BELUSO vs.

MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY
G.R. No. 153974; August 7, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about 20,424 square meters.
On November 8, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued
Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on April 14, 1997 by
the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the RTC of Roxas City.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but only
for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners voted
against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the
land sought to be expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but their
signatures were forged or they were misled into signing the same.
RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. On October 1, 1997, the trial court issued an
Order appointing three persons as Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation
for the property. Petitioners filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court
Appointed Commissioners to Determine Just Compensation and for Clarification of the Court’s
Order dated October 1, 1997" which was denied by the trial court on November 3, 1997. MR was
also denied. At CA, it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the petitioners were not
denied due process. MR was also denied. Hence, this present petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

Before this Court is a petition for review questioning the Decision  of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 20, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47052, as well the Resolution  dated
June 11, 2002 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not expropriation proceeding by the local government may proceed from a
mere resolution by its legislative body.

RULING:
No. The Local Government Code requires that it be an ordinance. Under Sec. 19 of R.A.
No. 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, it is clear therefore that several
requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

APIADO, ELYN D.
 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless;
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body.
R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance
for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will
not suffice.
Ordinance vs Resolution:
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code.
But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19
of R.A. No. 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance.
In this case, as respondent’s expropriation was based merely on a resolution, such
expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting
local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGU’s exercise of its delegated
power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

PRINCIPLES/DOCTRINES:
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private
property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature.
While such power may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs), other public
entities and public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In
fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating authority and
such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to its control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or
in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain.
Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not
eminent but "inferior" since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus

APIADO, ELYN D.
partakes only of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the
LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principal’s will or modify the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental right. It greatly affects a landowner’s right to private property which is a
constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal
dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Thus, whether such power is
exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the exercise of such power must
undergo painstaking scrutiny.
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still
the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in
accordance with the delegating law.

APIADO, ELYN D.