Religion and Hezbollah

This comprehensive and thought-­provoking volume examines the role and

function of religion in Hezbollah’s political strategy in the context of con-
temporary Lebanese politics and global security.
The book demonstrates how Hezbollah uses religious mechanisms such
as taklif shari (religious assessment), ijtihad (interpretation) of jihad, and
fatwa (religious verdict) as political tools to mobilise the Shi’a in Lebanon
and the Middle East and to build political support. The comprehensive con-
tent analysis scrutinised speeches of Hezbollah Secretary General, H ­ assan
Nasrallah, from 2000 to 2013. The results provide and inform a wide-­scoping
discussion of Nasrallah’s uses of rhetorical devices and context to imbue
religious elements into Hezbollah politics to mobilise and motivate support-
ers. Additionally, a case study analysis of Hezbollah’s intervention in the
Syrian conflict is also included. This further demonstrates H­ ezbollah’s stra-
tegic use of political pragmatism and religious rhetoric to link its political
and military agendas and to transition the Party from a resistance group in
Lebanon to a regional actor with a regional priority.
As such, readers are provided with new and interesting insights into
­Hezbollah’s ideology and identity as a domestic and regional non-­state ac-
tor, and the social mobilisation of Shi’a in Lebanon and the region. Pro-
viding a nexus between religion, politics, and security, the book will be a
key resource for students and researchers interested in religious studies and
Middle East politics.

Mariam Farida is a sessional teacher at Macquarie University and Univer-

sity of New South Wales (Sydney, Australia). Farida conducted an extensive
research on insurgent groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and studied
the development of non-­state armed groups from violence to political
transformation.
Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics

92 Patterns of Nationhood and Saving the State in Turkey

Ottomanism, Nationalism and Multiculturalism
Serhun Al

93 Power Sharing in Lebanon

Consociationalism Since 1820
Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif

94 Israel in a Turbulent Region

Security and Foreign Policy
Edited by Tore T. Petersen

95 Women in Turkey
Silent Consensus in the Age of Neoliberalism and Islamic
Conservatism
Gamze Çavdar and Yavuz Yaşar

96 The Decline of Democracy in Turkey

A Comparative Study of Hegemonic Party Rule
Kürşat Çınar

97 Ethnicity and Party Politics in Turkey

The Rise of the Kurdish Party during the Kurdish Opening Process
Berna Öney

98 Religion and Hezbollah

Political Ideology and Legitimacy
Mariam Farida

For a full list of titles in the series: https://www.routledge.com/middleeaststudies/

series/SE0823
Religion and Hezbollah
Political Ideology and Legitimacy

Mariam Farida
First published 2020
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa
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© 2020 Mariam Farida
The right of Mariam Farida to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
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To my Dad
Contents

List of figures ix
List of tables xi
Acknowledgements xiii

1 Historical background 1

2 Fatwa and politics 33

3 Hezbollah’s political pragmatism through ijtihad 48

4 Social mobilisation theory 66

5 Content and context analyses of Nasrallah’s speeches

2000–2013 77

6 Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian conflict:

insights and implications 120

7 Conclusion 140

Index 143
List of figures

5.1a Nasrallah’s references to Hezbollah as a protector of the

Shi’a sect in his speeches by year (2000–2013) 79
5.1b Nasrallah’s references to the Hezbollah-Iran relationship in
his speeches by year (2000–2013) 80
5.1c Nasrallah’s references to Hezbollah’s support for Palestine
in his speeches by year (2000–2013) 81
5.1d Nasrallah’s references to religion-based resistance to Israel
in his speeches by year (2000–2013) 82
5.2 Religion-based storytelling by speech event 86
5.3 Nasrallah’s use of humour in his speeches by event (2000–2013) 87
5.4 Nasrallah’s references to religion in his speeches by topic of
discussion (2000–2013) 94
5.5 Nasrallah’s use of the “divine victory” theme in his speeches
by year (2000–2013) 96
5.6 Nasrallah’s use of “victory” theme in his speeches by main
communication medium (2000–2013) 96
5.7 Nasrallah’s use of the language of fear and threat in his
speeches by type of event (2000–2013) 98
5.8 Nasrallah’s use of the “oppressed vs. oppressors” theme in
his speeches by year (2000–2013) 100
5.9 Nasrallah’s references to community development in his
speeches by event (2000–2013) 104
5.10 Nasrallah’s references to the importance of education in his
speeches by year (2000–2013) 106
5.11 Nasrallah’s references to the role of women in society in his
speeches by year (2000–2013) 107
5.12 Nasrallah’s references in his speeches to pragmatism based
on quietism by year (2000–2013) 109
5.13 Nasrallah’s references to Hezbollah as “a party for all
Lebanese” vs. as “a party for the Shi’a” in his speeches by
year (2000–2013) 112
5.14 Nasrallah’s references to Welayet al-Faqih in his speeches
by year (2000–2013) 113
5.15 Welayet al-Faqih by speech event 114
List of tables

5.1 Occasions of religious significance celebrated by Hezbollah 88

5.2 Hezbollah speeches on domestic and regional affairs 88
Acknowledgements

This book is dedicated to all the progressive women in the Middle East, for
Arab female scholars who are striving to have a voice amongst the turbulent
Middle East.
I would first wish to acknowledge that this book has been self-­funded,
and for that, I thank and dedicate this book to my father, Abdul Rahman
Farida, for supporting me financially throughout my academic career and
for believing in my intellectual ability. I also wish to thank my family for
their un- ­conditional and eternal love and support throughout my life. I wish
to thank my mother Fatme, my brothers Moe and Bilal, my sisters Rania,
Farah, Emma, and my sisters-­in-law Pia and Kholoud.
This book could not have been successful without the unprecedented
support and help of Pavle Zupkovic, Dr. Julian Droogan, Dr. Dominique
Fitzsimmons, Dr. Jamie Roberts, Ceem Haidar, Dr. Jasmin Kelaita,
Dr. Kelly Royds, Dr. Edwina Throsby, Dr. Holi Birman, Dr. Brett Todd, and
Dr. Joe Alizzi.
Thank you for the conversations, the laughs, and the cries. It takes a
village.
1 Historical background

The emergence of Hezbollah

The history of Lebanon is laden with war, violence, and fragmentation. Since
gaining its independence in 1943, the country has established a unique polit-
ical system titled “confessionalism,” which entails a power-­sharing arrange-
ment based on religious communities. Despite the attempt at ­power-sharing,
the country has experienced ongoing civil conflict for the past 15 years aris-
ing from religious differences combined with economic and political insta-
bility. Even 30 years after the civil war, Lebanese people still suffer from
political and social segregation, and a stalemate among politicians. Lebanese
Shi’ite communities are mostly concentrated in rural areas – ­particularly in
southern Lebanon and the Bekaa areas – and they experience greater pov-
erty relative to other communities. Indeed, they received little attention from
the Lebanese government until Shi’ite leaders such as Musa Al-Sadr, and
later Hezbollah, drew attention to their plight. Most residents in these ar-
eas reached out to the zo’ama (local leader) or Ulama (local cleric) to have
their social needs met (Traboulsi 2007: 43–47). Since the Israeli invasion and
occupation of Lebanon in 1982 however, Lebanon’s Shi’a began to assert
themselves, including at the political level.
Hezbollah, or Party of God, initially emerged as an armed militia to free
the southern parts of Lebanon from foreign occupation and to improve
Shi’ite standing in Lebanon. It has subsequently presented itself as a legiti-
mate political party. In May 2011, Sayyed Nasrallah, the Secretary-General
of Hezbollah, declared that “Hezbollah is a resistance movement that aims
at liberating the occupied territories and is not a substitute for the govern-
ment.”1 This statement was intended to assure the Lebanese people of the
Party’s intentions; however, the nature of Hezbollah still provokes great
controversy today. Some Western governments have labelled Hezbollah’s
armed wing a terrorist organisation, but most Arab States, and Lebanon
particularly, continue to describe it as a legitimate resistance movement
(­Dionigi 2014).
The uniqueness of the Party is most reflected in its ability to successfully
operate across multiple domains, namely, the civilian (da’wa) context of
2  Historical background
social welfare and religious education, as a military-resistance organisation
( jihad), and as a key player in the Lebanese political system (Azani 2013:
899–900). In addition, Hezbollah is unique in the sense that it has proved
to be extremely competent in its ability to downplay its application of reli-
gious ideals and principles while emerging as a prototypical hybrid militant-­
political organisation in domestic and regional jihad movements.
The marginalisation of the Muslim Shi’ite community in Lebanon reveals
a snapshot of neglect and political disregard (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 35–80).
Hence, the emergence of Hezbollah did not only stem from the Israeli in-
vasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon in 1982 (ostensibly to con-
trol members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation who had settled in
Lebanon and were carrying out attacks against Israel (Norton 2007b)) but
also because of long abandonment and under-representation of the Shi’ite
community in Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007: 110–130).
According to Norton (2007a: 475–491), the main catalyst in the develop-
ment of Islamist groups in Lebanon came because of the Islamic revolution
in Iran in 1979. Lebanese Shi’ites and Iran have a long history of coopera-
tion going back to the 17th century. Even before Imam Ruhollah Khomeini,
a religious leader and politician, took power in Iran, there were some Shi’ite
groups that were already politically active in Lebanon. For example, there
were the Committee of Ulema of the Bekaa, “Islamic Committees,” and
the Lebanese branch of the Iraqi Shi’ite Al-Dawa Party, for which Sayyid
­Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was the standard-bearer in Lebanon (Al-
Agha 2011a: 54–56). In addition, the grand scale of Israeli aggression against
southern Lebanon in 1978, where most of the Shi’ite population resided,
gave Iran reason to support these small emerging Shi’ite groups. Moreover,
the leaders of the Shi’ite groups became aware of the need to put together a
well-organised party structure. As Qassem (2010: 11–40) explained, Shi’ite
leaders agreed that Islam would be the guiding principle for this Party and
that it would follow Khomeini’s model of Wilayat al-Faqih.2
This foundation represented the process in which Hezbollah would use
a mode of operation, with ideological, practical, and religious dimensions,
to serve its political objectives (Hamzeh 2004: 15–40). This included the
grounding principles for the creation of Hezbollah based on resistance
against the Israeli occupation and the supremacy of the Supreme Guide
(Ayatollah Khomeini at the time) as the descendant of the Prophet and his
Imams3 (Qassem 2010: 11–40). Given these founding principles, the leaders
of the Shi’ite groups set a proposal for establishing Hezbollah. A com-
mittee of nine – composed of three senior representatives from the cells
founded by the Committee of Ulema of the Bekaa, the Islamic Committees,
and Islamic AMAL (Afwaj al-Mouqawma Al-Lubnaniyya 4) – was responsi-
ble for submitting the proposal for approval by the Supreme Guide. Hence,
after getting the blessing of Ayatollah Khomeini, “the different cells dis-
solved to form a single federating party that took the name Hezbollah”
(Qassem 2010: 32).
 Historical background  3
Hezbollah formally announced its political programme in 1985 (Hamzeh
2004: 34–40). Since then, the Party has been able to acquire military and
financial aid from Iran, via Syria, through “experts from the Guardians of
the Revolution, who set up military training camps in the Bekaa Valley to
train Hezbollah militants” (Hamzeh 2004: 44). At the time, Hezbollah was
not the only Shi’ite group in Lebanon. The Movement of Hope (AMAL)
was founded in 1974 and was for a time the largest and most powerful Shi’ite
group in Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007: 109–130). However, Hezbollah could
distinguish itself as a Shi’ite Party separate from AMAL. The need to dis-
tinguish one party from another stems from AMAL’s involvement in the
Lebanese civil war and specifically, the “war of the camps” in 1985 against
the PLO. This damaged their standing among the Shi’ite community be-
cause it resulted in a clash against Palestinian factions who shared the same
fight against Israel. Hezbollah’s non-involvement in the Lebanese civil war
(1975–1990) increased its status within the Lebanese society. Unlike AMAL,
Hezbollah presented itself as a party whose sole aim was to resist Israeli
occupation and aggression against Lebanon – rather than to engage in vio-
lence over domestic matters – and this added to the Party’s credibility and
legitimacy.
Hezbollah’s ideological principles are organised according to Khomeini’s
Wilayat al-Faqih, which entails forming an Islamic State in Lebanon (Nor-
ton 2007b: 475–491). The following statement is taken from the group’s po-
litical platform, first published in 1985:

The solution to Lebanon’s problems is the establishment of an Islamic

republic as only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for
all of Lebanon’s citizens. The Hezbollah organization views as an im-
portant goal the fight against ‘western imperialism’ and its eradication
from Lebanon. The group strives for complete American and French
withdrawal from Lebanon, including all their institutions.
(Al-Agha 2011a: 39)

Thus, the acknowledgement of the supreme rule and authority by Wali

al-Faqih5 constitutes one of the main attributes of Hezbollah’s ideology.
Therefore, an understanding of the Wilayat al-Faqih structure is essential to
this book’s investigation of Hezbollah’s political strategy.
Hezbollah is depicted by the West and more recently by the Arab League
as a terrorist organisation with a specific intent (along with Iran) to desta-
bilise the Middle East region (Sabah and Noueihed 2017). Notwithstanding
the clear ideological platforms that underpin such claims, from 1982 to the
present, the Party has positioned itself as a legitimate and arguably the only
effective resistance group to Israel – in response to the Israeli occupation of
southern Lebanon – and has successfully integrated into Lebanese politics
(first joining the Lebanese parliament, and then the government). ­Hezbollah
is, however, a political group based on a platform of Islamic social and
4  Historical background
political ideology. Indeed, Hezbollah has retained its religious identity and
does not shy away from its intellectual and ideological commitment to the
Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine.
There exists a wide funding network that supports Hezbollah’s position
and ensures its continuity within Lebanese society. Sources of funding in-
clude zakat (Islamic alms), financial support from its ally, Iran, and dona-
tions from wealthy Lebanese businessmen and women abroad. Through the
funds the Party receives, it has established a dynamic social programme and
manages a nation-wide network of social, educational, and charitable pro-
grammes. These efforts, in addition to the long struggle against Israel, have
helped Hezbollah gain the support of a wide sector of the Lebanese popula-
tion, specifically, but not exclusively, the Muslim Shi’ite sect. Hezbollah has
also gained recognition amongst some segments of society as the strongest
political force in the country (Khatib et al. 2014: 105–111).
The unity of Hezbollah members is tied to the Shi’ite sect. The Shi’ite
community’s faith and belief in the guiding mission of the Party has there-
fore helped it to grow stronger. Furthermore, Hezbollah has positioned it-
self as the only group capable of fighting the ongoing threat that Israel poses
to Lebanon. Initially, Hezbollah did not need propaganda tools to attract
members, as its target and mission were widely recognised as being to free
Lebanese lands from foreign occupation. This had been enough to attract
large numbers of young Shi’ites to join the organisation (Norton 2007a).
However, Hezbollah’s formal recruitment strategy is a key to its success.
During the 1980s, recruitment was relatively simple since the country was
at war. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s leaders were careful to choose the “right”
people who were driven by their commitment and who had a comprehensive
understanding of the mission, in addition to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine.
Hezbollah’s entry into the Lebanese parliament and its emergence as a
political party has embedded it into the fabric Lebanese society. The Party
has proven, during its 30 years of existence, that it is able to maintain a solid
organisational structure. Moreover, its continued ability to integrate into
Lebanese politics stems from a religious pragmatism that resides in Shi’ite
theology. Specifically, the Shi’ite endorsement of taqiyya 6 to protect one-
self facilitates Hezbollah’s use of religious tools such as ijtihad and fatwa to
consolidate its position in the Lebanese political system via political prag-
matism. Indeed, as is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Shi’ites had to adopt a
dissimulation strategy in order to protect themselves from Sunni persecu-
tion. The notion of taqiyya entails that Shi’ites would not declare their true
sect and would live under the authority of the local ruling until the return
of the Twelfth Imam (Mahdi), from his disappearance, otherwise known as
the Occultation period.
The extent and nature of Hezbollah’s employment of religion for its po-
litical gain is typically analysed through an examination of specific dates
and developments that shaped the Party’s religious-political identity. There
are extensive analyses of the Party’s religion/sectarian rhetoric to explain
 Historical background  5
three major political decisions (Hamzeh 2004; Harik 2004; Khatib 2013).
First, there were the 1992 decisions to take part in the parliamentary elec-
tions in Lebanon which shifted the Party’s identity from resistance group to
legitimate political party. Second, there were the events of 2005 and 2006,
namely, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri,
and the war with Israel in 2006. This latter event represents a milestone in
Hezbollah’s emergence as a political party as it faced the dilemma of poten-
tially having to compromise its regional position and alliances to become a
national party. Third, there were the clashes of 2008 with the Future Move-
ment which presented similar challenges to Hezbollah’s domestic position
and popularity.
As part of its secretive nature, Hezbollah has adopted a strategy of “re-
veal and hide.” This, in Hezbollah’s perspective, is essential for its survival
in the face of continuous threats from Israel. However, this strategy has
led to accusations against the Party that it is deceptive and untrustworthy
(Khatib 2013). For example, Hezbollah was criticised by the March 14 bloc
for using its weapons against Lebanese citizens and as a tool to pressure the
Lebanese government during the 2008 clashes in Beirut.

Hezbollah and insurgent terrorism

Notwithstanding the assertion in this book that Hezbollah should be con-
sidered as a resistance group rather than as a terrorist organisation, the
Party has explicitly been deemed by the West, some Arab countries, and nu-
merous scholars as the latter. As such, it is worth briefly exploring the nature
of their claim. Current explanations of insurgent terrorism are applied to
Hezbollah as an insurgent non-State actor in Lebanon and the Middle East
region more broadly. These theories often seek to establish a link between
insurgent violence and economic hardship or marginalisation (McAllister
and Schmid 2011: 249). For instance, theories of relative deprivation (e.g.
Gurr 1986: 45–50) have posited a relationship between violent insurgence
due to political frustration and a perceived gap between individual entitle-
ment and the individual’s capacity to achieve one’s goals.
Terrorism is characterised as a form of asymmetrical conflict between
the State and the insurgent group, but from the perspective of three possi-
ble types of asymmetry: power, status, and vulnerability (Stepanova 2008:
9–11). Power typically favours the State and the State almost always has a
monopoly on legitimacy (i.e. status) at both the domestic and international
levels. However, in terms of vulnerability asymmetry (i.e. ideological and
structural disparities), this typically accrues to the advantage of the (weaker)
insurgent group because it is typically less restrained than the State to initi-
ate a response to provocation and to frame its response as collective action
(Stepanova 2008: 9–11). In turn, the recourse to violence by an insurgent
group is more likely when individuals perceive there to be a lack of political,
social, and economic avenues available for goal attainment (Gurr 1986: 317).
6  Historical background
This is reflected in the way that insurgent violence is underpinned primarily
by three root causes: economics, politics, and culture, in addition to a fourth
cause presenting as a fusion of the three primary causes, namely globalisa-
tion (McAllister and Schmid 2011: 249).
As a generalisation, “insurgent terrorism itself can take many forms”
(McAllister and Schmid 2011: 213). In turn, the three most commonly
agreed strands include the following: stand-alone, peacetime terrorism
manifest primarily as armed propaganda for recruitment and mobilisation;
embedded terrorism which is enmeshed with warfare; and global terrorism
as demonstrated by movements with international ambitions such as Al-­
Qaeda (McAllister and Schmid 2011: 213).
Regarding Hezbollah, any associations between the Party and insurgent
terrorism made by countries or in the literature typically reflect the notion
of embedded terrorism “as a form of asymmetrical conflict” (McAllister
and Schmid 2011: 241). Asymmetric conflict perpetrated by insurgent groups
manifests as a challenge to “the monopoly of (legitimate) violence held by
states” and generally aims to protect civilian populations from “discrimi-
natory state policies and practices” (Jongman 2011: 342–343). In such con-
texts, the insurgent (terrorist) groups fight on behalf of the oppressed groups
through the development of “new protest and action methods to challenge
governments” often, but not always, using violence. Importantly, asymmet-
ric conflict typically relies on networked (and often decentralised) uses of
communication, transportation, and weapon technologies to overcome its
adversaries and achieve its agenda. This approach is often theorised as pro-
viding greater resilience to attack than the hierarchical insurgent counter-
parts as well as greater adaptability and flexibility to initiate operational
changes (McAllister and Schmid 2011: 241).
Some of the attributes of embedded terrorism (manifest as asymmetri-
cal conflict) are arguably present in the actions of Hezbollah, and this has
been used by the US and Israel to label the Party as a violent extremist
organisation (Paine 2017: 1), and subsequently place it on a terrorist watch
list. However, the Party is fundamentally a political and hierarchical entity
rather than a networked or decentralised organisation. As such, it “must
procure social and political goods to maintain organizational salience” and
coordinate campaigns of asymmetrical conflict while articulating coherent
political and social platforms (McAllister and Schmid 2011: 242).
The hierarchical structure of Hezbollah rather than the highly distrib-
uted organisation of Al-Qaeda for instance means it is “more adept at pro-
viding the social and political goods” associated with success (McAllister
and Schmid 2011: 242). For instance, the centralised command and control
structure make it easier for the terrorist organisation (political institution)
to “articulate a coherent political platform” and coordinate sophisticated
terrorist campaigns (McAllister and Schmid 2011). Key elements in what
may be regarded as successful terrorist activities include the provision of
social and political goods for constituent communities such as social welfare
 Historical background  7
outcomes and political victories against the State (McAllister and Schmid
2011: 242). However, it is important to note that Hezbollah is not regarded as
a terrorist organisation in Lebanon. Notwithstanding the different perspec-
tives of the Party among Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims as a result of their dif-
ferent affiliations in Islam, Hezbollah is generally viewed by the Lebanese
as a legitimate political entity deeply connected to national politics and as
necessary to protect and represent them (Mouzahem 2017).

Security studies and religion

Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East region has emerged as a new
and unique area of interest in security studies as it represents a transition
away from the “balance of power” politics of the Cold War to what Walt
(1987) has referred to as the “balance of threat” alliances of Arab States.
According to the author, the alliance politics in the Middle East and the
dynamics of the relationships between Arab States reflect the concept of
balancing threats that lie at the centre of security issues in the region. In
turn, if one is to conceptualise State relations in the Middle East within a
balance of threats dynamic, Barnett (1998) further argued that any attempt
to understand the nature of the relationship dynamic must investigate the
relationship between identity and security constructs. Given the sectarian
nature of relations between (and even within) countries in the Middle East,
religion will likely emerge as a key security referent in the different identity
claims (Malmvig 2015: 33).
Religion has long been associated with securitisation claims. According
to Patterson (2013: 117–118), “There are many ways that religion can foster
or exacerbate conflict” including individuals’ uses of religious justifications
for violence, when religious actors claim the authority to prescribe violence
(including killing), when religious texts mandate violence, or when a religion
makes sacred something tangible, resulting in a spiritual obligation to pro-
tect it. In turn, the examination of religion in the context of security studies
generally emerges from the premise that State (and presumably non-State)
actors engage in conflict for ideational/cultural reasons which are separate
to (or, at least, in combination with) material reasons. As such, it is im-
portant to consider the meso-level mechanisms that play a key role in the
relationship between religion (specifically, religious nationalism) and inter-
national security (Gorski and Türkmen-Dervis¸oglu 2013: 136).

Islam as a social identity marker: taking a nuanced approach

The principle of faith identification is at the centre of the relationship be-
tween religion and security. This point is elaborated on by Patterson (2013:
119) in his explanation of how religion can serve “as a critical communal
social identity marker” that provides the platform for its use as a leverage
point for political, social (including violence), and/or economic outcomes.
8  Historical background
Regarding Islam specifically, revelations in the Qur’an that authorise and
in some cases command Muslims to fight – politically, militarily, and
­diplomatically – “against those who would fight the Muslims … to ensure
the victory and sustainability of his community” (Gross 2013: 57) present
significant implications for the security landscape in the Middle East. In-
deed, the conclusion drawn by early Muslim jurists that “war for the cause
of religion ( jihad) was legitimate” (Gross 2013: 58) represents what Ayaz and
Ahmad (2013: 72) have characterised as the obligation of Muslims to safe-
guard the path of justice, punish the treacherous, eradicate internal enemies
of the State, and support the oppressed.
As such, a nuanced discussion of the role of Islam in domestic, regional,
and/or international security matters is needed because of the different sects
and varying positions within the religion itself (Shaw 2011: 27). In terms of
Shi’ite Muslims in the Middle East, the cleric-dominated State of Iran pre-
sents as the champion of their security in the region, with support provided
to the neighbouring Shi’a communities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon
(Gross 2013: 57). In turn, Gross (2013: 57) has argued that Shi’a Muslims
have always had a preoccupation with security, driven in large part by the
harassment and persecution they have been subjected to due to “their mi-
nority status within the larger Sunni Muslim world.”
Furthermore, the security of Shi’a communities in the Middle East is of-
ten contextualised in the literature as an inter-sect conflict, namely, an “us
versus them” dynamic between Shi’a and Sunni communities. As explained
by Gross (2013: 58), with the political ascendency gained by Sunnis through-
out the Islamic world, Shi’a Muslims are largely regarded by them as a “de-
spised heretical sect.” This has prompted the security of Shi’a communities
to become (and remain) a priority agenda for Iran and sects within other
countries in the Middle East (e.g. Hezbollah), with Shi’a communities look-
ing to their religious leaders (ulama, mujtahids) for guidance and strength
(Gross 2013: 60). However, as Gross (2013: 57) further explained, Shi’a com-
munities have traditionally relied upon political quietism7 rather than as-
sertiveness as a method to achieve their political agenda, notwithstanding
the revolutionary change within the Shi’a message driving the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran.
The cleric-controlled government in Iran and the “powerful and decisive
role” played by Hezbollah in Lebanese politics point to the contemporary
revival of sorts of the Shi’a in the Middle East (Gross 2013: 65). This revival
is openly regarded as a threat to regional and international security by the
West and the Sunnis (e.g. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to contain the Shi’a resur-
gence). As such, the security of Shi’a communities is reflected in the Consti-
tution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and facilitated to some extent through
Iran’s provision of financial, advisory, and military support to Shi’a groups.
However, as stated by Gross (2013: 66), how Shi’a citizens in Lebanon and
other countries “view the requirements for their security may eventually
take precedence over the view of their clerics.”
 Historical background  9
Contextualising Hezbollah and religion within the social sciences
The examination of religion in the field of security studies generally emerges
from the premise that States (and non-State actors) engage in conflict for
ideational/cultural reasons which are separate to (or possibly in combina-
tion with) material reasons. As stated by Patterson (2013: 117–118), “there
are many ways that religion can foster or exacerbate conflict” including in-
dividuals’ uses of religious justifications for violence, when religious actors
claim the authority to prescribe violence (including killing), when religious
texts mandate violence, or when a religion makes sacred something tangi-
ble, resulting in a spiritual obligation to protect it.
In addition, the politicised use of religion in State affairs is likened by
Gorski and Türkmen-Dervis¸oglu (2013: 140) to a type of social movement
that claims to speak in the name of the group and which defines the group
in terms of religion. Indeed, social mobilisation theory can, at least in part,
help to explain the Party. “Social mobilization is the mechanism that brings
demand and supply of protest together” (Klandermans 2013: 12). The theory
may therefore be used to explain the reasons for social mobilisation, how
it manifests, and its potential to achieve social, cultural, and political out-
comes (Christiansen 2009: 1).
Hezbollah thus presents a unique and interesting case study of the nexus
between religion and politics, particularly how the Party may utilise religious
tools to pursue a pragmatic political platform to strengthen its power base
in Lebanon. The religious tools in question include the exclusive use of taklif
shari, a religious command that can be neither negotiated nor declined, and
which may only be used by the Party leader (i.e. Hassan Nasrallah). The use
of this tool exemplifies how a religious concept can be employed for political
purposes. Indeed, taklif shari was used to mobilise fighters in the 2006 war
with Israel, to fight in Syria in 2013, and to encourage people to vote in the
parliamentary elections.
Herein lies the element of religion in the analysis of the actions of
­Hezbollah. Fatwa is an applied notion in the Islamic tradition and is widely
used as a progressive religious idea in Islamic discourse in specific social,
political, and economic cases. Hezbollah is confronted with constantly
changing political and social conditions in Lebanon and the region more
broadly. In turn, ijtihad as a reasoning process can be applied by Hezbollah
to case-specific circumstances when issuing a fatwa while still maintaining
the centrality of core Islamic principles (Cook 2001: 124–147). The fatwa
(based on this reasoning) thus enables the Party to maintain its identity as a
staunchly religious movement while also adopting a pragmatic approach to
decision-making and action-taking (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 70–75).
The interpretation of Islamic principles in case-specific situations may
thus serve both political and religious objectives. Muslims can be mobilised
to act according to religious principles, and a response to changing circum-
stances can be pursued by Hezbollah that will potentially strengthen its
10  Historical background
political position (Cook 2001: 124–147). That is, the scope for interpretation
facilitates political pragmatism because it allows the religious understand-
ing of the prevailing circumstances to be framed within a response that can
take advantage of political opportunities (Hamzeh 2004).

Integration of Wilayat al-Faqih in Hezbollah’s governance

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 signified a turning point in the Mid-
dle East, with various repercussions arising because of this milestone.
Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, used his role as a religious cleric to
rally support for the uprising, which combined both religion and politics in
all messaging. In understanding the concept of religion in our Islamic cul-
ture, it is clear that no contradiction exists between religious and political
authority. Political struggle is an integral part of the mission and duties of
a cleric. In this regard, Khomeini promoted the Wilayat al-Faqih model in
Iran (Qassem 2010: 34–40).
To understand the transmission and adoption of this approach by
­Hezbollah, the relation between the Party and the Republic must be as-
sessed, which has been an important issue of debate among scholars in the
West. The decisions of the Party have often been claimed to be an imple-
mentation or an instrument of growing Iranian power in the Middle East
(Deeb 2013), yet the reality is far more nuanced. Notwithstanding that Shi’a
in Lebanon supported a variety of political parties or movements through-
out the 1950s to the 1970s (including secular opposition parties), their main
intellectual stance was most closely aligned to that of Iran (Wimberly 2015:
690). Indeed, the intellectual and political stance towards Islamism gained
momentum with the arrival to Lebanon of Iranian cleric, Musa al-Sadr, in
1958 when he established the Movement of the Deprived and, later in 1975,
Amal was established, the main armed Lebanese Shi’a group. It is also note-
worthy that some of the founding members of Hezbollah had studied in the
Shi’a seminaries in Najaf, Iraq where they came into contact with the ideas
of Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr and his al-Da’wa Party. Hezbollah’s later con-
ceptualisation of Wilayat al-Faqih would closely reflect al-Sadr’s theories,
which became increasingly evident after the death of Khomeini.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s foundation “in the shadow of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran, as Shi’a Islamism was beginning to take hold in Lebanon” (­Wimberly
2015: 691) is contextualised around political and social fragmentation in Leb-
anon due to the Civil War beginning in 1975 and the external threat from the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. This fragmentation at the national level,
which included Hezbollah ultimately clashing with Amal, made more pro-
nounced the divide between the more secular ideology of Amal and the “near
totalitarian concept of Wilayat al-Faqih” reflecting Khomeini’s Islamic Gov-
ernment articulated by Hezbollah. With Hezbollah’s eventual win over Amal
in 1990, and the leading faqih in Iran given wilayah over the Islamic world,
Hezbollah was now firmly embedded in an Islamic world system. In turn, by
following Khomeini and aligning Wilayat al-Faqih authority to the Prophet
 Historical background  11
and the Infallible Imams, Hezbollah was associated with a divine authority
that “granted legitimacy and authority amongst Lebanese Shi’a that no other
group could claim” (Wimberly 2015: 692).
In turn, Hezbollah has often been referred to as Iran’s proxy in the region.
However, an examination of the Party’s actions does not suggest disloyalty
towards Lebanon in favour of loyalty to Iran. Unlike several accusations
made by the March 14 bloc against Hezbollah, the Party has proven on sev-
eral occasions its commitment to Lebanon as its homeland and defended
the nation (often in the absence of formal State institutions, especially the
army). Nasrallah continuously refers to Lebanon as the Party’s homeland
and highlights its willingness to defend the country. For example, Nasrallah
stated in a speech in 2011 that:

I assert to you that this Resistance will remain adherent to Lebanon

and all its people, national unity, civil peace, united army, strength and
integrity, and all these conspiracies to sabotage Lebanon and cause se-
dition and civil war in Lebanon will be gone with the wind. I assert
to you that your Resistance which you support and believe in will be
greater than sedition and greater than the oppression afflicting it. It will
be greater than the accusations. We have a great tolerance power. This
is where our power lies. Our strength is that it is not easy to provoke us.8

While the power dynamics between the party and Iran remains ambiguous,
the ideological adoption by Hezbollah of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine is
evident but has been tailored to suit the local context in which the Party
operates. As well as in Lebanon, Hezbollah used the same approach as
Khomeini during the Islamic revolution on numerous occasions. However,
the Party applies a Lebanese interpretation of the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine
in a way that it is tailored to the Lebanese domestic formula (Hamzeh 2004:
44–79; Saad-Ghorayeb 2003: 73–77). Nasrallah stated in 2009,

I want or would like to inform you that the issue of Wilayat al-Faqih (the
authority of the Jurist leader), imamate and such issues are for us part of
our religious conviction and doing harm to such issues is doing harm to
our religious convictions. We are ready for whoever likes to get involved
in a religious debate with us. But that indeed has nothing to do with
elections, political campaigns, the government and deputies. Rather
scholars, religious men and men of intellect and culture gather and make
seminars and discussions as we discuss theology, prophet-hood, divine
messages, jurisprudential rules and the Worldly and Hereafter affairs
[…] In other religious convictions of other sects also there are convictions
not unanimously agreed on by their sects. So, if it is not unanimously
agreed upon that does not make it anymore a religious conviction which
must be respected […] (but especially Lebanon as it has such a clause in
its Constitution which we all say we believe in): Avoid doing harm to our
religious convictions and say about us in politics whatever you want.9
12  Historical background
In his book on Hezbollah, Qassem (2010: 34–35) underscores that:

The Wali al-Faqih has the prerogative to monitor the proper construal of
the Islamic law, to make important political decisions affecting the nation
(Umma), to decide on war or peace, to safeguard the security of the nation
and its financial interests, to ensure the redistribution of money collected
by the religious authorities and to define the contours of the Islamic State.

Yet, despite blatant references to Wali al-Faqih, and the fact that ­Hezbollah’s
command resides in the hands of the Wali al-Faqih, the reality and context
of the situation of each country needs to be analysed with care (Qassem
2010: 34–50). Qassem emphasises that Hezbollah is a “Lebanese political
party in which all leaders, officers and members are Lebanese” (2004: 60).
Therefore, Hezbollah recognises the authority of the Faqih in making major
political decisions. Yet, the “detailed follow-up, resolution of disputes, daily
disposition of political, societal and cultural matters including resistance to
the Israeli occupation defaults to the Party’s command” (Qassem 2010: 62).
The Party’s command is based on the internal structure of the Shura
Council headed by the Secretary-General who derives his legitimacy from
the Wali al-Faqih (the following chart indicates the organisational structure
of Hezbollah and the chain of command).10 Accordingly, while Hezbollah
is in favour of the establishment of an Islamic State, it is also committed
to integrate itself and its followers into Lebanese society and it is quick to
underscore that in practice such a project cannot be implemented. More-
over, the Party leaders and spokespeople have continuously affirmed that
­Hezbollah has no intention of establishing an Islamic State in Lebanon,
even if it remains committed to Islam as the basis of its actions. This concept
is recurrently promoted in the Party’s messaging, in order not to turn public
opinion against the Party and for it to be positioned as a threat to national
security, as it appeared in 2008, following the clashes on the street between
Hezbollah fighters and their supporters, and opposing political parties. This
incident augmented negative sentiment towards the Party and many politi-
cal factions framed this incident as Hezbollah trying to establish an Islamic
State in Lebanon and take over the country (Khatib 2013).
The Party’s leader, Nasrallah, had to be very careful in his messaging
because of this, reaffirming that an Islamic State is not on the Party’s
agenda. Hezbollah’s manifesto in 2009 announced that, taking the reality
of ­Lebanon into account, its goal is to arrive at a multi-confessional leader-
ship that would guarantee equal participation of all communities in man-
aging the State (Al-Agha 2011a: 50–65). Moreover, it is important to look
at the political manifesto at length to pinpoint the abovementioned points.
­Hezbollah’s political manifesto includes the claim that:

The resistance in Lebanon, including the Islamic Resistance, was the

first to fight hegemony and occupation for more than two decades and
a half. It has adhered to this choice at a time which seemed to be the
 Historical background  13
inauguration of the US era which there were trials to depict as the end
of history. In the light of the force balances and the circumstances that
were then prevailing, some viewed the choice of resistance as a kind of
illusion or political rashness or an inclination that opposes rationalism
and logic.
Despite that, the resistance moved on its jihad process with absolute
certainty of the righteousness of its cause and its capability to achieve
victory while believing in Allah and trusting in Him, belonging to the
whole nation and adhering to the national Lebanese interests, having
confidence in its people and raising high human values: righteousness,
justice and freedom.
Through its long path of jihad and its depicted victories – starting
with the pull out of the Israeli occupation (forces) from Beirut, Mount
Lebanon and fleeing from Sidon, Tyr, Nabatiyeh, July Aggression in
1993, April Aggression in 1996, the liberation in May 2000 and July War
2006 – this resistance secured its credibility and model before making
its victories. The Resistance project has grown from a liberation power
to a balance and confrontation power and then to a defence and deter-
rence one besides its political internal role as an influencing pillar in
building the just and capable State.
Simultaneously it was doomed for the political and human status of
the Resistance to evolve: it developed from being a Lebanese national
value to a radiant Arab and Islamic value and it has become today an
international human value; its model is being followed and its achieve-
ments are being taken into consideration by the experiences and cour-
tesies of all those seeking freedom and liberty all around the world.11

Therefore, Hezbollah’s push to establish an Islamic State in Lebanon ended

with their participation in the Lebanese parliamentary elections, which was
inevitable to safeguard their position in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s relation to Wilayat al-Faqih

Saouli (2014: 26) identified that “it is important to emphasise that ­Hezbollah’s
commitment [to Wilayat al-Faqih] is not a mere ideological and/or intellec-
tual stand.” On this topic, Moussawi (2011: 15), the head of Media Relations
for Hezbollah, asserted,

Wilayat al-Faqih is not a fixed, closed system, but rather is a fluid con-
cept that is open to a wide range of interpretations by a variety of Is-
lamic clerics and scholars and draws from republican concepts such as
constitutionalism, separation of powers, etc.

Moussawi (2011: 15) also asserted that “Shi’i Islam and its jurisprudence are
progressive in nature, and allow for independent reasoning (Ijtihad), thus
entailing a continuous evolution in religious thinking.”
14  Historical background
These ideas have also been highlighted in the work of Ibrahim Moussawi
(2011), Shi’ism and the Democratisation Process in Iran, and Hassan Fad-
lallah (2015), Hezbollah and the State in Lebanon: The Vision and the Path.
Both Moussawi and Fadlallah offer an insider’s voice as official represent-
atives of the Party. Moussawi presented the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine as a
parallel to democracy, using Iran as his case study. He argued (2011: 48), “the
welaya entails that the final say in all the societal and leadership exercises
lies in the hands of the Wali al-Faqih whose authority is absolute and irrevo-
cable, thus it should be completely abided by.” Notably, Moussawi does not
apply the notion to Hezbollah and explains the process only in the context of
Iran. Conversely, Fadlallah (2015: 32) explored how the principle of Wilayat
al-Faqih is developed in accordance with a country’s (e.g. Lebanon) specific
circumstances in which criteria such as respect for local government, adap-
tation to domestic political structures, and improving the local community
from within were set as benchmarks in the application of the principle.
According to Khashan and Moussawi (2007: 9), Hezbollah has adopted
the Faqih doctrine in which Wilayat al-Faqih is mandated to support the
installation and empowerment of an Islamic government during the time of
occultation. The premise underpinning this formulation endorses the cre-
ation of an Islamic community that is self-governed and led by the faqih
until humanity is redeemed upon the return of the infallible Twelfth Imam
(Khashan and Moussawi 2007: 9). Another study of the ideology of Hezbol-
lah was conducted by Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah
since 1991. When writing about the organisation, Qassem (2010: 30–43) ex-
plained Hezbollah’s relation to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine and the Party’s
commitment to the higher Jihad as a religious resistance group (Qassem
2010: 55–100).12 Qassem’s book is an essential reading to understand how
religion links to Wilayat al-Faqih for Hezbollah as it represents an identifi-
cation of the Party’s ideological framework from within.
However, Hezbollah officials tend to suggest that even though the Party’s
ideological commitment is to the Wali, the Party’s internal decision-making
is strictly separated from the Wali’s intervention (Fadlallah 2015). As such,
the Wali becomes essential only in global terms such as war, peace, and for-
eign policy. Hence, the question is left open as to the extent to which Wilayat
al-Faqih principles apply to Hezbollah. However, this book treats the notion
of Wilayat al-Faqih in Shi’ism as a platform for leaders such as Nasrallah
to exercise exclusive authority using religious tools such as taklif shari and
fatwa to mobilise fighters and support which will prove to be key for the
Party’s future involvement in regional conflicts such as the Syrian war.

