are acquitted with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.