Hezbollah ideology and identity

Interest in Hezbollah often emerges from questions around the complexity
of its ideology and identity. For instance, in Transcript Q&A: How Power-
ful Is Hezbollah? Local, Regional and Global Implications,13 Mathew Lev-
itt introduced Hezbollah with the statement, “if you think Hezbollah is a
 Historical background  15
terrorist group only, you are mistaken, and if you think Hezbollah is a re-
sistance group only, you are also mistaken, Hezbollah is all of those, it is a
hybrid movement.”
While some scholars have focused on Hezbollah’s identity and forma-
tion, others have sought to focus on the Party’s radical Islamism and to
further examine its difference or similarities to other Islamist groups. For
instance, Bordenkircher (2007: 1–28) examined the differences between
Jamaa al Islamiyah (Islamic communion) and Hezbollah in terms of politi-
cal participation and the common objective to establish an Islamic State. In
addition, Sadiki (2010: 350–376) was one of many scholars who compared
Hezbollah and Hamas, focusing on their resistance and the “mojtama moka-
wem” (society of resistance). While Bordenkircher (2007) and Sadiki (2010)
each offered perceptive insights on this subject, this book does not cover the
difference or similarities between Hezbollah and other Islamist groups in
detail and does not adopt a comparative approach.
Hezbollah is typically depicted as a committed and structured organisa-
tion. For example, Khashan and Moussawi (2007: 9) explained, “­Hezbollah’s
military jihad integrates five components, which reflect both the challenges
and opportunities that have crossed its path since 1982.” In addition, Kramer
(1994: 21) equated Hezbollah to medieval assassins, stating,

[…] More than any other fundamentalist movement in recent history,

Hezbollah evoked the memory of the medieval Assassins, who had been
feared in the West and Islam for their marriage of fierce militancy to de-
structive deeds. Like the Assassins, Hezbollah gave rise to an immense
lore, and much confusion.

The Hezbollah and Iran alliance

The intricacies of Hezbollah’s organisational structure bear many similar-
ities to that of Iran, thus deepening the alliance between the Party and the
Iranian State. The Party has structured its hierarchy and institutions in a
way that reflects the bond between Hezbollah as a political group and Iran,
in regard to shared elements with the Iranian institutional structure, the
power of the clerics, and the use of religious rhetoric to highlight the Party’s
hegemony over its popular base. These elements indicated ideological simi-
larities between the two.
Hezbollah’s decision-making process has been one of the controversial
and ambiguous aspects of the Party’s structure. Limited sources are avail-
able which can identify the Party’s hierarchical structure and delegation
of authority, such as Hamzeh (2004) and Al-Agha (2011b, 2013). Hamzeh
(2004), for example, explained how the division of authority is assigned be-
tween the Shura council and other legislative bodies. On the other hand,
Al-Agha (2013) offered a chart outlining all the executive and legislative
bodies in the Party’s structure. However, little explanation has been of-
fered to clarify the decision-making process between Hezbollah and Iran.
16  Historical background
Evidence based on analysis of Hezbollah and leading Shi’ite clerics, particu-
larly Sheikh ­Qassem, clearly demonstrates that major political decisions,
especially on war and peace, remain in the hands of the Wali al-Faqih. How-
ever, Hezbollah’s actions, which led to war with Israel in 2006, do not seem
to have been coordinated with Iran. Hence, from the information offered, it
can be concluded that there is considerable authority exercised by the Shura
council (which is the top legislative body in the Party’s hierarchal structure),
which then carries most of the decision-making and is controlled by Hezbol-
lah’s religious members. Avon and Katchadourian (2012: 67) explained the
Party’s hierarchical structure by developing a chart to provide a visual in-
terpretation to how the Party’s legislative and executive bodies correspond
and how the authority is divided between the two.
Furthermore, the alliance between Hezbollah and Iran can be analysed
beyond this point, not solely based on organisational structure but also
tapping into the strategic and political significance of this alliance (Deeb
2013; Levitt 2014; Love 2010). Hezbollah’s alliance with Iran has benefited it
greatly; however, the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah carries with
it a much more intertwined partnership than mere strategy. Hezbollah of-
ficials, to safeguard their existence as a resistance party, have continuously
rejected the accusation of “taking orders from Iran,” arguing that the Par-
ty’s decision-making is an internal affair and Iran is a friend and an ally but
does not interfere in the Party’s internal decision-making (Qassem 2010).
Hezbollah also receives great financial support from Iran. The amount of fi-
nancial aid that Hezbollah receives annually varies between 100 and 300 bil-
lion dollars (Coughlin 2010; Levitt 2014). Hezbollah officials argue that all
political factions in Lebanon are aligned with a foreign country (in reference
to March 14 bloc alignment with America, France, and Saudi Arabia) and
they see nothing wrong in Iran being a close ally of Hezbollah (Fadlallah
2015). This section, however, does not aim to dismiss other established ar-
guments of the implications of the Hezbollah-Iran alliance. For instance,
Deeb (2013) had presented Hezbollah as an agent of Iran in Lebanon, where
Hezbollah works under the authority of the Wali due to its ideological com-
mitment to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine, while Saad-Ghorayeb (2003) had
distinguished this alliance as a partnership with mutual benefits.

Religion in the Middle East: implications for Hezbollah

As argued by Toft et  al. (2011: 8), “religion matters […] and such under-
standing is crucial for grasping contemporary global politics.” Religion fills
the gaps in civil society as a “competitor for political space” (Khashan and
Moussawi 2007: 5). That is,

In the Middle East, religion has survived as the main source of alle-
giance since it was never seriously contested by modern crosscutting
cleavages based on economic interest or territorial nationalism. The
 Historical background  17
weakness of civil society, as well as its suppression by successive dicta-
torships, has ensured that religion would remain as the primary outlet
for political mobilization.
(Khashan and Moussawi 2007: 5)

Thus, religion is instrumental in, not separate from, politics and thus has
clear implications for non-State groups in the Middle East such as Hezbol-
lah. As stated by Khashan and Moussawi (2007: 16),

Hezbollah has presented itself as a role model for other jihadist move-
ments, especially Hamas. Palestinian Islamic militants incorporated
suicide missions in their fight against Israel after they interacted with
Hezbollah members in Marj al-Zuhur on the Lebanon-Israel borders.
In addition, Hamas learned from Hezbollah to avoid involvement in
polemics and to shun religious debates.

The power relationships in Lebanon are inevitably impacted by broader Inter-

national Relations (IR) such as the provision of finances to the March 14 Co-
alition and military aid to the Lebanese government by Saudi Arabia (Gause
2015), and the implications for Hezbollah’s power base through its alliance
with Syria and Iran (Patrikarakos 2012: 32–46). This context reconfigures the
relationships of power in Lebanon towards sectarian balance and thus restricts
and reshapes Hezbollah as a jihadist movement. Qassem (2010) understands
that it is important to improve relations with the West and Hezbollah looks to
establish such relations in the future. Hezbollah, however, is seemingly resil-
ient enough to carry out the transformation (Khashan and Moussawi 2007).
Furthermore, Dionigi (2014: 97) emphasised the contingency of these
foundations: “the origins and formation of Hezbollah can be understood
and explained only as resulting from concurrent dynamics, including trans-
national networks, regional […] and social conditions within the Lebanese
context.” Therefore, Hezbollah finds itself within a dualistic ideology: one
nationalistic and the other “transnationally Islamist” (Dionigi 2014: 97).
Additionally, the assumption that non-State actors have different priori-
ties to State actors arguably implies that system-level factors will not matter
a great deal to them (Szekely 2016). It is generally assumed that the priori-
ties of non-State actors are typically concerned with local conflicts, namely,
the “overthrow of a particular regime, the control of specific territory or
(in practice if not in theory) victory over rival militias” (Szekely 2016: 75),
As such, shifts in regional realignment – as opposed to domestic political
affairs – will do little to direct their behaviour, with the alliance behaviour
of the non-State actors at the local, regional, and international levels driven
primarily by an evaluation of which alliances will assist them to achieve
their objectives (Szekely 2016).
Hezbollah’s actions in response to the Syrian Civil War draw attention
to the Party’s international relations; that is, its relations with surrounding
18  Historical background
States and political movements appear to demonstrate that the Party has
“other concerns that trump the ‘resistance’ project” (Szekely 2016: 75).
­Hezbollah is described by Szekely (2016: 76) as a “proto-State actor,” occu-
pying “a conceptual space somewhere between States and non-State actors.”
As such, the Party has a clear political presence and undertakes actions that
support or challenge the elected government’s authority or legitimacy, but
which lacks “the authority and recognition afforded to the government”
(Szekely 2016: 76).
Much has been written on the ways that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
Sunni-Shi’ite division in the Middle East (typified by the Saudi-Iranian strategic
rivalry) have significantly impacted the foreign policies of States in the region,
including the extent to which they become involved in the politics of neighbour-
ing States and engage with non-State actors (Guzansky and Berti 2014).
Regarding Hezbollah specifically, Szekely (2016: 76) has provided a com-
prehensive exploration of the way regional politics and events have impacted
the Party’s alliances. The author has pointed to the way the Party has clearly
“benefited militarily, politically and financially from its relationship with
Iran.” Moreover, Hezbollah’s political influence in Lebanon (and its access
to arms) increased as a result of its alliance with Syria during the Syrian
occupation of Lebanon up to 2005. More recently, Hezbollah has emerged
as a crucial ally for the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war (Guzansky and
Berti 2014). In turn, Szekely (2016) has also identified the implications of this
alliance for the way Hezbollah asserts its presence in international relations
in the region. As the author explained, although Hezbollah’s involvement
in the Syrian civil war was framed as “necessary to preserve the ‘Axis of
Resistance’ for the fight against Israel,” another key objective was clearly
to preserve the Assad regime (Szekely 2016: 84). In turn, Szekely (2016) as-
serted that this foreign policy approach not only weakened Hezbollah’s po-
litical position in Lebanon but also contributed to the destabilisation of the
country due to the massive influx of nearly 1.2 million Syrian refugees into
Lebanon (by the end of 2015), comprising about 25% of the total population.
Irrespective of whether Hezbollah’s alliance with Syria has weakened its
domestic position, the Party increasingly regards itself as a regional actor
rather than just a resistance group. Hezbollah’s decision-making in regard
to domestic and regional politics has clearly become more influenced by
regional issues and not just resistance to Israel. Thus, the decision-making
and strategic actions performed by the Party to strengthen its legitimacy
and survival will increasingly aim to “balance a range of domestic concerns
with equally complex issues of foreign policy” (Szekely 2016: 85).

Hezbollah, religion, and social mobilisation

Hezbollah uses Islamist discourse for two distinct purposes: to improve
the condition of the Shi’ite community in Lebanon (i.e. to create a just
and equal society) and to increase its legitimacy as a resistance movement
against ­Israel. In turn, an attempt is then made to demonstrate how the
 Historical background  19
party’s use of religion in these ways relates to its pragmatic approach to po-
litical decision-making and the mobilisation of its supporters. For instance,
the Party’s use of ijtihad to facilitate a pragmatic approach to how it fights
against Israel, and the Party’s uses of taklif shari to mobilise fighters.
The key question is thus how the Party is able to implement and reconcile
the competing religious and political interests and what are the short-term
and long-term implications. The literature is quite silent when it comes to an
examination of the theoretical foundation underpinning the role of religion
in Hezbollah’s identity. As such, important questions remain unanswered: is
Hezbollah’s decision-making influenced by its religious identity?
AbuKhalil (1991) examined the ability of organisations to use Islam as
a pretext to promote their political aims. In doing so, the author provided
an interesting insight into the similarity between Khomeini’s Islamic revo-
lution in 1979 and Marxism. Even though AbuKhalil presented Hezbollah
as a similar example to the Iranian strategy, he did not comprehensively ad-
dress the aim of using Islam as a pretext for political gain. This is important
because Hezbollah’s political statements and parliamentary representation
reveal that it believes it has earned broader popularity due to its acceptance
and assimilation into the Lebanese political system.
Dionigi (2014), Karagiannis (2009), Kramer (1994), and Azani (2009, 2010,
2011) have indicated that religion is the core element of Hezbollah, and that
Hezbollah follows Wilayat al-Faqih or religious authority. Moreover, they
argued that the Party’s adaptability or pragmatism finds a place in the sect’s
theological notion of ijtihad. However, while Wilayat al-Faqih is established
as an essential element in Hezbollah’s ideology, little attention is paid to
the role and the significance of religion in Hezbollah’s everyday politics and
how it is employed for the mobilisation of Shi’ites, the pursuit of legitimacy,
and the consolidation of political power. Indeed, most of the literature on
Hezbollah has focused on its stages of development rather than on religion
as an essential element in its identity.
The political agenda projected by Hezbollah to better serve and safe-
guard Shi’ite status in Lebanon (especially through social services) reflects
a religious element found in the Shi’ite sect. Arguably, the collective Shi’ite
experience of persecution served to produce the need for a party such as
Hezbollah to work towards the improvement of their situation. In Pity the
Nation, Fisk (1990: 12–48) stated that the victimisation of Lebanese Shi’ites
was the result of the tragic ancient Battle of Karbala where Imam Hussein
(the grandson of the Prophet) suffered a violent death at the hands of Yazid’s
army (the second Omayyad Khalif). The narrative of deprivation and per-
secution felt by Shi’ites allowed Hezbollah to use this sense of political and
social isolation to construct a “collective Shi’ite identity” to achieve and
maintain hegemony over this group. It was for these reasons that promi-
nent Shi’ite leaders such as Imam Musa Al-Sadr and Mohammad Hussein
­Fadlallah began to demand better rights for Shi’ites.
In addition, the works of Fisk (1990) and Norton (2007a) have highlighted
how the Party’s cult of martyrdom revolves around the heroic figure of
20  Historical background
Imam Hussein, which it uses as a role model for sacrifice. As such, both
Fisk’s and Norton’s works establish the contextual background to Shi’ite
persecution and the way it is instrumental in Hezbollah’s political rhetoric.
However, these works do not explain how Hezbollah has used Shi’ite Karbali
(in reference to the battle of Karbala) rhetoric to mobilise the Shi’ite com-
munity. Moreover, there are recurring references to fear and reminders of
Shi’ite victimisation in a number of statements by Nasrallah. Some of the
statements issued by Nasrallah implied that there is an international-Arab
intention to eliminate Hezbollah (cited in Makdisi 2011).
The use of religious rhetoric by Hezbollah became increasingly evident
from its Open Letter in 1985 to the Political Manifesto in 2009. The Open
Letter described the present Lebanese system as arrogant and unjust to the
point that it was beyond “reform or modification.” As such, a radical change
was needed if Muslims were to participate in a just regime based upon Is-
lamic prescriptions [ahkam] and Shari’a law as told by the Prophet Moham-
med (Hezbollah, 1985; cited in Karagiannis 2009: 370–371).
Hezbollah’s change in political direction rested on the decision to par-
ticipate in the 1992 parliamentary elections as indicated by Qassem (2010:
271–277):

It is now imperative to cooperate with other devoted parties in order to

complete the necessary steps towards… the forging of internal peace on
the basis of political concord that is furthest as could be from abomina-
ble sectarian biases or narrow confessional discriminations.

The Party then continued its change of rhetoric as it became more involved
in the political process. During the 1996 election campaign, the Party issued
its programme to achieve justice and equality for all Lebanese people by
building a strong, dignified, and prosperous country (Hamzeh 2004). This
would, in turn, engage all Lebanese in the construction of a country that has
equality of opportunity for all people irrespective of class, duties, or politi-
cal persuasion (Hezbollah, 1996; cited in Karagiannis 2009: 374).
While the Political Manifesto in 2009 included a revisionary look at the
Party’s nationalistic identity, the limitation of this document is that it does
not explain how Hezbollah uses religion and religious tools such as taklif
shari and its Islamic ijtihad in its political mobilisation. The Party’s 1991
electoral campaign and the 2009 political manifesto indicate its strategy to
open-up and to change the tone of its rhetoric, which serves the hypothe-
sis suggested by Dionigi (2014), Karagiannis (2009), and Azani (2009). It
nonetheless does not articulate if the Party changed its strategic objectives
through the employment of religion. Moreover, it does not offer an insight
into how ijtihad, for example, was adopted in the Party’s adaptability.
Hezbollah needed to use religion to increase its influence in Lebanon
(Dionigi 2014; Hamzeh 2004; Khatib et al. 2014). As Kramer (1994: 36) ar-
gued, the main driving force of Hezbollah was to implement Islamic law.
 Historical background  21
To achieve this, the Party had to operate within the parameters of Islamic
law as understood by the clerics. As stated by Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ubayd,
a Hezbollah cleric abducted by Israel in 1989, “The Muslim fighter needed
answers to many questions” (Kramer 1994: 36) related to the obligatory na-
ture of resistance to the occupation (in terms of religious obligation) and
to the notion of self-martyrdom. Thus, the role of the Cleric was crucial as
these questions could only be answered according to law, not to politics.
Indeed, the Clerics’ answers were an “essential contribution” to fighters’
understanding of the legitimacy of the violence answers that could not be
provided by the military commander.
In addition, Saade (2015) offered insights into the way Hezbollah’s me-
dia outlets, Al-Ahd newspaper, operated as a propaganda machine to con-
struct the ideology of “martyrology.” Saade (2015) suggests that the concept
of martyrdom has almost become synonymous with Hezbollah’s ideology
whereby the ideology of Hezbollah is framed within, and augmented by,
martyrdom indoctrination. Saade’s work echoes the work conducted by
Norton (2007a), Hamzeh (2004), Khatib (2013), and Harik (2004), which
indicates that Hezbollah’s cult of martyrdom has assisted the Party in its
propaganda against Israel. This ideology is set to be the main factor be-
hind the Party’s recruitment programme and political activism. The use of
Islamic doctrines, and specifically the Imam Hussein martyrdom episode,
has been instrumental in the Party’s resistance against Israel forces, domes-
ticating its political mission, and in its formulation of a “society/culture of
resistance” (Harb and Leenders 2005).
Sayyid Fadlallah, Sheikh Shams al-Din, and Sayyid Musa al-Sadr14 were
key figures in the development of Shi’ite resistance and organisation (Nasr
2007; Sankari 2005). Sayyid Fadlallah stated that

the engendering of conscious and committed Muslim individuals in so-

ciety would constitute the first phase in creating a true Islamic society,
through the nurturing of fraternal Islamic ties and the insemination in
the collective psyche of Islamic precepts and values, such as social jus-
tice, equality and solidarity.
(Dionigi 2014: 89)

Fadlallah here underscores clearly the role of the clerics and Islamic dis-
course in the development both of party policy in the present and its propa-
gation in future social structures.

Transition to political participation

Hezbollah’s decision in 1992 to participate for the first time in elections
was taken by the 12-member Shura Committee. The Committee consid-
ered whether the participation of Hezbollah in the Lebanese elections fol-
lowed Shi’ite religious doctrine. By a majority of ten to two, the Committee
22  Historical background
approved Hezbollah’s participation in the elections. This decision was later
ratified by the Wali al-Faqih, Imam Khamenei (Azani 2009: 97). The ratifi-
cation from Imam Khamenei came as a fatwa issued in May 1992, asserting
that Hezbollah’s participation in the parliamentary elections has earned a

religious stamp of approval and moral justification in the community

and made it possible for them to claim, on one hand, that the movement
was remaining faithful to its ideological path and vision and, on the
other hand, to emphasise that entering the parliament would help fur-
ther resistance activities.
(Azani 2009: 97)

In this regard, Nawwaf Mussawi, a Foreign Affairs official in Hezbollah,

declared that this decision by the Wali did not stem from a political need,
but rather to ensure that the political decision was compliant with the doc-
trine of the faith (Azani 2009). The extent of power and command which the
Wali has over Hezbollah’s Lebanon-related political matters is still unclear.
Since the early 1990s, Hezbollah has sought to promote an integrated
Shi’ite community through a network of social services (Harb and Leenders
2005: 173–197). As a result, Lebanese Shi’ites started to join in numbers,
and the recruitment process took a more organised but also more secretive
form. Hezbollah’s handling of its recruitment process is a key to its suc-
cess.15 Hezbollah, along with its non-Shi’ite electoral allies won 12 parlia-
mentary seats including eight Shi’ite seats in 1992, holding about 10% of all
parliamentary seats. Hezbollah also won control of two-thirds of important
Shi’ite municipalities, including the Beirut suburbs of Burj el Barajneh and
Ghobeyre.16 Hezbollah’s participation in the elections was a turning point in
their identity, which resulted in more group engagement with domestic poli-
tics. ­Hezbollah wanted to involve the Shi’ite population in Lebanese politics
after years of exclusion. Therefore, Hezbollah’s objectives were to eventually
become part of the Lebanese political structure. That is why Hezbollah re-
mains as a distinctive case in the literature of non-State actors, as this Party
could successfully blend into Lebanese politics and still safeguard its mis-
sion as a resistance group based on its Islamist ideology.

The “Victory”: May 2000

Israel’s withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon in May 2000 was regarded by
Hezbollah as a victory (Khatib 2013: section I). The group then turned its
attention to improving the Shi’ite community’s standing in Lebanon. These
efforts were directed at providing a range of social services that were not
offered by the Lebanese government, such as enhanced construction, infra-
structure, proper hospital services, education, water, and electricity (Khatib
2013). Hezbollah provided services to all the communities in areas in which
it was based, especially in Southern Lebanon, Beirut suburbs (Dahye), and
 Historical background  23
the Bekaa, where its focus was on the city of Baalbek. This had a major ef-
fect on its level of popularity within those communities that benefited from
the Party’s activities (Khatib 2013; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002). The group estab-
lished new schools in these communities, as well as volunteer humanitarian
facilities that care for the injured and the families of martyrs, which include
Jihad for construction “Jihad al-Bin’a,” the Islamic Health authority, the
non-interest loan society, Islamic beneficiary support society, the Martyr’s
Association, the Islamic Institution for Education, Al Jarha (wounded) As-
sociation, and the Emdad Committee (financial assistance) (Hamzeh 2004).
In addition, the Party has important sports, cultural, and informational in-
stitutions, such as the Imam Khomeini Centre, Al-Ahd magazine, and the
Al-Manar TV channel, which constitutes a large part of the Party’s informa-
tion network (Khatib 2013).
Because of the increasing popularity of Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well
as their evident and increasing assimilation in the Lebanese political spec-
trum, there were continuous and growing demands from the Lebanese gov-
ernment for Hezbollah to surrender its arms after May 2000. However, in
an interview with Al Jazeera network on December 2000, Sayyid Hassan
Nasrallah, the Party’s Secretary-General, described Hezbollah as being at
the forefront (al tali’a) of the Palestinian armed struggle (cited in Harb and
Leenders 2005: 176). Nasrallah also affirmed his Party’s full support for the
Palestinian intifada in December 2001, on Jerusalem’s Commemoration
day. Israel continues to occupy a small part of Chebaa farms, Kfarshouba
hills, and al Ghajar town, which are on the border with Syria.17 Neverthe-
less, there were fewer attacks from Hezbollah on Israel following the victory
of 2000 (Sobelman 2004: 67–70). In May 2003, a Hezbollah parliamentarian
said, in response to this new strategy, that they were “laying low.” Another
Hezbollah parliamentary member described it as “temporary, tactical re-
treat” (Harb and Leenders 2005: 180). As for the question of Hezbollah’s
disarmament, Nawwaf Mussawi, a Foreign Affairs official for Hezbollah,
said in an article for Assafir newspaper in August 2003:

The basis of our objectives is related, on one hand, to the national en-
vironment governed by the theory of prevention and defence [rade’ wa
difaa’], and on the other, to the liberation of the occupied Lebanese
territories. Thus, calling for the demilitarization of Hezbollah is equiv-
alent to calling for the removal of all security measures from Lebanon
and for its deadly strategic exposure.
(Cited in Harb and Leenders 2005: 186)

Hence, disarmament of Hezbollah was out of the question. During the cen-
tral ceremony to commemorate the 40th day for the martyrdom of Imam
Hussein, a central historic figure in Shi’ite Islam, which was held in the city
of Baalbek in May 2012, Nasrallah affirmed, “Our arms are increasing in
quality and quantity.”18
24  Historical background
In 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1559,
which called for the disarmament of all militias (including Hezbollah) and
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon (which included the
Syrian army). It is important to note that Syrian intelligence played a ma-
jor role in controlling Lebanese politics, interfering in the general elections,
as well as the nomination for presidential elections from 1992 until 2005
(Norton 2007b: 475–491). For instance, Ghazi Kanaan (head of Syria’s se-
curity apparatus in Lebanon) and Rustom Ghazeleh (Syrian Military and
Intelligence Officer) enforced a non-negotiable three-year extension for
the presidential terms of Elias Hrawi in 1995 and Emile Lahoud in 2004.
Rafic Hariri, the Lebanese Prime Minister at the time, opposed Lahoud’s
extension and, following the extension of Lahoud’s term under Syria’s or-
ders, Hariri resigned. Consequently, this has created a gap between Syria
and Hariri which also negatively affected Hezbollah’s position in domestic
politics as an ally to Syria. Specifically, because Syria was accused of con-
ducting the assassination of Hariri, there were also suspicions cast towards
Hezbollah. Doubts started to surface as to what role Hezbollah may have
played in the assassination, or at least towards how much the Party knew of
the intended assassination attempt and the perpetrator.

Valentine’s Day in Beirut/not for Hezbollah

On 14 February 2005, Rafic Hariri was assassinated in a car bombing in the
Lebanese capital, Beirut. The assassination was a major shock for the Leba-
nese population. It also marked a turning point for the Lebanese in general
and for Hezbollah in particular. From that point onwards, major strategic
factors changed, and domestic challenges were introduced. Blame for the at-
tack was generally directed at Syria, Israel, and America. The assassination
was followed by several huge demonstrations calling for justice and revenge,
and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. The demonstrations, along with in-
ternational pressure, succeeded in the complete Syrian withdrawal from
Lebanon in April 2005, leaving the Lebanese divided into two major coali-
tions. On one side was the 14 March coalition which, when first formed, was
about establishing “for” or “against” positions regarding the Syrian pres-
ence in Lebanon and protesting the assassination of Rafic Hariri. The coa-
lition could be labelled as an anti-Shi’ite group, included Sunnis (the Future
Movement, headed by Hariri’s son, Saad Hariri), the dominant Druze sect
(Walid Jumblatt), and some Christian political parties (Lebanese Forces,
Phalanges, Watanyeen Ahrar). Alternatively, there was the 8 March coali-
tion representing the campaign against American hegemony. It consisted of
Hezbollah (along with AMAL); Sleiman Franjieh, who heads the Christian
group Marada; and Druze leader, Talal Arslan. Christian Maronite leader
and head of the Free Patriotic Movement, General Michel Aoun (who had
recently returned from exile), initially supported the demands of the 14
March coalition, but later also gave his support to the “8 March coalition.”
 Historical background  25
Hariri’s assassination was followed by several assassinations of other
anti-Syrian politicians and activists. As an ally of Syria, these killings in-
creased the pressure on Hezbollah to disarm and further tested the Party’s
popularity in Lebanon as the public’s level of trust towards the Party started
to fall on suspicion of its role in the assassinations. The Party’s standing
was restored by Israel’s attack on Lebanon in 2006 (Zisser 2009: 1–13), with
87% of Lebanese supporting Hezbollah’s response to the Israeli assault (El-­
Husseini 2012: 808). Consequently, the war with Israel was a major turning
point for Hezbollah and its reception as a political party in Lebanon. It be-
gan after Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers at the border to conduct
a prisoner swap, a tactic that had worked peacefully in the past with the
Israelis (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 2003). It would have been part of the “wa’ed
el sadeq”19 the faithful promise to return the three or four remaining Leb-
anese prisoners who were still in Israeli jails after the Israeli occupation.
Israel’s aggressive and disproportionate response to the kidnapping caused
a shock to the Lebanese people, the government, and to Hezbollah. In the
early hours of the morning following the kidnapping, Israel launched a full-
fledged war on Lebanon which lasted 33 days, killing almost 1,300 civilians
and destroying major roads, 48 bridges, and the International airport (Nor-
ton 2007b: 475–491; Zisser 2009: 1–13). The intensity of the Israeli action
made Hezbollah realise that it had miscalculated (Norton 2007b: 475–491).
Nasrallah revealed in his interview with New TV, a prominent Lebanese
TV Station, on 27 August 2006, that if Hezbollah had known or anticipated
such a response from Israel, they would not have gone ahead with the oper-
ation (Norton 2007b: 480).
It is evident that the Israeli reaction to the kidnapping spread a wave of
concern across the Arab region, and Nasrallah was later accused and criti-
cised by many Arab States namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and ­Jordan
for his “uncalculated adventures” (Norton 2007b: 480). Despite all the
criticism and lack of support from the Lebanese government, Nasrallah
emerged from the war victorious, based on the failure of Israel to achieve
its main objective, which was the destruction of Hezbollah, thus leading
many to consider Hezbollah as the victor (Khatib 2013; Khatib et al. 2014).
­Hezbollah could limit ground attacks from Israeli soldiers. Furthermore,
the attack on one of the Israeli Navy Sa’ar 5 class Corvettes, took place dur-
ing a speech being delivered by Nasrallah, who at the time, was ordering the
attack on the ship. Nasrallah asked viewers to turn and look at the ship as it
went up in flames, a move which was celebrated by many (Harb 2011; Khatib
et al. 2014). Nasrallah’s words were, “the Israeli warship that attacked our
infrastructure, people’s homes and civilians. Look at it burn.”20 This attack
then turned Nasrallah into a hero for most Shi’ites in Lebanon and the re-
gion (Khatib 2013). Thus, Hezbollah achieved major strategic success in this
war. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the 2006 war eventually cre-
ated further divisions among the Lebanese. The war ended with a cease-fire
agreement in August 2006, under the implementation of Security Council
26  Historical background
resolution 1701, which called for the deployment of 15,000 UN soldiers along
the border between southern Lebanon and Israel, creating a buffer zone.

After the 2006 war

The 2006 war was one of the many incidents resulting in further pressure on
Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s opponents questioned the Party’s motives, accusing
Hezbollah of being an agent for Syria and Iran, whose only purpose was to
preserve their interests, as well as still considering the possibility of estab-
lishing an Islamic State (Norton 2007b: 475–491). These accusations were not
new and did not come about as a result of the 2006 war. As mentioned earlier,
Hezbollah has faced these accusations since its emergence in the early 1980s.
After the 2006 war, there was a call from Hezbollah (and its coalition) for
a “national unity” government, of which Hezbollah and its political ally,
the Free Patriotic Movement, would be a part. The tension escalated, when
in October 2006, Nasrallah demanded either the government agree to a na-
tional unity government or they would retaliate. This was followed by the
resignation of Hezbollah’s five Shi’ite members in the government after they
were not consulted on the approval of the International Tribunal set up to
investigate Hariri’s assassination under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.21
This was March 14’s only way to challenge Hezbollah and pressure them to
surrender their arms, but it rebounded against them. Accusations against
Hezbollah further increased after the May 2008, conflict between members
of the March 14 coalition and March 8 coalition, otherwise known as “the
May 7 conflict.” In his interview with New TV in August 2006, Nasrallah
reassured his fellow Lebanese that Hezbollah’s weapons are only to fight
Israel (Norton 2007b: 475–491), but the developments during the week of
May 7 suggested otherwise.
Shortly after, the Lebanese government (which was comprised of March
14 forces) decided to dismiss Wafiq Shuqayr, Beirut Airport’s Chief Secu-
rity Officer and a Hezbollah supporter. The dismissal was followed by the
decision to shut down Hezbollah’s private communication network (that
serves as an internal and secure network of communication among Hezbol-
lah cadres) (Zisser 2009: 14). As a result, Hezbollah supporters and members
(along with AMAL members) clashed with March 14 members in various
parts of Beirut. Fortunately, the clashes only lasted a few days, and nego-
tiations were organised by Qatar (otherwise known as the Doha Accord).
As a result, Hezbollah’s communication network did not shut down, and
Hezbollah and its allies were given one-third of the seats (a plus one vote) in
the Lebanese government as it would guarantee a majority vote. This gave
Hezbollah the power to veto any government decision (The Weekly Middle
East Reporter 2011: 1–50).22 As such, despite the fact that both the 2006 war
and the 7 May 2008 conflict played major roles in weakening popular sup-
port for Hezbollah, they did work to secure Hezbollah’s position as a major
political influence in the Lebanese government. Hezbollah consolidated its
 Historical background  27
power and policies as it was not only presented as a powerful resistance
army, it had also won one-third of the vote in the Lebanese government.
This meant that the Party had increased its negotiation position with the
government and was increasingly being acknowledged as a political party
within the system of government.

Notes
1 Archive: Almanar TV Website (2011) Sayyed Nasrallah’s full speech on May 25,
available at: http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=17623 (ac-
cessed 15 February 2015).
2 The theory of Wilayat al-Faqih in Shia Islam posits that Islam assigns Islamic
Jurists ( faqīhs) guardianship (or custodianship) over citizens. The extent of the
guardianship, however, remains a topic of debate among Ulama, with the spec-
trum of interpretations of the theory ranging from “limited” guardianship only;
for instance, relating to non-litigious matters; to “absolute” guardianship cov-
ering all matters deemed the responsibility of the Prophet of Islam and Shi’a
Imam (Moussawi 2012: 1–10). The latter interpretation of the theory of Wilayat
al-Faqih includes guardianship over how the country is governed and was first
proposed as an approach to governance in Iran by the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini in the 1970s. Wilayat al-Faqih as absolute guardianship is now the
foundation principle of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed,
the rule of the Clerics initiated by Khomeini during the Iranian Revolution in
1979 represents the first nation-state to give recognition of the absolute and su-
pranational political and religious authority of the Supreme Guide, the Wali
al-Faqih. As such, the Constitution of Iran requires all faqih (Guardian Jurists)
to be the Supreme Leader of the government. In the “absolute” guardianship
interpretation of Wilayat al-Faqih theory, wilayat thus means rule or sovereignty
as well as friendship or guardianship (Moussawi 2012: 1–10) constitutes (Mous-
sawi 2012: 1–10).
3 Many people claim that descent from the prophet’s bloodline would comprise a
certain level of insight. This is important in Shi’ite Islam where Imams have all
claimed direct descent from the prophet.
4 The Lebanese Youth Resistance.
5 It is important to note the difference between a Wali and a Welayet. A Wali is the
ruler while the Welayet is the district/state/province, it also means the ruling of.
6 “Quietism” (Taqqiya) and “Activism” are two broad political traditions of Islam.
Political quietism is generally understood as the religiously motivated retreat
from political matters. The quietist tradition may be adopted when one accepts
that it is forbidden to rebel against a Muslim ruler or when one seeks to protect
oneself from danger. For instance, it was an approach adopted by Shi’ite Mus-
lims to protect themselves from continuous persecution.
7 “Quietism” (Taqqiya) and “Activism” are two broad political traditions of Islam.
Political quietism is generally understood as the religiously motivated retreat
from political matters. The quietist tradition may be adopted when one accepts
that it is forbidden to rebel against a Muslim ruler or when one seeks to protect
oneself from danger. For instance, it was an approach adopted by Shi’ite Mus-
lims to protect themselves from continuous persecution.
8 Alahed News (2011) Hezbollah SG Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah Speech on Par-
liamentary Consultations January 23, 2011, available at: www.almanar.com.
lb/english/adetails.php?fromval=3&cid=101&frid=23&seccatid=14&eid=126081
(accessed 30 July 2014).
28  Historical background
9 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
10 Chart found in Avon and Katchadourian (2012:67).
11 Lebanon Renaissance (2009) The new Hezbollah manifesto, available at: www.
lebanonrenaissance.org/assets/Uploads/15-The-New-Hezbollah-­Manifesto-
Nov09.pdf (accessed 4 January 2014).
12 For Hezbollah, there is a distinction between higher Jihad and lower Jihad.
Higher Jihad denotes the self/personal purification from evil, and lower Jihad
denotes fighting for God (military Jihad) (Saouli 2014; Khashan and Moussawi
2007).
13 Chatham House (2013) How powerful is Hezbollah? Local, regional and global
implications (Transcript Q&A) available at: www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/
chathamhouse/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/301013HezbollahQA.
pdf (accessed 2 June 2015).
14 Fadlallah was born Najaf, the Shi‘ite shrine city of Iraqi on 16 November 1935.
During his formative years in Najaf, he developed a detailed knowledge of the
Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams. He also mas-
tered the formal conventions of classical Arabic speech which, according to
Kramer (1997:83–84), “affirmed the power of speaker over listener.” Fadlallah
later became the spokesperson for Hizbullah, whereby he “processed the rage of
Hizbullah into speech, in sermons and lectures, on tape and in print.” As such,
Fadlallah not only became “the voice of Hizbullah’s conscience and its spokes-
man to the world” (p. 2) but also emerged as a role model for the role of leaders
in the emerging contemporary Islamic movements (Kramer 1997: 83–84).
Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din was Chairman of the Supreme
Islamic Shi‘ite Council. Shams al-Din challenged Fadlallah amif claims of the
latter’s nepotism and corruption. As the leading Shi‘ite cleric he was in control
of significant funds and had the power of appointment (Kramer 1997: 123–125).
Shams al-Din also enjoyed wide respect from Shi‘ite communities in Lebanon
and was the person Iranian emissaries would turn to when frustrated with the
actions of Fadlallah. Fadlallah would often publicly discount Shams al-Din’s
influence in Shi’ite communities, stating on one occasion that “the composition
of the Council is not such as to inspire Islamic Shi‘ite trust.” He would, however,
also downplay his rivalry with Shams al-Din, suggesting that “the scope of their
differences was confined to ‘tactics’” (Kramer 1997: 124).
Sayyid Musa al-Sadr was born in Qom, Iran in 1928. Like Fadlallah, he was
born to a family with deep roots in Najaf, where he completed four years of study.
Sayyid Musa moved to Lebanon in 1959 having been persuaded to do so by Aya-
tollah Muhsin al-Hakim, a mentor of Fadlallah (Kramer 1997: 91). As a Shi‘ite
cleric, Sayyid Musa enjoyed considerable support among Shi’ites who ultimately
acclaimed him as the Imam Sadr. Sayyid Musa al-Sadr’s “message of hope cap-
tured the imagination and won the loyalty of many of Lebanon’s Shi‘ites” (Kramer
1997: 97), and his strong sense of Shi‘ite identity and often resonated more
strongly in Shi’ite communities than did Fadlallah’s focus on the threat of Israel.
For further details, see Kramer (1997), available at: https://scholar.­harvard.edu/
files/martinkramer/files/martinkramer.org-the_oracle_of_­h izbullah_sayyid_
muhammad_husayn_fadlallah_1.pdf (Accessed 6 January 2019).
15 Hezbollah’s ability to survive and improve throughout the past 20 years has
shown that recruitment is considered the most important element in Hezbol-
lah’s mission. There has been a large amount of funds set out for training camps
and courses, in addition to creating cells within Hezbollah structure to detect
 Historical background  29
members’ behaviour. In addition, Hezbollah’s skills selection has also contrib-
uted significantly to its achievements (see Chapter 3; also, Farida, M. (2010)
‘Field Notes on Hezbollah’s Recruitment, Training and Organizational Struc-
ture’, Journal for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 5(2): 71–77).
16 These suburbs are of major concentrations of Shi’ites and are where significant
Hezbollah operations are based.
17 The issue of these lands is controversial. It remains uncertain if these lands are
Syrian or Lebanese. In addition, Syria was accused of using this factor to put
pressure on Israel and to protect Hezbollah.
18 Alahed News (2015) The speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed
Hassan Nasrallah during the ceremony marking the Resistance and Liberation
Day held in Bint Jbeil on May 25th, 2012, available at: www.english.­alahednews.
com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=20414&cid=453#.WQE7i4V8jU4 (accessed 10 July
2014).
19 The faithful promise; this narrative has developed as part of Hezbollah’s prom-
ise to release all Lebanese prisoners from Israeli prisons.
20 Shadid, A. (2006) Israel, Hizbollah Vow Wider War, The Washington Post 15 July
2006, 1, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
07/14/ AR2006071400385.html.
21 Which allows for the use of force to stop any threat to international peace and
security.
22 The agreement required legislation to be approved by a majority plus one.

References
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2 Fatwa and politics

Islam and politics

Differences in the beliefs of the Sunni and the Shi’a and in how they view
Islamic history and react to contemporary events stem back to the 17th
century and the death of the Prophet Muhammad (Esposito 2010: 52–53).
The Prophet’s death in 632 raised questions amongst his followers as to his
rightful successor to hold the “mantle of leadership” and continue to pro-
vide spiritual guidance to the Islamic movement. There emerged one view
amongst a minority of Muslims that the rightful successor should be a mem-
ber of the family of the Prophet Muhammad, his cousin and son-in-law,
Ali. This group called themselves Shiat Ali or Shi’a (the Party of Ali). An
alternative view held by the majority of Muslims was that Islamic tradition
should dictate the choice of the rightful successor to the Prophet Muham-
mad, that is, the choice of leader (caliph) should be made by tribal elders
based on who they believed had the most prestige and power in the tribal
system. This group called themselves Sunni, the followers of tradition.
With the Shi’a in the minority, Ali was passed over for the position of ca-
liph in the first instance, with the “close companion and trusted advisor” to
the Prophet, Abu Bakr, being endorsed as caliph by the Sunni majority. Ali
was passed over for the position of caliph a further two times, before being
selected for the position in 656 AD. However, tensions between the Shi’a and
the Sunni developed further with the assassination of Ali while caliph in
661 AD, and with the massacre of his son, Hussein, and his band of rebels at
Karbala in 680 AD as they attempted to seize power from the caliph, Yazid.
Thus, notwithstanding their unity in faith in God, the Qur’an, and the
Prophet Muhammad, the Shi’a and the Sunni have fundamental differences
in their views of leadership. To Sunnis, the caliph is selected or elected as
their political and military leader, “but not as their Prophet.” To Shi’a, the
Imam is selected as their political and religious leader, with the condition
that he is “a direct descendant of the Prophet’s family.” The honorific title to
denote male and female descendants of the Prophet’s family is “sayyid” and
“sayyidah,” respectively, but the title may also be used to when referring to
a tribal leader, elder, or a scholar. Regarding Hezbollah Secretary General,
Hassan Nasrallah, specifically, his sayyid title denotes his descendancy from
34  Fatwa and politics
the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Husain ibn Ali. In the broader
social context, while sayyids and sayyidahs are afforded a certain level of
respect based on their ancestral lineage by fellow Shi’a, the title itself does
not autonomically confer any political or religious superiority.
In turn, the different notions of leadership espoused by the Shi’a and the
Sunni have implications for how they view historical events. As Esposito
(2010: 52–53) explains, the success of Sunni caliphs is viewed by the Sunni
as “signs of God’s guidance, rewards for their faith, and historic valida-
tion of Sunni claims to rule.” Conversely, the Shi’a view the predominantly
Sunni rule in Islamic history as “the illegitimate usurpation of power,” and
thus have positioned themselves as the disinherited, oppressed but righteous
group who must “continue to fight for God’s rule.”
In terms of leadership, the Twelvers Shii Islam – one of the three subdivi-
sions of the Shi’a – along with the Fivers (Zaydi) and the Seveners ­(Ismaili) –­
representing the Shi’a majority in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain – endorse commu-
nity leadership based on a clerical hierarchy of religious leaders (ayatollahs).
In Iran, for instance, the Ayatollah Khomeini has the authority to reinterpret
Shii Islam and the clergy (ulama) have also been assigned to right to govern.
Such disparate views between the Shi’a and the Sunni of the power of the
clergy to rule have resulted in intense political rivalry between the sects and
difference in how each sect performs religious practices including ijtihad.
Concepts derived from Islamic studies such as fatwa, ijtihad, and Taqiyya
are useful to explain Hezbollah and its use of religion in politics, as well as
the ways in which religion is employed for political purposes by State and
non-State actors in the Middle East more broadly. The importance of ex-
ploring the interconnection between religion and politics in relation to Hez-
bollah’s use of fatwas and other religious tools emerges from the broader
context of Islamic fundamentalism. Radical ideologies and fundamental-
ism linked to Islam have become prominent in international discourse in
recent decades in response to the emergence of groups such as Al-Qaeda,
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), Boko Haram, and
others. Members of these groups claim that they are fighting a jihad, a holy
war, and thus have a religious justification to further their cause and recruit
additional members. Notably, groups such as ISIS use religious indoctri-
nation to maintain control over captured territories and have issued fatwa
with all the force that such a religious decree entails. As such, the fatwa has
afforded groups such as ISIS the opportunity to exercise power and rule
over captured territories under the guise of religious justifications.
The “participatory” role that Islam plays in politics in the Lebanon and the
Middle East region more broadly suggests that the relationship between reli-
gion and politics in Islam is one of fusion rather than separation (Norris and
Inglehart 2011: 95). The beginnings of this fusion stem back centuries. Fol-
lowing the Prophet Mohammed’s death, numerous successors ruled Muslims,
adopting the title of Khalifa (caliph). However, after the Mongol invasion of
Baghdad in 1258, the emergence of religious scholars (or Ulama) adopting the
 Fatwa and politics  35
role of political advisors to secular rulers was to mark a shift in the religious-­
political dynamic in Islam (Roy 2004). This development eventually shaped
Sunni political theory and religion and politics became intertwined.
The role of religion in the expression of political authority also shifted
following the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire in 1453
(Roy 2004). This is evidenced in the way the Ottoman Sultan held both reli-
gious authority by assigning himself as caliph and political authority in the
role of Sultan (Toft et al. 2011: 64). Hence, religion and politics in Islam have
historically been intimately intertwined, with Islam having a direct effect on
politics in Muslim societies. In turn, it is perhaps not surprising that schol-
ars who have underestimated the role of religion in politics have had their
views challenged in recent years (Toft et al. 2011: 1).
Some scholars such as Fox and Sandler (2004: 8), as well as numerous
“neo-atheist” writers, have acknowledged that religion has not vanished,
and claim to be “alarmed by its persistence” and potential influence on
global politics. It is certainly well documented that two important events
shaped American foreign policy over recent decades (and the Western per-
spective of the Middle East). First, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which
involved the American hostage crisis that lasted for 444 days and which
marked the beginning of a major “re-alignment of Middle East Politics”
(Toft et al. 2011: 3). Second, the attacks of 11 September 2001 which resulted
in the Bush Administration’s declaration of a “war on terror” and the sub-
sequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, Islamist radical-
ism was the common factor and both events instigated growing demands
from a segment of the Muslim community to create regimes that promote
Islamic law (Sharia law) both at home and around the world (Kramer 1994;
Khashan and Moussawi 2007).
As such, Keohane (2010; cited in Toft et al. 2011) argued that after 9/11
the world should keep in mind that religious belief can fuel violence and
that we should always be mindful of its implications for political decision-­
making. Keohane also emphasised the need for analysts to understand the
main drivers of the violence and events in the field. In addition, Toft et al.
(2011: 8) assert that,

If scholars, journalists, educators, and public intellectuals have come

to realise by now that religion matters, they have only begun to under-
stand how religion matters and whether it is likely to bring violence or
peace, division or unity, progress or decline. But such an understand-
ing is crucial for grasping contemporary global politics. Whether one
is a maker of foreign policy, a business person conducting global com-
merce, a scholar of politics, economics, or culture, an advocate for eco-
nomic development or human rights, a doctor fighting disease overseas,
a translator, a missionary, or simply a world traveller, one cannot afford
to ignore religion’s resurgent political power in its almost infinitely var-
ied manifestations (author’s emphasis).
36  Fatwa and politics
In this light, a key point for consideration is how much influence religious
actors can have on politics. It is worth noting here the conclusion drawn by
Toft et al. (2011: 76) in their study of the participation of religious actors in
a country’s political system:

With the number of “free” and “partly free” countries jumping from 93
in 1975 to 147 in 2005, religious groups and organisations around the
world enjoy a greater opportunity to influence the political process by
forming lobbies, fielding candidates, organizing political parties, and
inviting politicians of all kinds to try to win their support. In countries
that combine some modernisation with little or no democratisation,
religious and other organisations experience dissonant dynamics: they
may enjoy an increased capacity to formulate their own agenda and
mobilise resources but little or no opportunity to promote that agenda
in the formal political process, a mixture of conditions that is likely to
generate violent militancy when combined with an integralist political
theology. It is therefore little surprise that parts of the world have expe-
rienced some modernisation, little democratisation, and the widespread
diffusion of militant political theologies – the Arab Middle East and
North Africa, above all – have produced radical religious movements
such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah.

Thus, conclusions in the literature such as these give weight to the asser-
tion that religious actors are increasingly exercising political power within
States and across borders (Toft et  al. 2011: 50). Moreover, it is indicative
of how they can often generate violent militancy in their attempt to influ-
ence political systems. Indeed, in some cases, the evidence shows religion
has challenged the political system and driven a shift towards “Godly sys-
tems” in which the need for Sharia law resonates. One such example is when
Khomeini initiated an Islamic revolution to overthrow the Shah’s secular
system (Coughlin 2010). Furthermore, as Harik (2004) reminds us, religious
actors such as Hezbollah have exerted great influence on the Lebanese po-
litical system through the use of “Godly” doctrines. She argues, Hezbollah’s
bottom-up “Islamisation” process is an indication of the Party’s objectives
to present an alternative system to the Lebanese government.

Hezbollah and the Islamisation process

Educational and cultural institutions play a key role in Hezbollah’s efforts
to coordinate the Islamisation process in Lebanon (Deeb 2006). In turn, as
discussed by various authors such as Deeb (2006), Harik (2004), and others,
the Islamisation process has played a key role in Hezbollah’s efforts to con-
trol the Shi’ite community in Lebanon, an outcome which is explored in the
­ l-Shahid –
following chapter. An example of the Islamisation process is the A
martyr’s foundation and Al-Jarih – foundation for wounded fighters.
 Fatwa and politics  37
The aim of the foundation is both to manage medical clinics and hospitals
to assist the wounded, and to spread “the culture of martyrdom” (Avon and
Katchadourian 2012: 60). Al-Mahdi scouts stand as another example of an
alternative Islamisation process put in place by Hezbollah, whereby scouts
are taught about martyrdom and Wilayat al-Faqih (Coombes 2009). In this
context, it is important to underline how ­Hezbollah – as an active partici-
pant in the Lebanese political system – uses religious tools to allow religious
leaders such as Nasrallah to make State-level political decisions.
This tells us something about the difference between Muslim societies in
the Middle East and Europe, where the principle of separation of church
and State has long been established. The principles of non-interference and
sovereignty found their way into Western thinking after the peace of West-
phalia 1648 (Griffiths 2003: 29). This approach reflects the European model
and dominated the relationship between religion and politics until the 1960s
when religious actors began to challenge the European model of governance
in the Middle East (Toft et al. 2011: 58). These challenges were activated due
to a number of factors including the failure to end the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, American foreign policy towards the region, and the Iranian Rev-
olution (Roy 1994).
In turn, it is important to further explore the nature of the relationship
between Hezbollah politics (a religious actor) and the Party’s use of reli-
gious tools such as fatwa and taklif shari to achieve political outcomes.
For instance, one might ask, What is a fatwa and can a religious leader
such as Nasrallah in Lebanon, Sistani in Iraq, or Khomeini in Iran issue a
“political fatwa”? Moreover, how does use of the fatwa differ to the use of
taklif shari? To better understand how the fusion between religious tenets
and politics in Islam can manifest, an exploration of the fatwa in Islam is
provided below. The objective of the exploration is to further demonstrate
how fatwa have been issued by religious figures in political contexts and the
ways in which the progressive dimension of fatwas is used for political gain.

Fatwa origins, definitions, and requirements

A key difference between the Shi’a and the Sunnis concerning the hadith
is that Sunnis are open to accepting any tradition from the companions ir-
respective of the nature of the relationship between them or the perceived
justness in unjustness of their actions. Conversely, the Shi’a only accept the
hadith if all narrators in the chain were known to be just and proven to be
trustworthy. This difference is due to the Shi’a belief in the infallibility of
the Prophet and the Imams, with the knowledge of Imam drawn from the
knowledge of their forefathers up to the Prophet. In turn, only if the narra-
tors in the chain have been just and the chain of narrators remains unbroken
will the Hadith be regarded as authentic.
The term fatwa is derived from a verse in the Qur’an and means “asking
for a definitive answer” or “giving a definitive answer” (Surat An-Nisā’ [The
38  Fatwa and politics
Women] verse 4:127, 176). As such, it is an Islamic legal decree issued by an
expert in religious law (mufti), relating to a specific question. The fatwa is
usually undertaken at the request of an individual or judge seeking to resolve
an issue where Islamic jurisprudence is uncertain. A fatwa may cover a wide
scope of matters that include philosophy, social issues, theology, and legal
theory (Roy 1994), and can be broad enough to respond to questions related
to economics, politics, science, and technology. Notably, it remains the case
that a fatwa lacks compulsion; that is, even though a fatwa can be applicable
to a person’s concerns, it is up to the individual to accept it or not (Roy 1994).
Importantly, a fatwa combines the opinion (and judgement) of the mufti
with Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) knowledge. Therefore, rigorous training
in Fiqh is required prior to issuing a fatwa to ensure it is not based only on
the mufti’s ideas and thoughts. That is, it should be rendered in accord-
ance with fixed guidance from sources of Islamic law (i.e. the Qur’an and
the Hadith).1 For a mufti to issue a fatwa he should meet the standards of
ijtihad, the process of differentiating between different scholars’ opinions
and positions on a subject and judging it in accordance to the strengths or
weaknesses of the evidence provided. Ijtihad is translated to contextual le-
gal interpretation or reasoning. As Imam Shafi’i, founder of one of the four
Sunni Schools of thought, explained (cited in Al-Tabtaba’i 2010: 11–31),

It is not allowed for anyone to give a Shari’a explanation ( fatwa), except

one who knows the Holy Qur’an completely including what verses are
abrogated and by which verses they were abrogated, and which verses
resemble each other in the Qur’an and whether a chapter was revealed
in Makkah or Madina. He must know the entire corpus of the Hadith of
the Prophet(s), both those which are authentic and those which are false.
He must know the Arabic language of the time of the Prophet(s) with its
grammar and eloquence as well as know the poetry of the ­Arabs. Ad-
ditionally, he must know the culture as the various peoples who live in
each different part of the community. If a person has all such attributes
combined in [him], he may speak on what is permitted (halal) and what
is forbidden (haram). Otherwise he has no right to issue a fatwa.

The characteristics of a mufti identified above by Imam Shafi are not ex-
haustive. Furthermore, for a scholar to be qualified to issue a fatwa, he is
required to:

• know the verses of Qur’ān pertaining to the ruling at hand;

• know the reason behind the verses of the Qur’ān related to the ruling –
when each was revealed and why;
• distinguish between the supportive and oppositional verses of the Qur’ān;
• know all the hadith pertaining to the ruling and the soundness of their
chain of transmission;
• be familiar with the legal precedents of the issue before him, including
the arguments or consensus reached by earlier scholars; and
 Fatwa and politics  39
• be well-versed in the syntax, grammar, pronunciation, idioms, special lin-
guistic uses, customs, and culture prevalent at the time of the Prophet(s)
and the succeeding two generations (Al-Tabtaba’i 2010: 11–31).

Indeed, the mufti is perceived as person of authority since

The ideological authority of the fatwā is invariably explained by saying

that a muftī is the deputy and successor to the Prophet, the lawgiver.
Legally, the authority of the muftī is derived from the doctrine of taqlīd
(adherence to tradition), which demands consulting the learned, often
those of a particular school of law, and following their opinions. Since
a muftī has to cite authorities for his opinion, his authority is moral
and institutional, not personal. For this reason, the qualifications of a
muftī and the rules for issuing a fatwā have been developed in consid-
erable detail. A mustaftī (inquirer) should accept and obey the opin-
ion of the muftī when he is satisfied that he is competent and that his
opinion is based on earlier authorities. Theoretically, a muftī must be
a mujtahid (an interpreter of law qualified to exercise legal reasoning
independently of schools of law), yet a muqallid (an adherent to a school)
is also allowed to issue a fatwā, as long as he mentions the source of his
citation (my emphasis).
(Al-Tabtaba’i 2010: 11–31)

Hence, there are many conditions and requirements associated with the title
of mufti in the context of issuing a fatwa which have clear implications for
our understanding of Islamic authority in the Middle East. The following
sections explore how religious tools such as fatwas are linked to politics in
the Middle East and the role they play in the attempts by leaders or those
in authority to direct the thoughts and actions of individuals in the region.

Fatwas and politics in the Middle East

Because there are different schools of thought in Islam between the Sunni
and Shi’ite sects, there is arguably a lack of central authority. In turn, this
provides a socio-political environment in which fatwas can be instrumental
in the justifications given for intervention and participation in the politi-
cal process. One notable example is when the prominent Iraqi Shi’ite cleric,
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, issued a fatwa in June 2003, against L. Paul
Bremer’s2 draft Iraqi post-invasion constitution. The draft was to be adopted
through an unelected council chosen primarily by the US (Toft et al. 2011:
93–98). Sistani rejected the council, claiming that it should seek to “create
a constitution conforming with the greater interests of the Iraqi people and
expressing the national identity, whose basis is Islam” (Sistani; cited in Toft
et al. 2011: 97). Sistani then (indirectly) asked for immediate popular elec-
tions and urged women to vote, comparing their role to that of Zaynab,
the sister of Imam Hussein (Toft et al. 2011: 93–98). Sistani exercised both
40  Fatwa and politics
religious and political authority when he urged his followers to vote in the
March 2005 national elections and thus presents as an important example
of a religious figure who exercises his authority quite deliberately for politi-
cal gains. Indeed, Sistani was at the time identified as “Iraq’s most consist-
ent and effective advocate of elections and parliamentary representations”
(Chandraskaran 2005: 37).
Furthermore, in 1907, the Ulama of Marrakech issued a fatwa ousting
the Sultan of Morocco for his inability to defend the State against French
aggression. In 1933, a fatwa by the Iraqi Ulama called for a boycott on
­Zionist products as a sign of resistance. Also, in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini
used fatwas to introduce and legitimise institutions such as the Council
for the Islamic Revolution and the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini also issued a fatwa in 1989 calling for a death
sentence for the author of The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie. Likewise,
Sheikh Qardawi issued a fatwa in April 2004, to boycott American and
Israeli products as retribution for not supporting the Palestinian cause.
Thus, these examples show the breadth of power that a religious cleric in
Islam can wield as both a political figure and a decision-maker.
Some fatwas have been significant beyond the specific issue, attracting
both popular and elite support, whereas others have been largely ignored,
apart from local relevance. For example, Pakistan’s Islamist group, Mutta-
hida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), declared a fatwa in January 2007, to endorse
the government’s decision to vaccinate all children against polio in the
country’s Northwest province (Foreign Policy 2007). However, health work-
ers discovered that parents of 24,000 children refused the vaccination for
their child. This resistance emerged due to the local influence of anti-State
clerics who claimed that the vaccination was a “Western plot to sterilise
Muslims” (Foreign Policy 2007). Thus, issuing a fatwa is not restricted to
religious cases only; rather, it may also address a social issue. Interestingly,
fatwas can now be obtained online by “Cybermuftis.” Websites such as
www.­islamonline.net and www.fatwa-online.com are amongst many online
websites which offer instant fatwas (Masud et al. 2017).
The following section explores the theoretical (Islamic) grounds on
which fatwa and ijtihad can be used in politics. As such, it sets the frame-
work for a discussion in Chapter 4 of the circumstances and ways in which
Hezbollah uses ijtihad, taklif shari, etc. as religious tools to serve its polit-
ical agenda.

Fatwa, taklif shari, and ijtihad

The relationship between Hezbollah and the Faqih

Hezbollah has followed Khamenei as the Party’s Marja (source of emula-
tion), and since 1994 he has issued fatwas for the Party. Unlike Sunni Is-
lam, the Shi’ite sect follows the notion of marjaeyah, in which an individual/
group chooses a certain Marja (source) and follows his interpretation of the
 Fatwa and politics  41
Qur’an (Kalantari 2012: 1–13). This provides the individual with the capac-
ity to choose from a variety of options and also ensures the sect’s major
element of ijtihad.
Of some interest is the way in which the relationship between Hezbollah
and the Faqih allows for a broad scope for independent decision-making.3
As asserted by Saad-Ghorayeb (2002: par. 14),

this wide scope of jurisdiction was not only evident under the wilayat of
Ayatollah Khomeini, who was apotheosized by the party as a Mujaddid
al-Din (Renewer of Religion), but also under Ayatollah Khamenei who
did not officially earn the title of marjaa al-taqlid (religious source of
emulation) until 1994, shortly after which Hezbollah subscribed to his
religious authority.4

However, the nature of the allegiance that Hezbollah has with Iran and to
the Wali remains hard to define (Azani 2011). Certainly, the Party’s inter-
vention in the Syrian war has indicated its need to safeguard Iran’s interest
in the region (Levitt 2014). Moreover, when Hezbollah was faced with the
question of whether to participate in the parliamentary elections in 1992, it
was Khamenei’s advice that resolved the matter, explaining that the initia-
tive would be in accordance with the Party’s strategic objectives (Avon and
Katchadourian 2012).
Hence, there is a greater level of involvement by Faqih in the Party’s inter-
nal and external matters than that might appear on the surface. For exam-
ple, Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2001 which effectively meant that Nasrallah
was to be re-elected as the Party’s leader permanently, which was against
Party’s rules5 (Al-Agha 2011b; Avon and Katchadourian 2012). Khamenei
also issued a fatwa for the continuation of Hezbollah’s resistance operations
against Israel after May 2000 (Norton 2007: 90). Thus, Khamenei used his
role as a Wali and a source of emulation to serve a political outcome by
ensuring the re-appointment of Nasrallah as leader of the Party. Moreover,
Khamenei arguably added to Nasrallah’s and Sheikh Mohammad Yazbek’s
(Head of Hezbollah’s Juristic Council) power in Lebanon by appointing
them as his religious representatives to endorse the Wali’s religious power in
Lebanon (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002).
At the leadership level, the intertwined relationship between religion and
politics is evidenced by the actions of Nasrallah for Hezbollah and Khomeini/
Khamenei in Iran, where the leaders exercise religious and political author-
ity. Nasrallah uses his position as leader to issue religious commands and
to give religious sermons (such as the ten-day Ashoura commemoration).
He has also made political decisions such as the call in 2008 for Hezbollah
ministers to withdraw from the Cabinet headed by the then Lebanese Prime
Minister, Fouad Siniora, following an objection to the establishment of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Avon and Katchadourian 2012). Moreover,
Nasrallah uses his image as a religious leader and a Sayyid (i.e. a descendant
of the Prophet) to ensure his judgements remain unchallengeable (Khatib
42  Fatwa and politics
et al. 2014) (the role of Nasrallah’s image in the Party’s success is highlighted
in the following chapters).

Nasrallah, fatwa, and taklif shari

As Khamenei’s religious legal representative in Lebanon (along with
­Yazbek), Nasrallah holds the exclusive right to issue a taklif shari, endorsed
by Khomeini as a religious pronouncement. Indeed, this book argues that a
taklif shari issued by Nasrallah heightens his authority and renders his com-
mands more powerful than a fatwa because of its compulsory nature. Fur-
thermore, although the fatwa offers solutions/answers to civil matters, taklif
shari can be used in combat (linking it to military jihad) (Hamzeh 2004). As
Hamzeh (2004) explains, Khomeini initiated this practice by issuing Iranian
men (or in some cases Iranian boys) a taklif shari to walk through the land-
mines during the Iran-Iraq war. In this context, the taklif shari becomes a
paramilitary tool employed by religious figures.
Therefore, with the continued endorsement of Khamenei, Nasrallah has
the capacity to exercise his authority to issue a taklif shari rather than hav-
ing to resort to issuing a fatwa. Moreover, as previously noted, compliance
with a fatwa is voluntary, whereas a taklif shari is non-negotiable. Hence,
it is reasonable to suggest that it will sometimes be in Nasrallah’s and the
Hezbollah’s interests to utilise taklif shari as a paramilitary tool for the mo-
bilisation of supporters and for engaging in conflict more broadly and leave
fatwas for civil, social, and economic matters. In turn, the opportunity to
use these religious tools to achieve political, social, and/or military out-
comes is important to our understanding of how Hezbollah uses religion to
undertake a pragmatic approach to building up its power base in Lebanon.
For instance, notwithstanding the greater benefits to the Party from issu-
ing taklif shari, Nasrallah has in fact issued fatwas on occasions to resolve
socio-political issues. For example, when a political dispute led to clashes
between Sunni and Shi’ite students at a Lebanese university in 2008, Nas-
rallah gave a televised speech to “issue a fatwa calling for calm” (Avon and
Katchadourian 2012: 88). Nasrallah also issued a fatwa to stop “celebra-
tory” shootings that traditionally followed his (or any other political lead-
er’s) speech. Incidents of people being hit by stray bullets led Nasrallah to
ask his followers to refrain from using real ammunition. In a speech in 2013,
Nasrallah called for celebratory shooting to be “forbidden,” stating,

Well nowadays on holidays people open fire; in political occasions, they

open fire; in funerals of martyrs, they open fire […] Whenever any of
the politicians – including me – show up, people start firing in the air.
I am not talking about anyone else. I am talking, above all, about my-
self. […] today I will say more following discussions we made with reli-
gious scholars. Though the idea is clear, we were obliged to send written
requests to several major religious authorities whether in Iran or in Iraq.
 Fatwa and politics  43
[…] Thus, we resorted to our religion and asked our scholars, authorities
and jurists. That’s because talking rationally did not lead anywhere,
talking legally did not yield any result, and talking morally did not work
too […] this issue is forbidden. Whoever is careful for his religion and
his Hereafter must be aware. Moreover, this is more forbidden when the
arms are ours and the bullets are ours. Hezbollah does not allow that its
arms and bullets are used as such.6

This extract exemplifies well how Nasrallah’s position as leader of Hezbol-

lah combines both religion and politics and thus has pragmatic undertones.
To clarify, it can be argued that Hezbollah’s calls to Shi’ites to refrain from
firing live ammunition into the air as a traditional form of celebration and
the clash between Shi’ite and Sunni students are both issues that have the
potential to undermine Hezbollah’s powerbase. When confronted with such
political and social issues in need of resolution, Nasrallah has demonstrated
his willingness to resort to Islam (“to our religion”) by way of the fatwa to
connect the present-day socio-political issues to Islamic tenets to achieve a
pragmatic resolution, namely, one that protects the Party’s support base.
In terms of taklif shari, Nasrallah has also issued these on different oc-
casions to support a pragmatic approach to addressing social, political, or
military issues that threaten or promote Hezbollah’s domestic or regional
presence. For example, during the 1992 parliamentary elections, he issued
taklif shari for all Shi’ites to participate and vote (Hamzeh 2004), an action
which reflects the same principles as Al-Sistani’s request for women to vote
in Iraq as discussed above. This is arguably a pragmatic decision given, as
Hamzeh (2004) explains, that votes were essential for the Party to safeguard
its position in the Lebanese parliament. In addition, during the 2006 war
with Israel, Nasrallah commanded all reserve members of Hezbollah to
join the battle. Similarly, Nasrallah used taklif shari to call on members to
fight in Syria (Smyth 2015) and thus made pragmatic use of the religious
tool to strengthen Hezbollah’s action taking power in the region (i.e. Syria)
and, in turn, its political interests in Lebanon. It is worth noting, however,
that Nasrallah’s extensive use of taklif shari has led to criticism from prom-
inent Shi’ite clerics such as Fadlallah, the Party’s source of emulation be-
fore Khamenei. Fadlallah argued that taklif shari should be respected and
should not be employed for political gains (Al-Agha 2013; Sankari 2005).
In addition, the application of taklif shari as a religious paramilitary com-
mand and to maintain a policy of deterrence with Israel in response to its
“reveal and disguise strategy” (or psychological war) is closely linked to the
group’s historical survival notion of taqiyya or dissimulation.7 Indeed, these
elements represent the controversy surrounding religion/religious actors
playing an influential role in national politics, whereby they become increas-
ingly capable of exerting political power within States and across borders
(Toft et al. 2011: 50). Therefore, there is evidence to show that Hezbollah’s
strategic objective has transitioned from political quietism (dissimulation)
44  Fatwa and politics
to political hegemony (Deeb 2013) as evidenced by years of effort to mo-
bilise the Shi’ite community, the implementation of networks of social ser-
vices, and the use of religious tools justify and support political, social, or
military action.
Thus, the use of these religious tools has helped Hezbollah to pursue its
political agenda. Foremost, by issuing fatwas at particular times and taklif
shari at other times, Hezbollah appears to be fortified with religious author-
ity (Al-Agha 2011b: 51–55). Moreover, the use of religious tools to protect
Lebanese sovereignty combined with the major support it provided to Leba-
non’s Shi’ite community through the provision of social services has helped
to legitimise the Party’s objectives (Al-Agha 2011a: 21).

Ijtihad: political pragmatism

The third element in Hezbollah’s political identity that finds its roots in reli-
gious notion is ijtihad. Ijtihad, or judgement derived from contextual inter-
pretation, is yet another area where the Shi’ite sect faces criticism. To clarify,
Shi’ites believe that the act of ijtihad is something to be proud of, whereas,
for Sunni Muslims, ijtihad is rarely practiced. To clarify, Hallaq (1984; 3)
has suggested that the “gate of ijtihad” cannot been irrevocably closed for
Sunnis because the “differences among jurists, encouraged by ambiguities
in legal terminology” means it remains lawful in Sunni law. Nonetheless,
given the impossibility for Sunnis to create new legal schools, the practice
of ijtihad by jurists is limited to rare individual cases. Therefore, the notion
of ijtihad is more accessible to the Shi’ite sect where its importance lies in
its ability to ensure their security and survival. Notably, ijtihad can play a
role in economic matters (e.g. bank interest), social matters (e.g. funerals,
inheritance, and marriage), and politics (e.g. activism and resistance) (Al-­
Tabtaba’i 2010) and as such there are specific requirements and guidelines
to follow if one is to practice ijtihad.
Sharia is derived from the Holy Scriptures in the Qur’an and the hadith
and fatwas that achieve authority through consensus. In turn, fatwa is the
product of the ijtihad process and takes shape after a series of discussions
that involve an ijtihad (interpretations) practice. So, in other words, ijtihad
is the continuation of the process of fatwa and (in some cases) challenges
pre-determined fatwas. Importantly, the authority afforded religious fig-
ures to interpret hadith based on personal judgement has important im-
plications for our understanding of Hezbollah’s application of ijtihad in its
use of religious tools. As cases vary in context, circumstances, and reasons,
ijtihad reflects the theological continuity and adaptation that Hezbollah
represents (Khatib 2013). Hence, Hezbollah’s ability to adapt to different
­circumstances  – from being a resistance group to an influential political
party and regional actor – is the result of an expression of ijtihad. For ex-
ample, Hezbollah continually reiterates that it will not use weapons against
 Fatwa and politics  45
the Lebanese people, yet the Party explained its military response in 2008 as
an act of necessity to ensure its security (Khatib 2013). As such, the military
response was positioned under the interpretation of events as “necessary”
allowing ijtihad to be used for political “manoeuvring.”
To cite a specific example, in order to take part in union elections (League
of Lebanese University Professors, League of Secondary School T ­ eachers,
and the journalist’s unions), Hezbollah allied itself with members of the
“Lebanese Forces,” a political group closely linked to Israel during  the
­Lebanese Civil War. Although this was deemed by the Party to be disloyal
(Avon and Katchadourian 2012: 48), the temporary alliance was also deemed
to be necessary to protect the Party’s strategic objectives.
When questioned about the politics of such a decision, Hezbollah’s
response is that ijtihad is a religious notion, an accepted norm of divine
practice, which carries heavy implications. Moreover, the Party’s policy of
interpreting events will always be undertaken as a religious duty ( jihad, tak-
lif shari, necessary measures). This has influenced how international actors
perceive the Party, provoking debate as to whether it is a religious party or
a political party. In turn, important questions emerge, such as How can the
international community deal with Hezbollah?
Such questions about the confluence of Hezbollah’s religious and political
agendas affect how the international community perceives the Party and
what policies it should form in response to its actions. However, what is
lacking is a comprehensive understanding of the religious influence on the
Party’s ethics, and how the Party uses religion as a political tool. This lack
of understanding helps to create a significant and widening gap in knowl-
edge of Lebanese politics, Lebanese-Israeli relationships, the Arab-Arab
relationship, and Arab-Israeli conflicts. Furthermore, Hezbollah’s progres-
sive and adaptive uses of fatwa and taklif shari may also be an indication of
the pragmatism it has developed during its political transformation. Argu-
ably, such pragmatism is facilitated through the use of ijtihad and the af-
fordances it provides the Party to inform decision-making on political and
social affairs via independent interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunnah,
thus making it difficult to predict its intentions and objectives.
Based on the success of groups like Hezbollah, religious actors may prove
to be the defining elements in 21st-century politics. Non-State actors such
as Hamas and Hezbollah have shifted the balance of power in the Middle
East and increased the role of Iran in the region (Toft et al. 2011: 214). In
addition, a 2014 US strategy paper stipulated that “the role of Hezbollah
shows how a non-State actor can have an important role to work within
the regional balance of power equation” (Nerguizian 2014: 19). Hezbollah
often employs the instruments of religion and this enhances the symbolic
influence of the Party over the Lebanese State. The realisation that religion
matters in global politics is thus only now being slowly recognised by policy-­
makers both within the region and outside.
46  Fatwa and politics
Notes
1 Hadith are references to Prophet Mohammed’s life and statements. These collec-
tions have then been used by Muslim scholars as references to Sharia.
2 An American diplomat, best known for the Coalition Provisional Authority fol-
lowing the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
3 In order for a scholar to become a source of emulation (or Marja taklid), he has
to acquire Fiqh knowledge and should therefore be a Faqih. The Faqih can be
a source of emulation; however, a source of emulation cannot necessarily be a
Wali al-Faqih. Wali al-Faqih denotes the highest ruling rank in Shi’ite Islam.
4 In order to gain the title of Marja, one needs to have followers.
5 Nasrallah was elected as a Party leader first in 1992 after the assassination of
Sayyid Abbas Moussawi, the Party’s Secretary General then, through consulta-
tive council (Shura council) vote.
6 Islamic Resistance – Lebanon (n.d.) Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed ­Hassan
Nasrallah, available at: www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=28330&cid=142
(accessed 2 February 2014).
7 Taqiyya is concealing religion or faith due to fear despite believing in the religion
being concealed. The notion of taqiyya is derived from the Qur’anic verse (Surat
Al-Imran 3:28) that states, “except by way of precaution, that ye may Guard
yourselves from them and this is Taqiyya.” According to Qur’anic text, Shi’ites
are therefore able to “bend the rules” or hide the truth to protect themselves.

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3 Hezbollah’s political
pragmatism through ijtihad

The evolution of Hezbollah’s political pragmatism

Hezbollah’s success as a politico-resistance movement has largely been the
result of political pragmatism. In turn, the Party’s turn to political moder-
ation (pragmatism) can be explained by its use of ijtihad when issuing taklif
shari1 and through the practice of Taqiyya. In this way, political pragmatism
can plausibly be applied by Hezbollah when the centrality of certain doctri-
nal principles is repeatedly stressed.
The decision by Hezbollah to pursue a strong position within the L­ ebanese
political system (which was considered corrupt) represented the first indica-
tion of pragmatism in the Party’s political career. After signing the Tai’f
Accord,2 Hezbollah realised that its position in Lebanon would be com-
promised as one of the key principles in the Accord was the disarmament
of all militias. Hezbollah decided that to remain armed it needed to gain
legitimacy as a national resistance movement, even if that meant being part
of a corrupt system. This is not to shy away from the fact that Hezbollah
was willing to do what any other non-State actor would do to ensure con-
tinuity. However, the Party was arguably still at the beginning/early stages
of its political career it made politically pragmatic decisions endorsed by its
religious identity which reduced the challenges to its legitimacy.
Integral to the pragmatic politics demonstrated by Hezbollah is the
Party’s hybrid political-religious identity (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 70–75).
A demonstration of Hezbollah’s emergent pragmatic politics is evident in
the Party’s response to increased domestic pressure for it to disarm. In 2006,
Nasrallah responded to these demands with the statement, “When we build
a strong, able and just State that protects Lebanon and the Lebanese, we
will easily find an honourable solution to the issue of the resistance.”3 The
political pragmatism of Nasrallah’s statement is evident when one consid-
ers the crucial role that weaponry plays in both the Party’s existence as
a resistance movement and its agenda to bring about political change in
Lebanon (Gaub 2013: 7). By suggesting that there is an inextricable connec-
tion between Hezbollah’s military strength and the strength of the Lebanese
State, Nasrallah is attempting to legitimise the Party’s use of violence and
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  49
to remind the reader of the historical persecution that the Shi’ites faced. As
such, there is an attempt to act (to protect its arms) that will present little
disruption to the status quo and the pursuit of its political agenda.
The argument offered by Nasrallah reflects a position sometimes sup-
ported in Islam that the consequences of action, rather than the action
itself, should often be given primary consideration when determining the
morality of the course of action (Leaman 2016: 39). By referring to the ulti-
mate goal of an “honourable solution,” Nasrallah is applying the “principle
of darura or necessity” to the Party’s need for arms and its resort to vio-
lence in resistance. That is, he is arguing that the circumstances in ­Lebanon
demand that Hezbollah has arms to engage in certain actions which oth-
erwise may not be acceptable, but which are nonetheless morally justifia-
ble (Karmer 1990; Leaman 2016). In turn, it also implies the evolution of
Taqiyya as a result. As mentioned previously, Hezbollah’s protection of arms
stems from its insecurities and a lack of trust towards the weak and corrupt
Lebanese State. This mirrors the Shi’ite endorsement of taqiyya – a religious
endorsement – as a mean of protection and survival. However, T ­ aqiyya is
not the only religious element that can be identified in H ­ ezbollah’s political
platform.
In fact, when looking at the hierarchical structure of Hezbollah, one can
trace the influence of the group’s religious identity on its political activi-
ties and strategy. For instance, the organisation’s decision-making is made
through a Shura Council comprised of six members and the Shura al-Qarar
comprised of nine members, all of whom are clerics (Hamzeh 2004). Ac-
cordingly, the role of religion in Hezbollah’s political actions is evident, and
the uniqueness of Hezbollah and its success is intimately connected to its
religious identity. In turn, of particular importance is the way in which the
Party’s religiosity underpins its political pragmatism.
To develop an understanding of this relationship, it is important to ex-
amine the Party’s hierarchical structure. The members of both councils
are first and foremost religious figures and they therefore are primarily
guided in their decision-making by religious scriptures rather than politi-
cal doctrines or norms of international law (Hamzeh 2004). However, the
councils operate within a centralised hierarchical structure that exercises
control over “social, political, and military institutions to consolidate pop-
ular support, political capital, and military capability” (Jackson 2000: 2).
Moreover, ­decision-making related to these different “dimensions” of the
Party increasingly takes place within the context of Hezbollah’s transition
from domestic fringe actor to quasi-legitimate national and regional actor
with a recognised political presence and growing national support. Hence,
there is a pressure on decision-makers to maintain and grow Hezbollah’s
diverse support base while considering how greater moderation in their
­decision-making and political activities may benefit their inclusion in legit-
imate political discourse (Jackson 2009). The challenge for clerics is thus to
50  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
negotiate, bargain, and make decisions that accommodate both the ­Party’s
absolute position on conflict and the pragmatism required to access re-
sources to ensure their political survival.

Ijtihad and political Fatwas

Hezbollah’s pragmatism is made possible through ijtihad 4 (Cook 2001).
The leading Shi’ite school of thought on ijtihad is the Jaafari School. It was
headed by Imam Jaafar Ibn Muhammad Al-Sadiq, whose work, Al-fiqh
al-Jaafari, addressed topics such as hadith, Islamic ethos, ethology, and the
Qur’an (Cook 2001). The Jaafari School does not differ significantly from the
four Sunni schools5; however, there are notable methodological differences.
For Shi’ites, there exists a belief that God will not leave humankind without
guidance. This is why God sent prophets and why there are Imams (religious
scholars) responsible for the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith to give
guidance after the prophets died (Cummiskey 2012: 76–80). With the pass-
ing of the 11th Imam in Shi’ite Islam, however (there were 12 recognised
Imams in total), Ayatollahs emerged to play a significant role in Shari’a in-
terpretation. This notion is based on treating hadith as divine authority.
In Islam, the Qur’an is considered to be the direct word of God, with the
Prophet Mohammed as his Messenger. Moreover, it is the theological basis
of the authority of the hadith, which are non-Qur’anic sayings of the Prophet
Mohammed and the example of his life as a model (Sunna). As such, the
Qur’an and hadith represent the cornerstones of the Islamic way of life and
Islamic law or Shari’a. Also, while the Islamic way of life is centred upon the
fulfilment of the five pillars of Islam,6 there remains a certain degree of flex-
ibility in how (or if) each pillar is to be fulfilled. For example, breaking the
fast in the holy month of Ramadan is permitted for health reasons. The Hajj
“pilgrimage” is also to be made only if the person is capable both financially
and physically.
Importantly, these simple examples of “exception” that exist within the
doctrine of Islam indicate a flexibility in practice that can be translated into
Shari’a pragmatism. In their simplest interpretation, they demonstrate the
potential difficulties the faithful may experience in their daily lives in apply-
ing Shari’a norms. In turn, the faithful rely on mufti (particularly rationalist
mufti) to guide interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith and to offer advice
( fatwa) on what behaviours conform suitably to Shari’a (Jonsen 2005). Cru-
cially, fatwa can also address political situations (in addition to personal
issues) with the aim to balance “exceptional” circumstances with “rational
efforts to interpret and reconcile opinions” to guide governance practices
and individual behaviours (Jonsen 2005: 58). Therefore, after the Prophet
Mohammed’s death, there was a great need for ijtihad. This guidance was
based on a complete trust in religious scholars.7 Shi’ite theologians focussed
on important aspects of ijtihad and considered it as a continuous notion
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  51
since it addressed matters of the current age rather than referring to unre-
lated times (Ruthven 1997: 40–71).
At the geopolitical level, it is important to note that Iran is the only
country where Shi’ism is the State religion. There, Shi’ite clerics continue
to use re-interpretation or ijtihad by grand Ayatollahs. The akhbari “tra-
ditionalists” believed that this right was closed with the disappearance of
the twelfth Imam, whereas Usuli “fundamentalists” believe that this right
resided with the high Ulama (Roy 1994: 171). Thus, the right to ijtihad was
then recognised only for high Ulama, referred to as Mujtahid “interpreter”
or Ayatollah.
The clergy’s position in politics was evident in Ayatollah’s Shirazi’s fatwa
in 1891, which forbade the use of tobacco if it was produced by a British
company (Roy 1994: 172). The fatwa served a political role again in 1920,
when Shi’ite clerics inspired resistance against English troops in southern
Iraq by issuing fatwas to fight the occupation. The agenda of these clerics
was not only religious in nature but also political, and fatwas were used to
ensure public support.
As asserted by Roy (1994: 172), the relative “openness” of the Shi’ite clergy
“to the non-Islamic corpus” – compared to the more closemindedness of
the Sunni ulama – allowed for greater consideration of different schools of
thought and cultural factors in their decision-making. As such, their consid-
eration of religious traditions did not always rely only on legalistic impulses
based on the application of moral law. Rather, the centralised consensus
capacity of the clergy could at times combine philosophical understandings
with “casuistic legalism” (Roy 1994: 172) which allowed for the case-specific
applications of ethical rules to guide individual conduct.
The traditionalist view of Sharia is essentially legalistic and casuistic,
whereas the reformist fundamentalist position is critical of tradition and
popular religious practices, favouring strict application of the founding
texts, particularly when presented with an external threat (Roy 1994). This,
of course, implies a form of tension in the application of Shari’a between
traditionalists and reformists. The legalistic and casuistic (traditionalist)
view of Sharia invites the incorporation of broader “philosophical” con-
siderations into interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith. As such, there is
greater scope for pragmatic logic – that is more reflective of popular forms
of Sufism8 – to be applied in decision-making processes and to selected
courses of action, including the issuing of fatwas. Notably, the utilisation
of fatwa for political purposes was clearly evident in Iran’s clerical constitu-
tion. For example, Khomeini announced the primacy of Shari’a over other
laws in 1988 (Coughlin 2010: 44–60). Khomeini’s emphasis on religious tools
to serve his revolutionary goals is thus evident in this instance.
The allowance for analogical reasoning and a case-by-case approach in
ijtihad means it can be used as a religious tool for a pragmatic approach to
political decision-making. As Rumi (2015: 91–96) explains, ijtihad is “the
52  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
way of change” within Islam. This provides the councils’ clerics with the
religious platform from which to engage in their “duty” to exercise inde-
pendent judgement to formulate new interpretations of Islamic principles to
reflect changing times. In turn, given that a salient feature of Shi’ism is the
interpretation of Shari’a through ijtihad by Ayatollahs, the following sec-
tions explore the extent to which the acceptance of ijtihad by Shi’ites allows
for, or underpins, the convergence of religiosity in the decision-making and
political pragmatism demonstrated by Hezbollah.
The changing political and social conditions in Lebanon have required
Hezbollah to translate its social and military actions into political capital
(Rumi 2015), namely to use ijtihad as a tool to develop political appeal. For
example, Hezbollah’s political participation in the Lebanese parliament in
1992 was negotiated with Iran so that it did not conflict with the Party’s ide-
ology, namely Wilayat al-Faqih. Another example is the staunchly Islamist
institutional network operated by Hezbollah (Hamzeh 2004). This allows
the Party to operate under an Islamic banner but also to operate politically
to gain more votes and to control/monopolise the Shi’ite community. The
Party achieves this primarily by leading, to a certain extent, the process
of much-needed social and political change in Lebanon via a bottom-up
approach (Saade 2016: 143–145). Having emerged in the context of civil war
(and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1973), Hezbollah uses its Is-
lamist institutional network to not only respond to the punishment of Shi’ites
by Israel in response to regional issues (i.e. the activities of Palestinians) but
also to directly access and gain support from the Shi’ite communities to ad-
dress the disproportionately low level of political representation of Muslims
in the Lebanese government (Deeb 2006). Hence, in both these examples,
the decision-making by Hezbollah clerics demonstrated a religious-based
pragmatic approach to taking advantage of political opportunities.
Indeed, notwithstanding its ostensible adherence to Islamic purity,
­Hezbollah’s ability to gain political advantage and popularity in the last 10
years has arguably been most derived from its pragmatic decision-­making
and ­action-taking (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 70–75). Clearly, the Party has had
to adapt to the constantly changing circumstances in the region but has
managed to do so without openly violating its platform as a devout religious
movement. After linking the notion of Taqiyya to its decision to take part in
the Lebanese political system, Hezbollah utilised another religious instru-
ment to support its success, namely, the common Shi’ite theological notion
of ijtihad, which is the continuation of fatwa. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, ijtihad is widely used and accepted by Shi’ite clerics, whereas most of
the Sunni sects remain rather ambivalent about its use (Ruthven 1997: 40–71).

Hezbollah’s political pragmatism through the use of religious tools

The extent to which Hezbollah’s use of ijtihad when issuing a fatwa to de-
liver politically pragmatic outcomes reflects the Western-centric (Christian)
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  53
approach of casuistry. As such, it provides insights into the employment of
religious tools in political contexts (or non-religious contexts) by different
monolithic religions, namely, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Casuistry
has a place in the Arab and Islamic worlds9; however, the exploration of
fatwas through the lens of Christian casuistry is not undertaken at length
as the focus of this chapter if to retain the analysis of Hezbollah’s use of
religious tools within Islamic parameters. As such, the following section
briefly explores the evolution of casuistic methods and the philosophical use
of the construct before examining the parallels between Western-centric ca-
suistry and Islamic fatwa to locate Hezbollah’s use of religious tools within
a non-Islamic notion.

Casuistry: an overview
In general, the literature on casuistry covers issues such as morality (moral
law), mental reservations or lying, self-preservation, abuse of casuistry, the
role of the casuist, and moral consciousness. Kirk (1999: 109) defined ca-
suistry as “the science of dealing with ‘cases’ of consciences; and a case,
whether in conscience or in law, is a collection of unforeseen circumstances.”
Casuistry is thus a process of moral reasoning applied to specific cases, as
opposed to the general study of ethical theories or concepts (Smith; cited
in Kirk 1999: 90–110). As such, casuistry developed as a process of analo-
gies to resolve unforeseen circumstances and emerged during the 16th and
17th centuries as an element of theological revisions led by Catholic, Protes-
tant, and Anglican institutions (Kirk 1999: 90–110).10
Notwithstanding the criticism of the casuistic process from some 18th-­
century and 19th-century philosophers,11 casuistry was generally perceived
to be valid (Kirk 1999). During the early 20th century, a reassertion of mo-
rality and basic values emerged in Britain and America, particularly in the
fields of law, medicine, and business (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 112–117).
In turn, a result of this reassertion was the notion of moral reasoning as a
useful method for finding resolutions.
For instance, Jonsen (1991: 14–16) has argued that casuistry is useful for
justifying decisions about particular actions in specific contemporary cases
because it is not restricted – like ethical theories such as Kantianism and
utilitarianism – to comprehensively account for all ethical perspectives. In
addition, Strong (1999: 398) argues (in relation to bio-medicine) the ben-
efits of the inductive rather than deductive approach to decision-making
endorsed in casuistry. According to the author, this allows decision-­makers
to develop arguments based on comparisons of morally relevant factors
with other contemporary paradigm cases – rather than general ethical
­principles – to identify reasonable and contextually relevant courses of ac-
tion to take.
Furthermore, some scholars have referred to the notion of new or modern
casuistry, with a new understanding of casuistic explanations in politics.
54  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
The new understanding pertains to the central role that social institutions
can play in providing “reliable moral knowledge and the stability of norms
and expectations” in the practical application of morality (Cherry and ­Iltis
2007: 75). Examples include the norm of humanitarian intervention and
“war on terror” (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988).
Casuistry thus offers a framework of case-specific moral reasoning closely
paralleled with ijtihad and can thus provide a guide to understanding prag-
matism by a group such as Hezbollah, which is firmly grounded in a system
of religious belief. In other words, an attempt can be made to use casuistry
in order to explain Hezbollah’s pragmatism and to explore how religious
principles underpin this.

Hezbollah’s pragmatism and the party’s religious framework

The decisions by Hezbollah to participate in the Lebanese parliament
in 1992 and the Lebanese government in 2005 had to be confirmed with
the grand Ayatollah, in compliance with the Party’s religious framework
(Hamzeh 2004). Notably, in Sunni Islam, the highly decentralised notion
of Sunna religious consensus means that Sunni adaptation to changing cir-
cumstances is a much longer process. In contrast, the hierarchical structure
of Shi’ism makes it possible to reach consensus more quickly regarding re-
sponses designed to adapt to changing circumstances (Roy 1994: 170–189).
In relation to Hezbollah, as mentioned earlier, the hierarchical structure
of the Party reflects a traditional arrangement, namely, a chain of command
from top to bottom. The party has two major decision-making bodies: the
Shura Council and the Shura al-Qarar (Hamzeh 2004: 44–79). Matters per-
taining to legislative and administrative issues are addressed by the Shura
Council, whereas matters covering political issues are resolved by the Shura
al-Qarar. The authority of the two councils is subordinated, however, to the
Secretary-General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, who has the distinctive and
exclusive capacity for taklif shari (Hamzeh 2004: 44–79). Given his role as
the head of both legislative bodies, Nasrallah was thus in a position to guide
the development of the Party’s hard and soft power capabilities to the ex-
tent that it could pursue its goals and objectives more independently (Swan-
son 2008: 26–28). Of critical importance to this outcome was Nasrallah’s
ability to facilitate the transition of Hezbollah’s primary focus away from
a staunchly pan-Islamic perspective to a more Lebanon-centric perspective
(Malthaner 2011: 97–99).
These developments provide evidence of the connections made in this
chapter between ijtihad and Hezbollah’s pragmatism. Nasrallah is acknowl-
edged for his “astute pragmatism” when calculating the manner of the Par-
ty’s involvement in conflicts and its efforts to overcome political obstacles
(Khatib 2013). Moreover, he is recognised for his ability to bring members
of the Sunni and Shi’a sects together, and to enjoy some support among
Christian and secularist groups (Swanson 2008). Although, as stated by
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  55
Malthaner (2011: 98), “Hezbollah’s cardinal reference group was first of all
the Shi’ite community.” In turn, the Party’s ability to adapt the concept of
Islamic jihad in response to military, societal, and political matters provide
it with the ideological flexibility and Party mechanism to build political sup-
port through its responses to regional and domestic politics (Khashan and
Moussawi 2007: 1).
As a result, Nasrallah’s pragmatism and its potential to appeal to diverse
groups strengthened his prestige as both a political leader and a religious
figure (Hamzeh 2004). It is well documented that the positive impact of
­Nasrallah’s leadership on Hezbollah has been his ability to shape the defini-
tion and redefinition of Hezbollah’s interests in Lebanon and how they can
be achieved successfully (Malthaner 2011; Swanson 2008). In turn, this has
meant understanding Islamic principles and applying religious tools such as
ijtihad and taklif shari to drive its resistance efforts from a more nationalis-
tic perspective. Moreover, Hezbollah’s shift in orientation towards Lebanon
“as its frame of reference” (Malthaner 2011: 89) has in many ways necessi-
tated that Nasrallah adopt a pragmatic approach to his decision-making,
that is, a case-based moral interpretation of Shari’a, to support the Party’s
political goals. The following section discusses the way in which Nasrallah
directs Hezbollah towards politically pragmatic outcomes in response to
political and social issues through the use of taklif shari.

Hezbollah’s use of taklif shari

Taklif shari is a religious command or non-negotiable order often perceived
as a holy request (Hamzeh 2004). It is used only in certain “cases,” often in
times of war (2006 war) and emergency (2008 clashes). In turn, a number of
examples can be cited where Nasrallah has employed the analogical reason-
ing allowed in ijtihad to case-specific events to issue taklif shari so that the
Party may achieve politically pragmatic outcomes.
For instance, the Lebanese government’s decree in May 2008, to end the
independence of Hezbollah’s local communication network and to limit the
powers of the Chief of Airport Security (a supporter of Hezbollah) were major
challenges to the Party’s political agenda. As Khatib (2011: 73) explains, Hez-
bollah’s use of communication technologies is vital to its public relations cam-
paigns and its ability to conduct “visual displays of power” to win political
support in the public domain. Nasrallah issued a taklif shari to mobilise sup-
porters to protect the moqawama’s communication network (Zisser 2009: 33)
issuing a statement that Hezbollah “will cut the hand off anyone who wants
to jeopardise the moqawama.” Hezbollah fighters were subsequently sent onto
the streets of Beirut. This action later escalated into open gunfire exchanges
between Future Movement, AMAL, and Hezbollah fighters. Moreover, it was
feared that the conflict would quickly translate into S­ unni-Shi’ite strife (Ab-
boud and Muller 2013: 472) as the Future Movement was a S ­ unni-dominated
group, and Amal and Hezbollah were Shi’ite dominated.
56  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
An analysis of this response by Hezbollah demonstrates how ijtihad was
used to (re)interpret the way in which “resistance” should be understood. On
the surface, Hezbollah’s response to its political opponents demonstrated
the Party’s un-willingness to compromise its communication network and
made evident that it was prepared to use a religious instrument, taklif shari,
to explain itself. When analysed more deeply, however, by identifying the
communications network as a “significant part of the weapons of the resist-
ance,” Nasrallah sought to draw an analogy between the adversarial actions
of the Lebanese government and the adversarial actions of Israel.
Arguably, his reasoning was to frame all adversarial action against
­Hezbollah as action in support of Israel, thus positioning all “those who try
to stand in [Hezbollah’s] way as traitors and Israeli collaborators” (Khatib
2011: 70). Nasrallah is able to make his reasoning credible by drawing on
Hezbollah’s growing reputation in Lebanon as a resistance group, namely,
the primary force of resistance to Israel in the Middle East, rather than
a militia. Moreover, he increases the impact of his reasoning on Hezbol-
lah supporters by making statements that frame Hezbollah’s adversaries as
traitors.
This reasoning process by Nasrallah is evidence of his astute pragma-
tism because it provided him with an opportunity to engage Hezbollah sup-
porters to protect the political ground that had been made by the Party
through its successes against Israel in Southern Lebanon and its strengthen-
ing Shi’ite base. Nasrallah undoubtedly realises the power of taklif shari as
a non-negotiable paramilitary command to direct Hezbollah followers. By
using analogical reasoning to position his political opponents as an “exten-
sion of the Israeli threat” (Khatib 2011: 70), and then issuing a taklif shari to
resist such a threat, Nasrallah shows his ability to use the religious tool in a
well-calculated and specific way to consolidate the Party’s political power
(Al-Agha 2006). In this instance, Nasrallah is the casuist in that he draws
on specific domestic circumstances to interpret Islamic resistance which he
then uses to underscore when and why to issue taklif shari.
Even though Hezbollah had the military capabilities to use greater mili-
tary force in the clashes over the communications network, it chose instead
to limit its response. However, it can be argued that Nasrallah’s pragmatic
awareness of the link between the people’s perceptions of the Party’s military
power and their perceptions of the Party as a credible resistance movement
drove his decision-making. As Khatib (2011) points out, the opportunity for
Hezbollah to present itself as reluctantly prepared to use force in domestic
issues was crucial to building political support in Lebanon as it positioned
Hezbollah as a party in the pursuit of justice rather than power.
The use of taklif shari by Hezbollah is also evident in Nasrallah’s call
on the reserve army to assemble in times of war (Hamzeh 2004). As stated
by Abu Ali, a Hezbollah fighter in Syria, in an article published in June
2013 on the website “Now Lebanon,” titled Hezbollah fighter details opera-
tions in Qusayr, “everyone who goes to fight in Syria received a taklif shari”
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  57
(Now Lebanon 2013). Hence, the use of taklif shari can be regarded as a tac-
tical action by Hezbollah related to a specific case, that is, the essential need
for the Party to take part in protecting the Syrian regime. Nasrallah’s rea-
soning in this instance is based on his understanding that Hezbollah’s part-
nership with Syria is beneficial to both parties (Khatib 2011: 64). Moreover,
it involves the use of ijtihad to achieve politically pragmatic outcomes in the
way that Nasrallah utilises Wilayat al-Faqih ideology as a political tool. In
relative contrast to the Lebanon-centric reasoning by Nasrallah discussed
above, the more pan-Islamic perspective demonstrated in Hezbollah’s sup-
port of Syria demonstrates Nasrallah’s political strategy to balance political
decisions related to domestic issues in Lebanon with political decisions re-
lated to the Islamic world.
Moreover, Hamzeh (2004) reminds us in In the Path of Hezbollah that
taklif shari is derived from the Wilayat al-Faqih ideology and from the Par-
ty’s loyalty to the Faqih. That is, the Faqih is the only political body to issue
a taklif shari. Hence, if a fatwa requires a consensus committee, use of the
taklif shari is solely restricted to the religious leader. Furthermore, the cred-
ibility of the use of taklif shari is also reinforced as it is issued by a religious
figure and leader as a “Sayyid.” As the Party leader, Nasrallah will invar-
iably need to blend ideological (religious), social, military, and economic
elements in his decision-making on domestic and non-domestic “cases” for
strategic purposes to continue to strengthen the Party’s political base.
Another example of Nasrallah’s ijtihad (reasoning) and the way it under-
pins Hezbollah’s political pragmatism includes the decision to form a coa-
lition with the Free Patriotic Movement (a major Christian Maronite group
in Lebanon). The main long-term objective of Hezbollah as stated in the
Party manifesto (p. 23) is to achieve leadership in Lebanon via change in
the political system to a majoritarian democracy. This form of democracy
is fundamentally about achieving majority consensus among the L ­ ebanese
people to assume leadership power. Yet, with political sectarianism be-
ing the main obstacle to reform in the Lebanese political system (Khatib
2011: 62), ­Nasrallah’s pragmatic reasoning suggests the need to build popu-
lar national support by shifting the public’s perception of the Party as intent
on creating an Islamic State to one that can be a leader of all people.
It may therefore be argued that in the pursuit of consensus building, ijtihad
has been applied by Nasrallah to interpret the way in which non-Muslims
are regarded within the Islamist framework of Lebanese society. Nasrallah’s
interpretation legitimises Christians as collaborators in building Lebanese
society – as opposed to ahl al-dhimma or as non-Muslims subjected to Shari’a
law (Khatib 2011: 72). The pragmatism underpinning “consensus rhetoric”
to identify Lebanon’s Christians as “partners” in the national resistance
movement is thus evident in its potential to deliver Hezbollah majority sup-
port in Lebanon, without which the Party cannot achieve its vision.
Hezbollah’s decisions based on ijtihad (reasoning) have not always pro-
duced positive results for Lebanon, however. The kidnapping of two Israeli
58  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
soldiers in 2006 by the Party, for instance, was the reason used by Israel
to wage war on Lebanon. Nasrallah claimed during one interview on Al-
Mayadeen TV in 2013 that Hezbollah had intelligence that Israel was plan-
ning to attack Lebanon that year. In turn, he determined that the best course
of action was to do a pre-emptive attack by kidnapping the soldiers and cre-
ating an element of surprise for the Israelis. This, he stated, might weaken
or decrease the effect of the Israeli attacks (Morris 2013). Therefore, it could
be suggested that Nasrallah had acted in accordance with the Islamic prin-
ciple of “lesser evil” that was explained by Khashan and Moussawi (2007)
in order to identify what circumstances calls for defensive or offensive jihad.
Subsequently, Hezbollah was widely accused of being responsible for the
war and for weakening the Lebanese State. For example, a prominent Leba-
nese Druze member of parliament, Walid Jumblatt, criticised Hezbollah in
his interview with Le Figaro on 13 July 2006. Jumblatt stated, “Hezbollah
played a very dangerous game by kidnapping these two soldiers….” Also, the
Arab League claimed that Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel were “unexpected,
inappropriate, and irresponsible acts” (cited in Middle East Media Research
Institute 2006). Nasrallah was criticised for taking such action independently
and without consulting the Lebanese government (Zisser 2009: 33–36).
On the other hand, the Party’s decision to pre-empt what had been
planned by Israel is further evidence of Nasrallah applying ijtihad to frame
Hezbollah’s resistance towards those who threaten Islam around the notions
of necessity and self-defence (Khatib 2013: 71). The disproportionate nature
of the Israeli response, however, led Nasrallah to state that “had he known
the scale of the Israeli attack, he would not have gone into war” (Zisser
2009: 33). In turn, Nasrallah’s admission suggests his awareness of the po-
litical limits of his decision-making based on a pragmatic approach. None-
theless, Hezbollah then worked to translate the outcome into a “victorious
war” for the Party by demonstrating that it had the capacity to stop any
ground attack in southern Lebanon and to hold firm in the face of ­Israel’s
disproportionate aggression (Khatib 2013: 54–68).

Implications of ijtihad for Hezbollah’s actions

The above examples provide evidence of the pragmatism that underpins
decisions by Hezbollah leadership on how to respond to domestic and re-
gional cases. When considered collectively, it may be asserted that Nasral-
lah’s objective was to use religious tools such as ijtihad and taklif shari to
position the Party as a resistance party rather than a militia, and one whose
resistance is one of necessity and self-defence. This then allows Hezbollah
to move away from public perceptions that the Party’s primary goal is to
create an Islamic State towards the perception that its goal is to protect
and strengthen Lebanon, a perception that is vital to the Party’s ability to
achieve broader political support.
Hezbollah’s political pragmatism and the use of taklif shari have won the
Party considerable success and relative popularity in Lebanon. Indeed, this
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  59
chapter has argued that Hezbollah’s success can be attributed to the organ-
isation’s sustained ability to develop and maintain a coherent and convinc-
ing identity based on religious and political pragmatism. These elements in
Hezbollah’s response to events are thus the cornerstone of the Party’s sur-
vival or demise. Hezbollah must be constantly aware of the dangers of the
abuse of taklif shari, however, for it may lead to the Party’s loss of credibility
and place the Party under suspicions again.

Hezbollah’s pragmatism: resistance group and political party

A considerable number of studies have been conducted on Hezbollah and its
internal operations as a developing party (e.g. Harik 2004; Saad-Ghorayeb
2003), especially its use of pragmatism as a political tool to integrate into
the Lebanese political system. Indeed, numerous scholars have suggested
that Hezbollah’s pragmatism has contributed to its success as a resistance-­
political party and its capacity to mobilise support (Al-Agha 2006, 2011,
2013; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 2003; Saouli 2014).
Religion is an essential element in Hezbollah’s political pragmatism. In-
deed, Karagiannis (2009) and Azani (2009, 2010, 2011) have both claimed
that Hezbollah’s identity as a Shi’ite group is not enough to explain the Par-
ty’s pragmatic identity. Karagiannis (2009: 370) explained that “Hezbollah’s
frames have become popular because they draw their legitimacy from the
Qur’an and other Islamic sacred texts.” This is an important consideration
in light of Sidney Tarrow’s (cited in Goodwin and Jasper 2015: 112) asser-
tion that religion is a source of social movement framing. The author also
indicated that religion offers ready-made symbols and customs that can be
mobilised and used by party leaders.
Hence, a consistent view to emerge in the literature (e.g. Azani 2009, 2010,
2011; Karagiannis 2009) is that Hezbollah, as a political movement, gener-
ally regards politics to be inseparable from religion and thus utilises vio-
lence for political rather than ritualistic objectives, that is, to increase its
power base. However, while the authors discussed above offer insights into
the emergence of Hezbollah as an actor in the region, they do not explain
in detail how religion is used pragmatically in the Party’s political strategy.
The authors have not closely examined the instances where the Party has
employed ijtihad in order to justify its intervention in the Syrian war. Ad-
ditionally, Nasrallah’s use of taklif shari for political reasons such as the
May 8 clash has also been overlooked by these authors.
Nevertheless, the literature does point to the marginalisation of Shi’ites in
Lebanon as a key element in Hezbollah’s pragmatic approach (Khatib et al.
2014; Norton 2007; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002). The general view among authors
is that the Party recognised early that combining elements of religious in-
doctrination with social/financial support would ensure ongoing backing
from people who are often left marginalised. In evaluating such claims, the
actions of Nasrallah are worth considering. For instance, Nasrallah was
open about the Lebanese government’s neglect of Shi’ite areas in Lebanon,
60  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
as evidenced in his speech celebrating the “divine victory” in Baalbek, in
2007. In it he reminded listeners of the political path forming in the region
under Imam Sayyid al-Sadr in the early 1970s.
Furthermore, it is important to note the assertion from Nasrallah that
addressing Shi’ite disadvantage in the north is less about a political choice
and more about changing the “governing mentality” in Lebanon. By mak-
ing this assertion, Nasrallah is clearly attempting to position governance
is Lebanon as separate to “political consideration, religious denomination
or community affiliation.”12 Nonetheless, when addressing the issue of the
marginalisation of Lebanese people residing in the northern and southern
border areas, it is notable that Volk (2009: 263–282) compared Sunni mar-
ginalisation in the north and Shi’ite marginalisation in the south.
On the issue of pragmatism, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002: 35–80) discussed
Hezbollah’s emergence from an Islamist group into a political party in
­Hezbollah: Politics and Religion. The author offered perceptive insights into
Hezbollah’s politics, ideology, and connections to Iran. Notably, she de-
scribed Hezbollah’s flexibility in decision-making and provided the reader
with an understanding of the Party’s political commitment to Lebanon
rather than to Iran (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 35–80). It is thus important to
re-visit Saad-Ghorayeb’s book when studying Hezbollah as it offers a basic
understanding and explanation of the Party. As argued by the author, even
though the Party remains loyal to the Iranian regime, it nevertheless puts
considerable effort in creating an independent Lebanese identity. This argu-
ment will be revisited in looking at the Party’s regional alliances in addition
to its Lebanonisation process.
Sobelman (2004), in his text, New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah
after the Withdrawal from Lebanon, has also contributed important insights
into Hezbollah’s pragmatism in the context of the Party’s need for accept-
ance and support within Lebanese society. Highlighting the relationship be-
tween pragmatism and legitimacy for Hezbollah is the assertion from Ehud
Barak (cited in Sobelman 2004: 44), the former Israeli Prime Minister, that

even in their behaviour while they were fighting against us in south

­ ebanon you could see their obsession with legitimacy for each and
L
every operation. This is why I understood that the legitimacy factor is
more important than it seems.

Adding to the school of thought on this issue is Uzi Dayan (cited in Sobel-
man 2004: 45). In the following quote, the author highlights the importance
of public opinion to Hezbollah:

Hezbollah will not operate in a way that angers the Lebanese people;
that is, it will not act against public opinion and the (mood of the) street
and will not create a situation in which it is perceived as an enemy of the
­Lebanese people or act contrary to its socio-political interests in Lebanon.
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  61
Bayat (2010) assessed Hezbollah’s development and entry into the Lebanese
political system as “transcending its Islamist platform” (2010: 246). In turn,
claims such as these that point to the Party’s reliance on different platforms
led Levitt (2014), for instance, to describe Hezbollah as a hybrid party capa-
ble of being a political party and a fundamentalist Islamist group. Arguably,
hybridity in this sense provides a suitable platform for political pragmatism
as the Party can draw on different political or religious tools to justify its ac-
tions. This sentiment is reflected in Saouli’s (2011: 925–942) claim that prag-
matism helped to speed up Hezbollah’s integration into Lebanese society.
Al-Agha (2011: 54) has also asserted that Hezbollah shifted its ideology to
better assimilate into Lebanese politics. Implied in the assertion is that the
only way for Hezbollah to have a continued presence was to become a po-
litical party rather than remain a resistance group (Al-Agha 2011b: 54–56).
Al-Agha’s argument goes hand in hand with the arguments put forward by
Harik (2004) and Saad-Ghorayeb (2002). In addition, Karagiannis (2009:
369–375) argued a similar point, suggesting the social framework of Hez-
bollah was vital to its continued success. Although the author posited the
Party’s success was largely due to the ideological indoctrination of Islam
and its commitment to Wali el-Faqih, it is also worth noting the importance
placed on Hezbollah’s transition to a political party.
Harb and Leenders (2005) referred to Hezbollah’s transition towards
pragmatism as the “Lebanonisation processes.” In turn, Rabil (2012: 49–64)
suggested that the Lebanonisation process (transformation of ­Hezbollah
into a Lebanese party) started as soon as Israeli troops withdrew from
southern Lebanon in May 2000. By this time, Hezbollah had won its armed
struggle against Israel and was now a Lebanese political party with military
credibility, a huge military arsenal, and highly trained military members.
It is interesting to note that when commenting on Hezbollah’s decision to
join the Lebanese parliamentary elections in 1992, scholars such as Nor-
ton (2007a), Harik (2004), and Hamzeh (2004) argued that the Lebanoni-
sation of Hezbollah would eventually see it converted into a conventional
­Lebanese political party doomed to internal divisiveness (cited in Hoover
2007: 46–68). This is particularly interesting as it sheds light on the way
in which the Party’s pragmatic action-taking is underpinned by religious
notions, namely, the uses of ijtihad in its reasoning to participate in the
Lebanese parliament, to Lebanese the Party’s identity, and to justify its in-
tervention in Syria.
Based on the complexities surrounding Hezbollah’s pragmatism, Rabil
(2012), Hoover (2007), and Harb and Leenders (2005) have claimed that the
Party is a unique case that needs further study as it distinctly illustrates an
Islamist resistance group’s transformation into a conventional party with
political and social demands. Rabil (2012: 49–64), for instance, gave impor-
tance to Hezbollah’s hierarchical structure as a bottom-up rather than a
top-down model. Furthermore, Harb and Leenders (2005: 173–197) argued
that Hezbollah has had success with its military struggle against Israel and
62  Political pragmatism through Ijtihad
has operated an essential network of social services which serve to organise
the Shi’ite community in Lebanon into a “society of resistance.” This net-
work was, in turn, the cornerstone of their success in the Lebanese parlia-
ment elections in 1992.
In sum, the literature revealed that Hezbollah’s pragmatism is a particu-
larly interesting aspect of Middle Eastern politics for political scientists
working in the field as it offers an unusual case of an Islamist party suc-
cessfully developing into a prominent political party. For many scholars,
­Hezbollah has been characterised as a party that has been able to “stay
true” to its ideology despite its involvement in domestic politics. What is no-
table, however, is that even though writers such as Harik (2004: 63–93) tack-
led the political pragmatism of Hezbollah, the author did not examine the
effect of religion on Hezbollah’s political strategy. Also, Klaushofer (2007)
identified the provision of social services as a key indicator to Hezbollah’s
success but failed to tackle the Party’s religious and sectarian commitment.
Moreover, the literature on Hezbollah offers different explanations of the
Party’s ­ideology – from the Party’s commitment to Wilayat al-Faqih to its
decision to open-up – but it nevertheless does not present religion as a key
factor in this adaptability. The use of religion in Hezbollah’s case thus re-
mains largely unexplored.

Notes
1 Taklif shari is an order made under religious pretext – see Chapter 3.
2 The Tai’f Accord is an agreement reached in 1989 to provide an end to the
­Lebanese civil war and return to political normalcy.
3 Radio Islam (2006). English Translation of the Speech Delivered by Sayyid
­Hassan Nasrallah at the Divine Victory Rally on 22nd September 2006, avail-
able at: https://radioislam.org/lebanon/resistance/22_september_2006_speech.
htm (accessed 2 February 2014).
4 Ijtihad, which means diligence, is a system of textual interpretations commonly
used in Islam.
5 The four Sunni schools are: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali.
6 The five pillars of Islam are as follows: declaration of faith in God and his mes-
senger Mohammed, prayer, charity, or zakat, fasting during the holy month of
Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca (Hadith in Sahih Al Bokhari 1:2:48).
7 The four major schools of Sunni Islamic theology are as follows: Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafii, and Hanbali.
8 Sufism is defined as Islamic mysticism or the inward dimension of Islam. This
phenomenon involves a mystical trend characterised by values and ritual
practices.
9 A direct translation of the term is ifta’ or fatwa of damir: cases of conscience. In
other words, casuistry in Arabic equates to issuing fatwas about legal/religious
or Shari’a matters (Al-Mawrid 1986: 158; Elias’ Pocket Dictionary; 55; Oxford
Dictionary 1972: 194). As illustrated earlier, fatwa is a case-specific legal notion
practised by Muslim theologians to issue religiously binding verdicts for possi-
ble application amongst all Muslims. An individual has the capacity to choose
either to accept (adopt) or dismiss a fatwa (and possibly seek another religious
opinion). Although in Shi’ism, opinions by the various Ayatollahs tend to be
limited to their followers.
 Political pragmatism through Ijtihad  63
10 Indeed, casuistry was initially pursued by Roman Catholic priests to locate rel-
evant solutions for certain cases, both novel and common (Leites 1988: 59).
11 Casuistry was criticised by philosophers including Locke, Butler, Kant, Pascal,
and Rousseau because of its unorthodox approach to the interpretation and moral
examination or reasoning of certain subjects (Kirk 1999). Locke, for instance,
argued that an individual is not capable of interpreting an action or behaviour
without going back to, or referring to, a law that is considered unquestionable
or natural, that is, God’s law as transformed from natural law into societal law
(Locke 1821: 12). Casuistry was also rejected on hermeneutic grounds; different
cultures possessed different ways of resolving problems and this posed inherent
difficulties for centralised decision-making structures (Keenan 1996: 123).
12 Alahed News (2007) Sayyed Nasrallah`s speech at divine victory celebra-
tion at Baalbeck, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetailsf.
php?eid=740&fid=11 (accessed 3 January 2014).

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4 Social mobilisation theory

Four stages of social mobilisation

Social mobilisation theory is typically used to explain the mobilisation of
individuals, groups, or communities to effect a significant change. Focus
is therefore often assigned to the ways in which the mobilisation manifests
and its potential to achieve social, cultural, and political outcomes (Chris-
tiansen 2009: 1). Social mobilisation denotes particularly the mobilisation
of members of groups (religious or civic) or community networks within
the context of contentious politics, often as a form of political protest. As
described by Klandermans (2013: 12), “social mobilization is the mechanism
that brings demand and supply of protest together.” In turn, Hoover and
Johnston (2012) have asserted that the mobilisation of religion based on eth-
nicity, nationalism, and culture is a distinctive feature of modern times.
As a generalisation, social mobilisation theory posits that the coordinated
mobilisation of groups in response to clearly defined political complaints is
not for the primary benefit of individuals, but rather to force changes in
the broader socio-political context. In turn, it is asserted by Christiansen
(2009: 2) that the motivations of individuals to engage in social movements
oriented towards changing the norms in social systems generally emerge
from a personal grievance with existing social structures. Issues of identity
and quality of life are therefore typically at the centre of such coordinated
social actions. Christiansen (2009: 2) further explained the key assumption
underpinning social mobilisation theory is that the solidarity manifested
through micro-political associations based on religion, ethnicity, gender,
etc. represents a type of social capital that can be utilised to mobilise social
resources for change. Klandermans (2013) has therefore argued that social
mobilisation focuses on factors such as persuasive communication tech-
niques and their effectiveness, the mobilisation channels, the role played by
social networks, and individual or collective perceptions of the costs and
benefits of participation.
A view commonly endorsed in the literature is that social mobilisation
(movement) development occurs across four stages: emergence, coales-
cence, bureaucratisation, and decline (e.g. Christiansen 2009; De la Porta
 Social mobilisation theory  67
and Diani 2006). To elaborate, the “emergence” stage of a social movement
is typically contextualised within a period of widespread social discontent
(Christiansen 2009: 1–2). As such, it has been referred to as the “social fer-
ment” stage, whereby potential movement participants are dissatisfied with
social policy or social conditions (De la Porta and Diani 2006: 150–152).
Such discontent may be experienced at the individual level or be tied to a
social movement organisation. Stage two of social movement development,
the “coalescence” stage, is characterised by more clearly defined accounts
of the reasons for the social discontent and the people or groups who are
responsible (Christiansen 2009: 2–3). It is at this stage that the social dis-
content is believed to transition from the uncoordinated and individual to
the focused and collective, primarily due to the emergence of leadership and
strategies for action. Christiansen (2009: 2–3) further explained that the “bu-
reaucratisation” stage of social movement development is characterised by
the formalisation of the leadership structure and the coalition of strategies.
De la Porta and Diani (2006: 150–152) also examined the bureaucratisa-
tion of social movement organisation and reported that the key implication
from such processes is that there is a core need for the social action to be
coordinated in order for it to be most impactful on the social and political
structures deemed in need of change. Lastly, the “decline” stage of a so-
cial movement represents its conclusion or institutionalisation. As argued
by Christiansen (2009: 4), however, social movement decline should not
necessarily be associated with social movement failure as the decline may
potentially result from many different factors including success, failure, or
repression by a greater institutional power. In turn, an appreciation of the
four stages of social movement development is useful as the paradigm can
be used “an analytic tool for understanding how collective action occurs”
and the impact of the movement of society (Christiansen 2009: 4–5).

Consensus mobilisation and action mobilisation

A review of the literature on social mobilisation revealed the long-standing
view among theorists and scholars that the mobilisation act itself comprises
two core steps: consensus mobilisation and action mobilisation. According
to Klandermans (1984: 586), consensus mobilisation is the process by which
a social movement organisation such as Hezbollah may seek to gain sup-
port for its socio-political positions or perspectives. The actions taken by
the movement to achieve these outcomes invariably involve four elements:
establishing a collective good, articulating a movement strategy, confront-
ing one’s opponent, and achieving observable results. Klandermans (1984:
586) also argued that “the degree of success with which consensus is mo-
bilized … can be measured by the extent to which the collective goods are
known and valued.” In terms of action mobilisation, this is characterised as
the processes undertaken by the social movement organisation to get peo-
ple to participate (Klandermans 1984: 587). As such, action mobilisation is
68  Social mobilisation theory
essentially a motivation agenda built around notions of the attractiveness of
participation and the rewards of participation. According to Klandermans
(1984: 588), a mobilising social movement organisation will therefore “try to
make the benefits of participation and the costs of nonparticipation as high
as possible, and the costs of participation and the benefits of nonparticipa-
tion as low as possible.”
Notably, the literature on consensus and action mobilisation in social
mobilisation theory also points to the use of religious symbols and associ-
ations by mobilisation actors. On this issue, Patterson (2013: 120) has pos-
ited that religious symbols are often used as political objects to mobilise
patrons or to shape the nature of conflict and security. For example, among
several factors, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s use of Islamic symbols when call-
ing for a theocratic government built on an Iranian identity, political order,
and a historic Muslim, played a key role in resonating the message to the
­Iranian people (Patterson 2013: 120). Arguably, establishing a distinction
between a true Iranian Islamic identity and the pagan (Persian) identity was
the springboard from which his message was promoted (Berkley Centre for
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs 2013: 9). In addition, the consolidation
of religious identity and the subsequent generation of religious nationalism
using religious concepts and symbols have been core elements of both the
Zionist movement’s and the Palestinian national movement’s strategies to
mobilise popular support.

Social mobilisation theory and Hezbollah

As previously established, several scholars including Dionigi (2014), Kara-
giannis (2009), and Azani (2009, 2010, 2011) have sought to examine and
explain Hezbollah according to social mobilisation (movement) theory. Di-
onigi (2014: 186) summarised his study by “explaining the process by which
Hezbollah has become subjected to international norms, especially focus-
ing on the idea of international socialisation.” Dionigi’s argument comple-
ments the assertions of Azani (2009, 2010, 2011) and Karagiannis (2009),
namely, that social circumstances (and in Dionigi’s case, international fac-
tors) have played a major part in the Party’s change of politics from the
hard-line ­Islamist discourse in the 1980s to a pragmatic and nationalistic
tone in 2009. Indeed, Karagiannis (2009: 369) stated that “Hezbollah is a
SMO [Social Movement Organisation] since [….] the group has a number of
highly committed members and it aims at political change.” Both D ­ ionigi
(2014) and Karagiannis (2009) argue that Hezbollah’s objectives and efforts
to improve the condition of the Shi’ite community have presented it as a
social movement organisation in which the movement constitutes two cri-
teria: mobilising supporters for a common cause and developing political
objectives that can change the situation for the collective good (Kriesi and
Wisler 1996: 152).
 Social mobilisation theory  69
Given Klandermans’ (1997: 2) description of a social movement as “col-
lective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sus-
tained interaction with the elite and the authorities,” it could be suggested
that the collective Shi’ite experience of persecution has served to produce
a need for a party such as Hezbollah to work towards the improvement of
their situation. Nonetheless, Karagiannis (2009: 370) continues to explain
that “Hezbollah’s frames have become popular because they draw their le-
gitimacy from the Qur’an and other Islamic sacred texts.”1 Sidney Tarrow
(cited in Goodwin and Jasper 2015:112) argues that “because it is so relia-
ble a source of emotion, religion is a recurring source of social movement
framing.” Hence, it may be argued that religion has become an essential
element of the Party’s social movement development strategy because it is
tied to politics and the deployment of violence in the pursuit of political
power. However, it should be noted that while social mobilisation theory is
embedded at times into the multidisciplinary approach to explain the devel-
opmental phases of Hezbollah as a social movement organisation, it does
not explain explicitly how religion has become such an instrumental element
in Hezbollah’s political strategy. What is more explicitly discussed in the lit-
erature is the political pragmatism adopted by the Party and its implications
for mobilising its supporters.

Hezbollah’s use of media as a social mobilisation tool

Hezbollah’s communication strategy relies largely on traditional and sub-
merged “informal infrastructures of action” such as mosques as social cen-
tres, Friday sermons, speeches, and rallies. The structure of these networks
aims to build a system of “being, thinking and acting” that allows the Party
to sustain itself over time (Deeb 2006). To this end, Hezbollah has developed
numerous media institutions to promote the Party’s participation in the
Lebanese political system and to herald its inclusive political identity (Deeb
2008). Moreover, Hezbollah’s compilation of videos showing its resistance
operations serve to demonstrate the full impact of the emotional and dra-
matic power of religious symbols and narrative for community building
(Matar cited in Khatib et al. 2014: 168).
This is arguably of particular importance to the Party’s political strategy
because Hezbollah’s ability to successfully transition towards political mod-
eration (pragmatism) relies to a significant degree on an effective commu-
nication network. After 2000, Hezbollah could reach audiences both inside
and outside of Lebanon through its al-Manar satellite channel, and its news-
paper and magazine outlets that include al-Bilad, al-Wihda al-­Islamiyya,
and the monthly al-Sabil. The focus of these outlets varies from private
matters, to political and religious affairs (Deeb 2006; Khatib et al. 2014: 42;
Saade 2015). In fact, Nasrallah’s speeches, interviews, and rallies are con-
structed by Hezbollah’s media arm as dramatic political performances that
70  Social mobilisation theory
demand urgent attention. For example, before Nasrallah is due to make a
speech, al-Manar will begin broadcasting his previous speeches, with clips
and images of Hezbollah fighters in battle, along with pictures of destroyed
Israeli armour (Matar cited in Khatib et al. 2014: 174).
Given the defiant and disruptive nature of Hezbollah’s messaging, the se-
curity around Hezbollah cadres and Nasrallah particularly is high. This has
served the Party and the way its media institutions portray Nasrallah in two
ways: first, it protects Nasrallah from domestic and international threats;
and second, it elevates his role to an almost divine status, giving him what
Khatib and colleagues (2014:175) refer to as a “larger-than-life” celebrity
role.2 This latter outcome is achieved because of a perpetual sense of threat
surrounding the leader adds to the drama of the speech event and to Nas-
rallah’s capacity to present “a powerful image of presence” to legitimise his
request for support and obedience from the Lebanese people (Khatib et al.
2014: 153). However, the constant threat to Nasrallah’s personal security has
led him to deliver most of his speeches by live video link rather than in per-
son, which has arguably helped to elevate the perceived importance of his
rare live appearances. Given the external “threat” to Nasrallah specifically
and Hezbollah more broadly is typically related to the interrelationships be-
tween Party image, security for its members, religious rhetoric, and political
strategy are worthy of consideration.
As for Nasrallah’s response to the threats to his security, he stated during
an interview with Al-Akhbar newspaper in August 2014, when asked about
using Facebook:

Due to the security situation, I should stay away from anything related
to mobile phones or the internet. Thus, I don’t have a direct relationship
with Facebook. However, I am always up to date on all sorts of dis-
cussions, rumours and conversations happening on Facebook, through
reports and summaries on the issue.

Moreover, Nasrallah continues to remind his followers of prominent threats

from Israel and insecurities in Lebanon as evidenced in a 2013 speech in
which he proclaimed “we must be cautious and aware of all what is tak-
ing place around”; also, “there is an international-Arab resolution to crush
Hezbollah.”3 In turn, it is important to give some consideration to these ex-
pressions of defiance in the face of danger by Nasrallah as they are arguably
used by the leader to reflect the threats against Hezbollah more broadly. By
placing such focus on security and defiance, the Party heightens the drama
surrounding its very existence as well as feeds into the fears of the Shi’ite
community. That is, the threats to his existence reflect the threat to the Par-
ty’s capacity to protect Lebanese Shi’ites.
Marsden and Savigny (2013: 204) have pointed to the role of the media in
shaping our understanding of the securitisation of religion, that is, religion
in a security context. They argued that there is little doubt that news media
 Social mobilisation theory  71
and social media platforms play an ever-increasing role in “mediating … the
religion-security nexus” in international affairs. In terms of global security
for instance, Islam for instance has been constructed by the Western media
as “an existential threat to a Western way of life” that must be managed
both ideologically and militarily (Marsden and Savigny 2013: 208). In turn,
ideological, societal, and military securities emerge as key points of focus.
Conversely, these security points of focus emerge as the priority concerns at
the regional or national security level for Islamic countries which regard the
perceived existential threat from the West. Hence, religion may be relatively
easily securitised, that is, constructed as a security issue when contradictory
religious values (at the ideological and societal level) appear to be, or actu-
ally are, threatening one’s own religious norms and values (Marsden and
Savigny 2013: 208). Notably, there has been considerable effort by H ­ ezbollah
to present itself as a political entity as well as an Islamist resistance group.
In turn, the establishment of a major institutional network including me-
dia outlets and engagement in socio-political activities have been central to
these efforts.
Zisser (2009) and Norton (2007a) both paid close attention to the decline
in Hezbollah’s support following the 2006 war with Israel and the resultant
limiting of their ambitions in the country. However, while Norton (2007b:
476–489) focused on the internal/regional obstacles faced by Hezbollah,4
Zisser (2009: 1–13) was more focused on the impact of the Lebanon-Israeli
conflict and on Hezbollah’s portrayal of the 2006 war in the media. A key
point made by the author, however, is that the 2006 war was the first indica-
tion of a decline in Hezbollah’s support, pointing to the way Nasrallah had
lost his appeal as leader due to this gamble.
The issue of how Hezbollah employed its developing media skills to se-
curitise it religious-political position was also the topic of El-Houri’s analy-
sis (2012: 91–200). He explained that Hezbollah’s central discourse – from a
critical perspective – demonstrated the ethical dilemmas inherent to resist-
ance strategies. Moreover, the author argued that as a socially conservative
movement its strategies and politics exemplified “the rise of political Islam
as a new global force as well as the growing counter-hegemonic political
movements in the world in general” (El-Houri 2012: 2). In turn, one can
argue that such claims by these authors highlight how Hezbollah’s success
as a movement is derived from its ability to present a model of resistance in
its media discourse that engages people from diverse backgrounds and with
varying political views. El-Houri (2012) also emphasised the role that the
Al-Manar television station played in presenting Hezbollah as a prominent
political party. Importantly, the author draws the reader’s attention to the
important role that the Al-Manar television network and the Al-Nour radio
station play in enabling the Party to reach out to the Shi’ite community in
Lebanon.
Arguably, the studies by Zisser (2009) and El-Houri (2012) were limited
in regard to the implications of the 2006 war for Hezbollah’s image and
72  Social mobilisation theory
credibility. While they are crucial factors in the Party’s test of moral reason-
ing, the studies failed to explain the reasoning behind the decision to kidnap
the two Israeli soldiers (that was followed by the 2006 war), or the Party’s use
of ijtihad in this reasoning.
Similarly, Khatib (2013) and Khatib et al. (2014) examined the communi-
cation strategy used by Hezbollah to promote its agenda. Khatib’s work was
essential to this book as it highlighted the importance of discourse to the
Party’s branding success. Specifically, Khatib et al. (2014: 5) argued that the
communication strategy employed by Hezbollah laid the foundation for its
political development and continuation as a movement. According to the au-
thor, the management of its “image” has always been important to ­Hezbollah
as it is seen as fundamental to establishing its legitimacy as a Party, reaching
out to followers, and to implementing its political goals (Khatib et al. 2014:
5–7). Thus, the political and cultural mobilisation of the Party is inextricably
linked to the establishment of an Islamic State derived from the political
communications and actions of the clerics (Khatib et al. 2014: 5).
Khatib et al. (2014) also drew attention to the role of Hezbollah’s Secretary-­
General, Nasrallah, as “the central actor” in the Party’s decision-making
process and in the success of the Party’s communication strategy. The au-
thors referred to this notion as the “branding of Nasrallah.” Interestingly,
Khatib et al.’s (2014) study covers Hezbollah’s campaign and the effect of
Nasrallah as the “defining feature of its [the Party’s] communication strat-
egy since its inception in 1982.”
However, Hezbollah’s use of the media to mobilise fighters and supporters
was not restricted to its rhetoric of resistance against Israel. The Party also
operated its media programmes as recruitment tools. Therefore, Hezbollah’s
use of the media should receive greater attention from scholars, especially
the discourse related to both propaganda and recruitment. As Smyth (2015:
27) indicated, Nasrallah acknowledged during May 2013 the involvement of
Hezbollah forces in Syria, thus showing that the Party’s online recruitment
efforts were active. Initially launched by Iran in Iran, the Party’s Facebook
pages, blogs, and messaging, etc., featured the Hezbollah symbol alongside
an image of the dome of Sayyida Zainab and the statement, “Zainab, we are
all your Abbas.” Moreover, phone numbers were included for recruitment
along with further links to the site.
However, Smyth (2015: 28) also warned that “while ISIS’ social media-­
based recruitment has been the topic of discussion and focus by Western
intelligence agencies and media, very little attention has been paid to Hezbol-
lah’s [Shi’ite] incredibly open and active recruitment techniques.” Therefore,
Hezbollah’s growing role as a transnational Shi’ite group requires further
exploration given the group’s use of the religious narrative of Karbala to help
mobilise fighters in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. As Smyth (2015: 30) claimed,
the most common poster designs were those that showed the names of Kataib
Hezbollah, Liwa Dhulfiqar, and Lebanese Hezbollah attached to faces of
Afghan Shi’ites. This suggests that an active recruitment programme was
 Social mobilisation theory  73
underway for these groups and suggests the links with Iran. The Badr organ-
isation also posted phone numbers and the group names on Facebook and
displayed pamphlets in Iraqi Shi’ite communities (Smyth 2015: 30).
Hezbollah’s use of media outlets as part of its resistance rhetoric also
proved successful during the early years of the Party’s struggle against Is-
rael. In addition, the role of the Party’s leader conveys the pragmatic face
of the Party, which started with the infitah policy (opening up) at the start
of Nasrallah’s leadership in 1992, paving the way for the development of
the Party’s political identity and its integration into Lebanese society. No-
tably, these studies (Khatib et al. 2014; Smyth 2015) do not place emphasis
on the tools employed by Hezbollah to support its political communication
strategy. In turn, Nasrallah’s speeches have been thematically coded and
analysed to explain Hezbollah’s social and political success.

Hezbollah’s image management

Hezbollah has carefully managed its identity and messaging over the years
to influence each of its stakeholders in different ways. The organisation
has media institutions that work simultaneously, on numerous fronts, such
as television, print, outdoor messaging, and one-to-one communication.
These media outlets combine to produce the same narrative and to ensure
that “the message, images and symbols used in different spaces constantly
reinforced each other” (Khatib et al. 2014: 188).
Hezbollah’s image as a Lebanese Islamist party is based on four inter-
related elements that have persisted through time: being an ally of Iran; a
resistance group to Israel; a Party committed to the liberation of ­Palestine;
and a religious representative, and protector, of the Shi’ite community
(Khatib et al. 2014: 43). To delve further into each of these elements:

• Hezbollah receives most of its funding and weaponry from Iran,

and the Republic remains its predominant supporter in the region.
­Notably, when asked about Nasrallah’s religious references, General
Michel Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and an ally
of ­Hezbollah since 2005, replied that Nasrallah’s adherence to Iran is
similar to the Catholic people’s allegiance to the Vatican. Hence, even
though Hezbollah’s religious framework is identified through Iran’s
Wilayat al-Faqih, the Party’s loyalty remains to Lebanon. Moreover, as
Aoun claimed, Hezbollah has vowed to fight for and defend Lebanese
interests and is serving as protector of the nation (Deeb 2008).
• Hezbollah was founded as a resistance group to Israel and continues to
base the need for its existence on the imminent threat that Israel poses
to Lebanon. This is a recurrent theme to emerge from within the rheto-
ric of Nasrallah’s speeches.
• Hezbollah remains one of the few forces, be it an organisation or a
country, to champion the liberation of Palestine. This issue is at the
74  Social mobilisation theory
forefront of the Party’s rhetoric and further provides its supporters with
a reason for its existence.
• Due to sectarian segregation that divided power amongst different sects,
political power is allocated on this basis (Traboulsi 2007). Accordingly,
each political party is affiliated with a religious sect, and through this
structure gains some power in the different government institutions and
entities. The discourse of each political party is therefore directed to its
supporters who are predominantly from the same sect. Political par-
ties campaign for support in the areas with the highest concentration
of their supporting sect. They then focus their activities in these areas
to be seen to be providing the community and thus to gain more votes
during parliamentary elections. Given the Shi’ite sect is marginalised
in several areas in Lebanon, Hezbollah is seen to be lending a helping
hand to the Shi’ite community via education, work-related, and social
projects. Through its efforts, Hezbollah has positioned itself as the pro-
tector of the Shi’ite sect, not only in Lebanon, but across the Middle
East (Norton 2007a). Nasrallah’s speeches have frequently echoed fierce
support for marginalised Shi’ites across the globe, with focus on Middle
Eastern countries.

To further demonstrate Hezbollah’s image management in relation to these

four “elements,” particularly in the messaging and discourse used by the
Party, charts 1a–1d present relevant analysis results for Nasrallah’s speeches
between 2000 and 2013. The statistical data presented in the charts show
how Nasrallah’s references to Iran, resistance of Israel, Palestine, and the
Shi’ite community link religion either directly or indirectly to Hezbollah’s
political agenda. An examination is then undertaken to determine the ex-
tent to which Nasrallah’s religious references can be regarded as a way for
the Party to enhance its image and strengthen its capacity to balance the
competing domestic and regional demands through increasingly pragmatic
political decision-making and action-taking.
Due to the change in political climate in Lebanon after the assassination
of Rafic Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister in 2005,5 Nasrallah’s
speeches became more frequent and more charged, focusing on key messages
about the Shi’ite sect that are repeated throughout. Previously, ­Hezbollah’s
focus was on reaffirming its image as a resistance movement for all of Leba-
non, and the Party had widespread support, particularly as it was regarded
as the force that liberated Lebanon from Israeli occupation (Norton 2007a).
Following the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, the
Party enjoyed widespread support from all sects and areas of Lebanon.
Notably, the Party was not represented in government or in the broader
political spectrum at this time and it can reasonably be asserted that this
afforded the Party certain cover for its operations and allowed it to keep its
efforts low profile. However, as previously established, Hezbollah eventu-
ally did become part of the Lebanese government to preserve and represent
 Social mobilisation theory  75
a segment of the Shi’ite sect in Lebanon. Still, Nasrallah’s speeches were
not fuelled with sectarian messaging. Even after the organisation came un-
der heavy criticism from the March 14 bloc when their actions were seen
to “harm” Lebanon and its people, as was perceived to be the case in May
2008, Nasrallah’s messaging remained neutral and focused on protecting
Lebanon’s sovereignty. However, the messaging landscape changed as is re-
flected in the fluctuating nature of Nasrallah’s uses of religion.

Notes
1 In this quote, Karagiannis (2009) refers to Hezbollah’s policies and decision-
making.
2 In October 2008, a rumour surfaced that Nasrallah had survived an assassi-
nation attempt through poison. Internal opponents of Nasrallah were accused.
However, Hezbollah sources denied all such reports (Kaplan 2010).
3 Alahednews (2006) Sayyed Nasrallah Delivers Speech on Resistance and
Liberation Day, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=25839&cid=454#.WXsVk4V8jU4 (accessed 8 March 2016).
4 This was also covered by Parkin and Kainikara’s (2007: 29–50) report on the
Lebanon-Israel war of 2006 and its strategic outcomes. Reports by the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies in 2010 also discussed the implications
of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities. In addition, Harel and Issacharoff (2008:
82–90) reviewed the policy implications of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war.
5 The former Lebanese prime minister was assassinated in a car bomb in 2005.
The Syrian regime was accused of the assassination and huge demonstrations
followed his assassination demanding the withdrawal of Syrian political and
military hegemony over Lebanon.

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5 Content and context analyses
of Nasrallah’s speeches
2000–2013

Political rhetoric and the mobilisation of supporters

The power of rhetoric and the speech act, and their effects on audiences
have been of great interest to writers for many decades (Glover 2011). How-
ever, the focus has largely been on the analysis of successful speeches in
Western contexts (Alkhirbash and Abdul Muati 2014: 41). As such, there has
been little attention paid to rhetoric and the speech act in non-Western com-
munities, and the significance of contextual events and audience to speech
contents and the techniques employed by the speaker.
Nasrallah’s use of religious rhetoric in combination with other varia-
bles such as Hezbollah’s wide institutional network and social services has
helped the Party to obtain and maintain its image as a resistance group and
to solidify its political status in Lebanon. The popular support of Lebanese
Shi’ites particularly is identified as especially important to the achievement
of these outcomes. Indeed, the results demonstrate that Hezbollah has con-
structed a religious-historical narrative of Shi’ism as a “social, cultural, and
political force” that aims to create and empower an “imagined community”
of Shi’ite resistance in Lebanon (Khatib et al. 2014: 52; Nasr 2007).

Personal attributes of Nasrallah and social mobilisation

Nasrallah provides a useful starting point for the analysis of his rhetori-
cal style and the importance he places on safeguarding his image as Party
leader. His personal attributes contribute to the success of his speeches
because it is important for the audience members to be persuaded of the
speaker’s credibility and reputation so that they may believe and trust in
what he/she says. In Nasrallah’s case, this task is made easier based on his
religious credentials (as Sayyid) which accord him a credible and divine im-
age (Hamzeh 2004; Nasr 2007).
Moreover, Nasrallah’s reputation as a person who says what needs to
be said was enhanced following the speech he delivered after the death/­
martyrdom of his eldest son, Hady, in the battle against the Israelis on 12
September 1997 (Matar cited in Khatib et al. 2014: 160). Nasrallah’s dig-
nified reaction came across as a heroic stand (Matar cited in Khatib et al.
78  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
2014: 160) which was reinforced by his refusal to negotiate with the Israe-
lis on the return of his son’s body. Instead, he waited until June 1998, for
a prisoner exchange deal to be made with Israel. Subsequently, Nasrallah
proclaimed his son a martyr to Lebanon and the resistance.
This is worth mentioning because Nasrallah’s response in this way in-
voked notions of self-sacrifice, faith, and bravery, similar to Churchill’s ref-
erences to “tears, blood and sweat” (Khatib et al. 2014: 156). As asserted by
Corbett (1990 cited in Alkhirbash and Abdul Muati 2014: 43), a speaker’s
willingness to sacrifice for the benefit of others can reflect a virtuous image,
and it is the position that such an “image” of Nasrallah plays a fundamental
role in adding weight and credibility to the messages in his speeches and to
the Party’s capacity to increase its political support.

Protector of Shi’ite community

Given the central position that the Shi’ite community has in Hezbollah’s im-
age as a resistance movement and its political status in Lebanon, references
by the Party leader to Hezbollah as protector of the Shi’ite sect – which are
inherently religious references – were analysed. Figure 5.1a presents the re-
sults of the analyses of Nasrallah’s speeches showing such references were
most pronounced in 2013 (4.46%), compared to their least frequent use in
2000 (1.79%). The figure demonstrates that little to no references were made
in other years. The turning point in 2013 came with Hezbollah’s highly pub-
lic involvement in the Syrian war. The increased messaging on this theme
can be accounted for by Hezbollah’s need to recruit more fighters from the
Shi’ite community for this war. The Party’s involvement marked the first
time that its operations had crossed borders to initiate offensive military
rather than defensive tactics. Thus, more fighters were needed (Foreign Pol-
icy 2016). One of the key messages given focus in Nasrallah’s speeches dur-
ing this time was that their involvement in the Syrian war was to protect
Shi’ite shrines in Syrian villages.
In turn, the increase in the number of references by Nasrallah to ­Hezbollah
as protector of the Shi’ite communities can be explored through the lens
of pragmatic politics. While Hezbollah had previously tried to maintain a
sectarian-free language and to present itself as a party for Lebanon, it now
found that to appeal to the Shi’ite public it needed to use discourse that
the latter would be able to relate to. This war of resistance was no longer
just against the national enemy of Lebanon, and no longer perceived only
in terms of the threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty, it was now a war across
borders in response to the need to protect a neighbouring nation (or more
specifically a neighbouring regime). Hence, a shift was arguably taking
place in the Party towards political pragmatism as it moved from acting
against threats to Lebanon’s sovereignty from a common enemy, to acting
on grounds of religion, and the war became a noble and religious war, seen
to protect a marginalised Shi’ite community across the region.
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  79

4.46%

1.79%

0.00% 0.00% 0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.17% 0.00% 0.00%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.1a  N
 asrallah’s references to Hezbollah as a protector of the Shi’a sect in his
speeches by year (2000–2013).

Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran

The exact nature of Iran’s influence on Hezbollah remains unclear to date.
However, it is generally asserted that Iran’s position is one of support for
Hezbollah’s efforts and for Nasrallah in the leadership role. Moreover, the
sustainability of the Party continues to depend on the funding, weapons,
and political support from Syria and Iran. Nasrallah’s references to Iran
in his speeches can be considered as religious in nature given Hezbollah’s
commitment to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine. As such, they were included
in the speech analysis.
The data in Figure 5.1b show that Nasrallah’s references in his speeches to
Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran remained relatively consistent over
the years, particularly in 2011 (6.61%), 2012 (4.75%), and 2010 (4.36%). The
exceptions are 2005 and 2006, with no mention by the leader of the Party’s
close ties to Iran. In turn, to properly interpret these figures, one must con-
sider the role played by the regional political landscape in Nasrallah’s dis-
course, as it is this landscape that allowed for his speeches to remain timely
and relevant. In the period from 2010 to 2012, Hezbollah’s efforts were being
channelled in two ways: to play a regional role as part of the axis of re-
sistance against foreign intervention from Western and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) nations, and to position itself as a close ally to the Syrian
regime and support for Iran’s role in the region (Saade 2015). The discourse
on strengthening the Party’s alliance to Iran instilled a sense of power in
its supporters, as Iran, and, in turn, Syria were both in the international
spotlight and growing in power during this period. Hezbollah emerged from
being a national player, to a regional one.
80  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

6.61%

4.75%
4.36%
3.57% 3.57%
3.08%

1.66%
1.22%
0.00% 0.00%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.1b  Nasrallah’s references to the Hezbollah-Iran relationship in his speeches

by year (2000–2013).

The distinct lack of references to Hezbollah as protector of the Shi’ite

sect and as ally to Iran in 2005 and 2006 may be explained due to the turbu-
lence Hezbollah experienced as a Party during this time. First, in February
2005, former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, was assassinated and
initial reports sought to blame Syria and to accuse Hezbollah of being a co-­
conspirator in the attack (Patrikarakos 2012). The second issue for the Party
was the 2006 war with Israel, which greatly damaged the Party’s reputation
amongst its supporters, non-supporters, and global audience (Zisser 2009).
The Party was vilified by many media outlets for both events and the subse-
quent establishment of the Special Tribunal on Lebanon (STL) after Hariri’s
assassination is regarded as a highly political act. As such, to distance the
Party from these accusations, Nasrallah refrained from making references
to Iran during this time to safeguard its image as independent from Syria
and Iran. During the STL, a number of Hezbollah members were named as
suspects in the assassination (Makdisi 2011). During this time, Nasrallah
remained cautious not to infuse his discourse with both sectarian and Syria/
Iran support, choosing to remain neutral. Thus, the contrasting levels of ref-
erencing to Hezbollah’s role as protector of the Shi’ite demonstrate how the
Party’s developing pragmatism was influenced by local and regional events,
and how Nasrallah employed ijtihad reasoning to manipulate his messaging
to protect the Party’s power base in response to the current political climate.

Hezbollah and Palestine

On the topic of Palestine, this issue continues to be debated at a regional
and international level and remains a core issue in need of a resolution.
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  81

9.04% 9.15%
8.04%
7.14%
6.82%
6.15%
5.42%

3.84%
2.67% 2.75%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.1c  
Nasrallah’s references to Hezbollah’s support for Palestine in his
speeches by year (2000–2013).

Hezbollah positions itself as a defender of marginalised populations, fight-

ing for the rights of those that resist foreign intervention and occupation
(Fadlallah 2015). This topic has remained at the forefront of Nasrallah’s
speeches, with references to Hezbollah’s support for Palestine remaining
consistent throughout the years. Figure 5.1c shows this consistency in his
references to Palestine from 2000 to 2013, particularly during 2012 (9.15%),
2008 (9.04%), and 2013 (8.04%).
In order to maintain its position as a resistance movement in the absence
of imminent threat from Israel, Nasrallah arguably made references to
Palestine in his speeches to be seen as an advocate and protector or mar-
ginalised populations. Because the situation in Palestine is one that many
local, regional, and international stakeholders agree needs a resolution,
the references to Palestine could be made repeatedly by Nasrallah to gain
the support of the audience. As such, the analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches
for their references to Palestine provides further insight into the way he
draws on religious conflict at the regional level to reaffirm the legitimacy of
­Hezbollah as a resistance party while also messaging to Lebanese Shi’ites
particularly that the Party is committed to the fight against oppression (or
for their rights).

Resistance movement against Israel

When further analysing Nasrallah’s speeches, it emerged that he references
Hezbollah as a resistance movement against Israel on the grounds of re-
ligion. Figure 5.1d reveals that such references consistently appear in his
speeches from 2000 to 2013. Notably, there is spike in the number of his
82  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

15.65%

12.31%

7.83%
6.67%
6.06%
5.24% 5.36%
3.57% 4.07%
0.00%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.1d  
Nasrallah’s references to religion-based resistance to Israel in his
speeches by year (2000–2013).

references made during 2007 (12.31%) and 2008 (15.65%), which is most
likely due to the growing pressure posed by the Lebanese government for
Hezbollah to disarm. These changes began surfacing after the 2006 war,
where Hezbollah was viewed by some political factions (namely March 14
political group) as having engaged in an unnecessary war and contributed
to dragging Lebanon into an ongoing conflict (Parasiliti 2013). Similarly,
in 2008, after political moves to disband Hezbollah’s phone network in the
Lebanese airport, clashes erupted on the streets between the Party’s sup-
porters and rival political parties. Again, Hezbollah’s image was tarnished
amongst the population and heavily criticised on a political level (Khatib
2013). This led to calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah, to lessen its power
and influence in Lebanon. As such, when analysing Nasrallah’s speeches,
the repeated discourse of the Party on the basis of religion was a topic that
thousands if not millions in Lebanon could relate to and identify with. To
reiterate, each political party in Lebanon works to protect supporters from
its own sect, before extending its efforts to a national scale (Traboulsi 2007).
Therefore, to gain momentum and rally support from the Shi’ite commu-
nity, references to resistance on the grounds of religion aided Hezbollah in
protecting itself from pressure to disarm. Also, continually citing Israel and
its past aggression towards Lebanon, as well as creating an aura of the im-
minent threat of war erupting with Israel, aids the Party in maintaining its
share of power. Thus, when discussing the issue of disarming the Party, Nas-
rallah links the need for the Party to retain its weaponry to the fight against
Israel and to the protection of the Shi’ite community. These religion-based
references therefore enable the Party to adopt a politically pragmatic ar-
gument, namely, weapons mean better protection of Shi’ites and Lebanon,
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  83
while also serving the interests of the Party, namely, weapons improve the
chances of Party survival.
In sum, the analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches revealed that religion is ap-
parent in Hezbollah’s political rhetoric to a large extent via references to the
four main domains comprising Hezbollah’s image as a resistance organisa-
tion/political party, namely protector of the Shi’ite sect, resistance move-
ment against Israel, ally of Iran, and supporter of Palestine. As revealed in
the discussion, these references can be further examined through the lens of
political pragmatism to gain insights into the way the timing and frequency
of the religious references assist Nasrallah to affirm Hezbollah’s role as a
relevant resistance group as well as a viable political party.

Nasrallah’s speech style

Cicero (Glover 2011: 66) emphasised the usefulness of emotional expressions
by a speaker to win over the audience, particularly during the opening and
ending of a speech. The “emotional expressions” in Nasrallah’s speeches of
interest in this book are his religious references, and these have been ana-
lysed in relation to his speech style in general. This is an important aspect
of this book because, as asserted by Cicero above, speech style is critical to
the capacity of the speaker to win over the audience, and winning over the
audience is arguably of critical importance to Nasrallah if he is to further
the Party’s political strategy.
Nasrallah often attempts to capture the audience’s attention with his
opening and closing statements, which always carry religious salutations.
Nasrallah’s speeches always start with,

In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful, praise be to Allah,

lord of the worlds, prayers and peace be upon our prophet Mohammed,
his household and chosen companions, and all the prophets and mes-
sengers […]

His speeches also always end with,

May God bless you all, and raise our martyr to his heavens, along with
the martyrs who preceded him and God willing our course will only be
filled with victory festivities.

Nasrallah’s use of a traditional religious greeting to open his speeches

conveys a holy image and encourages the audience members to grant him
their full attention. Arguably, Nasrallah has become the embodiment of
­Hezbollah and as such the Party’s political success is highly dependent on his
public appeal. “Nasrallah alive is better than Nasrallah dead.” These words
were uttered by Tsivikia Yahzikali, an Arabic affairs analyst for Channel
Ten in Israel during a documentary titled Nasrallah in Their Eyes in 2014 on
84  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
Al-Mayadeen TV (Hashem 2015). They revealed much about the fascination,
and perhaps obsession, with Nasrallah’s influence as a political actor.
During the documentary, speech experts and body language interpret-
ers from Israel identified what they described as the points of strength in
Nasrallah’s speeches. It is important to note that there is no evidence to
suggest that Nasrallah receives oratory coaching but instead, he prepares
his own speeches. The elements included his hand gestures (denoting power
and trust), facial traits (e.g. thin lips resembling comfort, beard and mous-
tache concealing his softness), and fixated look to the camera (interpreted as
a sign of directing the speech to whoever is watching and thus encouraging
the viewer to feel that he is talking to them direct). Other elements identi-
fied as influential to the success of Nasrallah’s speech-making included his
tone, dialect, and occasional humour. The documentary also highlighted
the contexts in which Nasrallah’s speeches are delivered as important to
their overall impact (Hashem 2015).

Religious storytelling
A key element contributing to the persuasiveness of Nasrallah’s speeches is
the religious rhetoric conveyed through storytelling. For instance, Nasral-
lah’s references to the tragic Battle of Karbala are attempts to link histori-
cal/religious events to current events in Lebanon and in the region through
storytelling. Deeb (2006) asserted in her book, An Enchanted Modern: Gen-
der and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon that the commemoration of Ashoura
is associated with the shared narratives, practices, and meanings of Shi’ite
identity. Deeb (2006) demonstrated her findings through documenting the
majlis a’za’1 and nadbat2 of Ashoura that are hosted by jamiya’ in Lebanon.
She also highlighted the visibility of religion in Hezbollah’s areas of control
such as Dahiya and some areas of southern Lebanon. The power of the Ash-
oura commemoration lies not only in its identification of cultural practices
but also in affirming the collective Shi’ite identity of victimisation, tragedy,
and captivity. It reminds Shi’ites of their constant struggle for recognition
and solidifies their quest for survival. This has relevance to our under-
standing of Nasrallah as a skilled orator and why he continuously reminds
­Lebanese Shi’ites of their persecution in historical and present periods. The
majalis3 served to teach religious, social, and political lessons and to link
the important meaning of Ashoura to current times (Deeb 2006: 143). This is
reflected by one of Deeb’s interlocutors during her fieldwork in Lebanon in
2000. Dalal describes current-day Ashoura lessons by saying,

They recite the same story about Husayn. But the lecture differs. It de-
pends on the audience and the recitor and the topic and his own rela-
tionship to Ashoura. But they are better than before, because they are
being tied to our daily lives, this linking of the past to the present and the
future, this is better. Before we used to just go and listen to the story.
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  85
Now, we are not just going to cry for Imam Husayn, we are going to
learn from his school. The lecture is important; it is clarifying why you
are crying, and why Imam Husayn was martyred.
(My emphasis, Deeb 2006: 143)

Dalal’s insight not only sheds light on the central place that historical
events of religious significance have in shaping Shi’ite’s understanding of
­present-day context but also the role of the orator and his/her potential to
shape the thoughts and opinions of the audience when linking the present
to the past within a religious framework. Deeb’s field observations revealed
that some orators’ objectives were to stir emotions and to make people “cry”
rather than to explain historical events accurately (Deeb 2006: 142). Such ob-
jectives are important for consideration in relation to Nasrallah’s speeches
given that narration represents the core of Shi’ism and is a powerful force
in Shi’ite theology. Based on such considerations, it is clearly evident that
­Nasrallah’s speech style reflects his awareness of the importance of main-
taining the Shi’ite tradition in speech-making of including allusions to past
religious events. More importantly, Nasrallah arguably uses the tradition
in a way that is politically pragmatic. That is, his speech style to “relive”
Ashoura and other religious events provides Hezbollah with the opportunity
to give weight to its domestic and regional actions in the eyes of the Shi’ite
community and thus protect its position in the Lebanese political landscape.
The Battle of Karbala on October 10th, 680 AD has served as a pivot
around Shi’ite practices of mourning, commemoration, and differentiation
from Sunnis. The battle of Karbala draws on experiences of injustice and
for the need to resist wherever injustice exists (Khatib et al. 2014: 53). Imam
Hussein and his followers realised before the battle against Yazid’s army
that they were destined for defeat, yet they continued to fight. This battle
serves to commemorate the need for fighting injustice and defiance, “by cre-
ating a Foucauldian sense of political spiritualism” (Al-Agha 2011b: 48–49).
Shi’ism is defined by “its passion for Husayn, whose martyr’s death is
the dramatic experience that lies at the beating heart of Shi’a development”
(Nasr 2007: 43). Alternatively, the use of the Ashoura commemoration also
demonstrates the collective Shi’ite identity mobilised for political purposes.
For example, Shi’ites often used the Husayn story to situate their conflicts
in modern times. Examples include its use against the Shah in Iran in 1979,
against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, and against Saddam Hussein’s
troops in Iraq following the first Gulf War in 1991 (Nasr 2007: 43). This
claim can be measured along with Hezbollah’s branding of itself as the ul-
timate and necessary protector to Shi’ites and, on a larger measure, of any
“oppressed” group. The identification of Hezbollah as a fighter of oppres-
sors stems from the rhetoric of Khomeini when speaking of the division
between the “oppressed” and the “oppressors.” Hezbollah categorised itself
as the vanguard of support for the oppressed and the rhetoric was used by
the Party in its claims for fighting Israel, aiding some Palestinian groups,
86  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

74

56

19 0 9 0 22 1

Figure 5.2  R
 eligion-based storytelling by speech event.

and later in its intervention in the Syrian war. Nasrallah’s use of religious
rhetoric through storytelling in his speeches was confirmed in the content
analysis. Figure 5.2 shows this type of storytelling was particularly evident
when Nasrallah was speaking at Shi’ite festivals (73 times) and Hezbollah
celebrations (57 times), and to a somewhat lesser extent while talking at Is-
lamic events (19 times) and Iran-related events (19 times).
These results are significant because they further demonstrate the key role
that religion has in the political rhetoric of Hezbollah to win the support of
the Shi’ite community. The more frequent use of religious storytelling when
speaking at Shi’ite festivals and Hezbollah celebrations, etc. demonstrates
the way in which Nasrallah attempts to appeal to the different audiences’
perspectives and sensibilities when conveying a political message.
Nasrallah’s awareness of the power of narration in Shi’ism shapes his
speech delivery style and his attempts to enhance his credibility and listen-
ability as a narrator. His Shi’ite audience/supporters are familiar with the
storytelling format and Nasrallah’s use of the method in his political rheto-
ric arguably helps to increase his credibility as a leader and authority figure.
Nasrallah’s speech delivery style in combination with Hezbollah’s branding
demonstrates the ability of Hezbollah to present Nasrallah as a larger-than-
life figure with full religious credibility.

Irony and humour

Nasrallah’s ability to apply contextual considerations to the contents of his
speeches is also evident in his use of humour and irony. The results from
the content analysis presented in Figure 5.3 reveal that Nasrallah’s use of
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  87

13

9
7
5
3 0 1 0

Figure 5.3  N
 asrallah’s use of humour in his speeches by event (2000–2013).

humour and irony was particularly evident in his speeches during ­Hezbollah
celebrations (13 uses), International Quds Day (9 uses), and other occasions
labelled as “unknown” which are the speeches made during the month of
Ramadan.
Irony is increasingly used in modern advertising to appeal to audiences
(Khatib 2013: 91). In turn, Mohammad Kawtharani, the creative director
of Idea Creation – the public relations company that designed Hezbollah’s
campaign in 2006 – told Al-Ahd magazine that Hezbollah commonly used
the tactic of double messaging in its advertisements to create irony for the
audience. To illustrate his point, he cited the example of when Hezbollah
juxtaposed a red banner above the slogan “extremely accurate targets” with
images of the destruction of Beirut’s southern suburbs.
The following sections focus on the results of the analysis of Nasrallah’s
speeches related to Nasrallah’s use of religious ceremonies and other events
as contexts of purpose. In turn, the descriptive and quantitative data re-
veal how Nasrallah uses religious rhetoric on these occasions to confirm
­Hezbollah’s religious identity and to forge links between religion and resist-
ance to the audience.

Time and place

Cicero posited that the best speech writer/speaker is the one who under-
stands the state of mind of the audience (Glover 2011: 56). This assertion is
based on the premise that each speaking occasion has its own requirements
and for the speaker to succeed he/she must produce the speech that fits the
occasion. Thus, the context within which the speech is placed will in many
88  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
ways shape the nature of the speech, its impact on the audience, and thus its
capacity to achieve its purpose.
Hezbollah’s strategy to deliver speeches on special occasions – religious
and otherwise – such as Jerusalem Day as well as at events when the need
arises provides a pretext for the Party to present its position on political de-
velopments (Khatib et al. 2014: 110). Table 5.1 lists some of the established oc-
casions that Hezbollah celebrates, which often carry religious significance.
Speeches are also delivered by the Party during specific domestic and re-
gional events. Table 5.2 reveals that these events reflect diverse affairs in-
cluding government elections in Lebanon, violence against Palestinians,
and the Syrian civil war.

Use of religious ceremonies

An analysis of Nasrallah’s use of rhetoric and speech style is often framed
within the impact of his speeches on the Shi’ite community. Integral to
his oratorical power is his ability to communicate his remarkable under-
standing of the vulnerabilities and aspirations of the Shi’ite community in
­Lebanon, and to address these elements directly. Nasrallah uses speeches to
consolidate his political position as Party leader and to reinforce the percep-
tion that he is “close” to the everyday experience of Lebanese Shi’ites. Amri
Nir, an Israeli Hezbollah specialist, noted that Nasrallah’s endorsement of
the delivery of social services such as electricity and education was the rea-
son for this widespread support (Azani 2010; Zisser 2009).
Furthermore, Nasrallah’s rare public appearances are considered the
backbone of the Party’s ability to forge its connection with Shi’ites. Some
public events such as Hezbollah’s campaign against the STL, for instance,

Table 5.1  Occasions of religious significance celebrated by Hezbollah

Ashoura Day Resistance and Liberation Day

Al-Quds Day Birthday of Khomeini
Birthday of Prophet Mohammed Start of Holy Month of Ramadan
Martyrs Day

Table 5.2  Hezbollah speeches on domestic and regional affairs

Government/ Parliamentary elections 2000 Israeli withdrawal

2004–2005 Lebanon political instability July War (2006)
Gaza Wars/Freedom flotilla UN Resolution on Lebanon
2006–2008 Lebanese political crisis 2007 violence in the Palestinian camps
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Lebanon political assassinations
Prisoner swap Syrian civil war
Imad Mughniyah Assassination Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409
2011 Arab uprisings Party’s policy initiatives (Al-Waad project)
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  89
are part of the “repertoire” of Hezbollah’s special occasions and are cre-
ated to make a political point (Khatib et al. 2014: 110). As such, the context
of Nasrallah’s speeches is used purposefully for the delivery of ideological
propaganda as well as for the use of religion for political manoeuvring. For
example, Nasrallah linked the STL to the resistance movement and claimed
that it posed a general threat to resistance and aimed to destroy the Party.
Therefore, the speech content and its context are what provide Nasrallah
with the opportunity to establish and affirm Hezbollah’s religious identity
within the Shi’ite community.
Norton (1987: 41) argues that under Imam Musa al-Sadr, “considerable
influential religious commemorations became vehicles for building commu-
nal solidarity and political consciousness.” Therefore, religious occasions
can be a useful context in which to mobilise Shi’ite support for Hezbollah,
which enables the Party to strengthen its position politically, socially, and
religiously. In turn, Nasrallah’s speeches suggest that he is aware of the
power of speech in its right context to mobilise Hezbollah followers and
thus help the Party to achieve its objectives.

Battle of Karbala
Shi’ite religious occasions are of significance to examine the way Nasrallah
reinforces his messages with religious rhetoric. For instance, in 2000 on the
day of commemoration for the Battle of Karbala, Nasrallah affirmed the
Party’s pledge to resistance, stating: “…on the fortieth day of Abi Abdul-
lah, we confirm again that here blood triumphs over the sword….” Nasral-
lah continued to then link the notion of resistance to martyrdom; “…We
meet here to celebrate the victory achieved by martyrdom and blood….” In
2003, on the same religious occasion, Nasrallah also said in his speech in re-
sponse to the American invasion of Iraq: “Tomorrow will be similar to what
happened in Lebanon on the first of Ashoura after the Israeli invasion of
1982 […].” Comments such as these from Nasrallah are insightful in that they
illustrate how he links religion to the political agenda of the Party to bolster
the Party position. Specifically, Nasrallah refers to martyrdom in Karbala
on many occasions (e.g. it in relation to STL, the fight against Israel, and the
civil war in Syria) to reaffirm to his listeners that the fight against oppression
must continue. In doing so, he links the actions of the Party to martyrdom in
the resistance movement and remind the listener of the importance of their
support for the Party (Khatib et al. 2014).
In turn, Nasrallah (in 2008) uses the day of commemoration for the Battle
of Karbala to condemn the invasion of Iraq and thus to build support for
the Iraqi resistance groups, stating,

[…] tomorrow, those who can read should read and search for the truth
in the eyes of the millions gathered in Karbala. This truth will say
that the 40th anniversary of Imam Al-Hussein’s death will mark the
90  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
beginning of the end of the American age in Iraq and the region, a fact
that the next few years will confirm […].4

Arguably, such religiosity in Nasrallah’s speeches further demonstrates the

Party’s use of religion in a politically pragmatic way to strengthen its political
position. If one accepts the assertion by Saade (2015: 724) that H ­ ezbollah’s
remembrances of its dead or martyrs provided a “tool-kit for action,” it can
be argued that Nasrallah’s efforts to relate a significant religious event of
the past to current regional conflicts aim primarily to legitimise Hezbollah’s
ongoing resistance stance to listeners as well as strengthen its political posi-
tion. Indeed, the commemoration of Ashoura, the rhetoric of Karbala, and
Hezbollah martyrs have been combined under the notion of martyrology by
Nasrallah to show how the Karbala incident could be applied as a lesson in
the present. This is arguably a politically pragmatic act as it is employed by
the Party to mobilise support for its fight against Israel and to strengthen its
position in domestic politics.
Moreover, this is made possible given the sense of community the K ­ arbala
remembrance provides to Shi’ites. As Fischer (1980 cited in Torab 2007:
19–21) explains, “Karbala provides a model for living and a mnemonic for
thinking about how to live.” This was evident in Nasrallah’s speech in 2008
when he said,

It was with this Hussaini, Karabalan logic, you rejected humiliation and
shame, and insisted on continuing the confrontation and resistance, de-
spite the destruction of tens of thousands of your homes, and the fall of
thousands of martyrs and the wounded men, women and children, with
few supporters by your side, abandoned by those close to you, and the
collusion of those far from you.5

In turn, although there is some debate among scholars as to whether the ref-
erences to Karbala are made to empower the Shi’ite community or to solid-
ify Hezbollah’s grip on power, the references are arguably made to achieve
both outcomes. It is clearly evident from Nasrallah’s use of language such
as “rejected,” “insisted,” and “resistance” that there is a focus on provid-
ing Shi’ites with a sense of empowerment. But it is also difficult to refute
the assertion from Amal Saad-Ghorayeb that “the ultimate goal” of the
­Hezbollah rhetoric “is to control and shape the people” (Khatib interview
with Saad-Ghorayeb in 2011: 49), which Nasrallah appears to attempt to do
with the Shi’ite community by feeding into their history of oppression and
using of the Karbala rhetoric to pressure them into compliance with the
Party’s political agenda.
Consequently, the mourning gatherings that Hezbollah holds across
­Lebanon to commemorate the nights of Ashoura are used by the Party to
emphasise the fixed path of the Islamic resistance in the face of Zionist oc-
cupation. In turn, the centrality of Hezbollah’s strategy to reach out to and
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  91
mobilise Shi’ites, and the degree of its success is reflected in the results of
a September 2013 Pew poll of Shi’ite Muslims in Lebanon which indicated
that close to 90% of the respondents had a favourable opinion of ­Hezbollah.
Indeed, the same poll was conducted across 11 Islamic countries and showed
that only 42% of the respondents (both Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims) had
an unfavourable opinion of the organisation (Pew Research Centre 2013).
Hence, the Party’s practices serve to summon the Shi’ite community as a
collective while concurrently granting a supreme value on any individual
who chooses to sacrifice himself to the cause.
A similar use of Shi’ite religious occasions by Nasrallah as a context to
establish links between resistance and religion was during his speech on the
day of the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in 2006. Of
note on this occasion – a breakfast hosted by the Council for the Support
of the Islamic Resistance – is the way in which Nasrallah established a link
for his audience between the martyrdom of Imam Hussein to have the land
returned “with honour and dignity,” and Hezbollah’s request/demand to
have its prisoners “return to us with honour and dignity.”6 The intention of
Nasrallah in being explicit in his language to link resistance to religion and
martyrdom is to give justification to the resistance and to garnish public sup-
port. In forging this connection between resistance and religion, Nasrallah
can then use religious grounds to justify, and as an attempt to validate, the
involvement of the resistance movement in other conflicts such as the Syrian
civil war. This is evidenced in a speech by Nasrallah in late 2006 where he
stated, “According to what we believe in, to our culture and our faith, Samir
and our brothers in prison deserve our sacrifice, which we are ready for[…].”7

Day of celebration of resistance and liberation

A context also used by Nasrallah to engage in religious rhetoric to promote
the cause for resistance was the day of celebration of resistance and libera-
tion. In a speech in 2005 to mark this occasion, Nasrallah stated,

[…] we are here to celebrate once again; one of God almighty’s days on
which he generously granted the mujahidin, the patient and steadfast
people of this country, the victory and dignity they deserve.8

Nasrallah thus not only uses speeches to remind his followers of their pledge
to the resistance movement but also as a platform to demonstrate resilience
and his power to his foes.
Nasrallah also used the day of celebration of resistance and liberation in
2006 as the context to respond to the July War criticisms. During his speech,
Nasrallah claimed,

We, as I said in previous speeches, do not want war. We did not even want
the July War. They wanted this war for which they placed objectives on
92  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
the level of the Middle East as a whole, and it was they who pushed the
situation into this direction. In all cases, precaution is our duty, thank
God if no war erupts, for ‘and enough is God for the believers in their
fight’, and if God forbid Lebanon was faced with a new challenge we
would be able to meet this challenge. However, I tell you that prepar-
edness and preparations for war are the most important means of war
prevention. This is what is called a balance of terror and deterrence.9

Al-Quds (Jerusalem) day

Furthermore, Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day was used by Nasrallah as a context
in which to reinforce the significance of religious obligations to his audi-
ence. For example, during the tribute of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day in 2008,
Nasrallah linked safeguarding the Palestinian cause to a holy quest made
to God. Indeed, Nasrallah consistently attempts to strengthen the power
and impact of his speeches with citations from the Qur’an and references to
the Prophet Mohammed and his descendants (Matar cited in Khatib et al.
2014: 173).
Thus, Nasrallah uses the context of Shi’ite religious celebrations as a way
to tie Hezbollah resistance to religious values and principles. Ending on a
note of irony, Nasrallah identified how some religious groups use religion
to serve their political objectives, a notion that Hezbollah adopts through
the use of the martyrdom doctrine, Karbala narrative, and taklif shari as a
para-military command. Nasrallah remarked in 2007:

Unfortunately, some leaders in Lebanon with no political plan, without

ideology nor persuasion or a civilized thought, unable to accommo-
date a large group of people, they work through his/their religious de-
nomination by raising their fear from other religions to strengthen his/
their control over them. This is happening in Lebanon and among all
­Lebanese religious denominations. There is someone without a political
project, speech or literature within their religion except only to frighten
his/their own people from others.10

The following sections explore how Nasrallah uses his speeches to promote
a discourse on resistance. In turn, descriptive and quantitative data results
are provided on themes related to linking religion to resistance, building a
culture of resistance, and the promise of divine victory.

Hezbollah and the discourse of resistance

For Hezbollah, justice can only be achieved by appropriating moqawama
(resistance) as a discourse and as a practice to fight oppression, as well as
to fight Israel. In contrast to the armed struggle against Israel by leftist
and secular forces in the 1980s – mainly Palestinian factions – Hezbollah
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  93
identified moqawama with Islamic rather than nationalist values in order to
distinguish itself from other groups (Azani 2010). Therefore, the Party’s im-
age of resistance – linked with Islamic discourse – along with narratives of
suffering, heroism, defiance, and victory, is reinforced daily through various
media outlets (Khatib et al. 2014: 49; Saade 2015).
Hezbollah situates its resistance operations within the necessity to fight
the oppressors/Israel and to protect those who are suffering. For H ­ ezbollah,
this is done within the doctrine of martyrdom and jihad. Nasrallah ex-
plained in 2007:

I am talking about a movement that possesses a high degree of aware-

ness, faith and knowledge that is popular and filled with passion and
enthusiasm. It knows its path and is committed to its objectives with the
vibrant determination of the youth. The various scenes in which this
vital phenomenon reveals itself include: the resistance, political work,
university presence, various institutions, diverse activities and all the
fields and arenas.11

Resistance is also a key Shi’ite paradigm as the entire edifice of the Shi’ite
faith is situated within narratives of resistance, sacrifice, and endurance
(Deeb 2006; Nasr 2007). Therefore, using the perception of Shi’ites as vic-
tims to strengthen Hezbollah’s political representation among this com-
munity allows the Party to justify its role as the guardian of the Shi’ites.
Hezbollah’s ability to gain control over Shi’ites and its use of religious jus-
tifications such as jihad commit Shi’ites to conflicts that best fit Hezbollah’s
plan. Therefore, jihad is an ideologically pragmatic notion to Hezbollah that
is employed to attain political hegemony over national resistance and the
whole Shi’ite community.

Speeches linking religion and resistance

The content analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches reveals that he creates a strong
link between religion and the resistance movement, a theme which is pro-
moted in his speeches across a broad range of contexts. The data in ­Figure 5.4
show that Nasrallah correlates religion and resistance in his speeches at
heightened degrees with 256 references. This is principally due to the foun-
dation of Hezbollah being based on religious doctrines. The Party advo-
cates a religious paradigm in all of its efforts, with its slogan taken directly
from the Qur’an: “Fa inna Hezbollah hum al ghaliboon,” which translates
to “The Party of God is the victorious.”
In addition, the reason for Hezbollah’s existence is to be the force of re-
sistance against the oppressor. In this regard, to rally the support of poten-
tial fighters and the general community, a religious connotation is required.
Such a connotation helps people to believe in a higher cause to which their
actions and potential martyrdom is connected (in Islam, heaven is promised
94  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

247 256

183 184
146

95
58 17 47 21 8 51

Figure 5.4  Nasrallah’s references to religion in his speeches by topic of discussion

(2000–2013).

to martyrs and, in the Lebanese community, being a martyr is considered

honourable). This theme is played out prior to the fighters being recruited
by feeding the community messages pertaining to jihad, a noble religious
fight, and by uniting the community in their refusal of oppression by exter-
nal parties. The theme of religion and oppression is also relayed during the
battle itself, with frequent references in Nasrallah’s speeches to advance-
ments in the battles, with fighters being commended for their strength or
their martyrdom. This theme extends to the time following a fighter’s death,
with organisations with names such as “Martyr Association” or “Families
of Martyrs” set up to care for their families. Access to funding, education,
and healthcare are provided, thus creating a stronger community and link-
ing all parties back to Hezbollah.

Culture of resistance
Nasrallah’s justification for promoting a culture of resistance relies heavily
on the Karbala doctrine. Nasrallah’s references to Karbala in present-day
contexts in his speeches are done to encourage Shi’ite Lebanese to stand up
and fight when in danger, danger that Nasrallah reiterates constantly. Such
references have been evident in Nasrallah’s speeches such as

This is not a culture of death; the culture of death is when, you are
killed as a lion, you thence transform into a sheep. When you as a lion,
are killed, then your children come to surrender their heads to the
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  95
executioner… that is the culture of death! But this, the culture of life, is
when a lion among us is killed, our offspring know their enemy and seek
revenge and to stop the killing, usurpation and occupation, to dignify
the nation.12

Therefore, the development of Shi’ites’ political spiritualism by Hezbollah

is employed for strategic purposes. This is not to claim that Hezbollah is the
only Shi’ite group in Lebanon that does so. However, Hezbollah’s branding
as the only successful resistance group linked to Islam that aims to improve
the social status of Shi’ites has put the Party in a strong political position.
The uses of Islamic themes for political purposes are of course not restricted
to Hezbollah. Other Islamist movements (such as Hamas in Gaza) have used
a similar strategy to promote a collective identity. However, what is unique to
Hezbollah is its focus on maintaining a continuous interchange of mutually
held knowledge adapted from everyday situations and claiming it as its own
(Khatib et al. 2014: 40). To clarify, the Party attempts to justify its legitimacy
as both resistor of Israel and protector of Shi’ites by shaping the informa-
tion in the discursive arena to suit its political ends. By linking the threats to
Shi’ites posed by domestic and regional circumstances to the Shi’ites’ own
collective understanding of Islamic themes and principles, ­Hezbollah is able
to assert its role as protector of the Shi’ite and to use religion to persuade and
convince the community of the importance of its support.

Divine victory
Given the culture of resistance promoted by Hezbollah, “divine victory”
emerged as a prominent theme in the content analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches
from 2000 to 2013. As revealed in Figure 5.5, Nasrallah referred to the no-
tion of divine victory in all of his speeches during this period, excepting
2005. The references were particularly evident during his speeches in 2000
(21.43%). This is most likely due to the Israeli withdrawal from southern
Lebanon in May 2000. Figure 5.5 shows Nasrallah’s allusions to religious
victory were also somewhat more pronounced during his speeches in 2006
(5.33%), coinciding with the July War against Israel, 2007 (3.88%), corre-
sponding with the growing role of Hezbollah in the Lebanese government
and in 2013 (3.57%), which coincided with the Party’s military achievments
in the fight against ISIS (and other Syrian oppositon groups) in Syria. The
high number of references to victory in 2000 is due to the Party’s achieve-
ment with the withdrawal of the Israeli army. On the other hand, the Party’s
reference to victory dropped from the years 2007 (3.88%) to 2013 (3.57%)
which indicates the Party’s emphasis on justifying its policies not with a
victorious rhetoric, but a participatory one. After all, the Party’s inability to
emphasise a victory narrative against ISIS in 2013 stems from the fact that
the conflict was still unfolding and the Party was putting more efforts on
recruitment and mobilisation.
96  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

21.43%

5.33%
0.00% 3.08% 1.04% 0.60% 0.35% 1.38% 0.68% 3.57%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.5  Nasrallah’s use of the “divine victory” theme in his speeches by year
(2000–2013).

"

56%

11%

Al Manar TV Speech at public events

Figure 5.6  Nasrallah’s use of “victory” theme in his speeches by main communica-
tion medium (2000–2013).

In terms of the communication medium used by Nasrallah to appeal to

his followers’ “need” for victory, Figure 5.6 shows that the Hezbollah leader
included this rhetoric in the majority of his public speeches (56%) from 2000
to 2013, as well as during his appearances on Al Manar TV (11%) over the
same period.
Nasrallah’s references to divine victory at public events particularly and
on television occasionally suggest his belief in the importance of connecting
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  97
with his audience when promising them victory or to remind them of why
and what they are fighting for.
Furthermore, during the July War 2006, Nasrallah understood his audi-
ence’s “need” for victory and promised his followers as much when he stated
in his speech:

Oh brothers and sisters, from all religions, sects, movements and par-
ties, you are indeed victorious … as I said to you in the invitation, as I
used to always promise you victory, I promise victory again … them …
they are continuing the July-August war, and we continue our battle of
defending Lebanon’s identity, unity and integrity. Long live all of you,
blessed be the martyr Ahmed Mahmoud, blessed be your martyrs and
long live Lebanon.13

Thus, Nasrallah combines religious and political language to emphasise his

status as a religious and political leader, declaring the end of the July War
(2006) as both a divine victory that only Hezbollah could have achieved
and a political victory for all Lebanese (Zisser 2009). Thus, as Khatib (2013)
concluded, Hezbollah’s resistance rhetoric served not only to remind its
supporters of the armed struggle against Israel but also to provide its sup-
porters with an inclusive and religiously endorsed discourse that provided a
point of political difference.
Nasrallah also demonstrates his oratory skills to use religious rhetoric to
convey political and strategic messages that combine religion and resistance
across a wide range of contexts. Indeed, the circumstances in Lebanon and
the region, most notably the war of 2006 and the clashes of 2008, provided the
contextual framework for Nasrallah to adapt the messaging in his speeches to
changing audience demands. As such, his speeches throughout 2006 included
several statements about divine victory and martyrdom for example, whereas
his speeches after 2007 included more references to pragmatism and openness.

Use of language of fear and threat

To affirm the Shi’ites’ journey on the path of resistance, and to present
­Hezbollah as a protector of the oppressed Shi’ites, Nasrallah stated in 2002,

[…] we should commit ourselves to the path on which we have indeed

offered many martyrs and sacrifices, but have found at the end of it only
victory’s self-esteem, and dignity for ourselves, our people, the moth-
erland, our citizens, our nation, and for every oppressed and suffering
human being.14

This demonstrates the language of fear and threat Nasrallah uses to pro-
ject his role as guardian and Hezbollah’s role as the only group to stand
98  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
up against global and regional threats. This was demonstrated in Nasral-
lah’s statement after the July War in 2006: “We feel that we won and that
Lebanon won, that Palestinians triumphed and so has the Arab nation as a
whole, that all the vulnerable, oppressed, deprived and victims in this world
have triumphed.”15
Specifically, Figure 5.7 presents the results regarding Nasrallah’s use of
the language of fear and threat in his speeches. What emerged from the
analysis is that Nasrallah used this language overwhelmingly (25% of oc-
casions) when talking about the “sit-ins.”16 The other occasions where the
language of fear and threat was most prominent in Nasrallah’s speeches
included when he was talking at graduation celebrations (7%) and about
Islamic (non-Shi’ite) festivity (5%).
Thus, Hezbollah’s collective identification of Shi’ites as a victimised
group combined with Nasrallah’s uses of the language of fear and threat
demonstrates the Party’s use of religious rhetoric to serve its political
agenda. For instance, in a specific reminder to his audience of their status
as a target of American and Israeli threats, Nasrallah claimed in 2005,
“They will be able to see the future through Muslim eyes and not through
the eyes of an America that only seeks our defeat.”17 Also, in 2006, Nas-
rallah asserted,

we have to remain calm and absorb the shock, their objective is clear
for all to see. It is to sow pure sedition of which the primary beneficiary
in Iraq is the American administration, which still pursues its policy of
imposing total control over Iraq’s oil, potential and resources.18

30%

25%
25%
20%

15%

10%

5% 7%
2% 3% 5% 2% 1% 4%
0%

Figure 5.7  N
 asrallah’s use of the language of fear and threat in his speeches by type
of event (2000–2013).
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  99
Nasrallah continued with this line of argument in 2006, but in a different
tone:

I do not accuse all those in March 14, or the entire team in power. I
do not accuse all its personalities. I did not mention names to anyone,
nor to any American or non-American journalists; but those who sat
with the Americans and asked do them to wage war on Lebanon know
themselves!19

Nasrallah also referred in his speeches to the marginalisation of Lebanese

Shi’ites to reinforce the Party’s role as the only source of support for the
Shi’ite community. In a speech in 2006, Nasrallah emphasised that “in the
past, it was the Shi’a areas that were [one of the] deprived [communities in
Lebanon]. Now it is not only the Shi’a areas [that are deprived].”20 “Either
we are required to die, die by being killed or die of hunger, or die as a result
of illness or to be ignorant and hold jobs as shoe-shiners.”21 In this speech,
Nasrallah reminds the Lebanese Shi’ites of their inferior status in Lebanon
and their unhappy destiny as a group. In this way, Nasrallah successfully
builds significant political support for Hezbollah among most members of
the Shi’ite community.

The oppressed versus the oppressor

The language of marginalisation and threat in Hezbollah’s characterisation
of Shi’ites points to Nasrallah’s use of the “oppressed versus oppressor”
theme in his language. In turn, the content analysis of his speeches from 2000
to 2013 revealed a variable but omnipresent use of the political and religious
language of the oppressed versus the oppressor. As indicated in Figure 5.8,
the use of “oppressed vs. oppressor” rhetoric was especially prominent in
2011 (14.88% of the speech content), 2000 (14.29% of the speech content),
and 2010 (11.17% of the speech content). The interpretation of this consistent
theme usage is tied to the oppression of Shi’ite communities across the Mid-
dle East by external forces. This rhetoric allows for the marginalised Shi’ite
community to identify with the notion of being oppressed, which has been a
recurrent theme since the emergence of the sect during the Battle of Karbala
in the year 680. Most the Shi’ite communities replay the scenes of oppres-
sion, signified by Ashoura and the commemoration of the death of Hussein,
son of Ali, and typically wear black during this period and refrain from
joyful celebrations.
Shi’ites are keen to replay the massacre of Hussein, his companions and
family members. Themes of sorrow and sadness commonly emerge during
the time of Ashoura and are actually encouraged. Mourning the death of
Hussein commenced immediately after the Battle of Karbala by his surviv-
ing relatives and supporters and continues until today. On an annual basis,
100  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
Hezbollah televises a grand-scale Ashoura event that includes a march on the
streets of Beirut. By revisiting the themes of Shi’ite oppression and wrongful
massacres, leaders of the sect such as Nasrallah can bring people together in
support of a common identity. The use of “oppressed vs. oppressor” stems
from this incident, to rally support to revolt against any kind of oppression.
Again, Nasrallah ties his speech content to local, regional, and interna-
tional politics. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the heightened use of
the theme of “oppressed vs. oppressor” in 2010 and 2011 is tied to the “Arab
Spring” uprisings, where Nasrallah tried to present himself and his Party as
supporters of the revolution, and opponents to any form of oppression. In
the case of May 2000, this theme was tied to the withdrawal of the Israeli
army (the oppressors) from Southern Lebanon (the oppressed). The Israeli
army had meddled forcefully in Southern Lebanon, occupying different vil-
lages, since 1985. Therefore, the withdrawal of the forces was highly cele-
brated and catapulted Hezbollah’s efforts into the spotlight, gaining them
support from many in the local community and across the region. This day
is marked on May 25 and celebrated every year as “Liberation Day.” It is
commemorated via a televised speech by Nasrallah which plays on the “op-
pressed vs. oppressor” theme by reminding the Party’s supporters and the
general public of the efforts by Hezbollah to liberate the country.
The meaning of this rhetoric reflects language that Shi’ites can easily re-
late to. The language used was clearly intended to speak to Lebanese Shi’ites
as it spoke about their struggle, namely, a community denied political, so-
cial, and economic standing by the Lebanese State, and a group that had
been subjected to repeated Israeli attacks (Khatib et al. 2014: 51). For ex-
ample, an article in Al-Ahd magazine describes the lack of “[…] sanitary
care. The recent events (after fighting in the south) caused diseases such as
chest infections and measles” (Khatib et al. 2014: 51). In this, there is a clear

14.88%
14.29%

11.17%

8.14%
6.82%
6.09% 5.72%
4.46%
4.00%
3.46%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.8  Nasrallah’s use of the “oppressed vs. oppressors” theme in his speeches
by year (2000–2013).
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  101
reference to the failure of the Lebanese State and justification for Hezbollah
and its resistance agenda.
Hezbollah’s ability to present itself as a protector relies on a combina-
tion of Islamic and nationalist platforms that ultimately contribute to the
perceptions of the Party’s complex and ambiguous agenda (Harik 2004).
Although Shi’ite Islam has a core position in the internal structure and hi-
erarchy of Hezbollah, the nationalistic platform of the Party is evidenced in
its primary objective to defend Lebanon against Israel and to provide relief
and social justice to the Shi’ite Muslim population (Al-Agha 2013: 12–16).
As such, the complexity and ambiguity of the Party’s identity emerges from
the sympathy and support for its cause to secure Lebanon’s borders. Nasral-
lah’s affirmation of Hezbollah’s duty to protect Lebanon as the homeland
and Shi`ites as the oppressed are reflected in his statements in 2006:

[…] with the exception of the issue of Shebaa farms, which is a special
one, and in connection with the recent war, we will consider it our right
to fight Israel in any position it occupies. As for when and how to fight
it, this is up to the resistance command.22

In a speech on Al-Quds day in 2008, Nasrallah proclaimed, “this experi-

ence of the resistance, which must be transferred to the world, relies on
faith, conviction, trust, and the moral and spiritual willingness to [sacrifice
ourselves].”23 However, the question remains as to how much Hezbollah is
willing to let the Lebanese State be involved in the Shi’ite areas. While Nas-
rallah claims at one point in his speech, “we want the government to assume
its responsibility at this stage. Is it not the government that says it is the one
which wants to protect its citizens?,” he continues to then assert; “As for
when and how to fight it, this is up to the resistance command.” Also, in
2007 Nasrallah proclaimed, “we are the protectors of the nation.”24
Nasrallah continues his demand for the Lebanese State to take responsi-
bility for the domestic affairs when saying,

They say: oh you are having a State within a State. Well, make me un-
derstand. You are the State, you don’t want to liberate the land, you
don’t want to free the prisoners, you don’t want to protect us from being
killed or assassinated, or protect us from landings, you don’t want to
cure us, you don’t want to feed us and you don’t want to teach us.25

Therefore, the fusion of religion and politics in Nasrallah’s rhetoric serves

a pragmatic purpose to undermine State authority by exposing its ina-
bility to perform its sovereign duty and in doing so, secure more support
for ­Hezbollah. To clarify, Nasrallah’s primary intent in his rhetoric is to
mobilise the support of Lebanon’s Shi’ites by persistently pointing to the
Lebanese government’s failure, along with the failure of leftist parties, to
secure and protect the rights of the poor (Deeb 2006: 79). This demonstrates
102  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
political pragmatism in that he does this knowing that weak States are a re-
sult of alternative growing powers, which is the status of the post-war system
in Lebanon. This was also evident in Hezbollah’s autonomy by building its
separate institutional network. However, the Shi’ite community in L ­ ebanon
is not the only group given focus by Hezbollah when speaking on the threat
of oppression and marginalisation. The following section reveals how
Nasrallah implies that Hezbollah itself is also subject to the same “threats”
through attempts to disarm the Party.

Demands for Hezbollah to disarm

Hezbollah has unquestionably evolved as a Party since Nasrallah’s appoint-
ment as the Party leader. In terms of weaponry, Hezbollah has steadily
increased its arsenal to include more than a thousand 122 mm Katyusha
rockets, rocket propelled grenades, AT-4 antitank missiles, and mortars and
antiaircraft batteries. As a result, it emerged as one of the most well-armed
non-State actors in the world (Al-Agha 2013). Thus, Nasrallah has overseen
a significant strengthening in the Party’s standing as a resistance/political
movement.
In turn, Nasrallah’s speeches demonstrate how he seizes upon the con-
tinuous domestic and international demands to disarm Hezbollah, the re-
sistance movement, within the notions of religious martyrdom. In a speech
made in 2005, for example, Nasrallah confirmed: “[…] but if anyone, listen
to me, if anyone tries to disarm the resistance, we will fight him the way
martyrs fought in Karbala […].”
Moreover, in his speeches, he alludes to the perceived conspiracy against
Hezbollah by asserting that “Hezbollah, Lebanon and the Palestinians in
Palestine are forbidden to have modest weapons to defend themselves, their
country and their homeland.”26 He continues,

I tell you frankly that the international community does not seek to
further the interests of the Palestinians, Lebanese, Arabs or this en-
tire region. Rather it is doing its utmost to advance the interests of the
United States and Israel.27

In 2006, Nasrallah then affirmed that “the decision [Israel war against
­Lebanon] was to crush Hezbollah.”28
One finds a change in Nasrallah’s tone when making statements about
Hezbollah’s weapons in 2007. Nasrallah’s rhetorical change shows his will-
ingness to adapt to changing circumstances in that his discourse responds
to present-day circumstances with powerful historical and religious allu-
sions without revealing the Party’s full intentions. However, this has left
Hezbollah’s rivals and enemies “guessing” as to the next step to be made by
the Party (Matar cited in Khatib et al. 2014: 169).
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  103
Illustrations of Hezbollah’s “ideological ambiguity” (Harik 2004) are
also found in some of Nasrallah’s statements on weapons following the July
War in 2006, and the May 2008 clashes. Nasrallah framed these topics as
a necessity to protect and secure moqawama. As discussed in Chapter 4 in
relation to Nasrallah and his uses of ijtihad reasoning, Nasrallah reasoned
that ­Hezbollah must keep its weapons to support its objective to strengthen
­Lebanon and to protect the Lebanese people. Insisting that Hezbollah
would not use its arms against other Lebanese factions, Nasrallah argued
that only when the Party’s objective was realised would it negotiate on an
outcome regarding its weapons.
In addition, Nasrallah referred to the July War in 2006 to again argue that
Hezbollah was a resistance movement – rather than a militia – that required
weaponry as part of its defensive strategy. In turn, he reasoned that when
such a defensive mindset was no longer needed, then the Party would consider
relinquishing its weapons. Lastly, Nasrallah also referred to the May 2008
clashes to position Hezbollah as the victim of unfair decisions by the govern-
ment and therefore the Party needed weapons capabilities to defend itself.
Hence, Hezbollah situated the threats from within Lebanon and abroad
on the same scale to mobilise great support from Lebanese Shi’ites in re-
turn. Alternatively, Nasrallah is justifying his actions under the “principle
of lesser evil” (Coughlin 2010). Nasrallah’s rhetoric constantly attempts to
draw attention to the Party’s adaptation to socio-historical occasions while
maintaining ideological ambiguity. For instance, at one point he opens the
door for debates on Hezbollah’s weapons while leaving Hezbollah’s rivals
and enemies guessing as to what its next steps will be.
As previously mentioned, central to the culture of resistance promoted by
Hezbollah is the doctrine of jihad. The following sections present descriptive
and quantitative results from the content and context analysis of Nasral-
lah’s speeches to demonstrate an emphasis placed on community-­building,
education, and addressing the role of women in society. The selection of
these specific aspects for analysis was informed by the direction undertaken
by the Party at this time to promote an image of progressiveness. The fol-
lowing discussion of the analysis results helps to illustrate ­Hezbollah’s po-
litical pragmatism by further emphasising its important role and position in
­Lebanese society. In turn, this reinforces the Party’s message that it is more
than just a conventional Islamic party by being adaptable and by “opening-­
­up” (Al-Agha 2011a) to the people.

Doctrine of Jihad
To maintain the support of Lebanese Shi’ites, Hezbollah sought to formu-
late a religious-historical narrative of Shi’ism as a social, cultural, and polit-
ical force, a notion which was first employed by Imam Musa al-Sadr in the
late 1970s. This formulation served as the basis of individual empowerment
104  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
and for creating an imagined community of Shi’ite resistance in Lebanon
(Khatib et al. 2014: 52). As a result, the participation of Lebanese Shi’ites
in the development of State and society, and in the resistance against Israel,
becomes a collective religious and civic duty. This was not only reflected in
Hezbollah’s media strategy but also through religious and symbolic prac-
tices (Deeb 2006; Khatib et al. 2014).

Community development
In an attempt to enhance the Shi’ite identity, Hezbollah sought to strengthen
the institutional network it created. Hence, Nasrallah made an important
correlation between community-building and jihad in numerous speeches.
For Nasrallah, jihad does not only cover fighting the enemy (otherwise
known as lesser jihad). Rather, Nasrallah’s reference goes to the principle
of higher jihad, which manifests itself in the purity of the soul and in doing
good deeds.
This is reflected in the content analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches, with
­Figure 5.9, showing that Nasrallah included numerous references to com-
munity development when speaking at graduation celebrations (22% of the
time). Similarly, although to a much lesser degree, he would also refer to
community development when speaking at Hezbollah celebrations (5% of
the time).
Nasrallah promotes the concept of higher jihad to strengthen the Shi’ite
community and therefore develop and improve their social situation (com-
munal jihad). This was highlighted by Deeb (2006: 50–66) who noted the

25%

20% 22%

15%

10%

5%
5%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
0%

Figure 5.9  N
 asrallah’s references to community development in his speeches by
event (2000–2013).
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  105
importance of volunteerism for pious women in Dahye. As one volunteer
stated, religion can be considered from two positions, the person’s relation-
ship with God and the person’s relationship with God in the context of soci-
ety. Regarding the second position, the notion of one’s obligation to worship
is given consideration in relation to the way in which the acts of worship
serve others in society.
Indeed, worship that does not benefit society is addressed in the Qur’an,
namely through Fa-waylu lil-musallin alladhinahum ‘an salatihim sahun in
reference to worshippers who are not interested in their prayers, alladhina-
hum yur’aun in reference to those who worship just to be seen to be doing
so by others, and wa yamnau’n al-ma’un in reference to those who prevent
others from achieving happiness. Of course, the Qur’an endorses worship
that combines prayers and service to others to support the collective benefit
to all.
Another aspect of the doctrine of jihad promoted by Nasrallah in his
speeches relates to the importance of support for, or sponsorship of, the
children of martyrs. Nasrallah frames this responsibility within Islamic
discourse through references to a Hadith; “ana wa kafil al-yatim fi-l-janna,
I (the prophet) and the orphan’s sponsor will be in heaven” (Deeb 2006:
197). Nasrallah reiterated this responsibility in his statement in 2008: “these
children are our responsibility.” Nasrallah uses the concept of jihad in a
politically pragmatic way, namely, to bolster political support for the Party,
by aligning the Party’s existence to an ongoing responsibility to support the
children of martyrs. Asserting the Party’s responsibility to serve the com-
munity has thus assisted Hezbollah to consolidate religious concepts in its
political discourse.

Education
Education also emerges as a focal point in Nasrallah’s speeches in his at-
tempts to establish links between Hezbollah and the doctrine of jihad. As
such, the content analysis of his speeches focused on the extent to which
he referred to education to appeal to the needs of his audience. The results
presented in Figure 5.10 reveal Nasrallah was relatively consistent in his
references to education, with 2010, 2012, and 2007 recording the highest
percentages of references at 4.19%, 4.07%, and 3.85%, respectively.29 In
contrast, there were no references to education in his speeches during the
years 2005, 2006, and 2008. To account for these differences, the focus of
local and regional politics at different times required different key messag-
ing. In 2005, for example, the assassination of the Former Prime ­Minister
of ­Lebanon was making headlines and therefore, education was not at the
forefront. The year 2006 marked the Israeli war with Lebanon, again the fo-
cus was on defending Lebanon, Hezbollah emerging as the “victor” of this
war and the rebuilding of the damaged, war torn areas across L ­ ebanon as a
result of the war (with a full-fledged, properly designed, and communicated
106  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

4.19%
4.07%
3.85%

2.71%

1.79%

0.83% 0.89%

0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.10  Nasrallah’s references to the importance of education in his speeches

by year (2000–2013).

campaign entitled “Samidoon,” which means “we will stand strong and
remain” in Arabic) (Khatib 2013). In 2008 as well, the focus of speeches
related to the talks on the disarmament of Hezbollah and resulted in the
clashes on the streets of Beirut. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn
that Nasrallah and his team of advisors consider local, regional, and in-
ternational politics and ensure that speeches are timely and can be contex-
tualised and quoted when needed. Also, through his speeches, N ­ asrallah
seeks to gain support and take a stance on local and regional issues where
applicable. He uses his speeches as a tool to rally support, recruit new
fighters or influence the minds of his supporters in a way that is tied to
local and regional happenings.

Role of women role in society

Women’s role in society is another important social consideration addressed
by Nasrallah in his speeches that allude to the doctrine of jihad. For in-
stance, Nasrallah explained the importance of women’s role in society in a
speech in 2008 when he stated,

It was with this Hussaini, Karabalan logic, you rejected humiliation

and shame, and insisted on continuing the confrontation and resistance
through education, despite the destruction of tens of thousands of your
homes, and the fall of thousands of martyrs and the wounded men,
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  107

References to Women's role

12.00%
10.00%
8.00% 10.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00% 1.58% 3.71% 2.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.37%
0.00%

Figure 5.11  Nasrallah’s references to the role of women in society in his speeches by
year (2000–2013).

women and children, with few supporters by your side, abandoned by

those close to you, and the collusion of those far from you.30

Similar to the content analysis results for community development, ­Figure 5.11

shows that Nasrallah sought in his speeches to establish a relationship be-
tween religious rhetoric and women’s role in society at graduation celebra-
tions 10.00% of the time and Hezbollah celebrations 3.71% of the time.
The following sections explore how Nasrallah’s speeches address
­Hezbollah’s “position” in domestic politics. Descriptive and quantitative data
results are provided in relation to such themes as pragmatism and quietism,
Hezbollah as the party for all Lebanese, and its links to Wilayat al-Faqih.

Hezbollah and domestic politics

A key theme to emerge in Nasrallah’s speeches is his dismissal of accusa-
tions against Hezbollah that its primary objective is the pursuit of political
power. Nasrallah explained in 2007:

I mean must I every day and in every speech re-iterate, as we constantly

do, that we stand for co-existence, civil peace, the Taif Agreement, the
unity of the Lebanese and that we have no hidden Goals or ulterior mo-
tives, that we do not want to take control of the government.31

Nasrallah then indicates the Party’s objective to participate in the political

process by stating,

We had employed political and civil means, which is why we were par-
ticipating in the political process. Today, we will continue the political
struggle in order to achieve a state of law and institutions, in order to
achieve a government that considers all the Lebanese as equals, that
defends and preserves their security.32
108  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
In this, the issue of Hezbollah’s transparency as a political party arises.
When Hezbollah undermines State authority, it reinforces its position as the
only protector and representative of Lebanese Shi’ites. By this, Hezbollah
can guarantee its status within the community and make decisions for it
collectively (as will be shown in the Party’s participation in the Syrian con-
flict). The battle for this position is fought through the use of Ashoura, as an
example of Shi`ite historical and religious quest for survival and insecurity.
Hezbollah presents itself as a political and religious group capable of
integrating into the Lebanese political system while retaining its religious
identity. This is evident in the high-level visibility of religion in its area of
control (Deeb 2006) and its communication strategy or branding (Khatib
2013). However, the Party had to undergo an infitah (opening up) policy33 to
protect its position in the post-Tai’ f political changes which depended on a
re-interpretation of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
One of the themes in Nasrallah’s speeches reflecting Hezbollah’s agenda
to build political support in Lebanon is “pragmatism based on quietism.”
The content analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches between 2000 and 2013 also
revealed that “pragmatism based on quietism” was a religious theme he re-
ferred to from 2008 to 2010 particularly. To clarify, the religiosity of the
“quietism” theme to Shi’ites is to be understood in relation to taqiyya, that
is, the denial of one’s religious beliefs and practices when subjected to per-
secution (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) (Black 2015: 230–233). The prag-
matic aspect of the quietism position of the Party is then evident in the goal
to assert religious grounds for the withdrawal from the political arena and
thus not be perceived to be deliberately undermining the government.
As shown in Figure 5.12, this theme accounted for 2.09% of the content
of his speeches during 2008, and that he continued to make references to
this religious idea during 2009 (0.15%) and 2010 (0.70%). It is interesting to
note that Nasrallah made no references to the notion of pragmatism based
on quietism from 2000 to 2007 or from 2011 to 2013. As Nasrallah seeks to
focus on immediate matters and crafts his speeches based on timely local,
regional, and international events, the events taken place in those years need
to be assessed.
Therefore, the years in which the “pragmatism based on quietism” ap-
proach was not used by the Party were problematic as it brought into ques-
tion the Party’s true objectives. Other events taking place required the
Party’s full strategic focus on the ground or were not led by the Party. In
2000, the Party was working to liberate Lebanon from Israeli occupation,
which it achieved on 25 May 2000. The messaging released by Hezbollah and
its leader in this year and during the years that immediately followed were
about winning the war using whatever strategic tactics was being deployed.
The facts were clearly stated and the Party’s efforts in winning back Leba-
non’s sovereignty were widely celebrated. In addition, following the assassi-
nation of former Prime Minister, Hariri, the Party had to take a firm stance
against all that was taking place to clear its name from being tied to the
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  109

Pragmatism based on quietism

2.09%

0.70%

0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.12  Nasrallah’s references in his speeches to pragmatism based on quietism

by year (2000–2013).

assassination (Khatib 2013). A straightforward reporting approach based

on facts had also been used in recent years, pertaining to Hezbollah’s role
in the Syrian war. This factual approach was used to update the local, re-
gional, and international public on events on ground as the details remained
somewhat hard to access for those who were not directly participating.
However, when compared to 2008, 2009, and 2010, there is a spike in the
use of the “pragmatism based on quietism” approach. The Party was under
a lot of scrutiny from various external forces and political parties and calls
for its disarmament were ever present. In addition, Hezbollah’s image was
under great scrutiny following the clashes on the streets of Beirut in 2008,
and the Party was seen as an “internal enemy” by a growing number of
people (Saade 2015). Therefore, Nasrallah chose to relay the facts as they
appeared, but chose not to challenge them, so as not to engage in needless
banter. When the Party met with severe repercussions due to its actions and
reputation, Nasrallah’s approach was not to fight back, but rather to af-
firm that the Party’s actions were channelled towards the greater good of
­Lebanese society, as a protector no less.

Lebanese parliamentary elections in 1992

Unlike former Party leaders such as Sheikh Sobhi Tufaili,34 regarded by
many as a hardliner, Nasrallah wants to project the image that he pre-
sides over a more pragmatic Party – with Lebanese national interests as its
main concern. This is evident in his approach when negotiating on whether
Hezbollah should participate in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in
1992. Tufaili, for instance, opposed the suggestion on the premise that it
would weaken the Party and divert it from its primary objective to provide
110  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
resistance to Israel. Tufaili also believed that the Lebanese political sys-
tem was corrupt. Nasrallah, on the other hand, along with his predecessor,
Sayyid Abbas Moussawi, voiced their support for Hezbollah’s participation
in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections, arguing that it would secure
the Party’s position in Lebanon and thus secure Hezbollah’s political future.
Of greater interest to Nasrallah was that the election campaigns would pres-
ent him with the opportunity to communicate his political agenda to the
Lebanese people.
This is an important consideration given Hezbollah has struggled to es-
tablish widespread support in Lebanon. This has been due to several factors
including the Party’s ambiguous policies, its insistence on remaining armed,
and its stated objectives. In addition, the clannish nature of the Lebanese
political system means that it is difficult for the Party to make inroads into
the Christian population of the country. Perhaps too, the central and almost
omnipotent role played by Nasrallah in Hezbollah’s political processes has
alienated other supporter groups.
Nasrallah emphasised the importance of the Party’s alliances with AMAL
and the FPM in statements in 2008 and 2009. Specifically, he declared that
a common understanding can be established with Christian leaders from
different regions. Notably, Nasrallah was determined to emphasise that the
new understanding between Hezbollah and the FPM was not intended to be
at the expense of Hezbollah’s willingness to work with other sects, religions,
or political forces. As he explained, the new understanding with the FPM
was signed when they were all Ministers in PM al-Saniora’s Cabinet, and
the alliance was a step towards the real goal to build stronger connections
between all groups and segments of Lebanese society. Moreover, Nasrallah
argued that Hezbollah and Amal enjoyed a brother-like bond based on rea-
son and cooperation that could not be broken by others. As such, the bond
relied on mutual and deep trust between the two parties that rose above
politics and political interests.35
The agreement signed between Hezbollah and the FPM appears to have
provided Nasrallah with the context to reinforce the notion of religious
pragmatism in his speeches. This is evidenced in a speech given in 2008
when Nasrallah commented:

On your behalf, I take this occasion to congratulate all Muslims and

Christians, on their grand, cherished and glorious holidays that are
associated and connected to two great figures, of the greatest of God
Almighty’s prophets, Jesus, God’s Spirit and word… and the supreme
Messenger of all the prophets and messengers of God, Mohammed Bin
Abdullah peace and prayers of the Lord be upon them both and upon
all God’s prophets and messengers. Each one of these two grand figures
transformed from a man into a nation exceeding a billion and hundreds
of millions when talking about either Muslims or Christians.36
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  111
This was done to ensure that Hezbollah was regarded as a national Party
and not simply a Shi’ite group, namely, a national Lebanese party seeking
to represent all of society.
These steps can be characterised through a pragmatic notion of Islamic
jurisprudence – ijtihad – that provides Hezbollah with flexibility in terms
of its political behaviour (Khatib et al. 2014: 27). Hezbollah adheres to the
two principles: “necessity permits what is prohibited” and “what cannot be
accomplished in its whole … should not be left abandoned in its whole”
(Khatib et al. 2014: 27). Hezbollah also relies on the following principles of
Shari’a (Al-Agha 2011a: 165):

• The protection of reason;

• The protection of the self;
• The protection of family and descent;
• The protection of religion; and
• The protection of property.

Furthermore, Hezbollah embraces its own realpolitik, arguing that while

realpolitik refers to “choosing practicality over ideology in the pursuit of
power, Hezbollah has managed to find a balance between the two” (Khatib
et al. 2014: 27). Qassem (2010: 279) supports this claim by stating that “the
dominance of interest over principles is unacceptable but considering inter-
est to be in the framework of maintaining principles is acceptable.” There-
fore, the principle is employed to serve the Party’s interests as it allows it
to choose any political action while still retaining its credibility in the eyes
of supporters. This can be linked to the group’s participation in the Syrian
civil war as discussed in Chapter 7.

Hezbollah as the party for all Lebanese

Furthermore, Nasrallah’s reference in 2006 to Hezbollah as a party for
all Lebanese, Christians, and Muslims alike, whose only yardstick is
­L ebanon’s best interests against foreign aggression, provided him with the
platform he needed to again downplay the Party’s sectarian (Shi’ite) ties.
It is notable, however, that since 2013 Nasrallah has signalled a change in
regard to the Party’s position on the civil war in Syria. As evidenced in
the content analysis of his speeches, he increasingly refers to Hezbollah’s
active role as protector of Shi’ite shrines and minorities. Data presented
in ­Figure  5.13 show that in 2013, Nasrallah’s referred to Hezbollah as a
party for the Shi’ite on average 4.46% times. This is compared to references
to Hezbollah as a Party for all Lebanese on average 11.61% times during
the same year. This is a significant turn-around given that he referred to
Hezbollah as a Party for the Shi’ite on average only 0.55% of the time in all
speeches from 2005 to 2012.
112  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

31.33%

16.07% 11.61%

10.38%
7.65% 8.28% 6.78%
4.55% 3.32% 3.03% 4.46%
1.79% 0.38% 0.17%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Hezbollah as a Shi'a party Hezbollah as a Party for all Lebanese

Figure 5.13  N
 asrallah’s references to Hezbollah as “a party for all Lebanese” vs. as
“a party for the Shi’a” in his speeches by year (2000–2013).

Therefore, it is evident that Hezbollah’s exploitation of religious principles

is often undertaken as a political tactic. The principles are often embodied
in the Party’s everyday rhetoric in the areas under Hezbollah control such as
Dahiye, and through Hezbollah’s media outlets and communication strat-
egy. This is also supported by the Party’s institutional power which serves to
mobilise historically marginalised Shi’ites.

A constituent conference at the horizon

Nasrallah stated in 2010,

Today I renew my call: We do not seek power. On the contrary, we are

being criticized from several circles in the Opposition because we do not
seek power. You hear their voices and they pick at us in internal sessions
and at times in the media to the extent that some circles in the Oppo-
sition during 2009 elections accused Hezbollah of not acting seriously
in the elections because Hezbollah did not want to achieve power and
form an Opposition government. Aren’t these facts?37

It would be premature to suggest that this statement identifies Hezbollah’s

ultimate objectives; however, when considering the course of action and
achievements of the Party one cannot but raise the question of the Party’s
prospects. Hezbollah’s ideology relies heavily on the doctrine of Wilayat
al-Faqih and the establishment of an Islamic system of rule. However, as dis-
cussed in previous chapters, this option is deemed unpractical by Hezbollah
and therefore dismissed.
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  113

3500.00%

0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%300.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 5.14  N
 asrallah’s references to Welayet al-Faqih in his speeches by year
(2000–2013).

The content analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches confirms this shift away

from references to the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine. As shown in Figure 5.14,
such references by Nasrallah occurred only sporadically from 2000 to 2013,
such as when speaking at Hezbollah celebrations (4 times) or at Iran-related
events including the anniversary of Khomeini’s death (33 times).
The content analysis produced similar results when Nasrallah’s refer-
ences to Wilayat al-Faqih in his speeches was analysed by year. As shown
in ­Figure 5.15, such references were uttered by Nasrallah significantly more in
2011 (35 times) compared to all other years from 2000 to 2013. This spike in
the number of references to Wilayat al-Faqih in 2011 particularly can most
likely be explained by the growing intensity of the Syrian war and the need for.
Hezbollah to align itself with Iran and the Assad regime in the face of
takfiri38 groups. Therefore, it can be argued that the Party refrains from at-
tempts to gain further political control through its ties to Wilayat al-Faqih,
preferring instead to try a different pathway, therefore practicing taqiyya.39

Revision of the power-sharing formula

The above analysis and discussion of Hezbollah’s uses of religion in its rhet-
oric can be considered in relation to the capacity of Lebanon to shape its
own destiny. Changes to regional power structures – such as is currently
taking place between the US, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia – can impact
the power-sharing formula in Lebanon as well as force Hezbollah to reassess
its strategic position vis-à-vis this equation. Notwithstanding the assertions
114  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013

34

0 4 0 0 0 0 0

Figure 5.15  Welayet al-Faqih by speech event.

by numerous Hezbollah parliamentary members that “it would be folly to

exclude Hezbollah from a new government.”40 Norton (2007a: 100–105)
correctly points out that the Party’s decision to fight alongside the Assad
regime (deemed to be a tyrant regime by some Gulf States) in the Syrian
conflict raises questions about its standing in the region as a pan-Arab and
a trans-national group.
Nasrallah has emphasised that the parliamentary electoral law should re-
flect the powers that some groups have (e.g. Shi’ites) in a realistic way (i.e.
power sharing). Thus, Nasrallah could be suggesting a “change” in the elec-
toral system that would grant Shi’ites a better position in the government
and parliament. This was partially secured in the Doha Accord after the
May 2008, clashes when Hezbollah gained the plus-one vote in the govern-
ment. Furthermore, Hezbollah has recently called for a constituent confer-
ence for Lebanon where possible changes to the parliamentary electoral law
and the presidential powers are open for discussion. He even suggested there
could be an opportunity to “recreate Lebanon’s power structure.”41
Nasrallah’s request for adequate power sharing can be illustrated through
Hezbollah’s proposal to modify the National Pact and the Tai’f Accord. In
this case, the power-sharing formula would shift from one that is based
on Muslim-Christian parity to a Sunni-Shi’ite-Christian triangle. This
proposal follows Hezbollah’s establishment of the three-way equation:
Jayshe-sha’eb-moqawama (People-Army-Resistance) which was directed to-
wards nationalising moqawama as a necessity and as an essential part of any
future defensive strategy. This was undertaken to ensure Hezbollah’s role in
any future power allocation and to secure its legitimacy as a national resist-
ance group. Nasrallah stated in 2011 that “Anyone who targets the army is
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  115
serving Israel. I am not accusing anyone of being a traitor. The equation of
the army, people, and Resistance alone can thwart Israel.”42
Thus, Lebanese politics – in which Hezbollah seeks to play a leading role –
is impacted by regional and international relations and exceptional circum-
stances that included imminent threats, civil strife, wars, political crises,
and attacks against the national army. Indeed, some Christian groups have
expressed concern that the power structures in the Lebanese government
were shifting in such a way that the Shi’ite faction backed by Iran and Syria,
and the Sunni factions backed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries,
would ultimately wrestle for control (Arab Centre for Research and Policy
Studies: 2014).43
In retrospect, Hezbollah’s aim to improve and sustain the social and po-
litical status of Shi’ites in Lebanon was a shrewd and pragmatic political act
because support for the Party grew among this community as a result. As
previously established, the Lebanese State was notoriously lacking in its so-
cial provision to Lebanese Shi’ites and Hezbollah’s act to fill this void played
a key role in bolstering support for both its electoral politics (i.e. votes) and
militia politics (i.e. manpower) agendas.
However, with the uncertainty surrounding the true intentions of
­Nasrallah (discussed in Chapter 3), it is, therefore, not guaranteed that
resistance through “bottom-up” Islamisation will not take effect once the
main objectives to empower the Shi’ite identity are achieved. Moreover,
Hezbollah’s pursuit of more political power may provoke a response by the
Lebanese Sunni; an outcome that reminds us of the sectarian strife that
erupted in Iraq during the post-Saddam period (Nasr 2007). The suicide
attacks carried out by ISIS (and Al-Nusra Front) on Dahye in 2013 are an
indication of the consequences for Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian
war which threatens its position in the country.
The Party vowed to try to stop fitna – sectarian strife/discord in Lebanon.
Nasrallah also referred to 8 May 2008 (following the clashes that erupted
between the Future Movement, March 14 Bloc and March 8 Bloc-pro
­Hezbollah groups) as a “glorious day” because it eliminated a Sunni-Shi’a
fitna (Al-Agha 2011a: 147). However, the Party’s participation in the Syrian
war alongside the Alawite Assad regime against Sunni groups has undoubt-
edly placed it in a questionable position and forced it to justify the need to
take part in the Syrian war to protect the axis of resistance, Lebanon, and
religious shrines.

Notes
1 Funeral gatherings.
2 A ritual practiced during the remembrance of Ashoura where individuals cry
and mourn the tragedy of Karbala.
3 Ceremonies.
4 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
116  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
5 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
6 Alahednews (2006) Sayyed Nasrallah calls for a strict investigation into
­Sunday’s events, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=691&cid=438#.WW6u9oV8jU4 (accessed 8 March 2016).
7 Alahednews (2006) Sayyed Nasrallah calls on European parliaments to issue
laws banning insults, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=693&cid=438#.WW6uaIV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
8 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
9 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
10 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
11 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
12 The Saker (2009) Important speech by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah about the recent elections in Lebanon, available at: http://thesaker.is/
important-speech-by-hezbollah-secretary-general-hassan-­nasrallah-about-the-
recent-elections-in-lebanon/ (accessed 8 March 2016).
13 Alahednews (2006) Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on the Divine Victory Rally in Bei-
rut on 22-09-2006, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=709&cid=447#.WW6wG4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
14 Alahednews (2002) Sayyed Nasrallah: Hezbollah`s Secretary General: We will
fight to the death anyone who thinks about disarming the resistance by force, avail-
able at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=687&cid=437#.
WXsTMYV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
15 Alahednews (2006) Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on the Divine Victory Rally in
­Beirut on 22-09-2006, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­essaydetails.
php?eid=709&cid=447#.WW6wG4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
16 The “sit-ins” took place in 2008 in Beirut when hundreds of thousands of
­Hezbollah supporters streamed into the capital city and laid siege the Prime
Minister, Fouad Siniora’s office for four days. The protesters threatened to esca-
late their campaign of civil disobedience until they brought about the collapse of
the US-backed government.
17 Alahednews (2005) Sayyed Nasrallah: Hezbollah wants to keep the ­region war-
free, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=673&
cid=437#.WW6wwIV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
18 Alahednews (2006) Nasrallah: We will be asking in talks `how do we pro-
tect Lebanon?`, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=695&cid=438#.WW6xKYV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
 Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013  117
19 Alahednews (2006) Hezbollah SG Speech on 30-11-2006 www.english.­
alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=715&cid=447#.WW6xhYV8jU4 (accessed
30 July 2014).
20 Ibid.
21 www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=2121&cid=142 (accessed 30th July,
2014).
22 Alahednews (2006) Nasrallah: We will be asking in talks `how do we pro-
tect Lebanon?`, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=695&cid=438#.WW6xKYV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
23 Alahednews (2008) Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: We must arm our army,
even through black market, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­
essaydetails.php?eid=5200&cid=449#.WW6yI4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
24 Alahednews (2007) Sayyed Nasrallah speech at Rayah Stadium on Divine
Victory Festival, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=742&cid=448#.WW6x-oV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
25 Alahednews (2007) Sayyed Nasrallah speech at Rayah Stadium on Divine
Victory Festival, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=742&cid=448#.WW6x-oV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
26 Alahednews (2008) Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: We must arm our army,
even through black market, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­
essaydetails.php?eid=5200&cid=449#.WW6yI4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
27 Alahednews (2008) Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: We must arm our army,
even through black market, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­
essaydetails.php?eid=5200&cid=449#.WW6yI4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
28 Alahednews (2006) Hezbollah SG Speech on 30-11-2006 www.english.
alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=715&cid=447#.WW6xhYV8jU4
(­accessed 30 July 2014).
29 It is important to consider that even though ‘Education’ theme was recorded
only between 3% and 4% of Nasrallah’s speeches, it is aimed to show this theme,
as it comprises one of the Party’s social policies.
30 Alahednews (2008) Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: We must arm our army,
even through black market, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­
essaydetails.php?eid=5200&cid=449#.WW6yI4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
31 Alahednews (2007) Sayyed Nasrallah speech at Rayah Stadium on Divine
Victory Festival, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=742&cid=448#.WW6x-oV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
32 Alahednews (2007) Sayyed Nasrallah speech at Rayah Stadium on Divine
Victory Festival, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.
php?eid=742&cid=448#.WW6x-oV8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
33 The infitah policy undertaken by Hezbollah started with the approval of the
Iranian Supreme Leader for the Party to join the Lebanese parliamentary elec-
tions in 1992 (see Chapter 1). In this action, Hezbollah showed its readiness to
integrate into Lebanese politics and to accept the Lebanese confessional system.
In another attempt at infitah, Hezbollah sought alliances in the legislative and
municipal elections with “ideological enemies, like any political party, that ac-
commodated its protest by negotiations and bargaining with a wide spectrum of
groups across the Lebanese myriad” (Al-Agha 2011a: 55–59).
34 Tufaili would later represent one of the prominent Shi’ite clerics who opposed
Hezbollah’s monopolisation of the resistance and for its policy towards the
­Lebanese Shi’ite community.
35 Alahednews (2008) Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: We must arm our army,
even through black market, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­
essaydetails.php?eid=5200&cid=449#.WW6yI4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
118  Nasrallah’s speeches 2000–2013
36 Alahednews (2008) Sayyed Nasrallah on al-Quds Day: We must arm our army,
even through black market, available at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/­
essaydetails.php?eid=5200&cid=449#.WW6yI4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
37 Alahednews (2010) Sayyed Nasrallah on October 28, 2010 on the Performance of
International Investigation Committee, available at: www.english.alahednews.
com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=12512&cid=451#.WXscDoV8jU4 (accessed 30 July
2014).
38 Takfiri groups are radical Islamist groups that accuse other Muslims of apostasy
if they are not adherent to Islamic faith. This notion has been influenced by
Sayyid Qutub’s work on emphasising the importance of Muslims to work and
fight for the return of the rightful way of living in accordance with the Prophet’s
teachings. This notion has also influenced the shaping of Wahhabism and Salaf-
ism (Stahl 2011).
39 According to Al-Shaykh Muhammad Ridha al-Mudhaffar, “al-Taqiyya should
conform to specific rules vis-a-vis the situation wherein eminent danger is present;
these rules, listed in many books of Fiqh (Jurisprudence), along with the severity
of the danger determine the validity, or lack of, al-Taqiyya itself.” www.al-islam.
org/shiite-encyclopedia-ahlul-bayt-dilp-team/al-taqiyya-­d issimulation-part-2
(accessed 12 February 2014).
40 Mouzahem (2013) More obstacles to the formation of New Lebanon Gov-
ernment, available at www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/lebanon-­
obstacles-government-formation.html (accessed 30 July 2014).
41 Mouzahem (2013). More obstacles to the formation of New Lebanon Gov-
ernment, available at www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/lebanon-­
obstacles-government-formation.html (accessed 30 July 2014).
42 Alahednews (2011) Sayyed Nasrallah on the Resistance and Liberation Day, avail-
able at: www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=14234&cid=452#.
WXsdi4V8jU4 (accessed 30 July 2014).
43 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2014). Lebanon: the Presiden-
tial Vacuum Awaiting Regional and International Agreements, available at:
http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/4c7601ce-b7a6-4d31-a12b-078698368946
­(accessed 30 July 2015).

References
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India.
Al-Agha J. 2011a, Hezbollah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009
Manifesto. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam.
Al-Agha J. 2011b, Hezbollah’s Identity Construction. Amsterdam University Press,
Amsterdam.
Alkhirbash A. & Abdul Muati S. 2014, Aspects of Persuasive Language in Selected
Speeches of Mahathir Mohamad, Journal of Language and Communications,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 41–57.
Azani E. 2010, Analyzing Hizballa, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 39, no. 2,
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Coughlin C. 2010, Khomeini’s Ghost. Pan Books, London.
Deeb L. 2006, An Enchanted Modern Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon.
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Foreign Policy 2016, ‘Hezbollah’s Death Valley’, accessed 21 January 2017, at https://
platosguns.com/2016/03/04/hezbollahs-death-valley-nour-samahaforeign-policy/.
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Hamzeh N. 2004, In the Path of Hezbollah. Syracuse University Press, New York.
Harik J. 2004, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. I.B. Tauris, London.
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interview-syria-hamas-iraq.html.
Khatib L. 2011, Hezbollah’s Political Strategy, Survival: Global Politics and ­Strategy,
vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 61–76.
Khatib L. 2013, Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political
Struggle. I.B. Tauris, London.
Khatib L., Matar D. & Alshaer A. 2014, The Hezbollah Phenomenon: Politics and
Communication. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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Shadow of the ‘War on Terror, International Peacekeeping, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 4–20.
Nasr V. 2007, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future.
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Norton R. 1987, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. University of
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Patrikarakos D. 2012, State Within a State, New Statesman Ltd, vol. 141, no. 5087,
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Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis (pp. 177–193). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
6 Hezbollah’s intervention in the
Syrian conflict
Insights and implications

Arab Spring in perspective

The year 2011 was a turning point for the Arab world. The Middle East
region ignited with continuous revolutions that emerged in Tunisia after
Mohamad Bou Azizi set fire to himself in a demonstration of social and eco-
nomic frustration. The events were quickly followed by mass demonstrations
demanding the overthrow of President Ben Ali. Similarly, demonstrations
took place in Egypt against President Mubarak, in Yemen against President
Saleh, in Libya against Col. Qaddafi, in Bahrain to demand reforms, and in
Syria against the Assad regime (Knio 2013). However, each country had its
own distinct context. For instance, in Syria, the demonstrations started as
a people’s initiative, but the intervention by regional and international ac-
tors in the country shifted the conflict into a long-­standing civil/proxy war
(Sorenson 2016: 30). But it is important to note that the common demands
of the demonstrators represented a call for better life opportunities, work,
education, and health (Al-­Agha 2013).
In terms of Hezbollah’s response to the Arab Spring, the Party pub-
licly supported the demonstrations in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and
­Bahrain (Knio 2013). For example, Nasrallah openly supported the revo-
lution as it erupted in Tunisia saying, “We must congratulate the Tunisian
people on their historic revolution, their struggle, and their uprising.” Also,
in support of Libyan revolution, Nasrallah affirmed:

A group of young men and women rose and they were faced with bul-
lets; war was imposed on the popular revolution. What is taking place in
Libya is war imposed by the regime on a people that was peacefully de-
manding change; this people was forced to defend itself and war broke
out in the east and the west, with warplanes, rocket launchers, and ar-
tillery. It brought back to our memory the 1982 invasion of Lebanon
and all of Israel’s wars. Such serious crimes should be condemned, and
the revolutionary people of Libya should be helped so as to persevere.1

However, Hezbollah took a different standpoint in relation to the demon-

strations in Syria. Nasrallah opposed the demonstrations and instead ad-
vised for “regime maintenance” (Knio 2013: 856). At one stage, he declared,
 Insights and implications  121
We call upon the Syrian people to maintain their regime of resistance,
as well as to give way to the Syrian leadership to implement the required
reforms and to choose the course of dialogue.2

Hezbollah’s “flexible” position on the Arab Spring events in the region has
opened up debate among scholars who have questioned the consistency of
Hezbollah’s position towards its regional allies. Hezbollah’s somewhat un-
anticipated position on the Syrian people’s uprising is one of significance
because of the importance of Syria to its operations. Syria provides training
grounds for Hezbollah fighters as well as a passageway for the delivery of
weapons. In turn, as Szelkey (2016: 75) explains that the significant shift in
the alignment, between the Syrian-­Iranian axis and the pro-­Western axis,
caused by the Syrian conflict resulted in a challenge to Hezbollah’s image as
a non-­State domestic actor.
Undoubtedly, Hezbollah’s response to the uprisings in Syria was perceived
by many to be both Iranian driven and self-­serving, prompting scholars
such as Knio (2013) to argue that the Party’s image needed to be reviewed if
its identity and interests are to be understood. Yet, the Party’s response to
the unfolding events in Syria and its direct involvement in the Syrian con-
flict may also be a politically pragmatic act. That is, the Party’s ideological
flexibility provides it a new platform to respond pragmatically to changing
domestic and regional circumstances (Al-­Agha 2013; Khatib 2013). Specif-
ically, Al-­Agha (2013: 227) claims that Hezbollah demonstrated its ability
to adapt to changing circumstances to meet its interests and to protect its
survival. Interestingly, Al-­Agha (2013: 218) also links the Party’s political
pragmatism to Shi’ite mythology and the notion that Shi’ites had to be ad-
aptable as a result of their ongoing persecution. Thus, Hezbollah’s “flexible”
response to the unfolding Arab Spring events in the Middle East provides
further evidence of the Party’s orientation towards political pragmatism and
adaptability through its use of a religious narrative (protection of Shi’ites) to
achieve a strategic objective.
Furthermore, Khatib (2013) and Knio (2013) argue that the Party’s ca-
pacity to employ its media institutions and ta’bia (recruitment) for regional
conflicts is alarming. Certainly, Hezbollah has faced criticism from some
Lebanese political factions such as the Future Movement, the Phalanges,
and Lebanese forces. These parties have strongly attacked Hezbollah for
dragging Lebanon into a regional conflict and have questioned the Party’s
commitment to Lebanon. For example, Sammy Gemayel, a member of the
Lebanese parliament for the Phalange party, stated,

Our problem with Hezbollah is not Hezbollah in itself. It’s the way
­ ezbollah is dealing with the Lebanese people — using force on the
H
Lebanese people and dragging Lebanon into a conflict that has nothing
to do with Lebanon. These are our problems with Hezbollah. Any agree-
ment that will keep Hezbollah acting the way it is, the way ­Hezbollah
is acting today, we will fight it, because we will not allow Hezbollah to
122  Insights and implications
keep acting the way it is acting in Lebanon. Any agreement that will
pacify Hezbollah, it would be something positive for us. It depends on
what is the result of this agreement.3

Gemayel added,

I really believe that the fact that Hezbollah went there, it attracted these
people to come and fight it here. You know, when you decide to go fight
a war in another country, you have to expect that these people will go
fight you in your own country.4

The Syrian war

The eruption of the Syrian revolution put Hezbollah at crossroads. Prior
to the Arab spring in 2011, Hezbollah had established itself as a prominent
political party in Lebanon and the region. The Party’s regional status was
elevated after the group’s “victorious” war against Israel in 2006, in which
Hezbollah became the only non-­State army that was able to fight the Israeli
army, by not allowing Israel to attain any of the goals set for the 2006 war,
namely eliminating Hezbollah’s arsenal, and weakening the Party’s military
presence in south Lebanon. Moreover, the Party had also established it-
self as an influential component in the Lebanese government, after it had
achieved the plus one vote in the Doha accord following the signing of cease
fire of the violent clashes in 2008. So, for Hezbollah, the objective of power
sharing was closer than ever.
While the Party’s position on the uprisings in Bahrain, Libya, Tunisia,
and Egypt was clear in support of the revolution(s), the Party’s attitude to
the Syrian uprising was initially ambiguous. The Party restricted its politi-
cal statements to a call for negotiations and reform, yet as the uprisings took
an increasingly violent form, Hezbollah changed course. Hezbollah partic-
ipated in the fight alongside the Assad regime against militant opposition
groups and later fundamentalist groups.5 Nasrallah stated in 2012,

We are fighting alongside our Syrian brothers, alongside the army and
the people and the popular resistance in Damascus and Aleppo and
Deir Ezzor and Qusayr and Hasakeh and Idlib, […] we are present today
in many places and we will be present in all the places in Syria that this
battle requires.
This is not a threat to the resistance in Lebanon or to one sector of the
regime in Syria or the government in Iraq or a group in Yemen. This is a
danger to everyone. No one should bury their heads in the sand. We in-
vite everyone in Lebanon and the region to take responsibility and con-
front this danger and end their silence and hesitation and neutrality.6

This intervention has had a number of implications for the Party’s loyalty
to regional allies, national interest, and its support base (where a number
 Insights and implications  123
of suicide bombings targeted Dahye, Hezbollah’s strong-­hold, and resulted
in numerous human and material losses). A  survey of Shi’a communities
of Dahye (a suburb in the south of Beirut), South Lebanon, and the Bekaa7
conducted by ShiaWatch titled 15 Questions for the Lebanese Shia Commu-
nity, in February and March 2015, shows the insecurities of the Shi’ite com-
munity following Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war. The survey
showed that 81.3% thought “things are moving in the wrong direction” when
asked where Lebanon was heading. In the same poll in 2014, this figure was
59%. When asked about their financial situation, 66% indicated that their
financial situation is “worse than it was last year.” With respect to the coun-
try’s economic situation, 86% indicated that it “Was worse than it was last
year.” In another interesting finding, when asked about Hezbollah and the
Lebanese army forces, 95.6% answered that there “should be more cooper-
ation between the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah,” up from 83% in 2014.
Hence, the future of Hezbollah will be greatly affected by the way in
which the Syrian war ends. The Syrian war is mirroring a rivalry for re-
gional control, the increased role of Turkey and Qatar as supporters of the
Syrian opposition is met with Iranian and Russian support of the Assad
regime. Khatib (2013: 105–111) had predicted:

Hezbollah today is Lebanon’s strongest political party. However, its mil-

itary intervention in the Syrian conflict has put it at a crossroads. While
the Party’s domestic strength continues, largely due to the weakness of its
Lebanese political opponents and to its reliance on the possession of weap-
ons to intimidate them, Hezbollah is facing increasing challenges in Syria.
­Hezbollah – being Iran’s key client – will find its autonomy and ability to act
in the domestic Lebanese sphere as well as externally reduced in the future.

It is then important to consider Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian war

as a changing point in the Party’s political development.
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria demonstrates the Party’s politically
pragmatic use of taklif shari (one of the tools discussed in Chapter 4) to
link its political and military agendas in Syria to religion in its rhetoric.
The “pragmatic” use of taklif shari in this instance is best understood in its
context. Hezbollah’s entry into the Syrian conflict was swift and the Party
remains one of the key non-­State actors in the conflict (Choucair 2016: 1–2).
However, Hezbollah’s involvement remains both controversial and unpopu-
lar among Arabs because it is seen to contribute to the broader problem of
foreign military involvement in the region and what many believe is I­ ranian
meddling in the outcome (Choucair 2016: 3). As previously established,
­Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict demonstrates a clear shift
in the Party’s role as “resistance” group on the domestic front to regional
actor with a regional priority, which many believe is to protect Iranian axis
interests (Deeb 2013). For many Arabs, the involvement calls into question
Hezbollah’s commitment to domestic issues and thus presents as a potential
threat to Hezbollah’s political base in Lebanon.
124  Insights and implications
In terms of the use of taklif shari, the principles of reasoning and “ne-
cessity permits what is prohibited” are used as frameworks to analyse how
religiosity is tied to politics in Hezbollah’s rhetoric to achieve pragmatic
political outcomes, specifically, how religion is used to justify the Party’s
changes in its political agenda in response to domestic and regional events.
This is highlighted in the religious narrative conducted to justify the inter-
vention in Syria based on the need to protect the Sayyida Zainab shrine,
and in targeting the takfiris as the enemy of not only Shi’ites but also of all
­Muslims. In turn, it arguably demonstrates Hezbollah’s pragmatic stand-
point towards regional conflicts, that is, its reliance on Iran and the subse-
quent need for it to balance its domestic and regional priorities to protect its
political future.
Levitt (2014) also recognises the significance of Hezbollah’s close ties with
Iran and Syria, arguing that Hezbollah had no other choice but to fight in
Syria in order to protect Iran’s agent in the Middle East. What is notable,
however, is that, in the face of these attacks, Hezbollah relied on the use of
religious, political, and nationalistic arguments to justify the Party’s inter-
vention in Syria. For Nasrallah, Hezbollah is fighting in Syria to “protect
Lebanon from the dangers of takfiris,”8 and an examination of the measures
that the Party felt compelled to undertake is therefore of interest as it brings
this book closer to the hypothesis that Hezbollah employs religion and reli-
gious tools, namely taklif shari, fatwa, and ijtihad (interpretation) of jihad,
in pursuit of its political goals. Moreover, the use of religion also allows
Hezbollah to justify its decisions by undertaking a malleable or pragmatic
approach that is embedded in the widely accepted (and practiced) notion of
ijtihad or fatwa, as evidenced in the Party’s flexible response to the unfolding
Arab Spring in different countries in the region.

Insights into Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria:

self-­preservation principle, necessity, and Takfiris
as the enemy of all Muslims
While few would argue the success of Hezbollah in progressing its political
platform, the coherency of the platform itself has been the subject of some
criticism. Indeed, Hezbollah’s short-­term objectives have been widely crit-
icised following the Party’s intervention in the Syrian war in 2012, particu-
larly amid Hezbollah suggestions that the Party went to the aid of the Assad
regime based on Iran’s instructions. For example, Khatib (2013) asserted
that even though Hezbollah did not favour intervention in Syria for fear of
losing credibility in Lebanon (and the region), it nevertheless had to yield to
Iran’s orders to protect the Assad regime.
The Party’s decision to take part in the Syrian war was presented as nec-
essary to protect “the backbone of resistance,” as Nasrallah claimed. Yet,
even though the Party attempted to justify its participation in the Syrian
conflict this did not stop domestic, regional, and international criticism of
 Insights and implications  125
the Party. These critical voices included Lebanese Shi’ite political activists
not overtly aligned with any political group (Khatib 2013).
Rami Ollaik, a former Party member, is an example of an anti-­Hezbollah
voice. In his books, Bees Road and Under the Green Water, Ollaik (2013)
summarises his work with the Party and described the Party’s monopoli-
sation of the Shi’ite community through its hijacking of resistance. Ollaik
(2013) has claimed in several televised interviews that he had received threats
for speaking out and he has accused Hezbollah of ambushing him in a town
in south Lebanon in order to stop him from presenting in a seminary talk
in Yohmor in 2013. Regardless of whether Ollaik’s accusations are accurate,
and despite the reasons behind Ollaik publishing his books (perhaps to un-
dermine the Party), it does give the impression to outsiders that the Party’s
claim to have a hold over the Shi’ite community is questionable.
Lokman Slim, director of the ShiaWatch centre, is another Shi’ite voice
of opposition. ShiaWatch is an electronic publishing space where articles
are issued that oppose Hezbollah’s politics. ShiaWatch have also conducted
a quantitative study of Hezbollah’s support in the Shi’ite community. The
study concluded:

Despite Hezbollah having asserted its “representation” of large sectors

of the Lebanese Shia community (although in this context, the very
notion of representation must be deconstructed—and not just from
an electoral or political viewpoint), the mutual identity of the organi-
sation and the community was usually misinterpreted despite numer-
ous attempts by observers of Lebanese and Shia issues that define this
symbiosis.
(ShiaWatch 2014: 3)

The importance of this report is that it not only questions the Party’s control
over the Shi’ite community and its popularity but also demonstrates that
the Party’s integration into the Lebanese political system has rendered it
open to criticism and to demands for accountability from the public. On
that note, Hezbollah has been criticised by religious figures including Shi’ite
clerics, Sheikh Hani Fahs and Sheikh Sobhi Tufaili. Tufaili, the group’s first
Secretary-­General (1989–1991), who claims that the Party’s involvement in
politics has diverted it from its main objectives to resist Israel and to im-
prove the living conditions of Lebanon’s Shi’ite community. Tufaili organ-
ised a demonstration in July 1997, named “revolt of the hungry,” a reference
to the Party’s initial slogan (Sadiki 2010: 227). Additionally, Fahs accused
Hezbollah of being exclusionary by aiming to separate and isolate the Shi’ite
community from the rest of the Lebanese community. Such critical voices
indicate a willingness to critique Hezbollah’s claims of hegemony.
Hezbollah’s assistance to the Assad regime in Syria was initially concen-
trated on military training and warfare tactics offered to Syrian soldiers
(Sorenson 2016). However, the Party soon found itself involved directly in
126  Insights and implications
the conflict when it sent troops to fight in Lebanon’s northern borders with
Syria, and later on in Homs, Qusayr, and Qalamoun. This was followed by
the Party’s engagement in battle in Damascus under the justification of pro-
tecting the Sayyida Zainab shrine.
Despite the steady increase in its involvement, however, there were at-
tempts by the Party to keep its level of involvement and the numbers of
casualties it suffered undisclosed. For example, to limit information about
death tolls, families were “instructed to keep quiet on the circumstances
of the deaths” (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst 2012). This is linked to the
self-­preservation principle that the Party adopts9 and is also closely related
to taqiyya, where the notion of not revealing the full truth may be taken to
mean the offer of misleading information (dissimulation).10 However, soon
enough the number of funerals held in Lebanese villages disclosed to the
public the significant losses that Hezbollah was suffering. Indeed, in a 2014
Al-­Akhbar newspaper article titled, “What is the death toll of Hezbollah
fighters in Syria,” Hisham Ashkar estimated the number of fighters who
had died in Syria by counting the number of funerals held in Shi’ite villages.
Ashkar’s chart, in parallel with the reports of the Syria Observatory for
Human Rights (SOHR) and Hezbollah’s limited declarations, indicated that
as of December 2013, the death toll was 232. In March 2014, the number of
deaths reported by the SOHR had increased to 332. The chart provided by
Al-­Akhbar article shows the death toll of the fighters and the regions from
which they came.11
The case of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war provides an illus-
trative example of how the Party mixes religiosity with politics to address
accusations of disloyalty to Lebanon and of being hypocritical in its agenda.
Such accusations were quickly forthcoming from the March 14 bloc, the Par-
ty’s main opposition and previous claimant as protector of the “oppressed”
(Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst Report 2012). Hezbollah’s actions were also in
defiance of the country’s “dissociation initiative” concluded as part of the
Baabda Agreement by then president, Michel Suleiman. The declaration
was accepted and adopted by all political factions (including Hezbollah)
and aimed to neutralise Lebanon from regional conflicts in general and the
Syrian conflict particularly (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst 2012).12
Although the Baabda Agreement was designed to shield Lebanon from
potential threats, it soon lost its value when it was discovered that some
political factions were providing aid to different sides in the Syrian crisis.
Saad Hariri, for instance, the head of the Future Movement and foe of the
Assad regime, was found to be aiding the Syrian opposition with money
and weapons, in part because of Assad’s alleged involvement in the murder
of his father, former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri (Deeb 2013). Additionally,
Hezbollah’s consistent statements that the Syrian conflict “is a danger that
threatens all Lebanese” and that the goal of the takfiris should they gain
control of the borders is to “transform Lebanon into a part of their Islamic
State” de-­valued the essence of the Baabda declaration.13 Hence, the use of
 Insights and implications  127
the takfiris’ threat was an essential element in Hezbollah’s justification for
opposing the Baabda Agreement and for taking part in the Syrian war.

The Syrian war

With the Syrian uprising in its sixth year, it has shifted from a peaceful
uprising to the bloodiest war in the region (Khatib 2013). As such, there is a
great deal of scrutiny of Hezbollah’s involvement and pressure on Nasrallah
to convince Party supporters of the legitimacy of its actions. To “crush the
opposition,” the Assad regime used military attacks as well as some Jihadist
ex-­prisoners in order to undermine the moderation of the opposition (Khatib
2015; Smyth 2015). For instance, former jihadist prisoners were released by
the regime to carry out terrorist attacks under the name of Islamist groups
(Levitt 2014). However, the Assad regime ultimately realised that these
groups had become an overwhelming threat that was difficult to contain.
Eventually, Assad had to rely on his patrons: Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah
(Khatib 2015; Smyth 2015) for greater support, and this placed increasing
pressure on the Party to be more explicit in its regional agenda. Notably,
during the early stages of the uprisings, February to May 2011, Hezbollah
did not issue any political statements. When Nasrallah did comment on the
issues for the first time in May 2011, he called for dialogue between the re-
gime and opposition to resolve their differences while also reminding his
audience of Syria’s role and sacrifice in helping to bring stability to Lebanon
during the country’s own civil war (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst 2012).
During the following months, Nasrallah continued to affirm Hezbollah’s
support of Assad based on his regime’s resistance to Western pressure.
­Nasrallah stated in an interview on Al-­Mayadeen TV in January 201514 that
any strike on Syria (from Israel) “targets the whole of the resistance axis.”
It would appear that it was at this point that Nasrallah was starting to
prepare Hezbollah followers for the future “necessary measures” that the
party would need to take to protect its regional ally. Borghard and Rapp-­
Hooper (2013) claim that since Hezbollah represents a proxy agent for Iran
in the Middle East, and because of the alliance dynamics that surround the
Iran-­Syria-Hezbollah relationship, Hezbollah had to engage in the war in
Syria to protect the alliance, even if the Party saw it as endangering its po-
litical support in Lebanon. There is little doubt that the significant strategic
and political benefits Hezbollah gained from this alliance could jeopardise
the Party’s domestic position by making it militarily vulnerable and polit-
ically isolated if it were to allow the regime to fall (Saouli 2014). This was
evident in Nasrallah’s continuous pleas for negotiations to try to achieve a
peaceful settlement in the first months of the conflict. Moreover, Nasral-
lah’s pleas support the central argument in this book that the Party was
increasingly seeking to employ religious pragmatism to achieve its political
agenda.
As Nasrallah reiterated in his interview with Julian Assange in 2012,
128  Insights and implications
This is the first time I  say this  –  We [Hezbollah] contacted […] the
­opposition to encourage them and to facilitate the process of dialogue
with the regime. But they rejected dialogue.

Nasrallah continued,

Right from the beginning we have had a regime that is willing to un-
dergo reforms and prepared for dialogue. On the other side, you have
an opposition which is not prepared for dialogue and it is not prepared
to accept reforms. All it wants is to bring down the regime. This is a
problem.15

Nasrallah was also aware of the more politically vulnerable position the
Party was placed in due to its involvement in the conflict. It was especially
difficult to overlook the disproportionate responses of the Assad army
against demonstrators (who largely came from the Sunni majority) (Jane’s
Islamic Affairs Analyst 2012) and Hezbollah’s active support for the govern-
ment would then be perceived as siding with an “oppressive” regime. Such
an image challenged the notion that Hezbollah’s ideology relies heavily on
popular support and recruitment, that it is a movement that sides with the
oppressed against the oppressors. Another issue that Hezbollah was forced
to address was the sectarian characteristics of the conflict, namely, the
­i mage of the Alawite Assad regime attacking the Sunni majority. Such im-
ages could jeopardise Hezbollah’s position as a shield against fitna (division)
(Al-­Agha 2013). The conflict in Syria had rapidly found a fertile environment
for expansion in Lebanon due to already existing divisions among Lebanese.
Given these circumstances, the way in which Hezbollah sought to engage
in several political and media campaigns to frame its intervention in Syria
as “necessary” and “inevitable” for the protection of moqawama (resistance)
and Lebanon’s security (Dabashi 2011) is of interest. This demonstrates the
way in which Hezbollah provided a solid pretext/justification for its inter-
vention in Syria through the use of religion: the religious narrative of pro-
tecting Shi’ite shrines and the dangers of takfiris spreading to Lebanon.
Adding that this danger, but closer to home, was the reported attacks on
the northern borders with Syria. In tightening the religiosity-­politics con-
nection, Hezbollah moved the focus away from sectarianism and framed it
within a nationalistic narrative.
The first reasoning of Hezbollah’s intervention came as a need to protect
those Lebanese villages bordering Syria. These villages fall on the northern
areas of Lebanon and are home to approximately 20,000 people, many of
whom are Shi’ites (Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst 2012). Hezbollah’s rhetoric
was that the Party was not directing the conflict in these villages, but rather
it was the people’s natural response to arm and defend themselves. However,
a Shi’ite politician stated in an interview with Al-­Monitor newspaper that
 Insights and implications  129
Hezbollah used the bordering villages’ situation as a pretext for its military
intervention. The politician asserted,

I know the region that Nasrallah mentioned very well. It only includes
eight villages, each inhabited by 300 to 400 Shi’ites. Most of them have
left their homes due to the dangerous security situation and fled to the
Bekaa region in Lebanon, where they originally come from. So, we are
talking about a maximum of 3,000 people [inside this region].16

The Party used the threat against the Lebanese Shi’ite villages as justifica-
tion for its military strategy and amplified the threat to serve this objective.
This is because these towns are located on the Lebanese-­Syrian border and
are important in linking Damascus to the city of Homs. They are known to
be part of the channel for the transfer of weapons from Iran to Syria and to
Hezbollah. Hence, the threatened areas fall between the Lebanese border
and the city of Homs. Hezbollah had therefore initially framed its justifica-
tion for intervention solely on the need to protect Lebanese Shi’ite villages.
However, the religious rhetoric in Nasrallah’s speeches intensified in May
and June 2014, when he spoke to his audience of the need to go into the town
of Al-­Qusayr, a Syrian town, in order to protect the holy Shi’ite shrine of
Sayyida Zainab from al-­Qaeda’s affiliated groups and Salafists.17 Nasral-
lah had now combined the threat to Lebanon generally with the threat to
Shi’ites traditions more specifically.
Nasrallah was thus beginning to represent Hezbollah’s intervention as in-
evitable and labelled the Salafist groups as an “existential threat.” Indeed, he
warned in a 2014 speech that “if takfiris achieve victory in Syria, we would
all be eliminated in Lebanon, not just the resistance.”18 In this way, Nas-
rallah had once again reminded Lebanese Shi’ites of an imminent threat to
them, a tactic that was previously used for political gain when fighting Israel
and was now being used for regional conflicts. As such, use of the religious
narrative parallels with the ijtihad principle discussed in Chapter 4 in rela-
tion to the way in which Nasrallah legitimises the Party’s participation in
a conflict in accordance with the Party’s needs (Khatib 2015; Szekely 2016).
It is reasonable to suggest that the Party had commenced a propaganda
campaign using religion as a central theme to secure its position as a le-
gitimate armed group (Khatib 2015). Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s position in
the Syrian crisis tested the Party’s standing among its Shi’ite supporters.
Iran, along with its affiliated Iraqi Shi’ite groups, framed their participation
in Syria in the context of the protection of the Sayyida Zainab shrine. As
Smyth (2015: 4) reminds us, “Given its location in southern Damascus, with
the international airport to its east, the shrine’s strategic value cannot be
overlooked.” Additionally, Levitt (2013) indicated that Hezbollah used the
Sayyida Zainab site to identify prospective militant recruits and as a cover
for members to travel between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
130  Insights and implications
Hence, considerable efforts were made to present the Iranian role as
protector of the shrine under religious narratives. For instance, “The site’s
prominence in the view of Shi’ite fighters is further evidenced by the shrill,
mantra-­like chant ‘Labayk ya Zainab!’ (At your service, O  Zainab!), sung
regularly at funerals for Lebanese Hezbollah members and Iraqi Shi’ites
killed in Syria. Propaganda songs produced by Iraqi Shi’ite organisations
and Hezbollah have also featured the slogan” (Smyth 2015: 4). The site’s
significance was also related to the emergence of pan-­Shi’ism in the face
of Sunni Jihadist groups such as ISIS. In a televised speech on 2 August
2013, Nasrallah emphasised the group’s role in underpinning Islamic unity
in fighting Israel. Nasrallah stated,

Hezbollah, the Islamic Shi’a party, will not abandon Palestine, al-­Quds,
and the holy sites of the nation. We were born and arisen on bearing the re-
sponsibility of defending Palestine and al-­Quds. We—the Shi’ites—won’t
abandon this cause, never, ever. Describe us as rejectionists [rawafidh],
describe us as terrorists, describe us as criminals, say whatever you want
and keep killing us at every front, at the door of every mosque, we the
Shi’ites of Ali bin Abi Talib will not abandon Palestine (my emphasis).

Therefore, given that Hezbollah had positioned itself as the defender of Is-
lamic shrines and resistance to the Americans and Israelis, the narrative
of fighting Western-­backed takfiris became more credible (and perceived as
necessary) over time.
Nasrallah reiterated his claim of Western support of takfiris in his speech
in August 2013, when referring to the notion of “Shi’a expansionism” which
he asserted was invented by America and Israel to confuse and exploit
­Muslims. According to Nasrallah, such claims were made to convince many
Islamic groups of the “threat” posed by Iran and the need to confront the
Shi’ite danger. In this way, Shi’ite ideology and Shi’ite expansionism are de-
picted as posing a greater danger to the Ummah than Israel because of the
Shi’a intent to destroy the region, its people, and its armies, and its peo-
ple. Hence, Nasrallah suggests that anyone who supports the takfiri groups
in the Islamic world is simply benefiting and assisting Israel and America
(Smyth 2015: 11).
This is in parallel with the fatwa of Sheikh Shams al-­Din to start Shi’ite
resistance in south Lebanon after the death of two Shi’ite residents as a re-
sult of an Israeli disruption of an Ashoura commemoration (Hamzeh 2004).
This may also be related to Sistani’s fatwa to resist and fight American led-­
coalition troops in Iraq in 2003. Hence, the role of Shi’ite clerics is essen-
tial to legitimise militant violence. Religious actors use militant violence
to justify the way they seek to influence the State (Toft et al. 2011) and thus
religion becomes a platform for strategic gains.
The statement of the Popular Committee for the mobilisation to defend
Sayyida Zainab, in December 2013, offers the religious figures’ support for
 Insights and implications  131
their decision to fight in Syria. The objectives of the intervention into Syria
were to defend Shi’ites, the Ahl al-­Bait, Islamic shrines, and the resistance.
The takfiri groups in Syria had been directly targeting Shi’ite shrines and
so Nasrallah declared the intent to fight against the assailants in Syria, and
to also have a presence in Iraq, especially in Najaf. In turn, he likens this
action to the time when the Prophet emerged in Medina to confront the
mushrikin [idolaters] when informed of their quest to destroy Islam. As such,
Hezbollah’s actions are depicted as defensive in nature and thus do not re-
quire permission from others to be undertaken. Notwithstanding that per-
mission is not required, the jihad in Syria is overseen by a legitimate ruler,
namely the Wali al-­Faqih is in charge of managing the religious and political
affairs of men, and who referred back directly to the Ayatollah Khamenei,
Iran’s Supreme Leader (Smyth 2015: 15).
While the legitimacy of these religious figures and their commitment to
Wilayat al-­Faqih cannot be doubted, there are some questions regarding
their support for the war in Syria. Such questions do not diminish the le-
gitimacy of those who fight out of obligation (duty to go to war) and there
is support for this obligation in Wali al-­Faqih. Not having an interest in
going to war and labelling the war as illegitimate are two different matters.
Moreover, given the support for the leadership and capabilities of Wali al-­
Faqih from highly ranked religious figures, the legitimacy of fighting takfiri
groups to defend Shi’ites in Syria and Sayyida Zainab, and to defend Shi’ite
existence in Iraq, was not brought into question (Smyth 2015: 15).
In this way, the intervention in the Syrian war has been framed within
a religious narrative such as the protection of the Sayyida Zainab shrine
from the imminent threat of the takfiris against Shi’ites, as well as all other
Muslims, and in protecting the resistance axis against American and Israeli
threats to the region. Yet, the intervention was set to serve a strategic pur-
pose to safeguard Hezbollah’s weapons route from Iran and to commit to
the Wali’s taklif shari to take part in the fight against these takfiri groups.
“Thus, the conflict was morphed into a romantic jihad addressing a var-
ied existential threat” (Smyth 2015: 8). It is important now to examine how
­Hezbollah has sought to legitimise its participation in the Syrian war under
its use of taklif shari.

Hezbollah’s intervention as necessary: the reasoning of taklif shari

Nasrallah, as a religious leader, has argued the necessity of participating in
the Syrian conflict in order to protect the axis of resistance and religious
shrines. The Party has used the justification of protecting the Sayyida
Zainab shrine, and the imminent threat to Lebanon from takfiris, as a way
to convince its popular base of the need to fight in Syria. As suggested in the
previous chapters, Hezbollah has demonstrated its success in homogenising
the Shi’ite community and in controlling and maintaining the Party’s domi-
nance over it. The Party has argued that, as a result of its actions over time, it
132  Insights and implications
has become the only protector of the Shi’ites and the Lebanese nation. In ad-
dition, this has been reinforced by the exploitation of several elements such as
fear, the provision of social services, the apparent success of the Party’s strat-
egy, realistic objectives, and lastly, the branding of Hezbollah and Nasrallah.
In addition, the Party has employed taklif shari to consolidate its position.
As previously noted, taklif shari is a religious command re-­introduced in
1979 by Khomeini which gives power to the Faqih to require all supporters
to abide by his commands or risk disobeying God (Hamzeh 2004). Since
Nasrallah is considered the highest religious figure in Hezbollah, he has the
power to apply taklif shari. Therefore, taklif shari has been instrumental in
rallying people for demonstrations (Hamzeh 2004), for voting (Al-­Agha 2013;
Hamzeh 2004; Sankari 2005), and for forcing fighters to fight in Syria (Smyth
2015). This use of taklif shari for political causes, however, has been criti-
cised. For example, Sayyid Fadlallah criticised Hezbollah’s use of taklif shari
to call for people to participate in voting and for rallying in demonstrations
(Sankari 2005). Fadlallah argued that taklif shari must be utterly respected
as a religious duty and should not be employed for political gains because the
people would lose their individual right to express their opinions and would
be bound to obey a God-­given command (Al-­Agha 2013; Sankari 2005).
However, as argued throughout this chapter, religion has played a central
role in Hezbollah’s transition towards more politically pragmatic decision-­
making. As such, the Party’s uses of taklif Shari further demonstrates the
Party’s employment of religious tools in contexts it deems to represent spe-
cial circumstances to enhance its survival and to pursue its political agenda.
Hence, all these elements were catalysed by the Party’s religious ethos
which entitled it to offer contextualised justification to events such as the
2006 war with Israel, 2008 domestic clashes, and more recently, fighting in
Syria. Nevertheless, in a study by Al-­Agha (2013) on Shi’ite “manual of jihad
and martyrdom,” nine circumstances are outlined when a defensive jihad
is permitted in reference to Qur’anic verses. These circumstances can be
summarised as follows:

• If the enemies of Islam attack the Muslim countries in order to elimi-

nate Islam (reference to Qur’anic verse 2:190);
• If the enemies of Islam attacked any of the Muslim countries in order
to control and colonise them (in reference to Qur’anic verse 22:39–40);
• If a Muslim country is attacked by another Muslim country, then the
aid should come to the victim Muslim country (in reference to Qur’anic
verse 49:9);
• If there is an onslaught on the public wealth of Muslims;
• If there is an offensive against the selves, possessions, and dignities of
the Muslims;
• If there is an onslaught on worshipping God, and the mosques and
places of prayer are attacked by the enemies in order to obliterate Islam
(in reference to Qur’anic verse 22:40);
 Insights and implications  133
• Conduct Jihad in order to defend Islamic culture and ethical norms, and
preclude anti-­Islamic cultural and moral campaigns from targeting the
Islamic Umma;
• Conduct Jihad in order to defend the oppressed (in reference to Qur’anic
verse 4:75); and
• Conduct Jihad in order to prevent the propagation of materialism and
atheism (in reference to Qur’anic verse 4:74).
(Al-­Agha 2013: 47–48)

Therefore, of the abovementioned nine circumstances, which can be em-

ployed to justify intervening in Syria? The answer lies to a large extent in the
extent to which Hezbollah characterised ISIS as an “enemy” of Islam. By
asserting that ISIS was indeed an enemy of Islam (principles 1 and 2) intent
on creating political and social instability in the region to take control of
Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah sought to justify its invention in Syria, namely, to
come to the aid of “the victim Muslim country” (principle 3) necessary for
Shi’ite protection and protection of Lebanon (principle 5). In adopting this
position, the Party “interpreted” the rules of offensive jihad according to
context-­specific circumstances to achieve a political outcome.

Implications of Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian war

Perhaps the most serious consequence of Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria
is the direct reprisal attacks that targeted Shi’ite areas around Beirut in par-
ticular. In 2013, there were a number of explosions that shook a Hezbollah
stronghold in a Shi’ite neighbourhood to the south of the city. Between 2013
and 2014, Lebanon experienced 16 car bomb attacks that mainly targeted
Shi’ite areas (Schenker 2015). These attacks were considered to be a “re-
sponse” from the Al-­Nusra Front and later from ISIS against Hezbollah be-
cause of its intervention in Syria and as revenge for the killing of “innocent
Syrians.” One of the groups responsible for the bombing of Rweiss (a southern
Beirut suburb) in 2013 stated in a video broadcast that, “Hassan Nasrallah
is an agent of Iran and Israel and we promise him more and more [attacks]”
(Schenker 2015). In its statement taking credit for the attack [in Rweiss], ISIS
declared; “We tell the Party of Satan [a derogatory reference to Hezbollah,
the ‘Party of God’] and its agent, the Lebanese army, that this is the first
rain and we tell you that there are hundreds of people seeking suicide, who
love the blood of rejectionists [used pejoratively to refer to Shi’ites]” (Smyth
2015: 48). Therefore, Hezbollah’s claim to be the protector of Lebanon from
the threat of these groups quickly came under challenge, with the Party now
faced with an alarming reaction to its intervention in Syria. Significantly,
some of these attacks were on the Party’s headquarters, which were meant to
be highly secure, raising questions about the unity of the Party’s inner circle
and the effectiveness of its security apparatus. The Party’s hard-­earned repu-
tation for its secretive and secure nature has been put to question.
134  Insights and implications
A survey of Hezbollah’s popularity after the intervention in Syria would
have provided interesting insights into the Party’s standing among Lebanese
people. However, due to the sensitivity of the topic and the group, obtaining
quantitative data to test the Party’s relationship with its Shi’ite constituency
is difficult. As a result, observers are left to rely on political analysis and
interpretation. Yet things are starting to take a different turn. As of 2013,
ShiaWatch claims to have developed the ability to collect data from Shi’ite
communities in Beirut such as the poll by Hayya Bina in 2014. Interestingly,
ShiaWatch was accused by Nasrallah of working under the supervision of
the American embassy in Lebanon. It is of note that during this period,
many Shi’ite opposition individuals emerged to denounce Hezbollah’s mo-
nopolisation of the Shi’ite community and for exposing their constituency to
a new threat to maintain their hegemony and political goals. Among these
critics, Rami Ollaik stands out. A  former member of the Party who has
written two books on some of the inner workings of the organisation, Ollaik
appeared on television talk shows trying to explain the Party’s hegemonic
influence over Shi’ites by creating an imaginary continuous threat or fear.
Ollaik also spoke about the Party’s attempt to silence him by attacking his
car while driving to participate in a seminary talk in the town of Yohmor.19
Other prominent figures considered as Shi’ite opposition are Sheikh Hani
Fahs (a Shi’ite intellectual), Sayyid Ali Al-­A min, the former mufti of Tyre
and Jabal Amil, Sheikh Muhammad Al-­Hajj Hassan, the leader of the Free
Shi’ite Movement, Sheikh Yusuf Kanj, and Sheikh Subhi Al-­Tofeili (former
Secretary-­General to Hezbollah) (Al-­Agha 2013:127).
For 30 years, Hezbollah has sought to maintain credibility as a resistance
group, even during the 2006 war. However, the case this time is different.
A poll conducted by Hayya Bina organisation (ShiaWatch) in Dahye in 2014,
headed by a progressive Shi’ite and Hezbollah critic, Lokman Slim, indi-
cated that even though respondents supported Hezbollah’s intervention in
Syria (95.3%), some still considered Lebanon to be going in “the wrong di-
rection” (59%), and 74% indicated that their financial situation was “worse
than the year before” (ShiaWatch 2014). Also, 75% responded that “they
knew someone who has been killed in Syria.” Fifty-­three percent indicated
“Hassan Nasrallah is the leader they trust most” (ShiaWatch 2014). Even
though the study stands alone in providing data on the people’s attitudes,
it does provide an overall picture of the atmosphere surrounding Dahye
residents. Moreover, while 74% of respondents reported that their financial
situation was in decline, they still had trust in Nasrallah, which confirms
Nasrallah’s success as a leader and a brand (ShiaWatch 2014).
The emergence of public criticism and the results of the Hayya Bina poll
may indicate the re-­consideration by Shi’ites of the role of Hezbollah as a
Lebanese party. Yet the attacks on Shi’ite areas do not only represent the
implications of the intervention. Sunni-­Shi’ite clashes and possible escala-
tions also represented a new challenge to the Party’s major claim to reject
fitna (sectarianism). June 2013 witnessed the first signs of serious tensions
 Insights and implications  135
between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the town of Sidon. The Lebanese Salafist
sheikh, Ahmad Al-­Assir, declared himself as a patron of Sunnis against the
“party of the devil” in referring to Hezbollah (Party of God) and vowed to
take back “Sunni dignity.” Because of Al-­Assir’s escalating language, he
found sympathisers in Tripoli and northern Lebanon (Saouli 2014). This
sympathy was elevated after the army attacked him in Sidon, putting an end
to his campaign. After that, the army was perceived as a Hezbollah agent
and numerous attacks on army checkpoints and ambushes took place.20
Events such as these provide further evidence of Hezbollah’s (albeit failed)
attempts to achieve a politically pragmatic domestic outcome in response
to volatile regional issues. Similar to events in 2006, Hezbollah took pre-­
emptive action using the justification that intervention in Syria was the lesser
evil when considered in relation to the spread of takfiris/ISIS into Lebanon.
It remains to be seen whether this justification based on pragmatism does
irreparable damage to the Party’s standing in Lebanon.
Additionally, the political paralysis of the country can be seen as an-
other indication of the implications of Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria.
The election of General Michel Aoun came after one and a half years of
deadlock over the presidency. In addition, the parliament has extended its
term, since it was argued that it was impossible to conduct elections in such
“unsecured and unstable times,” as the Lebanese Interior Minister, Nuhad
Al-­Machnouq, stated in a televised interview in 2014 (Schenker 2015).
Perhaps the most important development is the Party’s human and mate-
rial losses. The Party’s continuous goal of fighting Israel has now been ex-
posed to questions as the Party is sending its troops to Syria while Israel can
take advantage of this and open a new front in the south which could jeop-
ardise the Party’s military capabilities and would weaken its positions (For-
eign Policy 2016). Also, the death of Jawad Moughnie21 is a great loss for the
Party, knowing his rank and importance. And even though Hezbollah still
portrays its dead fighters as martyrs and celebrates their deaths, it is notable
that the Party that was based on voluntary recruitment is now advertising to
attract fighters to go for jihad in Syria. During its first 30 years of existence,
Hezbollah had never advertised for recruits; however, this new phenomenon
makes one question the Party’s standing among its Shi’ite constituency.
Hezbollah’s full-­fledged participation in the seemingly endless conflict
in Syria has forced it to institute unprecedented recruitment efforts. For
example, ShiaWatch captured a photo of a poster in 18 July 2014, in Bourj
al-­Barajneh, that read “Recruitment campaign for individuals to help de-
fend the holy family of the Prophet.” At left, “Please contact the recruitment
office or call” [two phone numbers are given].
The advertisement poster is not the only way Hezbollah has reached out
for fighters to join the conflict in Syria. Smyth (2015: 28) reminds us that
Iran’s Iraqi proxies have long used a combination of Facebook pages, blogs,
and websites as part of their online recruitment network. Social media plat-
forms are used to disseminate recruitment notices and to announce the
136  Insights and implications
creation of a new militia group. Moreover, such online recruitment plat-
forms are preferred given the relatively anonymity they afford Hezbollah,
their capacity to interact directly with the target audience, their low cost,
and the ability to replicate websites when recruitment efforts are disrupted
(Smyth 2015: 28).
The purpose of the use of social media was to gather the biggest number
of recruits for the fight in Syria, as it needed to overcome widespread re-
luctance to fight in support of the Assad regime. Therefore, the social me-
dia platform was designed for easy approach and access. Smyth (2015: 29)
explains that the use of Facebook and YouTube to recruit fighters was not
common to all established groups. In addition, potential recruits were often
required to search concealed Facebook profiles to upload images embedded
with the group’s phone number. For example, the Kataib Sayyid al-­Shuhada
(KSS)22 would use imagery of Shi’ite militia organisations as part of its 2013
campaign and post photos of recruitment posters including phone numbers.
In 2014, however, the KSS started to post images featuring phone numbers
on its difficult-­to-access Facebook profile designed for internet distribution.
Additionally, what is interesting is the timing of these campaigns, which
carries important religious connotations. The advertisements became active
online during October–November 2013, Ashoura commemoration and the
Arbain [40th day commemoration] from December 2013 to February 2014
(Smyth 2015: 30–31). The group (KSS) made posters with embedded phone
numbers for display on the main streets of Najaf and Karbala (Shi’ite holy
cities) along routes travelled by those visiting Shi’ite holy sites. Moreover,
unlike the recruitment programmes of ISIS or other Sunni jihadist organi-
sations, a centralised structure was maintained by Iran’s Shi’ite proxies to
coordinate its online recruitment and indoctrination programmes (Smyth
2015: 30–31).
Hence, with the increased use of the religious narrative Hezbollah can
increase its chances of success in the Syrian towns of Al-­Qusayr, Nabul and
Zahra. In addition to reinforcing security in these towns, Hezbollah has
shifted the conflict narrative away from the “fight against terrorists” run by
the Assad regime to the “defence of Sayyida Zainab” (Smyth 2015: 46–47).
In turn, the strategic significance of the success of this narrative shift is that
it was not really conducive to local conditions. To clarify, Busra al-­Sham was
home to a minority Shi’ite population only, and many of them professed to
be Sunnis to avoid persecution. Hezbollah’s presence in the area, however,
has resulted in Shi’ites increasingly adopting sectarian identities. Notably,
Hezbollah attracts recruits using martyrdom-­themed posters, Party-­insignia
on uniforms, and the Sayyida Zainab narrative (Smyth 2015: 46–47).
Hezbollah successfully transferred its ideology beyond Lebanon as evi-
denced by the Hezbollah-­led fighting cells which emerged in Syria staffed by
Shi’ite and Alawite Syrians. These groups were useful security options for
other Shi’ite entities. For example, Jaish al-­Imam al-­Mahdi al-­Muqawama
al-­Watani al-­Aqaidiya fi Suriya (Army of Imam al-­Mahdi, the National
 Insights and implications  137
Ideological Resistance in Syria) has been active in Aleppo and not only
displays Hezbollah symbols and proclaims publicly its loyalty to Hassan
Nasrallah, it also brings together Khamenei, Khomeini, and Bashar and
Hafiz al-­Assad to establish a holistic framework of Syrian and Iranian “re-
sistance” (Schenker 2015).
Smyth (2015) in his report referred to this notion as the virtual “Hez-
bollahzation of militias,” in which Hezbollah becomes the role model for
resistance groups in the region:

The virtual Hezbollahization of militias now taking up many combat

roles against ISIS by late 2014, around fifty Shiite militias had been an-
nounced, either emerging as popular committees or as more dedicated
organizations. Many of these groups have been crafted as Iraq-­based
near duplicates of Hezbollah.
(Smyth 2015: 55)

Hezbollah had obtained this status after the withdrawal of the Israeli army
from southern Lebanon in 2000, and after Hezbollah claimed victory in the
2006 war with Israel. That is why Hezbollah represents an interesting trans-
national group in the region.

Notes
1 Al-­jazeera (2011) Arab Spring exposes Nasrallah’s hypocrisy, available at: www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011618103354910596.html (accessed 30
July 2015).
2 Al-­jazeera (2011) Arab Spring exposes Nasrallah’s hypocrisy, available at: www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011618103354910596.html (accessed 30
July 2015).
3 Al-­Monitor (2013), Hezbollah in Syria hurts Lebanon, available at: www.al-­
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/gemayel-­h ezbollah-syria-­hurt-lebanon.
html##ixzz3X9H6XnNn (accessed 30 July 2014).
4 Al-­Monitor (2013), Hezbollah in Syria hurts Lebanon, available at: www.al-­
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/gemayel-­h ezbollah-syria-­hurt-lebanon.
html##ixzz3X9HXdE00 (accessed 30 July 2014).
5 Some of these militant opposition groups are: Free Syrian Army, ISIS, Syr-
ian Liberation Front, Army of Islam, and Southern Front. These groups were
backed by countries such as Turkey, Qatar, U.S., and Turkey.
6 Aljazeera (2015) Nasrallah: Hezbollah to increase presence in Syria, available
at: www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/nasrallah-­hezbollah-increase-­presence-
syria-­150524233716453.html (accessed 2 June 2015).
7 www.ShiaWatch.com; www.hayyabina.org (accessed 30 July 2015).
8 Al-­jazeera (2011) Arab Spring exposes Nasrallah’s hypocrisy, available at: www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011618103354910596.html (accessed 30
July 2015).
9 Self-­preservation notion has been used by Party’s recruitment and training and
by the Party’s psychological war with Israel.
10 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Shi’ites had to adopt a dissimulation strategy
in order to protect themselves from Sunni persecution, the notion entails that
138  Insights and implications
Shi’ites would not declare their true sect and would live under the authority of
the local ruling until the return of the Twelfth Imam (Mahdi), from his disap-
pearance, otherwise known as the Occultation period.
11 Image Courtesy of Al-­Akhbar Newspaper, available at: http://english.al-­akhbar.
com/node/19226/ (accessed 30 July 2014).
12 Baabda Agreement entailed “keeping Lebanon away from the policy of regional
and international conflicts and sparing it the negative repercussions of regional
tensions and crises” (The Daily Star 2013).
13 BBC News (2014) Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows to keep fighters in Syria,
available at: www.bbc.com/news/world-­m iddle-east-­26222171 (accessed 20 Jan-
uary 2015).
14 Al-­Akhbar (2015), Nasrallah warns Israel against any “stupid” moves in Leba-
non, Syria, available at: http://english.al-­akhbar.com/node/23240 (accessed 30
July 2016).
15 Naharnet (2012) Nasrallah to Assange: We Contacted Syrian Opposition
Urging Dialogue with Regime, available at: http://m.naharnet.com/stories/
en/37094-­n asrallah-to-­a ssange-we- ­c ontacted-syrian-­o pposition-urging-­
dialogue-with-­regime (accessed 30 July 2014).
16 Hajj (2013), What Is the Extent of Hezbollah’s Involvement in Syria? Available at:
http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/04/hezbollah-­i nvolvement-
syria- ­conflicting-information.html#ixzz4oTfjLq6I (accessed 30 July 2014).
17 Hajj (2013), What Is the Extent of Hezbollah’s Involvement in Syria? Available at:
http://www.al-­monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2013/04/hezbollah-­i nvolvement-
syria- ­conflicting-information.html#ixzz4oTfjLq6I (accessed 30 July 2014).
18 Al-­A khbar (2014), Nasrallah: If takfiris succeed in Syria, all in Lebanon will be
eliminated, available at: http://english.al-­akhbar.com/node/19213 (accessed 30
July 2015).
19 Now (2013), Hezbollah critic and relatives threatened, available at: https://
now.m media.me/lb/en/archive/hezbollah-­c ritic-receives-­d eath-threats-­
grandmothers-house-­attacked (accessed 12 June 2014).
20 Mortada (2014), Assir faces death penalty, aimed to establish Free Lebanese
Army, available at: http://english.al-­akhbar.com/node/18839 (accessed 30 July
2015).
21 Jawad Moughnie is the son of Imad Moughnie who was considered the second
man in Hezbollah’s hierarchy. Imad Moughnie was in charge of Hezbollah’s
ground operations (Levitt 2013) until his assassination by Israeli agents in 2008.
22 A Shi’ite militant organisation operation in Syria and Iraq.

References
Al-­Agha J. 2013, Hezbollah’s DNA and the Arab Spring. University of Calcutta,
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Borghard, E.D. & Rapp-­Hooper, M. 2013, Hizbullah and the Iranian Nuclear
­Programme, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 85–106.
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7 Conclusion

To conclude this book, a review of the main themes to emerge from the anal-
ysis of Nasrallah’s speeches is provided. The main findings are considered
in relation to the role and function of religion in Hezbollah’s political strat-
egy in the context of contemporary global security issues. Conclusions are
also drawn on the extent to which Hezbollah can be considered a rational
non-­State actor in Lebanon and the Middle East or deemed as a terrorist
organisation.
Even though nearly 30 years have passed since the end of the Lebanese
civil war, the people of Lebanon still endure political and social segregation
(Farha 2009: 83–86). This is particularly the case for domestic Shi’ite commu-
nities whose concentration in the outskirts of Beirut, in southern L ­ ebanon,
and in the Bekaa area meant that little attention has been given to them by
successive Lebanese governments. The religious and ethnic persecution of
Shi’ite communities in southern Lebanon during the Israeli occupation in
1973 and 1982 was compounded by their continuous neglect by the L ­ ebanese
government, due in part to the Shi’ite community’s inability to make its
case to these governments (Salamey 2014: 32–33). Founded as a resistance
movement to the threat of Israel, Hezbollah’s success in driving ­Israel out of
southern Lebanon gained it widespread support among ­Lebanese Shi’ites,
particularly (Khatib et al. 2014: 105–111). In turn, ­Hezbollah subsequently
sought to increase its political power based in Lebanon and its legitimacy
as a regional actor – rather than as a domestic actor only – by mixing re-
ligiosity with politics to position itself as simultaneously the protector of
Lebanon from the threat of Israel, and the guardian of Shi’ite values and
traditions in the region more broadly.
Hezbollah employs religion and religious tools to better pursue its politi-
cal goals. A particularly salient case in point is Hezbollah’s use of the rhet-
oric of Karbala (Ashoura commemoration) which recalls the martyrdom of
their Imam who died in an epic battle, centuries ago. Religious rhetoric of
this nature, namely, allusions to Shi’ite religious traditions and the collec-
tive grievances of Shi’ites was integral to Hezbollah’s political agenda to
shape and exploit the Shi’ite identity to serve its political interests. By link-
ing the principles and beliefs associated with Karbala and martyrdom to
 Conclusion  141
the present-­day context of domestic politics and (later on) regional conflicts,
Hezbollah sought to provide explanation and justification for what has been
widely regarded as self-­serving decision-­making and action-­taking (Khatib
et al. 2014: 53–55). This book demonstrates why the rhetoric and actions of
Hezbollah should be regarded as a good starting point to better understand
the role of religion in the Party’s political strategy.
Hezbollah’s use of religious tools such as taklif shari, ijtihad, and fatwa
also provides a clear demonstration of the Party’s ability to be flexible in its
interpretation of Islamic principles and values to serve its strategic interests.
A key element in Hezbollah’s transition towards political moderation (prag-
matism) and the Party’s more “flexible” stance on regional conflicts is its use
of religious tools, namely, ijtihad, taklif shari, and fatwa. Such tools enable
the Party to take decisions and to implement actions to serve their domestic
and regional position and objectives. Therefore, it may be concluded that
Hezbollah is acting as a rational non-­State group and thus should not simply
be deemed as a guerrilla or terrorist organisation. Hence, in order to offer
a comprehensive understanding of the Party, it should be examined as a ra-
tional non-­State actor and more than just a military organisation.
To further illustrate this point, a case study analysis of Hezbollah’s in-
volvement in the Syrian conflict was provided. The analysis revealed the ex-
tent of the links between religiosity and politics in the rhetoric by ­Hezbollah
to justify its involvement in Syria. Specifically, it highlighted the appropri-
ation by the Party of the takfiris as the enemy of not only Shi’ites, but of all
Muslims while balancing this appropriation against the more Shi’ite-­c entred
argument for the need to protect the Sayyida Zainab shrine. In combining
the threat to Lebanon generally with the threat to Shi’ites traditions more
specifically, the role of religion in Hezbollah’s pragmatic approach to politi-
cal decision-­making and action-­taking was exposed. Namely, to use religion
as a tool – specifically taklif shari to reason that “necessity permits what is
prohibited” – to protect the Party’s political base in Lebanon as a result of
its involvement in Syria.
The decision-­m aking and action-­t aking by Hezbollah in relation to
domestic (Lebanese) politics and regional conflicts is unquestionably
an important and developing point of interest. The changing and often
volatile nature of politics in the region, and Hezbollah’s emergent pro-
pensity to be “flexible” in its political agenda provide a rich context for
from which to explore the increasingly pragmatic aspects of the Party’s
decision-­m aking.
Hezbollah is a rational non-­State group and more than just a guerrilla or
terrorist organisation was supported on various grounds. Specifically, the
Party’s use of religion (as evidenced in Nasrallah’s speeches) primarily to
pursue a pragmatic (rather than destabilising) approach to its political and
resistance action-­t aking was well established. In addition, the Party’s use
of religion also facilitated a key domestic agenda to support the marginal-
ised Shi’ite community in Lebanon as well as the Shi’a Islamic identity in
142  Conclusion
the region. Lastly, the rational use of religious rhetoric or instruments by
non-­State actors to justify actions or to mobilise populations to facilitate
social change.

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Index

Arab Spring 100, 120–2 Iran 3, 10, 11, 12, 64, 86; use of
religious tools 49, 51
Battle of Karbala 19, 20, 84, Israeli occupation of Lebanon 2, 3, 15
85, 89, 99
Lebanese Shi’ite 2, 19, 22, 70, 77, 81, 84,
Doctrine of Jihad 103–7 88, 99, 100, 103, 104, 108, 115, 125,
129, 140
Fatwa 4, 9,14, 22, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, Lebanon 2, 12, 13, 14, 20
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45; Fatwa and
Martyrdom 19, 21, 37, 89, 91, 92, 94,
politics 34
102, 136, 140
Middle East 3, 5, 7, 10, 16, 35, 58, 62,
Global security 71, 140 74, 92, 99, 120; and Arab Spring
120; and global security 43; and
Hezbollah: alliance with Iran 19, politics 48; and religion 21, 42; Shi’s
20, 75, 92, 101, 102, 124, 127; communities 10
emergence of 2, 3, 6, 22; entry Middle East politics 35
into Lebanese parliament 5, 6,
53, 65, 77; ideology and identity Non-­State actors 7, 9, 17, 18, 22, 34, 45,
5, 6, 12, 18, 26, 65, 75, 76, 77; 102, 123, 142
mobilisation of supporters 77, 86,
99; as a non-­State actor 7, 27, 102, Quietism 8, 43, 107, 108, 109
128; participation in the Syrian
War 12, 22, 23, 50, 71, 120, 122, Sayyed Nasrallah 1; on Lebanon 14;
133; party structure 68; political use of religious rhetoric 99, 107, 108,
participation 17, 27, 65, 87, 110, 114, 116, 123, 133; speech style 105
136; political pragmatism 6, 12, 23, Social mobilisation theory 9, 66, 68, 69
52, 54, 61, 66, 76; use of religious Sunni 4, 7, 8, 24, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40,
rhetoric 6, 25, 88; use of religious 42, 51, 54
tools 6, 12, 42, 51, 53, 55, 66, 73, Sunni-­Shi’ite division 18, 37, 40, 42
124; as a resistance movement 2, Syrian civil war 17, 18, 88, 91, 111
23, 61, 71, 93; suporting Lebanese
Shi’ite 3, 6, 23, 27, 77, 87, 92, 100; Taklif shari 9, 19, 20, 37, 42, 43, 48, 54,
and Wilayat al-­Faqih 13, 14, 17, 18, 56, 58, 124, 131
24, 71, 108, 112, 131, 134, 140 Taklif Shari: use as a political tool 69, 71
Taqiyya 4, 34, 43, 48, 49, 52, 108, 126
Ijtihad 4, 9, 13, 19, 20, 34, 41, 44, 45, 50,
51; use as a political tool 54 Wilayat al-­Faqih 2, 3, 10, 37